Case title: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila et. al vs.

CA
Topic: Donation; condition may be imposed by the donor to the
donee but such condition must not be contra bonus mores
(contrary to law, morals, public policy or public order) so as to
unreasonably restrict his right to dispose or alienate the property
as a right springing from ownership.
Facts:
On ugust !", #$"%, &pouses 'usebio de (astro and )artina
*ieta ( predecessor+in+interest of respondents), now both
deceased, e,ecuted a deed of donation in fa-or of therein
defendant *oman (atholic rchbishop of )anila co-ering a
parcel of land with an area of $./ s0uare meters, more or less.
On or about 1une "%, #$2%, and while still within the prohibiti-e
period to dispose of the property, petitioner *oman (atholic
3ishop of 4mus, in whose administration all properties within the
pro-ince of (a-ite owned by the rchdiocese of )anila was
allegedly transferred on pril !., #$.!, e,ecuted a deed of
absolute sale of the property sub5ect of the donation in fa-or of
petitioners Florencio and &oledad (. 4gnao.
6ri-ate respondents on 7o- #$2/ as plaintiffs, filed a complaint
for nullification of
deed of donation, rescission of contract and recon-eyance of
real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and
&oledad (. 4gnao and church ( defendants therein).
Trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
The case was ele-ated to (. ( holding that the action has not
yet prescribed, rendered a decision in fa-or of pri-ate
respondents (plaintiff therein).
6etitioners contended that the cause of action of herein pri-ate
respondents has already prescribed, in-o8ing rticle 9./ of the
(i-il (ode which pro-ides that :(t)he donation shall be re-o8ed at
the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter,:
and that :(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the
non+compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the
heirs of the donor, and may be e,ercised against the donee;s
heirs.:
Thus should ha-e raised the action between 1an #$2%+ 1an
#$2/. On 7o-. #$2/, it has prescribed.
4ssues:
#.<O7 5udicial declaration is re0uired as the re-ocatory act of
the donation in this case
!.<O7 the cause of action of respondents has prescribed under
rt. 9.=
".<O7 respondents ha-e a cause of action granting the cause
of action has not prescribed
*uling:
#.7o 5udicial declaration needed. utomatic re-ocation by -irtue
of the stipulation in the deed of donation
!. ction has not prescribed
SC quoting CAs decision:
The deed of donation in-ol-ed herein e,pressly pro-ides for
automatic re-ersion of the property donated in case of -iolation
of the condition therein, hence a 5udicial declaration re-o8ing the
same is not necessary.
:3y the -ery e,press pro-ision in the deed of donation itself that
the -iolation of the condition thereof would render ipso facto null
and -oid the deed of donation, <' are of the opinion that there
would be no legal necessity anymore to ha-e the donation
5udicially declared null and -oid for the reason that the -ery deed
of donation itself declares it so. 6hrase reading ;would render
ipso facto null and -oid; would not appear in the deed of
donation, if the intention was otherwise.
The (ourt of ppeals committed no error in holding that the
cause of action of herein pri-ate respondents has not yet
prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract
prescribes in ten (#%) years ( #$2%+#$$%, respondents filed the
case on #$2/ 7o-). rticle 9./ was intended to pro-ide a 5udicial
remedy in case of non+fulfillment or contra-ention of conditions
specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties ha-e not
agreed on the automatic re-ocation of such donation upon the
occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein.
3. The issue hether or not the action b! respondents has
prescribed is not reall! the case at bar. "rivate respondents
have no cause of action from the beginning.
ction filed by pri-ate respondents may not be dismissed by
reason of prescription; the same should be dismissed on the
ground that pri-ate respondents ha-e no cause of action against
petitioners.
The cause of action of pri-ate respondents is based on the
alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the
deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold
within a period of one hundred (#%%) years from the date of
e,ecution of the deed of donation. &aid condition, in our opinion,
constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from
ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public
policy.
Donation, as a mode of ac0uiring ownership, results in an
effecti-e transfer of title o-er the property from the donor to the
donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. lthough the donor may
impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in
the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and
undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the
property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of
ownership. &uch a prohibition against alienation, in order to be
-alid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of
time.
(ertain pro-isions of the (i-il (ode illustrati-e of the aforesaid
policy may be considered applicable by analogy. >nder the third
paragraph of rticle /$/, a donor or testator may prohibit
partition for a period which shall not e,ceed twenty (!%) years.
rticle 29%, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the
testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more
than twenty (!%) years are -oid.
That the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation
of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable
emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
onership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible
condition within the contemplation of rticle 9!9 of the (i-il
(ode. (onse0uently, as specifically stated in said statutory
pro-ision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed.
The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale
supposedly constituti-e of the cause of action for the nullification
of the deed of donation is not in truth -iolati-e of the latter hence,
for lac8 of cause of action, the case for pri-ate respondents must
fail.
CAS# T$T%#: Concepcion vs. Concepcion
&.R. 'o.: %()**+ August *+, -.+*
T/"$C: $nter 0ivos or Mortis Causa
1ACTS
fter the e,ecution of a deed of donation on 7o-ember #2, #$/9,
the donor )anuela (oncepcion died. 6laintiffs+appellees who are
. nephews and nieces of the donor instituted special
proceedings in the (F4 of ?ambales for the summary settlement
of the estate of their aunt. 3ecause the estate or the greater
portion thereof sought to be summarily settled and distributed
was included in the donation, the donee 'milia (oncepcion filed
opposition to the petition claiming that the . parcels sub5ect of
the donation belonged to her. The (ourt in said special
proceedings without deciding the title and right of possession to
the . parcels claimed by 'milia, merely ordered the partition of
the estate of )anuela (oncepcion among all her heirs who are
besides the . petitioners, 'milia (oncepcion and her / brothers.
3ecause 'milia refused to gi-e up the parcels said to ha-e been
donated to her, the . original petitioners in the special
proceedings filed the present action in the (F4 of ?ambales to
ha-e themsel-es declared owners of and entitled to the
possession of their shares in those properties claimed by 'milia
in the proportion of one+ele-enth (#@##) for each.
fter trial, the lower court found that the donation was one mortis
causa and because it was not e,ecuted in the manner re0uired
by law on wills, it was declared null and -oid; the properties
therein included were all declared part if the estate of the
deceased )anuela (oncepcion sub5ect to distribution among the
heirs in the proportion of #@## for each as declared by the court in
the special proceedings.
'milia (oncepcion appealed the decision to the (, but finding
that only 0uestions of law were in-ol-ed in the appeal, said court
by resolution certified the case to this (ourt.
4&&>':
<hether the deed of donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
(because if the former, it is valid having been duly accepted by
the donee, but if the latter it would be void because being in the
nature of disposal of property by will, according to the article 620
of the Civil Code, it shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary succession)
A'BD:
Aere, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis
causa. From the body, howe-er, we find that the donation was of
a nature remunerati-e rather that onerous. The donation instead
of being onerous or for a -aluable consideration, as in payment
of a legal obligation was more of remuneratory or compensatoruy
nature, besides being partly moti-ated by affection.
4n the case of De Guzman et al. vs. bea, et al. (.9 6hil., .""),
this (ourt through said that if a donation by its terms is inter
vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor
styles it mortis causa.
