CHAPTER III

BASIC GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF LAWS

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
T h e o b j e c t o f a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s t a t u t e s i s
t o ascertain the meaning and intention of the l egislature, to the end that the same may be
enforced. L e g i s l a t i v e i nt e nt i s det e r mi ne d pr i nc i pa l l y f r om t he l a ng ua g e of t he
statute.
VERBA LEGIS
I f t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e i s p l a i n a n d f r e e f r o m a mb i g u i t y , a n d
e x p r e s s a s i n g l e , d e f i n i t e , a n d s e n s i b l e m e a n i n g , t h a t m e a n i n g i s
conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the l egislature intended to convey.
STATUTES AS A WHOLE
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be
a s c e r t a i n e d f r o m a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e a s a wh o l e a n d n o t merely
of a particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a meaning which is different from the one
actually intended.
A s t a t u t e s h o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d a s a w h o l e b e c a u s e i t i s n o t t o b e
presumed that the l egisl ature has used any usel ess words, and because it is dangerous
practice to base the construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may be qualified by other
portions
SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words
would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or woul d thwart or contravene
the manifest purpose of the l egislature i n
its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or
modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law.

When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
CASUS OMISSUS
W h e n a s t a t u t e m a k e s s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s i n r e g a r d t o
s e v e r a l enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a case or object which is
analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general
scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or obj ect was omitted by inadvertence or
because it was overlooked or unforeseen, it is called a
casus omissus.
Such omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts. The rul e of casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
STARE DECISIS
It is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principl e,
anda p p l y i t t o a l l f u t u r e c a s e s , wh e r e f a c t s a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e s a me ,
regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same.
Stare Decisis
Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been s e t t l e d. Ma t t e r s a l r e a dy de c i de d on
t he me r i t s c a nnot be r e l i t i ga t e d again and again.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere
(follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.




CHAPTER IV
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OFWORDS AND PHRASES

W H E N T H E L A W D O E S N O T D I S T I N G U I S H , C O U R T S SHOULD
NOT DISTINGUISH
When the law does not distinguish, courts shoul d not distinguish. The rule, founded on l ogic,
is a corollary of the principl e that general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be
accorded their natural and general significance. The courts should administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court.
EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUTE
Wh e n t h e l a w d o e s n o t ma k e a n y e x c e p t i o n , c o u r t s ma y n o t e x c e p t
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
GENERAL AND SPECIAL TERMS
General terms in a statute are to receive a general construction, unl ess
r e t r a i n e d b y t h e c o n t e x t o r b y p l a i n i n f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e s c o p e a n d
purpose of the act. General terms or provisions in a statute may be restrained and limited by
specific terms or provisions with which they are associated. S p e c i a l t e r ms i n a s t a t u t e ma y
s o me t i me s b e e x p a n d e d t o a g e n e r a l signification by the consideration that the reason of
the law is general

G E N E R A L T E R M S F O L L O W I N G S P E C I A L T E R
M S (EJUSDEM GENERIS)
It is a general rul e of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and s pe c i f i c mea ni ng, s uc h g e ne r a l wor ds a r e not
t o be c ons t r ue d i n t he i r widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But this r ul e mus t be
di s c a r de d whe r e t he l e g i s l a t i v e i nt e nt i on i s pl a i n t o
t he contrary. T h i s r u l e i s c o mmo n l y c a l l e d t h e e j u s d e m g e n e r i s r u l e , b e c a u
s e i t teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as and all others, or any
others, are usually to be restricted to persons or things of the same kind or class with
those specially named in the preceding words. Rul e of
ejusdem generis
merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION
It is a general rul e of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Except:

When there is manifest of injustice

When there is no reason for exception.
ASSOCIATED WORDS (NOSCITUR SOCIIS)
Where a particular word is equally susceptibl e of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

