Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile

Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile
Author(s): Eduardo Silva

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 1992-
1993), pp. 77-117
Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165807 .
Accessed: 07/10/2014 12:26
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 158.109.185.182 on Tue, 7 Oct 2014 12:26:55 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Capitalist Regime Loyalties
and Redemocratization
in Chile
Eduardo Silva*
CHILE IS OFTEN
portrayed
as an
exceptional
case
among
recent transitions from authoritarian rule for a number of
reasons. It was the last of the "bureaucratic authoritarian"
regimes
to
democratize;
the transition followed the timetable and condi-
tions set
by
the
military
more
closely
than in
Argentina
and
Uruguay;
the
prognosis
for economic and
political stability
seems
optimistic
relative to the rest of the
region.
An
important
reason
for Chilean
exceptionality
was the fact
that,
unlike in other
cases,
Chile's business and
landowning
elites
supported
the
military
government
to the end.
Why
did
they
do so?
Most studies frame the
question
of Chilean
upper
class
loyalty
to General
Augusto
Pinochet in the
following
manner.
In other
countries,
economic elites became ambivalent about
authoritarianism
(or
even turned
against
it)
for three main
reasons.
They
were
(1)
shut out of the
policymaking process,
(2)
buffeted
by
economic
restructuring,
and
(3)
hurt
by
economic crisis associated with structural
adjustment.
Although
Eduardo Silva is Assistant Professor of Political Science and a Fellow
at the Center for International Studies at the
University
of Missouri-St. Louis.
He is co-editor
(with
Paul W.
Drake)
of ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZA-
TION IN LATIN AMERICA (San
Diego:
Institute of the
Americas,
1986) and
author of
scholarly
articles on the
politics
of economic
change
in Chile. His
current research interests include social
equity
in Latin American democra-
cies and the
political economy
of rainforest conservation and sustainlable
development.
'Research for this article was
supported by
grants
from
Fulbright-Hays,
the Social Science Research
Council,
and the
University
I am debted to Paul
Drake,
William C.
Smith,
Catherine
Conaghan
and the
anonymous
reviewers of the
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND
WORLD AFFAIRS for their
commentary
on earlier drafts. I
alone,
of
course,
am
responsible
for the contents of this article.
in Chile
Eduardo Silva*
CHILE IS OFTEN
portrayed
as an
exceptional
case
among
regimes
to
democratize;
tions set
by
the
military
more
closely
than in
Argentina
and
Uruguay;
the
prognosis
for economic and
political stability
seems
optimistic
region.
An
important
reason
for Chilean
exceptionality
was the fact
that,
unlike in other
cases,
landowning
elites
supported
the
military
government
to the end.
Why
did
they
do so?
question
of Chilean
upper
class
loyalty
to General
Augusto
Pinochet in the
following
manner.
In other
countries,
authoritarianism
(or
even turned
against
it)
for three main
reasons.
They
were
(1)
shut out of the
(2)
buffeted
by
economic
restructuring,
and
(3)
hurt
by
adjustment.
Although
University
He is co-editor
(with
Paul W.
Drake)
Diego:
Institute of the
Americas,
1986) and
author of
scholarly
articles on the
politics
of economic
change
in Chile. His
equity
cies and the
political economy
development.
supported by
grants
from
Fulbright-Hays,
Council,
and the
University
I am debted to Paul
Drake,
William C.
Smith,
Catherine
Conaghan
and the
anonymous
reviewers of the
JOURNAL
commentary
alone,
of
course,
am
responsible
in Chile
Eduardo Silva*
CHILE IS OFTEN
portrayed
as an
exceptional
case
among
regimes
to
democratize;
tions set
by
the
military
more
closely
than in
Argentina
and
Uruguay;
the
prognosis
for economic and
political stability
seems
optimistic
region.
An
important
reason
for Chilean
exceptionality
was the fact
that,
unlike in other
cases,
landowning
elites
supported
the
military
government
to the end.
Why
did
they
do so?
question
of Chilean
upper
class
loyalty
to General
Augusto
Pinochet in the
following
manner.
In other
countries,
authoritarianism
(or
even turned
against
it)
for three main
reasons.
They
were
(1)
shut out of the
(2)
buffeted
by
economic
restructuring,
and
(3)
hurt
by
adjustment.
Although
University
He is co-editor
(with
Paul W.
Drake)
Diego:
Institute of the
Americas,
1986) and
author of
scholarly
articles on the
politics
of economic
change
in Chile. His
equity
cies and the
political economy
development.
supported by
grants
from
Fulbright-Hays,
Council,
and the
University
I am debted to Paul
Drake,
William C.
Smith,
Catherine
Conaghan
and the
anonymous
reviewers of the
JOURNAL
commentary
alone,
of
course,
am
responsible
in Chile
Eduardo Silva*
CHILE IS OFTEN
portrayed
as an
exceptional
case
among
regimes
to
democratize;
tions set
by
the
military
more
closely
than in
Argentina
and
Uruguay;
the
prognosis
for economic and
political stability
seems
optimistic
region.
An
important
reason
for Chilean
exceptionality
was the fact
that,
unlike in other
cases,
landowning
elites
supported
the
military
government
to the end.
Why
did
they
do so?
question
of Chilean
upper
class
loyalty
to General
Augusto
Pinochet in the
following
manner.
In other
countries,
authoritarianism
(or
even turned
against
it)
for three main
reasons.
They
were
(1)
shut out of the
(2)
buffeted
by
economic
restructuring,
and
(3)
hurt
by
adjustment.
Although
University
He is co-editor
(with
Paul W.
Drake)
Diego:
Institute of the
Americas,
1986) and
author of
scholarly
articles on the
politics
of economic
change
in Chile. His
equity
cies and the
political economy
development.
supported by
grants
from
Fulbright-Hays,
Council,
and the
University
I am debted to Paul
Drake,
William C.
Smith,
Catherine
Conaghan
and the
anonymous
reviewers of the
JOURNAL
commentary
alone,
of
course,
am
responsible
in Chile
Eduardo Silva*
CHILE IS OFTEN
portrayed
as an
exceptional
case
among
regimes
to
democratize;
tions set
by
the
military
more
closely
than in
Argentina
and
Uruguay;
the
prognosis
for economic and
political stability
seems
optimistic
region.
An
important
reason
for Chilean
exceptionality
was the fact
that,
unlike in other
cases,
landowning
elites
supported
the
military
government
to the end.
Why
did
they
do so?
question
of Chilean
upper
class
loyalty
to General
Augusto
Pinochet in the
following
manner.
In other
countries,
authoritarianism
(or
even turned
against
it)
for three main
reasons.
They
were
(1)
shut out of the
(2)
buffeted
by
economic
restructuring,
and
(3)
hurt
by
adjustment.
Although
University
He is co-editor
(with
Paul W.
Drake)
Diego:
Institute of the
Americas,
1986) and
author of
scholarly
articles on the
politics
of economic
change
in Chile. His
equity
cies and the
political economy
development.
supported by
grants
from
Fulbright-Hays,
Council,
and the
University
I am debted to Paul
Drake,
William C.
Smith,
Catherine
Conaghan
and the
anonymous
reviewers of the
JOURNAL
commentary
alone,
of
course,
am
responsible
77 77 77 77 77
78
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 78
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
the Chilean
bourgeoisie
also suffered from the same
problems,
studies of Chile's
upper
class conclude that
they
feared
resurgent
socialism more than Pinochet's
imposition
of eco-
nomic
change.
This article
argues
that
although
fear of
resurgent
social-
ism was indeed a matter of
concern,
this view takes the
upper
classes' rhetoric too much at face value. More
important
was
the fact
that,
in
1983,
landowning groups
forged
a cohesive alliance
-
the
pragmatic
neoliberal coalition
-
around a
specific
set of
policy proposals,
and that Pinochet
responded favorably
to its demands.
By
the same
token,
the
threat from below was
considerably
weaker than
touted, espe-
cially
after the transformation
-
or renovation - of the Left.
The success of the
pragmatic
coalition carried three
important consequences
for Chile's transition from
authoritarianism between
1983
and
1988.
First,
the inclusion of
all
major capitalist groups
in the economic
policy coalition,
their exclusive access to the
and
policy
concessions on the
part
of the
military government
worked to
cement the
relationship
between the
capitalists
and Pinochet
for the
plebiscite
of
1988.
As a
result,
no
capitalist
or
landowning
group
was available for alliance with the main
opposition
group seeking
an end to Pinochet's
dictatorship:
Alianza
Democratzca
(AD).
Second,
the absence of a multi-class movement for
political
democratization that included
important capitalist
and
landowning groups significantly
influenced the
process
of
Chile's shift from an authoritarian to a democratic form of
government.'
It made it
possible
for the
military government
to
adhere to the timetable and conditions for
political
liberaliza-
tion set forth in the
1980
Constitution.2
Moreover,
the institu-
tional conditions that ensured a
"protected" democracy
-
one
in which the
military
retained veto
power
over civilian authori-
ties,
and that built in a conservative bias to economic
policymaking
-
remained intact
(Loveman,
1991).
The success of the
pragmatic
coalition and the failure of
the AD to win over business elites had a third
consequence.
the Chilean
bourgeoisie
problems,
studies of Chile's
upper
class conclude that
they
feared
resurgent
imposition
of eco-
nomic
change.
This article
argues
that
although
fear of
resurgent
social-
concern,
this view takes the
upper
important
was
the fact
that,
in
1983,
landowning groups
forged
a cohesive alliance
-
the
pragmatic
-
around a
specific
set of
policy proposals,
and that Pinochet
responded favorably
to its demands.
By
the same
token,
the
considerably
weaker than
touted, espe-
cially
-
The success of the
pragmatic
1983
and
1988.
First,
the inclusion of
all
in the economic
policy coalition,
and
policy
concessions on the
part
of the
military government
worked to
cement the
relationship
between the
capitalists
and Pinochet
for the
plebiscite
of
1988.
As a
result,
no
capitalist
or
landowning
group
opposition
group seeking
dictatorship:
Alianza
Democratzca
(AD).
Second,
political
and
influenced the
process
of
government.'
It made it
possible
for the
military government
to
political
liberaliza-
1980
Constitution.2
Moreover,
the institu-
-
one
in which the
military
retained veto
power
ties,
policymaking
-
remained intact
(Loveman,
1991).
The success of the
pragmatic
consequence.
the Chilean
bourgeoisie
problems,
studies of Chile's
upper
class conclude that
they
feared
resurgent
imposition
of eco-
nomic
change.
This article
argues
that
although
fear of
resurgent
social-
concern,
this view takes the
upper
important
was
the fact
that,
in
1983,
landowning groups
forged
a cohesive alliance
-
the
pragmatic
-
around a
specific
set of
policy proposals,
and that Pinochet
responded favorably
to its demands.
By
the same
token,
the
considerably
weaker than
touted, espe-
cially
-
The success of the
pragmatic
1983
and
1988.
First,
the inclusion of
all
in the economic
policy coalition,
and
policy
concessions on the
part
of the
military government
worked to
cement the
relationship
between the
capitalists
and Pinochet
for the
plebiscite
of
1988.
As a
result,
no
capitalist
or
landowning
group
opposition
group seeking
dictatorship:
Alianza
Democratzca
(AD).
Second,
political
and
influenced the
process
of
government.'
It made it
possible
for the
military government
to
political
liberaliza-
1980
Constitution.2
Moreover,
the institu-
-
one
in which the
military
retained veto
power
ties,
policymaking
-
remained intact
(Loveman,
1991).
The success of the
pragmatic
consequence.
the Chilean
bourgeoisie
problems,
studies of Chile's
upper
class conclude that
they
feared
resurgent
imposition
of eco-
nomic
change.
This article
argues
that
although
fear of
resurgent
social-
concern,
this view takes the
upper
important
was
the fact
that,
in
1983,
landowning groups
forged
a cohesive alliance
-
the
pragmatic
-
around a
specific
set of
policy proposals,
and that Pinochet
responded favorably
to its demands.
By
the same
token,
the
considerably
weaker than
touted, espe-
cially
-
The success of the
pragmatic
1983
and
1988.
First,
the inclusion of
all
in the economic
policy coalition,
and
policy
concessions on the
part
of the
military government
worked to
cement the
relationship
between the
capitalists
and Pinochet
for the
plebiscite
of
1988.
As a
result,
no
capitalist
or
landowning
group
opposition
group seeking
dictatorship:
Alianza
Democratzca
(AD).
Second,
political
and
influenced the
process
of
government.'
It made it
possible
for the
military government
to
political
liberaliza-
1980
Constitution.2
Moreover,
the institu-
-
one
in which the
military
retained veto
power
ties,
policymaking
-
remained intact
(Loveman,
1991).
The success of the
pragmatic
consequence.
the Chilean
bourgeoisie
problems,
studies of Chile's
upper
class conclude that
they
feared
resurgent
imposition
of eco-
nomic
change.
This article
argues
that
although
fear of
resurgent
social-
concern,
this view takes the
upper
important
was
the fact
that,
in
1983,
landowning groups
forged
a cohesive alliance
-
the
pragmatic
-
around a
specific
set of
policy proposals,
and that Pinochet
responded favorably
to its demands.
By
the same
token,
the
considerably
weaker than
touted, espe-
cially
-
The success of the
pragmatic
1983
and
1988.
First,
the inclusion of
all
in the economic
policy coalition,
and
policy
concessions on the
part
of the
military government
worked to
cement the
relationship
between the
capitalists
and Pinochet
for the
plebiscite
of
1988.
As a
result,
no
capitalist
or
landowning
group
opposition
group seeking
dictatorship:
Alianza
Democratzca
(AD).
Second,
political
and
influenced the
process
of
government.'
It made it
possible
for the
military government
to
political
liberaliza-
1980
Constitution.2
Moreover,
the institu-
-
one
in which the
military
retained veto
power
ties,
policymaking
-
remained intact
(Loveman,
1991).
The success of the
pragmatic
consequence.
SILVA: CAPITALIST REGIME LOYALTIES IN CHILE SILVA: CAPITALIST REGIME LOYALTIES IN CHILE SILVA: CAPITALIST REGIME LOYALTIES IN CHILE SILVA: CAPITALIST REGIME LOYALTIES IN CHILE SILVA: CAPITALIST REGIME LOYALTIES IN CHILE
Between
1985
and
1988,
in its efforts to
allay capitalist
fears of
democratization,
the Alianza
Democrcatca
- which was
dominated
by
Christian Democrats and included the reformed
Left- continued to moderate its economic
policy platform.
As
the
plebiscite
drew
nearer,
it became
increasingly apparent
that
capitalists' rejection
of AD had more to do with their
aversion to even mild social democratic reform than to
any
real
fear of
revolutionary
socialism. This
suggests
that when AD
failed to draw
capitalists
into an
explicit political
coalition to
change
the
regime,
it
joined
them in an
implicit
conservative
economic
compact
to assure democratization. In other
words,
AD committed itself to the economic model of the
pragmatic
neoliberal coalition in
exchange
for
acquiescence
to
political
change
on the
part
of
capitalists
and landowners.
Within the context of Chile's new
political institutions,
this
compromise
favors the economic interests of conservative
forces. Their interests are further
strengthened by
the fact that
the
compromise
encouraged
collaboration between
govern-
ment and the
private
sector in economic and social
policymaking
during
Patricio
Aylwin's
administration. As a result of these
developments,
reformers will find it difficult to formulate and
pass policies designed
to address the issue of social
equity
in
Chile.
For, although
the
Right
agreed
that a little more attention
to
equity
was
desirable,
its stance on taxation and labor laws
makes it difficult to enact substantive welfare
policies,
or to
allow blue-collar workers to benefit from the fruits of increased
productivity.
BUSINESSMEN AND LANDOWNERS IN
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIANISM
IN LATIN AMERICA
A
SIGNIFICANT
body
of
writing suggests
that
political
change
-
especially
reforms such as
political
liberaliza-
tion and democratization
-
often
begins
with
splits
at the
top
(Skocpol,
1979;
O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986; Mosca,
1938).
Under what circumstances do
cleavages among
the elites turn
Between
1985
and
1988,
in its efforts to
allay capitalist
fears of
democratization,
the Alianza
Democrcatca
- which was
dominated
by
policy platform.
As
the
plebiscite
drew
nearer,
it became
that
any
real
fear of
revolutionary
socialism. This
suggests
that when AD
failed to draw
capitalists
into an
explicit political
coalition to
change
the
regime,
it
joined
them in an
implicit
conservative
economic
compact
words,
pragmatic
exchange
for
acquiescence
to
political
change
on the
part
of
capitalists
and landowners.
this
compromise
strengthened by
the fact that
the
compromise
encouraged
govern-
ment and the
private
policymaking
during
Patricio
Aylwin's
developments,
equity
in
Chile.
For, although
the
Right
agreed
to
equity
was
desirable,
policies,
or to
productivity.
IN LATIN AMERICA
A
SIGNIFICANT
body
of
writing suggests
that
political
change
-
especially
reforms such as
political
liberaliza-
-
often
begins
with
splits
at the
top
(Skocpol,
1979;
O'Donnell and
1938).
cleavages among
the elites turn
Between
1985
and
1988,
in its efforts to
allay capitalist
fears of
democratization,
the Alianza
Democrcatca
- which was
dominated
by
policy platform.
As
the
plebiscite
drew
nearer,
it became
that
any
real
fear of
revolutionary
socialism. This
suggests
that when AD
failed to draw
capitalists
into an
explicit political
coalition to
change
the
regime,
it
joined
them in an
implicit
conservative
economic
compact
words,
pragmatic
exchange
for
acquiescence
to
political
change
on the
part
of
capitalists
and landowners.
this
compromise
strengthened by
the fact that
the
compromise
encouraged
govern-
ment and the
private
policymaking
during
Patricio
Aylwin's
developments,
equity
in
Chile.
For, although
the
Right
agreed
to
equity
was
desirable,
policies,
or to
productivity.
IN LATIN AMERICA
A
SIGNIFICANT
body
of
writing suggests
that
political
change
-
especially
reforms such as
political
liberaliza-
-
often
begins
with
splits
at the
top
(Skocpol,
1979;
O'Donnell and
1938).
cleavages among
the elites turn
Between
1985
and
1988,
in its efforts to
allay capitalist
fears of
democratization,
the Alianza
Democrcatca
- which was
dominated
by
policy platform.
As
the
plebiscite
drew
nearer,
it became
that
any
real
fear of
revolutionary
socialism. This
suggests
that when AD
failed to draw
capitalists
into an
explicit political
coalition to
change
the
regime,
it
joined
them in an
implicit
conservative
economic
compact
words,
pragmatic
exchange
for
acquiescence
to
political
change
on the
part
of
capitalists
and landowners.
this
compromise
strengthened by
the fact that
the
compromise
encouraged
govern-
ment and the
private
policymaking
during
Patricio
Aylwin's
developments,
equity
in
Chile.
For, although
the
Right
agreed
to
equity
was
desirable,
policies,
or to
productivity.
IN LATIN AMERICA
A
SIGNIFICANT
body
of
writing suggests
that
political
change
-
especially
reforms such as
political
liberaliza-
-
often
begins
with
splits
at the
top
(Skocpol,
1979;
O'Donnell and
1938).
cleavages among
the elites turn
Between
1985
and
1988,
in its efforts to
allay capitalist
fears of
democratization,
the Alianza
Democrcatca
- which was
dominated
by
policy platform.
As
the
plebiscite
drew
nearer,
it became
that
any
real
fear of
revolutionary
socialism. This
suggests
that when AD
failed to draw
capitalists
into an
explicit political
coalition to
change
the
regime,
it
joined
them in an
implicit
conservative
economic
compact
words,
pragmatic
exchange
for
acquiescence
to
political
change
on the
part
of
capitalists
and landowners.
this
compromise
strengthened by
the fact that
the
compromise
encouraged
govern-
ment and the
private
policymaking
during
Patricio
Aylwin's
developments,
equity
in
Chile.
For, although
the
Right
agreed
to
equity
was
desirable,
policies,
or to
productivity.
IN LATIN AMERICA
A
SIGNIFICANT
body
of
writing suggests
that
political
change
-
especially
reforms such as
political
liberaliza-
-
often
begins
with
splits
at the
top
(Skocpol,
1979;
O'Donnell and
1938).
cleavages among
the elites turn
79 79 79 79 79
80
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
into conflict? The literature on authoritarianism
argues
that the
inclusion or exclusion of
significant large-scale
business and
landowning groups
in dominant
economic-policy
coalitions
colors their
support
for such
regimes
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982; O'Donnell,
1979).
Where
they
are included in the
policy
coalition,
have access to the
policymaking process
and can
defend themselves
against
measures that threaten their funda-
mental interests
-
property
and
profits
-
upper-class
elites
remain
loyal
to a
regime.
Put another
way,
for businessmen and
landowners,
these
factors
provide
a measure of the
reliability
of an authoritarian
regime (Kaufman, 1986; Frieden,
1989).
This means that when
the
opposite
holds
true,
a
regime
is
unreliable,
and excluded
capitalist
and
landowning groups may
turn
against
it. Dis-
gruntled
members of the
upper
class
may prefer
a more
democratic form of
government
because such
regimes
offer
more
points
of access and influence in
policymaking
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982).
They
also
encourage
more
open
and
diverse sources of
information,
which is often crucial to
decision-making
in business.
Nevertheless,
the
regime loyalties
of
capitalists
and land-
owners also
depend
on economic
performance (Frieden, 1989;
Chalmers and
Robinson,
1982).
Upper-class groups
shut out of
policymaking may
not
oppose
an authoritarian
regime during
good
economic
times;
but
during
prolonged, deep
economic
downturns, they may
well cast about for alternatives.
However,
whether or not
they
do so
may hinge
on the character of
emerging political party systems (Kaufman, 1986, Frieden,
1989, Epstein,
1984).
Capitalists
are more
likely
to
support
political
liberalization and democratization when
Leftist,
so-
cialist,
and
populist political parties
are weak.
A considerable
empirical
literature
supports
such views.
Research on
Ecuador,
Peru,
Bolivia,
and the Dominican
Republic
showed that business elites
supported
a shift from
authoritarianism to more democratic rule because
they
be-
lieved
they
would have
greater
access to the economic
under conditions in which the
perceived
argues
that the
business and
landowning groups
in dominant
economic-policy
coalitions
colors their
support
for such
regimes
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982; O'Donnell,
1979).
Where
they
are included in the
policy
coalition,
have access to the
and can
defend themselves
against
mental interests
-
property
and
profits
-
upper-class
elites
remain
loyal
to a
regime.
Put another
way,
for businessmen and
landowners,
these
factors
provide
a measure of the
reliability
of an authoritarian
1989).
the
opposite
holds
true,
a
regime
is
unreliable,
and excluded
capitalist
and
turn
against
it. Dis-
gruntled
members of the
upper
class
may prefer
a more
democratic form of
government
because such
regimes
offer
more
points
policymaking
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982).
They
also
encourage
more
open
and
diverse sources of
information,
decision-making
in business.
Nevertheless,
the
regime loyalties
of
capitalists
and land-
owners also
depend
on economic
Chalmers and
Robinson,
1982).
Upper-class groups
shut out of
policymaking may
not
oppose
an authoritarian
regime during
good
economic
times;
but
during
prolonged, deep
economic
downturns, they may
However,
whether or not
they
do so
may hinge
on the character of
1989, Epstein,
1984).
Capitalists
are more
likely
to
support
political
Leftist,
so-
cialist,
and
are weak.
A considerable
empirical
literature
supports
such views.
Research on
Ecuador,
Peru,
Bolivia,
and the Dominican
Republic
supported
a shift from
they
be-
lieved
they
would have
greater
perceived
argues
that the
business and
landowning groups
in dominant
economic-policy
coalitions
colors their
support
for such
regimes
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982; O'Donnell,
1979).
Where
they
are included in the
policy
coalition,
have access to the
and can
defend themselves
against
mental interests
-
property
and
profits
-
upper-class
elites
remain
loyal
to a
regime.
Put another
way,
for businessmen and
landowners,
these
factors
provide
a measure of the
reliability
of an authoritarian
1989).
the
opposite
holds
true,
a
regime
is
unreliable,
and excluded
capitalist
and
turn
against
it. Dis-
gruntled
members of the
upper
class
may prefer
a more
democratic form of
government
because such
regimes
offer
more
points
policymaking
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982).
They
also
encourage
more
open
and
diverse sources of
information,
decision-making
in business.
Nevertheless,
the
regime loyalties
of
capitalists
and land-
owners also
depend
on economic
Chalmers and
Robinson,
1982).
Upper-class groups
shut out of
policymaking may
not
oppose
an authoritarian
regime during
good
economic
times;
but
during
prolonged, deep
economic
downturns, they may
However,
whether or not
they
do so
may hinge
on the character of
1989, Epstein,
1984).
Capitalists
are more
likely
to
support
political
Leftist,
so-
cialist,
and
are weak.
A considerable
empirical
literature
supports
such views.
Research on
Ecuador,
Peru,
Bolivia,
and the Dominican
Republic
supported
a shift from
they
be-
lieved
they
would have
greater
perceived
argues
that the
business and
landowning groups
in dominant
economic-policy
coalitions
colors their
support
for such
regimes
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982; O'Donnell,
1979).
Where
they
are included in the
policy
coalition,
have access to the
and can
defend themselves
against
mental interests
-
property
and
profits
-
upper-class
elites
remain
loyal
to a
regime.
Put another
way,
for businessmen and
landowners,
these
factors
provide
a measure of the
reliability
of an authoritarian
1989).
the
opposite
holds
true,
a
regime
is
unreliable,
and excluded
capitalist
and
turn
against
it. Dis-
gruntled
members of the
upper
class
may prefer
a more
democratic form of
government
because such
regimes
offer
more
points
policymaking
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982).
They
also
encourage
more
open
and
diverse sources of
information,
decision-making
in business.
Nevertheless,
the
regime loyalties
of
capitalists
and land-
owners also
depend
on economic
Chalmers and
Robinson,
1982).
Upper-class groups
shut out of
policymaking may
not
oppose
an authoritarian
regime during
good
economic
times;
but
during
prolonged, deep
economic
downturns, they may
However,
whether or not
they
do so
may hinge
on the character of
1989, Epstein,
1984).
Capitalists
are more
likely
to
support
political
Leftist,
so-
cialist,
and
are weak.
A considerable
empirical
literature
supports
such views.
Research on
Ecuador,
Peru,
Bolivia,
and the Dominican
Republic
supported
a shift from
they
be-
lieved
they
would have
greater
perceived
argues
that the
business and
landowning groups
in dominant
economic-policy
coalitions
colors their
support
for such
regimes
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982; O'Donnell,
1979).
Where
they
are included in the
policy
coalition,
have access to the
and can
defend themselves
against
mental interests
-
property
and
profits
-
upper-class
elites
remain
loyal
to a
regime.
Put another
way,
for businessmen and
landowners,
these
factors
provide
a measure of the
reliability
of an authoritarian
1989).
the
opposite
holds
true,
a
regime
is
unreliable,
and excluded
capitalist
and
turn
against
it. Dis-
gruntled
members of the
upper
class
may prefer
a more
democratic form of
government
because such
regimes
offer
more
points
policymaking
(Chalmers
and
Robinson,
1982).
They
also
encourage
more
open
and
diverse sources of
information,
decision-making
in business.
Nevertheless,
the
regime loyalties
of
capitalists
and land-
owners also
depend
on economic
Chalmers and
Robinson,
1982).
Upper-class groups
shut out of
policymaking may
not
oppose
an authoritarian
regime during
good
economic
times;
but
during
prolonged, deep
economic
downturns, they may
However,
whether or not
they
do so
may hinge
on the character of
1989, Epstein,
1984).
Capitalists
are more
likely
to
support
political
Leftist,
so-
cialist,
and
are weak.
A considerable
empirical
literature
supports
such views.
Research on
Ecuador,
Peru,
Bolivia,
and the Dominican
Republic
supported
a shift from
they
be-
lieved
they
would have
greater
perceived
threat from below was low
(Conaghan, Malloy
and
Abugattas,
1990; Conaghan
and
Espinal,
1990).
Similar evidence exists for
the cases of
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and Venezuela
(Smith,
1989; Cardoso, 1986; Maxfield, 1989; Millan, 1988, Frieden,
1991).
Capitalists
turned to
democracy
due to
varying
combi-
nations of the
following
factors: their exclusion from economic
policymaking, poor
economic
performance
under
authoritarianism,
and low salience of the threat from below.
This
brings
the discussion back to the issue of Chilean
exceptionality.
Most studies
argue
that Chilean
large-scale
busi-
nessmen and landowners chafed under the same unfavorable
conditions as their
peers
elsewhere in Latin America:
they
were
excluded from economic
policymaking
and suffered
deeply
during
severe economic crises.
Nevertheless, they
continued to
support
Pinochet because
they
feared
resurgent
socialism in the
wake of the
1983-84
economic debacle. In other
words,
according
to these
studies,
the main difference between Chile and the other
cases
lay
in the
degree
of threat from below.
This article
argues
that the crucial differences between
Chile and the other Latin American cases
lay
elsewhere. Chilean
capitalists supported
Pinochet because
they
were
included,
rather than
excluded,
from economic
policymaking
under
conditions in which the threat from below was far from
overwhelming, especially
after the
taming
of the Left. More-
over,
the Chilean
bourgeoisie accepted
Pinochet's defeat in the
October
1988
plebiscite
because the
opposition
had committed
itself to retain their economic
model,
because the
economy
had
continued to
grow
from
1985
onwards,
and because the
constitution ensured
protection
of their
privileges.3
BUSINESSMEN, LANDOWNERS,
PRAGMATIC NEOLIBERALISM
AND MASS MOBILIZATION:
1983-85
THE CHILEAN
military government
was at its weakest
during
the economic crisis of
1983-85.
It faced both an
entrepre-
neurial revolt
against
extreme free-market
policies
and mass
(Conaghan, Malloy
and
Abugattas,
1990; Conaghan
and
Espinal,
1990).
the cases of
and Venezuela
(Smith,
1991).
Capitalists
turned to
democracy
due to
varying
combi-
nations of the
following
policymaking, poor
economic
performance
under
authoritarianism,
This
brings
exceptionality.
Most studies
argue
that Chilean
large-scale
busi-
conditions as their
peers
they
were
policymaking
and suffered
deeply
during
Nevertheless, they
continued to
support
Pinochet because
they
feared
resurgent
socialism in the
wake of the
1983-84
words,
according
to these
studies,
cases
lay
in the
degree
This article
argues
lay
elsewhere. Chilean
Pinochet because
they
were
included,
rather than
excluded,
from economic
policymaking
under
after the
taming
of the Left. More-
over,
the Chilean
October
1988
plebiscite
because the
opposition
had committed
model,
because the
economy
had
continued to
grow
from
1985
onwards,
and because the
protection
of their
privileges.3
1983-85
THE CHILEAN
military government
was at its weakest
during
1983-85.
It faced both an
entrepre-
neurial revolt
against
extreme free-market
policies
and mass
(Conaghan, Malloy
and
Abugattas,
1990; Conaghan
and
Espinal,
1990).
the cases of
and Venezuela
(Smith,
1991).
Capitalists
turned to
democracy
due to
varying
combi-
nations of the
following
policymaking, poor
economic
performance
under
authoritarianism,
This
brings
exceptionality.
Most studies
argue
that Chilean
large-scale
busi-
conditions as their
peers
they
were
policymaking
and suffered
deeply
during
Nevertheless, they
continued to
support
Pinochet because
they
feared
resurgent
socialism in the
wake of the
1983-84
words,
according
to these
studies,
cases
lay
in the
degree
This article
argues
lay
elsewhere. Chilean
Pinochet because
they
were
included,
rather than
excluded,
from economic
policymaking
under
after the
taming
of the Left. More-
over,
the Chilean
October
1988
plebiscite
because the
opposition
had committed
model,
because the
economy
had
continued to
grow
from
1985
onwards,
and because the
protection
of their
privileges.3
1983-85
THE CHILEAN
military government
was at its weakest
during
1983-85.
It faced both an
entrepre-
neurial revolt
against
extreme free-market
policies
and mass
(Conaghan, Malloy
and
Abugattas,
1990; Conaghan
and
Espinal,
1990).
the cases of
and Venezuela
(Smith,
1991).
Capitalists
turned to
democracy
due to
varying
combi-
nations of the
following
policymaking, poor
economic
performance
under
authoritarianism,
This
brings
exceptionality.
Most studies
argue
that Chilean
large-scale
busi-
conditions as their
peers
they
were
policymaking
and suffered
deeply
during
Nevertheless, they
continued to
support
Pinochet because
they
feared
resurgent
socialism in the
wake of the
1983-84
words,
according
to these
studies,
cases
lay
in the
degree
This article
argues
lay
elsewhere. Chilean
Pinochet because
they
were
included,
rather than
excluded,
from economic
policymaking
under
after the
taming
of the Left. More-
over,
the Chilean
October
1988
plebiscite
because the
opposition
had committed
model,
because the
economy
had
continued to
grow
from
1985
onwards,
and because the
protection
of their
privileges.3
1983-85
THE CHILEAN
military government
was at its weakest
during
1983-85.
It faced both an
entrepre-
neurial revolt
against
extreme free-market
policies
and mass
(Conaghan, Malloy
and
Abugattas,
1990; Conaghan
and
Espinal,
1990).
the cases of
and Venezuela
(Smith,
1991).
Capitalists
turned to
democracy
due to
varying
combi-
nations of the
following
policymaking, poor
economic
performance
under
authoritarianism,
This
brings
exceptionality.
Most studies
argue
that Chilean
large-scale
busi-
conditions as their
peers
they
were
policymaking
and suffered
deeply
during
Nevertheless, they
continued to
support
Pinochet because
they
feared
resurgent
socialism in the
wake of the
1983-84
words,
according
to these
studies,
cases
lay
in the
degree
This article
argues
lay
elsewhere. Chilean
Pinochet because
they
were
included,
rather than
excluded,
from economic
policymaking
under
after the
taming
of the Left. More-
over,
the Chilean
October
1988
plebiscite
because the
opposition
had committed
model,
because the
economy
had
continued to
grow
from
1985
onwards,
and because the
protection
of their
privileges.3
1983-85
THE CHILEAN
military government
was at its weakest
during
1983-85.
It faced both an
entrepre-
neurial revolt
against
extreme free-market
policies
and mass
81 81 81 81 81
82
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
mobilization
demanding
democratization.
During
this crucial
period,
the
opposition
tried to wrest control of the
pace
and
nature of
political change away
from
Pinochet,
but it failed in
that
attempt
due its
inability
to
forge
a cross-class coalition
which included the disaffected
capitalists.
To build such an
alliance,
the
opposition
would have had to convert that
conflict over economic
policy
between the business/
landowning
sector and the
regime
into
support
for
rapid
democratization.
However,
Pinochet
managed
to
regain
the
undivided
loyalty
of the
bourgeoisie, thereby foiling
his
political opposition.
To
point
out
just
how this
transpired,
the
following
sections will outline the
military regime's
economic
and
political project;
the economic
policy
differences be-
tween
capitalists
and the
regime;
how the
opposition
tried to
capitalize
on these
differences,
and what Pinochet did to
recover the situation.
Backdrop
to Crisis
Between
1973
and
1977,
after the overthrow of Salvador
Allende and the demobilization of
society,
Chile's
military
government developed
two
goals
for its economic and
political
agenda.
It wanted to
replace
democratic
politics
with authori-
tarian rule and economic
policies
that
gave
a central role to the
state with ones based on the free-market.4 To that
end,
Pinochet consolidated the state under one-man rule and
sponsored
a cadre of neoliberal technocrats
-
the so-called
"Chicago boys,"
in reference to the fact that
many
of them had
studied neoclassical economics at the
University
of
Chicago
-
to
design
and
implement
extreme laissez-faire economic
policies
(Constable
and
Valenzuela, 1991; Valdes,
1989;
Edwards
and
Cox-Edwards, 1987; Silva,
1993).
Pinochet insulated the
Chicago boys
from the
pressure
of
those
groups
in
society
that
protested
his economic restructur-
ing, including
businessmen and landowners
(Campero,
1984).
It should be
recognized, however,
that those
policies
garnered
considerable
support
from a limited number of
conglomerates
mobilization
demanding
democratization.
During
this crucial
period,
the
opposition
pace
and
nature of
from
Pinochet,
but it failed in
that
attempt
due its
inability
to
forge
capitalists.
To build such an
alliance,
the
opposition
policy
landowning
sector and the
regime
into
support
for
rapid
democratization.
However,
Pinochet
managed
to
regain
the
undivided
loyalty
of the
his
To
point
out
just
how this
transpired,
the
following
military regime's
economic
and
political project;
the economic
policy
differences be-
tween
capitalists
and the
regime;
how the
opposition
tried to
capitalize
on these
differences,
Backdrop
to Crisis
Between
1973
and
1977,
society,
Chile's
military
two
goals
political
agenda.
It wanted to
replace
democratic
politics
with authori-
policies
that
gave
end,
sponsored
-
the so-called
"Chicago boys,"
many
of them had
University
of
Chicago
-
to
design
and
implement
policies
(Constable
and
1989;
Edwards
and
1993).