4t is clear that e-en when the donor calls the donation mortis
causa instead of inter vivos, e-en if he says it is to ta8e effect
after his death, when from the body of the instrument or donation
is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is
not the death of the donor but rather ser-ices rendered to him, by
the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation should
be considered as inter vivos, and when duly accepted, it
transfers title immediately to the donee, and the condition that
the donation is to ta8e effect only after the death of donor should
be interpreted as meaning that the possession and en5oyment of
the fruits of the property donated should ta8e place only after
donor;s death
One other consideration may be mentioned in support of our
stand. The donation here was accepted by 'milia; said
acceptance is embodied in the deed of donation, and both donor
and donee signed below said acceptance conclusi-ely showing
that the donor was aware of said acceptance. The deed and
acceptance was by agreement of both recorded or registered.
'-erything was complete. Only donations inter vivos need be
accepted. Donation mortis causa being in the nature of a legacy
need not be accepted. 6resuming that the donor )anuela and
the donee 'milia 8new the law, the fact that they not only be
agreed to the acceptance but regarded said acceptance
necessary argues for their understanding and intention that the
donation was inter vivos.
4n -iew of the foregoing, we find that the donation in 0uestion is
inter vivos and not mortis causa, and that it is -alid because the
re0uisites of the law about the e,ecution of wills do not apply to
it. The decision appealed from is hereby re-ersed with costs.
Austria(Magat vs. CA
Facts:
4n #$=", 3asilisa bought a parcel of residential land
together with the impro-ement thereon. On December #9, #$9=,
3asilisa e,ecuted a document designated as CDasulatan sa
Daloobpala (Donation)E o-er said parcel in fa-or her children.
Bater, 3asilisa and her said children li8ewise e,ecuted
another notariFed document denominated as CDasulatanE which
is attached to the deed of donation where it was stated that the
same parcel will still be in the possession of their mother in her
lifetime and be free from any encumbrance.
On February ., #$9$, 3asilisa e,ecuted a Deed of
bsolute &ale of the sub5ect house and lot in fa-or of herein
petitioner polinaria ustria+)agat for 6=,%%%. s the result of
the registration of said sale, T(T 7o. *T+/%". in the name of the
donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof T(T 7o. T+#%/"/ was
issued by the *D of (a-ite (ity in fa-or of petitioner on February
2, #$9$.
On &eptember !#, #$2", herein respondents Teodora
(arampot, Domingo (omia, and 'rnesto polo (representing
their deceased mother (onsolacion ustria), *icardo, )amerto
and &egunda, all surnamed &umpelo (representing their
deceased mother *osario ustria) and Florentino Bumubos filed
before the *T( of (a-ite an action against the petitioner for
annulment of T(T 7o. T+#%/"/ and other rele-ant documents,
and for recon-eyance and damages. Aowe-er, it was dismissed.
ccording to the trial court, the donation is a donation mortis
causa pursuant to rticle 9!2 of the 7ew (i-il (ode inasmuch as
the same e,pressly pro-ides that it would ta8e effect upon the
death of the donor; that the pro-ision stating that the donor
reser-ed the right to re-o8e the donation is a feature of a
donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of
a will; and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the
formalities pertaining to wills, the same is -oid and produced no
effect whatsoe-er. Aence, the sale by the donor of the said
property was -alid since she remained to be the absolute owner
thereof during the time of the said transaction.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was re-ersed by
the (ourt of ppeals in its sub5ect decision declared null and -oid
the Deed of &ale of *egistered Band and T(T 7o. T+#%/"/ of
and ordering the cancellation thereof; and also declared that
appellants and appellee are co+owners of the house and lot in
0uestion in accordance with the deed of donation e,ecuted by
3asilisa (omerciante on December #9, #$9=. The appellate
court ruled that the deed is a donation inter -i-os based on the
pro-ision of the same which e,presses the irre-ocability of the
con-eyance. The irre-ocability of the donation is a characteristic
of a donation inter -i-os. 3y the words Chindi mababawiE, the
donor e,pressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the
house and lot in 0uestion. The right to dispose of a property is a
right essential to full ownership. Aence, ownership of the house
and lot was already with the donees e-en during the donorGs
lifetime. lso, the attached document to the deed of donation, a
stipulation is present which is a mere reiteration of the
irre-ocability of the dispossession on the part of the donor. On
the other hand, the prohibition to encumber, alienate or sell the
property during the lifetime of the donor is recognition of the
ownership o-er the house and lot in issue of the donees for only
in the concept of an owner can one encumber or dispose a
property.
4ssue(s):
#. <hether or not it was a donation inter -i-os.
!. <hether the action has prescribed under the &tatute of
Bimitations.
*uling:
4t has been held that whether the donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to
transfer ownership o-er the properties upon the e,ecution of the
deed. &ignificant to the resolution of this issue is the irre-ocable
character of the donation in the case at bar. 4n Cuevas v.
Cuevas, the (ourt ruled that when the deed of donation pro-ides
that the donor will not dispose or ta8e away the property donated
(thus ma8ing the donation irre-ocable), he in effect is ma8ing a
donation inter vivos. Ae parts away with his na8ed title but
maintains beneficial ownership while he li-es. 4t remains to be a
donation inter vivos despite an e,press pro-ision that the donor
continues to be in possession and en5oyment of the donated
property while he is ali-e.
(onstruing together the pro-isions of the deed of donation,
the (ourt finds and so hold that in the case at bar the donation
is inter vivos. The e,press irre-ocability of the same (Chindi na
mababawiE) is the distincti-e standard that identifies that
document as a donation inter vivos. The other pro-isions therein
which seemingly ma8e the donation mortis causa do not go
against the irre-ocable character of the sub5ect donation. The
pro-isions which state that the same will only ta8e effect upon
the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate,
encumber, dispose, or sell the same, are only necessary
assurances that during the donorGs lifetime, the latter would still
en5oy the right of possession o-er the property; but, his na8ed
title of ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that
upon the donorGs death, the donees would get all the rights of
ownership o-er the same including the right to use and possess
the same; and not necessarily proofs that the donation is mortis
causa.
The pro-ision in the deed of donation that the donated
property will remain in the possession of the donor 5ust goes to
show that the donor has gi-en up his na8ed title of ownership
thereto and has maintained only the right to use (!us utendi) and
possess (!us possidendi) the sub5ect donated property. lso, the
prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her
lifetime is proof that na8ed ownership o-er the property has been
transferred to the donees. 4t also supports the irre-ocable nature
of the donation considering that the donor has already di-ested
herself of the right to dispose of the donated property.
