Chapter 1

The Legal Basis and Nature (Sec. 2, PD 1529)

Concept of Jura Regalia
G.R. No. 107764
October 4, 2002
COLLADO, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14,
Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which
laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands,
territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
G.R. No. 135385
December 6, 2000
CRUZ vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(native title an exception to the theory of jura regalia)
Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian
theory does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of
Cario v. Insular Government, where the U.S. Supreme Court, through
Justice Holmes declared:
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to
have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land.
(Agcoili, p. 6)
Purpose and meaning of the Torrens System of Registration
G.R. No. L-8936
October 2, 1915
LEGARDA vs. SALEEBY
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens
system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in
this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing
with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in
vain.
G.R. No. 114299
March 9, 2000
TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
x x x The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on
the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were
not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of
the principal objects of the Torrens system of the land registration, that is,
to facilitate transactions involving lands.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title
to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title
thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard
such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of
such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the
title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Chapter 2
The Land Registration Commission and its Registries of Deeds
General functions of the Office of the Register of Deeds
G.R. No. 81163
September 26, 1988
BARANDA vs. GUSTILO
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of
the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all
the requisites for registration. .... If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such
denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him
of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the function of the
Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is
clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means
"ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation,
used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory."

Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the

registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in
pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should
have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the
Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
G.R. No. L-20611
May 8, 1969
BALBIN vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR
(an example by way of Consulta)
Petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy
of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the
same be annotated on the title. The register of deeds denied the requested
annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law."
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds.
With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner
observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property
described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously
sold undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of
three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate
issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates
which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers.
Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate
of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must likewise be
surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of
the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point.
Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary,
these titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.
As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners'
claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside
the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in
existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if
an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and
not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued
as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical
entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land
covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to
carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be reliable.
Chapter 3
Original Registration
Who may apply? Sec. 4, P.D. 1529
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2)

Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provision of existing laws.

(3)

Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned

river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(p. 107, Agcaoili)

(4)

Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner

provided for by law. (p. 114, Agcaoili)

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may
file an application for the original registration of the land, provided,
however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency
of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated
in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and
may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the
trust.
Ownership of abandoned river beds by right of accession under
art. 461 of the Civil Code, river beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners
whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.
Requisites:
(a) The change must be sudden in order that the old river may be
identified.
(b) The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and not
temporary overflooding of anothers land.
(c) The change of the river must be a natural one, i.e., caused by natural
forces (and not by artificial means).
(d) There must be definite abandonment by the government
(e) The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry up
or disappear.
Ownership by right of accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by
or sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of land bordering
on streams, torrents, lakes, and rivers. Requisites:

(a)
(b)
(c)

That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;

That it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and
That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
the rivers.

Judicial confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles [Sec. 48 (b),

C.A. 141 Public Land Act]
G.R. No. L-24066
December 9, 1925
SUSI vs. RAZON
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that
is, for about forty-five years. x x x If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director
of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover
possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there
lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to
bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
G.R. No. 73002
December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.
x x x No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at
the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would
not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.
xxx
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be
conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in
the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations
from acquiring and owning private lands.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to
be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against
said corporation's holding or owning private land.
G.R. No. 144057
January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was
not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in
the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
G.R. No. 156117
May 26, 2005
REPUBLIC vs. HERBIETO

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may

only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never
ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable
and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto. It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied
with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject
Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
G.R. No. 179987
G.R. No. 179987
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirtyyear period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No.
1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to
the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it
is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for
at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens
into ownership.
Forms and Contents
Amendment of boundaries or area
G.R. No. L-26127
June 28, 1974
BENIN vs. TUASON
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original
survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition
of lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be