Chicago boys
from the
pressure
of
those
groups
in
society
that
protested
ing, including
(Campero,
1984).
It should be
that those
policies
garnered
considerable
support
conglomerates
mobilization
demanding
democratization.
During
this crucial
period,
the
opposition
pace
and
nature of
from
Pinochet,
but it failed in
that
attempt
due its
inability
to
forge
capitalists.
To build such an
alliance,
the
opposition
policy
landowning
sector and the
regime
into
support
for
rapid
democratization.
However,
Pinochet
managed
to
regain
the
undivided
loyalty
of the
his
To
point
out
just
how this
transpired,
the
following
military regime's
economic
and
political project;
the economic
policy
differences be-
tween
capitalists
and the
regime;
how the
opposition
tried to
capitalize
on these
differences,
Backdrop
to Crisis
Between
1973
and
1977,
society,
Chile's
military
two
goals
political
agenda.
It wanted to
replace
democratic
politics
with authori-
policies
that
gave
end,
sponsored
-
the so-called
"Chicago boys,"
many
of them had
University
of
Chicago
-
to
design
and
implement
policies
(Constable
and
1989;
Edwards
and
1993).
Chicago boys
from the
pressure
of
those
groups
in
society
that
protested
ing, including
(Campero,
1984).
It should be
that those
policies
garnered
considerable
support
conglomerates
mobilization
demanding
democratization.
During
this crucial
period,
the
opposition
pace
and
nature of
from
Pinochet,
but it failed in
that
attempt
due its
inability
to
forge
capitalists.
To build such an
alliance,
the
opposition
policy
landowning
sector and the
regime
into
support
for
rapid
democratization.
However,
Pinochet
managed
to
regain
the
undivided
loyalty
of the
his
To
point
out
just
how this
transpired,
the
following
military regime's
economic
and
political project;
the economic
policy
differences be-
tween
capitalists
and the
regime;
how the
opposition
tried to
capitalize
on these
differences,
Backdrop
to Crisis
Between
1973
and
1977,
society,
Chile's
military
two
goals
political
agenda.
It wanted to
replace
democratic
politics
with authori-
policies
that
gave
end,
sponsored
-
the so-called
"Chicago boys,"
many
of them had
University
of
Chicago
-
to
design
and
implement
policies
(Constable
and
1989;
Edwards
and
1993).
Chicago boys
from the
pressure
of
those
groups
in
society
that
protested
ing, including
(Campero,
1984).
It should be
that those
policies
garnered
considerable
support
conglomerates
mobilization
demanding
democratization.
During
this crucial
period,
the
opposition
pace
and
nature of
from
Pinochet,
but it failed in
that
attempt
due its
inability
to
forge
capitalists.
To build such an
alliance,
the
opposition
policy
landowning
sector and the
regime
into
support
for
rapid
democratization.
However,
Pinochet
managed
to
regain
the
undivided
loyalty
of the
his
To
point
out
just
how this
transpired,
the
following
military regime's
economic
and
political project;
the economic
policy
differences be-
tween
capitalists
and the
regime;
how the
opposition
tried to
capitalize
on these
differences,
Backdrop
to Crisis
Between
1973
and
1977,
society,
Chile's
military
two
goals
political
agenda.
It wanted to
replace
democratic
politics
with authori-
policies
that
gave
end,
sponsored
-
the so-called
"Chicago boys,"
many
of them had
University
of
Chicago
-
to
design
and
implement
policies
(Constable
and
1989;
Edwards
and
1993).
Chicago boys
from the
pressure
of
those
groups
in
society
that
protested
ing, including
(Campero,
1984).
It should be
that those
policies
garnered
considerable
support
conglomerates
that
expanded rapidly
under the new economic
policies.
Those
conglomerates
concentrated their assets in the
very
economic
sectors favored
by
economic
restructuring:
nontraditional
exports, imported
consumer
goods,
and
foreign
loan interme-
diation
(Dahse, 1979; Sanfuentes,
1984).
Between
1977
and
1981
the Chilean
economy boomed,
so
that, by 1979,
the
peak
associations made
up
of
big
were
solidly
behind the Pinochet economic and
political
model.
In
1980,
at the
height
of the economic
boom,
the
military
government legalized
its
project
for
political
change
by
initiat-
ing,
and
ratifying,
a new constitution.
According
to the
government,
the Constitution of
1980
was
approved by
67% of
the voters.
However,
the
plebiscite
on the constitution was
noncompetitive
and offered no
safeguards
for the
opposition.
The new constitution extended Pinochet's
authority
to the
year
1988,
at which time another
noncompetitive plebiscite
would
be held to determine whether he would continue in office until
at least
1997.
Permanent articles of the constitution were
designed
to ensure a
"protected" democracy,
one in which the
military
would continue to exercise a
tutelary
role over civilian
governments
in the future
through
a National
Security
Council
(Drake
andJaksic, 1991; Loveman,
1991).
The
early successes,
and
resulting euphoria,
of the
Pinochet
regime
came to an
abrupt
end with
collapse
of the
domestic
economy
in
1982-83.
Faith in the
military regime's
acumen was
shattered,
and
support
for its
policies
dwindled;
between
1983
and
1985
confidence in the
government
reached
its lowest
point.
The
conglomerates,
which had formed the
core of the
government's support, disintegrated; entrepreneur-
ial
groups rejected
the ultra-neoliberalism
they
had
formerly
embraced as
they sought
relief from
ruin;
and the middle and
lower classes
(who
had suffered most under the extremities of
laissez-faire)
joined
with
resurgent parties
in the
political
opposition
to swell a mass mobilization movement that chal-
lenged
Pinochet's rule.
that
expanded rapidly
policies.
Those
conglomerates
very
economic
sectors favored
by
economic
restructuring:
nontraditional
exports, imported
consumer
goods,
and
foreign
loan interme-
diation
1984).
Between
1977
and
1981
the Chilean
economy boomed,
so
that, by 1979,
the
peak
associations made
up
of
big
were
solidly
political
model.
In
1980,
at the
height
of the economic
boom,
the
military
its
project
for
political
change
by
initiat-
ing,
and
ratifying,
a new constitution.
According
to the
government,
the Constitution of
1980
was
approved by
67% of
the voters.
However,
the
plebiscite
noncompetitive
and offered no
safeguards
for the
opposition.
authority
to the
year
1988,
would
at least
1997.
designed
to ensure a
one in which the
military
tutelary
role over civilian
governments
in the future
through
a National
Security
Council
(Drake
1991).
The
early successes,
and
resulting euphoria,
of the
Pinochet
regime
came to an
abrupt
end with
collapse
of the
domestic
economy
in
1982-83.
Faith in the
military regime's
acumen was
shattered,
and
support
for its
policies
dwindled;
between
1983
and
1985
confidence in the
government
reached
its lowest
point.
The
conglomerates,
core of the
ial
groups rejected
they
had
formerly
embraced as
they sought
relief from
ruin;
and the middle and
lower classes
(who
laissez-faire)
joined
with
resurgent parties
in the
political
opposition
lenged
Pinochet's rule.
that
expanded rapidly
policies.
Those
conglomerates
very
economic
sectors favored
by
economic
restructuring:
nontraditional
exports, imported
consumer
goods,
and
foreign
loan interme-
diation
1984).
Between
1977
and
1981
the Chilean
economy boomed,
so
that, by 1979,
the
peak
associations made
up
of
big
were
solidly
political
model.
In
1980,
at the
height
of the economic
boom,
the
military
its
project
for
political
change
by
initiat-
ing,
and
ratifying,
a new constitution.
According
to the
government,
the Constitution of
1980
was
approved by
67% of
the voters.
However,
the
plebiscite
noncompetitive
and offered no
safeguards
for the
opposition.
authority
to the
year
1988,
would
at least
1997.
designed
to ensure a
one in which the
military
tutelary
role over civilian
governments
in the future
through
a National
Security
Council
(Drake
1991).
The
early successes,
and
resulting euphoria,
of the
Pinochet
regime
came to an
abrupt
end with
collapse
of the
domestic
economy
in
1982-83.
Faith in the
military regime's
acumen was
shattered,
and
support
for its
policies
dwindled;
between
1983
and
1985
confidence in the
government
reached
its lowest
point.
The
conglomerates,
core of the
ial
groups rejected
they
had
formerly
embraced as
they sought
relief from
ruin;
and the middle and
lower classes
(who
laissez-faire)
joined
with
resurgent parties
in the
political
opposition
lenged
Pinochet's rule.
that
expanded rapidly
policies.
Those
conglomerates
very
economic
sectors favored
by
economic
restructuring:
nontraditional
exports, imported
consumer
goods,
and
foreign
loan interme-
diation
1984).
Between
1977
and
1981
the Chilean
economy boomed,
so
that, by 1979,
the
peak
associations made
up
of
big
were
solidly
political
model.
In
1980,
at the
height
of the economic
boom,
the
military
its
project
for
political
change
by
initiat-
ing,
and
ratifying,
a new constitution.
According
to the
government,
the Constitution of
1980
was
approved by
67% of
the voters.
However,
the
plebiscite
noncompetitive
and offered no
safeguards
for the
opposition.
authority
to the
year
1988,
would
at least
1997.
designed
to ensure a
one in which the
military
tutelary
role over civilian
governments
in the future
through
a National
Security
Council
(Drake
1991).
The
early successes,
and
resulting euphoria,
of the
Pinochet
regime
came to an
abrupt
end with
collapse
of the
domestic
economy
in
1982-83.
Faith in the
military regime's
acumen was
shattered,
and
support
for its
policies
dwindled;
between
1983
and
1985
confidence in the
government
reached
its lowest
point.
The
conglomerates,
core of the
ial
groups rejected
they
had
formerly
embraced as
they sought
relief from
ruin;
and the middle and
lower classes
(who
laissez-faire)
joined
with
resurgent parties
in the
political
opposition
lenged
Pinochet's rule.
that
expanded rapidly
policies.
Those
conglomerates
very
economic
sectors favored
by
economic
restructuring:
nontraditional
exports, imported
consumer
goods,
and
foreign
loan interme-
diation
1984).
Between
1977
and
1981
the Chilean
economy boomed,
so
that, by 1979,
the
peak
associations made
up
of
big
were
solidly
political
model.
In
1980,
at the
height
of the economic
boom,
the
military
its
project
for
political
change
by
initiat-
ing,
and
ratifying,
a new constitution.
According
to the
government,
the Constitution of
1980
was
approved by
67% of
the voters.
However,
the
plebiscite
noncompetitive
and offered no
safeguards
for the
opposition.
authority
to the
year
1988,
would
at least
1997.
designed
to ensure a
one in which the
military
tutelary
role over civilian
governments
in the future
through
a National
Security
Council
(Drake
1991).
The
early successes,
and
resulting euphoria,
of the
Pinochet
regime
came to an
abrupt
end with
collapse
of the
domestic
economy
in
1982-83.
Faith in the
military regime's
acumen was
shattered,
and
support
for its
policies
dwindled;
between
1983
and
1985
confidence in the
government
reached
its lowest
point.
The
conglomerates,
core of the
ial
groups rejected
they
had
formerly
embraced as
they sought
relief from
ruin;
and the middle and
lower classes
(who
laissez-faire)
joined
with
resurgent parties
in the
political
opposition
lenged
Pinochet's rule.
83 83 83 83 83
84
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
Businessmen,
the
Opposition
and Pinochet:
1983
Prior to
1983,
Pinochet had been a firm
supporter
of
radical,
neoliberal economic
policies.5
His
government
im-
posed,
and
clung to,
low real
exchange
rates
(indeed,
a fixed
rate between
1979-82), high
interest
rates,
low customs tariffs
(10%)
across the board with little non-tariff
protection,
defla-
tionary monetary policies,
and a
general
disinterest in either
government-sponsored
debt relief or sectoral
policies.6
In
addition,
the formulation of economic
policy pointedly
ex-
cluded
any input
from business
organizations
or their
peak
associations.
During
the boom
years,
firms and individuals could -
and did - borrow
extensively
for
purposes
of
investment,
consumption,
and
navigating
financial difficulties. In
1982,
however,
the flood of
foreign lending began
to
dry up,
and
economic hard times set in with a
vengeance.
The
peak
business associations had to learn how to
respond
to debt-
induced
bankruptcies,
lack of credit
(due
to restrictive mon-
etary policies),
stiff
competition
from
imports,
and an overval-
ued
currency
that
hampered exports. By mid-1983,
Chile's
associations of
big
business and
big
landowners had formed a
coalition
sponsoring
an alternative
program
for
recovery
based
on an
explicitly "pragmatic"
neoliberal economic
policy.
The
coalition was still
sufficiently
neoliberal to
prefer
market
mechanisms to
regulation by
the
state,
but it was also suffi-
ciently pragmatic
to
recognize
that it was time for the state to
assume a
larger
role in
managing
the
economy
than had been
the case
up
til then.
The coalition in favor of a
pragmatic
neoliberal
policy
emerged
as the result of
negotiations
on the
part
of Chile's six
major peak
business associations. These
negotiations
took
place
under the
aegis
of the Confederation of Production and
Commerce
(CPC),
an umbrella
organization
of the
six,
which
published
its
plan
for economic
recovery,
entitled
"Recuperaci6n
econ6mica:
Analisisyproposiciones,
"in
July
1983.
The
report
called for a number of measures to deal with the crisis:
(1)
high
real
exchange
rates to stimulate
exports
and
protect against
Businessmen,
the
Opposition
and Pinochet:
1983
Prior to
1983,
supporter
of
radical,
neoliberal economic
policies.5
His
government
im-
posed,
and
clung to,
low real
exchange
rates
(indeed,
a fixed
rate between
1979-82), high
interest
rates,
low customs tariffs
(10%)
protection,
defla-
and a
general
policies.6
In
addition,
policy pointedly
ex-
cluded
any input
from business
organizations
or their
peak
associations.
During
the boom
years,
and did - borrow
extensively
for
purposes
of
investment,
consumption,
and
navigating
1982,
however,
the flood of
to
dry up,
and
vengeance.
The
peak
respond
to debt-
induced
bankruptcies,
lack of credit
(due
to restrictive mon-
etary policies),
stiff
competition
from
imports,
and an overval-
ued
currency
that
Chile's
associations of
big
business and
big
coalition
sponsoring
an alternative
program
for
recovery
based
on an
neoliberal economic
policy.
The
coalition was still
sufficiently
neoliberal to
prefer
market
mechanisms to
regulation by
the
state,
ciently pragmatic
to
recognize
assume a
larger
role in
managing
the
economy
than had been
the case
up
til then.
pragmatic
neoliberal
policy
emerged
as the result of
negotiations
on the
part
of Chile's six
major peak
negotiations
took
place
under the
aegis
Commerce
(CPC),
an umbrella
organization
of the
six,
which
published
its
plan
for economic
recovery,
entitled
"Recuperaci6n
econ6mica:
"in
July
1983.
The
report
(1)
high
real
exchange
rates to stimulate
exports
and
protect against
Businessmen,
the
Opposition
and Pinochet:
1983
Prior to
1983,
supporter
of
radical,
neoliberal economic
policies.5
His
government
im-
posed,
and
clung to,
low real
exchange
rates
(indeed,
a fixed
rate between
1979-82), high
interest
rates,
low customs tariffs
(10%)
protection,
defla-
and a
general
policies.6
In
addition,
policy pointedly
ex-
cluded
any input
from business
organizations
or their
peak
associations.
During
the boom
years,
and did - borrow
extensively
for
purposes
of
investment,
consumption,
and
navigating
1982,
however,
the flood of
to
dry up,
and
vengeance.
The
peak
respond
to debt-
induced
bankruptcies,
lack of credit
(due
to restrictive mon-
etary policies),
stiff
competition
from
imports,
and an overval-
ued
currency
that
Chile's
associations of
big
business and
big
coalition
sponsoring
an alternative
program
for
recovery
based
on an
neoliberal economic
policy.
The
coalition was still
sufficiently
neoliberal to
prefer
market
mechanisms to
regulation by
the
state,
ciently pragmatic
to
recognize
assume a
larger
role in
managing
the
economy
than had been
the case
up
til then.
pragmatic
neoliberal
policy
emerged
as the result of
negotiations
on the
part
of Chile's six
major peak
negotiations
took
place
under the
aegis
Commerce
(CPC),
an umbrella
organization
of the
six,
which
published
its
plan
for economic
recovery,
entitled
"Recuperaci6n
econ6mica:
"in
July
1983.
The
report
(1)
high
real
exchange
rates to stimulate
exports
and
protect against
Businessmen,
the
Opposition
and Pinochet:
1983
Prior to
1983,
supporter
of
radical,
neoliberal economic
policies.5
His
government
im-
posed,
and
clung to,
low real
exchange
rates
(indeed,
a fixed
rate between
1979-82), high
interest
rates,
low customs tariffs
(10%)
protection,
defla-
and a
general
policies.6
In
addition,
policy pointedly
ex-
cluded
any input
from business
organizations
or their
peak
associations.
During
the boom
years,
and did - borrow
extensively
for
purposes
of
investment,
consumption,
and
navigating
1982,
however,
the flood of
to
dry up,
and
vengeance.
The
peak
respond
to debt-
induced
bankruptcies,
lack of credit
(due
to restrictive mon-
etary policies),
stiff
competition
from
imports,
and an overval-
ued
currency
that
Chile's
associations of
big
business and
big
coalition
sponsoring
an alternative
program
for
recovery
based
on an
neoliberal economic
policy.
The
coalition was still
sufficiently
neoliberal to
prefer
market
mechanisms to
regulation by
the
state,
ciently pragmatic
to
recognize
assume a
larger
role in
managing
the
economy
than had been
the case
up
til then.
pragmatic
neoliberal
policy
emerged
as the result of
negotiations
on the
part
of Chile's six
major peak
negotiations
took
place
under the
aegis
Commerce
(CPC),
an umbrella
organization
of the
six,
which
published
its
plan
for economic
recovery,
entitled
"Recuperaci6n
econ6mica:
"in
July
1983.
The
report
(1)
high
real
exchange
rates to stimulate
exports
and
protect against
Businessmen,
the
Opposition
and Pinochet:
1983
Prior to
1983,
supporter
of
radical,
neoliberal economic
policies.5
His
government
im-
posed,
and
clung to,
low real
exchange
rates
(indeed,
a fixed
rate between
1979-82), high
interest
rates,
low customs tariffs
(10%)
protection,
defla-
and a
general
policies.6
In
addition,
policy pointedly
ex-
cluded
any input
from business
organizations
or their
peak
associations.
During
the boom
years,
and did - borrow
extensively
for
purposes
of
investment,
consumption,
and
navigating
1982,
however,
the flood of
to
dry up,
and
vengeance.
The
peak
respond
to debt-
induced
bankruptcies,
lack of credit
(due
to restrictive mon-
etary policies),
stiff
competition
from
imports,
and an overval-
ued
currency
that
Chile's
associations of
big
business and
big
coalition
sponsoring
an alternative
program
for
recovery
based
on an
neoliberal economic
policy.
The
coalition was still
sufficiently
neoliberal to
prefer
market
mechanisms to
regulation by
the
state,
ciently pragmatic
to
recognize
assume a
larger
role in
managing
the
economy
than had been
the case
up
til then.
pragmatic
neoliberal
policy
emerged
as the result of
negotiations
on the
part
of Chile's six
major peak
negotiations
took
place
under the
aegis
Commerce
(CPC),
an umbrella
organization
of the
six,
which
published
its
plan
for economic
recovery,
entitled
"Recuperaci6n
econ6mica:
"in
July
1983.
The
report
(1)
high
real
exchange
rates to stimulate
exports
and
protect against
imports,
(2)
higher
across-the-board tariffs with
protection
against
unfair
competition,
(3)
a
reflationary monetary policy,
(4)
low interest
rates,
(5)
debt
relief,
and
(6)
policies
that
targeted
specific
sectors
(such
as
export promotion,
construc-
tion
projects, agricultural development,
and so
on).
The CPC
and its affiliates also demanded not
only
that
they
be included
in the
but that such a role for
input
from
the
private
sector be institutionalized. Pinochet
largely ignored
these
pleas
for
help
from an
increasingly desperate
business
community (Silva,
1991).
As the business
community stepped up
its criticism of the
government's
economic
policy,
the
working
and middle
classes,
also
suffering
from the
recession,
were
becoming increasingly
restive as well. In
May 1983,
their resentment
erupted
into a
national
day
of
protest,
initiated and directed
by
the
copper
workers union but far
surpassing
their wildest
expectations.
The massive demonstration
gave graphic
indication of the
depth
of
public
unrest and
opposition
to Pinochet and shook
the
regime
to its core.
A coalition of
parties
from the Center and
Center-Left,
dominated
by
the Christian
Democrats, quickly
took control of
the
principal opposition
movement
-
Alianza Democratica
(AD)
-
and
began staging monthly protests (Garreton,
1989
and
1987).
The
goal
of the Alianza was to turn the
1980
Constitution's limited
political
liberalization into
full-fledged
democratization. AD demanded
free,
competitive
elections
with full citizen
participation
and civil
guarantees by
1985.
That
meant
stripping
Pinochet of his
power, abrogating
the
per-
petual
state of
emergency, rescinding
the restrictions on
political party activity, allowing
exiles to
return,
and
restoring
political rights
to Marxist
parties.
Meanwhile,
more radical
parties
of the Left
(mainly
the
Communist
Party
and a faction of the Socialist
Party)
formed a
much smaller bloc of the
opposition
called the Movimiento
Democrtitco
Popular(MDP). Although they
too
participated
in
the
monthly protests,
the
leadership
of the Alianza Democratica
made
every
effort to distance itself from the
MDP, rejecting
all
imports,
(2)
higher
protection
against
unfair
competition,
(3)
a
(4)
low interest
rates,
(5)
debt
relief,
and
(6)
policies
that
targeted
specific
sectors
(such
as
export promotion,
construc-
tion
and so
on).
The CPC
only
that
they
be included
in the
input
from
the
private
largely ignored
these
pleas
for
help
from an
business
community (Silva,
1991).
As the business
government's
economic
policy,
the
working
and middle
classes,
also
suffering
from the
recession,
were
restive as well. In
May 1983,
their resentment
erupted
into a
national
day
of
protest,
by
the
copper
surpassing
their wildest
expectations.
gave graphic
indication of the
depth
of
public
unrest and
opposition
the
regime
to its core.
A coalition of
parties
from the Center and
Center-Left,
dominated
by
the Christian
Democrats, quickly
took control of
the
movement
-
Alianza Democratica
(AD)
-
and
1989
and
1987).
The
goal
1980
political
liberalization into
full-fledged
free,
competitive
elections
with full citizen
participation
and civil
guarantees by
1985.
That
meant
stripping
Pinochet of his
power, abrogating
the
per-
petual
state of
the restrictions on
exiles to
return,
and
restoring
political rights
to Marxist
parties.
Meanwhile,
more radical
parties
of the Left
(mainly
the
Communist
Party
Party)
formed a
opposition
Democrtitco
too
participated
in
the
monthly protests,
the
leadership
made
every
MDP, rejecting
all
imports,
(2)
higher
protection
against
unfair
competition,
(3)
a
(4)
low interest
rates,
(5)
debt
relief,
and
(6)
policies
that
targeted
specific
sectors
(such
as
export promotion,
construc-
tion
and so
on).
The CPC
only
that
they
be included
in the
input
from
the
private
largely ignored
these
pleas
for
help
from an
business
community (Silva,
1991).
As the business
government's
economic
policy,
the
working
and middle
classes,
also
suffering
from the
recession,
were
restive as well. In
May 1983,
their resentment
erupted
into a
national
day
of
protest,
by
the
copper
surpassing
their wildest
expectations.
gave graphic
indication of the
depth
of
public
unrest and
opposition
the
regime
to its core.
A coalition of
parties
from the Center and
Center-Left,
dominated
by
the Christian
Democrats, quickly
took control of
the
movement
-
Alianza Democratica
(AD)
-
and
1989
and
1987).
The
goal
1980
political
liberalization into
full-fledged
free,
competitive
elections
with full citizen
participation
and civil
guarantees by
1985.
That
meant
stripping
Pinochet of his
power, abrogating
the
per-
petual
state of
the restrictions on
exiles to
return,
and
restoring
political rights
to Marxist
parties.
Meanwhile,
more radical
parties
of the Left
(mainly
the
Communist
Party
Party)
formed a
opposition
Democrtitco
too
participated
in
the
monthly protests,
the
leadership
made
every
MDP, rejecting
all
imports,
(2)
higher
protection
against
unfair
competition,
(3)
a
(4)
low interest
rates,
(5)
debt
relief,
and
(6)
policies
that
targeted
specific
sectors
(such
as
export promotion,
construc-
tion
and so
on).
The CPC
only
that
they
be included
in the
input
from
the
private
largely ignored
these
pleas
for
help
from an
business
community (Silva,
1991).
As the business
government's
economic
policy,
the
working
and middle
classes,
also
suffering
from the
recession,
were
restive as well. In
May 1983,
their resentment
erupted
into a
national
day
of
protest,
by
the
copper
surpassing
their wildest
expectations.
gave graphic
indication of the
depth
of
public
unrest and
opposition
the
regime
to its core.
A coalition of
parties
from the Center and
Center-Left,
dominated
by
the Christian
Democrats, quickly
took control of
the
movement
-
Alianza Democratica
(AD)
-
and
1989
and
1987).
The
goal
1980
political
liberalization into
full-fledged
free,
competitive
elections
with full citizen
participation
and civil
guarantees by
1985.
That
meant
stripping
Pinochet of his
power, abrogating
the
per-
petual
state of
the restrictions on
exiles to
return,
and
restoring
political rights
to Marxist
parties.
Meanwhile,
more radical
parties
of the Left
(mainly
the
Communist
Party
Party)
formed a
opposition
Democrtitco
too
participated
in
the
monthly protests,
the
leadership
made
every
MDP, rejecting
all
imports,
(2)
higher
protection
against
unfair
competition,
(3)
a
(4)
low interest
rates,
(5)
debt
relief,
and
(6)
policies
that
targeted
specific
sectors
(such
as
export promotion,
construc-
tion
and so
on).
The CPC
only
that
they
be included
in the
input
from
the
private
largely ignored
these
pleas
for
help
from an
business
community (Silva,
1991).
As the business
government's
economic
policy,
the
working
and middle
classes,
also
suffering
from the
recession,
were
restive as well. In
May 1983,
their resentment
erupted
into a
national
day
of
protest,
by
the
copper
surpassing
their wildest
expectations.
gave graphic
indication of the
depth
of
public
unrest and
opposition
the
regime
to its core.
A coalition of
parties
from the Center and
Center-Left,
dominated
by
the Christian
Democrats, quickly
took control of
the
movement
-
Alianza Democratica
(AD)
-
and
1989
and
1987).
The
goal
1980
political
liberalization into
full-fledged
free,
competitive
elections
with full citizen
participation
and civil
guarantees by
1985.
That
meant
stripping
Pinochet of his
power, abrogating
the
per-
petual
state of
the restrictions on
exiles to
return,
and
restoring
political rights
to Marxist
parties.
Meanwhile,
more radical
parties
of the Left
(mainly
the
Communist
Party
Party)
formed a
opposition
Democrtitco
too
participated
in
the
monthly protests,
the
leadership
made
every
MDP, rejecting
all
85 85 85 85 85
86
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
offers of
working together.
With the destruction of the Commu-
nist
Party
and the "domestication" of most of the socialist Left
after
1986,
AD was
unquestionably
the
majority opposition
group.
Alianza Democratica realized that a
smooth, rapid
tran-
sition to democratic rule would
require negotiating
with the
military
and with conservatives
-
but without Pinochet. AD
also knew that if it were to
accomplish
that
goal
it would have
to broaden the base of its
organization
and enlist the
support
of one or more of the
groups
made
up
of the
big
business or
large landowning
interests. To do
so,
AD
sought
to make
political capital
out of the dissension between
big
business and
government
over economic
policy
and turn it to its own
advantage, hopefully by
convincing
the nation's
capitalist
class
of the need for
regime change.
All
throughout 1983,
both the
PartidoDemocratico Cristiano(PDC) and Alianza Democratica
sought
to create an
implicit
alliance with
capitalist
and conser-
vative
political parties
based on a moderate economic
program
tailored to the demands of the
pragmatic
neoliberal business/
landowning
coalition. The
attempt
to
forge
an alliance was
implied
in that AD
sought
to secure their
backing by endorsing
an economic
policy
that would cater to their interests rather
than
by entering
into
negotiations
with the business associa-
tions
directly.
Seeking
to diminish
any anxiety
the
business/landowning
class
might
harbor
regarding political change,
AD
quickly
adopted,
and
publicized
its commitment
to,
the
capitalist
road
to economic
development early
in
1983.
Within the context of
a mixed
economy,
AD
pledged
itself to
respect private property
on the one
hand,
as well as to continue
prudent
macro-
economic and
foreign
debt
management
on the other. It also
announced its
support
of sectoral economic
policies (espe-
cially
industrial
policy
and debt
relief),
a
rapid
re-activation of
the
economy,
and
taking
a
tougher
stance with the Interna-
tional
Monetary
Fund
(IMF)
in
negotiations
to
acquire
the
resources needed to
recharge
the
economy
without
incurring
the risk of
steep
inflation
(Foxley,
1982;
CIEPLAN, 1983;
Que
offers of
working together.
nist
Party
after
1986,
AD was
unquestionably
the
majority opposition
group.
smooth, rapid
tran-
require negotiating
with the
military
-
accomplish
that
goal
it would have
organization
and enlist the
support
groups
made
up
of the
big
business or
large landowning
interests. To do
so,
AD
sought
to make
political capital
big
business and
government
over economic
policy
convincing
the nation's
capitalist
class
of the need for
regime change.
All
throughout 1983,
both the
sought
to create an
implicit
alliance with
capitalist
and conser-
vative
political parties
program
pragmatic
landowning
coalition. The
attempt
to
forge
an alliance was
implied
in that AD
sought
to secure their
an economic
policy
than
by entering
into
negotiations
tions
directly.
Seeking
to diminish
any anxiety
the
business/landowning
class
might
harbor
AD
quickly
adopted,
and
publicized
its commitment
to,
the
capitalist
road
to economic
development early
in
1983.
a mixed
economy,
AD
pledged
itself to
on the one
hand,
prudent
macro-
economic and
foreign
debt
management
announced its
support
policies (espe-
cially
industrial
policy
and debt
relief),
a
rapid
re-activation of
the
economy,
and
taking
a
tougher
tional
Monetary
Fund
(IMF)
in
negotiations
to
acquire
the
resources needed to
recharge
the
economy
without
incurring
the risk of
steep
inflation
(Foxley,
1982;
CIEPLAN, 1983;
Que
offers of
working together.
nist
Party
after
1986,
AD was
unquestionably
the
majority opposition
group.
smooth, rapid
tran-
require negotiating
with the
military
-
accomplish
that
goal
it would have
organization
and enlist the
support
groups
made
up
of the
big
business or
large landowning
interests. To do
so,
AD
sought
to make
political capital
big
business and
government
over economic
policy
convincing
the nation's
capitalist
class
of the need for
regime change.
All
throughout 1983,
both the
sought
to create an
implicit
alliance with
capitalist
and conser-
vative
political parties
program
pragmatic
landowning
coalition. The
attempt
to
forge
an alliance was
implied
in that AD
sought
to secure their
an economic
policy
than
by entering
into
negotiations
tions
directly.
Seeking
to diminish
any anxiety
the
business/landowning
class
might
harbor
AD
quickly
adopted,
and
publicized
its commitment
to,
the
capitalist
road
to economic
development early
in
1983.
a mixed
economy,
AD
pledged
itself to
on the one
hand,
prudent
macro-
economic and
foreign
debt
management
announced its
support
policies (espe-
cially
industrial
policy
and debt
relief),
a
rapid
re-activation of
the
economy,
and
taking
a
tougher
tional
Monetary
Fund
(IMF)
in
negotiations
to
acquire
the
resources needed to
recharge
the
economy
without
incurring
the risk of
steep
inflation
(Foxley,
1982;
CIEPLAN, 1983;
Que
offers of
working together.
nist
Party
after
1986,
AD was
unquestionably
the
majority opposition
group.
smooth, rapid
tran-
require negotiating
with the
military
-
accomplish
that
goal
it would have
organization
and enlist the
support
groups
made
up
of the
big
business or
large landowning
interests. To do
so,
AD
sought
to make
political capital
big
business and
government
over economic
policy
convincing
the nation's
capitalist
class
of the need for
regime change.
All
throughout 1983,
both the
sought
to create an
implicit
alliance with
capitalist
and conser-
vative
political parties
program
pragmatic
landowning
coalition. The
attempt
to
forge
an alliance was
implied
in that AD
sought
to secure their
an economic
policy
than
by entering
into
negotiations
tions
directly.
Seeking
to diminish
any anxiety
the
business/landowning
class
might
harbor
AD
quickly
adopted,
and
publicized
its commitment
to,
the
capitalist
road
to economic
development early
in
1983.
a mixed
economy,
AD
pledged
itself to
on the one
hand,
prudent
macro-
economic and
foreign
debt
management
announced its
support
policies (espe-
cially
industrial
policy
and debt
relief),
a
rapid
re-activation of
the
economy,
and
taking
a
tougher
tional
Monetary
Fund
(IMF)
in
negotiations
to
acquire
the
resources needed to
recharge
the
economy
without
incurring
the risk of
steep
inflation
(Foxley,
1982;
CIEPLAN, 1983;
Que
offers of
working together.
nist
Party
after
1986,
AD was
unquestionably
the
majority opposition
group.
smooth, rapid
tran-
require negotiating
with the
military
-
accomplish
that
goal
it would have
organization
and enlist the
support
groups
made
up
of the
big
business or
large landowning
interests. To do
so,
AD
sought
to make
political capital
big
business and
government
over economic
policy
convincing
the nation's
capitalist
class
of the need for
regime change.
All
throughout 1983,
both the
sought
to create an
implicit
alliance with
capitalist
and conser-
vative
political parties
program
pragmatic
landowning
coalition. The
attempt
to
forge
an alliance was
implied
in that AD
sought
to secure their
an economic
policy
than
by entering
into
negotiations
tions
directly.
Seeking
to diminish
any anxiety
the
business/landowning
class
might
harbor
AD
quickly
adopted,
and
publicized
its commitment
to,
the
capitalist
road
to economic
development early
in
1983.
a mixed
economy,
AD
pledged
itself to
on the one
hand,
prudent
macro-
economic and
foreign
debt
management
announced its
support
policies (espe-
cially
industrial
policy
and debt
relief),
a
rapid
re-activation of
the
economy,
and
taking
a
tougher
tional
Monetary
Fund
(IMF)
in
negotiations
to
acquire
the
resources needed to
recharge
the
economy
without
incurring
the risk of
steep
inflation
(Foxley,
1982;
CIEPLAN, 1983;
Que
Pasa, 1982, 1983a,
1983c).
In other
words,
the AD tried to
assuage
the fears of both the
military
and
entrepreneurial
class
that transition to
democracy, including
substantial revision of
the
1980
Constitution,
would not mean return to the kind of
socialism associated with the Unidad
Popular(UP).
This move on the
part
of AD offers
strong
evidence that
any
threat that democratization would
inevitably
involve
radical economic and social
change
was somewhat
overdrawn,
to
say
the least. After
all,
AD indicated not
only
its
support
of
a moderate economic
program,
but also its
willingness
to work
with both
military
and conservative
forces,
in order to unite a
majority
of the
polity
behind a
negotiated
transition to democ-
racy.
Not
incidentally,
that
strategy
would have
effectively
isolated the Marxist
opposition movement,
the Movimiento
Democratico
Popular
(MDP).
Nevertheless, despite
these assurances of both AD and the
PDC,
the forces
favoring
redemocratization
-
e.g.,
an
early
transition to
democracy
under less restrictive institutional
conditions
-
were unable to secure the
support
of the
big
business/landowning groups.
To the
dismay
of the
opposition,
the fierce criticism directed
against
the
government's
economic
policy began
to abate sometime late in the
September
of
1983.
This shift carried serious
implications
for
opposition hopes
because the
1983
rift between economic elites and the
military
government
had offered the AD its
only
chance to win the
support
of that influential class and
place
it
squarely
behind its
political program.
When the differences between economic
elite and
military regime diminished,
so did AD
prospects
for
early
democratization.
The time that
elapsed
between the
eruption
of mass
protest (May
1983)
and the
softening
of
capitalist
rhetoric and
stance
regarding
the
government's
economic
policy (Septem-
ber-October
1983)
lends force to the
argument
that the threat
of civic unrest was not in itself sufficient to
explain
the return
of dissident business and
landowning groups
to the authoritar-
ian fold.
Indeed,
it was that
very
dissidence which had fed AD
hopes
of
constructing
a broad cross-class alliance to thwart the
Pasa, 1982, 1983a,
1983c).