On the other hand, the prohibition on the donees only
meant that they may not mortgage or dispose the donated
property while the donor en5oys and possesses the property
during her lifetime. Aowe-er, it is clear that the donees were
already the owners of the sub5ect property due to the irre-ocable
character of the donation. nother indication in the deed of
donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause
therein of the donees. n acceptance clause is a mar8 that the
donation is inter vivos and is also a re0uirement for
donations inter vivos. On the other hand, donations mortis causa,
being in the form of a will, are not re0uired to be accepted by the
donees during the donorGs lifetime.
lso, the act of selling the sub5ect property to the petitioner
herein cannot be considered as a -alid act of re-ocation of the
deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to re-o8e the
donation must be filed pursuant to rticle 9./ of the (i-il
(ode which spea8s of an action that has a prescripti-e period of
four (/) years from non+compliance with the condition stated in
the deed of donation. The rule that there can be automatic
re-ocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the
case at bar for the reason that the sub5ect deed of donation is
de-oid of any pro-ision pro-iding for automatic re-ocation in
e-ent of non+compliance with the any of the conditions set forth
therein.
s regards the ground of estoppel, the donor, 3asilisa,
cannot in-o8e the -iolation of the pro-ision on the prohibition to
encumber the sub5ect property as a basis to re-o8e the donation
thereof inasmuch as she ac8nowledged the -alidity of the
mortgage e,ecuted by the donee, (onsolacion ustria, when the
said donor as8ed respondent Domingo (omia to redeem the
same. Thereafter, the donor, 3asilisa li8ewise as8ed respondent
Florentino Bumubos and the petitioner herein to redeem the
same. Those acts implied that the donees ha-e the right of
control and na8ed title of ownership o-er the property
considering that the donor, 3asilisa condoned and ac8nowledged
the -alidity of the mortgage e,ecuted by one of the donees,
(onsolacion ustria.
nent the second issue, the petitioner asserts that the
action, against the petitioner, for annulment of T(T 7o. T+#%/"/
and other rele-ant documents, for recon-eyance and damages,
filed by the respondents on &eptember !#, #$2" on the ground
of fraud and@or implied trust has already prescribed. The sale
happened on February ., #$9$ and its registration was made
on February 2, #$9$ when T(T 7o. *T+/%". in the name of the
donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof T(T 7o. T+#%/"/ in the
name of the petitioner was issued. Thus, more than four (/)
years ha-e passed since the sale of the sub5ect real estate
property was registered and the said new title thereto was issued
to the petitioner. The petitioner contends that an action for
recon-eyance of property on the ground of alleged fraud must be
filed within four (/) years from the disco-ery of fraud which is
from the date of registration of the deed of sale on February 2,
#$9$; and that the same prescripti-e period also applies to a suit
predicated on a trust relationship that is rooted on fraud of
breach of trust. Aowe-er, the four+year prescripti-e period is not
applicable to the case at bar for the reason that there is no fraud
in this case. The findings of fact of the appellate court which are
entitled to great respect, are de-oid of any finding of fraud. The
records do not show that the donor, 3asilisa, and the petitioner
e-er intended to defraud the respondents herein with respect to
the sale and ownership of the said property. On the other hand,
the sale was grounded upon their honest but erroneous
interpretation of the deed of donation that it is mortis causa,
not inter vivos"and that the donor still had the rights to sell or
dispose of the donated property and to re-o8e the donation.
There being no fraud in the trust relationship between the donor
and the donees including the herein petitioner, the action for
recon-eyance prescribes in ten (#%) years. (onsidering that
T(T 7o. T+#%/"/ in the name of the petitioner and co-ering the
sub5ect property was issued only on February 2, #$9$, the filing
of the complaint in the case at bar in #$2" was well within the
ten+year prescripti-e period.
(Gs decision is affirmed.
MA. #ST#%A MA&%ASA'&, '$C/%AS CA2AT$'&A' and
M#R%3 S. CA2AT$'&A', petitioners, vs. T4# 4#$RS /1
C/RA5/' CA2AT$'&A', namel!, %65 M. 2/76$A, "#R%A
M. A2#%%A, #STR#%%A M. CA8#T#, %/6R9#S M. 36S/',
and :6%$A %. MA3/%, 4#$RS /1 &#'/0$0A C. 'AT$0$9A9
namel!, /SCAR C. 'AT$0$9A9, /%&A 'AT$0$9A9, /9#TT#
'AT$0$9A9, /"4#%$A 'AT$0$9A9, R$C4AR9 'AT$0$9A9,
RA3M6'9 'AT$0$9A9, R$C4$# 'AT$0$9A9, S/'$A
'AT$0$9A9 and #'CAR'AC$/' CA2AT$'&A' 09A. 9#
TR$'$9A9, A%1R#9/ CA2AT$'&A' and :#S6SA C.
'A0A9A, respondents.
2ienvenido R. Saniel, :r. for petitioners.
Senining 2elci;a < Atup for private respondents.
&H7O6&4&
(onchita (abatingan, during her lifetime, e,ecuted
four Deeds of Donation in fa-or of petitioners. The Deeds
pro-ide, among others, that the donation will become effecti-e
upon the death of the donor and the same shall be rescinded in
case the donee predeceased the donor. fter (onchita;s death,
respondents, heirs of (onchita, filed an action before the
*egional Trial (ourt of )andaue, see8ing the annulment of the
said four Deeds of Donation. *espondents alleged, inter alia,
that the documents were -oid for failing to comply with the
pro-isions of the (i-il (ode regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, considering that the Deeds were donation mortis
causa. The *T( fa-orably ruled for the respondents. Aence, this
petition.
6etitioners insisted that the Deeds were inter -i-os
donations as they were made by the late (onchita :in
consideration of the lo-e and affection of the donor: for the
donee, and there was nothing in the Deeds which indicate that
the donations were made in consideration of (onchita;s death.
6etitioners further alleged that the stipulation on rescission in
case petitioners die ahead of (onchita was a resolutory condition
that confirmed the nature of the donations as inter -i-os.
The &upreme (ourt found petitioners; arguments
bereft of merit. 4t held that in a donation mortis causa, :the right
of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is
still ali-e.: 4n the present case, the nature of the donations as
mortis causa was confirmed by the fact that the donations did not
contain any clear pro-ision that intends to pass proprietary rights
to petitioners prior to (onchita;s death. The phrase :to become
effecti-e upon the death of the DO7O*: admits of no other
interpretation but that (onchita did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. That
the donations were made :in consideration of the lo-e and
affection of the donor: did not 0ualify the donations as inter -i-os
because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason.
(onsidering that the disputed donations were
donations mortis causa, and the same parta8es of testamentary
pro-isions, the (ourt held that the trial court did not commit any
re-ersible error in declaring the sub5ect Deeds null and -oid for
failure to comply with the re0uisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under rticles 2%= and 2%. of the (i-il (ode. 6etition
denied.
S3%%A26S
-. C$0$% %A=> 9/'AT$/'S> 9/'AT$/' M/RT$S
CA6SA> C4ARACT#R$ST$CS> R$&4T /1 9$S"/S$T$/' $S
'/T TRA'S1#RR#9 T/ T4# 9/'## =4$%# T4# 9/'/R $S
ST$%% A%$0#> CAS# AT 2AR. ? 4n a donation mortis causa,
:the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the
donor is still ali-e.: $n determining hether a donation is one
of mortis causa, the folloing characteristics must be ta@en
into account: A-B $t conve!s no title or onership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor> or hat
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the onership Afull or na@edB and control of the propert!
hile alive> A*B That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable b! the transferor at ill, ad nutum> but
revocabilit! ma! be provided for indirectl! b! means of a
reserved poer in the donor to dispose of the properties
conve!ed> and A3B That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
4n the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa
is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any
clear pro-ision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to (abatingan;s death. The phrase :to become
effecti-e upon the death of the DO7O*: admits of no other
interpretation but that (abatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
* MA3 2# MA9# $' C/'S$9#RAT$/' /1 T4# %/0# A'9
A11#CT$/' /1 T4# 9/'/R T/ T4# 9/'##. ? That the
donations were made :in consideration of the lo-e and affection
of the donor: does not 0ualify the donations as inter -i-os
because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason.