made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of

the area that was added after the publication of the original plan.
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired
jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration
proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction
attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If
it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands
not included in the original application as published, then the registration
proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void
in so far but only in so far as the land not included in the publication is
concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of
the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of
registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are
valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering
lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title
is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the
registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.
Survey of the land
G.R. No. 169397
March 13, 2007
REPUBLIC vs. SARMIENTO
The absence or weakness of the evidence for petitioner notwithstanding,
respondent still bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
lot he seeks to register forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the
public domain.
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears
the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that this survey is inside
the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry.
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to
prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part
of the inalienable public domain.
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E"
(Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this
case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown
to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of
the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has
been declared alienable.[37] (Citations omitted;
Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Publication, Opposition and Default
Notice of Initial Hearing
G.R. No. 102858
July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABISTADO
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in
its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529
requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing
and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the
law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who,
per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by

parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is

likewise imperative (essential/necessary) since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
Proof
required
in
incontrovertible proof

registration

proceedings

well

nay

G.R. No. 127296

January 22, 1998
GORDULA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
In Director of Lands v. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection
of "private rights" to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation
must show ". . . by clear and convincing evidence that the property in
question was acquired by [any] . . . means for the acquisition of public
lands".
G.R. No. 175746
March 12, 2008
ONG vs. REPUBLIC
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is
not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain
because the law requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v.
Alconaba:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his
brothers actually occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made
thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that he and his
wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the
same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. Aside from
these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to establish the
character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners other alleged
predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed to establish
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the
nature and duration required by law.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who
must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration
required by law. Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not constitute the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary in cases of this nature.
G.R. No. L-43361
August 21, 1937
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
After hearing, His Honor, Judge Eulalio Garcia, on October 29, 1934, denied
the application of the Province of Camarines Sur, overruled the opposition
of Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, and declared lot No. 3 public land
which had been reserved by the Governor-General on October 19, 1933 for
use as site of the Camarines Sur Agricultural School. The oppositors, Ciriaco
Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, moved for reconsideration and new trial which
motion was denied. Exception was taken and the case finally elevated to
this court by bill of exceptions.
xxx
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xxx
It has been uniformly held by his court that to justify judicial confirmation of
title to a public agricultural land, the claimant must prove actual and
physical occupation of said land, and that the possession must be
continuous, open, exclusive, notorious, adverse and under a bona fide claim
of ownership from July 26, 1894 x x x up to the date of the filing of the
application or at least up to July 1, 1919 when Act No. 2874 was enacted x x
x. If the possessory right has been enjoyed in the manner set forth in the
foregoing cases, it ripens into one of presumptive ownership. The
appellants, to be sure, attempted to prove the element of the required
possession. We find, however, the evidence on his point unsatisfactory.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Counsel for the appellant vigorously assert in their brief that the Province of
Camarines Sur and the Insular Government had recognized the ownership
of the appellants of the land in question by the assessment thereof three
times by the provincial assessor of Camarines Sur in the name of Jose
Aramburo. Assessment alone, however, is of little value as proof of title .
Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property in the
declarant x x x. Neither is the alleged offer (Exhibit 7, p. 37, rec.) made by
the provincial governor to buy the claims of the appellant Jose Aramburo
any concession or evidence of ownership (Director of Lands vs. Abdul,
supra); nor does the issuance of a certificate of repurchase by the
provincial treasurer of Camarines Sur in favor of Jose Aramburo upon the
redemption payment of the accused taxes on the land up to 1929 vest in
him any title or operate as an estoppel against the Government. The
repurchase certificate was "issued with the understanding that it does not
acknowledge a better right to the properties being redeemed but said Jose
Aramburo than that had by their former owners prior to the forfeiture
thereof and without prejudice to the right of the Government to contest the
title thereto, if deemed necessary, in proper proceedings." (Exhibit 6, p 36,
rec.) Furthermore, the purchaser of land acquires the interest held by the
delinquent owner and the Government is not deemed to have included in
the conveyance the title which it holds over the land. (Government of the
Philippine Island vs. Adriano, 41 Phil., 112.).
G.R. No. 108998
August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LAPIA
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a

vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely
because they were American citizens at the time of their application
therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such
that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have
acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.

case maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the

registration book and signed by the register of deeds, the page on
which the transcription is made become the original certificate of
title, more commonly called the Torrens title.
xxx
The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription
of the decree in the original registration book by the register of
deeds, the date and time of such transcription being set forth in the
process and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate of title.
xxx

In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born

Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held
by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition,
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.

