Journal of Islamic Studies 2011 Marcotte 153 82

Published online 7 April 2011
Journal of Islamic Studies 22:2 (2011) pp. 153182
doi:10.1093/jis/etr029
AL-MAS28IL AL-QUDSIYYA AND MULL2

4ADR2S PROOFS FOR MENTAL EXISTENCE1
R O X AN N E D . MA R CO T T E
University of Queensland
Presentations of earlier versions of this paper include Mental Existence in

Mull: 4adr: (d.1050/1640) in the Arabic al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, delivered at the
Cordoba and Isfahan International Colloquium on Two Schools of Islamic
Philosophy, Isfahan, Iran (April 279, 2002) and A Philosopher at Work: Mull:
4adr:s al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, delivered at the Department of Near and Middle
Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto, Canada (October 31, 2005). I
would like to thank warmly Professors Mehdi Mohaghegh and Hermann
Landolt (my shaykh) who enabled my attendance at the Cordoba and Isfahan
conference in 2002. Research for this paper was made possible by an FCAR
(Formation de chercheurs et aide a` la recherche) Postdoctoral Fellowship,
Quebec Government (Canada), a residency as Visiting Researcher at the Institut
francais detudes arabes a` Damas, IFEAD (June 2000 to June 2001), and at the
Institut francais de recherche en Iran, IFRI, and the University of Tehran (August
2001 to May 2002) as Visiting Researcher. This enabled me to attend the classes
of Professor (Eujjat al-Isl:m) MuAsayn Kadvar on Mull: 4adr: at Tarbiyat
Modarres University (Tehran), who was a wonderful guide to the intellectual
world of Mull: 4adr:. Many insights included in this paper find their origin in
our class discussions. I also wish to express my most sincere gratitude for the
judicious and most helpful comments, suggestions and corrections provided by
this Journals two anonymous reviewers. They helped me to clarify a number of
passages and avoid many of the pitfalls any newcomer to an area of scholarship is
bound to encounter. It goes without saying that any infelicities or errors that
remain are mine alone.
2
The best example being geometrical proofs, cf. Aristotle, De Anima (transl.
J. A. Smith in The Works of Aristotle, under the editorship of W. D. Ross;
Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1931] 1963), iii. 431b2 and 434a9 (respectively); cf.
id. Posterior Analytics (transl. with notes by Jonathan Barnes; Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), 100a416; cf. id. Metaphysics: Newly Translated as a
Postscript to Natural Science with an Analytical Index of Technical Terms
(transl. Richard Hope; New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 980b28
981a9.
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Aristotle noted that representation occurs through particular mental

images and wrote that without a presentation [that is, an image]
intellectual activity is impossible.2 Mental representation, therefore, lies
154
r o xa n ne d . m ar c ot t e
Aristotle, De Memoria et reminiscentia (transl. J. I. Beare) in The Works of

Aristotle, 449b30450a9. Naturally, the Aristotle that Mull: 4adr: encountered
would have been the Arabic Aristotle (in translation), the same being true, more
generally, of the other Greek philosophical traditions.
4
His epistemological critique encompassed both the Avicennan/Peripatetic
representationalism and the Suhrawardian/Illuminationist co-relationism
(i@:f) theories of knowledge, see Sajjad H. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr: and
Metaphysics: Modulation of Being (London: Routledge, 2009), 8891.
5
This concept of mental existence is identified as the cornerstone of Mull:
4adr:s novel (un-Peripatetic) transcendent theosophy, although its importance
is not discussed in Nasrs general introduction to Mull: 4adr:s philosophy. See
Seyyid Hossein Nasr, 4adr al-Dn Shr:z and his Transcendent Theosophy:
Background, Life and Works (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy,
1978), 62.
6
Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 401, 589.
at the heart of cognition and the construction of knowledge. The soul

never thinks without an image, Aristotle adding that the faculty of
thinking then thinks the forms in the images.3 It is not surprising,
therefore, that epistemological issues have preoccupied the minds of
philosophers who followed in his footsteps ever since. This is not to say
that all agreed with his views, as commentators also attempted to
account for non-discursive thinking, heralded by those who upheld more
mystical epistemologies, whether this was to be found in the works of the
Ancients Greeks or not. This was, in fact, the position of 4adr al-Dn alShr:z, known as Mull: 4adr: (d. 1051/1641) who attributed great
importance to knowledge by presence (Au@<r) which was to figure
prominently in his epistemological critique of earlier conceptions of
knowledge.4 On the whole, mental representation was the subject of
much epistemological discussion which, in the work of Mull: 4adr:, also
held particular ontological significance.5
Whether one thinks of a mental form, a concept, a universal or a
logical category, there is a sense in which there is something that finds its
place in the mind that possesses a certain type of existence, a being of
sorts. In Mull: 4adr:s philosophy, mental existence constitutes, in fact,
one of three modes of being at the heart of his ontology. The first type of
entity is entities in concreto that exist extra-mentally in the world. The
second type of entities is concepts or mental entities that may only have
an existence in the mind. And the third and last type of entities is words
or linguistic tokens of being that language encompasses.6 Mental
entities are thus one of the main constituents of being and reality through
MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE
155
Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 849. For a very detailed analysis of mental existence
(mental being) and its ontological, psychological and epistemological significance in the work of Mull: 4adr:, see ibid, 77101.
8
Mull: 4adr:, al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya in id., Sih ris:la-yi falsaf
(Mutash:bih:t al-Qur8:nal-Mas:8il al-qudsiyyaAjwibat al-mas:8il) (introd.,
ed. and commentary by Jal:l al-Dn 2shtiy:n; Qum: Markaz-i Intish:r:t-i
Daftar-i Tablgh:t-i Isl:m, 3rd edn., 1378/1999), 174.1254.5.
9
This is presumably the work to which he is referring (kit:bun: al-kabr) at
the end of al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, cf. MQ, 254.35; cf. Mull: 4adr:, al-Eikma
al-muta6:liyya f l-asf:r al-6aqliyya al-arba6a, (ed. Rid: Lu3f et al.; introd. by
MuAammad Ri@: al-MuCaffar; Qum: Sharikat al-Ma6:rif al-Isl:m, 1387/1967),
i.1. 263.1277.4 [hereafter, al-Asf:r]; cf. Ibrahim Kalin, An Annotated
Bibliography of the Works of Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) with a Brief
Account of His Life, Islamic Studies, 42/1 (2003): 2162, esp. 534.
which human beings grasp and comprehend the world. They are also
entities constitutive of human consciousness.7
In what follows, we will present the three arguments for the
demonstration of mental existence (wuj<d dhihn) that Mull: 4adr:
offers in one of his less known and studied works, al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya
wa-l-qaw:6id al-malak<tiyya (Sacred Questions and Angelic Principles)
(hereafter, MQ).8 In this work, Mull: 4adr: mentions that he provides
more concise and clearer demonstrations of mental existence than what
he included in his other works. For example, he discussed more
extensively proofs for mental existence in his al-Eikma al-muta6:liyya
f l-asf:r al-6aqliyya al-arba6a (The Transcendent Philosophy on the
Four Intellectual Journeys) (63 pages in the Lu3f edition), also known as
al-Asf:r al-arba6a (The Four Journeys), his philosophical summa.9
A closer look at al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, however, reveals that Mull:
4adr:, for example, provides for one of his proofs greater details
than what he included in his discussion of that particular proof in his
al-Asf:r al-arba6a. As such, al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya provides us with
further insight into how Mull: 4adr: developed, in a later work, an
earlier argument that he had only very briefly mentioned in the al-Asf:r
al-arba6a.
In his al-Mas:8il al-Qudsiyya, Mull: 4adr: proposes three different
proofs to explain the existence and nature of mental entities: a
teleological proof, a proof based on the ability to judge (between two
mental concepts), and a proof based on the universality of mental
concepts. The inclusion of these three particular proofs warrants further
discussion, as they appear to have been rather significant proofs for
mental existence among the many he is known to have provided
throughout his works. The proof based on the ability to judge (between
two mental concepts), for example, one of the two demonstrations he
156
MULL2 4ADR2S PREDECESSORS