". TRA'S1#R S4A%% 2# C/'S$9#R#9 0/$9 $1 9/'/R
S4/6%9 S6R0$0# T4# 9/'##. ? The herein sub5ect deeds
e,pressly pro-ide that the donation shall be rescinded in case
petitioners predecease (onchita (abatingan. s stated in *eyes
-. )os0ueda, one of the decisi-e characteristics of a donation
mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered -oid if the
donor should sur-i-e the donee. This is e,actly what (abatingan
pro-ided for in her donations. 4f she really intended that the
donation should ta8e effect during her lifetime and that the
ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the donee
or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would
ha-e not e,pressed such pro-iso in the sub5ect deeds.
/.M6ST 2# #C#C6T#9 $' ACC/R9A'C# =$T4
R#76$S$T#S /' S/%#M'$T$#S /1 =$%%S A'9
T#STAM#'TS> S62:#CT 9##9S /1 9/'AT$/'
C/'S$9#R#9 '6%% A'9 0/$9 $' CAS# AT 2AR. I
(onsidering that the disputed donations are donations mortis
causa, the same parta8e of the nature of testamentary pro-isions
and as such, said deeds must be e,ecuted in accordance with
the re0uisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under
rticles 2%= and 2%. of the (i-il (ode, to wit: The deeds in
0uestion although ac8nowledged before a notary public of the
donor and the donee, the documents were not e,ecuted in the
manner pro-ided for under the abo-e+0uoted pro-isions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any re-ersible error in
declaring the sub5ect deeds of donation
null and -oid.
JK.*. 7o. 9!$%2. ugust ##, #$2$.L
Title: #ufemia "aDarillo, Claudio Suterio :r. vs. $AC, Salud
Suterio
Topic: "erfection of 9onation, Ma@ing and Acceptance of
9onation
1acts:
First Keneration: There were " siblings, 6erfecta, Felipe, and
1uana.
&econd Keneration: The children of 1uana, Salud ArespondentB
and (laudio &r. Third Keneration: The children of (laudio from
spouse 6a5arillo ApetitionersB
6erfecta here died but ne-er left a will but left a desire
to donate the land she owned to her niece &alud. &o the forced
heirs herein, Felipe and 1uana, carried out the desire of
deceased 6erfecta and donated the land to &alud. deed of
donation was made by the two through an e,ecution of a public
instrument (e,tra+5udicial partition) on )ay !%, #$/. with a note
of the acceptance of &alud 26T the actual acceptance was
made by &alud in a separate public instrument only on 1une !%,
#$/. with 6a5arillo+&uterio as witness. 7o registration was made
nor title transferred to &aludGs name but she immediately too8
possession.
3ecause of the re0uest of her mother, 1uana, &alud
transferred possession and en5oyment of the fruits of the land to
her mother, 1uana, who then occupied the land together with
(laudio &r. and his family. (laudio &r. paid the realty ta,es
thereon. On )ay !=, #$.=, 1uana e,ecuted a deed of absolute
sale con-eying the land to (laudio &r. for a declared
consideration of 6#!,%%% and after ! years was able to obtain a
T(T. (laudio &r. died in #$.# and 1uana died on #$.".
On 1une "%, #$.=, &alud (5oined by her husband)
initiated a complaint for the recon-eyance of the property on the
ground that the deed of absolute sale in fa-or of (laudio &r. was
fictitious and its registration in his name is null and -oid.
On pril #9,#$9$, 1udge 1uan ). )ontecillo of the
(ourt of First 4nstance of MueFon rendered 5udgment upholding
the donation to the plaintiff and annulling the deed of sale and
the registration of the land in fa-or of (laudio &uterio, &r. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto.
$ssue:
<hether or not the deed of donation is -alidN
Ruling:
$t is also pointed out that the donation is defective
in form because of non(compliance ith the requirements of
the la regarding its acceptance. As it as eEecuted in -.)F,
the applicable rule is Article F33 of the old Civil Code
reading as follos:
Art. F33. $n order that a donation of real propert! be valid it
must be made b! public instrument in hich the propert!
donated must be specificall! described and the amount of
the charges to be assumed b! the donee eEpressed.
The acceptance ma! be made, in the deed of gift or in a
separate public riting> but it shall produce no effect if not
made during the lifetime of the donor.
$f the acceptance is made, b! separate public instrument,
authentic notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this
proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.
There is no 0uestion that the donation was accepted in
a separate public instrument and that it was duly communicated
to the donors. '-en the petitioners cannot deny this. 3ut what
they do contend is that such acceptance was not :noted in both
instruments,: meaning the e,tra5udicial partition itself and the
instrument of acceptance, as re0uired by the (i-il (ode. There
is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that :authentic
notice: of the acceptance was made by &alud to 1uana and
Felipe. nd while the first instrument contains the statement that
:the donee does hereby accept this donation and does hereby
e,press her gratitude for the 8indness and liberality of the donor,:
the only signatories thereof were Felipe 3alane and 1uana
3alane de &uterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate
instrument of acceptance signed by &alud a month later.
The purpose of the formal re0uirement is to insure that
the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the
donor. 4n the case at bar, it is not e-en suggested that 1uana was
unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and
re0uested that the donated land be not registered during her
lifetime by &alud. Ki-en this significant e-idence, the (ourt
cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffecti-e because
there is no notation in the e,tra5udicial settlement of the donee;s
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere
form o-er substance. 4t would also disregard the clear reality of
the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate
instrument dated 1une !%,#$/., and as later ac8nowledged by
1uana.
The donation became effecti-e upon acceptance by
&alud e,cept that, in obedience to her mother;s re0uest, she
chose not to register the land in the meantime and to allow her
mother to en5oy its fruits. <hat was deferred was not its
effecti-ity but only its en5oyment by &alud. *egistration was not
necessary to ma8e the donation a binding commitment insofar as
the donors and the donee were concerned.
4t is clear that 1uana 3alane de &uterio had no right to
sell the sub5ect land to (laudio because she was no longer its
owner, ha-ing pre-iously donated it to her daughter &alud. 1uana
herself was holding the land merely as a trustee of &alud, who
had transferred possession to her mother at the old woman;s
re0uest. The deed of sale was itself -itiated by bad faith as
(laudio is presumed to ha-e 8nown of the pre-ious donation to
his sister &alud, whose acceptance of the donation was formally
witnessed by his own wife, the herein principal petitioner.
<A'*'FO*', the petition is D'74'D, with costs
against the petitioners.
JK.*. 7o. #/..2". 7o-ember !!, !%%#.L
C$R$%A ARCA2A, petitioner, vs. #R%$'9A TA2A'C6RA 09A.
9# 2AT/CA#%, S#$&1R#9/ C. TA2A'C6RA, 9/R$S C.
TA2A'C6RA, %65#%%$ C. TA2A'C6RA, 2#%#' C.
TA2A'C6RA, RA6% A. C/M$%%#, 2#R'A9#TT# A.
C/M$%%#, and A2'#R A. C/M$%%#, respondents.
&H7O6&4&
Aa-ing no children to ta8e care of him after his retirement,
Francisco (omille, then a widower, as8ed his niece Beticia
3ellosillo, the latter;s cousin, BuF-iminda 6aghacian, and
petitioner (irila rcaba to ta8e care of his house, as well as the
store inside. few months before his death, Francisco e,ecuted
an instrument denominated :Deed of Donation 4nter Oi-os,: in
which he ceded a portion of his lot consisting of #=% s0uare
meters, together with his house, to (irila, who accepted the
donation in the same instrument. *espondents filed a complaint
against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation
inter -i-os, reco-ery of possession, and damages. *espondents,
who are Francisco;s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that (irila was the common+law
wife of Francisco, and the donation inter -i-os made by
Francisco in her fa-or is -oid under rticle 29 of the Family (ode.
(onflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between (irila and Francisco. Beticia 3ellosillo said
Francisco and (irila were lo-ers since they slept in the same
room, while 'rlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco,
claimed that the latter had told her that (irila was his mistress.
On the other hand, (irila said she was a mere helper who could
enter the master;s bedroom only when the old man as8ed her to
and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. &he denied
they e-er had se,ual intercourse. The trial court rendered
5udgment in fa-or of respondents, holding the donation -oid
under the pro-ision of the Family (ode. On appeal, the (ourt of
ppeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Aence, the
present petition. The main issue is whether (irila is an employee
or the common+law wife of Francisco.
The &upreme (ourt affirmed the decision of the (ourt
of ppeals. ccording to the (ourt, human reason would lead to
the conclusion that (irila was Francisco;s common+law spouse.
(irila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for
a long time and the possibility that the two consummated their
relationship could be established from Beticia 3ellosillo;s
testimony that (irila and Francisco slept in the same bedroom.
The (ourt also considered the fact that (irila signed some
documents using Francisco;s surname clearly indicating that she
saw herself as Francisco;s common+law wife, otherwise, she
would not ha-e used his last name. lso, the fact that (irila did
not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication
that she was not simply a caregi-er+employee, but Francisco;s
common law spouse. &he was, after all, entitled to a regular cash
wage under the law and it is difficult to belie-e that she stayed
with Francisco and ser-ed him out of pure beneficence. Their
public conduct, therefore, indicated that theirs was not 5ust a
relationship of caregi-er and patient, but that of e,clusi-e
partners a8in to husband and wife.
&HBB3>&
#. C$0$% %A=> 1AM$%3 C/9#> "R/"#RT3 R#%AT$/'S
2#T=##' 46S2A'9 A'9 =$1#> 0/$9 9/'AT$/'S>
C/4A2$TAT$/' $S T4# "62%$C ASS6M"T$/' 23 A MA' A
=/MA' /1 T4# MAR$TA% R#%AT$/', A'9 9=#%%$'&
T/&#T4#R AS MA' A'9 =$1#, T4#R#23 4/%9$'&
T4#MS#%0#S /6T T/ T4# "62%$C AS S6C4. I <e
pre-iously held that the term :cohabitation: or :li-ing together as
husband and wife: means not only residing under one roof, but
also ha-ing repeated se,ual intercourse. (ohabitation, of course,
means more than se,ual intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer be interested in se,. t
the -ery least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man
and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themsel-es out to the public as
such. &ecret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together,
e-en if often repeated, do not constitute such 8ind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. 4n this 5urisdiction, this
(ourt has considered as sufficient proof of common+law
relationship the stipulations between the parties, a con-iction of
concubinage or the e,istence of illegitimate children.
!.> 9/'AT$/' MA9# $' 1A0/R /1 A C/MM/'(%A=
S"/6S# $S 0/$9 6'9#R T4# 1AM$%3 C/9#> CAS# AT 2AR.
I (irila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof
for a long time. 4t is -ery possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since (irila ga-e Francisco therapeutic massage
and Beticia said they slept in the same bedroom. t the -ery
least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not 5ust a
relationship of caregi-er and patient, but that of e,clusi-e
partners a8in to husband and wife. side from 'rlinda
Tabancura;s testimony that her uncle told her that (irila was his
mistress, there are other indications that (irila and Francisco
were common+law spouses. &eigfredo Tabancura presented
documents apparently signed by (irila using the surname
:(omille.: s pre-iously stated, these are an application for a
business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary
permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate,
and the death certificate of Francisco. These documents show
that (irila saw herself as Francisco;s common+law wife,
otherwise, she would not ha-e used his last name. &imilarly, in
the answer filed by Francisco;s lessees in :'rlinda Tabancura, et
al. -s. Kracia driatico &y and ntonio &y,: *T( (i-il (ase 7o.
/9#$ (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to (irila as
:the common+law spouse of Francisco.: Finally, the fact that
(irila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregi-er+employee, but
Francisco;s common law spouse. &he was, after all, entitled to a
regular cash wage under the law. 4t is difficult to belie-e that she
stayed with Francisco and ser-ed him out of pure beneficence.
Auman reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was
Francisco;s common+law spouse. *espondents ha-ing pro-en by
a preponderance of e-idence that (irila and Francisco li-ed
together as husband and wife without a -alid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in
fa-or of (irila is -oid under rt. 29 of the Family (ode.
CAS#: 76$%A%A vs. A%CA'TARA
1ACTS:
On February !%, #$2#, (atalina Muilala e,ecuted a :Donation of
*eal 6roperty 4nter Oi-os: in fa-or of Oioleta Muilala o-er a parcel
of land located in &ta. (ruF, )anila and registered in her name.
The :Donation of *eal 6roperty 4nter Oi-os: consists of two
pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is
signed on the bottom portion by (atalina Muilala and Oioleta
Muilala, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the c8nowledgment, which states merely that (atalina
Muilala personally appeared before the notary public and
ac8nowledged that the donation was her free and -oluntary act
and deed. There appear on the left+hand margin of the second
page the signatures of (atalina Muilala and one of the witnesses,
and on the right+hand margin the signatures of Oioleta Muilala
and the other witness
On 7o-ember 9, #$2", (atalina Muilala died. Oioleta Muilala
li8ewise died on )ay !!, #$2/.
6etitioner *ic8y Muilala alleges that he is the sur-i-ing son of
Oioleta Muilala.
)eanwhile, respondents Kliceria lcantara, Beonora lcantara,
4nes *eyes and 1uan *eyes, claiming to be (atalina;s only
sur-i-ing relati-es within the fourth ci-il degree of consanguinity
instituted an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation
inter vivos, and for the cancellation of the T(T in the name of
Oioleta Muilala.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring null and -oid the
deed of donation of real property inter -i-os e,ecuted by (atalina
Muilala in fa-or of Oioleta Muilala. The trial court found that since
it was ac8nowledged before a notary public only by the donor,
(atalina, there was no acceptance by Oioleta of the donation in a
public instrument. The decision was affirmed by the (.
4&&>': <hether or not the donation e,ecuted by (atalina in
fa-or of Oioleta is -alid
A'BD:
3elow the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affi,ed their signature. Aowe-er, the
c8nowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only
the donor, (atalina Muilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for
0ioletaGs failure to ac@noledge her acceptance before the
notar! public, the same as set forth merel! on a private
instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument.
<e disagree.
s pro-ided for in &ection ##!, paragraph ! of 6D 7o. #=!$, the
second page of the deed of donation, on which the
c8nowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one
witness on the left+hand margin. The donee and the other
witness signed on the right hand margin. &urely, the re0uirement
that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on
the left+hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The
intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and e-ery
page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The
re0uirement is designed to a-oid the falsification of the contract
after the same has already been duly e,ecuted by the parties.
Aence, a contracting party affi,es his signature on each page of
the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to e-erything that is
written thereon at the time of signing.
&imply put, the specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page does not in-alidate the document.