Classification of Public Lands

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that
the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Issuance of decree
G.R. No. 159595
January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC v. NILLAS
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v.
Menla, decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a
decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of
registration remained unissued after 26 years was already final and
enforceable. The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after
a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the
Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose
is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal. x x x
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx
that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does
not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both
of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure
of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason
that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the
owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be
registered.
When OCT takes effect
G.R. No. 123346
December 14, 2007
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the
certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the
recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription to
the certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is now
acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received
for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that
date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to
transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book
being the original certificate of title. Moreover, it is only after the
transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the
certificate of title is to take effect.
Xxx
xxx
xxx
Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, was of the same conviction:
A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the
Commissioner of Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the
name of the Judge to the fact that the land described therein is
registered in the name of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as the

G.R. No. 83609

October 26, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. BISNAR
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted
from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Office of the President. x x x.
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas,
56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply x x x.
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership x x x. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System x x x.
G.R. No. 155450
August 6, 2008
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those
lands which have been declared alienable or disposable.
Section 8
provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may
be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of
public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
(Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as
well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish
regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law.
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.
vs. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, et al.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been officially delimited and classified.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.
Non-registrable Properties
G.R. No. L-39473

April 30, 1979

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LASTIMADO

The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a
decree are: a) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he
has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that the petition is filed
within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that the property
has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or
collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted
or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The following ruling spells out the difference between extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud:
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
"outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud
takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as
the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not
affect the present action of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.
The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.
In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner alleged that
fraud was committed by private respondent when she misrepresented that
she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
publicly, peacefully, exclusively and adversely against the whole world as
owner for more than forty years when, in fact, the subject land was inside
the former U.S. Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the
Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she
likewise contended that her rights, as derived from the original and
primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial
confirmation under existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of land is
within the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, and is not subject to
disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Public Land Law.
G.R. No. 92013
July 25, 1990
LAUREL vs. GARCIA
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article
420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for
some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been
changed because the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become
patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public
officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair
and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA
368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based
on correct legal premises.
G.R. No. 164527
August 15, 2007
CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY and ROMERO
It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to
PEA, does not convert alienable lands of public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. We ruled in PEA that alienable lands of public domain
must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities
not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become
private or patrimonial lands (emphasis supplied). To lands reclaimed by
PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed
lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred
only to Filipino citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because
PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable
lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino
citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA
is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its
charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an enduser agency authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed
lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be
sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned
by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted

to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to

transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of
public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and
goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries
and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.
Chapter 4
Certificate of Title
Decree binds the land
G.R. No. L-59731
January 11, 1990
CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ASEDILLO
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's nameafter one year from the date of
the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value x x x.
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years
from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's
cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it x x
x.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop
forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land
(National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists
that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens
title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title
existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat
Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
G.R. No. 76265
April 22, 1992
CALALANG vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY
In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners try to convince us
to look or inquire into the validity of the reconstitution proceedings initiated
by Lucia dela Cruz, contending that the implementation of de la Cruz ruling
would deprive them of their properties without due process of law. We have
looked long and hard into the records of the case but the facts and
circumstances plus law and jurisprudence on the matter do not warrant
such action from the Court. INK's title over Lot 671 which necessarily
included Lot 671-A had already become incontrovertible and indefeasible.
To reopen or to question the legality of INK's title would defeat the
purpose of our Torrens system which seeks to insure stability by
quieting titled lands and putting to a stop forever any question of
the legality of the registration in the certificate or questions which
may arise therefrom. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to INK,
as registered owner it is entitled to rest secure in its land title.
G.R. No. 159595
January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC v. NILLAS
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the
rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant
or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to
issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn
the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to
transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and
the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the
decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds).
All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or
review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in
the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party
from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow
up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration
system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real
property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional
burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law
from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is
complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another
perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
G.R. No. 123346
December 14, 2007
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The process involved is what this Court called the method of giving a
paper title. It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act:
SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk
shall send a certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court, to the
register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city in which the land
lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to becalled the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive
order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the