USE OF NEGATIVE WORDS
N e g a t i v e w o r d s a n d p h r a s e s r e g a r d e d a s m a n d a t o r y w h i l e t h o s e affi
rmative are mere directory. T h e w o r d
shall
e m p h a s i z e s m a n d a t o r y c h a r a c t e r a n d m e a n s imperative, operating to impose a
duty which may be enforced.
T H E U S E O F T H E W O R D M A Y A N D S H A L L I N T H E STATUTE
Us e of t he wor d
may
in the statute generally connotes a
permissiblet h i n g , a n d o p e r a t e s t o c o n f e r d i s c r e t i o n wh i l e t h e wo r d
shall
is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced. The t e r m s ha l l ma y be e i t he r a s ma nda t or y or di r ec t or y de pe ndi ng upon
a c ons i de r a t i on of t he e nt i r e pr ovi s i on i n whi c h i t i s f ound, i t s object and consequences
that would follow from construing it one way or the other.
USE OF THE WORD MUST
The wor d mus t i n a s t a t ut e l i k e s ha l l i s not a l wa ys i mpe r a t i v e a nd may be
consistent with exercise discretion.
THE USE OF THE TERM AND AND THE WORD OR
And means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be
added or taken along with the first. Or is a disjunctive particl e used to express as al ternative or
to give choice of one among two or more things. It is also used to clarify what ha s a l r e a dy
be e n s a i d, a nd i n s uc h c a s e s , mea ns i n ot he r wor ds , t o wit, or that is to say.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Wh e n t h e l a ws s p e a k o f y e a r s , mo n t h s , d a y s o r n i g h t s , i t s h a l l b e
understood that years are of three hundred sixty five days each; months of t hi r t y da y s ; da y s of
t we nt y f our hour s ; a nd ni g ht s f r om s uns e t t o sunrise. If months are designated by their
name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the l ast day included (Art. 13, New Civil Code).A week
means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins.
FUNCTION OF THE PROVISO
Proviso
is a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which is either to except something
from the enacting clause, or to qual ify
orr e s t r a i n i t s g e n e r a l i t y , o r t o e x c l u d e s o m e p o s s i b l e g r o u
n d o f misinterpretation of its extent.
Provided
is the word used in introducing a proviso


CHAPTER VPRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION
PRESUMPTIONS
In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the Courts will presume that it was the
intention of the l egislature to enact a val id, sensibl e and just law, and one which should change the
prior law no further than maybe necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nul lification of law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the
constitution. T h e t h e o r y i s t h a t , a s t h e j o i n t a c t o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a n d e x e c u
t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s , a l a w i s s u p p o s e d t o h a v e b e e n c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d a n d dete
rmined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. All laws are presumed valid and
constitutional until or unl ess otherwise ruled by the Court.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE
The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause inj ustice as this never within the
legislative intent. We interpret and apply the law in consonance with justice. Judges do not and must not
unfeel ingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding l ike robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS
The two laws must be absol utely incompatibl e, and cl ear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be
drawn.I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n e x p r e s s r e p e a l , a s u b s e q u e n t l a w c a n n o
t b e construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in
terms of the new and old laws.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS
I n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e , t h e C o u r t s h o u l d s t a r t wi t h t h e assumptio
n that the legislature intended to enact an effective statute.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY
Statutes must receive a sensibl e construction such as will give effect to the legislative intention
so as to avoid an unjust and absurd conclusion. Presumption against undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Phi l i ppi ne s a s de moc r a t i c a nd r e publ i c a n s t a t e a dopt t he g e ne r a l l y accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and adhere to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Art. II, Sec. 2, Phil. Constitution).


CHAPTER VIINTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION
INTRINSIC AIDS
The term intrinsic means internal or within. Intrinsic aids, therefore, are those aids within the
statute. Intrinsic aids are resorted to only if there is ambiguity. In resorting to intrinsic aids,
one must go back to the parts of the statute: the titl e, the preambl e, context or body, chapter
and section headings, punctuation, and interpretation.

