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THE CHIEF OF POLICE (May 12, 1948)

Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the
crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April
2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948,
when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained
or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the
proper courts justice.
A writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed.
1. Are the petitioners illegally restrained of their liberty?
2. Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code?

Yes. Their liberty are restrained. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the
penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee
who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
The words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of
said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person
charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law. There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the
judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary
commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are
not authorized by law to do so. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public
officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a
warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case
against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than
six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of
Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant..

The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper
provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable
by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city
fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case
of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that
permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may
not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person
arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the
offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the
complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions.
Policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the
matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners
within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the
petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with
the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release
is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
Joan Gicayara, the mother of the victim allegedly caught Asper Agbay with his accomplice
Sherwin Jugalbot manipulating the vagina of Gayle Gicayara. The offenders were arrested and detained
at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the Special Protection of
Children Against Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The following day, or on September
8, 1997, Joan Gicayara filed a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against the offenders before
the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the
immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained Jasper
Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997. Private
respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner.

On September 12, 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued an
order, denominated as Detention During the Pendency of the Case, committing petitioner to the jail
warden of Cebu City. The MTC issued a resolution containing the following dispositive
portion:WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic Act 7610, it is hereby
recommended that an INFORMATION be filed against the two aforenamed accused. Under these
circumstances, a criminal complaint or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities
within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest.
1. Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint before the MCTC was
for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the offense.
2. As such, upon the lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to
the proper Regional Trial Court, private respondents were already guilty of violating Art. 125
3. Thus, petitioner argues, when the Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on
September 12, 1997, he was acting contrary to law since by then there was no basis for the continued
detention of petitioner
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes delivery to a
proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail. More specifically,
it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The
continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by
Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.
The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the courts of justices or judges of
said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person
charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior
courts as may be established by law.
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge, as in the instant
case, conducts a preliminary investigation, he is not acting as a judge but as a fiscal
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of the issue. In
contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his
function to conduct preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or
commitment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent
behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Thus, the very
purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.

Medina v. Orosco Jr. (1966)

On October 31, 1965, Medina allegedly killed Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa. On about 12:00 p.m.
on November 7, 1965, the offender was arrested and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail. At
about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, November 7, 1965, the case against Medina and two
others for Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a preliminary
investigation in petitioner's presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965, an information for
murder was filed against petitioner Medina.
The arresting officer's duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. He
was arrested at 12:00 pm on November 7. An information against hi, for murder was actually in court at
3:40pm on November 10. According to the petitioner, he was arbitrarily detained and therefore his
liberty was violated because the delivery to proper judicial authorities was not within 18 hours, it was
within 75 hours.
ISSUE: WON he was arbitrarily detained
No. November 7 was a Sunday (the time when he was arrested). November 8 was declared an
official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. No release or delivery to
proper judicial on no-office day (Sunday and holiday are no-office day). Hence, the petitioner was not
arbitrarily detained.
The reason on there is no release or delivery on no office day is because it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge
to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have
the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the certainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties.
These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was
arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.Petitioner
at present is jailed because of the court's order of commitment of November 10, 1965 upon a murder
indictment. No bail was provided for him, because he is charged with a capital offense Hence, detention
under a valid information.
Soria and Bista v. Desierto (2005)
8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections),
petitioners were arrested. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver
(a crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation
of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution

No. 3328. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm
and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition which is punishable by afflictive penalty. Immediately after their
arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station.
The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were
brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of their Joint-Affidavit.
At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was
released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while
petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the
time of petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already
At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against petitioner Bista with the MCTC. At 5:00 in the
afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261
par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed in the Regional Trial Court.On 08 June 2001,
petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413S. He was detained for 26 days.
The petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit
for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents. According to
them, they were arbitrarily detained; Soria must be detained only for 18 hours because the crime is
committed is punishably by Prision Correccional. Bista said that he must detained only for 36 hours
because his crime is punishable by Afflictive Penalty but that was not the case. They invoked the rule in
the statutory construction that when the law is clear, all you have to do is to apply it without
interpretation. HOWEVER, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Because of such, they claimed that the Office of Ombudsman committed a Grave Abuse of Discretion
resulting to Lack or Excessive Jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/O officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained
NO. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the respondents. Their disposition
of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have
been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence.
Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence (Medina v. Orosco), an
election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by

law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office
day. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code if
he was not released during the Election Day.
In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the
complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has
a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be released if he has no other
pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
U.S. v. Sanchez
A robbery was committed in a boat on Maypajo River. A boatman said that the crime was
committed by the son of a certain Eto who had been in the Billiard room the same night. sergeant had
acquired the information that Benigno Aranzanso had been in that billiard room that night and that
about five minutes before he had left on the run. Because of that, directed not only the defendant
Eulogio Sanchez but also all the patrolmen under his orders to look for the said Benigno Aranzanso in
order that he might be identified by the boatmen; and (4) that by virtue of said order and because the
description they had given him of the person who had been in the billiard room fitted Aranzanso.
The next morning about 9 oclock am of August 13, 1912, Eugolio Sanchez arrest Benigno
Aranzanso in the cockpit of Maypajo of that town and take him to the town hall, where he was detained
until just before nightfall of the same day because of the order of the Mayor. No warrant was previously
issued for his detention because the fact had not been reported to the justice of the peace and the 13th
of August was a legal holiday.
Benigno Aranzanso charged Sanchez illegal detention by keeping him in the municipal jail of the
pueblo of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, for a period of less than three days. Sanchez was held guilty by the
lower court.

ISSUE: Is Sanchez guilty of illegally detaining Aranzanso?

NO. Sanchezs compliance with orders of his chief (the sergeant of police,) in asserting Benigno
Aranzanso and his detention was justified for the purpose of identifying his person, since, according to
the sergeant, reasonable grounds existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion pointed
to that individual.
The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but . . . upon the
nature of the deed. One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the
disposal of the judicial or executive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act
constituting the violation or to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. One of the means

conducing to these ends being the identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the
duty that directly devolves upon the police to make the arrests or detentions for the purposes of such
investigation cannot be questioned.
The mere fact that an officer of the law compelled a person to appear before the chief of the
department to establish or prove his identity does not justify the classification of illegal detention. It was
merely in the nature of an administrative measure, justified by the suspicion that he may have made
certain threats against another person.
Padilla v. CA (1997)
A private person Maranang and his friend were inside a restaurant when Maranang noticed a
pajero running fast down the highway which might get an accident considering the inclement weather.
Immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching of
tires followed by a thus and saw a sideswiped victim (balut vendor). Through his radio and viper, he
reported the incident to the police in the Patrol Division located near the Traffic Division.
SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle
(Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the
only passable way going to the north. In the Abacan bridge, the responding policemen found out that
the driver of the pajero was Robin Padilla. When Padilla raised his hands, the police men that there was
something protruding at his back and thereafter discovered that he carried firearms. It was also seen in
his car that he carried a riffle. In the investigation, all the firearms were not registered in the name of
Robin contended that his arrest was illegal. The warrantless arrest was not legal because the
requisite of his presence was not satisfied because the one who was at the scene of the crime was a
private person and not the arresting officers.
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the
vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring
petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in
effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree
of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life.
The petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place
for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The
exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the
raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident.
The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than
mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in
criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm
(Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he
was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this
time in the presence of a peace officer.
There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and
the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in
response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and
railings thereof.These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily
then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.
Rolito Go v. CA (1992)
On July 2 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving along Wilson St. which was a one way road. Rolito Go
who was also driving entered the street. As a result, Maguans and the petitioners car nearly bumped.
Because of the traffic altercation, Go allegedly killed Maguan in the latters car. The Security Guard of
the Cravings Bake Shop saw the whole incident and point herein petitioner as the gunman, which he
positively identified when questioned by the authorities. Being convinced of the suspects identity, the
police launched a manhunt operation. The Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two
lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was
immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and singns a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner said that the
warrantless arrest and absence of preliminary investigation violated his rights.

The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant.
However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be
considered lawful.
Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms
of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they
have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact
that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. none of the "arresting"
officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's
wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted
is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to
determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably
guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal
proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of.
On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the
prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that
petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his
counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary
investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was
set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that
failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information
charging the latter of the crime of murder.
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute (prostitutes), which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed. On October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from
the chief of police, the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled
some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, consult their family and friends and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been
asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation.

The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented
an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Is the detention valid?
NO. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either justice or right.
The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice
was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their
domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society"
were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino
citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could
considered tantamount to slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of
abode."Ours is a government of laws and not of men."