register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of
title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x.
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the
registration book 'Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to
decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating time and place
of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect
upon the date of the transcription of the decree
Owners Duplicate Certificate Sec. 41, P.D. 1529
G.R. Nos. L-21703-04
August 31, 1966
REYES vs. RAVAL-REYES
While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects of
litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant
therein, had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by
the titles, we see no valid and plausible reason to justify, on this ground,
the withholding from the registered owners, such as the petitionersappellants herein, the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of
certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has already held that the
owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered
and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the
possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear
in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession
thereto. x x x.
G.R. No. 154409
June 21, 2004
ABRIGO vs. DE VERA
In the instant case, both petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the
sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors
(Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the
Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344. For
her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system
because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of
title (TCT) covering the property.
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens
system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under
Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L.
Paras:
x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has
therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is
registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as
amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used
under Art. 1544 x x x.
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a
free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522. The
OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598,
also in Villafanias name. As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598
was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to
respondent.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value
and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except
those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine the
condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the
register or certificate of title. Following this principle, this Court has
consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith
acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are
not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.
G.R. No. 153726
March 28, 2007
REPUBLIC vs. MENDOZA
The lapse of the one-year period within which a decree of title may be
reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof by the
government, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by
registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in
violation of the law would be the height of absurdity. As held in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals:
[T]he indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not bar to
an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been
acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether
or not fraud has been committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
Nevertheless, whilst we agree with petitioners that the government is not
precluded from conducting an investigation as to how titles to property
formerly belonging to the public domain has been acquired notwithstanding
the lapse of the one-year period for bringing an action for the annulment of
title and reversion of property to the public domain, in the absence of any
showing that there was fraud or a violation of any law, we are constrained
to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the authority of
administrative agencies to classify Silot Bay as timberland and its
subsequent release as alienable and disposable, and the findings of the
appellate court that the Mendozas have complied with all the necessary
requirements under the law for the issuance of the sales patents.

properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the same should
have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The
words 'married to Rafael Litam' written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in
each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status
of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered by said
titles.
Registered land not subject to prescription
G.R. No. 108547
February 3, 1997
CABRERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE FELICIO
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an
equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the
defendants title, but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiffs long
inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his
claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust
to defendant. Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time,
unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay,
laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.
This Court emphasized in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gampona, the reason upon
which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which
the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of
condition which may have arisen during the period in which there
has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of
the parties has to change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without
doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be
destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in
order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of
property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property
Registration Decree), no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to laches. As
we have stated earlier in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant
may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his
predecessor's
xxx
xxx
xxx
The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the
Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property, and, therefore,
void, is likewise untenable.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and even he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the
subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian
to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been
a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land
allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and
has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored--the
possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio possidentis).
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged
right over the portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that
their right has been lost by laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale (Punzalan
vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil 320 [1923]). This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects
only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the things owned in
common (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil 528 [1909]). . . . For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall
lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Certificate of title not subject to collateral attack
G.R. No. 152007
January 22, 2007
TAPUROC vs. VDA. DE MENDE

Statement of personal circumstances

As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally

attacked. The question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether
fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot
be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a
collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of
sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the
direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.

G.R. No. L-7644-45 November 27, 1956

LITAM vs. ESPIRITU

G.R. No. 175720

September 11, 2007
RODRIGUEZ vs. RODRIGUEZ

Finally, the very Torrens Titles covering said properties are proofs that the
properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. All
the said properties are registered in the name of 'Marcosa Rivera, married
to Rafael Litam.' This circumstance indicates that the properties in question
belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in

accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim
ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to
determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
Further, in Co v. Militar, it was held that:
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding
upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the
power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. x x x
We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of ownership is only
provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of
possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership,
which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641. Our ruling that
petitioner has a better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of
evidence without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case,
where the issue as to who has title to the property in question is fully
threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto.