In other
words,
the AD tried to
assuage
military
and
entrepreneurial
class
that transition to
the
1980
Constitution,
Popular(UP).
This move on the
part
of AD offers
strong
evidence that
any
inevitably
involve
change
was somewhat
overdrawn,
to
say
the least. After
all,
AD indicated not
only
its
support
of
a moderate economic
program,
but also its
willingness
to work
with both
military
and conservative
forces,
in order to unite a
majority
of the
polity
behind a
negotiated
racy.
Not
incidentally,
that
strategy
would have
effectively
the Movimiento
Democratico
Popular
(MDP).
PDC,
the forces
favoring
redemocratization
-
e.g.,
an
early
transition to
democracy
conditions
-
support
of the
big
To the
dismay
of the
opposition,
against
the
government's
economic
policy began
September
of
1983.
implications
for
opposition hopes
because the
1983
military
government
only
chance to win the
support
place
it
squarely
behind its
political program.
elite and
so did AD
prospects
for
early
democratization.
The time that
elapsed
between the
eruption
of mass
protest (May
1983)
and the
softening
of
capitalist
rhetoric and
stance
regarding
the
government's
economic
policy (Septem-
ber-October
1983)
lends force to the
argument
that the threat
explain
the return
landowning groups
to the authoritar-
ian fold.
Indeed,
it was that
very
hopes
of
constructing
Pasa, 1982, 1983a,
1983c).
In other
words,
the AD tried to
assuage
military
and
entrepreneurial
class
that transition to
the
1980
Constitution,
Popular(UP).
This move on the
part
of AD offers
strong
evidence that
any
inevitably
involve
change
was somewhat
overdrawn,
to
say
the least. After
all,
AD indicated not
only
its
support
of
a moderate economic
program,
but also its
willingness
to work
with both
military
and conservative
forces,
in order to unite a
majority
of the
polity
behind a
negotiated
racy.
Not
incidentally,
that
strategy
would have
effectively
the Movimiento
Democratico
Popular
(MDP).
PDC,
the forces
favoring
redemocratization
-
e.g.,
an
early
transition to
democracy
conditions
-
support
of the
big
To the
dismay
of the
opposition,
against
the
government's
economic
policy began
September
of
1983.
implications
for
opposition hopes
because the
1983
military
government
only
chance to win the
support
place
it
squarely
behind its
political program.
elite and
so did AD
prospects
for
early
democratization.
The time that
elapsed
between the
eruption
of mass
protest (May
1983)
and the
softening
of
capitalist
rhetoric and
stance
regarding
the
government's
economic
policy (Septem-
ber-October
1983)
lends force to the
argument
that the threat
explain
the return
landowning groups
to the authoritar-
ian fold.
Indeed,
it was that
very
hopes
of
constructing
Pasa, 1982, 1983a,
1983c).
In other
words,
the AD tried to
assuage
military
and
entrepreneurial
class
that transition to
the
1980
Constitution,
Popular(UP).
This move on the
part
of AD offers
strong
evidence that
any
inevitably
involve
change
was somewhat
overdrawn,
to
say
the least. After
all,
AD indicated not
only
its
support
of
a moderate economic
program,
but also its
willingness
to work
with both
military
and conservative
forces,
in order to unite a
majority
of the
polity
behind a
negotiated
racy.
Not
incidentally,
that
strategy
would have
effectively
the Movimiento
Democratico
Popular
(MDP).
PDC,
the forces
favoring
redemocratization
-
e.g.,
an
early
transition to
democracy
conditions
-
support
of the
big
To the
dismay
of the
opposition,
against
the
government's
economic
policy began
September
of
1983.
implications
for
opposition hopes
because the
1983
military
government
only
chance to win the
support
place
it
squarely
behind its
political program.
elite and
so did AD
prospects
for
early
democratization.
The time that
elapsed
between the
eruption
of mass
protest (May
1983)
and the
softening
of
capitalist
rhetoric and
stance
regarding
the
government's
economic
policy (Septem-
ber-October
1983)
lends force to the
argument
that the threat
explain
the return
landowning groups
to the authoritar-
ian fold.
Indeed,
it was that
very
hopes
of
constructing
Pasa, 1982, 1983a,
1983c).
In other
words,
the AD tried to
assuage
military
and
entrepreneurial
class
that transition to
the
1980
Constitution,
Popular(UP).
This move on the
part
of AD offers
strong
evidence that
any
inevitably
involve
change
was somewhat
overdrawn,
to
say
the least. After
all,
AD indicated not
only
its
support
of
a moderate economic
program,
but also its
willingness
to work
with both
military
and conservative
forces,
in order to unite a
majority
of the
polity
behind a
negotiated
racy.
Not
incidentally,
that
strategy
would have
effectively
the Movimiento
Democratico
Popular
(MDP).
PDC,
the forces
favoring
redemocratization
-
e.g.,
an
early
transition to
democracy
conditions
-
support
of the
big
To the
dismay
of the
opposition,
against
the
government's
economic
policy began
September
of
1983.
implications
for
opposition hopes
because the
1983
military
government
only
chance to win the
support
place
it
squarely
behind its
political program.
elite and
so did AD
prospects
for
early
democratization.
The time that
elapsed
between the
eruption
of mass
protest (May
1983)
and the
softening
of
capitalist
rhetoric and
stance
regarding
the
government's
economic
policy (Septem-
ber-October
1983)
lends force to the
argument
that the threat
explain
the return
landowning groups
to the authoritar-
ian fold.
Indeed,
it was that
very
hopes
of
constructing
87 87 87 87 87
88
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
dictatorship. Moreover,
it was that
very
rift which had
initially
fueled,
and
legitimized,
the
opposition
movement.
Thus,
if it
was fear of the masses
(including
the "socialist"
AD)
which
prompted
the
capitalist
forces to close ranks with the
military
government, why
had
they
not done so
sooner, immediately
following
the "national
day
of
protest?"
It is
significant
that the Confederation of Production and
Commerce
(CPC)
did not
begin
to relax its
posture
toward the
military government
until after
thefifth day
of national
protest
had
taken
place,
almost half a
year
later. Not
only that,
but when the
first mass
protests
were
instituted,
the CPC and its affiliates
stepped up
their
complaints
and escalated their demands.
They
presented
their economic
recovery plan
to the
government inJuly
1983
and lobbied hard for it both in
private
and in
public.
Ominously,
the business and landowner
coalition,
frustrated
by
the
goverment's
failure to
respond, began
to intimate that it was
considering making
common cause with the
growing political
opposition.7 During
the month of
September
1983
(just
before and
after the fifth
day
of
protest),
the
capitalist groups pressed
Pinochet to
replace
the ministers of finance and
economy
with
men who favored
reflationary policies.
In
short, though
Chile's
big
business and
landowning
classes
may
have been concerned about the
political consequences
of the
mass
mobilizations, they
seized
upon
these events to
step up,
rather than
downplay,
their differences over economic
policies.
The CPC coalition must have had some
degree
of confidence that
the downfall of the
regime
would not
necessarily
involve a
complete
reversal of the neoliberal
experiment. Otherwise,
the
strategy
that
they
did
pursue
-
hedging
bets to extract conces-
sions from both
government
and
opposition
-
would have been
far too
risky.
At the
very least,
the
capitalist
class must not have
perceived
the mass unrest as so
threatening
to their interests as
to
preclude capitalizing upon
it to
gain
leverage
in their
negotia-
tions with Pinochet and his
"Chicago boys."
What
happened
at the end of
September
and the
beginning
of October
1983
that
persuaded
these
capitalist groups
to
temper
their
anti-government
rhetoric and censure? Faced
it was that
very
rift which had
initially
fueled,
and
legitimized,
the
opposition
movement.
Thus,
if it
(including
the "socialist"
AD)
which
prompted
the
capitalist
military
government, why
had
they
not done so
sooner, immediately
following
the "national
day
of
protest?"
It is
significant
Commerce
(CPC)
did not
begin
to relax its
posture
toward the
military government
until after
thefifth day
of national
protest
had
taken
place,
almost half a
year
later. Not
only that,
but when the
first mass
protests
were
instituted,
stepped up
their
complaints
They
presented
their economic
recovery plan
to the
government inJuly
1983
private
and in
public.
Ominously,
coalition,
frustrated
by
the
goverment's
failure to
respond, began
considering making
growing political
opposition.7 During
the month of
September
1983
(just
before and
after the fifth
day
of
protest),
the
Pinochet to
replace
economy
with
men who favored
In
short, though
Chile's
big
business and
landowning
classes
may
of the
mass
mobilizations, they
seized
upon
these events to
step up,
rather than
downplay,
policies.
degree
of confidence that
the downfall of the
regime
would not
necessarily
involve a
complete
the
strategy
that
they
did
pursue
-
hedging
sions from both
government
and
opposition
-
would have been
far too
risky.
At the
very least,
the
capitalist
class must not have
perceived
threatening
to
it to
gain
leverage
in their
negotia-
"Chicago boys."
What
happened
at the end of
September
and the
beginning
of October
1983
that
persuaded
these
capitalist groups
to
temper
their
anti-government
it was that
very
rift which had
initially
fueled,
and
legitimized,
the
opposition
movement.
Thus,
if it
(including
the "socialist"
AD)
which
prompted
the
capitalist
military
government, why
had
they
not done so
sooner, immediately
following
the "national
day
of
protest?"
It is
significant
Commerce
(CPC)
did not
begin
to relax its
posture
toward the
military government
until after
thefifth day
of national
protest
had
taken
place,
almost half a
year
later. Not
only that,
but when the
first mass
protests
were
instituted,
stepped up
their
complaints
They
presented
their economic
recovery plan
to the
government inJuly
1983
private
and in
public.
Ominously,
coalition,
frustrated
by
the
goverment's
failure to
respond, began
considering making
growing political
opposition.7 During
the month of
September
1983
(just
before and
after the fifth
day
of
protest),
the
Pinochet to
replace
economy
with
men who favored
In
short, though
Chile's
big
business and
landowning
classes
may
of the
mass
mobilizations, they
seized
upon
these events to
step up,
rather than
downplay,
policies.
degree
of confidence that
the downfall of the
regime
would not
necessarily
involve a
complete
the
strategy
that
they
did
pursue
-
hedging
sions from both
government
and
opposition
-
would have been
far too
risky.
At the
very least,
the
capitalist
class must not have
perceived
threatening
to
it to
gain
leverage
in their
negotia-
"Chicago boys."
What
happened
at the end of
September
and the
beginning
of October
1983
that
persuaded
these
capitalist groups
to
temper
their
anti-government
it was that
very
rift which had
initially
fueled,
and
legitimized,
the
opposition
movement.
Thus,
if it
(including
the "socialist"
AD)
which
prompted
the
capitalist
military
government, why
had
they
not done so
sooner, immediately
following
the "national
day
of
protest?"
It is
significant
Commerce
(CPC)
did not
begin
to relax its
posture
toward the
military government
until after
thefifth day
of national
protest
had
taken
place,
almost half a
year
later. Not
only that,
but when the
first mass
protests
were
instituted,
stepped up
their
complaints
They
presented
their economic
recovery plan
to the
government inJuly
1983
private
and in
public.
Ominously,
coalition,
frustrated
by
the
goverment's
failure to
respond, began
considering making
growing political
opposition.7 During
the month of
September
1983
(just
before and
after the fifth
day
of
protest),
the
Pinochet to
replace
economy
with
men who favored
In
short, though
Chile's
big
business and
landowning
classes
may
of the
mass
mobilizations, they
seized
upon
these events to
step up,
rather than
downplay,
policies.
degree
of confidence that
the downfall of the
regime
would not
necessarily
involve a
complete
the
strategy
that
they
did
pursue
-
hedging
sions from both
government
and
opposition
-
would have been
far too
risky.
At the
very least,
the
capitalist
class must not have
perceived
threatening
to
it to
gain
leverage
in their
negotia-
"Chicago boys."
What
happened
at the end of
September
and the
beginning
of October
1983
that
persuaded
these
capitalist groups
to
temper
their
anti-government
it was that
very
rift which had
initially
fueled,
and
legitimized,
the
opposition
movement.
Thus,
if it
(including
the "socialist"
AD)
which
prompted
the
capitalist
military
government, why
had
they
not done so
sooner, immediately
following
the "national
day
of
protest?"
It is
significant
Commerce
(CPC)
did not
begin
to relax its
posture
toward the
military government
until after
thefifth day
of national
protest
had
taken
place,
almost half a
year
later. Not
only that,
but when the
first mass
protests
were
instituted,
stepped up
their
complaints
They
presented
their economic
recovery plan
to the
government inJuly
1983
private
and in
public.
Ominously,
coalition,
frustrated
by
the
goverment's
failure to
respond, began
considering making
growing political
opposition.7 During
the month of
September
1983
(just
before and
after the fifth
day
of
protest),
the
Pinochet to
replace
economy
with
men who favored
In
short, though
Chile's
big
business and
landowning
classes
may
of the
mass
mobilizations, they
seized
upon
these events to
step up,
rather than
downplay,
policies.
degree
of confidence that
the downfall of the
regime
would not
necessarily
involve a
complete
the
strategy
that
they
did
pursue
-
hedging
sions from both
government
and
opposition
-
would have been
far too
risky.
At the
very least,
the
capitalist
class must not have
perceived
threatening
to
it to
gain
leverage
in their
negotia-
"Chicago boys."
What
happened
at the end of
September
and the
beginning
of October
1983
that
persuaded
these
capitalist groups
to
temper
their
anti-government
with massive
public demonstrations,
on a
monthly basis,
and
the
organization
of medium-to-small scale
entrepreneurs
to
protest
its
policies,
the
government
needed to
recapture
the
support
of Chile's
large-scale business/landowning
class. The
defection of a
major
element from this
important
coalition to
either of those areas of the
opposition
would have added
significantly
to the momentum of the latter. With this
prospect
in
mind,
the
military government finally
found it
expedient
to
open
negotiations
on economic reform in accord with the
suggestions
of the
Recuperaci6n
econromca in return for a
toning
down of some of its more militant attacks on its
policies
(Que
Pasa, 1983g
and
1983h).
In other
words, by threatening
to
join
in a multi-class coalition
opposed
to the
military
government,
the
capitalist hierarchy
was able to
gain
the
leverage
it needed to force consideration of its neoliberal
economic reform
program
and even translate it into
policy.
In
August
1983,
the
government
began
to make conces-
sions to the CPC and its affiliates that fell into two
general
categories:
cabinet
change
and
policy change.
Cabinet
changes
held out the
promise
of real
negotiations
in
keeping
with CPC
proposals,
and the first set of cabinet
changes
took
place
in
August
when
Sergio
O.
Jarpa
was
appointed
Minister of the Interior and
Modesto Collados made Minister of Public Works. Both
appoint-
ments held out the
promise
of
policy change
for a
variety
of
interests, including
not
only
the
capitalists
but also medium and
small businessmen and others in the
opposition.
The
regime
also
began
to act
upon
the
policy
changes
recommended in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. For
instance,
Minister
Jarpa
was a
strong
advocate of
expanding
the
monetary system
to re-activate
the
economy and,
to that
end, agreed
with the CPC on the need
to
replace
Finance Minister Caceres with someone more in line
with CPC sentiment. Because
Jarpa
also wanted to broaden
political
liberalization in order to defuse a
potential uprising,
he
quickly opened
talks with Alianza Democr(itica in
hopes
of
being
able to
negotiate
a
political
settlement between the
regime
and the
At the same
time,
there was also
an effort to exclude the Left
(MDP)
from the
dialogue
and
any
potential political pact.
with massive
on a
monthly basis,
and
the
organization
entrepreneurs
to
protest
its
policies,
the
government
needed to
recapture
the
support
of Chile's
class. The
defection of a
major
element from this
important
coalition to
opposition
would have added
significantly
prospect
in
mind,
the
found it
expedient
to
open
negotiations
suggestions
of the
Recuperaci6n
toning
policies
(Que
Pasa, 1983g
and
1983h).
In other
to
join
opposed
to the
military
government,
the
was able to
gain
the
leverage
economic reform
program
policy.
In
August
1983,
the
government
began
to make conces-
general
categories:
cabinet
change
and
policy change.
Cabinet
changes
held out the
promise
of real
negotiations
in
keeping
with CPC
proposals,
changes
took
place
in
August
when
Sergio
O.
Jarpa
was
appointed
appoint-
ments held out the
promise
of
policy change
for a
variety
of
not
only
the
capitalists
but also medium and
opposition.
The
regime
also
began
to act
upon
the
policy
changes
recommended in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. For
instance,
Minister
Jarpa
was a
strong
advocate of
expanding
the
monetary system
to re-activate
the
economy and,
to that
end, agreed
to
replace
Jarpa
political
potential uprising,
he
quickly opened
hopes
of
being
able to
negotiate
a
political
regime
and the
At the same
time,
there was also
(MDP)
from the
dialogue
and
any
with massive
on a
monthly basis,
and
the
organization
entrepreneurs
to
protest
its
policies,
the
government
needed to
recapture
the
support
of Chile's
class. The
defection of a
major
element from this
important
coalition to
opposition
would have added
significantly
prospect
in
mind,
the
found it
expedient
to
open
negotiations
suggestions
of the
Recuperaci6n
toning
policies
(Que
Pasa, 1983g
and
1983h).
In other
to
join
opposed
to the
military
government,
the
was able to
gain
the
leverage
economic reform
program
policy.
In
August
1983,
the
government
began
to make conces-
general
categories:
cabinet
change
and
policy change.
Cabinet
changes
held out the
promise
of real
negotiations
in
keeping
with CPC
proposals,
changes
took
place
in
August
when
Sergio
O.
Jarpa
was
appointed
appoint-
ments held out the
promise
of
policy change
for a
variety
of
not
only
the
capitalists
but also medium and
opposition.
The
regime
also
began
to act
upon
the
policy
changes
recommended in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. For
instance,
Minister
Jarpa
was a
strong
advocate of
expanding
the
monetary system
to re-activate
the
economy and,
to that
end, agreed
to
replace
Jarpa
political
potential uprising,
he
quickly opened
hopes
of
being
able to
negotiate
a
political
regime
and the
At the same
time,
there was also
(MDP)
from the
dialogue
and
any
with massive
on a
monthly basis,
and
the
organization
entrepreneurs
to
protest
its
policies,
the
government
needed to
recapture
the
support
of Chile's
class. The
defection of a
major
element from this
important
coalition to
opposition
would have added
significantly
prospect
in
mind,
the
found it
expedient
to
open
negotiations
suggestions
of the
Recuperaci6n
toning
policies
(Que
Pasa, 1983g
and
1983h).
In other
to
join
opposed
to the
military
government,
the
was able to
gain
the
leverage
economic reform
program
policy.
In
August
1983,
the
government
began
to make conces-
general
categories:
cabinet
change
and
policy change.
Cabinet
changes
held out the
promise
of real
negotiations
in
keeping
with CPC
proposals,
changes
took
place
in
August
when
Sergio
O.
Jarpa
was
appointed
appoint-
ments held out the
promise
of
policy change
for a
variety
of
not
only
the
capitalists
but also medium and
opposition.
The
regime
also
began
to act
upon
the
policy
changes
recommended in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. For
instance,
Minister
Jarpa
was a
strong
advocate of
expanding
the
monetary system
to re-activate
the
economy and,
to that
end, agreed
to
replace
Jarpa
political
potential uprising,
he
quickly opened
hopes
of
being
able to
negotiate
a
political
regime
and the
At the same
time,
there was also
(MDP)
from the
dialogue
and
any
with massive
on a
monthly basis,
and
the
organization
entrepreneurs
to
protest
its
policies,
the
government
needed to
recapture
the
support
of Chile's
class. The
defection of a
major
element from this
important
coalition to
opposition
would have added
significantly
prospect
in
mind,
the
found it
expedient
to
open
negotiations
suggestions
of the
Recuperaci6n
toning
policies
(Que
Pasa, 1983g
and
1983h).
In other
to
join
opposed
to the
military
government,
the
was able to
gain
the
leverage
economic reform
program
policy.
In
August
1983,
the
government
began
to make conces-
general
categories:
cabinet
change
and
policy change.
Cabinet
changes
held out the
promise
of real
negotiations
in
keeping
with CPC
proposals,
changes
took
place
in
August
when
Sergio
O.
Jarpa
was
appointed
appoint-
ments held out the
promise
of
policy change
for a
variety
of
not
only
the
capitalists
but also medium and
opposition.
The
regime
also
began
to act
upon
the
policy
changes
recommended in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. For
instance,
Minister
Jarpa
was a
strong
advocate of
expanding
the
monetary system
to re-activate
the
economy and,
to that
end, agreed
to
replace
Jarpa
political
potential uprising,
he
quickly opened
hopes
of
being
able to
negotiate
a
political
regime
and the
At the same
time,
there was also
(MDP)
from the
dialogue
and
any
89 89 89 89 89
90
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
From the
point
of view of the
CPC,
the
appointment
of
Modesto Collados as Minister of Public Works also
represented
a
significant
step.
As
president
of the Cdmara de
ConstrucciBn,
he had been a contributor to the
policy
recommendations of
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. As a condition for
accepting
the
post,
he
demanded,
and
received,
a commitment to increase
the
spending
on
public
works as a measure to
help
revive the
economy (Araya,
1989).
Finally,
even Minister of the
Economy
Passicot, long
a
partisan
of the
"Chicago boys,"
fell into line
by
announcing
that his
ministry
would assume a more active role
in
managing
the
economy (Que Pasa,
1983h).
Another
long-standing
demand of the CPC coalition was
to increase its access to the
policymaking process, ensuring,
to
the extent
possible,
that
change
in economic
policy
would take
place. Consequently, despite
the fact that Pinochet did not
remove Finance Minister Caceres from his
post,
he did
agree
to meet more
frequently
with the CPC
leadership (CPC,
1983).
In
addition,
how
long
Caceres would remain as Finance
Minister remained
uncertain,
thus
raising
the coalition's
hopes
for a
change.
Pinochet even set
up
a "shadow cabinet" made
up
of men whose views coincided more with the views of the CPC
than of Caceres
-
Luis Escobar and former Minister of
Economy
Manuel Martin
-
to
accompany
Caceres to the United States on
his
trip
to
renegotiate
the debt
(Hoy,
1983d).
Escobar was known
to favor a
policy
of
reflation,
and
Martin,
as
noted,
had close ties
to the authors of
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. It was
commonly
believed that one of them was
being groomed
for the Caceres
position.
Of
course,
business leaders also had
easy
access
toJarpa.
Finally,
in
mid-September 1983,
the
military government
acceded
to another CPC demand
by agreeing
to the establishment of an
Economic and Social Council
(Hoy,
1983b; Que
Pasa,
1983d).
Granting
real concessions to the
pragmatic
neoliberal
coalition lent
credibility
to the
regime's promise
of
policy
change.
In
September 1983,
the CPC concentrated its
lobbying
efforts on the issue of deficit
spending (Hoy,
1983c).
It
reiterated the
demand,
set forth in
Recuperaci6n econ6mica,
that such
outlays
should reach 4% of the
gross
domestic
From the
point
of view of the
CPC,
the
appointment
of
represented
a
significant
step.
As
president
of the Cdmara de
ConstrucciBn,
policy
recommendations of
Recuperaci6n
accepting
the
post,
he
demanded,
and
received,
the
spending
on
public
help
revive the
economy (Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Economy
Passicot, long
a
partisan
of the
"Chicago boys,"
fell into line
by
announcing
that his
ministry
in
managing
the
economy (Que Pasa,
1983h).
Another
long-standing
to
the extent
possible,
that
change
in economic
policy
would take
post,
he did
agree
to meet more
frequently
with the CPC
leadership (CPC,
1983).
In
addition,
how
long
Minister remained
uncertain,
thus
raising
the coalition's
hopes
for a
change.
Pinochet even set
up
up
than of Caceres
-
Economy
Manuel Martin
-
to
accompany
his
trip
to
renegotiate
the debt
(Hoy,
1983d).
Escobar was known
to favor a
policy
of
reflation,
and
Martin,
as
noted,
had close ties
to the authors of
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. It was
commonly
being groomed
for the Caceres
position.
Of
course,
easy
access
toJarpa.
Finally,
in
mid-September 1983,
the
military government
acceded
by agreeing
(Hoy,
1983b; Que
Pasa,
1983d).
Granting
pragmatic
neoliberal
coalition lent
credibility
to the
regime's promise
of
policy
change.
In
September 1983,
lobbying
spending (Hoy,
1983c).
It
reiterated the
demand,
set forth in
that such
outlays
gross
domestic
From the
point
of view of the
CPC,
the
appointment
of
represented
a
significant
step.
As
president
of the Cdmara de
ConstrucciBn,
policy
recommendations of
Recuperaci6n
accepting
the
post,
he
demanded,
and
received,
the
spending
on
public
help
revive the
economy (Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Economy
Passicot, long
a
partisan
of the
"Chicago boys,"
fell into line
by
announcing
that his
ministry
in
managing
the
economy (Que Pasa,
1983h).
Another
long-standing
to
the extent
possible,
that
change
in economic
policy
would take
post,
he did
agree
to meet more
frequently
with the CPC
leadership (CPC,
1983).
In
addition,
how
long
Minister remained
uncertain,
thus
raising
the coalition's
hopes
for a
change.
Pinochet even set
up
up
than of Caceres
-
Economy
Manuel Martin
-
to
accompany
his
trip
to
renegotiate
the debt
(Hoy,
1983d).
Escobar was known
to favor a
policy
of
reflation,
and
Martin,
as
noted,
had close ties
to the authors of
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. It was
commonly
being groomed
for the Caceres
position.
Of
course,
easy
access
toJarpa.
Finally,
in
mid-September 1983,
the
military government
acceded
by agreeing
(Hoy,
1983b; Que
Pasa,
1983d).
Granting
pragmatic
neoliberal
coalition lent
credibility
to the
regime's promise
of
policy
change.
In
September 1983,
lobbying
spending (Hoy,
1983c).
It
reiterated the
demand,
set forth in
that such
outlays
gross
domestic
From the
point
of view of the
CPC,
the
appointment
of
represented
a
significant
step.
As
president
of the Cdmara de
ConstrucciBn,
policy
recommendations of
Recuperaci6n
accepting
the
post,
he
demanded,
and
received,
the
spending
on
public
help
revive the
economy (Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Economy
Passicot, long
a
partisan
of the
"Chicago boys,"
fell into line
by
announcing
that his
ministry
in
managing
the
economy (Que Pasa,
1983h).
Another
long-standing
to
the extent
possible,
that
change
in economic
policy
would take
post,
he did
agree
to meet more
frequently
with the CPC
leadership (CPC,
1983).
In
addition,
how
long
Minister remained
uncertain,
thus
raising
the coalition's
hopes
for a
change.
Pinochet even set
up
up
than of Caceres
-
Economy
Manuel Martin
-
to
accompany
his
trip
to
renegotiate
the debt
(Hoy,
1983d).
Escobar was known
to favor a
policy
of
reflation,
and
Martin,
as
noted,
had close ties
to the authors of
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. It was
commonly
being groomed
for the Caceres
position.
Of
course,
easy
access
toJarpa.
Finally,
in
mid-September 1983,
the
military government
acceded
by agreeing
(Hoy,
1983b; Que
Pasa,
1983d).
Granting
pragmatic
neoliberal
coalition lent
credibility
to the
regime's promise
of
policy
change.
In
September 1983,
lobbying
spending (Hoy,
1983c).
It
reiterated the
demand,
set forth in
that such
outlays
gross
domestic
From the
point
of view of the
CPC,
the
appointment
of
represented
a
significant
step.
As
president
of the Cdmara de
ConstrucciBn,
policy
recommendations of
Recuperaci6n
accepting
the
post,
he
demanded,
and
received,
the
spending
on
public
help
revive the
economy (Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Economy
Passicot, long
a
partisan
of the
"Chicago boys,"
fell into line
by
announcing
that his
ministry
in
managing
the
economy (Que Pasa,
1983h).
Another
long-standing
to
the extent
possible,
that
change
in economic
policy
would take
post,
he did
agree
to meet more
frequently
with the CPC
leadership (CPC,
1983).
In
addition,
how
long
Minister remained
uncertain,
thus
raising
the coalition's
hopes
for a
change.
Pinochet even set
up
up
than of Caceres
-
Economy
Manuel Martin
-
to
accompany
his
trip
to
renegotiate
the debt
(Hoy,
1983d).
Escobar was known
to favor a
policy
of
reflation,
and
Martin,
as
noted,
had close ties
to the authors of
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica. It was
commonly
being groomed
for the Caceres
position.
Of
course,
easy
access
toJarpa.
Finally,
in
mid-September 1983,
the
military government
acceded
by agreeing
(Hoy,
1983b; Que
Pasa,
1983d).
Granting
pragmatic
neoliberal
coalition lent
credibility
to the
regime's promise
of
policy
change.
In
September 1983,
lobbying
spending (Hoy,
1983c).
It
reiterated the
demand,
set forth in
that such
outlays
gross
domestic
product
(GDP).
A month
later,
Caceres
complied:
deficit
spending
for
1984
would be around 50/ of GDP
(Que Pasa,
1983h; Hoy,
1983e).
The CPC also
praised
Caceres for advanc-
ing
on another sensitive
policy issue, i.e.,
lower real rates of
interest
(CPC,
1983).
Overall,
these fell from
35%
in
1982
to 16%
in
1983.
In addition to these
measures,
the
government quickly
expanded housing
and
public
works
programs,
as
expected
given
the
appointment
of Collados to the
Ministry
of Public
Works
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).8
Last but not
least,
the CPC had
long
advocated
(since 1982)
that taxes on business be cut as a
way
of
stimulating
the
economy.
Finance Minister Caceres commit-
ted himself to do so and even
brought
the
peak
business
associations into the
process
of
drafting
revisions to the tax
code.9
Although
the CPC toned down its
barrage
of criticism
once the
government
authorities
began
to
negotiate
in
earnest,
it did not lift all
pressure. Essentially,
the CPC ceased its
demands for the
resignations
of Finance Minister Caceres and
Minister of the
Economy
Passicot
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).
At the
same
time,
it continued to
press
for a
purge
of the
"Chicago
boys"
who still held mid-level
positions
in ministries and
government agencies.
It was
generally
feared that
they
would
try
to obstruct
implementation
of the reforms
(Hoy, 1983c;
Que
Pasa,
1983e).
Furthermore,
the CPC continued to
lobby
the
policy changes
outlined in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica which
had not
yet
been addressed
by
the
government (Hoy,
1983c;
Que Pasa,
1983h).
For
example,
the CPC
pressed
for a broader
bill that would
renegotiate
domestic debt at interest rates lower
than those
prevailing
on the market
(5%
over
UF,
an inflation-
adjusted
measure of
value).
Moreover,
business
consistently
used this
report
as the basis for its
lobbying
in
meetings
with
government
officials.
Thus,
if business
appeared
less strident
in
presenting
its demands after
September 1983,
its actual
commitment
to,
and
pursuit of,
them did not diminish. Further-
more,
as will be
seen,
the
military government
continued to
make concessions on the recommendations of that
report
as
the
price
of
regaining
social
support
and in an effort to defuse
political opposition
to the
regime.
product
(GDP).
A month
later,
Caceres
complied:
deficit
spending
for
1984
(Que Pasa,
1983h; Hoy,
1983e).
The CPC also
praised
Caceres for advanc-
ing
policy issue, i.e.,
lower real rates of
interest
(CPC,
1983).
Overall,
these fell from
35%
in
1982
to 16%
in
1983.
measures,
the
government quickly
expanded housing
and
public
works
programs,
as
expected
given
the
appointment
of Collados to the
Ministry
of Public
Works
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).8
Last but not
least,
the CPC had
long
advocated
(since 1982)
way
of
stimulating
the
economy.
brought
the
peak
business
process
of
drafting
code.9
Although
barrage
of criticism
once the
government
authorities
began
to
negotiate
in
earnest,
it did not lift all
the CPC ceased its
demands for the
resignations
Minister of the
Economy
Passicot
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).
At the
same
time,
it continued to
press
for a
purge
of the
"Chicago
boys"
positions
in ministries and
It was
generally
feared that
they
would
try
to obstruct
implementation
of the reforms
(Hoy, 1983c;
Que
Pasa,
1983e).
Furthermore,
lobby
the
policy changes
outlined in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica which
had not
yet
been addressed
by
the
government (Hoy,
1983c;
Que Pasa,
1983h).
For
example,
the CPC
pressed
for a broader
bill that would
renegotiate
than those
prevailing
on the market
(5%
over
UF,
an inflation-
adjusted
measure of
value).
Moreover,
business
consistently
used this
report
lobbying
in
meetings
with
government
officials.
Thus,
if business
appeared
less strident
in
presenting
its demands after
September 1983,
its actual
commitment
to,
and
pursuit of,
more,
as will be
seen,
the
military government
continued to
report
as
the
price
of
regaining
social
support
to the
regime.
product
(GDP).
A month
later,
Caceres
complied:
deficit
spending
for
1984
(Que Pasa,
1983h; Hoy,
1983e).
The CPC also
praised
Caceres for advanc-
ing
policy issue, i.e.,
lower real rates of
interest
(CPC,
1983).
Overall,
these fell from
35%
in
1982
to 16%
in
1983.
measures,
the
government quickly
expanded housing
and
public
works
programs,
as
expected
given
the
appointment
of Collados to the
Ministry
of Public
Works
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).8
Last but not
least,
the CPC had
long
advocated
(since 1982)
way
of
stimulating
the
economy.
brought
the
peak
business
process
of
drafting
code.9
Although
barrage
of criticism
once the
government
authorities
began
to
negotiate
in
earnest,
it did not lift all
the CPC ceased its
demands for the
resignations
Minister of the
Economy
Passicot
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).
At the
same
time,
it continued to
press
for a
purge
of the
"Chicago
boys"
positions
in ministries and
It was
generally
feared that
they
would
try
to obstruct
implementation
of the reforms
(Hoy, 1983c;
Que
Pasa,
1983e).
Furthermore,
lobby
the
policy changes
outlined in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica which
had not
yet
been addressed
by
the
government (Hoy,
1983c;
Que Pasa,
1983h).
For
example,
the CPC
pressed
for a broader
bill that would
renegotiate
than those
prevailing
on the market
(5%
over
UF,
an inflation-
adjusted
measure of
value).
Moreover,
business
consistently
used this
report
lobbying
in
meetings
with
government
officials.
Thus,
if business
appeared
less strident
in
presenting
its demands after
September 1983,
its actual
commitment
to,
and
pursuit of,
more,
as will be
seen,
the
military government
continued to
report
as
the
price
of
regaining
social
support
to the
regime.
product
(GDP).
A month
later,
Caceres
complied:
deficit
spending
for
1984
(Que Pasa,
1983h; Hoy,
1983e).
The CPC also
praised
Caceres for advanc-
ing
policy issue, i.e.,
lower real rates of
interest
(CPC,
1983).
Overall,
these fell from
35%
in
1982
to 16%
in
1983.
measures,
the
government quickly
expanded housing
and
public
works
programs,
as
expected
given
the
appointment
of Collados to the
Ministry
of Public
Works
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).8
Last but not
least,
the CPC had
long
advocated
(since 1982)
way
of
stimulating
the
economy.
brought
the
peak
business
process
of
drafting
code.9
Although
barrage
of criticism
once the
government
authorities
began
to
negotiate
in
earnest,
it did not lift all
the CPC ceased its
demands for the
resignations
Minister of the
Economy
Passicot
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).
At the
same
time,
it continued to
press
for a
purge
of the
"Chicago
boys"
positions
in ministries and
It was
generally
feared that
they
would
try
to obstruct
implementation
of the reforms
(Hoy, 1983c;
Que
Pasa,
1983e).
Furthermore,
lobby
the
policy changes
outlined in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica which
had not
yet
been addressed
by
the
government (Hoy,
1983c;
Que Pasa,
1983h).
For
example,
the CPC
pressed
for a broader
bill that would
renegotiate
than those
prevailing
on the market
(5%
over
UF,
an inflation-
adjusted
measure of
value).
Moreover,
business
consistently
used this
report
lobbying
in
meetings
with
government
officials.
Thus,
if business
appeared
less strident
in
presenting
its demands after
September 1983,
its actual
commitment
to,
and
pursuit of,
more,
as will be
seen,
the
military government
continued to
report
as
the
price
of
regaining
social
support
to the
regime.
product
(GDP).
A month
later,
Caceres
complied:
deficit
spending
for
1984
(Que Pasa,
1983h; Hoy,
1983e).
The CPC also
praised
Caceres for advanc-
ing
policy issue, i.e.,
lower real rates of
interest
(CPC,
1983).
Overall,
these fell from
35%
in
1982
to 16%
in
1983.
measures,
the
government quickly
expanded housing
and
public
works
programs,
as
expected
given
the
appointment
of Collados to the
Ministry
of Public
Works
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).8
Last but not
least,
the CPC had
long
advocated
(since 1982)
way
of
stimulating
the
economy.
brought
the
peak
business
process
of
drafting
code.9
Although
barrage
of criticism
once the
government
authorities
began
to
negotiate
in
earnest,
it did not lift all
the CPC ceased its
demands for the
resignations
Minister of the
Economy
Passicot
(Que
Pasa,
1983h).