Mull: 4adr: was certainly not the first to tackle the issue of mental
existence (wuj<d dhihn). Before him, others had discussed its nature and
its relationship with extra-mental objects in the world, making for
gradually more complex discussions with the passing of time as
philosophers responded to objections and criticism and tried to provide
more sophisticated demonstrations for it and its nature.11 The following
discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive or even a detailed
presentation of the historical and philosophical developments of
discussions and debates that took place before the time of Mull:
4adr:. Rather, these few comments only purport to indicate some of his
10
Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya, with the complete Glosses

(Aaw:sh) of H:jj Mull: H:d Sabzaw:r (ed., introd. and notes by Jal:l alDn 2shtiy:n; English preface by Sayyid Hossein Nasr; Mashhad: Ch:pkh:na-i
D:nishg:h-yi Mashhad, 1347/1967).
11
For an earlier general historical overview and study, see, for example, the
section on The Problem of Mental Existence (al-wuj<d al-dhihn), in Fazlur
Rahman, The Philosophy of Mull: 4adr: (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1975), 21518.
included in his al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya f l-man:hij al-sul<kiyya

(Divine Witnesses in the Paths of Spiritual Journey)10 and al-Asf:r alarba6a and which rests on the ability of the mind to predicate positive
propositions on non-existents, appears to go back at least to the works of
Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z (d. 606/1209). As will become apparent, Mull:
4adr: was not only an attentive reader of Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zs
commentary on Avicennas al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t (Pointers and
Remarks), but also of NaBr al-Dn al-F<ss (d.672/1274) defence of
the Avicennan position presented in his own commentary on Avicennas
al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t. Moreover, Mull: 4adr: included, in his alMas:8il al-qudsiyya, a third demonstration for mental existenceone
that may be labeled a teleological proofwhich he had included in his
al-Asf:r al-arba6a, but for which he provides now a more extensive
explanation. The Mas:8il al-qudsiyya thus provides us with further
insight into Mull: 4adr:s elaboration of the teleological proof (one
intuited via divine insight) he had introduced in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a.
One may equally ask whether Mull: 4adr: addressed the issue of the
correspondence of mental entities and the external world. It will become
apparent that he was primarily concerned with ontological rather than
epistemological issues.
157
12
al-F:r:b (d. 339/950) would have, before Avicenna, discussed mental

existence, especially in his 6Uy<n al-mas:8il and his al-Mas:8il al-mutafarriqa
(two texts that I have been unable to consult).
13
Ibn Sn: (Avicenna), al-Ta6lq:t (ed. 6Abd al-RaAm:n Badaw; Qum:
Maktab-i al-I6l:m al-Isl:m, repr. 1984), 183.9; cf. Jules Janssens, Mull:
4adr:s Use of Ibn Sn:s Ta6lq:t in the Asf:r, Journal of Islamic Studies, 13/1
(2002): 113.
14
Ibn Sn:, al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t, ma6a SharA NaBr al-Dn al-F<s (ed.
Sulaym:n Duny:; Cairo: D:r al-Ma6:rif, 3rd edn., 4 vols., 1994), ii.7.
359.1362.1.
15
As the purpose of this study is not per se a historical overview of the various
positions before Mull: 4adr:, we refer the reader to the excellent work of
Kaukua, especially the whole third chapter on intentionality for further details of
Avicennas position, see Jari Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity: A Philosophical
Study (PhD diss. University of Jyvaskyla, Jyvaskyla, Finland, 2007), 3569.
16
Bahmany:r Ibn Marzub:n, al-TaABl (ed. and commentary Murta@:
Mu3ahhar; Tehran: Intish:r:t-i D:nishg:h-i Tihr:n, 2nd edn., 1375/1996); cf.
Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 33.
earlier predecessors and their concerns and questions over epistemological and ontological issues raised by their analyses of mental
representation to provide general background information to Mull:
4adr:s discussions.
Avicenna (d.429/1037), for example, wrote about both epistemological and ontological issues related to mental existence.12 In his al-Ta6lq:t
(Notes), for example, he notes that the general meaning (ma6na) does
not have a real existence in the extra-mental reality or in concreto
(f l-a6y:n), but rather in the mind (dhihn),13 a distinction he reiterated
in his al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t. The perception of a thing occurs via the
representation of its reality (Aaqqa). What is perceived is the reality of
the thing, but without possessing all the characteristics that its extramental existence possesses, for example, geometrical shapes, or the
image (mith:l) of something concretely existing in the external reality.
What is perceived is an imprint that occurs in the essence of the one
who perceives and becomes one with the form. These representations or
images are mental (dhihniyya) forms.14 Avicenna held that there was a
distinct mental existence, but nowhere did he seem to have elaborated
much on the issue. The closest one gets to a discussion of mental entities
is found among discussions on intentionality.15 It will suffice, for our
purpose, to note that, in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mull: 4adr: makes
extensive use of al-TaABl of Bahmany:r Ibn Marzub:n (d. 459/1066), a
summary of sorts of Avicennas al-Shif:8, on which Mull: 4adr: relies as
a representative text of the Peripatetic tradition.16
158
17
Shlomo Pines, Studies in Abul-Barakat al-Baghdads Poetics and

Metaphysics in The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, 5 vols., vol. i: Studies
in Abul-Barak:t al-Baghd:d. Physics and Metaphysics (Leiden: Brill /
Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 5 vols., 1979), i. 259338,
esp. 27486 [reprint of Scripta Hierosolymitana, 6 (1960): 12098]; cf. id.,
Beitrage zur islamischen Atomenlehre (Berlin: Grafenhainichen, Gedruckt bei A.
Hein gmbh, 1936), 823; cf. id., Studies in Islamic Atomism (transl. Michael
Schwarz, ed. Tzvi Langermann; Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew
University, 1997).
18
Ab< l-Barak:t (Ibn Malk:) al-Baghd:d, al-Kit:b al-Mu6tabar f l-Aikma alil:hiyya (eds. 6Abd All:h al-6Alaw al-Ha@ram, MuAammad 62dil al-Qud<s and
Zayn al-62bidn al-M<sav; Haiderabad: Jam6iyyat D:8irat al-Ma6:rif al6Uthm:niyya, 3 vols., 1358/1939), iii. 92.1219 ; cf. iii. 126.1416.
19
al-Baghd:d, al-Mu6tabar, ii. 408.1118.
20
Ibid, iii. 12.1518; and cf. ii. 394.17395.5.
21
al-Suhraward, al-Mash:ri6 wa-l-mu3:raA:t, in Sohravard, Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques (ed. with prolegomena by Henry Corbin; Tehran:
Mu8assasa-yi Mu3:li6:t va TaAqq:t-i Farhang, [1976] repr. 1372/1993), i. 193
506, esp. xx35, 199.12206.8.
Ab< l-Barak:t al-Baghd:d (d. ca. 1160) alluded similarly to the