G.R. No. 154409

June 21, 2004
ABRIGO vs. DE VERA
Double Sale
G.R. No. 124242
January 21, 2007
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right)
gains greater significance in case of double sale of immovable property.
When the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and
first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be
deemed the owner. Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with good
faith that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack
of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds after it had
acquired knowledge of Babasantas claim. Babasanta, however, strongly
argues that the registration of the sale by SLDC was not sufficient to confer
upon the latter any title to the property since the registration was attended
by bad faith. Specifically, he points out that at the time SLDC registered the
sale on 30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens on the file
with the Register of Deeds, the same having been filed one year before on
2 June 1989.
Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens obliterate the effects of delivery and possession in good faith
which admittedly had occurred prior to SLDCs knowledge of the transaction
in favor of Babasanta?
We do not hold so.

Chapter 5
Subsequent Registration

G.R. No. 148846

September 25, 2007
MELENCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Voluntary dealings with registered land

We have already ruled that the registration contemplated in this provision

(1544, Civil Code) refers to registration under the Torrens System, which
considers the act of registration as the operative act that gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. This rule precisely applies to
cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of
innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of the properties. Thus,
we held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to
bind the same.

Entry in the Primary Book of Entry (Sec. 52, 53, 56)

G.R. No. 157553
September 8, 2004
AUTOCORP GROUP & AUTOGRAPHICS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
The objection as to the payment of the requisite fees is unavailing. There is
no question that the fees were paid, albeit belatedly. Respondent bank
presented the certificate of sale to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu City for registration on January 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m. As the cashier
had already left, the Office could not receive the payment for entry and
registration fees, but still, the certificate of sale was entered in the primary
entry book. The following day, respondent bank paid the requisite entry and
registration fees. Given the peculiar facts of the case, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the payment of respondent bank must be deemed to
be substantial compliance with the law; and, the entry of the instrument
the day before, should not be invalidated. In any case, even if we consider
the entry to have been made on January 22, the important fact is that the
entry in the primary entry book was done prior to the issuance of the writ
of injunction by the trial court.
Section 56 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the
entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments
including copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note
in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments,
in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it refers,
shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as
well as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the
payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and
registration. (emphasis ours)
G.R. No. 143361
February 9, 2006
BALLESTEROS vs. ABION
x x x. Whether the second lease contract was registered or not was
immaterial since it was void. Registration does not legitimize a void
contract.
Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that the second contract
could be registered, the primary entry thereof did not produce the effect of
registration. Petitioner presented the second lease contract to the Register
of Deeds of Iriga City for registration on October 31, 1995, or a day after its
execution. The contract was, however, merely entered in the primary book.
It was not registered because it lacked certain requisites.
It is well settled that for the registration of voluntary instruments (e.g.,
deed of sale or contract of lease), it is necessary not only to register the
deed, instrument of assignment, mortgage or lease in the entry book of the
register of deeds but also for the Register of Deeds to annotate a
memorandum thereof on the owners duplicate certificate and its original.
In voluntary registration, if the owners duplicate certificate is not
surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees is made
within fifteen days, entry in the day book will not convey or affect the land
sold, mortgaged or leased.
Entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction
entered is voluntary or involuntary, so long as the registrant has complied
with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and
nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the
Register of Deeds. Here, petitioner admits that the second lease contract
was refused registration by the Register of Deeds for his failure to comply
with certain conditions for registration. And since petitioner failed to comply
with all the requisites for entry and annotation, the entry in the primary
book did not ripen into registration.

In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject property was

under the operation of the Torrens System even before the respective
conveyances to AZNAR and Go Kim Chuan were made. AZNAR knew of this,
and admits this as fact. Yet, despite this knowledge, AZNAR registered the
sale in its favor under Act 3344 on the contention that at the time of sale,
there was no title on file. We are not persuaded by such a lame excuse.
Act 3344 provides for the system of recording of transactions or claims
over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a
better right. But if the land is registered under the Land Registration Act
(and therefore has a Torrens Title), and it is sold and the sale is registered
not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such
sale is not considered registered, as the term is used under Art. 1544 of the
New Civil Code.
Innocent Purchaser for Value
G.R. No. 94457
October 16, 1997
LEGARDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
We do not have to belabor the fact that all the successors-in-interest of
Cabrera to the subject lot were transferees for value and in good faith,
having relied as they did on the clean titles of their predecessors. The
successive owners were each armed with their own indefeasible titles which
automatically brought them under the eagis of the Torrens System. As the
Court declared in Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, "(i)t is settled doctrine that
one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not
go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with
notice only such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title." In the
case at bar, it is not disputed that no notice of lis pendens was ever
annotated on any of the titles of the subsequent owners. And even if there
were such a notice, it would not have created a lien over the property
because the main office of a lien is to a warn prospective buyers that the
property they intend to purchase is the subject of a pending litigation.
Therefore, since the property is already in the hands of Luminlun, an
innocent purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to its original
owner by Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself.
There is no gainsaying that Legarda is the judgment debtor here. Her
property was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment debt. She
cannot claim that she was illegally deprived of her property because such
deprivation was done in accordance with the riles on execution of
judgments. Whether the money used to pay for said property came from
the judgment creditor or its representative is not relevant. What is
important is that it was purchase for value. Cabrera parted with real money
at the auction. In his "Sheriff's Certificate of Sale" dated June 27, 1985,
Deputy Sheriff Angelito R. Mendoza certified, inter alia, that the "highest
bidder paid to the Deputy Sheriff the said amount of P376,500.00, the sale
price of the levied property." If this does not constitute payment, what then
is it? Had there been no real purchase and payment below, the subject
property would never have been awarded to Cabrera and registered in his
name, and the judgment debt would never have been satisfied. Thus, to
require either Cathay or Cabrera to reconvey the property would be an
unlawful intrusion into the lawful exercise of the latter's proprietary rights
over the land in question, an act which would constitute an actual denial of
property without due process of law.
Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong
to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.
G.R. No. 150066

April 13, 2007

CHUA vs. SORIANO

Consistently, this Court has ruled that every person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate
to determine the condition of the property. Where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto.
However, when a person who deals with registered land through someone
who is not the registered owner, he is expected to look behind the
certificate of title and examine all the factual circumstances, in order to
determine if the vendor has the capacity to transfer any interest in the
land. He has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he
is dealing and the latters legal authority to convey.
The law "requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered owner
does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one
who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his
capacity to transfer the land."
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x, the general rule that the direct result of a previous void
contract cannot be valid, is inapplicable in this case as it will
directly contravene the Torrens system of registration. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title
thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard
such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of
such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be
preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property
registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance
as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued,
contrary to the evident purpose of the law.
Real Estate Mortgage (Sec. 50)
G.R. No. 128354
April 26, 2005
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS & TRUST CO. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL.
While the cases cited by petitioner held that the mortgagee is not under
obligation to look beyond the certificate of title when on its face, it was free
from lien or encumbrances, the mortgagees therein were considered in
good faith as they were totally innocent and free from negligence or
wrongdoing in the transaction. In this case, petitioner knew that the loan it
was extending to Garcia/TransAmerican was for the purpose of the
development of the eight-unit townhouses. Petitioners insistence that prior
to the approval of the loan, it undertook a thorough check on the property
and found the titles free from liens and encumbrances would not suffice. It
was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the status of the lots which
includes verification on whether Garcia had secured the authority from the
HLURB to mortgage the subject lots. Petitioner failed to do so. We likewise
find petitioner negligent in failing to even ascertain from Garcia if there are
buyers of the lots who turned out to be private respondents. Petitioners
want of knowledge due to its negligence takes the place of registration,
thus it is presumed to know the rights of respondents over the lot. The
conversion of the status of petitioner from mortgagee to buyer-owner will
not lessen the importance of such knowledge. Neither will the conversion
set aside the consequence of its negligence as a mortgagee.
G.R. No. 140398
September 11, 2001
DELA MERCED, et al. vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), et al.
Petitioners' rights of ownership over the properties in dispute, albeit
unregistered, are superior to the registered mortgage rights of GSIS over
the same. The execution and validity of the contract to sell dated
September 3, 1957 executed by the Zulueta spouses, as the former
subdivision owner, in favor of Francisco dela Merced, are beyond cavil.
There is also no dispute that the contract to sell was entered into by .the
parties before the third mortgage was constituted on October 15, 1957 by
the Zuluetas in favor of GSIS on the property covered by TCT No. 26105,
which included the subject lots. Francisco dela Merced was able to fully pay
the purchase price to the vendor, who later executed a deed of absolute
sale in his favor. However, the Zuluetas defaulted on their loans; hence, the
mortgage was foreclosed and the properties were sold at public auction to
GSIS as the highest bidder.
In the case of State Investment House, Inc. v. court of Appeals, it was held
that:
STATE's registered mortgage right over the property is inferior to that
of respondents-spouses' unregistered right. The unrecorded sale
between respondents-spouses and SOLID is preferred for the reason
that if the original owner (SOLID, in this case) had parted with his
ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had ownership and free
disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it again.
Registration of the mortgage is of no moment since it is understood to
be without prejudice to the better right of third parties.
In the same vein, therefore, the registered right of GSIS as mortgagee of
the property is inferior to the unregistered right of Francisco dela Merced.
The unrecorded sale between Francisco dela Merced as the vendee of, the
property and the Zuluetas, the original owners, is preferred for the same
reason stated above.
Respondents cannot, even assert that as mortgagee of land registered
under the Torrens system, GSIS was not required to do more than rely upon
the certificate of title. As a general rule, where there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to

explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto. This rule however, admits of an exception as where the
purchaser or mortgagee has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the
vendor, or that he was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the property in litigation.
Sale involving Real Estate
G.R. No. 169890
March 12, 2007
ESGUERRA, et al. vs. TRINIDAD, et al.
In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of
pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is
determined by way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000
per square meter), or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase
price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on an
estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million
for 1,000 square meters, etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court discussed the distinction:
. . . In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not
conclusive and the price may be reduced or increased depending on
the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers less than the area
agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor to deliver all that may
be stated in the contract or demand for the proportionate reduction of
the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor delivers
more than the area stated in the contract, the vendee has the option to
accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept the whole area,
provided he pays for the additional area at the contract rate.
xxxx
In the case where the area of the immovable is stated in the contract
based on an estimate, the actual area delivered may not measure up
exactly with the area stated in the contract. According to Article 1542
of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and
not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there
shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a
greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract. . . .
xxxx
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are
declared, the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable
prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and
boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. What really defines a
piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land
in a mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in
the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area
contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence that a
deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with
mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively
indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error
as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the
vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is
the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Caveat Emptor principle
G.R. No. 126236
January 26, 2007
DOMINGO REALTY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACERO
One final note. While the Court can commiserate with respondent Acero in
his sad plight, nonetheless we have no power to make or alter contracts in
order to save him from the adverse stipulations in the Compromise
Agreement. Hopefully this case will serve as a precaution to prospective
parties to a contract involving titled lands for them to exercise the diligence
of a reasonably prudent person by undertaking measures to ensure the
legality of the title and the accurate metes and bounds of the lot embraced
in the title. It is advisable that such parties (1) verify the origin, history,
authenticity, and validity of the title with the Office of the Register of Deeds
and the Land Registration Authority; (2) engage the services of a
competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes,
and bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the technical description
in the said title and the approved survey plan in the Land Management
Bureau; (3) conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot; (4) inquire from
the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the true and
legal ownership of the lot in question; (5) put up signs that said lot is being
purchased, leased, or encumbered; and (6) undertake such other measures
to make the general public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation,
lease, or encumbrance by the parties. Respondent Acero, for all his woes,
may have a legal recourse against lessor David Victorio who inveigled him
to lease the lot which turned out to be owned by another.