CHAPTER VIIEXTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION
EXTRINSIC AIDS
These are existing aids from outside sources, meaning outside of the four c or ne r s of t he s t a t ut e. I f
t he r e i s a ny doubt a s t o t he me a ni ng of t he statute, the interpreter must first find that out
within the statute. Extrinsic aids therefore are resorted to after exhausting all the available
intrinsic aids and still there remain some ambiguity in the statute. Extrinsic aids resorted to by the
courts are history of the enactment of t he s t a t ut e ; opi ni ons a nd r ul i ng s of of f i c i a l s of
t he g ov e r nme nt
c a l l e dupon t o e x ec ut e or i mpl e me nt a dmi ni s t r a t i v e l a ws ; c ont e mpor a ne ous constru
ction by executive officers; actual proceedings of the l egislative body; individual statements
by members of congress; and the author of the law. Other sources of extrinsic aids can be the reports
and
recommendationso f l e g i s l a t i v e c o mmi t t e e s ; p u b l i c p o l i c y ; j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i
o n ; a n d construction by the bar.


CHAPTER VIINTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION
INTRINSIC AIDS
The very term intrinsic means internal or within. Intrinsic aids, therefore, are those aids within the statute.
If the language of the statute is clear and unequivocal, there is no need to resort to intrinsic aids.
I n r e s o r t i n g t o i n t r i n s i c a i d s , o n e mu s t g o b a c k t o t h e p a r t s o f t h e statute.
THE TITLE OF THE LAW IS A VALUABLE INTRINSIC AID INDETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT

TEXT OF THE STATUTE AS INTRINSIC AID
Subtitle of the statute as intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent.
PREAMBLE AS INTRINSIC AID
The intent of the law as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it
sought to remedy, must be enforced. Preamble used as a guide in determining the intent of the lawmaker.

CHAPTER VIIEXTRINSIC AIDS IN CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION
EXTRINSIC AIDS
Extrinsic aids are existing aids from outside sources, meaning outside from the four corners of
the statute. Extrinsic aids are resorted to after exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and still
there remain some ambiguity in the statute. Extrinsic aids resorted to by the courts are:

History of the enactment of the statute;

Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement
administrative laws;

Contemporaneous construction by executive officers charged with implementing and
enforcing the provisions of the statutes unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous;

Actual proceedings of the legislative body;

Individual statements by members of congress; and

The author of the law Other sources of extrinsic aids are:

Reports and recommendations of legislative committees;

Public policy;

Judicial construction; and

Construction by the bar It is a well -accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, courts
ma y e x a mi ne bot h t he pr i nt e d pa g es of t he publ i s he d Ac t a s we l l a s those extrinsic
matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its
enactment, the reasons of the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.

I n d i v i d u a l s t a t e me n t s b y me mb e r s o f C o n g r e s s o n t h e f l o o r d o n o t necessari
ly reflect legislative intent. The best interpreter of the law or any of its provisions is the author of the law.


I n d i v i d u a l s t a t e me n t s b y me mb e r s o f C o n g r e s s o n t h e f l o o r d o n o t necessari
ly reflect legislative intent. The best interpreter of the law or any of its provisions is the author of the law.
CHAPTER VIIISTRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
I f a s t a t ut e s houl d be s t r i c t l y c ons t r ue d, not hi ng s houl d be i nc l ude d wi t hi n t he
s c ope t ha t does not c ome c l ea r l y wi t hi n t he me a ni ng of t he language used. But the rule of
strict construction is not applicable where the meaning of the statute is certain and unambiguous, for under
these circumstances, there is no need for
construction.O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e a r e ma n y s t a t u t e s wh i c h wi l l b e l i b e r a
l l y construed. The meaning of the statute may be extended to matters which come within the spirit or
reason of the law or within the evils which the law seeks to suppress or
correct.L i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l a w o r r u l e s , h o we v e r
,
a p p l i e s o n l y i n p r o p e r c a s e s a n d u n d e r j u s t i f i a b l e c a u s e s
a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t l i t i g a t i o n i s n o t a g a m e
o f technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted
ina c c o r d a n c e wi t h t h e p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e t o i n s u r e a n o r d e r l y a n d speed
y administration of justice.
PENAL STATUTES

Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor
of t h e a c c u s e d . H e n c e , i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p e n a l s t a t u t e , t h e
tendency is to subj ect it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard
the right of the accused.