At the
same
time,
it continued to
press
for a
purge
of the
"Chicago
boys"
positions
in ministries and
It was
generally
feared that
they
would
try
to obstruct
implementation
of the reforms
(Hoy, 1983c;
Que
Pasa,
1983e).
Furthermore,
lobby
the
policy changes
outlined in
Recuperaci6n
econ6mica which
had not
yet
been addressed
by
the
government (Hoy,
1983c;
Que Pasa,
1983h).
For
example,
the CPC
pressed
for a broader
bill that would
renegotiate
than those
prevailing
on the market
(5%
over
UF,
an inflation-
adjusted
measure of
value).
Moreover,
business
consistently
used this
report
lobbying
in
meetings
with
government
officials.
Thus,
if business
appeared
less strident
in
presenting
its demands after
September 1983,
its actual
commitment
to,
and
pursuit of,
more,
as will be
seen,
the
military government
continued to
report
as
the
price
of
regaining
social
support
to the
regime.
91 91 91 91 91
92
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
For the
capitalist coalition, then, negotiation proved
to be
a fruitful alternative to
confrontation, especially
under condi-
tions in which Pinochet needed to be able to
rely
on a firm
support
base if he
hoped
to
keep political
liberalization within
the narrow confines of the
1980
Constitution. The bloc of
big
businessmen and
large
landowners renewed its
support
of the
regime
once it
appeared
to have
gained
its ends and the ear of
government policymakers,
as evidenced
by
the
adoption
of its
policy suggestions
and
seeing
its
representatives placed
in
key
ministries. Access to the economic
excluding
all other social
groups,
cemented its dominant
position.
The Social Pact
Option:
1984
By
October of
1983
AD had lost the
edge
in its efforts to
promote rapid
and substantial
political
liberalization
(Que
Pasa, 1983f; Hoy,
1983d
and
1983e).
Pinochet had broken off
the
"dialogue"
with
AD,
and the
renegacde capitalists
had
returned to the fold.
Thus,
in
1984,
after the
strategy
of an
"implied"
alliance had fizzled
out,
AD next
attempted
to arrive
at an
explicit
social
pact
between
capital
and labor in order
to,
if not win
capital over,
at least
prevent
it from
opposing
a
transition to
democracy (Proyecto alternativo,
1984).
The
regime's political opponents hoped
that such a
pact
-
Concertaci6n Social - would
allay capitalist
fears
regarding
their future in a democratic
regime.
To this
end,
the PDC
sponsored
a series of
workshops
in late
1984
to enable the two
sides to enter into a
dialogue (CED,
1985).
Capitalists expressed
concern over
property rights
and wanted ironclad commit-
ments
against expropriation
and
competition
from state enter-
prises. They
also worried about
changes
in the labor code that
might
strengthen
the labor movement
(Leniz, 1985; Ojeda,
1985; Feliu,
1985).
Workers,
on the other
hand,
wanted
changes
in the labor code to facilitate collective
bargaining,
better
working conditions,
and
higher wages (Perez, 1985;
Thayer, 1984;
Ruiz di
Giorgio
and Ruiz dos
Santos, 1985; Diaz,
1985).
For the
to be
under condi-
rely
on a firm
support
base if he
hoped
to
keep political
1980
big
businessmen and
large
support
of the
regime
once it
appeared
to have
gained
as evidenced
by
the
adoption
of its
policy suggestions
and
seeing
its
in
key
excluding
all other social
groups,
position.
The Social Pact
Option:
1984
By
October of
1983
AD had lost the
edge
in its efforts to
promote rapid
and substantial
political
liberalization
(Que
Pasa, 1983f; Hoy,
1983d
and
1983e).
the
"dialogue"
with
AD,
and the
had
Thus,
in
1984,
after the
strategy
of an
"implied"
out,
AD next
attempted
to arrive
at an
explicit
social
pact
between
capital
and labor in order
to,
if not win
capital over,
at least
prevent
it from
opposing
a
transition to
1984).
The
that such a
pact
-
allay capitalist
fears
regarding
regime.
To this
end,
the PDC
sponsored
a series of
workshops
in late
1984
to enable the two
dialogue (CED,
1985).
concern over
property rights
ments
and
competition
from state enter-
prises. They
also worried about
changes
might
strengthen
the labor movement
1985; Feliu,
1985).
Workers,
on the other
hand,
wanted
changes
bargaining,
better
working conditions,
and
Thayer, 1984;
Ruiz di
Giorgio
and Ruiz dos
Santos, 1985; Diaz,
1985).
For the
to be
under condi-
rely
on a firm
support
base if he
hoped
to
keep political
1980
big
businessmen and
large
support
of the
regime
once it
appeared
to have
gained
as evidenced
by
the
adoption
of its
policy suggestions
and
seeing
its
in
key
excluding
all other social
groups,
position.
The Social Pact
Option:
1984
By
October of
1983
AD had lost the
edge
in its efforts to
promote rapid
and substantial
political
liberalization
(Que
Pasa, 1983f; Hoy,
1983d
and
1983e).
the
"dialogue"
with
AD,
and the
had
Thus,
in
1984,
after the
strategy
of an
"implied"
out,
AD next
attempted
to arrive
at an
explicit
social
pact
between
capital
and labor in order
to,
if not win
capital over,
at least
prevent
it from
opposing
a
transition to
1984).
The
that such a
pact
-
allay capitalist
fears
regarding
regime.
To this
end,
the PDC
sponsored
a series of
workshops
in late
1984
to enable the two
dialogue (CED,
1985).
concern over
property rights
ments
and
competition
from state enter-
prises. They
also worried about
changes
might
strengthen
the labor movement
1985; Feliu,
1985).
Workers,
on the other
hand,
wanted
changes
bargaining,
better
working conditions,
and
Thayer, 1984;
Ruiz di
Giorgio
and Ruiz dos
Santos, 1985; Diaz,
1985).
For the
to be
under condi-
rely
on a firm
support
base if he
hoped
to
keep political
1980
big
businessmen and
large
support
of the
regime
once it
appeared
to have
gained
as evidenced
by
the
adoption
of its
policy suggestions
and
seeing
its
in
key
excluding
all other social
groups,
position.
The Social Pact
Option:
1984
By
October of
1983
AD had lost the
edge
in its efforts to
promote rapid
and substantial
political
liberalization
(Que
Pasa, 1983f; Hoy,
1983d
and
1983e).
the
"dialogue"
with
AD,
and the
had
Thus,
in
1984,
after the
strategy
of an
"implied"
out,
AD next
attempted
to arrive
at an
explicit
social
pact
between
capital
and labor in order
to,
if not win
capital over,
at least
prevent
it from
opposing
a
transition to
1984).
The
that such a
pact
-
allay capitalist
fears
regarding
regime.
To this
end,
the PDC
sponsored
a series of
workshops
in late
1984
to enable the two
dialogue (CED,
1985).
concern over
property rights
ments
and
competition
from state enter-
prises. They
also worried about
changes
might
strengthen
the labor movement
1985; Feliu,
1985).
Workers,
on the other
hand,
wanted
changes
bargaining,
better
working conditions,
and
Thayer, 1984;
Ruiz di
Giorgio
and Ruiz dos
Santos, 1985; Diaz,
1985).
For the
to be
under condi-
rely
on a firm
support
base if he
hoped
to
keep political
1980
big
businessmen and
large
support
of the
regime
once it
appeared
to have
gained
as evidenced
by
the
adoption
of its
policy suggestions
and
seeing
its
in
key
excluding
all other social
groups,
position.
The Social Pact
Option:
1984
By
October of
1983
AD had lost the
edge
in its efforts to
promote rapid
and substantial
political
liberalization
(Que
Pasa, 1983f; Hoy,
1983d
and
1983e).
the
"dialogue"
with
AD,
and the
had
Thus,
in
1984,
after the
strategy
of an
"implied"
out,
AD next
attempted
to arrive
at an
explicit
social
pact
between
capital
and labor in order
to,
if not win
capital over,
at least
prevent
it from
opposing
a
transition to
1984).
The
that such a
pact
-
allay capitalist
fears
regarding
regime.
To this
end,
the PDC
sponsored
a series of
workshops
in late
1984
to enable the two
dialogue (CED,
1985).
concern over
property rights
ments
and
competition
from state enter-
prises. They
also worried about
changes
might
strengthen
the labor movement
1985; Feliu,
1985).
Workers,
on the other
hand,
wanted
changes
bargaining,
better
working conditions,
and
Thayer, 1984;
Ruiz di
Giorgio
and Ruiz dos
Santos, 1985; Diaz,
1985).
However the
big
business interests had no incentive to
join
the
concertaclon
project
and
every
incentive to
reject
it.
They
were
getting
what
they
wanted
anyhow. Throughout
1984,
the neoliberal coalition continued to consolidate its
position
vis-a-vis the
government
as evidenced
by
the number
of concessions it was
granted
in the area of economic
policy.
For
example,
an
expansionary
economic
policy
was
clearly
in
place
as measured
by
deficit
spending,
reduction in
unemploy-
ment,
and lower interest rates. A more
satisfactory
debt
rescheduling
scheme had been introduced.
Moreover,
the
pragmatic
coalition's access
to,
and
participation in,
the
economic
had increased
significantly.
As of
April 1984,
the ministries
responsible
for the
economy
were headed
by
"their" ministers
(many
of whom had been
part
of
Jorge
Alessandri's conservative
presidency
in the late 1950s
and
early 1960s),
and
many
of the
"Chicago boys"
continued
to be removed from their administrative
positions.
In
addition,
businessmen and landowners took
part
in
formulating
the
government's
Plan
Trienal,
a
3-year
sectoral
development plan
that had been
sponsored by
Collados when he was the
chairman of the construction
industry's
association in
1983
(Fontaine, 1989;
Araya,
1989).
Finally,
the Economic and Social
Council,
a
government agency
with
advisory
functions in eco-
nomic and social
matters,
had
begun operation.
Dominated
by
members of nation's
top
business
associations,
it
provided
an
additional forum for discussion and channel
by
which to commu-
nicate with
government
officials.10 These were
significant gains
compared
to the situation which had obtained
up
to
mid-1983
(Silva,
1991).
There was no need for the leaders of the CPC
coalition to enter into
any
social
pact
with labor."
By 1985, capitalists
had
largely
weathered the economic
storm,
now under
control,
and had
developed
a more or less
stable
relationship
with the
military government.
As a
result,
the
pragmatic
began
to maneuver to
extract economic
policy
concessions from AlianzaDemocratica.
It was now time for the
capitalist coalition, having
entrenched
their interests with the
government
in
power,
to seek to
establish for themselves and their interests a similar
impreg-
However the
big
join
the
concertaclon
project
and
every
incentive to
reject
it.
They
were
getting
what
they
wanted
anyhow. Throughout
1984,
position
vis-a-vis the
government
as evidenced
by
the number
granted
policy.
For
example,
an
expansionary
economic
policy
was
clearly
in
place
as measured
by
deficit
spending,
reduction in
unemploy-
ment,
satisfactory
debt
rescheduling
Moreover,
the
pragmatic
coalition's access
to,
and
participation in,
the
economic
had increased
significantly.
As of
April 1984,
the ministries
responsible
for the
economy
were headed
by
"their" ministers
(many
of whom had been
part
of
Jorge
presidency
in the late 1950s
and
early 1960s),
and
many
of the
"Chicago boys"
continued
positions.
In
addition,
part
in
formulating
the
government's
Plan
Trienal,
a
3-year
sectoral
development plan
that had been
sponsored by
industry's
association in
1983
(Fontaine, 1989;
Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Council,
a
government agency
with
advisory
functions in eco-
nomic and social
matters,
had
begun operation.
Dominated
by
members of nation's
top
business
associations,
it
provided
an
by
which to commu-
nicate with
government
significant gains
compared
up
to
mid-1983
(Silva,
1991).
any
social
pact
with labor."
had
largely
storm,
now under
control,
and had
developed
a more or less
stable
relationship
with the
As a
result,
the
pragmatic
began
to maneuver to
extract economic
policy
entrenched
government
in
power,
to seek to
impreg-
However the
big
join
the
concertaclon
project
and
every
incentive to
reject
it.
They
were
getting
what
they
wanted
anyhow. Throughout
1984,
position
vis-a-vis the
government
as evidenced
by
the number
granted
policy.
For
example,
an
expansionary
economic
policy
was
clearly
in
place
as measured
by
deficit
spending,
reduction in
unemploy-
ment,
satisfactory
debt
rescheduling
Moreover,
the
pragmatic
coalition's access
to,
and
participation in,
the
economic
had increased
significantly.
As of
April 1984,
the ministries
responsible
for the
economy
were headed
by
"their" ministers
(many
of whom had been
part
of
Jorge
presidency
in the late 1950s
and
early 1960s),
and
many
of the
"Chicago boys"
continued
positions.
In
addition,
part
in
formulating
the
government's
Plan
Trienal,
a
3-year
sectoral
development plan
that had been
sponsored by
industry's
association in
1983
(Fontaine, 1989;
Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Council,
a
government agency
with
advisory
functions in eco-
nomic and social
matters,
had
begun operation.
Dominated
by
members of nation's
top
business
associations,
it
provided
an
by
which to commu-
nicate with
government
significant gains
compared
up
to
mid-1983
(Silva,
1991).
any
social
pact
with labor."
had
largely
storm,
now under
control,
and had
developed
a more or less
stable
relationship
with the
As a
result,
the
pragmatic
began
to maneuver to
extract economic
policy
entrenched
government
in
power,
to seek to
impreg-
However the
big
join
the
concertaclon
project
and
every
incentive to
reject
it.
They
were
getting
what
they
wanted
anyhow. Throughout
1984,
position
vis-a-vis the
government
as evidenced
by
the number
granted
policy.
For
example,
an
expansionary
economic
policy
was
clearly
in
place
as measured
by
deficit
spending,
reduction in
unemploy-
ment,
satisfactory
debt
rescheduling
Moreover,
the
pragmatic
coalition's access
to,
and
participation in,
the
economic
had increased
significantly.
As of
April 1984,
the ministries
responsible
for the
economy
were headed
by
"their" ministers
(many
of whom had been
part
of
Jorge
presidency
in the late 1950s
and
early 1960s),
and
many
of the
"Chicago boys"
continued
positions.
In
addition,
part
in
formulating
the
government's
Plan
Trienal,
a
3-year
sectoral
development plan
that had been
sponsored by
industry's
association in
1983
(Fontaine, 1989;
Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Council,
a
government agency
with
advisory
functions in eco-
nomic and social
matters,
had
begun operation.
Dominated
by
members of nation's
top
business
associations,
it
provided
an
by
which to commu-
nicate with
government
significant gains
compared
up
to
mid-1983
(Silva,
1991).
any
social
pact
with labor."
had
largely
storm,
now under
control,
and had
developed
a more or less
stable
relationship
with the
As a
result,
the
pragmatic
began
to maneuver to
extract economic
policy
entrenched
government
in
power,
to seek to
impreg-
However the
big
join
the
concertaclon
project
and
every
incentive to
reject
it.
They
were
getting
what
they
wanted
anyhow. Throughout
1984,
position
vis-a-vis the
government
as evidenced
by
the number
granted
policy.
For
example,
an
expansionary
economic
policy
was
clearly
in
place
as measured
by
deficit
spending,
reduction in
unemploy-
ment,
satisfactory
debt
rescheduling
Moreover,
the
pragmatic
coalition's access
to,
and
participation in,
the
economic
had increased
significantly.
As of
April 1984,
the ministries
responsible
for the
economy
were headed
by
"their" ministers
(many
of whom had been
part
of
Jorge
presidency
in the late 1950s
and
early 1960s),
and
many
of the
"Chicago boys"
continued
positions.
In
addition,
part
in
formulating
the
government's
Plan
Trienal,
a
3-year
sectoral
development plan
that had been
sponsored by
industry's
association in
1983
(Fontaine, 1989;
Araya,
1989).
Finally,
Council,
a
government agency
with
advisory
functions in eco-
nomic and social
matters,
had
begun operation.
Dominated
by
members of nation's
top
business
associations,
it
provided
an
by
which to commu-
nicate with
government
significant gains
compared
up
to
mid-1983
(Silva,
1991).
any
social
pact
with labor."
had
largely
storm,
now under
control,
and had
developed
a more or less
stable
relationship
with the
As a
result,
the
pragmatic
began
to maneuver to
extract economic
policy
entrenched
government
in
power,
to seek to
impreg-
93 93 93 93 93
94
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
nable
position
with the
pro-democratic opposition by ensuring
that their
pragmatic
neoliberal economic model would become
an "untouchable" issue for
any political regime
that
might
emerge
in the future.
THE TRIUMPH OF PRAGMATIC
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE
OPPOSITION'S
RESPONSE,
1986-88
D
URING THIS
period,
the CPC coalition
sought
to
consolidate its
gains.
The
military government had,
to a
large extent, adopted
the economic model
sponsored by
the
coalition and had
given
it exclusive access to the
policymaking
process.
In
1986,
the
government
had further enhanced their
role in (and
opportunity
to
influence)
economic
policymaking
by creating
two
agencies
in the
Ministry
of
Economy,
both a
National Commission for Commerce and the National Commis-
sion for
Industry.
These commissions were
essentially working
groups
for the formulation of
policy,
in which the CPC and its
member associations had formal
status,
both in terms of
proposing policy (draw-backs,
for
example)
and in
revising
decree drafts
(Ramdohr, 1988; Fontaine,
1989;
Ale,
1988; Ward,
1988; Chile,
1986).
Moreover,
economic
recovery
and sus-
tained
growth
validated the terms of the
agreement
that held
the
pragmatic
together.
All members of the
big business/large
landowner
groups prospered.
Given these
successes,
in
1986
the
capitalist
coalition
initiated a
campaign designed
to
preserve
and
protect
their
neoliberal economic model in the future as well. Not
only
did
they oppose socialism,
but also most
government regulation
or
action which
might
vitiate
pragmatic
neoliberalism in
any way.
Growth with
austerity
was their
slogan. They sought
to defend
a model in which sectoral interests could
lobby
for
protection
and subsidies within a framework of macroeconomic
stability.
The
latter,
of
course,
required
fiscal
austerity
in order to
maintain the
privileges
of the former.
nable
position
with the
that their
pragmatic
that
might
emerge
in the future.
OPPOSITION'S
RESPONSE,
1986-88
D
URING THIS
period,
the CPC coalition
sought
to
consolidate its
gains.
The
to a
the economic model
sponsored by
the
coalition and had
given
policymaking
process.
In
1986,
the
government
role in (and
opportunity
to
influence)
economic
policymaking
by creating
two
agencies
in the
Ministry
of
Economy,
both a
sion for
Industry.
essentially working
groups
policy,
status,
both in terms of
for
example)
and in
revising
decree drafts
1989;
Ale,
1988; Ward,
1988; Chile,
1986).
Moreover,
economic
recovery
and sus-
tained
growth
agreement
that held
the
pragmatic
together.
All members of the
big business/large
landowner
groups prospered.
Given these
successes,
in
1986
the
capitalist
coalition
initiated a
campaign designed
to
preserve
and
protect
their
only
did
but also most
or
action which
might
vitiate
pragmatic
neoliberalism in
any way.
Growth with
austerity
was their
slogan. They sought
to defend
lobby
for
protection
stability.
The
latter,
of
course,
required
fiscal
austerity
in order to
maintain the
privileges
of the former.
nable
position
with the
that their
pragmatic
that
might
emerge
in the future.
OPPOSITION'S
RESPONSE,
1986-88
D
URING THIS
period,
the CPC coalition
sought
to
consolidate its
gains.
The
to a
the economic model
sponsored by
the
coalition and had
given
policymaking
process.
In
1986,
the
government
role in (and
opportunity
to
influence)
economic
policymaking
by creating
two
agencies
in the
Ministry
of
Economy,
both a
sion for
Industry.
essentially working
groups
policy,
status,
both in terms of
for
example)
and in
revising
decree drafts
1989;
Ale,
1988; Ward,
1988; Chile,
1986).
Moreover,
economic
recovery
and sus-
tained
growth
agreement
that held
the
pragmatic
together.
All members of the
big business/large
landowner
groups prospered.
Given these
successes,
in
1986
the
capitalist
coalition
initiated a
campaign designed
to
preserve
and
protect
their
only
did
but also most
or
action which
might
vitiate
pragmatic
neoliberalism in
any way.
Growth with
austerity
was their
slogan. They sought
to defend
lobby
for
protection
stability.
The
latter,
of
course,
required
fiscal
austerity
in order to
maintain the
privileges
of the former.
nable
position
with the
that their
pragmatic
that
might
emerge
in the future.
OPPOSITION'S
RESPONSE,
1986-88
D
URING THIS
period,
the CPC coalition
sought
to
consolidate its
gains.
The
to a
the economic model
sponsored by
the
coalition and had
given
policymaking
process.
In
1986,
the
government
role in (and
opportunity
to
influence)
economic
policymaking
by creating
two
agencies
in the
Ministry
of
Economy,
both a
sion for
Industry.
essentially working
groups
policy,
status,
both in terms of
for
example)
and in
revising
decree drafts
1989;
Ale,
1988; Ward,
1988; Chile,
1986).
Moreover,
economic
recovery
and sus-
tained
growth
agreement
that held
the
pragmatic
together.
All members of the
big business/large
landowner
groups prospered.
Given these
successes,
in
1986
the
capitalist
coalition
initiated a
campaign designed
to
preserve
and
protect
their
only
did
but also most
or
action which
might
vitiate
pragmatic
neoliberalism in
any way.
Growth with
austerity
was their
slogan. They sought
to defend
lobby
for
protection
stability.
The
latter,
of
course,
required
fiscal
austerity
in order to
maintain the
privileges
of the former.
nable
position
with the
that their
pragmatic
that
might
emerge
in the future.
OPPOSITION'S
RESPONSE,
1986-88
D
URING THIS
period,
the CPC coalition
sought
to
consolidate its
gains.
The
to a
the economic model
sponsored by
the
coalition and had
given
policymaking
process.
In
1986,
the
government
role in (and
opportunity
to
influence)
economic
policymaking
by creating
two
agencies
in the
Ministry
of
Economy,
both a
sion for
Industry.
essentially working
groups
policy,
status,
both in terms of
for
example)
and in
revising
decree drafts
1989;
Ale,
1988; Ward,
1988; Chile,
1986).
Moreover,
economic
recovery
and sus-
tained
growth
agreement
that held
the
pragmatic
together.
All members of the
big business/large
landowner
groups prospered.
Given these
successes,
in
1986
the
capitalist
coalition
initiated a
campaign designed
to
preserve
and
protect
their
only
did
but also most
or
action which
might
vitiate
pragmatic
neoliberalism in
any way.
Growth with
austerity
was their
slogan. They sought
to defend
lobby
for
protection
stability.
The
latter,
of
course,
required
fiscal
austerity
in order to
maintain the
privileges
of the former.
The Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
(SFF)
spearheaded
the
public
debate.
Throughout
1986
it
bluntly
stated that the
pragmatic
neoliberal model
represented
their
and,
of
course,
Chile's best interests.
Major
alteration would lead
only
to
disaster. The SFF demanded absolute
respect
for
private
property. Capitalists opposed
renewed state
participation
in
production,
as well as
joint
ventures between state and
private
entrepreneurs.
In other
words, they rejected
AD's version of a
mixed
economy
and
fervently supported privatization
to
reduce
public
sector
competition. Moreover,
Chile should
maintain an
open
and free
economy,
both
nationally
and
internationally.
This meant low across-the-board tariffs with
high
real
exchange rates, protection against
unfair
competition
when
indicated,
and no controls on
prices
or
foreign exchange.
Tax
structures, present provisions
for state
welfare,
and labor
market
arrangements
should remain
basically
unaltered.
(SFF,
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d;
also
1985/86, 1986/87;
Que
Pasa,
1986).
From
1987
til October
1988 (when
plebiscite
was
held),
the
Confederaci6n
de la Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
the
Sociedad Nacional de
Agricultura (SNA)
and the Camara
Nacional de Comercio
(CNC)
echoed the
pronouncements
of
the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
(SFF)
and declared their
allegiance
to Pinochet in the transition
process
(El
Campesino,
1987a,
1987c; CNC,
1988).12
With the formation of so-called
Civic Committees (Comites
Cyvicos)
in
1987,
the
array
of
capitalist
leaders and economic elites
began
to
campaign
for
the
military regime
in the
coming plebiscite.
The CPC came out
openly
for Pinochet at the
beginning
of
1988 (El
Campesino,
1988a,
1988b).
Recognizing
the
unwavering
adherence of these
groups
to their economic
program,
the Alianza
Democrdtica
advo-
cated an economic
platform
that became
increasingly
conser-
vative as time
passed.
The
also shifted its
stance because the
economy
was
improving
and the
program
was
gaining
international
prestige.
AD
hoped
to assure
capital-
ists and
Right-wing
parties
that it did not
represent
a threat to
(SFF)
spearheaded
the
public
debate.
Throughout
1986
it
bluntly
stated that the
pragmatic
neoliberal model
represented
their
and,
of
course,
Major
only
to
respect
for
private
renewed state
participation
in
production,
as well as
joint
private
entrepreneurs.
In other
AD's version of a
mixed
economy
and
to
reduce
public
sector
Chile should
maintain an
open
and free
economy,
both
nationally
and
internationally.
high
real
unfair
competition
when
indicated,
and no controls on
prices
or
foreign exchange.
Tax
for state
welfare,
and labor
market
arrangements
should remain
basically
unaltered.
(SFF,
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d;
also
1985/86, 1986/87;
Que
Pasa,
1986).
From
1987
til October
1988 (when
plebiscite
was
held),
the
Confederaci6n
de la Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
the
Agricultura (SNA)
and the Camara
(CNC)
echoed the
pronouncements
of
(SFF)
and declared their
allegiance
process
(El
Campesino,
1987a,
1987c; CNC,
1988).12
Cyvicos)
in
1987,
the
array
of
capitalist
began
to
campaign
for
the
military regime
in the
coming plebiscite.
The CPC came out
openly
for Pinochet at the
beginning
of
1988 (El
Campesino,
1988a,
1988b).
Recognizing
the
unwavering
adherence of these
groups
to their economic
program,
the Alianza
Democrdtica
advo-
cated an economic
platform
that became
increasingly
conser-
vative as time
passed.
The
also shifted its
stance because the
economy
was
improving
and the
program
was
gaining
international
prestige.
AD
hoped
to assure
capital-
ists and
Right-wing
parties
that it did not
represent
a threat to
(SFF)
spearheaded
the
public
debate.
Throughout
1986
it
bluntly
stated that the
pragmatic
neoliberal model
represented
their
and,
of
course,
Major
only
to
respect
for
private
renewed state
participation
in
production,
as well as
joint
private
entrepreneurs.
In other
AD's version of a
mixed
economy
and
to
reduce
public
sector
Chile should
maintain an
open
and free
economy,
both
nationally
and
internationally.
high
real
unfair
competition
when
indicated,
and no controls on
prices
or
foreign exchange.
Tax
for state
welfare,
and labor
market
arrangements
should remain
basically
unaltered.
(SFF,
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d;
also
1985/86, 1986/87;
Que
Pasa,
1986).
From
1987
til October
1988 (when
plebiscite
was
held),
the
Confederaci6n
de la Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
the
Agricultura (SNA)
and the Camara
(CNC)
echoed the
pronouncements
of
(SFF)
and declared their
allegiance
process
(El
Campesino,
1987a,
1987c; CNC,
1988).12
Cyvicos)
in
1987,
the
array
of
capitalist
began
to
campaign
for
the
military regime
in the
coming plebiscite.
The CPC came out
openly
for Pinochet at the
beginning
of
1988 (El
Campesino,
1988a,
1988b).
Recognizing
the
unwavering
adherence of these
groups
to their economic
program,
the Alianza
Democrdtica
advo-
cated an economic
platform
that became
increasingly
conser-
vative as time
passed.
The
also shifted its
stance because the
economy
was
improving
and the
program
was
gaining
international
prestige.
AD
hoped
to assure
capital-
ists and
Right-wing
parties
that it did not
represent
a threat to
(SFF)
spearheaded
the
public
debate.
Throughout
1986
it
bluntly
stated that the
pragmatic
neoliberal model
represented
their
and,
of
course,
Major
only
to
respect
for
private
renewed state
participation
in
production,
as well as
joint
private
entrepreneurs.
In other
AD's version of a
mixed
economy
and
to
reduce
public
sector
Chile should
maintain an
open
and free
economy,
both
nationally
and
internationally.
high
real
unfair
competition
when
indicated,
and no controls on
prices
or
foreign exchange.
Tax
for state
welfare,
and labor
market
arrangements
should remain
basically
unaltered.
(SFF,
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d;
also
1985/86, 1986/87;
Que
Pasa,
1986).
From
1987
til October
1988 (when
plebiscite
was
held),
the
Confederaci6n
de la Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
the
Agricultura (SNA)
and the Camara
(CNC)
echoed the
pronouncements
of
(SFF)
and declared their
allegiance
process
(El
Campesino,
1987a,
1987c; CNC,
1988).12
Cyvicos)
in
1987,
the
array
of
capitalist
began
to
campaign
for
the
military regime
in the
coming plebiscite.
The CPC came out
openly
for Pinochet at the
beginning
of
1988 (El
Campesino,
1988a,
1988b).
Recognizing
the
unwavering
adherence of these
groups
to their economic
program,
the Alianza
Democrdtica
advo-
cated an economic
platform
that became
increasingly
conser-
vative as time
passed.
The
also shifted its
stance because the
economy
was
improving
and the
program
was
gaining
international
prestige.
AD
hoped
to assure
capital-
ists and
Right-wing
parties
that it did not
represent
a threat to
(SFF)
spearheaded
the
public
debate.
Throughout
1986
it
bluntly
stated that the
pragmatic
neoliberal model
represented
their
and,
of
course,
Major
only
to
respect
for
private
renewed state
participation
in
production,
as well as
joint
private
entrepreneurs.
In other
AD's version of a
mixed
economy
and
to
reduce
public
sector
Chile should
maintain an
open
and free
economy,
both
nationally
and
internationally.
high
real
unfair
competition
when
indicated,
and no controls on
prices
or
foreign exchange.
Tax
for state
welfare,
and labor
market
arrangements
should remain
basically
unaltered.
(SFF,
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d;
also
1985/86, 1986/87;
Que
Pasa,
1986).
From
1987
til October
1988 (when
plebiscite
was
held),
the
Confederaci6n
de la Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
the
Agricultura (SNA)
and the Camara
(CNC)
echoed the
pronouncements
of
(SFF)
and declared their
allegiance
process
(El
Campesino,
1987a,
1987c; CNC,
1988).12
Cyvicos)
in
1987,
the
array
of
capitalist
began
to
campaign
for
the
military regime
in the
coming plebiscite.
The CPC came out
openly
for Pinochet at the
beginning
of
1988 (El
Campesino,
1988a,
1988b).
Recognizing
the
unwavering
adherence of these
groups
to their economic
program,
the Alianza
Democrdtica
advo-
cated an economic
platform
that became
increasingly
conser-
vative as time
passed.
The
also shifted its
stance because the
economy
was
improving
and the
program
was
gaining
international
prestige.
AD
hoped
to assure
capital-
ists and
Right-wing
parties
that it did not
represent
a threat to
95 95 95 95 95
96
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
established order and that it was a
legitimate participant
in what
should be a
negotiated
transition to
democracy.
Under the
circumstances
prevailing
in
Chile,
that meant
bargaining
over
the terms of the 1988
plebiscite
and various anti-democratic
clauses of the
1980
Constitution. In
short,
AD
gambled that, by
moderating
its economic
position,
it could attract the
support
necessary
to
negotiate
a transition from Pinochet's authoritar-
ian
regime
to a one more democratic than that
permitted
under
the
1980
Constitution.
Thus, regime opponents
decided to
concentrate on
political change
-
e.g.,
democratization -
rather than economic
change.
Although
AD has been
fairly
consistent in its
support
of
a moderate economic
program, up
til
September
1985 it was
still
advocating
a
greater degree
of state
participation
in
production
than was
palatable
to the
large-scale
economic
interests.13
However,
as the
capitalist
coalition
strengthened
its
organization
and consolidated its
position,
and as the
economy
itself showed
signs
of relative
improvement,
the AD softened
its
position
on state
enterprise. By 1988,
the
opposition, though
continuing
to
praise
a mixed
economy,
had redefined the term
to
apply essentially
to industrial
policy (targeting growth
industries, supplying
tax incentives for
investment, allocating
special credits,
etc.).
It no
longer
mentioned state
enterprise
as
such
(Estrategia, 1988;
La
Epoca, 1988; Tironi,
1989:
chapters
2 and
5; Larrain,
1988b).
Thus the
opposition
limited itself to
a discussion of distributional issues within the limits of the
neoliberal model
(Tironi, 1987; Garcia,
1987;
Molina
1987).
In
response
to the
gradual softening
of the AD
position,
by early
1987
the
capitalist groups
had
begun
to concede that
there was no
longer any
reason to fear for their
property rights,
acknowledging
that not much would
change regardless
of who
won the
plebiscite (Que Pasa, 1987).
Their
only
real concern
was that
government
intervention in markets
might
lead to
economic
instability (Ale, 1982; Prieto, 1982;
De la
Cuadra,
1982;
El
Campesino, 1988c; CNC,
1988:
8-11; SFF,
1988: 6-8).
However,
the Confederacion de la
Producci6ny
Comercio
(CPC)
opposed
even moderate economic reform in the interests of social
in what
should be a
negotiated
transition to
democracy.
Under the
circumstances
prevailing
in
Chile,
that meant
bargaining
over
plebiscite
clauses of the
1980
Constitution. In
short,
AD
gambled that, by
moderating
its economic
position,
support
necessary
to
negotiate
ian
regime
permitted
under
the
1980
Constitution.
decided to
concentrate on
political change
-
e.g.,
democratization -
change.
Although
AD has been
fairly
consistent in its
support
of
a moderate economic
program, up
til
September
1985 it was
still
advocating
a
greater degree
of state
participation
in
production
than was
palatable
to the
large-scale
economic
interests.13
However,
as the
capitalist
coalition
strengthened
its
organization
position,
and as the
economy
itself showed
signs
of relative
improvement,
the AD softened
its
position
on state
the
opposition, though
continuing
to
praise
a mixed
economy,
to
apply essentially
to industrial
tax incentives for
special credits,
etc.).
It no
longer
mentioned state
enterprise
as
such
(Estrategia, 1988;
La
1989:
chapters
2 and
5; Larrain,
1988b).
Thus the
opposition
limited itself to
neoliberal model
1987;
Molina
1987).
In
response
to the
gradual softening
of the AD
position,
by early
1987
the
capitalist groups
had
begun
to concede that
there was no
longer any
property rights,
acknowledging
that not much would
change regardless
of who
won the
Their
only
real concern
was that
government
might
lead to
economic
De la
Cuadra,
1982;
El
1988:
8-11; SFF,
1988: 6-8).
However,
Producci6ny
Comercio
(CPC)
opposed
in what
should be a
negotiated
transition to
democracy.
Under the
circumstances
prevailing
in
Chile,
that meant
bargaining
over
plebiscite
clauses of the
1980
Constitution. In
short,
AD
gambled that, by
moderating
its economic
position,
support
necessary
to
negotiate
ian
regime
permitted
under
the
1980
Constitution.
decided to
concentrate on
political change
-
e.g.,
democratization -
change.
Although
AD has been
fairly
consistent in its
support
of
a moderate economic
program, up
til
September
1985 it was
still
advocating
a
greater degree
of state
participation
in
production
than was
palatable
to the
large-scale
economic
interests.13
However,
as the
capitalist
coalition
strengthened
its
organization
position,
and as the
economy
itself showed
signs
of relative
improvement,
the AD softened
its
position
on state
the
opposition, though
continuing
to
praise
a mixed
economy,
to
apply essentially
to industrial
tax incentives for
special credits,
etc.).
It no
longer
mentioned state
enterprise
as
such
(Estrategia, 1988;
La
1989:
chapters
2 and
5; Larrain,
1988b).
Thus the
opposition
limited itself to
neoliberal model
1987;
Molina
1987).
In
response
to the
gradual softening
of the AD
position,
by early
1987
the
capitalist groups
had
begun
to concede that
there was no
longer any
property rights,
acknowledging
that not much would
change regardless
of who
won the
Their
only
real concern
was that
government
might
lead to
economic
De la
Cuadra,
1982;
El
1988:
8-11; SFF,
1988: 6-8).
However,
Producci6ny
Comercio
(CPC)
opposed
in what
should be a
negotiated
transition to
democracy.
Under the
circumstances
prevailing
in
Chile,
that meant
bargaining
over
plebiscite
clauses of the
1980
Constitution. In
short,
AD
gambled that, by
moderating
its economic
position,
support
necessary
to
negotiate
ian
regime
permitted
under
the
1980
Constitution.
decided to
concentrate on
political change
-
e.g.,
democratization -
change.