4n the same -ein, the lac8 of an ac8nowledgment by the donee
before the notary public does not also render the donation null
and -oid. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. 4t
cannot be considered a pri-ate document in part and a public
document in another part. The fact that it was ac8nowledged
before a notary public con-erts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the ac8nowledgment is of no
moment. To be sure, it is the con-eyance that should be
ac8nowledged as a free and -oluntary act. 4n any e-ent, the
donee signed on the second page, which contains the
c8nowledgment only. Aer acceptance, which is e,plicitly set
forth on the first page of the notariFed deed of donation, was
made in a public instrument.
6etition is granted. The appealed decision of the ( is re-ersed.
4eirs of Salud 9iHon Salamat vs. Tama!o
&.R. 'o. --IF)), /ctober 3I, -..J
1acts:
gustin DiFon died intestate on )ay #=, #$/! lea-ing
behind his fi-e children 'duardo, Kaudencio, Salud ApetitionerB,
Oalenta and 'atividad ArespondentB as sur-i-ing heirs. mong
the properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in 3arrio
&an 7icolas, Aagonoy, 3ulacan, with an area of !,#22 s0uare
meters co-ered by Original (ertificate of Title 7o. #%"2/.
'duardo sold his hereditary rights to his sister &alud
e-idenced by a pri-ate document bearing with signatures of
Oalenta and 7ati-idad. Bater on Kaudencio li8ewise sold his
rights still to &alud e-idenced by a notariFed document.
&ometime in #$29, petitioners instituted an action for
compulsory 5udicial partition of real properties registered in the
name of gustin DiFon with the *egional Trial (ourt, 3ranch #2
of )alolos, 3ulacan. The action was prompted by the refusal of
herein respondent 'atividad 9iHon Tama!o to agree to the
formal distribution of the properties of deceased gustin DiFon
among his heirs. *espondent claims that her father donated it to
her sometime in #$". with the conformity of the other heirs. &he
presented a pri-ate document of conformity which was allegedly
signed and e,ecuted by her elder brother, 'duardo, in #$".. The
sub5ect property is also declared for ta,ation purposes under Ta,
Declaration 7o. #%"9. in the name of respondent.
Trial court noted that the alleged endowment which
was made orally by the deceased gustin DiFon to herein
respondent partoo8 of the nature of a donation which re0uired
the obser-ance of certain formalities set by law. 7e-ertheless,
the trial court rendered 5udgment in fa-or of respondent.
(ourt of ppeals, in affirming the decision of the *T(,
stated that notwithstanding the une,plained erasures and
alterations, a cursory reading of the signed statement of 'duardo
DiFon, which e,ecution is undisputed, showed that there was an
oral donation of the litigated land from gustin DiFon to 7ati-idad
DiFon Tamayo in #$"..
$ssue:
<hether or not the document is authentic inasmuch as
it is marred by une,plained erasures and alterationsN
Ruling:
Art K). of the Civil Code reads:
$n order that the donation of an immovable ma! be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specif!ing therein the
propert! donated and the value of the charges hich the
donee must satisf!.
The acceptance ma! be made in the same deed of donation
or in a separate public document, unless it is done during
the lifetime of the donor.
$f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form and this
step shall be noted in both instruments.
4t is clear from rticle 9/$ that a transfer of real
property from one person to another cannot ta8e effect as a
donation unless embodied in a public document. The alleged
donation in the case at bar was done orally and not e,ecuted in a
public document. )oreo-er, the document which was presented
by respondent in support of her claim that her father donated the
sub5ect parcel of land to her was a mere pri-ate document of
conformity which was e,ecuted by her elder brother, 'duardo in
#$=.. 4t may not be amiss to point out that the brothers 'duardo
and Kaudencio had already ceded their hereditary interests to
petitioner &alud DiFon &alamat e-en before #$=%.
The document which was allegedly e,ecuted by
'duardo was marred by une,plained erasures and alterations.
<hile the document was originally penned in blac8 in8, the
number thirty+si, (".) in blue in8 was superimposed on the
number fifty+si, (=.) to ma8e it appear that the document was
e,ecuted in #$". instead of in #$=.. )oreo-er, a signature was
blotted out with a blac8 pentel pen and the three other signatures
9
of the alleged witnesses to the e,ecution of the document at the
lower portion of the document were dated 1une #, #$=#. This
could only mean that the witnesses attested to the -eracity of the
document = years earlier, if the document was e,ecuted in #$=.
or #= years later, if we are to gi-e credence to respondent;s
claim, that the document was e,ecuted in #$".. (uriously, two of
the signatories, namely, 6riscila D. *i-era and )aria D. 1ocson
signed the document as witnesses two days after the death of
their father Kaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned, had already
sold his hereditary rights to his sister &alud in #$/$.
ssuming that gustin really made the donation to
respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership
o-er the property. <hile it is true that a -oid donation may be the
basis of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription, it is
well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescripti-e right, must be ad-erse and under a claim of title.
*espondent was ne-er in ad-erse and continous possession of
the property. 4t is undeniable that petitioners and respondent,
being heirs of the deceased, are co+owners of the properties left
by the latter. co+ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner
being a trustee for each other and possession of a co+owner
shall not be regarded as ad-erse to other co+owner but in fact is
beneficial to them. )ere actual possession by one will not gi-e
rise to the inference that the possession was ad-erse because a
co+owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property.
The elements in order that a co+owner;s possession
may be deemed ad-erse to the cestui #ue trust or the co+owner
are: (#) that he has performed une0ui-ocal acts of repudiation
amounting to ouster of the cestui #ue trust or other co+owners (!)
that such positi-e acts or repudiation ha-e been made 8nown to
the cestui #ue trust or other co+owners and (") that the e-idence
thereon must be clear and con-incing.
&ince respondent ne-er made une0ui-ocal acts of
repudiation, she cannot ac0uire ownership o-er said property
through ac0uisiti-e prescription. the fact that the sub5ect
property is declared for ta,ation purposes in the name of
respondent who pays realty ta,es thereon under Ta, Declaration
7o. #/"9. is of no moment. 4t is well settled that ta, declarations
or realty ta, payments are not conclusi-e e-idence of ownership.
<A'*'FO*', the decision of the (ourt of ppeals is hereby
*'O'*&'D.
Title: S/%#9A9 CA%$C9A', represented b! her guardian
&6A9A%6"# CAST$%%/, petitioner vs. S$%0#Ri/ C#'9A8A,
substituted b! his legal heir C#%SA C#'9A8A(
A%ARAS, respondent
&.R. 'o. -++IJI 1ebruar! +, *II)
Topic: 0oid donation as basis for title b! acquisitive
prescription
Facts:
The instant contro-ersy in-ol-es a 9.% s0uare meter parcel of
unregistered land formerly owned by &i,to (alicdan, who died
intestate. Ae was sur-i-ed by his wife, Fermina, and three
children, namely, petitioner &oledad, 1ose and 3enigno.
On ugust !=, #$/9, Fermina e,ecuted a deed of donation inter
vivos whereby she con-eyed the land to respondent &il-erio
(endaPa, who immediately entered into possession of the land,
built a fence around the land and constructed a two+storey
residential house thereon sometime in #$/$, where he resided
until his death in #$$2.
On 1une !$, #$$!, petitioner, through her legal guardian
Kuadalupe (astillo, filed a complaint for :*eco-ery of
Ownership, 6ossession and Damages: against the respondent,
alleging that the donation was -oid; that respondent too8
ad-antage of her incompetence in ac0uiring the land.