I f t h e s t a t u t e i s a m b i g u o u s a n d a d m i t s o f t w o r e a s o n a b l e b
u t c ont r a di c t or y c ons t r uc t i ons , t ha t whi c h ope r a t es i n f a v or of a pa r t y accused under
its provisions is to be preferred.
TAX LAWS
Taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and pr ope r t y r i ght s of
t he pe opl e a nd t a k es f r om t he m a por t i on of t hei r property for the support of the
government. Ac c or di ng l y , i n c a s e of doubt , t a x s t a t ut es mus t be c ons t r ue d s t r i c t l y
against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes ,
b e i n g b u r d e n s , a r e n o t t o b e p r e s u me d b e y o n d wh a t t h e a p p l i c a b l e statute
expressly and clearly declares. Any claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.
NATURALIZATION LAW
Natural ization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed i n favor of the government
and against the applicant.
INSURANCE LAW
C o n t r a c t s o f I n s u r a n c e a r e t o b e c o n s t r u e d l i b e r a l l y i n f a v o r o f t h e insured
and strictly against the insurer. Thus, ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted
in favor of its beneficiary.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS
Doubt s i n t he i nt e r pr e t a t i on of Wor kme n s Compe ns a t i on a nd La bor Code s houl d
be r e s ol v e d i n f a vor of t he wor k e r . I t s houl d be
l i be r a l l yc ons t r ue d t o a t t a i n t he i r l a uda bl e obj e c t i v e, i . e . , t o gi ve r e l i e f t o t he work
man and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain in an injury

The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own
terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.
RETIREMENT LAWS
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to
provide for the retirees sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.
ELECTION RULES
Statute providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officer may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
RULES OF COURT
R u l e o f c o u r t s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n o r d e r t o p r o mo t e t h e i r object
ive of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

CHAPTER IXPROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE STATUTES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Prospective statute
i s a s t a t u t e w h i c h o p e r a t e s u p o n a c t s a n d transactions which have not
occurred when the statute takes effect, that is, which regulates the future.
Retrospective or retroactive law
is one which takes away or impairs v e s t e d r i g ht s a c qui r e d unde r e x i s t i ng l a ws , or
c r e a t e s ne w
obl i g a t i ons a n d i mp o s e s n e w d u t i e s , o r a t t a c h e s n e w d i s a b i l i t i e s i n r e s p e c
t o f transaction already
past.A s o u n d c a n o n o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h a t s t a t u t e s o p e r a t e prospe
ctively only and never retrospectively, unless the legislative intent t o t h e c o n t r a r y i s ma d e
ma n i f e s t e i t h e r b y t h e e x p r e s s t e r ms o f t h e statute or by necessary implication. The
Civil Code of the Phil ippines follows the above rule thus: Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Retroactive legislation is looked upon with disfavor, as a general rule and
properly so because of its tendency to be unjust and oppressive.
PENAL STATUTES
P e n a l s t a t u t e s a s a r u l e a r e a p p l i e d p r o s p e c t i v e l y . F e l o n i e s a n d m
isdemeanors are punished under the laws in force at the time of
theircommission. (Art. 366, RPC).H o w e v e r , a s a n e x c e p t i o n , i t c a n b e g i v e n r e
t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t i f i t i s favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal. (Art. 22, RPC).

PROCEDURAL LAWS ARE RETROSPECTIVE
S t a t ut es r e gul a t i ng t he
pr oc e dur e of t he Cour t wi l l be c ons t r ue d a s a p p l i c a b l e t o a c t i o n s p e n d i n g a n d
u n d e r mi n e d a t t h e t i me o f t h e i r passage. However, Rules of Procedure should not
be given retroactive effect if it would result in great injustice and impair substantive right. Procedural
provisions of the Local Government Code are retrospective.
CURATIVE STATUTES
The y a r e t hos e whi c h unde r t a k e t o c ur e e r r or s a nd i r r e g ul a r i t i e s
a nda dmi ni s t r a t i v e pr oc e e di ng s , a nd whi c h a r e des i g ned t o g i v e e f f e c t t ocontracts
and other transactions between private parties which otherwise woul d fail of producing their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement.
They are therefore retroactive in their character.