Although
AD has been
fairly
consistent in its
support
of
a moderate economic
program, up
til
September
1985 it was
still
advocating
a
greater degree
of state
participation
in
production
than was
palatable
to the
large-scale
economic
interests.13
However,
as the
capitalist
coalition
strengthened
its
organization
position,
and as the
economy
itself showed
signs
of relative
improvement,
the AD softened
its
position
on state
the
opposition, though
continuing
to
praise
a mixed
economy,
to
apply essentially
to industrial
tax incentives for
special credits,
etc.).
It no
longer
mentioned state
enterprise
as
such
(Estrategia, 1988;
La
1989:
chapters
2 and
5; Larrain,
1988b).
Thus the
opposition
limited itself to
neoliberal model
1987;
Molina
1987).
In
response
to the
gradual softening
of the AD
position,
by early
1987
the
capitalist groups
had
begun
to concede that
there was no
longer any
property rights,
acknowledging
that not much would
change regardless
of who
won the
Their
only
real concern
was that
government
might
lead to
economic
De la
Cuadra,
1982;
El
1988:
8-11; SFF,
1988: 6-8).
However,
Producci6ny
Comercio
(CPC)
opposed
in what
should be a
negotiated
transition to
democracy.
Under the
circumstances
prevailing
in
Chile,
that meant
bargaining
over
plebiscite
clauses of the
1980
Constitution. In
short,
AD
gambled that, by
moderating
its economic
position,
support
necessary
to
negotiate
ian
regime
permitted
under
the
1980
Constitution.
decided to
concentrate on
political change
-
e.g.,
democratization -
change.
Although
AD has been
fairly
consistent in its
support
of
a moderate economic
program, up
til
September
1985 it was
still
advocating
a
greater degree
of state
participation
in
production
than was
palatable
to the
large-scale
economic
interests.13
However,
as the
capitalist
coalition
strengthened
its
organization
position,
and as the
economy
itself showed
signs
of relative
improvement,
the AD softened
its
position
on state
the
opposition, though
continuing
to
praise
a mixed
economy,
to
apply essentially
to industrial
tax incentives for
special credits,
etc.).
It no
longer
mentioned state
enterprise
as
such
(Estrategia, 1988;
La
1989:
chapters
2 and
5; Larrain,
1988b).
Thus the
opposition
limited itself to
neoliberal model
1987;
Molina
1987).
In
response
to the
gradual softening
of the AD
position,
by early
1987
the
capitalist groups
had
begun
to concede that
there was no
longer any
property rights,
acknowledging
that not much would
change regardless
of who
won the
Their
only
real concern
was that
government
might
lead to
economic
De la
Cuadra,
1982;
El
1988:
8-11; SFF,
1988: 6-8).
However,
Producci6ny
Comercio
(CPC)
opposed
justice.'4
Given their satisfaction with Pinochet's
adoption
of the
pragmatic
neoliberal
model,
and their inclusion in the
policymaking
process,
the CPC and its affiliates continued to
support
Pinochet
in the
plebiscite
because he shielded them from even the
mildest economic
change.
THE PRAGMATIC NEOLIBERAL COALITION
AND CHILE'S TRANSITION
TO
DEMOCRACY,
1983-91
THE RISE OF the
pragmatic
neoliberal coalition between
large-scale
(which
was domi-
nated
by producers
for international markets within the CPC
but included domestic market
producers
as
well),
its consoli-
dation,
and the relative success of its economic model had
several
for Chile's
political
transition.
First,
the formation of the
pragmatic
robbed the
led
by AD,
of
securing
a
major ally
from within the
capitalist/landowning class,
and it
strengthened
the social base of the
military government
at its
very
core. This
gave
the
regime
the fortitude to resist
opposi-
tion demands for a more
rapid
transition to full
political
democracy.
Pinochet and his
supporters
could bide their time
and insist on a
political
transition within the institutional
confines of the
1980
constitution: i.e. a
plebiscite
in
1989,
with
Pinochet
virtually
assured of his
candidacy;
full elections in
1990
or
1997, depending
on the outcome of the
plebiscite;
election laws
promulgated
without
any input
from the
oppo-
sition
(with
all of the attendant
opportunity
for
gerrymander-
ing);
and full institution of the
pragmatic
neoliberal economic
model without
regard
for social
equity.'5
The consolidation of the
pragmatic
and the success of its economic model between
1986
and
1988
had a second
major
effect. The
opposition
was induced to
relinquish,
or
modify,
much of its economic
program.
The
Concertacion de
Partidospor
el NO
emphasized,
in no uncer-
tain
terms,
not
only
that it
wholly accepted
the
pragmatic
justice.'4
adoption
of the
pragmatic
neoliberal
model,
policymaking
process,
support
Pinochet
in the
plebiscite
mildest economic
change.
TO
DEMOCRACY,
1983-91
THE RISE OF the
pragmatic
large-scale
(which
was domi-
nated
by producers
producers
as
well),
its consoli-
dation,
several
for Chile's
political
transition.
First,
pragmatic
robbed the
led
by AD,
of
securing
a
major ally
from within the
and it
strengthened
military government
at its
very
core. This
gave
the
regime
opposi-
rapid
transition to full
political
democracy.
Pinochet and his
supporters
and insist on a
political
confines of the
1980
plebiscite
in
1989,
with
Pinochet
virtually
assured of his
candidacy;
full elections in
1990
or
1997, depending
plebiscite;
election laws
promulgated
without
any input
from the
oppo-
sition
(with
opportunity
for
gerrymander-
ing);
pragmatic
neoliberal economic
model without
regard
for social
equity.'5
pragmatic
1986
and
1988
had a second
major
effect. The
opposition
was induced to
relinquish,
or
modify,
program.
The
Concertacion de
Partidospor
el NO
emphasized,
in no uncer-
tain
terms,
not
only
that it
wholly accepted
the
pragmatic
justice.'4
adoption
of the
pragmatic
neoliberal
model,
policymaking
process,
support
Pinochet
in the
plebiscite
mildest economic
change.
TO
DEMOCRACY,
1983-91
THE RISE OF the
pragmatic
large-scale
(which
was domi-
nated
by producers
producers
as
well),
its consoli-
dation,
several
for Chile's
political
transition.
First,
pragmatic
robbed the
led
by AD,
of
securing
a
major ally
from within the
and it
strengthened
military government
at its
very
core. This
gave
the
regime
opposi-
rapid
transition to full
political
democracy.
Pinochet and his
supporters
and insist on a
political
confines of the
1980
plebiscite
in
1989,
with
Pinochet
virtually
assured of his
candidacy;
full elections in
1990
or
1997, depending
plebiscite;
election laws
promulgated
without
any input
from the
oppo-
sition
(with
opportunity
for
gerrymander-
ing);
pragmatic
neoliberal economic
model without
regard
for social
equity.'5
pragmatic
1986
and
1988
had a second
major
effect. The
opposition
was induced to
relinquish,
or
modify,
program.
The
Concertacion de
Partidospor
el NO
emphasized,
in no uncer-
tain
terms,
not
only
that it
wholly accepted
the
pragmatic
justice.'4
adoption
of the
pragmatic
neoliberal
model,
policymaking
process,
support
Pinochet
in the
plebiscite
mildest economic
change.
TO
DEMOCRACY,
1983-91
THE RISE OF the
pragmatic
large-scale
(which
was domi-
nated
by producers
producers
as
well),
its consoli-
dation,
several
for Chile's
political
transition.
First,
pragmatic
robbed the
led
by AD,
of
securing
a
major ally
from within the
and it
strengthened
military government
at its
very
core. This
gave
the
regime
opposi-
rapid
transition to full
political
democracy.
Pinochet and his
supporters
and insist on a
political
confines of the
1980
plebiscite
in
1989,
with
Pinochet
virtually
assured of his
candidacy;
full elections in
1990
or
1997, depending
plebiscite;
election laws
promulgated
without
any input
from the
oppo-
sition
(with
opportunity
for
gerrymander-
ing);
pragmatic
neoliberal economic
model without
regard
for social
equity.'5
pragmatic
1986
and
1988
had a second
major
effect. The
opposition
was induced to
relinquish,
or
modify,
program.
The
Concertacion de
Partidospor
el NO
emphasized,
in no uncer-
tain
terms,
not
only
that it
wholly accepted
the
pragmatic
justice.'4
adoption
of the
pragmatic
neoliberal
model,
policymaking
process,
support
Pinochet
in the
plebiscite
mildest economic
change.
TO
DEMOCRACY,
1983-91
THE RISE OF the
pragmatic
large-scale
(which
was domi-
nated
by producers
producers
as
well),
its consoli-
dation,
several
for Chile's
political
transition.
First,
pragmatic
robbed the
led
by AD,
of
securing
a
major ally
from within the
and it
strengthened
military government
at its
very
core. This
gave
the
regime
opposi-
rapid
transition to full
political
democracy.
Pinochet and his
supporters
and insist on a
political
confines of the
1980
plebiscite
in
1989,
with
Pinochet
virtually
assured of his
candidacy;
full elections in
1990
or
1997, depending
plebiscite;
election laws
promulgated
without
any input
from the
oppo-
sition
(with
opportunity
for
gerrymander-
ing);
pragmatic
neoliberal economic
model without
regard
for social
equity.'5
pragmatic
1986
and
1988
had a second
major
effect. The
opposition
was induced to
relinquish,
or
modify,
program.
The
Concertacion de
Partidospor
el NO
emphasized,
in no uncer-
tain
terms,
not
only
that it
wholly accepted
the
pragmatic
97 97 97 97 97
98
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
neoliberal economic
model,
but that distributional issues
would be addressed
solely
within its confines. The Concertacion
further demonstrated its commitment to this watered-down
version of its
original platform by stressing
the need for social
and
political
reconciliation in a
deeply
divided and traumatized
polity,
rather than the need to
avenge
abuses committed
during
16
years
of
arbitrary
rule
(LASA,
1989).
These concessions
helped
to assure a smooth
political
transition as
stipulated by
the
1980
Constitution. Since the
projection
of
pragmatic
neoliberalism was no
longer
at
issue,
the
opposition
minimized the risk that the transition
process
might
be reversed.16 This allowed the
opposition
to
press
for
a clean election in
1988,
to assure
recognition
of its
victory,
and
to set the
stage
for a constitutional
change, negotiated
with
conservative
political parties,
after the
plebiscite.
Events bore out the
Concelac6in's
hopes. Although
the
Concertaci6n had little influence on the rules
governing political
parties,
electoral
districting,
and
Congressional
representation
(majoritarian
versus
proportional),
it did establish the
right
to
monitor how ballots were counted at the
voting
booths
(LASA,
1988).
Moreover, during
the ballot count on the
night
of 5 October
1988,
when
many
worried that Pinochet
might attempt
to
invalidate what
appeared
to be an
opposition victory,
leaders
from Renovacion Nacional
-
the
largest
conservative
party
-
and
Junta
members Ferando Matthei
(Air Force)
and Rodolfo
Stange
(Carabineros)
conceded that the Concetaci6n seemed to
be
winning. Thus, they
undercut
any
intention Pinochet
might
have had of
annulling
the results of the
plebiscite.17
The "No"
campaign
won
by
a comfortable
margin:
54.7% of the vote to
43%'
for the "Si"
supporters (LASA,
1989).
Presidential and
congres-
sional elections were scheduled for 14 December
1989,
and the
transfer of office was set for 11 March
1990.
These results set the
stage
for Chile's first
presidential
election since
1970.
The
president
of the Christian Democratic
Party,
Patricio
Aylwin,
was the
presidential
candidate of
Concertact6n;
former Pinochet Minister of Finance Hernan
Bichi ran on behalf of the conservatives
(Democracia
y
neoliberal economic
model,
would be addressed
solely
version of its
the need for social
and
political
reconciliation in a
deeply
polity,
avenge
abuses committed
during
16
years
of
arbitrary
rule
(LASA,
1989).
These concessions
helped
to assure a smooth
political
transition as
stipulated by
the
1980
projection
of
pragmatic
longer
at
issue,
the
opposition
process
might
opposition
to
press
for
a clean election in
1988,
to assure
recognition
of its
victory,
and
to set the
stage
change, negotiated
with
conservative
political parties,
after the
plebiscite.
Events bore out the
Concelac6in's
hopes. Although
the
governing political
parties,
electoral
districting,
and
Congressional
representation
(majoritarian
versus
proportional),
right
to
voting
booths
(LASA,
1988).
Moreover, during
night
of 5 October
1988,
when
many
might attempt
to
invalidate what
appeared
to be an
opposition victory,
leaders
-
the
largest
conservative
party
-
and
Junta
(Air Force)
and Rodolfo
Stange
(Carabineros)
be
winning. Thus, they
undercut
any
intention Pinochet
might
have had of
annulling
the results of the
plebiscite.17
The "No"
campaign
won
by
a comfortable
margin:
43%'
for the "Si"
supporters (LASA,
1989).
Presidential and
congres-
1989,
and the
1990.
stage
for Chile's first
presidential
election since
1970.
The
president
Party,
Patricio
Aylwin,
was the
presidential
candidate of
Concertact6n;
(Democracia
y
neoliberal economic
model,
would be addressed
solely
version of its
the need for social
and
political
reconciliation in a
deeply
polity,
avenge
abuses committed
during
16
years
of
arbitrary
rule
(LASA,
1989).
These concessions
helped
to assure a smooth
political
transition as
stipulated by
the
1980
projection
of
pragmatic
longer
at
issue,
the
opposition
process
might
opposition
to
press
for
a clean election in
1988,
to assure
recognition
of its
victory,
and
to set the
stage
change, negotiated
with
conservative
political parties,
after the
plebiscite.
Events bore out the
Concelac6in's
hopes. Although
the
governing political
parties,
electoral
districting,
and
Congressional
representation
(majoritarian
versus
proportional),
right
to
voting
booths
(LASA,
1988).
Moreover, during
night
of 5 October
1988,
when
many
might attempt
to
invalidate what
appeared
to be an
opposition victory,
leaders
-
the
largest
conservative
party
-
and
Junta
(Air Force)
and Rodolfo
Stange
(Carabineros)
be
winning. Thus, they
undercut
any
intention Pinochet
might
have had of
annulling
the results of the
plebiscite.17
The "No"
campaign
won
by
a comfortable
margin:
43%'
for the "Si"
supporters (LASA,
1989).
Presidential and
congres-
1989,
and the
1990.
stage
for Chile's first
presidential
election since
1970.
The
president
Party,
Patricio
Aylwin,
was the
presidential
candidate of
Concertact6n;
(Democracia
y
neoliberal economic
model,
would be addressed
solely
version of its
the need for social
and
political
reconciliation in a
deeply
polity,
avenge
abuses committed
during
16
years
of
arbitrary
rule
(LASA,
1989).
These concessions
helped
to assure a smooth
political
transition as
stipulated by
the
1980
projection
of
pragmatic
longer
at
issue,
the
opposition
process
might
opposition
to
press
for
a clean election in
1988,
to assure
recognition
of its
victory,
and
to set the
stage
change, negotiated
with
conservative
political parties,
after the
plebiscite.
Events bore out the
Concelac6in's
hopes. Although
the
governing political
parties,
electoral
districting,
and
Congressional
representation
(majoritarian
versus
proportional),
right
to
voting
booths
(LASA,
1988).
Moreover, during
night
of 5 October
1988,
when
many
might attempt
to
invalidate what
appeared
to be an
opposition victory,
leaders
-
the
largest
conservative
party
-
and
Junta
(Air Force)
and Rodolfo
Stange
(Carabineros)
be
winning. Thus, they
undercut
any
intention Pinochet
might
have had of
annulling
the results of the
plebiscite.17
The "No"
campaign
won
by
a comfortable
margin:
43%'
for the "Si"
supporters (LASA,
1989).
Presidential and
congres-
1989,
and the
1990.
stage
for Chile's first
presidential
election since
1970.
The
president
Party,
Patricio
Aylwin,
was the
presidential
candidate of
Concertact6n;
(Democracia
y
neoliberal economic
model,
would be addressed
solely
version of its
the need for social
and
political
reconciliation in a
deeply
polity,
avenge
abuses committed
during
16
years
of
arbitrary
rule
(LASA,
1989).
These concessions
helped
to assure a smooth
political
transition as
stipulated by
the
1980
projection
of
pragmatic
longer
at
issue,
the
opposition
process
might
opposition
to
press
for
a clean election in
1988,
to assure
recognition
of its
victory,
and
to set the
stage
change, negotiated
with
conservative
political parties,
after the
plebiscite.
Events bore out the
Concelac6in's
hopes. Although
the
governing political
parties,
electoral
districting,
and
Congressional
representation
(majoritarian
versus
proportional),
right
to
voting
booths
(LASA,
1988).
Moreover, during
night
of 5 October
1988,
when
many
might attempt
to
invalidate what
appeared
to be an
opposition victory,
leaders
-
the
largest
conservative
party
-
and
Junta
(Air Force)
and Rodolfo
Stange
(Carabineros)
be
winning. Thus, they
undercut
any
intention Pinochet
might
have had of
annulling
the results of the
plebiscite.17
The "No"
campaign
won
by
a comfortable
margin:
43%'
for the "Si"
supporters (LASA,
1989).
Presidential and
congres-
1989,
and the
1990.
stage
for Chile's first
presidential
election since
1970.
The
president
Party,
Patricio
Aylwin,
was the
presidential
candidate of
Concertact6n;
(Democracia
y
Progreso
was a coalition of conservative
political parties
that
included Renovaci6n Nacional and Union Democratica
Independiente);
and
banker-businessman-populist
Francisco
Javier
Errazuriz
campaigned
on an
independent
ticket.
Aylwin
received 55.2% of the vote to Buchi's 29.4% and Errazuriz's
15.4%. Of the Senate's
38 elected
seats, parties
in the
Concertaci6n won 22 while those of Democracia
y Progreso
took 16.18 In the Chamber of
Deputies,
the
Aylwin
coalition
garnered
69
seats
compared
to the 48 won
by
the conservative
alliance. The
Left-wing
Lista Partido
Amplio
de
Izquierda
Socialista
(PAIS)
obtained two seats and the
independents only
one
(La
Epoca, 1989; Brager
1990).
Basically,
the
Concertacl6n
ran its
presidential campaign
on
pretty
much the same
platform
as it had
employed
for the "No"
crusade,
(Que
Pasa, 1989a;
Hoy,
1989;
Business Latin
America,
1989a
and
1989b);
whereas
Democracia
y Progreso emphasized
a neoliberal/libertarian
platform.19
The Concertacion 'sconcessions to the
pragmatic
neoliberal
coalition had a third
important consequence:
within the
context of Chile's new
the Concertacion
now favors the economic interests of the conservatives and
places
reformers at a
disadvantage because,
in
essence,
the
democratic
opposition
traded
away
broad economic reform in
return for
political
democratization. At the heart of the
pact
was
the fact that reformist
political parties
-
representing
the
middle class and some sectors of labor
-
explicitly
committed
themselves to
pragmatic
neoliberalism. In
return,
business-
men,
landowners and conservative
political parties accepted
limited
political change. Stretching
the narrow limits of this
constraining political
bargain
has
proved
difficult for reformers.
Three factors allow conservatives to dominate.
First,
questions
of social
equity
are subordinated to the
relatively
unfettered
play
of market
forces; thus,
the
emphasis
is on social
reform within the confines of the
pragmatic
neoliberal model.20
Second,
Chile's transition from authoritarianism took
place
within the confines of the
1980
Constitution,
a charter with
numerous features
designed
to
protect
conservative interests
Progreso
political parties
that
Independiente);
and
Francisco
Javier
Errazuriz
campaigned
on an
independent
ticket.
Aylwin
38 elected
seats, parties
in the
y Progreso
Deputies,
the
Aylwin
coalition
garnered
69
seats
compared
to the 48 won
by
the conservative
alliance. The
Left-wing
Lista Partido
Amplio
de
Izquierda
Socialista
(PAIS)
independents only
one
(La
Epoca, 1989; Brager
1990).
Basically,
the
Concertacl6n
ran its
on
pretty
much the same
platform
as it had
employed
for the "No"
crusade,
(Que
Pasa, 1989a;
Hoy,
1989;
Business Latin
America,
1989a
and
1989b);
whereas
Democracia
platform.19
pragmatic
neoliberal
within the
the Concertacion
places
reformers at a
in
essence,
the
democratic
opposition
traded
away
return for
political
pact
was
political parties
-
representing
the
-
explicitly
committed
themselves to
pragmatic
neoliberalism. In
return,
business-
men,
limited
bargain
has
proved
First,
questions
of social
equity
relatively
unfettered
play
of market
forces; thus,
the
emphasis
is on social
pragmatic
neoliberal model.20
Second,
place
1980
Constitution,
a charter with
numerous features
designed
to
protect
Progreso
political parties
that
Independiente);
and
Francisco
Javier
Errazuriz
campaigned
on an
independent
ticket.
Aylwin
38 elected
seats, parties
in the
y Progreso
Deputies,
the
Aylwin
coalition
garnered
69
seats
compared
to the 48 won
by
the conservative
alliance. The
Left-wing
Lista Partido
Amplio
de
Izquierda
Socialista
(PAIS)
independents only
one
(La
Epoca, 1989; Brager
1990).
Basically,
the
Concertacl6n
ran its
on
pretty
much the same
platform
as it had
employed
for the "No"
crusade,
(Que
Pasa, 1989a;
Hoy,
1989;
Business Latin
America,
1989a
and
1989b);
whereas
Democracia
platform.19
pragmatic
neoliberal
within the
the Concertacion
places
reformers at a
in
essence,
the
democratic
opposition
traded
away
return for
political
pact
was
political parties
-
representing
the
-
explicitly
committed
themselves to
pragmatic
neoliberalism. In
return,
business-
men,
limited
bargain
has
proved
First,
questions
of social
equity
relatively
unfettered
play
of market
forces; thus,
the
emphasis
is on social
pragmatic
neoliberal model.20
Second,
place
1980
Constitution,
a charter with
numerous features
designed
to
protect
Progreso
political parties
that
Independiente);
and
Francisco
Javier
Errazuriz
campaigned
on an
independent
ticket.
Aylwin
38 elected
seats, parties
in the
y Progreso
Deputies,
the
Aylwin
coalition
garnered
69
seats
compared
to the 48 won
by
the conservative
alliance. The
Left-wing
Lista Partido
Amplio
de
Izquierda
Socialista
(PAIS)
independents only
one
(La
Epoca, 1989; Brager
1990).
Basically,
the
Concertacl6n
ran its
on
pretty
much the same
platform
as it had
employed
for the "No"
crusade,
(Que
Pasa, 1989a;
Hoy,
1989;
Business Latin
America,
1989a
and
1989b);
whereas
Democracia
platform.19
pragmatic
neoliberal
within the
the Concertacion
places
reformers at a
in
essence,
the
democratic
opposition
traded
away
return for
political
pact
was
political parties
-
representing
the
-
explicitly
committed
themselves to
pragmatic
neoliberalism. In
return,
business-
men,
limited
bargain
has
proved
First,
questions
of social
equity
relatively
unfettered
play
of market
forces; thus,
the
emphasis
is on social
pragmatic
neoliberal model.20
Second,
place
1980
Constitution,
a charter with
numerous features
designed
to
protect
Progreso
political parties
that
Independiente);
and
Francisco
Javier
Errazuriz
campaigned
on an
independent
ticket.
Aylwin
38 elected
seats, parties
in the
y Progreso
Deputies,
the
Aylwin
coalition
garnered
69
seats
compared
to the 48 won
by
the conservative
alliance. The
Left-wing
Lista Partido
Amplio
de
Izquierda
Socialista
(PAIS)
independents only
one
(La
Epoca, 1989; Brager
1990).
Basically,
the
Concertacl6n
ran its
on
pretty
much the same
platform
as it had
employed
for the "No"
crusade,
(Que
Pasa, 1989a;
Hoy,
1989;
Business Latin
America,
1989a
and
1989b);
whereas
Democracia
platform.19
pragmatic
neoliberal
within the
the Concertacion
places
reformers at a
in
essence,
the
democratic
opposition
traded
away
return for
political
pact
was
political parties
-
representing
the
-
explicitly
committed
themselves to
pragmatic
neoliberalism. In
return,
business-
men,
limited
bargain
has
proved
First,
questions
of social
equity
relatively
unfettered
play
of market
forces; thus,
the
emphasis
is on social
pragmatic
neoliberal model.20
Second,
place
1980
Constitution,
a charter with
numerous features
designed
to
protect
99 99 99 99 99
100
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
from reform. Since it is still the law of the
land,
the structure of
current
political
institutions is not
fully democratic,
which
leaves reform-minded Christian Democrats and Social Demo-
crats at a
disadvantage (Loveman,
1991).
In the first
place,
the
staunchly
conservative
military
is
significantly independent
of
civilian control. As a
result,
civilian
governments
must continu-
ously gauge
the reaction of the armed forces toward
public
policies. Moreover,
the Senate is still a bastion of the
Right-
wing,
with the
power
to
block,
or water
down,
reformist laws.
This is due to the fact that
9
of the Senate seats are
subject
to
appointment by Pinochet,
and that the rules
governing
selec-
tion are slanted in favor of conservatives.21
Third,
the
system
of collaboration between
government
and the
private
sector
developed
to
assuage capitalist
fears of
arbitrary policy
and to
insure
steady
investment
-
significantly
benefits business
elites. It
gives capitalists privileged
access to
top policymakers
in
key ministries, providing
them with
ample opportunity
to
modify proposed policy
initiatives.22
These constraints
clearly hampered Aylwin's attempt
to
pass legislation
on tax and labor code reform
-
the corner-
stones of his mild social reform
project.
With
respect
to
labor,
the administration favored a
wage policy
that tied raises to
productivity gains (Larrain,
1991).
This,
in
theory,
satisfied
neoliberal demands for
wage
restraint to control
inflation, yet
did not
wholly
abandon the
government's pledge
to address
long-postponed
labor
grievances. However,
achievement of
that
goal required legislation
to
strengthen unions,
a
key
demand of the labor movement.
The
government proposed
a bill
designed
to reform three
key aspects
of the old labor code.
First,
the administration's
proposals sought
to make it more
difficult,
and more
expen-
sive,
to fire workers. The old code allowed
employers
to let
workers
go
without
showing
cause and to hire
replacements
for strikers.
Second,
the
Aylwin-backed
bill
permitted
unions
to
negotiate
contracts
by
economic sector rather than on a
company-by-company
basis. Unions would
gain
the
right
to
negotiate
health benefits and
job security
clauses.
Third,
the
land,
the structure of
current
political
institutions is not
fully democratic,
which
crats at a
1991).
In the first
place,
the
staunchly
conservative
military
is
of
result,
civilian
governments
must continu-
ously gauge
public
policies. Moreover,
Right-
wing,
with the
power
to
block,
or water
down,
reformist laws.
9
subject
to
and that the rules
governing
selec-
Third,
the
system
government
and the
private
sector
developed
to
assuage capitalist
fears of
arbitrary policy
and to
insure
steady
investment
-
significantly
benefits business
elites. It
access to
top policymakers
in
them with
ample opportunity
to
initiatives.22
These constraints
to
pass legislation
-
the corner-
project.
With
respect
to
labor,
wage policy
that tied raises to
1991).
This,
in
theory,
satisfied
wage
inflation, yet
did not
wholly
abandon the
government's pledge
to address
long-postponed
labor
achievement of
that
to
strengthen unions,
a
key
The
government proposed
a bill
designed
to reform three
key aspects
First,
proposals sought
to make it more
difficult,
and more
expen-
sive,
employers
to let
workers
go
without
showing
cause and to hire
replacements
for strikers.
Second,
the
Aylwin-backed
bill
permitted
unions
to
negotiate
contracts
by
company-by-company
basis. Unions would
gain
the
right
to
negotiate
health benefits and
job security
clauses.
Third,
the
land,
the structure of
current
political
institutions is not
fully democratic,
which
crats at a
1991).
In the first
place,
the
staunchly
conservative
military
is
of
result,
civilian
governments
must continu-
ously gauge
public
policies. Moreover,
Right-
wing,
with the
power
to
block,
or water
down,
reformist laws.
9
subject
to
and that the rules
governing
selec-
Third,
the
system
government
and the
private
sector
developed
to
assuage capitalist
fears of
arbitrary policy
and to
insure
steady
investment
-
significantly
benefits business
elites. It
access to
top policymakers
in
them with
ample opportunity
to
initiatives.22
These constraints
to
pass legislation
-
the corner-
project.
With
respect
to
labor,
wage policy
that tied raises to
1991).
This,
in
theory,
satisfied
wage
inflation, yet
did not
wholly
abandon the
government's pledge
to address
long-postponed
labor
achievement of
that
to
strengthen unions,
a
key
The
government proposed
a bill
designed
to reform three
key aspects
First,
proposals sought
to make it more
difficult,
and more
expen-
sive,
employers
to let
workers
go
without
showing
cause and to hire
replacements
for strikers.
Second,
the
Aylwin-backed
bill
permitted
unions
to
negotiate
contracts
by
company-by-company
basis. Unions would
gain
the
right
to
negotiate
health benefits and
job security
clauses.
Third,
the
land,
the structure of
current
political
institutions is not
fully democratic,
which
crats at a
1991).
In the first
place,
the
staunchly
conservative
military
is
of
result,
civilian
governments
must continu-
ously gauge
public
policies. Moreover,
Right-
wing,
with the
power
to
block,
or water
down,
reformist laws.
9
subject
to
and that the rules
governing
selec-
Third,
the
system
government
and the
private
sector
developed
to
assuage capitalist
fears of
arbitrary policy
and to
insure
steady
investment
-
significantly
benefits business
elites. It
access to
top policymakers
in
them with
ample opportunity
to
initiatives.22
These constraints
to
pass legislation
-
the corner-
project.
With
respect
to
labor,
wage policy
that tied raises to
1991).
This,
in
theory,
satisfied
wage
inflation, yet
did not
wholly
abandon the
government's pledge
to address
long-postponed
labor
achievement of
that
to
strengthen unions,
a
key
The
government proposed
a bill
designed
to reform three
key aspects
First,
proposals sought
to make it more
difficult,
and more
expen-
sive,
employers
to let
workers
go
without
showing
cause and to hire
replacements
for strikers.
Second,
the
Aylwin-backed
bill
permitted
unions
to
negotiate
contracts
by
company-by-company
basis. Unions would
gain
the
right
to
negotiate
health benefits and
job security
clauses.
Third,
the
land,
the structure of
current
political
institutions is not
fully democratic,
which
crats at a
1991).
In the first
place,
the
staunchly
conservative
military
is
of
result,
civilian
governments
must continu-
ously gauge
public
policies. Moreover,
Right-
wing,
with the
power
to
block,
or water
down,
reformist laws.
9
subject
to
and that the rules
governing
selec-
Third,
the
system
government
and the
private
sector
developed
to
assuage capitalist
fears of
arbitrary policy
and to
insure
steady
investment
-
significantly
benefits business
elites. It
access to
top policymakers
in
them with
ample opportunity
to
initiatives.22
These constraints
to
pass legislation
-
the corner-
project.
With
respect
to
labor,
wage policy
that tied raises to
1991).
This,
in
theory,
satisfied
wage
inflation, yet
did not
wholly
abandon the
government's pledge
to address
long-postponed
labor
achievement of
that
to
strengthen unions,
a
key
The
government proposed
a bill
designed
to reform three
key aspects
First,
proposals sought
to make it more
difficult,
and more
expen-
sive,
employers
to let
workers
go
without
showing
cause and to hire
replacements
for strikers.
Second,
the
Aylwin-backed
bill
permitted
unions
to
negotiate
contracts
by
company-by-company
basis. Unions would
gain
the
right
to
negotiate
health benefits and
job security
clauses.
Third,
the
draft
legislation
mandated that non-union
employees
would
have to
pay
union fees if
they
benefitted from
union-negotiated
contracts. This
stopped
short of the
key
demand
by
the Central
Unica de
Trabajadores(CUT)
for
mandatory
union enrollment
(Business Latin
America,
1990c).
Chilean
capitalists, represented by
the
Confederacidn
de
Produccion
y
Comercio
(CPC)
and such conservative
political
parties
as Renovacion Nacional
(RN),
consistently opposed
all
of these measures. The
appointive
seats in the Senate
provided
conservative forces with a
majority
in that chamber of the
legislature,
which forced the administration to
negotiate
the bill
for labor reform with RN
point by point
(Que
Pasa,
1990b).
The
legislation
soon
bogged
down
(Business
Latin
America,
1990d).
Moreover,
business leaders took
advantage
of their
preferential
access to the executive branch to
lobby against
the bill
directly
(Ale, 1992; Lizana, 1992; Garcia, 1992; Mujica, 1992; Guzman,
1992).
The
upshot
of these efforts was to
gut
the
proposed
reforms,
which
represented
the bare minimum of the labor
agenda, and, along
with
them,
labor's
ability
to
capture wages
based on the increase in
productivity (CIASI,
1990).
The fate of
attempts
to reform the tax code
provides
another
example
of how the retention of authoritarian
political
institutions in Chile's new democratic
phase hampers
attention
to social issues. In the interests of social
equity, Aylwin's
presidential campaign platform
committed his administration
to the
improvement
of education and health
services,
the
provision
of loans and technical assistance to start small
businesses,
the
expansion
of nutritional
programs
for infants
and
pregnant women,
and the introduction of
programs
to aid
the
indigent (Larrain,
1991).
Because
delivery
of these
programs
was
contingent upon
higher
levels of
government spending,
the
Aylwin government
introduced
legislation
to increase taxes on business.
Although
the tax-reform bill
passed,
Renovacion Nacional
managed
to
keep
the tax increase well within the bounds of what the CPC
considered
acceptable
(from
10% to 15% of
earnings).
Once
again,
the conservative
majority
in the Senate
(due
to Pinochet
draft
legislation
employees
would
have to
pay
union fees if
they
benefitted from
union-negotiated
contracts. This
stopped
short of the
key
demand
by
the Central
Unica de
Trabajadores(CUT)
for
mandatory
union enrollment
(Business Latin
America,
1990c).
Chilean
the
Confederacidn
de
Produccion
y
Comercio
(CPC)
political
parties
(RN),
all
appointive
seats in the Senate
provided
majority
legislature,
negotiate
the bill
point by point
(Que
Pasa,
1990b).
The
legislation
soon
bogged
down
(Business
Latin
America,
1990d).
Moreover,
advantage
of their
preferential
lobby against
the bill
directly
1992).
The
upshot
gut
the
proposed
reforms,
which
represented
agenda, and, along
with
them,
labor's
ability
to
capture wages
1990).
The fate of
attempts
provides
another
example
political
phase hampers
attention
equity, Aylwin's
to the
improvement
services,
the
provision
businesses,
the
expansion
of nutritional
programs
for infants
and
pregnant women,
programs
to aid
the
indigent (Larrain,
1991).
Because
delivery
of these
programs
was
contingent upon
higher
levels of
the
Aylwin government
introduced
legislation
Although
the tax-reform bill
passed,
Renovacion Nacional
managed
to
keep
considered
acceptable
(from
10% to 15% of
earnings).
Once
again,
the conservative
majority
in the Senate
(due
to Pinochet
draft
legislation
employees
would
have to
pay
union fees if
they
benefitted from
union-negotiated
contracts. This
stopped
short of the
key
demand
by
the Central
Unica de
Trabajadores(CUT)
for
mandatory
union enrollment
(Business Latin
America,
1990c).
Chilean
the
Confederacidn
de
Produccion
y
Comercio
(CPC)
political
parties
(RN),
all
appointive
seats in the Senate
provided
majority
legislature,
negotiate
the bill
point by point
(Que
Pasa,
1990b).
The
legislation
soon
bogged
down
(Business
Latin
America,
1990d).
Moreover,
advantage
of their
preferential
lobby against
the bill
directly
1992).
The
upshot
gut
the
proposed
reforms,
which
represented
agenda, and, along
with
them,
labor's
ability
to
capture wages
1990).
The fate of
attempts
provides
another
example
political
phase hampers
attention
equity, Aylwin's
to the
improvement
services,
the
provision
businesses,
the
expansion
of nutritional
programs
for infants
and
pregnant women,
programs
to aid
the
indigent (Larrain,
1991).
Because
delivery
of these
programs
was
contingent upon
higher
levels of
the
Aylwin government
introduced
legislation
Although
the tax-reform bill
passed,
Renovacion Nacional
managed
to
keep
considered
acceptable
(from
10% to 15% of
earnings).
Once
again,
the conservative
majority
in the Senate
(due
to Pinochet
draft
legislation
employees
would
have to
pay
union fees if
they
benefitted from
union-negotiated
contracts. This
stopped
short of the
key
demand
by
the Central
Unica de
Trabajadores(CUT)
for
mandatory
union enrollment
(Business Latin
America,
1990c).
Chilean
the
Confederacidn
de
Produccion
y
Comercio
(CPC)
political
parties
(RN),
all
appointive
seats in the Senate
provided
majority
legislature,
negotiate
the bill
point by point
(Que
Pasa,
1990b).
The
legislation
soon
bogged
down
(Business
Latin
America,
1990d).
Moreover,
advantage
of their
preferential
lobby against
the bill
directly
1992).
The
upshot
gut
the
proposed
reforms,
which
represented
agenda, and, along
with
them,
labor's
ability
to
capture wages
1990).
The fate of
attempts
provides
another
example
political
phase hampers
attention
equity, Aylwin's
to the
improvement
services,
the
provision
businesses,
the
expansion
of nutritional
programs
for infants
and
pregnant women,
programs
to aid
the
indigent (Larrain,
1991).
Because
delivery
of these
programs
was
contingent upon
higher
levels of
the
Aylwin government
introduced
legislation
Although
the tax-reform bill
passed,
Renovacion Nacional
managed
to
keep
considered
acceptable
(from
10% to 15% of
earnings).
Once
again,
the conservative
majority
in the Senate
(due
to Pinochet
draft
legislation
employees
would
have to
pay
union fees if
they
benefitted from
union-negotiated
contracts. This
stopped
short of the
key
demand
by
the Central
Unica de
Trabajadores(CUT)
for
mandatory
union enrollment
(Business Latin
America,
1990c).
Chilean
the
Confederacidn
de
Produccion
y
Comercio
(CPC)
political
parties
(RN),
all
appointive
seats in the Senate
provided
majority
legislature,
negotiate
the bill
point by point
(Que
Pasa,
1990b).
The
legislation
soon
bogged
down
(Business
Latin
America,
1990d).
Moreover,
advantage
of their
preferential
lobby against
the bill
directly
1992).
The
upshot
gut
the
proposed
reforms,
which
represented
agenda, and, along
with
them,
labor's
ability
to
capture wages
1990).
The fate of
attempts
provides
another
example
political
phase hampers
attention
equity, Aylwin's
to the
improvement
services,
the
provision
businesses,
the
expansion
of nutritional
programs
for infants
and
pregnant women,
programs
to aid
the
indigent (Larrain,
1991).
Because
delivery
of these
programs
was
contingent upon
higher
levels of
the
Aylwin government
introduced
legislation
Although
the tax-reform bill
passed,
Renovacion Nacional
managed
to
keep
considered
acceptable
(from
10% to 15% of
earnings).
Once
again,
the conservative
majority
in the Senate
(due
to Pinochet
101 101 101 101 101
102
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
appointees),
in
conjunction
with the direct access to
govern-
ment officials
enjoyed by
conservatives and their business
allies,
assured that the interests of
big
business could (and did)
prevail.23
However their victories were not uniform. For
example,
the CPC
proved
unable to block the abolition of
levies on estimated income for the
agriculture, mining
and
transportation
sectors in favor of actual
earnings.
And the
government gained
additional revenue
(1)
by raising,
albeit
temporarily,
the
regressive
value-added tax
(VAT)
from 160/o to
18%,
and
(2)
by managing
to transfer some resources obtained
by
cutting
the
military's budget
(Que
Pasa,
1989b
and
1990a;
Business Latin
America,
1990b
and
19900).
However,
these
partial, painstakingly negotiated
ad-
vances in tax reform are vulnerable to another
legacy
from the
authoritarian
period:
an autonomous Central Bank. This insti-
tution serves to re-inforce the commitment to
pragmatic,
neoliberal,
economic
policies
which
place
a
higher
value on
macro-economic
stability
than on social betterment
(Business
Latin
America,
1990a).
The bank's
policies
drain resources
which
might
otherwise
go
to social
programs by allocating part
of the revenues obtained
through
tax reform to
maintaining
a
balanced
budget
and
fighting
inflation.24 It is ironic
that, though
the administration
employs
a
tight monetary policy
to demon-
strate its commitment to the neoliberal
model, big
business and
its landowner allies view the most
meager
increases in social
spending by
the
government
as detrimental to the
private
sector.25
A
glance
at the record of the
Aylwin government's
first
years
confirms the
expectation
that the tacit alliance between
Concertaci6n and the
pragmatic
strongly
reduced chances for even mild economic reform. The
prag-
matic neoliberal
development
model is based on a
highly
unequal
distribution of wealth. A commitment to that eco-
nomic model
largely
locks Centrist
political parties
and mod-
erate socialists into
retaining
skewed distributional
patterns
despite
their best intentions. Chile's current
political
institu-
appointees),
in
conjunction
govern-
ment officials
enjoyed by
allies,
big
prevail.23
example,
the CPC
proved
agriculture, mining
and
transportation
earnings.
And the
government gained
additional revenue
(1)
by raising,
albeit
temporarily,
the
regressive
value-added tax
(VAT)
from 160/o to
18%,
and
(2)
by managing
by
cutting
the
military's budget
(Que
Pasa,
1989b
and
1990a;
Business Latin
America,
1990b
and
19900).
However,
these
ad-
legacy
from the
authoritarian
period:
pragmatic,
neoliberal,
economic
policies
which
place
a
higher
value on
macro-economic
stability
(Business
Latin
America,
1990a).
The bank's
policies
drain resources
which
might
otherwise
go
to social
through
tax reform to
maintaining
a
balanced
budget
and
fighting
that, though
the administration
employs
a
to demon-
model, big
business and
meager
increases in social
spending by
the
government
private
sector.25
A
glance
Aylwin government's
first
years
confirms the
expectation
pragmatic
strongly
prag-
matic neoliberal
development
model is based on a
highly
unequal
nomic model
largely
locks Centrist
political parties
and mod-
retaining
patterns
despite
political
institu-
appointees),
in
conjunction
govern-
ment officials
enjoyed by
allies,
big
prevail.23
example,
the CPC
proved
agriculture, mining
and
transportation
earnings.
And the
government gained
additional revenue
(1)
by raising,
albeit
temporarily,
the
regressive
value-added tax
(VAT)
from 160/o to
18%,
and
(2)
by managing
by
cutting
the
military's budget
(Que
Pasa,
1989b
and
1990a;
Business Latin
America,
1990b
and
19900).
However,
these
ad-
legacy
from the
authoritarian
period:
pragmatic,
neoliberal,
economic
policies
which
place
a
higher
value on
macro-economic
stability
(Business
Latin
America,
1990a).
The bank's
policies
drain resources
which
might
otherwise
go
to social
through
tax reform to
maintaining
a
balanced
budget
and
fighting
that, though
the administration
employs
a
to demon-
model, big
business and
meager
increases in social
spending by
the
government
private
sector.25
A
glance
Aylwin government's
first
years
confirms the
expectation
pragmatic
strongly
prag-
matic neoliberal
development
model is based on a
highly
unequal
nomic model
largely
locks Centrist
political parties
and mod-
retaining
patterns
despite
political
institu-
appointees),
in
conjunction
govern-
ment officials
enjoyed by
allies,
big
prevail.23
example,
the CPC
proved
agriculture, mining
and
transportation
earnings.
And the
government gained
additional revenue
(1)
by raising,
albeit
temporarily,
the
regressive
value-added tax
(VAT)
from 160/o to
18%,
and
(2)
by managing
by
cutting
the
military's budget
(Que
Pasa,
1989b
and
1990a;
Business Latin
America,
1990b
and
19900).
However,
these
ad-
legacy
from the
authoritarian
period:
pragmatic,
neoliberal,
economic
policies
which
place
a
higher
value on
macro-economic
stability
(Business
Latin
America,
1990a).
The bank's
policies
drain resources
which
might
otherwise
go
to social
through
tax reform to
maintaining
a
balanced
budget
and
fighting
that, though
the administration
employs
a
to demon-
model, big
business and
meager
increases in social
spending by
the
government
private
sector.25
A
glance
Aylwin government's
first
years
confirms the
expectation
pragmatic
strongly
prag-
matic neoliberal
development
model is based on a
highly
unequal
nomic model
largely
locks Centrist
political parties
and mod-
retaining
patterns
despite
political
institu-
appointees),
in
conjunction
govern-
ment officials
enjoyed by
allies,
big
prevail.23
example,
the CPC
proved
agriculture, mining
and
transportation
earnings.
And the
government gained
additional revenue
(1)
by raising,
albeit
temporarily,
the
regressive
value-added tax
(VAT)
from 160/o to
18%,
and
(2)
by managing
by
cutting
the
military's budget
(Que
Pasa,
1989b
and
1990a;
Business Latin
America,
1990b
and
19900).
However,
these
ad-
legacy
from the
authoritarian
period:
pragmatic,
neoliberal,
economic
policies
which
place
a
higher
value on
macro-economic
stability
(Business
Latin
America,
1990a).
The bank's
policies
drain resources
which
might
otherwise
go
to social
through
tax reform to
maintaining
a
balanced
budget
and
fighting
that, though
the administration
employs
a
to demon-
model, big
business and
meager
increases in social
spending by
the
government
private
sector.25
A
glance
Aylwin government's
first
years
confirms the
expectation
pragmatic
strongly
prag-
matic neoliberal
development
model is based on a
highly
unequal
nomic model
largely
locks Centrist
political parties
and mod-
retaining
patterns
despite
political
institu-
tions reinforce that
tendency. Very
mild
adjustments
and
symbolic gestures, however,
are still
possible.
The
compromise
between economic elites and the
Concertaci6n in Chile's transition to
democracy
not
only gives
verbal
guarantees
to businessmen and
landowners,
it also
gives
them
strong
institutional means with which to defend their
interests,
which center on a
very
broad definition of
property
rights, particularly
the view that most taxation constitutes state
confiscation of
profits.26
These are the conditions under which
Chilean
capitalists
and landowners have come to tolerate
democracy.
So
far, they
have demonstrated their
general
satisfaction
by occasionally defending
the
Aylwin government
when it comes under attack from
political
forces
impatient
for
economic and social reform
(La
Epoca,
1991).
This
suggests
that the
government's emphasis
on moderation and
negotia-
tion seems to
augur
well for
political stability.
Whether that will
translate into more
political democratization, however,
re-
mains to be seen.
Deepening political democracy
in Chile
requires reducing military prerogatives,
which the armed
forces
resist,
and
removing
the
1980
constitution's authoritar-
ian
features,
which
may
also
prove
difficult
(Stepan, 1988;
Loveman,
1991).
Moreover,
it is an
open
question
whether
Chilean business elites would remain as committed to democ-
racy
if
they
were faced with a
change
in their
circumstances,
such as diminished institutional veto
power
and the
resurgence
of reform
policies along
the lines of an active Scandinavian-
type
social
democracy.
tendency. Very
mild
adjustments
and
are still
possible.
The
compromise
democracy
not
only gives
verbal
guarantees
to businessmen and
landowners,
it also
gives
them
strong
interests,
which center on a
very
broad definition of
property
confiscation of
profits.26
Chilean
capitalists
democracy.
So
far, they
general
satisfaction
the
Aylwin government
political
forces
impatient
for
(La
Epoca,
1991).
This
suggests
that the
on moderation and
negotia-
tion seems to
augur
well for
Whether that will
translate into more
re-
mains to be seen.
in Chile
which the armed
forces
resist,
and
removing
the
1980
ian
features,
which
may
also
prove
difficult
(Stepan, 1988;
Loveman,
1991).
Moreover,
it is an
open
question
whether
racy
if
they
were faced with a
change
in their
circumstances,
power
and the
resurgence
of reform
policies along
type
social
democracy.
tendency. Very
mild
adjustments
and
are still
possible.
The
compromise
democracy
not
only gives
verbal
guarantees
to businessmen and
landowners,
it also
gives
them
strong
interests,
which center on a
very
broad definition of
property
confiscation of
profits.26
Chilean
capitalists
democracy.
So
far, they
general
satisfaction
the
Aylwin government
political
forces
impatient
for
(La
Epoca,
1991).
This
suggests
that the
on moderation and
negotia-
tion seems to
augur
well for
Whether that will
translate into more
re-
mains to be seen.
in Chile
which the armed
forces
resist,
and
removing
the
1980
ian
features,
which
may
also
prove
difficult
(Stepan, 1988;
Loveman,
1991).
Moreover,
it is an
open
question
whether
racy
if
they
were faced with a
change
in their
circumstances,
power
and the
resurgence
of reform
policies along
type
social
democracy.
tendency. Very
mild
adjustments
and
are still
possible.
The
compromise
democracy
not
only gives
verbal
guarantees
to businessmen and
landowners,
it also
gives
them
strong
interests,
which center on a
very
broad definition of
property
confiscation of
profits.26
Chilean
capitalists
democracy.
So
far, they
general
satisfaction
the
Aylwin government
political
forces
impatient
for
(La
Epoca,
1991).
This
suggests
that the
on moderation and
negotia-
tion seems to
augur
well for
Whether that will
translate into more
re-
mains to be seen.
in Chile
which the armed
forces
resist,
and
removing
the
1980
ian
features,
which
may
also
prove
difficult
(Stepan, 1988;
Loveman,
1991).
Moreover,
it is an
open
question
whether
racy
if
they
were faced with a
change
in their
circumstances,
power
and the
resurgence
of reform
policies along
type
social
democracy.
tendency. Very
mild
adjustments
and
are still
possible.
The
compromise
democracy
not
only gives
verbal
guarantees
to businessmen and
landowners,
it also
gives
them
strong
interests,
which center on a
very
broad definition of
property
confiscation of
profits.26
Chilean
capitalists
democracy.
So
far, they
general
satisfaction
the
Aylwin government
political
forces
impatient
for
(La
Epoca,
1991).
This
suggests
that the
on moderation and
negotia-
tion seems to
augur
well for
Whether that will
translate into more
re-
mains to be seen.
in Chile
which the armed
forces
resist,
and
removing
the
1980
ian
features,
which
may
also
prove
difficult
(Stepan, 1988;
Loveman,
1991).
Moreover,
it is an
open
question
whether
racy
if
they
were faced with a
change
in their
circumstances,
power
and the
resurgence
of reform
policies along
type
social
democracy.
103 103 103 103 103
104
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
NOTES
1. Political democratization takes
place
when an authoritarian
regime gives way
to a
system
that allows
dissenting
elites to alternate
in
power. Representative democracy requires fully competitive
elections with universal
participation.
Voters should be able to
choose, by
secret
ballot, among
candidates who hold
differing
views
on
public policy. Representative democracy
also calls for
guarantees
of civil
rights,
such as freedom of
political
organization
and
expres-
sion,
and
requires,
as
well,
institutions that
keep policynmakers
responsive
to the
citizenry.
Such institutions include effective
legis-
latures and
political parties,
as well as interest
group organizations.
For this
definition,
see Drake and Silva
(1986)
and O'Donnell and
Schmitter
(1986).
2. Political liberalization takes
place
when dictators
expand
political participation by relaxing repression
and
introducing
some
civil liberties. In contrast to
political
democratization,
it does not
involve increased
competition
for the transfer of
power
to
contending
groups. During political liberalization,
elections
may
be held that are
only semi-competitive
in order to authenticate an authoritarian
regime
at home and
abroad, although
the
party
of
government
invariably
dominates such
processes
(see
Drake and
Silva, 1986;
O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986).
3. This state of affairs
strongly
cautions
against overestimating
the commitment to
democracy
of the Chilean
Right.
The
implication
is that Chilean
capitalists
will tolerate
democracy only
so
long
as their
economic model is not threatened
by
social democratic
policies,
even
in a mild
form,
and as
long
as their constitutional
privileges
are not
reformed or rescinded.
4. The
political project
was not formalized until as late as 1980
when the
design
for the new constitution was finalized.
5. The extent to which these
policies
can be considered radical
can be measured in terms of the
degree
of freedom
enjoyed by
market
forces and the zeal with which these
policies
were
pursued,
particularly compared
to other countries at the
time,
such as
Argentina
and
Uruguay. However,
it must be
recognized
that this zeal
did not
preclude
occasional
subsidies,
tax
credits, price guarantees,
and other "illiberal"
policies. Among
the most notable
among
the
latter were
policies favoring
the
forestry industry.
NOTES
place
regime gives way
to a
system
that allows
dissenting
elites to alternate
in
participation.
choose, by
secret
ballot, among
candidates who hold
differing
views
on
also calls for
guarantees
of civil
rights,
such as freedom of
political
organization
and
expres-
sion,
and
requires,
as
well,
institutions that
keep policynmakers
responsive
to the
citizenry.
legis-
latures and
political parties,
as well as interest
For this
definition,
see Drake and Silva
(1986)
and O'Donnell and
Schmitter
(1986).
place
when dictators
expand
and
introducing
some
political
democratization,
it does not
involve increased
competition
for the transfer of
power
to
contending
elections
may
be held that are
regime
at home and
abroad, although
the
party
of
government
invariably
dominates such
processes
(see
Drake and
Silva, 1986;
O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986).
strongly
cautions
the commitment to
democracy
of the Chilean
Right.
The
implication
is that Chilean
capitalists
will tolerate
democracy only
so
long
as their
by
social democratic
policies,
even
in a mild
form,
and as
long
privileges
are not
4. The
political project
when the
design
policies
degree
of freedom
enjoyed by
market
policies
were
pursued,
time,
such as
Argentina
and
Uruguay. However,
it must be
recognized
that this zeal
did not
preclude
occasional
subsidies,
tax
policies. Among
the most notable
among
the
latter were
policies favoring
the
forestry industry.
NOTES
place
regime gives way
to a
system
that allows
dissenting
elites to alternate
in
participation.
choose, by
secret
ballot, among
candidates who hold
differing
views
on
also calls for
guarantees
of civil
rights,
such as freedom of
political
organization
and
expres-
sion,
and
requires,
as
well,
institutions that
keep policynmakers
responsive
to the
citizenry.
legis-
latures and
political parties,
as well as interest
For this
definition,
see Drake and Silva
(1986)
and O'Donnell and
Schmitter
(1986).
place
when dictators
expand
and
introducing
some
political
democratization,
it does not
involve increased
competition
for the transfer of
power
to
contending
elections
may
be held that are
regime
at home and
abroad, although
the
party
of
government
invariably
dominates such
processes
(see
Drake and
Silva, 1986;
O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986).
strongly
cautions
the commitment to
democracy
of the Chilean
Right.
The
implication
is that Chilean
capitalists
will tolerate
democracy only
so
long
as their
by
social democratic
policies,
even
in a mild
form,
and as
long
privileges
are not
4. The
political project
when the
design
policies
degree
of freedom
enjoyed by
market
policies
were
pursued,
time,
such as
Argentina
and
Uruguay. However,
it must be
recognized
that this zeal
did not
preclude
occasional
subsidies,
tax
policies. Among
the most notable
among
the
latter were
policies favoring
the
forestry industry.
NOTES
place
regime gives way
to a
system
that allows
dissenting
elites to alternate
in
participation.
choose, by
secret
ballot, among
candidates who hold
differing
views
on
also calls for
guarantees
of civil
rights,
such as freedom of
political
organization
and
expres-
sion,
and
requires,
as
well,
institutions that
keep policynmakers
responsive
to the
citizenry.
legis-
latures and
political parties,
as well as interest
For this
definition,
see Drake and Silva
(1986)
and O'Donnell and
Schmitter
(1986).
place
when dictators
expand
and
introducing
some
political
democratization,
it does not
involve increased
competition
for the transfer of
power
to
contending
elections
may
be held that are
regime
at home and
abroad, although
the
party
of
government
invariably
dominates such
processes
(see
Drake and
Silva, 1986;
O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986).
strongly
cautions
the commitment to
democracy
of the Chilean
Right.
The
implication
is that Chilean
capitalists
will tolerate
democracy only
so
long
as their
by
social democratic
policies,
even
in a mild
form,
and as
long
privileges
are not
4. The
political project
when the
design
policies
degree
of freedom
enjoyed by
market
policies
were
pursued,
time,
such as
Argentina
and
Uruguay. However,
it must be
recognized
that this zeal
did not
preclude
occasional
subsidies,
tax
policies. Among
the most notable
among
the
latter were
policies favoring
the
forestry industry.
NOTES
place
regime gives way
to a
system
that allows
dissenting
elites to alternate
in
participation.
choose, by
secret
ballot, among
candidates who hold
differing
views
on
also calls for
guarantees
of civil
rights,
such as freedom of
political
organization
and
expres-
sion,
and
requires,
as
well,
institutions that
keep policynmakers
responsive
to the
citizenry.
legis-
latures and
political parties,
as well as interest
For this
definition,
see Drake and Silva
(1986)
and O'Donnell and
Schmitter
(1986).
place
when dictators
expand
and
introducing
some
political
democratization,
it does not
involve increased
competition
for the transfer of
power
to
contending
elections
may
be held that are
regime
at home and
abroad, although
the
party
of
government
invariably
dominates such
processes
(see
Drake and
Silva, 1986;
O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986).
strongly
cautions
the commitment to
democracy
of the Chilean
Right.
The
implication
is that Chilean
capitalists
will tolerate
democracy only
so
long
as their
by
social democratic
policies,
even
in a mild
form,
and as
long
privileges
are not
4. The
political project
when the
design
policies
degree
of freedom
enjoyed by
market
policies
were
pursued,
time,
such as
Argentina
and
Uruguay. However,
it must be
recognized
that this zeal
did not
preclude
occasional
subsidies,
tax
policies. Among
the most notable
among
the
latter were
policies favoring
the
forestry industry.
6. For a
description
of neoliberal
policies during
this
period
see
Foxley
(1983)
and Ramos
(1986).
7. For
example,
when the CPC distributed its economic
recovery
plan
to
government ministers,
the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SFF
or
Society
for Industrial
Development)
cautioned that
though
the
private
sector had no wish to break with the
government,
it
might
be
forced into
opposition (Que Pasa, 1983b).
In the same
spirit,
CPC
President
Jorge
Fontaine declared that business
only sought
confron-
tation with
government
when its survival was at stake. The authorities
should
realize,
continued
Fontaine,
that adherence to orthodox
deflation would lead to
perdition (Hoy,
1983a).
8. Author's
personal
interviews with CPC officials reinforced the
conclusion that the
government
was
progressively implementing
the
CPC economic
program.
9.
Que
Pasa
(1983d)
reported
that the Tax Reform bill was
virtually ready
to clear the
legislative
commission in
charge
of
economic affairs. Business associations had
ample
access to the
policymaking process through
the
legislative
commissions
(CNC,
1983).
10. For Chile's Economic and Social
Council,
see Lecaros
(1989)
and Urenda
(1989).
11. Ramdohr
(1988),
who
participated
in the Concertaci6n
dialogues,
shared this view of
capital's
refusal to enter into such
pacts.
12. For the SNA
position
on
agrarian reform,
see El
Campesino
(1986a, 1986b);
for CPC
support
of the
SNA,
see El
Campesino
(1987b).
13.
For the
program
of the Alianza
Democrdtica,
see
Hoy
(1985).
14. This was evident in a statement loaded with neoliberal code-
words that
appeared
in El
Campesino
(1988a).
15. The
pro-Pinochet campaign
for the October
1988
plebiscite
(the "Si")
reflected officialdom's
resurgent triumphllism.
Its cam-
paign
advertisements
stridently
extolled economic
gains
since
1984
and
compared
Chile's
relatively stable, growing economy
to the
economic
disarray
of
fledgling
democracies in
neighboring
Argen-
tina,
Peru and Bolivia. Their ads also revealed a
heavy-handed
effort
to
equate
the anti-Pinochet
position
(the
"NO"
position)
with the
violence and chaos of the Allende
years.
6. For a
description
of neoliberal
policies during
this
period
see
Foxley
(1983)
and Ramos
(1986).
7. For
example,
recovery
plan
to
or
Society
for Industrial
Development)
cautioned that
though
the
private
government,
it
might
be
forced into
In the same
spirit,
CPC
President
Jorge
only sought
confron-
tation with
government
should
realize,
continued
Fontaine,
perdition (Hoy,
1983a).
8. Author's
personal
conclusion that the
government
was
the
CPC economic
program.
9.
Que
Pasa
(1983d)
reported
virtually ready
to clear the
legislative
commission in
charge
of
ample
access to the
the
legislative
commissions
(CNC,
1983).
Council,
see Lecaros
(1989)
and Urenda
(1989).
11. Ramdohr
(1988),
who
participated
in the Concertaci6n
dialogues,
shared this view of
capital's
pacts.
12. For the SNA
position
on
agrarian reform,
see El
Campesino
(1986a, 1986b);
for CPC
support
of the
SNA,
see El
Campesino
(1987b).
13.
For the
program
of the Alianza
Democrdtica,
see
Hoy
(1985).
words that
appeared
in El
Campesino
(1988a).
15. The
for the October
1988
plebiscite
(the "Si")
Its cam-
paign
advertisements
stridently
extolled economic
gains
since
1984
and
compared
Chile's
to the
economic
disarray
of
fledgling
democracies in
neighboring
Argen-
tina,
heavy-handed
effort
to
equate
the anti-Pinochet
position
(the
"NO"
position)
with the
years.
6. For a
description
of neoliberal
policies during
this
period
see
Foxley
(1983)
and Ramos
(1986).
7. For
example,
recovery
plan
to
or
Society
for Industrial
Development)
cautioned that
though
the
private
government,
it
might
be
forced into
In the same
spirit,
CPC
President
Jorge
only sought
confron-
tation with
government
should
realize,
continued
Fontaine,
perdition (Hoy,
1983a).
8. Author's
personal
conclusion that the
government
was
the
CPC economic
program.
9.
Que
Pasa
(1983d)
reported
virtually ready
to clear the
legislative
commission in
charge
of
ample
access to the
the
legislative
commissions
(CNC,
1983).
Council,
see Lecaros
(1989)
and Urenda
(1989).
11. Ramdohr
(1988),
who
participated
in the Concertaci6n
dialogues,
shared this view of
capital's
pacts.
12. For the SNA
position
on
agrarian reform,
see El
Campesino
(1986a, 1986b);
for CPC
support
of the
SNA,
see El
Campesino
(1987b).
13.
For the
program
of the Alianza
Democrdtica,
see
Hoy
(1985).
words that
appeared
in El
Campesino
(1988a).
15. The
for the October
1988
plebiscite
(the "Si")
Its cam-
paign
advertisements
stridently
extolled economic
gains
since
1984
and
compared
Chile's
to the
economic
disarray
of
fledgling
democracies in
neighboring
Argen-
tina,
heavy-handed
effort
to
equate
the anti-Pinochet
position
(the
"NO"
position)
with the
years.
6. For a
description
of neoliberal
policies during
this
period
see
Foxley
(1983)
and Ramos
(1986).
7. For
example,
recovery
plan
to
or
Society
for Industrial
Development)
cautioned that
though
the
private
government,
it
might
be
forced into
In the same
spirit,
CPC
President
Jorge
only sought
confron-
tation with
government
should
realize,
continued
Fontaine,
perdition (Hoy,
1983a).
8. Author's
personal
conclusion that the
government
was
the
CPC economic
program.
9.
Que
Pasa
(1983d)
reported
virtually ready
to clear the
legislative
commission in
charge
of
ample
access to the
the
legislative
commissions
(CNC,
1983).
Council,
see Lecaros
(1989)
and Urenda
(1989).
11. Ramdohr
(1988),
who
participated
in the Concertaci6n
dialogues,
shared this view of
capital's
pacts.
12. For the SNA
position
on
agrarian reform,
see El
Campesino
(1986a, 1986b);
for CPC
support
of the
SNA,
see El
Campesino
(1987b).
13.
For the
program
of the Alianza
Democrdtica,
see
Hoy
(1985).
words that
appeared
in El
Campesino
(1988a).
15. The
for the October
1988
plebiscite
(the "Si")
Its cam-
paign
advertisements
stridently
extolled economic
gains
since
1984
and
compared
Chile's
to the
economic
disarray
of
fledgling
democracies in
neighboring
Argen-
tina,
heavy-handed
effort
to
equate
the anti-Pinochet
position
(the
"NO"
position)
with the
years.
6. For a
description
of neoliberal
policies during
this
period
see
Foxley
(1983)
and Ramos
(1986).
7. For
example,
recovery
plan
to
or
Society
for Industrial
Development)
cautioned that
though
the
private
government,
it
might
be
forced into
In the same
spirit,
CPC
President
Jorge
only sought
confron-
tation with
government
should
realize,
continued
Fontaine,
perdition (Hoy,
1983a).
8. Author's
personal
conclusion that the
government
was
the
CPC economic
program.
9.
Que
Pasa
(1983d)
reported
virtually ready
to clear the
legislative
commission in
charge
of
ample
access to the
the
legislative
commissions
(CNC,
1983).
Council,
see Lecaros
(1989)
and Urenda
(1989).
11. Ramdohr
(1988),
who
participated
in the Concertaci6n
dialogues,
shared this view of
capital's
pacts.
12. For the SNA
position
on
agrarian reform,
see El
Campesino
(1986a, 1986b);
for CPC
support
of the
SNA,
see El
Campesino
(1987b).
13.
For the
program
of the Alianza
Democrdtica,
see
Hoy
(1985).
words that
appeared
in El
Campesino
(1988a).
15. The
for the October
1988
plebiscite
(the "Si")
Its cam-
paign
advertisements
stridently
extolled economic
gains
since
1984
and
compared
Chile's
to the
economic
disarray
of
fledgling
democracies in
neighboring
Argen-
tina,
heavy-handed
effort
to
equate
the anti-Pinochet
position
(the
"NO"
position)
with the
years.
105 105 105 105 105
106
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
16. The
opposition's strategic
choice was consistent with the
prescriptions
advocated
by
O'Donnell and Schmitter
(1986).
17. For events
during
the
night
of 5 October
1988,
when the
plebiscite
was
held,
see
Que
Pasa
(1988)
and the work
by Cavallo,
Salazar and
Sepuilveda
(1988:
chapter
53).
18. The Senate also has nine
designated
seats. One is reserved
for former
presidents
of the
republic
for
life,
and the others are
nominated
by
the
outgoing president
for one term.
19.
Btichi
emphasized
that his
candidacy symbolized
Chile's
liberation from the deleterious
political style
of the
past
which had
led to the
collapse
of
democracy: political
freedom without economic
freedom. His
platform,
Democracia
y Progreso,
stressed four
points:
(1)
decentralization of
power
(a
weaker
presidency
and more
autonomy
for administrative
regions);
(2)
the
promise
to create in
Chile an
"opportunity society,"
characterized
by
more
employment,
better
wages,
health and
housing,
zero
inflation,
and low
taxation; (3)
"education for
liberty,"
with subsidies for the
poor;
and
(4)
the need
for Chile to
strengthen
economic ties with its
neighbors (Que Pasa,
1989a, 1989c, 1989d).
20. For
example,
in addition to
arms-length government
inter-
vention in the
economy
and
support
for free
trade,
the
Aylwin
administration has
clearly
committed itself to a
policy
of
wage
restraint,
as
prescribed by pragmatic
neoliberalism
(see Larrain,
1991).
21. The
military
hold 4 out of the 9
appointed
Senate seats.
Pinochet is
guaranteed
an
appointment-for-life
to the Senate as
well,
and the
remaining appointive
seats also tend to favor conservatives.
For further
details,
see Loveman
(1991: 65).
22. In interviews with the
author,
business leaders confirmed
that
easy
access to the executive branch bolstered their confidence
in the Concertacion 's assertion that it intended to adhere to the main
tenets of
pragmatic
neoliberalism. The interviewees also acknowl-
edged
that this
system
allowed them to alter
proposed legislation
in
ways
that favored their interests
(Guzman, 1992; Felii, 1992; Lizana,
1992; Garcia, 1992; Mujica,
1992;).
Molina
(1992)
blamed the
government's
difficulties in
addressing
the issue of social
equity
on
this
system
of collaboration.
23.
Feliu
(1992)
described the
process
as an
"agreed-upon
negotiation"
(negociacion
pactadca)
between
government
and
business.
16. The
prescriptions
advocated
by
(1986).
17. For events
during
the
night
of 5 October
1988,
when the
plebiscite
was
held,
see
Que
Pasa
(1988)
and the work
by Cavallo,
Salazar and
Sepuilveda
(1988:
chapter
53).
designated
for former
presidents
of the
republic
for
life,
and the others are
nominated
by
the
outgoing president
for one term.
19.
Btichi
emphasized
that his
Chile's
political style
of the
past
which had
led to the
collapse
of
freedom. His
platform,
Democracia
y Progreso,
stressed four
points:
(1)
decentralization of
power
(a
weaker
presidency
and more
autonomy
for administrative
regions);
(2)
the
promise
to create in
Chile an
characterized
by
more
employment,
better
wages,
health and
housing,
zero
inflation,
and low
taxation; (3)
"education for
liberty,"
poor;
and
(4)
the need
for Chile to
strengthen
1989a, 1989c, 1989d).
20. For
example,
in addition to
inter-
vention in the
economy
and
support
for free
trade,
the
Aylwin
administration has
clearly
policy
of
wage
restraint,
as
neoliberalism
(see Larrain,
1991).
21. The
military
hold 4 out of the 9
appointed
Senate seats.
Pinochet is
guaranteed
an
to the Senate as
well,
and the
For further
details,
see Loveman
(1991: 65).
author,
that
easy
tenets of
pragmatic
edged
that this
system
in
ways
1992;).
Molina
(1992)
blamed the
government's
difficulties in
addressing
the issue of social
equity
on
this
system
of collaboration.
23.
Feliu
(1992)
described the
process
as an
"agreed-upon
negotiation"
(negociacion
pactadca)
between
government
and
business.
16. The
prescriptions
advocated
by
(1986).
17. For events
during
the
night
of 5 October
1988,
when the
plebiscite
was
held,
see
Que
Pasa
(1988)
and the work
by Cavallo,
Salazar and
Sepuilveda
(1988:
chapter
53).
designated
for former
presidents
of the
republic
for
life,
and the others are
nominated
by
the
outgoing president
for one term.
19.
Btichi
emphasized
that his
Chile's
political style
of the
past
which had
led to the
collapse
of
freedom. His
platform,
Democracia
y Progreso,
stressed four
points:
(1)
decentralization of
power
(a
weaker
presidency
and more
autonomy
for administrative
regions);
(2)
the
promise
to create in
Chile an
characterized
by
more
employment,
better
wages,
health and
housing,
zero
inflation,
and low
taxation; (3)
"education for
liberty,"
poor;
and
(4)
the need
for Chile to
strengthen
1989a, 1989c, 1989d).
20. For
example,
in addition to
inter-
vention in the
economy
and
support
for free
trade,
the
Aylwin
administration has
clearly
policy
of
wage
restraint,
as
neoliberalism
(see Larrain,
1991).
21. The
military
hold 4 out of the 9
appointed
Senate seats.
Pinochet is
guaranteed
an
to the Senate as
well,
and the
For further
details,
see Loveman
(1991: 65).
author,
that
easy
tenets of
pragmatic
edged
that this
system
in
ways
1992;).
Molina
(1992)
blamed the
government's
difficulties in
addressing
the issue of social
equity
on
this
system
of collaboration.
23.
Feliu
(1992)
described the
process
as an
"agreed-upon
negotiation"
(negociacion
pactadca)
between
government
and
business.
16. The
prescriptions
advocated
by
(1986).
17. For events
during
the
night
of 5 October
1988,
when the
plebiscite
was
held,
see
Que
Pasa
(1988)
and the work
by Cavallo,
Salazar and
Sepuilveda
(1988:
chapter
53).
designated
for former
presidents
of the
republic
for
life,
and the others are
nominated
by
the
outgoing president
for one term.
19.
Btichi
emphasized
that his
Chile's
political style
of the
past
which had
led to the
collapse
of
freedom. His
platform,
Democracia
y Progreso,
stressed four
points:
(1)
decentralization of
power
(a
weaker
presidency
and more
autonomy
for administrative
regions);
(2)
the
promise
to create in
Chile an
characterized
by
more
employment,
better
wages,
health and
housing,
zero
inflation,
and low
taxation; (3)
"education for
liberty,"
poor;
and
(4)
the need
for Chile to
strengthen
1989a, 1989c, 1989d).
20. For
example,
in addition to
inter-
vention in the
economy
and
support
for free
trade,
the
Aylwin
administration has
clearly
policy
of
wage
restraint,
as
neoliberalism
(see Larrain,
1991).
21. The
military
hold 4 out of the 9
appointed
Senate seats.
Pinochet is
guaranteed
an
to the Senate as
well,
and the
For further
details,
see Loveman
(1991: 65).
author,
that
easy
tenets of
pragmatic
edged
that this
system
in
ways
1992;).
Molina
(1992)
blamed the
government's
difficulties in
addressing
the issue of social
equity
on
this
system
of collaboration.
23.
Feliu
(1992)
described the
process
as an
"agreed-upon
negotiation"
(negociacion
pactadca)
between
government
and
business.
16. The
prescriptions
advocated
by
(1986).
17. For events
during
the
night
of 5 October
1988,
when the
plebiscite
was
held,
see
Que
Pasa
(1988)
and the work
by Cavallo,
Salazar and
Sepuilveda
(1988:
chapter
53).
designated
for former
presidents
of the
republic
for
life,
and the others are
nominated
by
the
outgoing president
for one term.
19.
Btichi
emphasized
that his
Chile's
political style
of the
past
which had
led to the
collapse
of
freedom. His
platform,
Democracia
y Progreso,
stressed four
points:
(1)
decentralization of
power
(a
weaker
presidency
and more
autonomy
for administrative
regions);
(2)
the
promise
to create in
Chile an
characterized
by
more
employment,
better
wages,
health and
housing,
zero
inflation,
and low
taxation; (3)
"education for
liberty,"
poor;
and
(4)
the need
for Chile to
strengthen
1989a, 1989c, 1989d).
20. For
example,
in addition to
inter-
vention in the
economy
and
support
for free
trade,
the
Aylwin
administration has
clearly
policy
of
wage
restraint,
as
neoliberalism
(see Larrain,
1991).
21. The
military
hold 4 out of the 9
appointed
Senate seats.
Pinochet is
guaranteed
an
to the Senate as
well,
and the
For further
details,
see Loveman
(1991: 65).
author,
that
easy
tenets of
pragmatic
edged
that this
system
in
ways
1992;).
Molina
(1992)
blamed the
government's
difficulties in
addressing
the issue of social
equity
on
this
system
of collaboration.
23.
Feliu
(1992)
described the
process
as an
"agreed-upon
negotiation"
(negociacion
pactadca)
between
government
and
business.
SILVA: CAPITALIST REGIME LOYALTIES IN CHILE 107
24. For
budget woes,
see Business Latin America
(1990b,
1990f). For commitment to macro-economic
stability,
see Business
Latin America
(1990a).
For recent inflation in
Chile,
see Business
Latin America
(1990e)
and the Latin American
Regional Report-
Southern Cone (1990: 3).
25.
An article
by
Biichi (1990)
illustrates this
point nicely.
26.
Capitalists enjoy specific guarantees regarding property.
However,
the
political
institutions of
post-authoritarian
Chile
give
them
ample
means
by
which
they
can defend themselves from
infringements
on their
profits
which
might
come from either
taxation,
redefining
the welfare state to favor an activist social
democracy
(Esping-Andersen, 1991),
or substantial reform of the labor laws.
24. For
budget woes,
(1990b,
stability,
see Business
Latin America
(1990a).
Chile,
see Business
Latin America
(1990e)
Regional Report-
25.
An article
by
Biichi (1990)
illustrates this
point nicely.
26.
However,
the
political
institutions of
post-authoritarian
Chile
give
them
ample
means
by
which
they
infringements
on their
profits
which
might
come from either
taxation,
redefining
democracy
24. For
budget woes,
(1990b,
stability,
see Business
Latin America
(1990a).
Chile,
see Business
Latin America
(1990e)
Regional Report-
25.
An article
by
Biichi (1990)
illustrates this
point nicely.
26.
However,
the
political
institutions of
post-authoritarian
Chile
give
them
ample
means
by
which
they
infringements
on their
profits
which
might
come from either
taxation,
redefining
democracy
24. For
budget woes,
(1990b,
stability,
see Business
Latin America
(1990a).
Chile,
see Business
Latin America
(1990e)
Regional Report-
25.
An article
by
Biichi (1990)
illustrates this
point nicely.
26.
However,
the
political
institutions of
post-authoritarian
Chile
give
them
ample
means
by
which
they
infringements
on their
profits
which
might
come from either
taxation,
redefining
democracy
24. For
budget woes,
(1990b,
stability,
see Business
Latin America
(1990a).
Chile,
see Business
Latin America
(1990e)
Regional Report-
25.
An article
by
Biichi (1990)
illustrates this
point nicely.
26.
However,
the
political
institutions of
post-authoritarian
Chile
give
them
ample
means
by
which
they
infringements
on their
profits
which
might
come from either
taxation,
redefining
democracy
108
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
REFERENCES
ALE, J. (1988)
Author interview with
Jaime Ale,
Director of
Planning
for the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
(SFF),
27
September,
Santiago
de Chile.
ARAYA,
P.
(1989)
Author interview with Pablo
Araya,
Director of
Research for the Camara Chilena de la Construcci6n
(CchC),
3
May, Santiago
de Chile.
BRAGER,
S.
(1990)
"The Chilean Elections of 1989:
An
Account,
an
Analysis,
and a Forecast for the Future"
(mimeo).
San
Diego,
CA:
University
of California.
BUCHI,
H.
(1990)
"El
presupuesto
de 1991
no es reactivador."
Que
Pasa?
(4
June):
29.
Business Latin America
(1990a)
"Chile's New Government Aims to
Maintain
Coalition,
Preserve Pa,st Economic Gains."
(26 March): 91.
(1990b)
"Chile's Labor Code Reforms."
(23
July):
230.
_
(1990c)
"Unions Threaten Strikes as Chile's New Labor Code
Gets
Bogged
Down in Senate."
(3
September):
279,
283.
_
(1990d)
"Chile Vexed
by
Inflation and Slowdown of
Economy,
Indexation under
Scrutiny."
(12 November): 358-359.
(1990e)
"Business Outlook: Chile."
(3 December): 392-393.
(1989a)
"Chile's
Opposition Agrees
to Back Moderate
Aylwin."
(10
July):
209-210.
(1989b)
"Chile's
Opposition
Unveils Electoral
Program
Containing
Moderate Social Reforms."
(14
August):
250-251.
Camara Nacional de Comercio
(CNC) (1988)
Informe econ6mico
anual,
1988.
Santiago,
Chile: Camrara de Comercio de
Santiago.
(1983)
Memorandum to Finance Minister
Caceres,
No. 265/
83;
4 November.
Santiago,
Chile: CNC.
CAMPERO,
C.
(1984)
Los
gremios empresariales
en el
periodo
1970-
1983:
Comportamiento sociopolitico
y
orientaciones
ideol6gicas.
Santiago,
Chile: Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios
Transnacionales
(ILET).
REFERENCES
ALE, J. (1988)
Jaime Ale,
Director of
Planning
(SFF),
27
September,
Santiago
de Chile.
ARAYA,
P.
(1989)
Araya,
Director of
(CchC),
3
May, Santiago
de Chile.
BRAGER,
S.
(1990)
An
Account,
an
Analysis,
(mimeo).
San
Diego,
CA:
University
of California.
BUCHI,
H.
(1990)
"El
presupuesto
de 1991
no es reactivador."
Que
Pasa?
(4
June):
29.
(1990a)
Maintain
Coalition,
(26 March): 91.
(1990b)
(23
July):
230.
_
(1990c)
Gets
Bogged
Down in Senate."
(3
September):
279,
283.
_
(1990d)
"Chile Vexed
by
Economy,
Indexation under
Scrutiny."
(12 November): 358-359.
(1990e)
(3 December): 392-393.
(1989a)
"Chile's
Opposition Agrees
to Back Moderate
Aylwin."
(10
July):
209-210.
(1989b)
"Chile's
Opposition
Unveils Electoral
Program
Containing
(14
August):
250-251.
(CNC) (1988)
Informe econ6mico
anual,
1988.
Santiago,
Santiago.
(1983)
Caceres,
No. 265/
83;
4 November.
Santiago,
Chile: CNC.
CAMPERO,
C.
(1984)
Los
en el
periodo
1970-
1983:
y
orientaciones
ideol6gicas.
Santiago,
Transnacionales
(ILET).
REFERENCES
ALE, J. (1988)
Jaime Ale,
Director of
Planning
(SFF),
27
September,
Santiago
de Chile.
ARAYA,
P.
(1989)
Araya,
Director of
(CchC),
3
May, Santiago
de Chile.
BRAGER,
S.
(1990)
An
Account,
an
Analysis,
(mimeo).
San
Diego,
CA:
University
of California.
BUCHI,
H.
(1990)
"El
presupuesto
de 1991
no es reactivador."
Que
Pasa?
(4
June):
29.
(1990a)
Maintain
Coalition,
(26 March): 91.
(1990b)
(23
July):
230.
_
(1990c)
Gets
Bogged
Down in Senate."
(3
September):
279,
283.
_
(1990d)
"Chile Vexed
by
Economy,
Indexation under
Scrutiny."
(12 November): 358-359.
(1990e)
(3 December): 392-393.
(1989a)
"Chile's
Opposition Agrees
to Back Moderate
Aylwin."
(10
July):
209-210.
(1989b)
"Chile's
Opposition
Unveils Electoral
Program
Containing
(14
August):
250-251.
(CNC) (1988)
Informe econ6mico
anual,
1988.
Santiago,
Santiago.
(1983)
Caceres,
No. 265/
83;
4 November.
Santiago,
Chile: CNC.
CAMPERO,
C.
(1984)
Los
en el
periodo
1970-
1983:
y
orientaciones
ideol6gicas.
Santiago,
Transnacionales
(ILET).
REFERENCES
ALE, J. (1988)
Jaime Ale,
Director of
Planning
(SFF),
27
September,
Santiago
de Chile.
ARAYA,
P.
(1989)
Araya,
Director of
(CchC),
3
May, Santiago
de Chile.
BRAGER,
S.
(1990)
An
Account,
an
Analysis,
(mimeo).
San
Diego,
CA:
University
of California.
BUCHI,
H.
(1990)
"El
presupuesto
de 1991
no es reactivador."
Que
Pasa?
(4
June):
29.
(1990a)
Maintain
Coalition,
(26 March): 91.
(1990b)
(23
July):
230.
_
(1990c)
Gets
Bogged
Down in Senate."
(3
September):
279,
283.
_
(1990d)
"Chile Vexed
by
Economy,
Indexation under
Scrutiny."
(12 November): 358-359.
(1990e)
(3 December): 392-393.
(1989a)
"Chile's
Opposition Agrees
to Back Moderate
Aylwin."
(10
July):
209-210.
(1989b)
"Chile's
Opposition
Unveils Electoral
Program
Containing
(14
August):
250-251.
(CNC) (1988)
Informe econ6mico
anual,
1988.
Santiago,
Santiago.
(1983)
Caceres,
No. 265/
83;
4 November.
Santiago,
Chile: CNC.
CAMPERO,
C.
(1984)
Los
en el
periodo
1970-
1983:
y
orientaciones
ideol6gicas.
Santiago,
Transnacionales
(ILET).
REFERENCES
ALE, J. (1988)
Jaime Ale,
Director of
Planning
(SFF),
27
September,
Santiago
de Chile.
ARAYA,
P.
(1989)
Araya,
Director of
(CchC),
3
May, Santiago
de Chile.
BRAGER,
S.
(1990)
An
Account,
an
Analysis,
(mimeo).
San
Diego,
CA:
University
of California.
BUCHI,
H.
(1990)
"El
presupuesto
de 1991
no es reactivador."
Que
Pasa?
(4
June):
29.
(1990a)
Maintain
Coalition,
(26 March): 91.
(1990b)
(23
July):
230.
_
(1990c)
Gets
Bogged
Down in Senate."
(3
September):
279,
283.
_
(1990d)
"Chile Vexed
by
Economy,
Indexation under
Scrutiny."
(12 November): 358-359.
(1990e)
(3 December): 392-393.
(1989a)
"Chile's
Opposition Agrees
to Back Moderate
Aylwin."
(10
July):
209-210.
(1989b)
"Chile's
Opposition
Unveils Electoral
Program
Containing
(14
August):
250-251.
(CNC) (1988)
Informe econ6mico
anual,
1988.
Santiago,
Santiago.
(1983)
Caceres,
No. 265/
83;
4 November.
Santiago,
Chile: CNC.
CAMPERO,
C.
(1984)
Los
en el
periodo
1970-
1983:
y
orientaciones
ideol6gicas.
Santiago,
Transnacionales
(ILET).
El
Campesino
(1988a)
"Respaldo
a
proceso
institucional." Nos. 1-2
(January-February):
7.
(1988b)
"Vision de
presente y
futuro." No. 5
(May):
9.
(1988c)
"Aniversario de Radio
Agricultura."
No. 11
(November):
9-10.
(1988d)
"Inauguraci6n
FISA '88: discurso del
presidente
de la
SNA
Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 29-31.
(1987a)
"Acuerdo de Jahuel." No. 6
(June): 10-15.
(1987b)
"Reforma
agraria: plan
fracasado
y anejo."
No. 8
(August):
11-12.
(1987c)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA, Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 17-19.
(1986a)
"Editorial: condiciones
para
el desarrollo sectorial."
Nos. 1-2
(January-February).
(1986b)
"Asamblea General de Socios." No. 11
(November):
28.
CARDOSO,
F. H.
(1986)
"Entrepreneurs
and the Transition to
Democracy
in
Brazil," pp.
137-153
in Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter,
and Laurence Whitehead
(eds.)
Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule:
Comparative Perspectives.
Baltimore,
MD: The
Johns Hopkins University
Press.
CAVALLO, A.,
M.
SALAZAR,
and 0. SEPULVEDA
(1988)
La historia
oculta del
regimen
militar.
Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones La
Epoca.
Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo
(CED) (1985)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: CED.
Centro de
Investigaci6n y
Asesoria Sindical
(CIASI) (1990)
"Trabajadores/Empresarios:
Desafio de Futuro"
(Documento
No.
6).
Santiago,
Chile: CIASI.
CHALMERS,
D. and C. ROBINSON
(1982)
"Why
Power Contenders Choose
Liberalization." Intemational Studies
Quarterly 26,
1
(March): 3-36.
Chile. Ministerio de Economia.
(1986)
Actas de las Reuniones de la
Subcomisidn
de
Reintegros,
15
y
22
mayo,
22
julio,
6
agosto, y
10 setiembre.
Santiago
de Chile: Comisi6n Nacional de Comercio
Exterior,
Ministerio de Economia.
El
Campesino
(1988a)
"Respaldo
a
proceso
(January-February):
7.
(1988b)
"Vision de
presente y
futuro." No. 5
(May):
9.
(1988c)
Agricultura."
No. 11
(November):
9-10.
(1988d)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA
Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 29-31.
(1987a)
(June): 10-15.
(1987b)
"Reforma
agraria: plan
fracasado
y anejo."
No. 8
(August):
11-12.
(1987c)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA, Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 17-19.
(1986a)
para
Nos. 1-2
(January-February).
(1986b)
(November):
28.
CARDOSO,
F. H.
(1986)
"Entrepreneurs
Democracy
in
Brazil," pp.
137-153
in Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter,
(eds.)
Transitions
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
CAVALLO, A.,
M.
SALAZAR,
and 0. SEPULVEDA
(1988)
La historia
oculta del
regimen
militar.
Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones La
Epoca.
(CED) (1985)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: CED.
Centro de
Investigaci6n y
Asesoria Sindical
(CIASI) (1990)
Desafio de Futuro"
(Documento
No.
6).
Santiago,
Chile: CIASI.
CHALMERS,
D. and C. ROBINSON
(1982)
"Why
Quarterly 26,
1
(March): 3-36.
(1986)
Subcomisidn
de
Reintegros,
15
y
22
mayo,
22
julio,
6
agosto, y
10 setiembre.
Santiago
Exterior,
El
Campesino
(1988a)
"Respaldo
a
proceso
(January-February):
7.
(1988b)
"Vision de
presente y
futuro." No. 5
(May):
9.
(1988c)
Agricultura."
No. 11
(November):
9-10.
(1988d)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA
Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 29-31.
(1987a)
(June): 10-15.
(1987b)
"Reforma
agraria: plan
fracasado
y anejo."
No. 8
(August):
11-12.
(1987c)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA, Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 17-19.
(1986a)
para
Nos. 1-2
(January-February).
(1986b)
(November):
28.
CARDOSO,
F. H.
(1986)
"Entrepreneurs
Democracy
in
Brazil," pp.
137-153
in Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter,
(eds.)
Transitions
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
CAVALLO, A.,
M.
SALAZAR,
and 0. SEPULVEDA
(1988)
La historia
oculta del
regimen
militar.
Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones La
Epoca.
(CED) (1985)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: CED.
Centro de
Investigaci6n y
Asesoria Sindical
(CIASI) (1990)
Desafio de Futuro"
(Documento
No.
6).
Santiago,
Chile: CIASI.
CHALMERS,
D. and C. ROBINSON
(1982)
"Why
Quarterly 26,
1
(March): 3-36.
(1986)
Subcomisidn
de
Reintegros,
15
y
22
mayo,
22
julio,
6
agosto, y
10 setiembre.
Santiago
Exterior,
El
Campesino
(1988a)
"Respaldo
a
proceso
(January-February):
7.
(1988b)
"Vision de
presente y
futuro." No. 5
(May):
9.
(1988c)
Agricultura."
No. 11
(November):
9-10.
(1988d)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA
Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 29-31.
(1987a)
(June): 10-15.
(1987b)
"Reforma
agraria: plan
fracasado
y anejo."
No. 8
(August):
11-12.
(1987c)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA, Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 17-19.
(1986a)
para
Nos. 1-2
(January-February).
(1986b)
(November):
28.
CARDOSO,
F. H.
(1986)
"Entrepreneurs
Democracy
in
Brazil," pp.
137-153
in Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter,
(eds.)
Transitions
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
CAVALLO, A.,
M.
SALAZAR,
and 0. SEPULVEDA
(1988)
La historia
oculta del
regimen
militar.
Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones La
Epoca.
(CED) (1985)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: CED.
Centro de
Investigaci6n y
Asesoria Sindical
(CIASI) (1990)
Desafio de Futuro"
(Documento
No.
6).
Santiago,
Chile: CIASI.
CHALMERS,
D. and C. ROBINSON
(1982)
"Why
Quarterly 26,
1
(March): 3-36.
(1986)
Subcomisidn
de
Reintegros,
15
y
22
mayo,
22
julio,
6
agosto, y
10 setiembre.
Santiago
Exterior,
El
Campesino
(1988a)
"Respaldo
a
proceso
(January-February):
7.
(1988b)
"Vision de
presente y
futuro." No. 5
(May):
9.
(1988c)
Agricultura."
No. 11
(November):
9-10.
(1988d)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA
Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 29-31.
(1987a)
(June): 10-15.
(1987b)
"Reforma
agraria: plan
fracasado
y anejo."
No. 8
(August):
11-12.
(1987c)
"Inauguraci6n
presidente
de la
SNA, Jose
Moreno." No. 11
(November): 17-19.
(1986a)
para
Nos. 1-2
(January-February).
(1986b)
(November):
28.
CARDOSO,
F. H.
(1986)
"Entrepreneurs
Democracy
in
Brazil," pp.
137-153
in Guillermo
O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter,
(eds.)
Transitions
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
CAVALLO, A.,
M.
SALAZAR,
and 0. SEPULVEDA
(1988)
La historia
oculta del
regimen
militar.
Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones La
Epoca.
(CED) (1985)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: CED.
Centro de
Investigaci6n y
Asesoria Sindical
(CIASI) (1990)
Desafio de Futuro"
(Documento
No.
6).
Santiago,
Chile: CIASI.
CHALMERS,
D. and C. ROBINSON
(1982)
"Why
Quarterly 26,
1
(March): 3-36.
(1986)
Subcomisidn
de
Reintegros,
15
y
22
mayo,
22
julio,
6
agosto, y
10 setiembre.
Santiago
Exterior,
109 109 109 109 109
110
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
Corporaci6n
de
Investigaciones
Econ6micas
para
America Latina
(CIEPLAN) (1983)
Reconstrucci6n econ6mica
para
la
Democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
CLARO,
R.
(1985)
"Commentary," pp.
256-259
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
Estudios del Desarrollo
(CED).
COLLIER,
D.
(ed.) (1979)
The New Authoritarianism in Latin America.
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
CONAGHAN,
C. and R. ESPINAL
(1990)
"Unlikely
Transitions to
Uncertain
Regimes? Democracy
without
Compromise
in the
Dominican
Republic
and Ecuador."
Journal
of Latin American
Studies
22,
3 (October): 553-574.
CONAGHAN, C., J. MALLOY,
and L. ABUGATTAS
(1990)
"Business
and the
Boys:
The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central
Andes." Latin American Research Review
25,
2:
3-30.
Confederacin de
Producci6nyComercio
(CPC) (1983)
Minutes of Executive
Committee,
No.
591 (5
September). Santiago,
Chile: CPC.
CONSTABLE,
P. and A. VALENZUELA
(1991)
A Nation of Enemies:
Chile under Pinochet. New
York,
NY: Norton and
Company.
DAHSE,
F.
(1979)
El
mapa
de la extrema
riqueza. Santiago,
Chile:
Editorial
Aconcagua.
DE LA
CUADRA,
S.
(1988)
Sergio
de la Cuadra
(Minister
of Finance in
1982),
29
September, Santiago
de Chile.
DIAZ,
E.
(1985)
"La concertaci6n desde una
perspectiva
sindical de
izquierda,"
pp.
219-229
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo
(CED).
DRAKE,
P.
(1991)
"Introduction: Transformation and Transition in
Chile, 1982-1990,"
pp.
1-17 in Paul Drake and
IvanJaksic (eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-199(.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and I.
JAKSIC (eds) (1990)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and E. SILVA
(1986)
Elections and Democratization in
Latin
America,
1980-1985. San
Diego,
CA: Center for Iberian
and Latin American
Studies,
Center for US-Mexican
Studies,
and
Institute of the Americas.
Corporaci6n
de
Investigaciones
Econ6micas
para
America Latina
(CIEPLAN) (1983)
para
la
Democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
CLARO,
R.
(1985)
"Commentary," pp.
256-259
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
COLLIER,
D.
(ed.) (1979)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
CONAGHAN,
C. and R. ESPINAL
(1990)
"Unlikely
Transitions to
Uncertain
Regimes? Democracy
without
Compromise
in the
Dominican
Republic
and Ecuador."
Journal
of Latin American
Studies
22,
3 (October): 553-574.
and L. ABUGATTAS
(1990)
"Business
and the
Boys:
25,
2:
3-30.
Confederacin de
Producci6nyComercio
(CPC) (1983)
Committee,
No.
591 (5
Chile: CPC.
CONSTABLE,
(1991)
York,
NY: Norton and
Company.
DAHSE,
F.
(1979)
El
mapa
de la extrema
riqueza. Santiago,
Chile:
Editorial
Aconcagua.
DE LA
CUADRA,
S.
(1988)
Sergio
de la Cuadra
(Minister
of Finance in
1982),
29
September, Santiago
de Chile.
DIAZ,
E.
(1985)
perspectiva
sindical de
izquierda,"
pp.
219-229
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
(CED).
DRAKE,
P.
(1991)
Chile, 1982-1990,"
pp.
IvanJaksic (eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-199(.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and I.
JAKSIC (eds) (1990)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and E. SILVA
(1986)
Latin
America,
1980-1985. San
Diego,
and Latin American
Studies,
Studies,
and
Corporaci6n
de
Investigaciones
Econ6micas
para
America Latina
(CIEPLAN) (1983)
para
la
Democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
CLARO,
R.
(1985)
"Commentary," pp.
256-259
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
COLLIER,
D.
(ed.) (1979)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
CONAGHAN,
C. and R. ESPINAL
(1990)
"Unlikely
Transitions to
Uncertain
Regimes? Democracy
without
Compromise
in the
Dominican
Republic
and Ecuador."
Journal
of Latin American
Studies
22,
3 (October): 553-574.
and L. ABUGATTAS
(1990)
"Business
and the
Boys:
25,
2:
3-30.
Confederacin de
Producci6nyComercio
(CPC) (1983)
Committee,
No.
591 (5
Chile: CPC.
CONSTABLE,
(1991)
York,
NY: Norton and
Company.
DAHSE,
F.
(1979)
El
mapa
de la extrema
riqueza. Santiago,
Chile:
Editorial
Aconcagua.
DE LA
CUADRA,
S.
(1988)
Sergio
de la Cuadra
(Minister
of Finance in
1982),
29
September, Santiago
de Chile.
DIAZ,
E.
(1985)
perspectiva
sindical de
izquierda,"
pp.
219-229
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
(CED).
DRAKE,
P.
(1991)
Chile, 1982-1990,"
pp.
IvanJaksic (eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-199(.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and I.
JAKSIC (eds) (1990)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and E. SILVA
(1986)
Latin
America,
1980-1985. San
Diego,
and Latin American
Studies,
Studies,
and
Corporaci6n
de
Investigaciones
Econ6micas
para
America Latina
(CIEPLAN) (1983)
para
la
Democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
CLARO,
R.
(1985)
"Commentary," pp.
256-259
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
COLLIER,
D.
(ed.) (1979)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
CONAGHAN,
C. and R. ESPINAL
(1990)
"Unlikely
Transitions to
Uncertain
Regimes? Democracy
without
Compromise
in the
Dominican
Republic
and Ecuador."
Journal
of Latin American
Studies
22,
3 (October): 553-574.
and L. ABUGATTAS
(1990)
"Business
and the
Boys:
25,
2:
3-30.
Confederacin de
Producci6nyComercio
(CPC) (1983)
Committee,
No.
591 (5
Chile: CPC.
CONSTABLE,
(1991)
York,
NY: Norton and
Company.
DAHSE,
F.
(1979)
El
mapa
de la extrema
riqueza. Santiago,
Chile:
Editorial
Aconcagua.
DE LA
CUADRA,
S.
(1988)
Sergio
de la Cuadra
(Minister
of Finance in
1982),
29
September, Santiago
de Chile.
DIAZ,
E.
(1985)
perspectiva
sindical de
izquierda,"
pp.
219-229
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
(CED).
DRAKE,
P.
(1991)
Chile, 1982-1990,"
pp.
IvanJaksic (eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-199(.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and I.
JAKSIC (eds) (1990)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and E. SILVA
(1986)
Latin
America,
1980-1985. San
Diego,
and Latin American
Studies,
Studies,
and
Corporaci6n
de
Investigaciones
Econ6micas
para
America Latina
(CIEPLAN) (1983)
para
la
Democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
CLARO,
R.
(1985)
"Commentary," pp.
256-259
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
COLLIER,
D.
(ed.) (1979)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
CONAGHAN,
C. and R. ESPINAL
(1990)
"Unlikely
Transitions to
Uncertain
Regimes? Democracy
without
Compromise
in the
Dominican
Republic
and Ecuador."
Journal
of Latin American
Studies
22,
3 (October): 553-574.
and L. ABUGATTAS
(1990)
"Business
and the
Boys:
25,
2:
3-30.
Confederacin de
Producci6nyComercio
(CPC) (1983)
Committee,
No.
591 (5
Chile: CPC.
CONSTABLE,
(1991)
York,
NY: Norton and
Company.
DAHSE,
F.
(1979)
El
mapa
de la extrema
riqueza. Santiago,
Chile:
Editorial
Aconcagua.
DE LA
CUADRA,
S.
(1988)
Sergio
de la Cuadra
(Minister
of Finance in
1982),
29
September, Santiago
de Chile.
DIAZ,
E.
(1985)
perspectiva
sindical de
izquierda,"
pp.
219-229
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
(CED).
DRAKE,
P.
(1991)
Chile, 1982-1990,"
pp.
IvanJaksic (eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-199(.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and I.
JAKSIC (eds) (1990)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
DRAKE,
P. and E. SILVA
(1986)
Latin
America,
1980-1985. San
Diego,
and Latin American
Studies,
Studies,
and
EDWARDS,
S. and A. COX-EDWARDS (1987) Monetarism and
Liberalization: The Chilean
Experiment. Cambridge,
MA:
Ballinger Publishing
Co.
FONTAINE,J. (1989) Author interview
withJorge Fontaine,
President
of the Confederacion de Produccion
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1968-1974 and
1982-1986, Santiago
de
Chile,
6
April.
La
Epoca
(1991) (20 January).
(1989) (16 December).
(1988) (26
December).
EPSTEIN,
E. (1984) "Legitimacy, Institutionalization, and
Opposition
in
Exclusionary
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian
Regimes:
The Situation
of the 1980s."
Comparative
Politics
17,
1
(October): 37-54.
ESPING-ANDERSEN,
G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
Estrategia (1988) (17 October).
FELIU,
A. (1985) "El
punto
de vista de los
empresarios," pp.
266-271
in CED (ed.) Concertacion social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile:
Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CED).
FELIU,
M. (1992) Author interview with Manuel
Feliui,
then President
of the Confederacion de Producci6n
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1986-1992, Santiago
de
Chile,
25 June.
FOXLEY,
A. (1983) Latin American
Experiments
in Neoconservative
Economics.
Berkeley,
CA:
University
of California Press.
(1982) "Algunas
condiciones
para
una democratizacion estable: El
case de Chile." Colecci6n Estudios CIEPLAN 9 (Decenber).
FRIEDEN, J.
(1991) Debt, Development,
and
Democracy:
Modern
Political
Economy
and Latin
America, 1965-1985. Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
(1989) "Winners and Losers in the Latin American Debt Crisis:
The Political
Implications,"
in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds.)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
GARCIA,
A. (1987) "Crecimiento
equitativo:
Politicas de
empleo
e
ingresos" (Materiales
para
Discusi6n
191, September). Santiago,
Chile: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CED).
EDWARDS,
MA:
Co.
withJorge Fontaine,
President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1968-1974 and
1982-1986, Santiago
de
Chile,
6
April.
La
Epoca
(1991) (20 January).
(1989) (16 December).
(1988) (26
December).
EPSTEIN,
Opposition
in
Exclusionary
Regimes:
The Situation
of the 1980s."
Comparative
Politics
17,
1
(October): 37-54.
ESPING-ANDERSEN,
Princeton
University
Press.
FELIU,
A. (1985) "El
punto
de vista de los
empresarios," pp.
266-271
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile:
FELIU,
Feliui,
then President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1986-1992, Santiago
de
Chile,
25 June.
FOXLEY,
Experiments
in Neoconservative
Economics.
Berkeley,
CA:
University
(1982) "Algunas
condiciones
para
FRIEDEN, J.
and
Democracy:
Modern
Political
Economy
and Latin
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
The Political
Implications,"
in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds.)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
GARCIA,
equitativo:
Politicas de
empleo
e
para
Discusi6n
EDWARDS,
MA:
Co.
withJorge Fontaine,
President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1968-1974 and
1982-1986, Santiago
de
Chile,
6
April.
La
Epoca
(1991) (20 January).
(1989) (16 December).
(1988) (26
December).
EPSTEIN,
Opposition
in
Exclusionary
Regimes:
The Situation
of the 1980s."
Comparative
Politics
17,
1
(October): 37-54.
ESPING-ANDERSEN,
Princeton
University
Press.
FELIU,
A. (1985) "El
punto
de vista de los
empresarios," pp.
266-271
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile:
FELIU,
Feliui,
then President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1986-1992, Santiago
de
Chile,
25 June.
FOXLEY,
Experiments
in Neoconservative
Economics.
Berkeley,
CA:
University
(1982) "Algunas
condiciones
para
FRIEDEN, J.
and
Democracy:
Modern
Political
Economy
and Latin
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
The Political
Implications,"
in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds.)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
GARCIA,
equitativo:
Politicas de
empleo
e
para
Discusi6n
EDWARDS,
MA:
Co.
withJorge Fontaine,
President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1968-1974 and
1982-1986, Santiago
de
Chile,
6
April.
La
Epoca
(1991) (20 January).
(1989) (16 December).
(1988) (26
December).
EPSTEIN,
Opposition
in
Exclusionary
Regimes:
The Situation
of the 1980s."
Comparative
Politics
17,
1
(October): 37-54.
ESPING-ANDERSEN,
Princeton
University
Press.
FELIU,
A. (1985) "El
punto
de vista de los
empresarios," pp.
266-271
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile:
FELIU,
Feliui,
then President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1986-1992, Santiago
de
Chile,
25 June.
FOXLEY,
Experiments
in Neoconservative
Economics.
Berkeley,
CA:
University
(1982) "Algunas
condiciones
para
FRIEDEN, J.
and
Democracy:
Modern
Political
Economy
and Latin
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
The Political
Implications,"
in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds.)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
GARCIA,
equitativo:
Politicas de
empleo
e
para
Discusi6n
EDWARDS,
MA:
Co.
withJorge Fontaine,
President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1968-1974 and
1982-1986, Santiago
de
Chile,
6
April.
La
Epoca
(1991) (20 January).
(1989) (16 December).
(1988) (26
December).
EPSTEIN,
Opposition
in
Exclusionary
Regimes:
The Situation
of the 1980s."
Comparative
Politics
17,
1
(October): 37-54.
ESPING-ANDERSEN,
Princeton
University
Press.
FELIU,
A. (1985) "El
punto
de vista de los
empresarios," pp.
266-271
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile:
FELIU,
Feliui,
then President
y
Comercio (CPC) from
1986-1992, Santiago
de
Chile,
25 June.
FOXLEY,
Experiments
in Neoconservative
Economics.
Berkeley,
CA:
University
(1982) "Algunas
condiciones
para
FRIEDEN, J.
and
Democracy:
Modern
Political
Economy
and Latin
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
The Political
Implications,"
in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds.)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
GARCIA,
equitativo:
Politicas de
empleo
e
para
Discusi6n
111 111 111 111 111
112
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
GARCIA,
R.
(1992)
Author interview with Rafl Garcia of the Sociedad
Nacional de
Agricultura (SNA),
24
June, Santiago
de Chile.
GARRETON,
M.A.
(1989)
The Chilean Political Process.
Boston,
MA:
Unwin
Hyman
Publishers.
(1987)
Reconstruir la
politica:
Transici6n
y
consolidacion
democratica en Chile.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial Andante.
GUZMAN, J. (1992)
Jose
Antonio
Guzman,
then
president
(at time of
interview)
of the Confederaci6n de
Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
15
June,
Santiago
de Chile.
Hoy
(1989)
"Patricio
Aylwin:
vamos a
ganar."
No. 626
(17
July):
3-8.
(1985)
"Acuerdo nacional
para
la
plena
democracia." No.424
(2
September):
10-13.
(1983a)
"Empresarios:
historia de un
pliego
secreto."
No.311
(6
July):
27-28.
(1983b)
"Jorge
Fontaine: la nueva embestida
empresarial."
No.313 (20
July):
23-24.
(1983c)
"Equipo
econ6mico:
ataque
a los mandos medios."
No.321 (14
September):
28-30.
(1983d)
"Equipo
econ6mico: como en el cuento del lobo."
No.326 (19 October):
11-12.
(1983e)
"Equipo
econdmico: las iltimas definiciones."
No.328
(2 November): 26-27.
KAUFMAN,
R.
(1986)
"Liberalization and Democratization in South
America:
Perspectives
from the
1970s,"
pp.
85-107
in Guillermo
O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter,
(eds.)
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
LARRAIN,
F.
(1991)
"The Economic
Challenges
of Democratic
Development," pp.
276-301
in Paul Drake and
IvanJaksic
(eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
(1988)
"Desarrollo economico
para
Chile en
democracia," pp.
21-84 in
Felipe
Larrain
(ed.)
Desarrollo econ6mico en
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Ediciones Universidad Cat6lica de
Chile.
GARCIA,
R.
(1992)
Nacional de
Agricultura (SNA),
24
June, Santiago
de Chile.
GARRETON,
M.A.
(1989)
Boston,
MA:
Unwin
Hyman
Publishers.
(1987)
Reconstruir la
politica:
Transici6n
y
consolidacion
Santiago,
GUZMAN, J. (1992)
Jose
Antonio
Guzman,
then
president
(at time of
interview)
Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
15
June,
Santiago
de Chile.
Hoy
(1989)
"Patricio
Aylwin:
vamos a
ganar."
No. 626
(17
July):
3-8.
(1985)
"Acuerdo nacional
para
la
plena
democracia." No.424
(2
September):
10-13.
(1983a)
"Empresarios:
historia de un
pliego
secreto."
No.311
(6
July):
27-28.
(1983b)
"Jorge
empresarial."
No.313 (20
July):
23-24.
(1983c)
"Equipo
econ6mico:
ataque
No.321 (14
September):
28-30.
(1983d)
"Equipo
11-12.
(1983e)
"Equipo
No.328
KAUFMAN,
R.
(1986)
America:
Perspectives
from the
1970s,"
pp.
85-107
in Guillermo
(eds.)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
LARRAIN,
F.
(1991)
"The Economic
Challenges
of Democratic
Development," pp.
276-301
in Paul Drake and
IvanJaksic
(eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
(1988)
para
Chile en
democracia," pp.
21-84 in
Felipe
Larrain
(ed.)
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile.
GARCIA,
R.
(1992)
Nacional de
Agricultura (SNA),
24
June, Santiago
de Chile.
GARRETON,
M.A.
(1989)
Boston,
MA:
Unwin
Hyman
Publishers.
(1987)
Reconstruir la
politica:
Transici6n
y
consolidacion
Santiago,
GUZMAN, J. (1992)
Jose
Antonio
Guzman,
then
president
(at time of
interview)
Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
15
June,
Santiago
de Chile.
Hoy
(1989)
"Patricio
Aylwin:
vamos a
ganar."
No. 626
(17
July):
3-8.
(1985)
"Acuerdo nacional
para
la
plena
democracia." No.424
(2
September):
10-13.
(1983a)
"Empresarios:
historia de un
pliego
secreto."
No.311
(6
July):
27-28.
(1983b)
"Jorge
empresarial."
No.313 (20
July):
23-24.
(1983c)
"Equipo
econ6mico:
ataque
No.321 (14
September):
28-30.
(1983d)
"Equipo
11-12.
(1983e)
"Equipo
No.328
KAUFMAN,
R.
(1986)
America:
Perspectives
from the
1970s,"
pp.
85-107
in Guillermo
(eds.)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
LARRAIN,
F.
(1991)
"The Economic
Challenges
of Democratic
Development," pp.
276-301
in Paul Drake and
IvanJaksic
(eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
(1988)
para
Chile en
democracia," pp.
21-84 in
Felipe
Larrain
(ed.)
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile.
GARCIA,
R.
(1992)
Nacional de
Agricultura (SNA),
24
June, Santiago
de Chile.
GARRETON,
M.A.
(1989)
Boston,
MA:
Unwin
Hyman
Publishers.
(1987)
Reconstruir la
politica:
Transici6n
y
consolidacion
Santiago,
GUZMAN, J. (1992)
Jose
Antonio
Guzman,
then
president
(at time of
interview)
Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
15
June,
Santiago
de Chile.
Hoy
(1989)
"Patricio
Aylwin:
vamos a
ganar."
No. 626
(17
July):
3-8.
(1985)
"Acuerdo nacional
para
la
plena
democracia." No.424
(2
September):
10-13.
(1983a)
"Empresarios:
historia de un
pliego
secreto."
No.311
(6
July):
27-28.
(1983b)
"Jorge
empresarial."
No.313 (20
July):
23-24.
(1983c)
"Equipo
econ6mico:
ataque
No.321 (14
September):
28-30.
(1983d)
"Equipo
11-12.
(1983e)
"Equipo
No.328
KAUFMAN,
R.
(1986)
America:
Perspectives
from the
1970s,"
pp.
85-107
in Guillermo
(eds.)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
LARRAIN,
F.
(1991)
"The Economic
Challenges
of Democratic
Development," pp.
276-301
in Paul Drake and
IvanJaksic
(eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
(1988)
para
Chile en
democracia," pp.
21-84 in
Felipe
Larrain
(ed.)
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile.
GARCIA,
R.
(1992)
Nacional de
Agricultura (SNA),
24
June, Santiago
de Chile.
GARRETON,
M.A.
(1989)
Boston,
MA:
Unwin
Hyman
Publishers.
(1987)
Reconstruir la
politica:
Transici6n
y
consolidacion
Santiago,
GUZMAN, J. (1992)
Jose
Antonio
Guzman,
then
president
(at time of
interview)
Producci6n
y
Comercio
(CPC),
15
June,
Santiago
de Chile.
Hoy
(1989)
"Patricio
Aylwin:
vamos a
ganar."
No. 626
(17
July):
3-8.
(1985)
"Acuerdo nacional
para
la
plena
democracia." No.424
(2
September):
10-13.
(1983a)
"Empresarios:
historia de un
pliego
secreto."
No.311
(6
July):
27-28.
(1983b)
"Jorge
empresarial."
No.313 (20
July):
23-24.
(1983c)
"Equipo
econ6mico:
ataque
No.321 (14
September):
28-30.
(1983d)
"Equipo
11-12.
(1983e)
"Equipo
No.328
KAUFMAN,
R.
(1986)
America:
Perspectives
from the
1970s,"
pp.
85-107
in Guillermo
(eds.)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
LARRAIN,
F.
(1991)
"The Economic
Challenges
of Democratic
Development," pp.
276-301
in Paul Drake and
IvanJaksic
(eds.)
The
Struggle
for
Democracy
in
Chile,
1982-1990.
Lincoln,
NB:
University
of Nebraska Press.
(1988)
para
Chile en
democracia," pp.
21-84 in
Felipe
Larrain
(ed.)
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile.
Latin America
Regional Reports-Southern
Cone
Report
(LARR-SC)
(1990)
"Economy:
Good News
Except
on Inflation."
(9August):
3.
Latin American Studies Association
(LASA) (1988)
"The Chilean
Plebiscite: A First
Step
toward Redemocratization." LASA Forum
19,
4
(Winter): 18-36.
LECAROS,
A.
(1989)
"Representaci6n
de los intereses de la sociedad
en el Estado
y
los
Consejos
Economico Sociales." MA
thesis,
Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile
(Instituto
de Ciencia
Politica).
LENIZ,
F.
(1985)
"El dificil consenso
econ6mico,"
pp.
50-56
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro
de Estudios del Desarrollo
(CED).
LIZIANA,
P.
(1992)
Author interview with Pedro
Liziana,
member of
(SFF)
Executive
Council,
Santiago (Chile),
10
June.
LOVEMAN,
B.
(1991)
"gMision Cumplida?Civil-Military
Relations and
the Chilean Political Transition."
Journal
of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs
33,
3 (Fall): 35-74.
MAXFIELD,
S.
(1989)
"National
Business,
Debt-Led
Growth,
and
Political
Transition," pp.
75-90 in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
MILLAN,
R.
(1988)
Los
empresarios
ante el estado
y
la sociedad.
Mexico
(DF),
Mexico:
Siglo
Veintiuno Editores.
MOLINA,
S.
(1992)
Statement of Minister of
Planning
and
Development
Sergio
Molina at
symposium
centered on themes of the 1992 UN
Human
Development Report,
held in former
Congreso
Nacional
building
in
Santiago
de
Chile,
16
July.
(1987)
"El
compromiso
de Chile: Construir un orden social
justo"
(Materiales
para
Discusi6n
200, November).
Santiago,
(CED).
MOSCA,
G.
(1938)
The
Ruling
Class. New
York,
NY: McGraw-Hill
Publishing
Co.
MUJICA,
A.
(1992)
Author interview with Alfonso
Mujica,
former
Vice-President (at time of
interview)
of the Cimara Nacional de
Comercio
(CNC),
16
June, Santiago
de Chile.
Latin America
Cone
Report
(LARR-SC)
(1990)
"Economy:
Good News
Except
on Inflation."
(9August):
3.
(LASA) (1988)
"The Chilean
Plebiscite: A First
Step
19,
4
(Winter): 18-36.
LECAROS,
A.
(1989)
"Representaci6n
en el Estado
y
los
Consejos
thesis,
(Instituto
de Ciencia
Politica).
LENIZ,
F.
(1985)
econ6mico,"
pp.
50-56
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro
(CED).
LIZIANA,
P.
(1992)
Liziana,
member of
(SFF)
Executive
Council,
Santiago (Chile),
10
June.
LOVEMAN,
B.
(1991)
Relations and
Journal
of Interamerican
33,
3 (Fall): 35-74.
MAXFIELD,
S.
(1989)
"National
Business,
Debt-Led
Growth,
and
Political
Transition," pp.
75-90 in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
MILLAN,
R.
(1988)
Los
empresarios
ante el estado
y
la sociedad.
Mexico
(DF),
Mexico:
Siglo
Veintiuno Editores.
MOLINA,
S.
(1992)
Planning
and
Development
Sergio
Molina at
symposium
Human
Development Report,
held in former
Congreso
Nacional
building
in
Santiago
de
Chile,
16
July.
(1987)
"El
compromiso
justo"
(Materiales
para
Discusi6n
200, November).
Santiago,
(CED).
MOSCA,
G.
(1938)
The
Ruling
Class. New
York,
NY: McGraw-Hill
Publishing
Co.
MUJICA,
A.
(1992)
Mujica,
former
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
June, Santiago
de Chile.
Latin America
Cone
Report
(LARR-SC)
(1990)
"Economy:
Good News
Except
on Inflation."
(9August):
3.
(LASA) (1988)
"The Chilean
Plebiscite: A First
Step
19,
4
(Winter): 18-36.
LECAROS,
A.
(1989)
"Representaci6n
en el Estado
y
los
Consejos
thesis,
(Instituto
de Ciencia
Politica).
LENIZ,
F.
(1985)
econ6mico,"
pp.
50-56
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro
(CED).
LIZIANA,
P.
(1992)
Liziana,
member of
(SFF)
Executive
Council,
Santiago (Chile),
10
June.
LOVEMAN,
B.
(1991)
Relations and
Journal
of Interamerican
33,
3 (Fall): 35-74.
MAXFIELD,
S.
(1989)
"National
Business,
Debt-Led
Growth,
and
Political
Transition," pp.
75-90 in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
MILLAN,
R.
(1988)
Los
empresarios
ante el estado
y
la sociedad.
Mexico
(DF),
Mexico:
Siglo
Veintiuno Editores.
MOLINA,
S.
(1992)
Planning
and
Development
Sergio
Molina at
symposium
Human
Development Report,
held in former
Congreso
Nacional
building
in
Santiago
de
Chile,
16
July.
(1987)
"El
compromiso
justo"
(Materiales
para
Discusi6n
200, November).
Santiago,
(CED).
MOSCA,
G.
(1938)
The
Ruling
Class. New
York,
NY: McGraw-Hill
Publishing
Co.
MUJICA,
A.
(1992)
Mujica,
former
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
June, Santiago
de Chile.
Latin America
Cone
Report
(LARR-SC)
(1990)
"Economy:
Good News
Except
on Inflation."
(9August):
3.
(LASA) (1988)
"The Chilean
Plebiscite: A First
Step
19,
4
(Winter): 18-36.
LECAROS,
A.
(1989)
"Representaci6n
en el Estado
y
los
Consejos
thesis,
(Instituto
de Ciencia
Politica).
LENIZ,
F.
(1985)
econ6mico,"
pp.
50-56
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro
(CED).
LIZIANA,
P.
(1992)
Liziana,
member of
(SFF)
Executive
Council,
Santiago (Chile),
10
June.
LOVEMAN,
B.
(1991)
Relations and
Journal
of Interamerican
33,
3 (Fall): 35-74.
MAXFIELD,
S.
(1989)
"National
Business,
Debt-Led
Growth,
and
Political
Transition," pp.
75-90 in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
MILLAN,
R.
(1988)
Los
empresarios
ante el estado
y
la sociedad.
Mexico
(DF),
Mexico:
Siglo
Veintiuno Editores.
MOLINA,
S.
(1992)
Planning
and
Development
Sergio
Molina at
symposium
Human
Development Report,
held in former
Congreso
Nacional
building
in
Santiago
de
Chile,
16
July.
(1987)
"El
compromiso
justo"
(Materiales
para
Discusi6n
200, November).
Santiago,
(CED).
MOSCA,
G.
(1938)
The
Ruling
Class. New
York,
NY: McGraw-Hill
Publishing
Co.
MUJICA,
A.
(1992)
Mujica,
former
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
June, Santiago
de Chile.
Latin America
Cone
Report
(LARR-SC)
(1990)
"Economy:
Good News
Except
on Inflation."
(9August):
3.
(LASA) (1988)
"The Chilean
Plebiscite: A First
Step
19,
4
(Winter): 18-36.
LECAROS,
A.
(1989)
"Representaci6n
en el Estado
y
los
Consejos
thesis,
(Instituto
de Ciencia
Politica).
LENIZ,
F.
(1985)
econ6mico,"
pp.
50-56
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro
(CED).
LIZIANA,
P.
(1992)
Liziana,
member of
(SFF)
Executive
Council,
Santiago (Chile),
10
June.
LOVEMAN,
B.
(1991)
Relations and
Journal
of Interamerican
33,
3 (Fall): 35-74.
MAXFIELD,
S.
(1989)
"National
Business,
Debt-Led
Growth,
and
Political
Transition," pp.
75-90 in Barbara
Stallings
and Robert
Kaufman
(eds)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
MILLAN,
R.
(1988)
Los
empresarios
ante el estado
y
la sociedad.
Mexico
(DF),
Mexico:
Siglo
Veintiuno Editores.
MOLINA,
S.
(1992)
Planning
and
Development
Sergio
Molina at
symposium
Human
Development Report,
held in former
Congreso
Nacional
building
in
Santiago
de
Chile,
16
July.
(1987)
"El
compromiso
justo"
(Materiales
para
Discusi6n
200, November).
Santiago,
(CED).
MOSCA,
G.
(1938)
The
Ruling
Class. New
York,
NY: McGraw-Hill
Publishing
Co.
MUJICA,
A.
(1992)
Mujica,
former
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
June, Santiago
de Chile.
113 113 113 113 113
114
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
O'DONNELL,
G. (1979) "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian
State and the
Question
of
Democracy," pp.
285-318
in David
Collier
(ed.)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
O'DONNELL,
G. and P. SCHMITTER
(1986)
Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions.
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
O'DONNELL, G.,
P.
SCHMITTER,
and L. WHITEHEAD
(eds.) (1986)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
OJEDA,
V.
(1985)
"Los
problemas
de la economia
y
la relaci6n
empresarios-trabajadores," pp.
76-79
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n
social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de Estudios del
Desarrollo
(CED).
PEREZ,
G.
(1985)
"Sindicalismo
y
redemocratizacion:
posibilidades y
alcances de la concertacion
social," pp.
80-10() in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
PRIETO,
H.
(1988)
Author interview with Humberto
Prieto, Secretary-
General
(at
time of
interview)
of the Caimara Nacional de
Comercio
(CNC),
16
October, Santiago
de Chile.
Proyecto
alternativo
(1984)
Proyecto
alternativo
(Vol.2)
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
Que
Pasa
(1990a)
"Empresarios:
'armados'
para
la democracia."
No.986 (1 March): 6-9.
(1990b)
"Entrevista: el
gobierno empieza
a
operar
en una
ruleta rusa." No.1021
(5 November): 4-7.
(1989a) "Sergio
Bitar: el crecimiento futuro sera mas lento."
No.954 (20
July).
(1989b)
"Tributacion: el terror de los
empresarios."
No.955
(27
July):
32-33.
(1989c) No.959 (24
August).
(1989d)
"Programa
Buchi: las cuatro tareas." No.964 (28
September):
14.
(1988)
"Post
plebiscito:
Frenando
expectativas."
No.914 (13
November): 37-38.
O'DONNELL,
State and the
Question
of
Democracy," pp.
285-318
in David
Collier
(ed.)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
O'DONNELL,
G. and P. SCHMITTER
(1986)
Transitions from
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
O'DONNELL, G.,
P.
SCHMITTER,
and L. WHITEHEAD
(eds.) (1986)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
OJEDA,
V.
(1985)
"Los
problemas
de la economia
y
la relaci6n
76-79
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n
social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Desarrollo
(CED).
PEREZ,
G.
(1985)
"Sindicalismo
y
redemocratizacion:
posibilidades y
social," pp.
80-10() in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
PRIETO,
H.
(1988)
Prieto, Secretary-
General
(at
time of
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
October, Santiago
de Chile.
Proyecto
alternativo
(1984)
Proyecto
alternativo
(Vol.2)
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
Que
Pasa
(1990a)
"Empresarios:
'armados'
para
la democracia."
No.986 (1 March): 6-9.
(1990b)
"Entrevista: el
gobierno empieza
a
operar
en una
(5 November): 4-7.
(1989a) "Sergio
No.954 (20
July).
(1989b)
empresarios."
No.955
(27
July):
32-33.
(1989c) No.959 (24
August).
(1989d)
"Programa
September):
14.
(1988)
"Post
plebiscito:
Frenando
expectativas."
No.914 (13
November): 37-38.
O'DONNELL,
State and the
Question
of
Democracy," pp.
285-318
in David
Collier
(ed.)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
O'DONNELL,
G. and P. SCHMITTER
(1986)
Transitions from
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
O'DONNELL, G.,
P.
SCHMITTER,
and L. WHITEHEAD
(eds.) (1986)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
OJEDA,
V.
(1985)
"Los
problemas
de la economia
y
la relaci6n
76-79
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n
social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Desarrollo
(CED).
PEREZ,
G.
(1985)
"Sindicalismo
y
redemocratizacion:
posibilidades y
social," pp.
80-10() in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
PRIETO,
H.
(1988)
Prieto, Secretary-
General
(at
time of
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
October, Santiago
de Chile.
Proyecto
alternativo
(1984)
Proyecto
alternativo
(Vol.2)
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
Que
Pasa
(1990a)
"Empresarios:
'armados'
para
la democracia."
No.986 (1 March): 6-9.
(1990b)
"Entrevista: el
gobierno empieza
a
operar
en una
(5 November): 4-7.
(1989a) "Sergio
No.954 (20
July).
(1989b)
empresarios."
No.955
(27
July):
32-33.
(1989c) No.959 (24
August).
(1989d)
"Programa
September):
14.
(1988)
"Post
plebiscito:
Frenando
expectativas."
No.914 (13
November): 37-38.
O'DONNELL,
State and the
Question
of
Democracy," pp.
285-318
in David
Collier
(ed.)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
O'DONNELL,
G. and P. SCHMITTER
(1986)
Transitions from
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
O'DONNELL, G.,
P.
SCHMITTER,
and L. WHITEHEAD
(eds.) (1986)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
OJEDA,
V.
(1985)
"Los
problemas
de la economia
y
la relaci6n
76-79
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n
social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Desarrollo
(CED).
PEREZ,
G.
(1985)
"Sindicalismo
y
redemocratizacion:
posibilidades y
social," pp.
80-10() in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
PRIETO,
H.
(1988)
Prieto, Secretary-
General
(at
time of
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
October, Santiago
de Chile.
Proyecto
alternativo
(1984)
Proyecto
alternativo
(Vol.2)
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
Que
Pasa
(1990a)
"Empresarios:
'armados'
para
la democracia."
No.986 (1 March): 6-9.
(1990b)
"Entrevista: el
gobierno empieza
a
operar
en una
(5 November): 4-7.
(1989a) "Sergio
No.954 (20
July).
(1989b)
empresarios."
No.955
(27
July):
32-33.
(1989c) No.959 (24
August).
(1989d)
"Programa
September):
14.
(1988)
"Post
plebiscito:
Frenando
expectativas."
No.914 (13
November): 37-38.
O'DONNELL,
State and the
Question
of
Democracy," pp.
285-318
in David
Collier
(ed.)
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
O'DONNELL,
G. and P. SCHMITTER
(1986)
Transitions from
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
O'DONNELL, G.,
P.
SCHMITTER,
and L. WHITEHEAD
(eds.) (1986)
Baltimore,
MD: The
Press.
OJEDA,
V.
(1985)
"Los
problemas
de la economia
y
la relaci6n
76-79
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n
social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Desarrollo
(CED).
PEREZ,
G.
(1985)
"Sindicalismo
y
redemocratizacion:
posibilidades y
social," pp.
80-10() in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
PRIETO,
H.
(1988)
Prieto, Secretary-
General
(at
time of
interview)
Comercio
(CNC),
16
October, Santiago
de Chile.
Proyecto
alternativo
(1984)
Proyecto
alternativo
(Vol.2)
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Aconcagua.
Que
Pasa
(1990a)
"Empresarios:
'armados'
para
la democracia."
No.986 (1 March): 6-9.
(1990b)
"Entrevista: el
gobierno empieza
a
operar
en una
(5 November): 4-7.
(1989a) "Sergio
No.954 (20
July).
(1989b)
empresarios."
No.955
(27
July):
32-33.
(1989c) No.959 (24
August).
(1989d)
"Programa
September):
14.
(1988)
"Post
plebiscito:
Frenando
expectativas."
No.914 (13
November): 37-38.
(1987)
"Empresarios: 1987,
afo de sobresaltos?"
No.833 (26
March): 36-37.
(1986)
"Empresarios y politica: ial margen
hasta cuando?
No.785 (24
April):
10-11.
(1983a)
"Edgardo Boeninger:
el mesianismo fue un
pecado
DC."
No.613 (6
January):
15-17.
(1983b)
"Las
proposiciones empresariales."
No.639 (7
July):
12-14.
(1983c)
"Los
postulados
econ6micos de la Alianza." No.647
(1
September):
30-32.
(1983d)
"Anuncios economicos:
inuevo
estilo de conducci6n?"
No.649
(15
September):
15-16.
(1983e)
"Politica
y
economia: dos caras de una crisis." No.650
(22
September):
8-10.
(19830
"El
gobiemo
y
la
oposici6n:
entre dimes
y
diretes."
8-10.
(1983g) "Operaci6n
Caceres." No.654 (20 October):
8-10.
(1983h)
"El
plan
Cerda." No.655 (27 October):
12-14.
RAMDOHR,
G.
(1988)
Author interview with Gustavo
Ramdohr,
past
president
of the Asociacion de Industriales
Metalurgicos
(ASIMET)
and
president
(at
time of
interview)
of the Asociacion
de
Exportadores
de Manufacturas no Tradicionales
(ASEXMA),
who had
participated
in Concertacin
dialogues,
25
August,
Santiago
de Chile.
RAMOS, J. (1986) Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone
of
LatinAmerica,
1973-1983.
Baltimore,
MD:
TheJohns
Hopkins
University
Press.
RUIZ DE
GIORGIO,J.
andJ. RUIZ DOS SANTOS
(1985)
"Concertacion
social: cambio
posible y necesario," pp.
230-255
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
SANFUENTES,
A.
(1984)
"Los
grupos
economicos: Control
y politicas."
Colecci6n Estudios CIEPLAN 15
(December): 131-170.
SILVA,
E.
(1993)
"Capitalist Coalitions,
the
State,
and Neoliberal
Economic
Restructuring: Chile, 1973-1988." World Politics
45,
4
(July).
(1987)
"Empresarios: 1987,
No.833 (26
March): 36-37.
(1986)
hasta cuando?
No.785 (24
April):
10-11.
(1983a)
"Edgardo Boeninger:
pecado
DC."
No.613 (6
January):
15-17.
(1983b)
"Las
No.639 (7
July):
12-14.
(1983c)
"Los
postulados
(1
September):
30-32.
(1983d)
inuevo
No.649
(15
September):
15-16.
(1983e)
"Politica
y
(22
September):
8-10.
(19830
"El
gobiemo
y
la
oposici6n:
entre dimes
y
diretes."
8-10.
(1983g) "Operaci6n
8-10.
(1983h)
"El
plan
12-14.
RAMDOHR,
G.
(1988)
Ramdohr,
past
president
Metalurgicos
(ASIMET)
and
president
(at
time of
interview)
of the Asociacion
de
Exportadores
(ASEXMA),
who had
participated
in Concertacin
dialogues,
25
August,
Santiago
de Chile.
of
LatinAmerica,
1973-1983.
Baltimore,
MD:
TheJohns
Hopkins
University
Press.
RUIZ DE
GIORGIO,J.
(1985)
"Concertacion
social: cambio
230-255
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
SANFUENTES,
A.
(1984)
"Los
grupos
economicos: Control
y politicas."
SILVA,
E.
(1993)
the
State,
and Neoliberal
Economic
45,
4
(July).
(1987)
"Empresarios: 1987,
No.833 (26
March): 36-37.
(1986)
hasta cuando?
No.785 (24
April):
10-11.
(1983a)
"Edgardo Boeninger:
pecado
DC."
No.613 (6
January):
15-17.
(1983b)
"Las
No.639 (7
July):
12-14.
(1983c)
"Los
postulados
(1
September):
30-32.
(1983d)
inuevo
No.649
(15
September):
15-16.
(1983e)
"Politica
y
(22
September):
8-10.
(19830
"El
gobiemo
y
la
oposici6n:
entre dimes
y
diretes."
8-10.
(1983g) "Operaci6n
8-10.
(1983h)
"El
plan
12-14.
RAMDOHR,
G.
(1988)
Ramdohr,
past
president
Metalurgicos
(ASIMET)
and
president
(at
time of
interview)
of the Asociacion
de
Exportadores
(ASEXMA),
who had
participated
in Concertacin
dialogues,
25
August,
Santiago
de Chile.
of
LatinAmerica,
1973-1983.
Baltimore,
MD:
TheJohns
Hopkins
University
Press.
RUIZ DE
GIORGIO,J.
(1985)
"Concertacion
social: cambio
230-255
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
SANFUENTES,
A.
(1984)
"Los
grupos
economicos: Control
y politicas."
SILVA,
E.
(1993)
the
State,
and Neoliberal
Economic
45,
4
(July).
(1987)
"Empresarios: 1987,
No.833 (26
March): 36-37.
(1986)
hasta cuando?
No.785 (24
April):
10-11.
(1983a)
"Edgardo Boeninger:
pecado
DC."
No.613 (6
January):
15-17.
(1983b)
"Las
No.639 (7
July):
12-14.
(1983c)
"Los
postulados
(1
September):
30-32.
(1983d)
inuevo
No.649
(15
September):
15-16.
(1983e)
"Politica
y
(22
September):
8-10.
(19830
"El
gobiemo
y
la
oposici6n:
entre dimes
y
diretes."
8-10.
(1983g) "Operaci6n
8-10.
(1983h)
"El
plan
12-14.
RAMDOHR,
G.
(1988)
Ramdohr,
past
president
Metalurgicos
(ASIMET)
and
president
(at
time of
interview)
of the Asociacion
de
Exportadores
(ASEXMA),
who had
participated
in Concertacin
dialogues,
25
August,
Santiago
de Chile.
of
LatinAmerica,
1973-1983.
Baltimore,
MD:
TheJohns
Hopkins
University
Press.
RUIZ DE
GIORGIO,J.
(1985)
"Concertacion
social: cambio
230-255
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
SANFUENTES,
A.
(1984)
"Los
grupos
economicos: Control
y politicas."
SILVA,
E.
(1993)
the
State,
and Neoliberal
Economic
45,
4
(July).
(1987)
"Empresarios: 1987,
No.833 (26
March): 36-37.
(1986)
hasta cuando?
No.785 (24
April):
10-11.
(1983a)
"Edgardo Boeninger:
pecado
DC."
No.613 (6
January):
15-17.
(1983b)
"Las
No.639 (7
July):
12-14.
(1983c)
"Los
postulados
(1
September):
30-32.
(1983d)
inuevo
No.649
(15
September):
15-16.
(1983e)
"Politica
y
(22
September):
8-10.
(19830
"El
gobiemo
y
la
oposici6n:
entre dimes
y
diretes."
8-10.
(1983g) "Operaci6n
8-10.
(1983h)
"El
plan
12-14.
RAMDOHR,
G.
(1988)
Ramdohr,
past
president
Metalurgicos
(ASIMET)
and
president
(at
time of
interview)
of the Asociacion
de
Exportadores
(ASEXMA),
who had
participated
in Concertacin
dialogues,
25
August,
Santiago
de Chile.
of
LatinAmerica,
1973-1983.
Baltimore,
MD:
TheJohns
Hopkins
University
Press.
RUIZ DE
GIORGIO,J.
(1985)
"Concertacion
social: cambio
230-255
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
SANFUENTES,
A.
(1984)
"Los
grupos
economicos: Control
y politicas."
SILVA,
E.
(1993)
the
State,
and Neoliberal
Economic
45,
4
(July).
115 115 115 115 115
116
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
JOURNAL
(1991)
"Capitalist
Coalitions and Economic
Policymaking
in
Authoritarian
Chile,
1973-1988."
Ph.D.
dissertation, University
of California-San
Diego.
SKOCPOL,
T.
(1979)
States and Social Revolutions: A
Comparative
Analysis
of
France, Russia,
and China.
Cambridge,
UK:
Cambridge
University
Press.
SMITH,
W.
(1989)
Authoritarianism and the Crisis of
Argentine
Political
Economy. Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press.
Sociedad de Fomento Fabril
(SFF) (1988)
"Los industriales
y
la
politica."
Revista Industria [SFF newsletter]
91,
4: 6-8.
(1986/87)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
(1986a)
"Acciones
prioritarias
1986."
Revista Industria
89,
1:
11.
(1986b)
"Editorial: los
programas politicos y
el sector
productivo."
Revista Industria
89,
2: 51.
(1986c)
"Derecho de
propiedad,
reforzamiento de la
empresa
privada y
economia libre." Revista Industria
89,
2: 61-62.
(1986d)
"Exposici6n
del
presidente
de la Sociedad de
Fomento Fabril en la 102 asamblea de socios." Revista Industria
89,
3: 117-122.
(1986e)
"Mensaje
del
presidente
de SFF Ernesto
Ayala:
Analisis econ6mico
y
social." Revista Industria
89,
5: 207-212.
(1985/86)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
STALLINGS,
B. and R. KAUFMAN
(eds.) (1989)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
STEPAN,
A.
(1988)
Rethinking Military
Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone.
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
THAYER,
L.
(1985)
Relaciones del
trabajo
en una institucionalidad
democratica: un
enfoque juridico," pp.
192-209
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
TIRONI,
E.
(1989)
Es
posible
reducir la
pobreza
en Chile.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Zig-Zag.
(1991)
"Capitalist
Policymaking
in
Authoritarian
Chile,
1973-1988."
Ph.D.
of California-San
Diego.
SKOCPOL,
T.
(1979)
Comparative
Analysis
of
France, Russia,
and China.
Cambridge,
UK:
Cambridge
University
Press.
SMITH,
W.
(1989)
Argentine
Political
Economy. Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press.
(SFF) (1988)
"Los industriales
y
la
politica."
91,
4: 6-8.
(1986/87)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
(1986a)
"Acciones
prioritarias
1986."
Revista Industria
89,
1:
11.
(1986b)
"Editorial: los
el sector
productivo."
Revista Industria
89,
2: 51.
(1986c)
"Derecho de
propiedad,
reforzamiento de la
empresa
privada y
89,
2: 61-62.
(1986d)
"Exposici6n
del
presidente
de la Sociedad de
89,
3: 117-122.
(1986e)
"Mensaje
del
presidente
de SFF Ernesto
Ayala:
Analisis econ6mico
y
89,
5: 207-212.
(1985/86)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
STALLINGS,
B. and R. KAUFMAN
(eds.) (1989)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
STEPAN,
A.
(1988)
Rethinking Military
Southern Cone.
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
THAYER,
L.
(1985)
Relaciones del
trabajo
democratica: un
192-209
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
TIRONI,
E.
(1989)
Es
posible
reducir la
pobreza
en Chile.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Zig-Zag.
(1991)
"Capitalist
Policymaking
in
Authoritarian
Chile,
1973-1988."
Ph.D.
of California-San
Diego.
SKOCPOL,
T.
(1979)
Comparative
Analysis
of
France, Russia,
and China.
Cambridge,
UK:
Cambridge
University
Press.
SMITH,
W.
(1989)
Argentine
Political
Economy. Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press.
(SFF) (1988)
"Los industriales
y
la
politica."
91,
4: 6-8.
(1986/87)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
(1986a)
"Acciones
prioritarias
1986."
Revista Industria
89,
1:
11.
(1986b)
"Editorial: los
el sector
productivo."
Revista Industria
89,
2: 51.
(1986c)
"Derecho de
propiedad,
reforzamiento de la
empresa
privada y
89,
2: 61-62.
(1986d)
"Exposici6n
del
presidente
de la Sociedad de
89,
3: 117-122.
(1986e)
"Mensaje
del
presidente
de SFF Ernesto
Ayala:
Analisis econ6mico
y
89,
5: 207-212.
(1985/86)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
STALLINGS,
B. and R. KAUFMAN
(eds.) (1989)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
STEPAN,
A.
(1988)
Rethinking Military
Southern Cone.
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
THAYER,
L.
(1985)
Relaciones del
trabajo
democratica: un
192-209
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
TIRONI,
E.
(1989)
Es
posible
reducir la
pobreza
en Chile.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Zig-Zag.
(1991)
"Capitalist
Policymaking
in
Authoritarian
Chile,
1973-1988."
Ph.D.
of California-San
Diego.
SKOCPOL,
T.
(1979)
Comparative
Analysis
of
France, Russia,
and China.
Cambridge,
UK:
Cambridge
University
Press.
SMITH,
W.
(1989)
Argentine
Political
Economy. Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press.
(SFF) (1988)
"Los industriales
y
la
politica."
91,
4: 6-8.
(1986/87)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
(1986a)
"Acciones
prioritarias
1986."
Revista Industria
89,
1:
11.
(1986b)
"Editorial: los
el sector
productivo."
Revista Industria
89,
2: 51.
(1986c)
"Derecho de
propiedad,
reforzamiento de la
empresa
privada y
89,
2: 61-62.
(1986d)
"Exposici6n
del
presidente
de la Sociedad de
89,
3: 117-122.
(1986e)
"Mensaje
del
presidente
de SFF Ernesto
Ayala:
Analisis econ6mico
y
89,
5: 207-212.
(1985/86)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
STALLINGS,
B. and R. KAUFMAN
(eds.) (1989)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
STEPAN,
A.
(1988)
Rethinking Military
Southern Cone.
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
THAYER,
L.
(1985)
Relaciones del
trabajo
democratica: un
192-209
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
TIRONI,
E.
(1989)
Es
posible
reducir la
pobreza
en Chile.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Zig-Zag.
(1991)
"Capitalist
Policymaking
in
Authoritarian
Chile,
1973-1988."
Ph.D.
of California-San
Diego.
SKOCPOL,
T.
(1979)
Comparative
Analysis
of
France, Russia,
and China.
Cambridge,
UK:
Cambridge
University
Press.
SMITH,
W.
(1989)
Argentine
Political
Economy. Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press.
(SFF) (1988)
"Los industriales
y
la
politica."
91,
4: 6-8.
(1986/87)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
(1986a)
"Acciones
prioritarias
1986."
Revista Industria
89,
1:
11.
(1986b)
"Editorial: los
el sector
productivo."
Revista Industria
89,
2: 51.
(1986c)
"Derecho de
propiedad,
reforzamiento de la
empresa
privada y
89,
2: 61-62.
(1986d)
"Exposici6n
del
presidente
de la Sociedad de
89,
3: 117-122.
(1986e)
"Mensaje
del
presidente
de SFF Ernesto
Ayala:
Analisis econ6mico
y
89,
5: 207-212.
(1985/86)
"Carta del
presidente."
SFF Memoria.
Santiago,
Chile: SFF.
STALLINGS,
B. and R. KAUFMAN
(eds.) (1989)
Debt and
Democracy
in Latin America.
Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
STEPAN,
A.
(1988)
Rethinking Military
Southern Cone.
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton
University
Press.
THAYER,
L.
(1985)
Relaciones del
trabajo
democratica: un
192-209
in CED
(ed.)
Concertaci6n social
y
democracia.
Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
TIRONI,
E.
(1989)
Es
posible
reducir la
pobreza
en Chile.
Santiago,
Chile: Editorial
Zig-Zag.
(1987)
"Democracia
y mejoramiento
de remuneraciones"
(Materiales
para
Discusion
178, July). Santiago,
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
URENDA,
B.
(1989)
Author interview with Beltrian
Urenda,
Chairman
(at
time of
interview)
of the Economic and Social
Council,
31
May, Santiago
de Chile.
VALDES,
J.
G.
(1989)
La escuela de
Chicago: Operaci6n
Chile. Buenos
Aires, Argentina:
Editorial Zeta.
WARD,
L.
(1988)
Author interview with Lee
Ward,
Director of the
National Commission for
Foreign
Trade
(Ministry
of the
Economy),
13
December, Santiago
de Chile.
(1987)
"Democracia
y mejoramiento
de remuneraciones"
(Materiales
para
Discusion
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
URENDA,
B.
(1989)
Urenda,
Chairman
(at
time of
interview)
Council,
31
May, Santiago
de Chile.
VALDES,
J.
G.
(1989)
La escuela de
Chicago: Operaci6n
Chile. Buenos
Aires, Argentina:
Editorial Zeta.
WARD,
L.
(1988)
Ward,
Director of the
Foreign
Trade
(Ministry
of the
Economy),
13
December, Santiago
de Chile.
(1987)
"Democracia
y mejoramiento
de remuneraciones"
(Materiales
para
Discusion
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
URENDA,
B.
(1989)
Urenda,
Chairman
(at
time of
interview)
Council,
31
May, Santiago
de Chile.
VALDES,
J.
G.
(1989)
La escuela de
Chicago: Operaci6n
Chile. Buenos
Aires, Argentina:
Editorial Zeta.
WARD,
L.
(1988)
Ward,
Director of the
Foreign
Trade
(Ministry
of the
Economy),
13
December, Santiago
de Chile.
(1987)
"Democracia
y mejoramiento
de remuneraciones"
(Materiales
para
Discusion
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
URENDA,
B.
(1989)
Urenda,
Chairman
(at
time of
interview)
Council,
31
May, Santiago
de Chile.
VALDES,
J.
G.
(1989)
La escuela de
Chicago: Operaci6n
Chile. Buenos
Aires, Argentina:
Editorial Zeta.
WARD,
L.
(1988)
Ward,
Director of the
Foreign
Trade
(Ministry
of the
Economy),
13
December, Santiago
de Chile.
(1987)
"Democracia
y mejoramiento
de remuneraciones"
(Materiales
para
Discusion
Chile: Centro de
(CED).
URENDA,
B.
(1989)
Urenda,
Chairman
(at
time of
interview)
Council,
31
May, Santiago
de Chile.
VALDES,
J.
G.
(1989)
La escuela de
Chicago: Operaci6n
Chile. Buenos
Aires, Argentina:
Editorial Zeta.
WARD,
L.
(1988)
Ward,
Director of the
Foreign
Trade
(Ministry
of the
Economy),
13
December, Santiago
de Chile.

Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile

Author(s): Eduardo Silva

You might also like