The trial court rendered a decision in fa-or of petitioner but was
re-ersed by the (.
4ssue:
<hether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by
prescription
*uling:
The factual findings of the trial court and the (ourt of ppeals are
conflicting; thus, we are constrained to re-iew the findings of
facts.
fter a re-iew of the e-idence on record, we find that the (ourt of
ppealsG ruling that the donation was -alid was not supported by
con-incing proof. The donation of the land is -oid because
Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was
inherited by &i,to from his parents.
Thus, the land was not part of the con5ugal property of the
spouses &i,to and Fermina (alicdan, because under the
&panish (i-il (ode, the law applicable when &i,to died in #$/#,
the sur-i-ing spouse had a right of usufruct only o-er the estate
of the deceased spouse.
(onse0uently, respondent, who deri-ed his rights from Fermina,
only ac0uired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which
the latter could con-ey.
7otwithstanding the in-alidity of the donation, we find that
respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by
e,traordinary ac0uisiti-e prescription.
6rescription is another mode of ac0uiring ownership and other
real rights o-er immo-able property. 4t is concerned with lapse of
time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and ad-erse.
The records show that the sub5ect land is an unregistered land.
<hen the petitioner filed the instant case on 1une !$, #$$!,
respondent was in possession of the land for /= years counted
from the time of the donation in #$/9. This is more than the
re0uired "% years of uninterrupted ad-erse possession without
5ust title and good faith. &uch possession was public, ad-erse
and in the concept of an owner.
)oreo-er, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit -oid for ha-ing
been e,ecuted by one who was not the owner of the property
donated, may still be used to show the e,clusi-e and ad-erse
character of respondentGs possession. Thus, in $eirs of %egunda
&aningding v. Court of 'ppeals,
#$
we held:
'-en assuming that the donation propter nuptias is -oid for
failure to comply with formal re0uisites, it could still constitute a
legal basis for ad-erse possession. <ith clear and con-incing
e-idence of possession, a pri-ate document of donation may
ser-e as basis for a claim of ownership. 4n (ensader v.
(ensader we ruled that while the -erbal donation under which
the defendant and his predecessors+in+interest ha-e been in
possession of the lands in 0uestion is not effecti-e as a transfer
of title, still it is a circumstance which may e,plain the ad-erse
and e,clusi-e character of the possession. (>nderscoring ours)
4n sum, the (ourt of ppeals correctly ordered the dismissal of
the case, and declared respondent the rightful owner of the
sub5ect property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation 4nter
Oi-os, which is hereby declared -oid, but on e,traordinary
ac0uisiti-e prescription.
<A'*'FO*', in -iew of the foregoing, the petition is D'74'D.
#0#%3' 9# %6'A, et., a l., petitioners, vs. 4/'. S/1R/'$/
1. A2R$&/, "residing :udge of the Court of 1irst $nstance of
7ueHon, 2ranch $C, and %65/'$A' 6'$0#RS$T3
1/6'9AT$/', $'C., respondents.
&.R. 'o. +K)++. :anuar! -J, -..I
Topic: Revocation and Reduction of 9onation
1acts of the Case:
On 1anuary !/, #$.=, 6rudencio de Buna donated a
portion of 9,=%% s0uare meters of Bot 7o. "9%9 of the (adastral
&ur-ey of Bucena co-ered by Transfer (ertificate of Title 7o. #+
=99= to the BuFonian (olleges, 4nc., (now BuFonian >ni-ersity
Foundation, 4nc., herein referred to as the foundation). The
donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation 4nter-i-os was sub5ect
to certain terms and conditions and pro-ided for the automatic
re-ersion to the donor of the donated property in case of -iolation
or non+compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the
conditions of the donation. On pril $, #$9#, 6rudencio de Buna
:re-i-ed: the said donation in fa-or of the foundation, in a
document entitled :*e-i-al of Donation 4nter-i-os sub5ect to
terms and conditions.
The donation was registered and annotated on pril #=, #$9# in
the memorandum of encumbrances as 'ntry 7o. #9$"$ of
Transfer (ertificate of Title 7o. T+=99=.
On ugust ", #$9#, 6rudencio de Buna and the foundation
e,ecuted a :Deed of &egregation: whereby the area donated
which is now 8nown as Bot 7o. "9%9+3 of &ubdi-ision 6lan 6sd+
/%"$! was ad5udicated to the foundation. s a result, transfer
certificate of title 7o. T+#.#=! was issued in the name of the
foundation. The remaining portion 8nown as Bot 7o. "9%9+ was
retained by the donor.
On &eptember !", #$2%, herein petitioners, who claim to be the
children and only heirs of the late 6rudencio de Buna who died
on ugust #2, #$2%, filed a complaint with the *egional Trial
(ourt of MueFon alleging that the terms and conditions of the
donation were not complied with by the foundation. mong
others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the
re-ersion of the donated land to the heirs. The complaint was
doc8eted as (i-il (ase 7o. 2.!/.
*espondent foundation claimed that it had partially and
substantially complied with the conditions of the donation and
that the donor has granted the foundation an indefinite e,tension
of time to complete the construction of the chapel. 4t also in-o8ed
the affirmati-e defense of prescription of action and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
The trial (ourt finds the motion to dismiss deemed filed by the
defendant on the ground of prescription to be well+ta8en and the
same is hereby K*7T'D.
$ssue of the Case:
TA' BO<'* (O>*T '**'D 47 T*'T47K TA' (O)6B47T
& O7' FO* 1>D4(4B D'(*'' OF *'OO(T4O7 OF TA'
DO7T4O7 47 M>'&T4O7 & (O7T')6BT'D 47 *T4(B'
9./ OF TA' (4O4B (OD' OF TA' 6A4B46647'& 7D <A4(A
6*'&(*43'& 47 FO>* (/) H'*& 7D 47 7OT
(O7&4D'*47K 4T & 7 (T4O7 TO '7FO*(' <*4TT'7
(O7T*(T <A4(A 6*'&(*43'& 47 T'7 (#%) H'*& &
6*OO4D'D 47 *T4(B' ##//, A'7(', TA' BO<'* (O>*T
'**'D 47 D4&)4&&47K TA' (O)6B47T.
Ruling:
Donations may be #) simple, !) remuneratory or ") onerous.
simple donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality (no
strings attached). remuneratory donation is one where the
donee gi-es something to reward past or future ser-ices or
because of future charges or burdens, when the -alue of said
ser-ices, burdens or charges is less than the -alue of the
donation. n onerous donation is one which is sub5ect to
burdens, charges or future ser-ices e0ual (or more) in -alue than
that of the thing donated ('dgardo B. 6aras, (i-il (ode of the
6hilippines nnotated, ## ed., 9!.).
4t is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the
parties, that the donation sub5ect of this case is one with an
onerous cause. 4t was made sub5ect to the burden re0uiring the
donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a 8indergarten school
in the donated property within fi-e years from e,ecution of the
deed of donation.
'e Civil Code as provided in Article K33 thereof hich
provides:
LArticle K33. 9onations ith an onerous cause shall be
governed b! the rules on contracts, and remunerator!
donations b! the provisions of the present Title as regards
that portion hich eEceeds the value of the burden
imposed.L
4t is true that rticle 9./ of the 7ew (i-il (ode, actions for the
re-ocation of a donation must be brought within for (/) years
from the non+compliance of the conditions of the donation.
Aowe-er, it is Our opinion that the said article does not apply to
onerous donations in -iew of the specific pro-ision of rticle 9""
pro-iding that onerous donations are go-erned by the rules on
contracts.
4n the light of the abo-e, the rules on contracts and the general
rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are
applicable in the case at bar.
>nder rticle #"%. of the 7ew (i-il (ode, the parties to a
contract ha-e the right :to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deemed con-enient, pro-ided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public orders
or public policy.: 6aragraph ## of the :*e-i-al of Donation
4nter-i-os, has pro-ided that: -iolation of any of the conditions
(herein) shall cause the automatic re-ersion of the donated area
to the donor, his heirs, . . . , without the need of e,ecuting any
other document for that purpose and without obligation on the
part of the DO7O*:. &aid stipulation not being contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is -alid and
binding upon the foundation who -oluntarily consented thereto.
The -alidity of the stipulation in the contract pro-iding for the
automatic re-ersion of the donated property to the donor upon
non+compliance cannot be doubted. 4t is in the nature of an
agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract
unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court.
>pon the happening of the resolutory condition of non+
compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is
automatically re-o8ed without need of a 5udicial declaration to
that effect The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that
the complaint in the case at bar is barred by prescription under
rticle 9./ of the 7ew (i-il (ode because rticle 9./ does not
apply to onerous donations.
s pro-ided in the donation e,ecuted on pril $, #$9#,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of
donation, shall be made within fi-e (=) years from its e,ecution.
The complaint which was filed on &eptember !", #$2% was then
well within the ten (#%) year prescripti-e period to enforce a
written contract (rticle ##//J#L, 7ew (i-il (ode), counted from
pril $, #$9..
#%/3 $M"#R$A%, petitioner vs. C/6RT /1 A""#A%S
&.R. 'o. --*)J
Topic:"rescriptive period to revo@e donations
Beoncio 4mperial was the registered owner of a "!,2"9+s0uare
meter parcel of land. On 1uly 9, #$=#, Beoncio sold the said lot
for 6#.%% to his ac8nowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who
then ac0uired title o-er the land and proceeded to subdi-ide it
into se-eral lots. 6etitioner and pri-ate respondents admit that
despite the contract;s designation as one of :bsolute &ale:, the
transaction was in fact a donation.
On 1uly !2, #$=", Beoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the
said Deed of bsolute &ale, on the ground that he was decei-ed
by petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute,
howe-er, was resol-ed through a compromise agreement, under
which terms: (#) Beoncio recogniFed the legality and -alidity of
the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (!) petitioner
agreed to sell a designated #,%%%+s0uare meter portion of the
donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a ban8, for
the con-enient disposal of Beoncio. 4n case of Beoncio;s death, it
was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by
petitioner to defray burial costs.
On 1anuary 2, #$.!, and pending e,ecution of the abo-e
5udgment, Beoncio died, lea-ing only two heirs +++ the herein
petitioner, who is his ac8nowledged natural son, and an adopted
son, Oictor 4mperial. On )arch 2, #$.!, Oictor was substituted in
place of Beoncio in the abo-e+mentioned case, and it was he
who mo-ed for e,ecution of 5udgment. On )arch #=, #$.!, the
motion for e,ecution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, Oictor died single and without issue,
sur-i-ed only by his natural father, *icardo Oillalon. Four years
hence, or on &eptember !=, #$2#, *icardo died, lea-ing as his
only heirs his two children, (esar and Teresa Oillalon.
Fi-e years thereafter, (esar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation with the *egional Trial (ourt of
BegaFpi (ity, doc8eted as (i-il (ase 7o. 9./.. 6etitioner mo-ed
to dismiss on the ground of res 5udicata, by -irtue of the
compromise 5udgment rendered by the (ourt of First 4nstance of
lbay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the (ourt
of ppeals re-ersed the trial court;s order and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
On October #2, #$2$, (esar and Teresa filed an amended
complaint in the same case, (i-il (ase 7o. 9./., for :nnulment
of Documents, *econ-eyance and *eco-ery of 6ossession: with
the *T(, see8ing the nullification of the Deed of bsolute &ale
affecting the abo-e property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and
inofficiousness. 4n the amended complaint, it was alleged that
petitioner caused Beoncio to e,ecute the donation by ta8ing
undue ad-antage of the latter;s physical wea8ness and mental
unfitness, and that the con-eyance of said property in fa-or of
petitioner impaired the legitime of Oictor 4mperial, their natural
brother and predecessor+in+interest.
The *T( held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the
legitime of Oictor. The (ourt of ppeals affirmed the *T(
Decision in toto.
4ssue:
<O7 pri-ate respondents; action is barred by prescription,
laches and estoppel
=hat, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for
reduction of an inofficious donationM
The Civil Code specifies the folloing instances of reduction
or revocation of donations:
(#) four years, in cases of subse0uent birth, appearance,
recognition or adoption of a child;#. J(i-il (ode, rt. 9.".L
(!) four years, for non+compliance with conditions of the
donation;#9 J4d., rt. 9./.L and
(") at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relati-es
entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reser-e property for
his or their support.#2 J4d., rt. 9=%.L 4nterestingly, donations as in
the instant case,#$ JKo-erned by rticles 9=! and 99# of the
(i-il (ode, which read thus:rt. 9=!. ,,, (7)o person may gi-e
or recei-e, by way of donation, more than what he may gi-e or
recei-e by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it ma! eEceed
this limitation.
rt.99#. Donations which in accordance with the pro-isions of
rticle 9=!, are inofficious bearing in mind the estimated net
-alue of the donor;s property at the time of his death, shall be
reduced with regard to the e,cess, but this reduction shall not
pre-ent the donations from ta8ing effect during the life of the
donor, nor shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits.
,,,L the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular
prescripti-e period, for which reason we must resort to the
ordinary rules of prescription.
>nder rticle ##// of the (i-il (ode, actions upon an obligation
created by law must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten+year prescripti-e period
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, re0uired
under rticle 99# of the (i-il (ode, to the e,tent that they impair
the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten+year period be rec8onedN The case of
)ateo -s. Bagua, !$ &(* 2./, which in-ol-ed the reduction for
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recogniFed that the
cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of
the donor+decedent. (learly so, since it is only then that the net
estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may
be determined.
4t too8 pri-ate respondents !/ years since the death of Beoncio
to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
6ri-ate respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. 4t may
be recalled that Beoncio died on 1anuary 2, #$.!. Fifteen years
later, Oictor died, lea-ing as his sole heir *icardo Oillalon, who
also died four years later. <hile Oictor was ali-e, he ga-e no
indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased
father. s we ha-e discussed earlier, the fact that he acti-ely
participated in (i-il (ase 7o. ##99 did not amount to a
renunciation of his inheritance and does not preclude him from
bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are matters that
Oictor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that he is a
lawyer.!# *icardo Oillalon was e-en a lessee of a portion of the
donated property, and could ha-e instituted the action as sole
heir of his natural son, or at the -ery least, raised the matter of
legitime by way of counterclaim in an e5ectment case filed
against him by petitioner in #$9$. 7either does it help pri-ate
respondents; cause that fi-e years ha-e elapsed since the death
of *icardo in #$2# before they filed their complaint with the *T(.