CHAPTER XCONFLICTING STATUTES
EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ENTIRE STATUTE
It may happen that in a statute, conflicting clauses and provisions may arise. If such situation
may occur, the statute must be construed as a whole.
STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA
Statutes that relate to the same subj ect matter, or to the same class of persons or things, or have
the same purpose or object. Statutes in
pari materia
are to be construed together; each legislative act i s t o be i nt e r pr e t e d wi t h r e f e r e nc e t o ot he r
a c t s r e l a t i ng t o t he s a me matter or subject. However, if statutes of equal theoretical
application to a particular case cannot be reconciled, the statute of later date must prevail
being a later expression of legislative will.
GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES
S o me t i me s we f i n d s t a t u t e s t r e a t i n g a s u b j e c t i n g e n e r a l t e r ms a n d a n o t
h e r t r e a t i n g a p a r t o f t h e s a me s u b j e c t i n p a r t i c u l a r l y d e t a i l e d manner.If
both statutes are irreconcilabl e, the general statute must give way
tot h e s p e c i a l o r p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s a s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l provis
ions.

This is so even if the general statute is later enactment of the legislature a nd br oa d e noug h
t o i nc l ude t he c a s es i n s pec i a l l a w unl e s s t he r e i s manifest intent to repeal or alter the
special law.
STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
If there is conflict an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way. It is a well -settled
rul e that a substantive l aw cannot be amended by procedural law. A general law cannot repeal a
special law. I n c a s e of c onf l i c t be t we e n a g e ne r a l pr ov i s i on of a s pe c i a l l a w a nd
particular provision of a general law, the latter will prevail. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between
a proviso and the body of a statute, the former prevails as latest expression of legislative
intent. T h e e n a c t me n t o f a l a t e r l e g i s l a t i o n wh i c h i s g e n e r a l l a w c a n n o t b e
construed to have repealed a special law. A statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus
the later cannot repeal or amend it. Where the instrument is susceptibl e of two interpretations,
one which will make it invalid and illegal and another whic h will make it valid and legal, and
the latter interpretation should be adopted. In case of conflict between an administrative order and
the provisions of the Constitutions, the latter prevails.


CHAPTER XICONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THECONSTITUTION
A constitution is a system of fundamental law for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute, and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative, or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force or effect.
ALL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE SELF-EXECUTING; EXCEPTIONS
Some constitutions are merely declarations of policies. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for
the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable
rights of citizens. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself. Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing.

In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing, unless
the contrary is clearly intended. on-self-executing provisions would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective, subordinated to the will of the law-making body.
PROHIBITORY PROVISIONS GIVEN LITERAL AND STRICTINTERPRETATION
Guidelines in construction and interpretation of the constitution arestressed:1. The Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied.2. One provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all provisions bearing upon particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.3. The proper
interpretation of the Constitution depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than the framers understanding thereof.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON NATURAL-BORNCITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES GIVEN
RETROACTIVEEFFECT
Under THE 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. The constitutional
provision is curative in nature.
THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE CONSTRUED IN ITSENTIRETY AS ONE, SINGLE DOCUMENT


LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF ONE TITLE OF ONESUBJECT
A liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule has been invariably adopted by the court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation. The title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to the
general subject.
RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE 1987CONSTITUION IS NOT GOVERNED BY ANY
FORMAL REQUIREMENT
AS TO FORM. IT CAN BE ORAL. IT CANBE WRITTEN. IT CAN BE EXPRESS. IT CAN BE IMPLIED.SPECIAL
PROVISION PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL ONE
Lex specialis derogant generali
SUPREMA LEX
It is time-honored that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land. It is the law of all laws. Hence, if
there is conflict between a statute and the Constitution, the statute shall yield to the Constitution.
STARE DECISIS
The rule of precedents. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it


CHAPTER XIIRECENT CASES ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The term may is indicative of a mere possibility, inopportunity or an option.

An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial conflict between the new and prior laws.

The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention to revoke must be clear and
manifest.

When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation.

Penal laws must be construed strictly. Such rule is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the Congress, not
in the Judicial department.

Where a requirement is made explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It
must see to it that the mandate is obeyed.

Statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall