BPI VS.

HONG

foreclosure of mortgage and all incidents relative thereto including its

validity or invalidity is within the jurisdiction of the RTC and is not
among those cases over which the SEC exercises exclusive and
Facts: Eyco filed a petition for suspending its payment and
original jurisdiction under Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A.
rehabilitation before the SEC. But the SEC disapproves the petition
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC.,
and order its liquidation of their corporation. EYCO raised the
Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent
decision to the CA but CA upheld the decision made by SEC.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in
on November, BPI filed to the RTC Valenzuela a petition for extrathe complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ECO P B
S
ultimate
facts constituted in the plaintiff's cause of action. Objections
Mahogany. Then it was subsequently scheduled on December 19,
to venue in civil actions arising from libel maybe waived since they do
2000. Eduardo Hong, Claiming that the judicial foreclosure filed bynot involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
BPI was illegal, he filed an action for injunction and damages against
procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not
BPI at the same court. He alleged the following: (MACOL di ma-view
jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that
tong portion na to. Hihihi)
venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
After the hearing the trial court issues a TRO. Petitioner filed a
FACTS L T filed a complaint for damages
(moral and
motion to dismiss arguing that by plaintiff own allegation in the exemplary) for alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against
complaint, jurisdiction over the reliefs prayed for belong to the SEC.
him in 2 articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Petitioners Inquirer
And that the plaintiff is actually resorting to a forum shopping since
and reporter Nocum , and ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective
he filed a claim to the sec and the designated liquidator in the joint answers alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action.
liquidation of the EYCO GROUP. The respondent said that the RTC
has and Capt. Umali also alleged that the venue was improperly
ALPAP
jurisdiction on the issue of propriety and validity of the foreclosure
laid. The complaint failed to state the residence of complainant Lucio
by petitioner in accordance with Sec. 1 Rule 4. The suit being
Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
in nature of a real action.
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
ISSUE: WON the case for foreclosure is within the jurisdiction
RTC of
the
M C
RTC.
ground of improper venue
T seeking reconsideration and
HELD: It held that questions relating to the validity or legality L
of
admission of the amended complaint now alleging that "This article
the foreclosure proceedings, including an action to enjoin the same,
was printed and first published in the City of Makati" and that " This
must necessarily be cognizable by the RTC, notwithstanding that the
SEC likewise possesses the power to issue injunction in all cases incaricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati."
which it has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 6 (a) of Presidential RTC dismissal stating that the
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. Further, the CA stated that an action for defect in the original complaint has already been cured in the

Amended complaint which can still be properly admitted pursuant

fixed
to by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue maybe
Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro since the Order of Dismissal was
conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
not yet final. Also, the amendment was merely formal.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended
t or certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI,
Complaint
one
that the article and the caricature were printed and first
by ALPAP and Umali) but CA dismissed the petition. The motions
published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue
for reconsideration were likewise denied. Thus, the appeal at the SC.
and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither
After the filing of comment by Tan and the reply filed by PDI andconfer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent's failure to
Nocum, SC resolved to give due course to the petition.
include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of
its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent's failure to allege these
C PDI N A 360 of RPC vests jurisdictionallegations
over
gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party,
all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1)to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly
where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2)laid.
where the complainant, if private person, resides; or (3) where the
complaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus, since the original
In Laquian v. Baltazar , this Court construed the term 'jurisdiction in
complaint stated only the business address of Lucio Tan and notRPC
his 360 as referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed
actual residence or the place of printing and first publication, the
or venue. The rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:1. Whether the
original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.
offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
iSSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basiscity
of where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the
the original complaint?
offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually
HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on
resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended
the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes
commission
of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First
of action. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding
filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent's causeInstance
of
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of whichoffice
is outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance
vested with the RTC. RPC 360 provides that it is a Court of
First of the province or city where he held office at the time of
the commission of the offense.
Instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled: We note that
VENUE vs JURISDICTION: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
the
determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard
or amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not
tried; (b)Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where originally it
had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the
for
the action. It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to
court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue

were properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that
jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is
would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil
a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
cases, venue may be waived. Consequently, by dismissing the case on
CHAVES v CA
the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over
the case. Apparently, the hereinpetitioners recognized this
FACTS:
jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit,
An Information for Libel dated 26 June 1995 was filed before the
questioning the propriety of venue, instead of a motion to dismiss.
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against private respondents
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower courtRegional
was
Rafael Baskinas and Ricardo Manapat, with petitioner Francisco
proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed
to as the complainant.
Chavez
allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where
On March 1995, in the City of Manila, the said accused [Baskinas and
the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless,
conspiring and confederating with others with intent of
before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amendedManapat]
as
impeaching
reputation of Francisco Chavez, former Solicitor General
in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a
of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and
quo's jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the
exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt cause to be
court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.
S F irculation in Manila,

and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and AuthorCIVIL vs CRIMINAL-- It is elementary that objections to venue in civil
Reporter.
actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural ratherPrivate respondents moved to quash the Information, as well as the
than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court corresponding warrants of arrest subsequently issued. However,
these motions were denied by the RTC of Manila, Branch 16, in an
over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial
Order dated 31 August 1995. Private respondents then filed a
and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter.
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the31
It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which
an 1995 Order. The petition was granted in a Decision dated 21
August
action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction December
of
1995, hence the present petition.
the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather
Referring to the fact that the Information against private
than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
respondents states that the libelous matter was to be
In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is
published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in M
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
the Court of Appeals deemed the casesof Agbayani v.Sayo
and Soriano v. IAC as controlling. Based on the doctrines pronounced
Petitioners' argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over cases, the appellate court held that the Information failed to
in said
the case because respondent failed to allege the place whereallege
the where the writtendefamation was and first
libelous articles were printed and first published would have been
an allegation sine qua non the circumstances as to
where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of
tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the
the
venue of the It was observed that of libel
original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because
cases
this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorialwhere the complainant is a private person is either in any of
only two places, namely: (1) where the subject article was printed

and first published; and (2) where complainant of the

commission
S F M The
actually resides at the time of the commission of the
fact The
that the present Information further alleges that Smart File was
Information, it was noted, did not indicate that the
libelous
articles
M
were printed or first published in Manila, or that petitioner resided
magazine wasprinted and first published in Manila.If this
in Manila at the time of the publication of the articles.
disquisition impressesan unduly formalistic reading of the
Information
at hand, it should be reiterated that the flaws in the
The Court of Appeals further observed that even during the
preliminary investigation, private respondents had already
Information strike at the very heart of the jurisdiction of the Manila
interposed that Smart File was actually printed and first published
in It is settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
RTC.
the City of Makati, and that the address of the publisher Animal determined
Farms
by the allegations of the complaint or information, and
Publication as indicated in the editorial page of the publication itself
the
offense
must have been committed or any one of its essential
was a post office box with the Makati Central Post Office. Even as this
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
observation was disputed by petitioner, who insisted the place of
court.
private printing and publishing business was actually
in Article 360 states, in as unequivocal a manner as possible, that
Manila, the Court of Appeals noted that he should have been alerted
the criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed with the court of
enough by private respondents' adverse insistence and that
due
a

investigation would have inevitably revealed that private
published, or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
respondents had transferred from their previous Manila address to
I I
Makati by the time the subject articles were published.
does not establish with particularity any of these two venue
petitioner attacksthe reliance placed on Agbayani and Soriano,
requirements, the trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the
primarily by pointing out that in both cases, the complainants were
criminal case.
public officers, and not private officials. Petitioner submits that the
1965 amendments to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
imposed the present venue requisites were introduced in order to
Jurisdiction over the parties
preclude the harassment of members of the press through libel suits
filed in remote and distant places by public officers. Petitioner also
assails the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the place of 1. How jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired
printing and first publication of Smart File was in Makati, saying that
Agravante v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-48324, March 14, 1990
this was derived out of hearsay evidence.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
In 1969, Juana Patriarca Pea filed with the Court of First Instance of
WON the subject information sufficiently
vest jurisdiction in
Sur an action to quiet title with damages against Jose
the Manila trial courts to hear the libel charge, in consonance Camarines
with
Agravante
and
Juan Agravante. Answer was in due course filed by the
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
defendants.
HELD:
The case was set for pre-trial but before it could be held, a fire broke
Jurisprudence applying the provision has established that it does not.
out on June 26, 1976 in the capitol building of Camarines Sur. The
what the Information at bar categorically states is that the libelous
records of the court were burned, including that of Case No. R-182.

The record of said case was reconstituted and the case was once
Pea-Ordoez, heirs of the late Juana Patriarca-Pea the original
more scheduled for pre-trial on January 25, 1978. The defendants'
plaintiff in this case, . . . (are) hereby ordered substituted in lieu of the
counsel moved for cancellation of this setting. The Court reset
deceased
the
party plaintiff.
pre-trial to February 27, 1978. But again, the defendants' attorney,
The defendants moved for reconsideration of these three (3) orders,
pleading illness, sought to have this second pre-trial setting cancelled
by motion which although dated February 14, 1978, was filed onlydated
on February 22 and 27, and March 4, 1978. The Judge denied the
motion
February 22, 1978. The motion contained no notice of hearing,
but for lack of merit on April 11, 1978 as well as a second,
presented by the defendants.
there was a photocopy of a medical certificate dated January 30, 1978
attached to it, attesting to the attorney's indisposition ("headache")
Hence, this petition for certiorari in which it is essentially contended
and advising rest for him. This motion was denied by the Presiding
that the defendants had been denied their day in court. While
Judge who promulgated the following Order on February 22, concedingthat their counsel'smotion for postponement
was
1978, notice of which was served on defendants' counsel on February
defective in that it had not been set for hearing, the defendants
24, 1978:
nonetheless contend that that flaw was but a formal one, caused by
its having been hastily drawn up when counsel was suffering from
The motion dated February 14, 1978 filed by Atty. Gil P. Pacamarra,
for the defendants, being not in accordance with the rules of lackpain
of (headache). They also theorize that the pre-trial setting was void
since notice thereof had not been given to the defendants personally,
notice to the adverse party, for lack of setting of the date of hearing,
only
their counsel having been notified; that when the Trial Court
and for the reason that the medical certificate attached thereto is only
authorized
the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte, she had already
a xerox copy of an alleged medical certificate dated since January
20,
been dead for some time and therefore the court failed to acquire
1978, indicating that if rest is what is only needed by Atty. Pacamarra,
jurisdiction
of her person; and that they had no opportunity to object
from that date to the date of the next hearing of the case, he
has
to
the
motion
for plaintiff's substitution by her heirs.
sufficient period to rest, and therefore, the motion is not meritorious,
the same is hereby denied.
ISSUE:
At the scheduled pre-trial on February 27, 1978 neither the WON the court acquired jurisdiction over Patriarca.
defendants nor their counsel appeared. The Court consequently
declared the defendants in default and authorized the plaintiffHELD:
to
"present . . . (her) evidence ex parte at any time before this Court."
Defendants' contention is completely without merit that the demise
On March 4, 1978, Juana Patriarca Pea having died, her heirs
of the plaintiff, Juana Patriarca, long before the pre-trial setting
presented a motion advising of her demise and praying that they
be
prevented
the Trial Court's acquisition of jurisdiction over her. It is
6 This was granted by Order of
substituted in her stead in the action.
axiomatic that jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff is acquired by
7
March 7, 1978:
the court by the filing of the complaint. The subsequent death of the
plaintiff in a real action like the one at bar, does not affect the Court's
For lack of objection to the motion of the plaintiff dated March
4,
jurisdiction,
all that is entailed in this eventuality beingthe
1978 (the same) is hereby granted and Deogracias Pea and Rosita
substitution of the heirs for the deceased in accordance with the

procedure set out in Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. resident
That
Defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard,
substitution is precisely what was done by the Court a quo.
pursuant to the Order of the trial court.
Non-resident Defendant Engelhard filed his Answer to the Amended
Complaint, while Petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins, through counsel,
Perkins v Dizon

G.R. No. 46631 (November 16, 1939)

MORAN, J.:
the lo P M
Demurrer having been overruled as well as her Motion for
FACTS:
Reconsideration of the Order of Denial, she now brought the present
Petition for Certiorari, praying that the Summons by Publication
Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins instituted an action in the CFI of
issued
against her be declared null and void, and that, with respect to
Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for
dividends on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of her, Respondent Judge be permanently prohibited from taking any
action
which was being withheld by the company; and, for the recognition
of on the case.
his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of
all others.
ISSUE:
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, in its Answer to the
Complaint averred that in connection with the shares of stock in
question, conflicting claims were being made upon it by said
Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, his wife Idonah Slade Perkins, Whether or not the CFI of Manila has acquired jurisdiction over the
and one named George H. Engelhard, and prayed that these last two
person of the Petitioner as a non-resident Defendant, or,
be made parties to the action and served with Summons by
notwithstanding the want of such jurisdiction, whether or not said
Publication, so that the three Claimants may litigate their conflicting
court may validly try the case?
claims and settle their rights among themselves. The court has NOT
issued an Order compelling the Conflicting Claimants to interpleadARGUMENTS:
with one another and litigate their several claims among themselves,
Petitioner contends that the proceeding instituted against her is one
but instead ordered Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins to amendofhis
interpleading and is therefore an action in personam. She contends
Complaint including the other two Claimants as Parties-Defendant.
that the lower court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person not
The Complaint was accordingly amended and in addition to the relief
only because she is a non-resident, but also because the court had no
prayed for in the Original Complaint, Respondent Eugene Arthur jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action.
Perkins prayed that Petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and George
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in
question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Thereafter, Summons by Publication were served upon the non-

RULING:

Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff [1878], may

be found in a recognized principl
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property
without its territory (Story, Confl. L., ch. 2; Wheat, Int. L., pt.
Yes. Here, the service of the Summons by Publication was ordered
by
2, ch. 2). The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the
the lower court by virtue of an action quasi in rem against the nonindependence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others.
resident Defendant. The action being quasi in rem, the CFI of Manila
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the
has jurisdiction over the person of the Petitioner.
laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, EXCEPT
so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it
can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either
Petition is DENIED with costs against the Petitioner.
A
S
binding such S C
L wu{# P N szyz {w US ysv tv L wxw
RATIO DECIDENDI:
568-569).
The general rule is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be
entertained by a Philippine court. Where, however, the action is inWhen, however, the action relates to property located in the
Philippines, the Philippine courts may validly try the case, upon the
rem or quasi in rem in connection with property located in the

Philippines, the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, and

its S
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident is non-essential. Insituated within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of
the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this
order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not
jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State
necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property,
where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its
potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody
citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate
when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court
just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property
I action and
in rem
by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is
or quasi in rem against a non-resident defendant, jurisdiction overowned
his
S person is non-essential, and if the law requires in such case that the
resident
situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into
summons upon the defendant be served by publication, it is merely
to
the non- e inquiry can
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition
of the property. If the non-resident has no property in the State, there
P N
The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire
[1878])
jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident, as laid down by the

P U S B
course, the action being quasi in rem and notice having be made by
In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought
publication, the relief that may be granted by the Philippine court
by Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins in his Amended Complaint must be confined to the res, it having no jurisdiction to render a
against Petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins seeks to exclude her from personal
any
judgment against the non-resident. In the Amended
interest in a property located in the Philippines. That property
Complaint filed by Respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, no money
consists in certain shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated judgment or other relief in personam is prayed for against the
Mining Company, a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines
Petitioner. The only relief sought therein is that she be declared to be
under the provisions of the Spanish Code of Commerce, with its without any interest in the shares in controversy and that she be
principal office in the City of Manila and which conducts its miningexcluded from any claim thereto.
activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where
the corporation is created, whether the certificated evidencing the
EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO VS. PALANCA, G.R. NO. L-11390,
ownership of those shares are within or without that jurisdiction. MARCH 26, 1918
(Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent ed. Vol. 11, p. 95).
Doctrines:
Under these circumstances, SC holds that the action thus brought is
isJURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property
quasi in rem, for while the judgement that may be rendered therein
which
is the subject of the litigation may result either from


property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from
wr CJ wru A S C
the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff [1878]:
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective.
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not
directly against property, and has for its object the disposition of the strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature
property, without reference to the title of individual claimants; but, in and is substantially such.
a large and more general sense, the terms are applied to actions
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is
between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of
always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or
property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to
be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.

The action being in quasi in rem, the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction FACTS:
over the person of the Petitioner. In order to satisfy the constitutional
Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various
requirement of due process, Summons has been served upon her Engracio
by
parcels
of
real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
publication. There is no question as to the adequacy of publication
Afterwards,
Engracio returned to China and there he died on January
made nor as to the mailing of the Order of Publication to the

29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor (3)That the court at a proper stage of the proceedings
then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale
resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of
for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt.
Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
since
A CAnd
I
jurisdiction is exlusively over property, the relief granted
by
the
court must be limited only to that which can been forced
shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
against the property itself.
Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila,
the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
Therefore, whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public
of the Clerk of the Court to mail the proper papers to the defendant in
auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7,
Amoy, China, such irregularity could impair or defeat the jurisdiction
1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven
of the court
years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by
Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
DISCUSSIONS
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order
OnofJurisdiction
default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the
court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendantT
or over
the

subject of the action.
senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind
ISSUES:
of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or
(2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the

Whether or not due process of law was observed

nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain and the relief it may grant.

RULING:
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Yes. Tanquinyeng is a non-resident and having refused to appear in
court voluntarily, the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. This
is, however, not essential since the foreclosure of mortgage is an Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance
of a party
in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired
action quasi in
by
the
coercive
power of legal process exerted over the person.
over the res.
Jurisdiction over the property is based on the following:

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation

may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
(1)That the property is located within the district;
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
(2)That the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and
recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though

at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be OFFICE OF THE COURTADMINISTRATOR V. JUDGE MATAS AND
taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction EDUARDO TORRES
acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where
the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some
FACTS:
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of
the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction Judge Jesus Matas and Eduardo Torres, the OIC Clerk of Court, were
over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of landaccused of violating RA 3019 which caused then Deputy Court
under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without
Administrator Ernani Cruz Pano to recommend that the Office of the
taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
Court Administrator (OCA) to file administrative charges against the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a
jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in two but said charges will be suspended pending the out come of
thecriminal case. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas and Torres,
favor of the petitioner against all the world.
in connivance with one George Mercado, concealed from J.K. Mercado
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose
and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his knowledge of the petition for
a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is issuance of new owners duplicate copies as well as taking
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action cognizance
in
of the case which was allegedly outside of the jurisdiction
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
of his court, the land being in Kapalong, Davao. Notwithstanding that
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
the land in question was owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons, Judge
with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
Matas still ordered the posing of the order and ultimately issued
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasiinstructed the Register of Deeds for the issuance a new
rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that inowners
the
duplicate to George Mercado. Justice Imperial was tasked
former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the
with the investigations. Hearing with the OCA commence but after
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
presenting two witnesses, it moved for suspension of the proceedings
burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object
to amend the complaint adding the grounds of gross inexcusable
the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
and gross ignorance of the law as well as modifying other
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, arenegligence
in a
portions
of
the complaint. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas
general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
and Torres acted with bad faith and partiality in ruling in favour of
xxx
George Mercado.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant forISSUE
whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a
personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not1. Whether or not Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking
affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear thecognizance of the case?
action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with
reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

2. Whether or not Judge Matas acted with gross inexcusable

asked them to vacate the premises, orally at first in the early part of
negligence and gross ignorance ofthe law in ruling in favor of George
1965, then in writing in April and May of the same year. The spouse
Mercado?
Santos refused to leave. Herein respondent judge found that their
spouses Santos had been unlawfully withholding possession for more
HELD
than one year prior to the filing of the complaint, and ruled that the
proper
action for recovery of possession was accion publiciana, not
1.NO. The subject parcel of land was well within the jurisdiction
unlawful
detainer. The judge, accordingly, declared the city court
ofthe court of Judge Matas. The so-called municipality of Sto Tomas
in
Davao never legally existed because it was created only by then without jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case and nullified the
proceedings therein, including the writ of execution.
President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress. The land was actually
part of Kapalong which is within the coverage of Branch 1 of the RTC
Petitioner herein attempted to appeal from this judgment. However,
of Davao del Norte where Judge Matas sits. It was a mere impropriety
on January 11, 1967, this Court dismissed his appeal for failure to pay
of venue which may be waived by the parties.
the docket fee on time. However, on October 1, 1966, before the case
on the merits could be decided, counsel for private respondents
2.NO. There was no gross inexcusable negligence and gross
ignorance of the law given that Judge Matas actually ordered the brought to the attention of this Court the fact that on September 20,
1966, the parties herein amicably settled their differences.
required posting to give notice. Also, he only ordered the RD to issue
a duplicate of copy existing in record of the Registry and not issueIssue:
new ones in the name of George Mercado.
Whether or not respondent judge of first instance erred in holding
that the city court had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
Fernando vs. Vasquez

Ruling:

Facts:

Yes. It was simply an error of judgment in his appreciation of the facts

and the law. Petitioner does not convince us that when the judge so
This case had its beginning prior to October 1961, when certain
decided,
lessees of market stalls erected on the premises denominated as he acted in grave abuse of discretion and/or exceeded or
acted without jurisdiction. The judge concededly had the jurisdiction
Folgueras Remnants Center located at Nos. 922-926 Folgueras Street,
tothe
render the judgment under review. If ever he committed a mistake
Tondo, Manila, found themselves in a quandary as to who was
on
the
merits of the case, it was in the exercise of such jurisdiction.
lawful owner thereof and entitled to receive their rental payments.
Because of this, they commenced suit for interpleader in the CourtThe
of error being one of judgment, not of jurisdiction, petitioner's
First Instance of Manila against petitioner Valentin A. Fernandoremedy
and is appeal, not certiorari. And, the petition for certiorari fails
of
its purpose.
his children Pelagia Fernando Santos, respondent, and Urbana
Fernando Cruz. Respondents Pelagia Fernando Santos and herThat amicable settlement was submitted to and acted upon by the
husband Pablo G. Santos had all the while been occupying the Court
secondof Appeals in a case between the same parties herein at the
floor of the building standing on the property involved. Petitioner
time pending in said court. It stipulated that respondents would leave

the premises (they have already in fact left), and that petitioner
municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.- On December 28,
agreed to retain the tenants on the property. Such amicable 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines,
promulgated Executive Order No. 368,which approved the
settlement, in the nature of a judicial compromise, has the effect and
recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted
authority of res judicata.
the barrios and sitios which shall compose the municipalities of
Bontoc
So it is, that either on the merits or because this case has becomeand Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek
as the boundary line separating Bontoc and Sogod.- However the
moot and academic, the result is the same the petition must fail.
President of the Philippines sent a telegram to the
Provincial Board of Southern Leyte suspending
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs.ROSALMEDIALDEA; September
theimplementation of EO 368.- The Provincial Board of Southern
24, 1991NATURE
Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation of
Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee to
FACTS
- On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating
the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the municipality of
Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of
the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion,Pacu, Beniton, Catmon,
Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios.- A
boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of
Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the
former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios abovementioned but also over other ten(10) barrios allegedly belonging to
Sogod.- The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617
directing the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether the people
in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod
or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted on August 1, 1952, and
the results thereof show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod
than those in favor of Bontoc.- On April 4, 1959, the Provincial
Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to
the President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of
the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to
include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the
following barrios claimed by Sogod which are in the heart of
Bontoc but not included in said
law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan,
Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board
also recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the municipality
of Sogod the following barrioswhich are very near Sogod and are
claimed by the latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc,
namely: Laogawan,Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi he board further
recommended that the boundary line between the two

conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios

affected by Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the boundary
dispute.- The municipality of Sogod filed two civil cases:1. Certiorari
and prohibition to enjoin the provincial board and provincial
governor from taking cognizance of the
long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities and t
o enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercisingterritorial
jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to the municipality
of Sogod.2. For recovery of taxes with receivership against the
municipality of Bontoc alleging that the municipality of Bontoc,
without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the
barrios enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also over ten (10)
barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod.
The complaint prayed that the municipality of Bontoc be
ordered to pay Sogod one half of the total amount of taxes collected
by the former from the inhabitants of theaforesaid barrios during the
period from 1950 to 1959.- The trial court issued an order dismissing
the two civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case.MR denied.
ISSUE
WON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack
of jurisdiction.
HELD
NO. The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between mu
nicipalities on the provincial board pursuant toSection 2167 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which reads:SEC. 2167.
Municipal boundary disputes
.?

How settled ?
be decided by the administrative department, involving as it does, the
Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over placesadoption
or
of meansand ways to carry into effect the laws creating said
municipalities.
barrios shall be decided by the province boards of the
DISPOSITION
provinces in which such municipalities are situated, after an
The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the respondent
investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly
judge are AFFIRMED.
heard. From the decision of the provincial board appealmay be taken
by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior (nowGMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN, et al.
the Office of the Executive Secretary),whose decision shall be final.
G.R. No. 160703
Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities
September 23, 2005
situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces
concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event
Facts:
of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of
Interior (Executive Secretary), whose decision shall befinal.
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA') filed on May 6, 2003 before the
(Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil. 394).
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against
respondents ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN'), Central
Reasoning
It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority toCATV, Inc. (SkyCable'), Philippine Home Cable Holdings, Inc. (Home
Cable') and Pilipino Cable Corporation (Sun Cable').
hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongs to the
provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions
of the boards are then appealable to the ExecutiveSecretary.
In its complaint, GMA alleged that respondents engaged in unfair
Records in the instant case show that when petitioner municipalitycompetition when the cable companies arbitrarily re-channeled
filed the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial petitioner's cable television broadcast on February 1, 2003, in order
board of Southern Leyte had not yet conducted a plebiscite as
to arrest and destroy its upswing performance in the television
ordered by the Executive Departmentin 1960 or rendered any order
industry.
settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the
matter of delay to the then Secretary of Interior (now Executive
GMA argued that respondents were able to perpetrate such unfair
Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although
existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power
business practice through a common ownership and interlocking
to determine or even alter municipal boundaries, the
businesses. SkyCable and Sun Cable are wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that matter, Sky Vision Corporation (Sky Vision') which is allegedly controlled by
was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps
Lopez, Inc. On the other hand, Home Cable is a wholly-owned
for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute. In
subsidiary of Unilink Communications Corporation (Unilink'), which
Pelaez v. Auditor General,
by Mediaquest Holdings, Inc., a company controlled by the
No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA5 6 9 , w h i c h a p p l is
i eowned
d
R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 2 3 7 0 , k n o w n as t h e B a r r i o C h a Pension
r t e r , Trust Fund of the PLDT Employees (PLDT Group').
We h e l d t h a t t h e p o w e r to f i x
c o m m o n boundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdicti
Pursuant to a Master Consolidation Agreement, the ownership, rights
on between adjoining
and interests in Sky Vision and Unilink were purportedly placed
municipalities may also partake of anadministrative nature that can

under a holding company known as 'Beyond Cable', 66.5 % of which

abuse of discretion, are well nigh indispensable. Between the power
is owned by the Benpres Group, composed of Lopez Inc., Benpres lodged in an administrative body and a court, therefore, the
Holdings and ABS-CBN, while 33.5% thereof is owned by the PLDTunmistakable trend is to refer it to the former.
Group. As a result of this business combination, respondents have
cornered at least 71% of the total cable television market in MegaIn this regard, we note that there is a pending case before the NTC in
Manila. They are thus able to dictate the signal transmission, channel
which the factual issues raised in petitioner's complaint have also
position, and the airing of shows, programs, and broadcast of non-been pleaded. Although petitioner prays in the NTC case for the
cable companies like ABS-CBN and GMA, which the law requires them
administrative remedy of cancellation of the cable companies'
to carry.
certificates of authority, licenses and permits, it is inevitable that, in
granting or denying this prayer, the NTC would have to pass upon the
GMA alleged that the re-channeling of its cable television broadcast
same factual issues posed in petitioner's complaint before the trial
resulted in damage to its business operations.
court. The latter was thus correct in applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction if only to avoid conflicting factual findings between the
Issues:
court and the NTC.
(a) Should the complaint be adjudicated under the jurisdiction of the
The regulation of ownership of television and cable television
trial court or the NTC?
companies is likewise within the exclusive concern of the NTC,
pursuant to its broader regulatory power of ensuring and promoting
(b) Is GMA entitled to an award of damages, it would have to initially
a 'larger and more effective use of communications, radio and
ascertain whether there was arbitrary re-channeling which distorted
television broadcasting facilities' in order that the public interest may
and downgraded GMA's signal?
well be served. The NTC is mandated to maintain effective
competition among private entities engaged in the operation of public
Held:
service communications. It is also the agency tasked to grant
certificates of authority to cable television operators, provided that
Jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission
the same 'does not infringe on the television and broadcast markets.
Consequently, while it is true that the regular courts are possessed
Ruling
of
on Damages
general jurisdiction over actions for damages, it would nonetheless
be proper for the courts to yield its jurisdiction in favor of an
Finally, the complaint failed to state a cause of action against ABSadministrative body when the determination of underlying factual CBN and the other respondents, considering that the ultimate facts
issues requires the special competence or knowledge of the latter.upon
In which the complaint for damages depends fall within the
this era of clogged court dockets, administrative boards or
technical competence of an administrative body. Otherwise stated,
commissions with special knowledge, experience and capability topending determination by the NTC of the factual questions involved
promptly hear and determine disputes on technical matters or
in the case, petitioner's complaint, which is founded upon such
intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave
factual issues, would be premature.

landholder and agricultural lessee. The Motion for Reconsideration,

praying that petitioner be allowed to exercise the right of redemption
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolution dated
was denied by respondent Court. With leave of Court, petitioner filed
October 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
a second Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
97, is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE(regarding Adherence of Jurisdiction): Whether or not the
denial of the petitioner to exercise the right of redemption is proper.
HELD(I took the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee):
BALTAZAR vs CA
The determination of these issues of fact and law will
(G.R. No. L-40191 May 27, 1981
ultimately
result in either the ejectment of the defendant-tenant and
ANGEL BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh
the
conversion,
by the plaintiff, of the landholding in question from
Division) and FLORA L. ESGUERRA, respondents.)
one devoted to agricultural purposes into one for residential
purposes;
or the defendant becoming the owner of the land by
ADHERENCE of JURISDICTION
redemption
or by repurchase.
> Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end
We
believe,
however, that these questions can no longer be
of
the
litigation
> Remains with the court until the case is finally terminated
> Exception to the rule: when a newly enacted statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court is given retroactive effect. It can divest a court
of jurisdiction over cases already pending before it which were filed
before the statute came to force or became effective.
FACTS:
This case involves a petition which seeks review of the Decision of CA
dismissing the ejectment suit against a tenant filed by a landowner
who wanted to convert her land into a residential subdivision, but
denying to the tenant the right of redemption, premised upon the
retroactive application of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316. The
subject matter of the case is a riceland located in San Miguel Bulacan.
Petitioner Baltazar was a tenant of said land which was owned by
private respondent Flora Esguerra. Esguerra wanted to convert the
land into residential land. Thus, she filed a case of Ejectment against
petitioner Baltazar before the Court of Agrarian Relations. By way of
counterclaim, petitioner tendered and deposited with the Court of
Agrarian Relations the sum of P5,000.00 to cover the purchase price
of P4,608.32, in the exercise of his right of redemption under ejection
of the Agrarian Code. After trial, the Court rendered its Decision,
upholding petitioner's right to exercise redemption. On appeal, CA
dismissed the suit for ejectment. The CA also ruled that the parties
should maintain the status quo, that is, the leasehold relationship as

resolved in accordance with the law then in force, and in accordance

with the evidence on record, in view of supervening Presidential
mandate as contained in Presidential Decrees, Instructions, and
Proclamations.
On October 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued in
his own handwriting Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known as
the Emancipation Decree, mandating "the emancipation of Tenant
from the bondage of the soil transferring to them the ownership of
the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanisms
therefore." On November 25, 1972, the President issued
Memorandum No. 123-72 enunciating the guideline that "no tenant
will be ejected or removed pending the promulgation of the Rules and
Regulations" for the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 27. ln
implementingthe "status quo" order of the President, the
Department, of Agrarian Reform issued onJune 19, 1973,
Memorandum Circular No. 2-A (Amended), Series of 1973, stating
that's as of October 21, 1972, tenant-farmers are deemed owners of
the land they till, subject to the provisions of the rules and regulations
to be hereafter promulgated. Meantime, the leasehold system shall be
provisionally maintained. The tenant- farmer shall continue to pay
the landowner the lease rentals for the time being, which subject to
the rules and regulations aforementioned may be later credited as
amortization payments. The memorandum clarified that "status quo

shall mean maintaining the leasehold arrangement existing as payment

of
of benefits.
October 21, 1972".
The Court of Appeals therefore properly rendered its
IBC alleged
judgment on dismissing the case of ejectment and denying
the that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
case,
that
the petitioner was a corporate officer who was duly
exercise of redemption.
elected by the Board of Directors of IBC; hence, the case

Ruling of CA:
qualifies as an intra-corporate dispute falling within the
The determination or whether or not a parcel of agricultural
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
land is suitable for residential purposes, while vested in the courts
under the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, had, by this
Petitioner
argues that he is not a corporate officer of the IBC but
statement of policy, been removed from the courts. Whether or not
the
land is suitable for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,an
can
employee thereof since he had not been elected nor
be determined only by a national development authority created, appointed
by His
as Comptroller and Assistant Manager by the IBC's
Excellency. We do not now have that authority. Consequently, We are
Board of Directors. He pointed out that he had actually been
not now in a position to determine whether or not the defendant may
appointed on January 11, 1995 by the IBC's General Manager,
exercise the right of redemption, as We do not now have the jurisdiction
to determine the suitability or non-suitability of the land now inCeferino Basilio.
question, for residential purposes.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED, but
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to exercise the right of
redemption, should the National Development Authority, to be created
by His Excellency, find that the land, now in question, is not suitable for
residential, commercial, industrial, or non- agricultural purposes.

DILY DANY NACPIL vs. INTERNATIONAL

BROADCASTING CORPORATION G.R. No.
144767. March 21, 2002
Prepared by: Arnel D. Mateo
Facts:
Petitioner was the Assistant General Manager for
Finance/Administration and Comptroller of private respondent
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) from 1996 until
April 1997. Upon assumption of Emiliano Templo as the IBC
President, petitioner was forced to retire. Templo refused to pay
him his retirement benefits. Hence, in 1997, petitioner filed with
the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-

Issue:Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the

case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits filed by
petitioner.
Ruling:Dismissal or non-appointment of a corporate officer is
clearly an intra-corporate matter and jurisdiction over the case
properly belongs to the SEC, not to the NLRC. Under Presidential
Decree No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), Controversies in
the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or
managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations fall
under the exclusive of the SEC. Two elements are to be
considered in determining whether the SEC has jurisdiction over
the controversy, to wit: (1) the status or relationship of the
parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of
their controversy.
Since complainant's appointment was approved unanimously by
the Board of Directors of the corporation, he is therefore
considered a corporate officer and his claim of illegal dismissal is

a controversy that falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC as

contemplated by Section 5 of P.D. 902-A. That the position of
Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of
the IBC in the By-Laws is of no moment, because the IBC's
Board of Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the
Corporation Code and under the corporation's By-Laws to
appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from

Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila

motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the

first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question
in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel
in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it
has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court
should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the because the same was issued without the summary hearing plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal
Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It
granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed
to
is, rather,
a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch,
CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to
regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view
"the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an
of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the
opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a
filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive
defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not
parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the
exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision
plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would
and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over be
"allsubmitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his
request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the
which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without
jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES
filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore,
complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its