distinctive nature of mental existence with his nominalist (conceptualist)
approach.17 In his al-Mu6tabar f l-Aikma (Considerations on
Philosophy), he noted that mental perception (idr:k dhihn) was the
perception of abstracted forms that only have an existence in the mind
and which possess their own characteristics (mza) and reality
(Aaq:8iq).18 Abstract forms include both concepts abstracted from
objects that exist in the world, such as primary intelligible, of which
the concept of humanity is an example, and the meanings of
metaphysical entities, such as soul and entities that exist at ontologically superior levels.19 These second types of mental entities are universal
concepts that are not abstracted from any particular individual entity, the
so-called secondary intelligible of which some logical categories are
examples. These are the ones towards which the soul needs to turn.20
Three quarters of a century later, Shih:b al-Dn al-Suhraward (d. 587/
1191) was also to discuss, for example, in his al-Mash:ri6 wa-lmu3:raA:t (Paths and Conversations), the distinctive nature possessed
by mental existence with regards to its intelligibility, that is, its capacity
to be grasped by the mind.21 These discussions find parallels in the earlier
works of both Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z, one of al-Suhrawards
contemporaries who, in his al-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya (Oriental
Investigations), provided a number of proofs to establish the distinctive
nature of mental existence, different from any other type of being whose
159
22
Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z, al-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya f l-6ilm al-il:hiyy:t wa-l3ab6iyy:t (ed. MuAammad al-Mu6taBim bi-All:h al-Baghd:d (Beirut: D:r alKit:b al-6Arab, 2 vols., 1401/1990), i.1. 130.11132.11. He may have adopted a
more theological stance in his al-MuAaBBal and rejected mental existence; hence,
one would need to study some of Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zs later works in greater
detail for a better picture of the development of his views, for example, in such
works as his al-Ma3:lib al-6:liyya min al-6ilm al-il:h (ed. AAmad Eij:z al-Saq:;
Beirut: D:r al-Kit:b al-6Arab, 9 vols. in 5, 1407/1987).
23
al-F<s, Tajrd al-i6tiq:d (ed. MuAammad Jaw:d al-Eusayn al-Jal:l; Qum:
Maktab al-I6l:m al-Isl:m, 1407/1986), 106.18107.2.
24
al-F<s, SharA al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t, in Ibn Sn:, al-Ish:r:t, ii. II, 7.
359.15362.26.
existence occurs in the external world, some of which Mull: 4adr: takes
up and discusses.22
About half to three quarters of a century later, NaBr al-Dn al-F<s
proposed, in his Tajrd al-i6tiq:d (Summation of Belief), a similar
distinction between entities found in external reality and those found
only in the mind. In his discussion of existence and non-existence, a
section provides a number of proofs to establish the independent
existence of mental entities.23 In his commentary on Avicennas alIsh:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t, al-F<s appears to have rejected a number of
Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zs objections pertaining to the objects of perception
of the mind, a discussion that has yet to be fully explored and analysed.24
On the whole, by the time of Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z and NaBr al-Dn alT<s, philosophical discussions about mental existence had become a
distinctive philosophical topos. Mull: 4adr: builds on their discussions
(for example, the second demonstration discussed below).
Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z (d. 710/1311), one of NaBr al-Dn al-F<ss
many students, wrote a Persian philosophical compendium entitled
Durrat al-t:j, in which he provided a number of arguments to uphold the
distinctive nature of mental entities, that can serve as a succinct
presentation of the main arguments that were discussed by the end of the
seventh/thirteenth and early eighth/fourteenth centuries (in the Islamic
East). The first argument Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z presents is (i) the
possibility of conceiving mentally the association of two opposites
(ijtim:6-i @iddayn) (for example, cold and hot), something that cannot
have an incidence in the external reality. The second argument he offers
is (ii) the possibility of distinguishing mentally between non-existent
(a6d:m) entities. Finally, the third argument he gives is (iii) the possibility
of distinguishing mentally between two accidents that occur at the same
time. This argument rests on the possibility of establishing mentally a
160
25
Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z, Durrat al-t:j (ed. MuAammad Mishk:t; Tehran:

Eikmat, 3rd edn., 5 vols. in 1, 1369/1990), iii.1. 484.15487.16; cf. Qu3b al-Dn
al-Shr:zs epistle titled F TaAqq 6:lam al-mith:l, translated in John
Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights: Qu3b al-Dn Shr:z and the
Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Center for
Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1992), 20032, esp. 203 and 227.
26
For a good general introduction, see Sajjad H. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr: Shr:z:
His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
27
Rahman, The Philosophy of Mull: 4adr:, 213 (based on Mull: 4adr:, alAsf:r, I, 3).
28
Besides Rizvis Mull: 4adr: and Metaphysics, the following two works
provide particularly excellent studies of Mull: 4adr:s epistemology and
ontology: Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mull: 4adr:
on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
logical priority of one accident over another accident, while both occur
at one and the same time.25
In what follows, we will see what influence some of these historical
arguments had on Mull: 4adr:s demonstrations of mental existence in
his al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, especially his engagement with the works of
Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z and NaBr al-Dn al-F<s. These few milestones
suffice for the purpose of providing some historical background on the
issue of mental existence. Naturally, we do acknowledge that further
investigation, beyond the scope of this study, would be required in order
to provide a fuller and more comprehensive historical overview of
developments that undoubtedly nourished Mull: 4adr:s own perspective, especially the views of a number of very important post NaBr al-Dn
al-F<s authors, such as Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z, 4adr al-Dn MuAammad
al-Dashtak (d. 903/1498), Jal:l al-Dn al-Daww:n (d. 907/1502),
Ghiy:th al-Dn ManB<r al-Dashtak (d. 949/1542) (and their students)
and Mr D:m:d (d. 1041/1631).
By the eleventh/seventeenth century, Mull: 4adr:, one of the greatest
philosophical minds of his time, being himself preoccupied with
epistemological and ontological issues, reviewed and criticized earlier
views. He was motivated by a desire to restructure metaphysics wherein
the concept of existence would come to the fore and predominate.26 His
attempts to complete the ontologization of physics, with his theory of
substantial motion, were grounded in a similar ontologization of
epistemology. In his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mull: 4adr: defines knowledge
as neither a privation like abstraction from matter, nor a relation, but a
[certain type of] being (wuj<d).27 His ontological definition of knowledge, in terms of being, builds upon the idea of modalities of existence
of quiddities.28
161
MENTAL EXISTENCE (WUJ?D DHIHNI ) IN

AL-MAS28IL AL-QUDSIYYA
and Cecile Bonmariage, Le reel et les realites: Mull: 4adr: Shr:z et la structure
de la realite (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2007). See also Ibrahim Kalin,
Mulla Sadras Realist Ontology of the Intelligibles and Theory of Knowledge,
Islam Arast|rmalar| Dergisi, 7 (2002): 129 (also published in The Muslim
World, 94/1 (2004): 81106); and the section on noetics in Sajjad Rizvis Mulla
Sadra in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (summer 2009 edn., ed. Edward
N. Zalta). Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-sa
dra (accessed 31 December, 2009).
29
2shtiy:n notes that, in a number of manuscripts that he consulted (seven
are listed), the title is al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya f al-Aikma al-muta6:liyya, cf. Mull:
4adr:, al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, 185 n.1.
30
Kalin, An Annotated Bibliography, 534.
In a number of his works, Mull: 4adr: discusses the nature of mental

existence, seeking to explicate the nature of the independent existence
mental entities possess. Among his works, al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya is of
particular interest.29 It is considered to be one of his later works, and
posterior to his al-Asf:r al-arba6a to which it refers. Mull: 4adr: tells us
that his aim in writing this work is, first, to present a condensed selection
of arguments that is more easily accessible to readers of his works,
especially in view of the fact that he scattered a number of arguments
throughout his writings (MQ, 186.2118.2). His second aim is to
provide a readable account of three important philosophical issues,
mental existence being one of them (MQ, 187.35). When he mentions
that his account will be readable, he most probably alludes to discussions
found in the works of his master, Mr D:m:d, who was well known for
his use of convoluted expressions that made most of his texts very
difficult to decipher and understand. Moreover, Mull: 4adr: indicates
that some of the arguments he includes in al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya were
provided to him by inspirations of the heart (al-w:rid:t al-qalbiyya),
such that those inspirations (some of the arguments he puts forward) are
not derived from the discursive speculations of formal philosophy
(rasmiyya), theological debates, blind imitation of the public, or the false
arguments of the sophists, hence the importance that Mull: 4adr:
himself attributes to this particular work.30
Mull: 4adr: divides al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya into three parts (maq:la),
each dedicated to a major philosophical issue with which he deals in his
other works. The first part consists of an analysis of the basic properties
and divisions of existence (wuj<d) and of its principles (MQ, 191.1
209.9). The second part introduces the principles of the Necessary Being,
162
A FIRST PRELIMINARY REMARK

In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, philosophers held, at least from the
time of Avicenna onwards, that the nature of a thing could be known in
itself, as it really is. This topic became part of classical medieval Arabic
cognitive psychology. The (i) classical distinction between quiddities
(m:hiyy:t) and existence (wuj<d) and (ii) the theory of correspondence
of quiddities in the mind made it possible to conceive of the mind
grasping the essence (dh:t) of objects in the world via its mental
representations. Hence, mentally posited entities, such as quiddities (that
which is said to constitute the essence of a thing), concepts (like
universals) or notions, have no existence in extra-mental reality, but can,
nonetheless, be predicated. In Mull: 4adr:s ontology, they all share the
quality of being non-material (having no effects in the extra-mental
world) and are incorporated into his theory of modalities of being
(tashkk al-wuj<d). Hence, some entities have an existence in the real
world, in concreto, while others, like concepts or mental beings (even
fictional entities), and words or linguistic expressions of any given
language all rely on mental entities, the latter linguistic expressions
attempting to correspond with entities in the real world (our
representation of that particular horse) and in the mind (the idea of
horsehood).33 With time, arguments were developed to establish the
31
Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid, mashh:d 1, sh:hid 2, 24.635.9.

Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 263.1326.7.
33
Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 5861; see also the whole discussion on Mull: 4adr:s
theory of meaning in ibid, 5876.
32
or God (MQ, 210.1216.12). Finally, the third and longest section of the
work presents a number of demonstrations to establish the nature of
mental existence (wuj<d dhihn) (MQ, 217.1254.5). Compared to
Mull: 4adr:s other works where he discusses mental entities, al-Mas:8il
al-qudsiyya proposes, on the one hand, a more detailed discussion of the
nature of mental entities, with proofs to establish their existence, than his
al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya,31 while, on the other hand, it offers a more
condensed version of discussions included in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, save
for the teleological argument which, here, gets a more detailed
exposition.32 Mull: 4adr: begins the third discussion on mental
existence (wuj<d dhihn) with two important preliminary remarks,
both found in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, but absent from his al-Shaw:hid alrub<biyya.
163
34
Mull: 4adr: notes that all possible existents (mumkin:t) possess both a
quiddity (m:hiyya) and an existence (wuj<d), see Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1.
263.11.
35
For a useful discussion of quiddities as pure beings of reason, see Rizvi,
Mull: 4adr:, 97100.
36
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 263.1215.
37
Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:; and id., Mulla Sadra [online].
existence of mental entities, their nature, their epistemological function,

and their relation to the external world.
Mull: 4adr:s first remark pertains to the nature of the distinct
modalities of existence that beings possess, whether they occur in the
mind or in the external reality. The first modality of being is mental,
whereas the second modality corresponds to in re existence. Their
respective modalities of being determine the nature of these two types of
entities.34 On the one hand, entities that exist extra-mentally are deemed
complete beings. Their quiddity (m:hiyya), which Mull: 4adr:
considers mentally posited (i6tib:r), possesses all the specific effects
(:th:r makhB<Ba), or accidents (a6r:@), that are associated with their
reality (Aaqqa). On the other hand, entities that exist in the mind share
the same quiddity as the one belonging to objects in the world, but some
of the particular effects that characterize their reality in the external
world are absent in their mental representation. In this perspective, some
mental entities may be deemed incomplete beings.
A good example is the mental representation of fire or of a tree, as in
Diagram 1 below. One of the particular effects that characterize fire, in
the external reality, is its capacity to burn, a capacity, however, which is
quite naturally absent from the mental representation of fire. Whereas
the extra-mental entity and the mental entity both possess the same
quiddity, the mental entity of fire only possesses some of the specific
effects possessed by the extra-mental fire, but not all. The representation
of fire, for example, is devoid of any heating capacity.35
Mental existence remains an incomplete being insofar as its existence
is characterized by the possession of a more limited number of distinctive
effects or characteristics when compared with the object existing in the
external world to which it corresponds. The combination of various
effects associated with each quiddity determines what Mull: 4adr: calls
a mode or a modality (naAw) of their respective being. Quiddity no
longer solely defines a being.36 In accordance with his own notion of
gradation of being (tashkk al-wuj<d),37 the presence or absence of
certain effects determines the different degrees or grades of existence
of various beings (MQ, 217.10218.11). The modality of being is,
164
Diagram 1: Correspondence of quiddities in the mind
therefore, of paramount importance in Mull: 4adr:s ontology, whereby

being is both a principle of commonality and differentiation.38
Mull: 4adr: makes a further distinction between two types of mental
entitiesrepresented by Bx1 (a) and Bx1 (b), as in Diagram 2. On the one
hand, mental entities can be quidditiesrepresented by xof entities
that exist in the external reality and have a concrete modality of
38
Diagram 2: Modalities of mental existence
165
39
For a study of this concept in Avicenna, see Deborah L. Black, Mental

Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna, Mediaeval Studies, 61 (1999):
4579.
40
Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid, 24.1116
41
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 272.4277.4.
42
Mustafa Muhaqqiq Damad, Some Notes on the Problem of Mental
Existence in Islamic Philosophy, Transcendent Philosophy, 2/1 (2001): 5361,
esp. 556; Rahman, The Philosophy of Mull: 4adr:, 46. This view appears to
have been rejected by Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z: see Damad, Some Notes, 57.
existencerepresented by Ax1. These mental entities correspond to

concepts, in some way, abstracted from objects existing in the extramental world, such as primary intelligibles like, for instance, the concept
of humanityrepresented by Bx1 (a). On the other hand, mental entities
can be concepts or universals that are not abstracted from any particular
individual entity that may exist in the extra-mental world, for instance,
secondary intelligibles, like the concepts of causality, of the first being, or
of logical categoriesrepresented by Bx1 (b).39
Mull: 4adr: also provides the example of substantiality (jawhariyya)
with which he identifies the three modalities of being it possesses, an
example indicative of his gradation of being theory. A first modality of
being a mental entity may possess is (i) its existence itself independent of
any kind of substrate and matter, for example, its existence present in the
active intellect (or in the separate intelligences or those present in God).
A second modality of being a mental entity may possess is (ii) its
existence in matter and affected by external causes or generation and
corruption, for example, specific forms and terrestrial souls. A third
modality of being mental entities may possess is (iii) their existence
viewed as a type of weaker existence, for example, imagined forms,
neither active nor passive (MQ, 218.411). 40 In a fashion similar to
discussions found in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mulla 4adr: identifies
different intellective mental forms, without, in fact, excluding the
possibilities of different, imaginative forms.41
At the heart of Mull: 4adr:s epistemic process lies a unity of reality of
all knowable entities thesis: the unity of quiddities that belong to mental
entities and those that belong to their extra-mental in re existence. Via
the apprehension of quiddities by a knowing subject, this unity of
quiddities offers a partial solution to the problem of the representativeness or the correspondence of mental concepts with extra-mental
objects. Mull: 4adr: adopts what some have labeled the essential
identification, or the identification of quiddity thesis.42 Since both the
object in the world and its mental representation are believed to share the
same quiddity, access to the real essence of entities found in the world
166
A SECOND PRELIMINARY REMARK

Mull: 4adr:s second remark, one which he also includes in his al-Asf:r
al-arba6a,45 pertains to the creative power of the soul. The soul is able to
create (j:d), on the one hand, the forms of immaterial entities, for
example, the concept of causality (or any other universal), in the
intellective faculty of the soulrepresented by Bx1 (b) in Diagram 2
each mental existence beholding a mode of being proper to it. The soul
can create, on the other hand, the forms of material entities, for example,
the representation of a tree, in the imaginative faculty of the soul
represented by Bx1 (a) in Diagram 2 above. Mull: 4adr: writes that this is
possible because, the soul is cognate with the divine world (min sinkh
al-malak<t). Hence, the souls creative power accounts for its ability to
generate mental entities and language, two of the three main modes of
43
44
45

See Rizvi, Mulla Sadra [online].
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 264.10266.11.
becomes possible via their corresponding quiddities found in the mind,

such that the extra-mental world can be truly known, as it really is. Some
knowledge occurs more directly, something that knowledge by presence
(6ilm Au@<r) appears to allow, for example, a priori knowledge. There is
a sense in which certain knowledge for Mull: 4adr: [. . .] involves things
being present to the mind and not acquired through the impressions and
images of things that occur in the mind through some form of
abstraction.43
In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, Mull: 4adr: seems more concerned with the
demonstration of the independent nature of mental entities and their
modalities of being than with the question of the nature of the relation
that exists between objects of our knowledge found in the world and
their mental representation (concepts and universals) and what would
guarantee any true correspondence between the two. This is not the case
in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, wherein the problem of the relation between
mental existence and objects in the world remains central, whether this
relation might be understood in terms of a real correspondence that
should exist or in terms of mere images being intermediaries in this
epistemic process. In this latter work, he appears to propose a realist
solution. The mind is a passive receptacle, capable of receiving forms of
intelligibles, similar to a mirror reflecting images that are the objects of
its creative power.44
167
DEFINITION OF MENTAL EXISTENCE

Towards the end of the preamble to the section on mental existence of alMas:8il al-qudsiyya,46 Mull: 4adr: provides a definition of mental
existence, one which he opposes to in re existence:
This existence that belongs to things and the quiddities upon which [all] specific
effects (:th:r) corresponding to it are not found when the soul conceives of them
(yataBawwaru-h:) and that are present (A:@ira) in the world of the soul, even
when it stops to look at the external world, is called a mental (dhihniyyan),
shadowy (Cilliyyan), and imaginal (mith:liyyan) existence.47
That other [types of existence] in which [all] the effects corresponding to it are
found is called an in re (kh:rijiyyan), concrete (6ayniyyan) and fundamental
(aBlan) existence (MQ, 220.203).
In his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mull: 4adr: presents a similar definition of

mental and extra-mental existences, where he also discusses the varying
degrees of existence of mental entities in terms of modality (naAw) or
manifestation (Cuh<r) of beings, reiterating the above definition of
mental entities in terms of mental and tenebrous existence, while in re
existence is defined as external and concrete (6ayn) existence.48
46
This section is introduced with an important example taken from Ibn

6Arabs work, which would merit further investigation, see MQ, 223.116.
47
Somehow possessing incomplete existential determinations, cf. Mull:
4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 278.19279.13.
48
Ibid, 226.811.
being within Mull: 4adr:s modulation of being ontology. This is the

world of power and of activity in which the soul becomes a
microcosmic reflection of the macrocosm. Within its own psychic
realm, human souls possess, in some sense, certain affinities with Gods
creative power in the external reality (MQ, 218.1218).
Mull: 4adr: explains that the nature of the manifestation of a
given reality merely depends on the degree of perfection of the
agent. Hence, the human soul creates entities that are deficient,
since the soul itself is deficient, and that these mental entities merely
resemble entities that exist in the external reality, because the soul
possesses a limited creative power. Its creative power, nonetheless,
enables it to produce mental entities. The soul ultimately leads towards
perfection so that its creative power and the images it produces increases
and strengthens.
168
DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF

MENTAL ENTITIES
Throughout his works, Mull: 4adr: provides a number of demonstrations to prove the existence of mental entities. In a recent study of Mull:
4adr:s metaphysics of being, Rizvi provides an excellent discussion of
the six demonstrations that Mull: 4adr: includes in the first journey of
his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, which can be summarized as follows:
49
Ibid, 268.10269.13; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 80.

Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 269.14272.3; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 801.
51
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 272.4274.20; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 82.
52
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 274.21275.2; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 82-3.
53
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 275.37; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 83.
54
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 275.8277.4; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 83. In his
commentary on Mull: 4adr:s al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Jav:d 2mul identifies at least
seven different demonstrations: (1) the ability to distinguish between different
non-existents (ma6d<m:t), for example, between a unicorn and a phoenix; (2) the
ability to predicate positive judgments on non-existents, for example, that
unicorns do not exist or that a phoenix is a kind of bird; (3) the possibility of
conceiving of universals, which he divides in two forms: (3. a) based on the
representation of natural universals (identical to unconditioned nature), for
example, quiddities themselves and (4) (3. b) based on the representation of
substantial and intelligible universals, for example, humanity (or causality); (5)
the ability to conceive of abstracted truths. This demonstration can, in some
sense, be reduced to the first or the second demonstration, for example, that the
whole is greater than the parts; (6) the representation of the ends that set an agent
in motion; (7) the representations and perceptions that are not real but that,
50
1. An argument based on the possibility of conceiving entities that do not have a

real existence (in extra-mental reality) or that are impossible, but which the
mind can conceive;49
2. An argument based on the possibility of affirming something (predication)
about non-existent entities, such as fictional entities;50
3. An argument based on the possibility of abstracting universals, such as
whiteness or the concept of quiddity;51
4. An argument, called an insight (istibB:r), based on the possibility of
conceiving of secondary intelligibles that can, nonetheless, be predicated of
things;52
5. An argument, identified as a divine inspiration (min al-6arshiyy:t al-w:rida),
based on the representation of the goal of every action in the mind that has, in
a sense, no existence before it has been realized;53
6. An argument based on the effects of mental entities associated with the
estimative faculty on the body.54
169
THE FIRST DEMONSTRATION

In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, the first demonstration of the existence of
mental entities that Mull: 4adr: introduces corresponds to the fifth
demonstration he included in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a (only five lines in the
Lu3f edition), but which he omitted from his al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya.
As in the latter work, Mull: 4adr: notes, at the outset, that this
demonstration was inspired and intuited, an insight that God eventually
confirmed (alhamn:-hu bi-hi wa taAaddasn: ta8ydan min All:h)
(MQ, 221.17).56 More significant, however, is the more detailed
nonetheless, have real effects, for example, sadness, happiness, fear, or false
reports that create anxiety, see Jav:d 2mul, RaAq-i makht<m: SharA-i Eikmati muta6:liyya (The Sealed Nectar: Commentary on the Transcendent Wisdom)
(ed. Eamd P:rs:niy:n; Qum: Markaz-i Nashr-i Isr:8, 1 vol. in 5 parts, 1417/
1375/1995), i.4. 5390.
55
Sabzaw:r, SharA al-ManC<ma f l-Aikma [F l-Il:hiyy:t bi-l-ma6n: alakhaBB min kit:b SharA ghurar al-far:8id, y: SharA-i manC<ma-i Aikmat], (ed.
Mahd MuAaqqiq; Tehran: Mu8assasa-yi Intish:r:t-i va Ch:p-i D:nishg:h-i
Tihr:n, 1990); and id., The Metaphysics of Sabzav:r (transl. Mehdi Mohaghegh
and Toshihiko Izutsu; Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1991).
56
He also mentioned this fact in the prologue to al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya where
he wrote that much of his insights originated in his own access to the world of
Light, one that was the object of insights (hiya min al-w:rid:t al-kashfiyya)
following his access to the intelligible world and his active and intellective union
(ittaAada bi-l-6aql al-fa66:l, ittih:dan 6aqliyyan fi6liyyan) following his efforts and
All of Mull: 4adr:s demonstrations of mental existence were

subsequently discussed by H:d Sabzaw:r (d. 1289/1872) in his SharA
al-ManC<ma, of which further study is bound to provide new insight into
nineteenth-century discussions of the issue (for example, his discussion of
the fourth proof).55
Now, let us turn to al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya. Mull: 4adr:, who notes
that various demonstrations can be proposed to argue for the existence
of mental entities, only introduces and discusses, in this particular work,
the second, the third, and the fifth proofs he included in al-Asf:r alarba6a, those three being, we should assume, three demonstrations he
would have viewed as more important, since the work aims to succinctly
present only the most important matters. Each demonstration is followed
by objections that have, or can be raised to these demonstrations. Mull:
4adr: then supplements the demonstrations with further analyses and
proposes some solutions to the objections raised.
170
exposition that Mull: 4adr: provides of this proof when compared with
what he included in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, thus providing us with greater
insight into his elaboration of this particular demonstration.
This first demonstration rests on the capacity of the soul to envision or
to represent a non-existent entity in the form of the non-existing end that
initiates motion. This demonstration may be labeled a teleological proof.
The first premise of his demonstration is that universal natures that
move their elemental matters are attentive, in the sense of being inclined,
to their natural ends.57 Mull: 4adr: gives three examples: first, the
abilities to contemplate (mush:had:t) the forms of that which is known (biBuwar al-ma6l<m:t) by (his soul) becoming engraved by light and unveiling
(intiq:shan kashfiyyan n<riyyan) presented in this work. Mystical contemplation is
said to have been at the origin of the reception of inspiration (MQ, 186.1420);
cf. Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid, 151.23.
57
Avicenna had described universal nature (the third principle in the chain of
emanation from the One, after intellect and soul) as a force that moves the
(universal) elements (being complementary) towards their perfection. In al-Shif:8,
he writes: Nature [3ab6a] is predicated in the manner of a particular and a
universal. That which is predicated in the manner of a particular is the nature
proper to each of the individuals, whereas the nature that is predicated in the
manner of the universal is sometimes a universal relative to a species and
sometimes a universal absolutely. Neither of these has an existence in concrete
particulars as subsisting entities, except in conceptualization. In fact, however,
only the particular has existence. The first of the two [universals] is what our
intellects recognize as a principle proper to the management necessary for the
conservation of a species, whereas the second is what our intellects recognize as a
principle proper to the management necessary for the conservation of the
universe according to its order [. . .] If there were a universal nature of this kind,
however, it would not be qua nature, but, rather, qua intelligible object vis-a`-vis
the first principles from which the management of the universe emanates, or qua
nature of the first of the heavenly bodies through whose mediation the order [of
the universe] is conserved, see Avicenna, The Physics of The Healing [al-Shif:8:
al-Sam:6 al-3ab6. Books III & IV] (transl., introd. and annotated Jon McGinnis;
Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2009), I.7.23, 512 (the first
volume contains Books I and II). In his Shif:8, Avicenna also introduced a
distinction between a universal nature and the nature that exists in the subject:
Horsehood (farasiyya) has a definition that does not demand (the definition of)
universality; rather, it is that to which universality happens. Hence, horsehood in
itself is nothing other than horsehood. For, in itself, it is neither one nor many,
neither existent in the (sensible) world (a6y:n) nor in the soul, neither is it in any
of these things potentially or actually in such a way that this is contained [under
the definition of] horsehood. Rather, [in itself it consists] of what is horsehood
only. See Avicenna, al-Shif:8, al-Il:hiyy:t (eds. Ibrahim Madkour, Georges C.
Anawati and Said Zayed [repr. of 1960(?) Cairo edn.]), i. V.1, 196.913.
171
58
Mull: 4adr:s idea of inclination (tawajjuh) shares some affinity with

Avicennas notion of impetus (mayl), a power of inclination toward movement
whose power of guidance (hid:ya) comes from the world of Intellect, while its
capacity to put in motion comes from the world of divine command, see Nasr, An
Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 2045 [based on a reading of a
passage of Avicennas Ris:la dar Aaqqat va kayfiyyat. . .].
59
Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zs objection is found in al-F<ss commentary, see NaBr
al-Dn al-F<s, SharA al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t in Ibn Sn:, al-Ish:r:t wa-ltanbh:t, iii. IV. 7, 18.711.
attention of simple elemental entities to a certain place; second, the

attention of celestial spheres to a certain position; and third, the
attention of composites to a certain quality or a certain quantity.58
The second premise is that the end of every motion, even the end of a
request, must necessarily possess a certain existence (wuj<dun m:) before
the advent of that particular motion, because the end constitutes the
cause of motion. The end, therefore, cannot be pure non-existence,
because pure non-existence cannot initiate motion.
The third premise is that the cause, here the end, must necessarily be
prior in existence to its effects, in this case, motion itself.
Mull: 4adr: can then draw the conclusion that these ends do not
possess a complete existence in the world of beings, before the
completion of motion, in as much as the realization of those ends has
not yet been fulfilled. In a sense, they could be said to possess a different
mode of existence before and after their realization. Hence, these ends
must necessarily possess another modality of existence, other than the
one possessed by any existent in the external world. This is the entity
called a mental existence. But what kind of mental existence are those
ends?
Mull: 4adr: notes the following objection: if bodily natures possessed
ends that they would desire, and if this were the cause of their motion,
then inanimate entities (jam:d:t), plants, and elemental and simple
bodies would necessarily possess knowledge (6ul<m) and perception
(idr:k:t), because they would be aware of the ends of their motions
(MQ, 222.1617).
The objection is similar to the one that Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z leveled
against Avicennas views on existence and its causes and which al-R:z
included in his commentary on Avicennas al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t.59
Mull: 4adr: mentions that, in the SharA al-Ish:r:t wa-l-tanbh:t
(Commentary on the Pointers and Remarks), NaBr al-Dn al-F<s
informs us that al-R:z objected to Avicennas view that natural activities
172
If realities are investigated and demonstrations are provided for the realization of
the degrees of awareness (shu6<r) and of perception (idr:k) of all natural
bodies that possess a real, not a mental (i6tib:r), unity and that possess an
existence by essence (bi-l-dh:t), not by accident (bi-l-6ara@), then, there is
nothing left to deny, except the merely improbable and what produces
habituation in human beings to what is familiar to them. Their minds do not
consider what is beyond, such as the existence of awareness [or sensation]
(shu6<r) of something that is conditional upon animal instruments and the
principles of the differences of willful (ikhtiy:riyya) actions; whereas absolute
choice (ikhtiy:r) is one thing, and the ability of motion and willful [actions] is
another, such that the loss of one does not entail the loss of the other (MQ,
222.1623).
Mull: 4adr: does not include al-F<ss reply to al-R:zs objection, but
it may, nonetheless, have guided him in his attempt to clarify the
apparent Avicennan paradox. Al-F<s states that naturals, for example,
universal nature, were made up of entities whose essences do not need
anything, such as a certain place, or an end, in order that motion be
initiated. Universal natures do not set the body (jism) in motion in order
that it may obtain a desired end, such that the existence (kawn) of the
end would depend on the existence of the natures, or that it would be
60
61
Ibid, iii. IV. 7, 18.911.

Ibid, 18.11.
can yearn for their final causes (6ilal gh:8iyya) and that these ends exist
(mawj<da) in their minds, or for that matter, in the external reality,
because natural activities or forces do not possess any type of awareness
(shu6<r) (MQ, 222.24223.1).
Siding with Avicenna, al-F<s deems al-R:zs objection as implausible,
because the existence [of the ends] depends on the existence of the
effects (ma6l<l:t); and that if these ends are non-existent and that which
is non-existent cannot be the cause of what is existent, then natural
activities cannot possess ends (gh:y:t).60 In short, what has not yet
occurred cannot be the cause of anything that exists, such as motion, or
incite what belongs to the natural world to yearn for non-existing ends.
Mull: 4adr: then notes that Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z rejected Avicennas
thesis that bodily natures possess ends (MQ, 222.24223.1), since,
according to al-R:z, the only solution to Avicennas dilemma is to state
that natural activities do not possess ends.61 Mull: 4adr: quotes alR:zs objection against philosophers (Avicenna) who established that
bodily natures possess ends:
173
some kind of subsisting matter (amr th:bit) that indicates the existence
of the end it would possess in potentiality and of which the naturals
would possess a certain awareness (shu6<r) before its actual existence.
What al-F<s does is to reject al-R:zs objection by making these ends
the final causes of their action and not an end they wilfully seek to
reach.62 Mull: 4adr: is certainly not unaware of al-F<ss refutation in
his dismissal of al-R:zs objection, which he discusses in his al-Asf:r alarba6a.63 He reiterates that Avicenna has demonstrated that they do have
some sort of awareness (shu6<r) of the end to which they aspire, or of the
end toward which they lean, and even possess the presence (Au@<r) of its
necessity (MQ, 223.23).
In one respect, Mull: 4adr:s solution appears to depart from al-F<ss

objection and, in another respect, to follow it. On the one hand, Mull:
4adr: maintains that these ends are the final causes of natural bodies, and
this is where he agrees with Avicenna and al-F<s. On the other hand, he
appears to tackle the problem in a way which al-F<s may have
precluded. Mull: 4adr: prefers to view the problem from a metaphysical,
rather than a physical angle. He writes:
[Universal] natures (3ab:8i6) that set in motion their elemental matters are
attentive (la-h: tawajjuh) to their natural ends (gh:y:t), such as a certain place,
as is the case for simple elemental entities, or to a certain position, as is the case
for [celestial] spheres, or to a certain quality or a certain quantity, as is the case
for composites (murakkab:t).
It is necessary that the end of every motion and request (3alab) possess a
(certain)64 existence (wuj<d) before the existence of that motion, because it is a
causea cause of motionand the cause is prior to its effects in existence. And
when something of those ends, which are in what is found in this world of beings
(taAt al-kawn), does not possess a perfect (t:mm) existence before the completion
62
Ibid, IV. 7, 18.124. The objection and its solution are absent from the
section on Ithb:t al-wuj<d al-dhihn in al-F<ss Tajrd al-i6tiq:d as reported in
Ibn al-Mu3ahhar al-Hills (d. 726/1325) commentary, the Kashf al-mur:d f
SharA Tajrd al-i6tiq:d, notes and commentary by Ibr:hm al-M<sav al-Zanj:n
(Qum: Shuk<r, 1373/1993), 19 and from Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zs section on
mental existence in his al-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya, i.1. 130.11132.11.
63
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 276.9277.4.
64
This is added in parentheses in 2shtiy:ns edition.
MULL2 4ADR2S SOLUTION
174
of the motions (Aarak:t), then, these ends necessarily possess another modality
(naAw) of existence that is called a mental existence. (MQ, 221.18-222.34)
The active power is attentive to the deficient being (kawn n:qiB) and yearns for
its completion, and it exists in natural bodies that possess deficiencies that are
either according to substantiality (tajawhur) and subsistence (qiw:m) or
according to excellence (fa@la) and completeness (tam:m). The first is like the
motions of seminal (minawiyya) and germinal (b:dhriyya) matters for the
coming about of animal and vegetal individuals (ashkh:B). And the second is like
the motions of simple bodies, of inanimate composites in their quantities, their
qualities, their colours, and their locations. (MQ, 222.510)
But what does Mull: 4adr: mean when he writes that the active
power of natural bodies is attentive to its own end, a mental existence, as
each universal nature yearns for its completion? Although he does not
elaborate,65 he had mentioned that it was established that the ends of
these natural motions belong to another world. Here is the metaphysical
leap that permits Mull: 4adr: to maintain that ends are mental entities.
These ends are now ascribed to a distinct ontological realm:
Indeed, it has been established that the ends (maq:Bid) of those natural motions
belong to another world, that they possess a subsistence (thub<t) in that world,
distinct from their external subsistence (siw: thub<ti-h: al-kh:rijiyya), and that
they possess a presence (Au@<r) in it, distinct from their concrete presence (siw:
Au@<ri-h: al-6ayniyya) [in the external reality]; and that world is the hidden
world (b:3in), unveiled (maksh<f) by those who possess the ability to unveil, [it
65
He only notes that this issue will be discussed in a section on the final cause.
What Mull: 4adr: does is to maintain the idea that ends that lead to
motion must amount to some sort of mental existence, what he calls a
deficient being (kawn n:qiB), and ascribes these mental entities to the
active power of natural bodies that is attentive to its own end (a type of
mental existence), as each universal nature yearns for its perfection.
Yearning for those ends occurs because natural bodies possess
deficiencies, deficiencies that are of two kinds. They can either be
according to substantiality and subsistence or according to excellence
and completeness. For the first type of deficiency, Mull: 4adr: gives the
example of the motions of seminal and germinal matter that leads to the
creation of individual animals and plants. For the second type of
deficiency, he provides the example of the motions of simple bodies and
of inanimate composites in their quantities, qualities, colours, and
locations:
175
is] the real (6ayn) world, contemplated with this eye or with any of the external
senses, and [it is] the imaginal world (6:lam al-mith:l) that those who tread the
mystical path (sull:k) and ascetics (ahl al-riy:@a) unveil. (MQ, 222.1115)
THE SECOND DEMONSTRATION

The second demonstration included in al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya is wellknown and appears (perhaps for the first time) in Fakhr al-Dn al-R:zs
al-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya (Oriental Investigations).66 The demonstration soon found its way into the works of numerous writers, for example,
NaBr al-Dn al-F<ss Tajrd al-i6tiq:d (Summation of Belief),67 in his
student Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:zs Durrat al-t:j,68 and eventually in Mull:
4adr:s al-Asf:r al-arba6a (second demonstration) and his al-Shaw:hid
al-rub<biyya.69 This demonstration rests on the ability of the mind to
positively establish (thub<tiyya) that non-existent entities (ma6d<m:t) do
not possess an existence in the external world and its ability to predicate
positive judgments, that is, factual propositions on such non-existent
entities.
The first premise of this demonstration is that it is possible to judge
that some entities have an extra-mental existence and that some entities
do not exist (ma6d<m) in the external reality, by predicating true and
affirmative judgments (aAk:m thub<tiyya B:diqa) onto those entities.
The second premise is that one can only pass judgment on the
existence of something that exists so that the possibility of making any
type of judgment, or for that matter, providing a factual proposition
66
Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z, al-Mab:Aith al-mashriqiyya, i.1. 130.13131.19.

See al-Eill, Kashf al-mur:d, 19, a commentary on al-F<ss Tajrd ali6tiq:d.
68
Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z, Durrat al-t:j, iii. 484.15487.16, esp. 484.22
485.9.
69
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 269.14270.3; cf. id., al-Shaw:hid, 24.1925.2
(it is the first demonstrationshorter and slightly different).
67
Here, Mull: 4adr: may develop an original argument by having ends

postulated as causes of motion or action that can not only exist in the
mind, but that can also exist in natural universals (for example, universal
nature), before they are ever materialized. Such a demonstration would
rest on the assumption that natural universals exist and that they can be
aware of their ends. It also supposes that they are, somehow, the forms of
concrete individuated existences, the depositors of their ends, the final
ends guiding material beings toward their completion.
176
70
This would correspond to Mull: 4adr:s principle of subordination (q:8ida

far6iyya).
71
There seems to be a hidden premise which would appeal to a
correspondence theory of truth. For a discussion of theories of truth, see Rizvi,
Mull: 4adr:, 5963.
72
Like al-F<s, al-Eill takes it to be in re (f l-a6y:n), see al-Eill, Kashf almur:d, 19.
73
The possibility of conceiving two opposites (@iddayn) in the mind, such as
cold and hot, that cannot have an incidence in the external world is the first
demonstration provided by Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z in his Durrat al-t:j, iii.
484.15487.16, esp. 484.1522.
about something, is subordinated to the existence of that particular

thing, independently of the type of existence it may possess.70
The third premise is that judgment is not limited to what exists in the
external reality. Mull: 4adr: argues that judgments apply more
comprehensively to all entities that are realized and determined in the
mind. He gives the example of the Phoenix (6anq:8) and of the
mathematical entity of the triangle that have no existence in the external
world. A representation of the Phoenix can occur in the mind, such that
the following proposition A Phoenix, or any Phoenix, is a kind of bird
must necessarily be true of any representation of a Phoenix to actually
correspond to a Phoenix. The same holds true for the proposition that
the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles (that is,
180 degrees).71
A final premise is that the truth-value that can be positively (Bidq alAukm al-j:b) ascribed to any given proposition, or being a reference,
requires, first, the establishment of the existence of its substratum
(maw@<6), such that, in the case of the Phoenix, the substratum of the
Phoenix, that corresponds to being a kind of bird with certain qualities
that make such propositions as x is a Phoenix true, only occurs in the
mind. No such entity exists extra-mentally.72 This is true of any (positive
or negative) proposition that can be predicated of a subject, whether it be
a Phoenix, the Law of Non-Contradiction (6adam ijtim:6 al-n:qi@ayn),
or any other proposition that only possesses an existence in the mind.73
Mull: 4adr: then draws the conclusion that the substratum, the
subject of the proposition to which an (affirmative or negative)
attribution is applied, must, therefore, possess some modality of
existence. Since such things as Phoenixes or, for that matter, Sherlock
Holmes (albeit a fictional character), do not exist in the external reality,
possessing no in re existence, they must, therefore, have an existence in
the mind. Mull: 4adr: defines this existence as an intellective (6aql) and
comprehensive (iA:3) existence (one on which he does not elaborate in
177
74
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 76.9; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 726.
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 270.5272.3.
76
This appears to be the second comment discussed in the Asf:r, which is
briefly mentioned in Rahmans The Philosophy of Mull: 4adr:, 218.
75
this work)in other words, a type of mental existence (MQ, 223.612).

In al-Asf:r al-arba6a, for example, Mull: 4adr: notes that it is
permissible for the thing to be existent in the intellect (th:bitan f l-6aql)
and non-existent in extra-mental reality (ma6d<man f l-kh:rij), whereby
these conceptual entities, nonetheless, possess meaning as imaginative
conceptual constructs to which specific characteristics are predicated
or attributed so as to allow for certain propositions to be true or false.
The existence of such mental entities can thus be affirmed (even of only
one mental instantiation), in spite of their non-existence in the world.74
In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, Mull: 4adr: notes the existence of a number
of objections leveled against this particular demonstration. He mentions
having discussed them elsewhere in more detail and to which he refers
the reader, that is, al-Asf:r al-arba6a, where he raises three different
objections.75 In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, he makes only one remark. He
notes that propositions that can be applied to mental entities must
necessarily extend to more than one individual, such as a judgment on
the individuality (shakhBiyya) or the naturalness (3ab6iyya) of particular
entities. Although such propositions pertain to the substratum of entities
(Aaqqiyy:t), whose real essence (Aaqqiyya) may exist in the external
decreed reality (wuj<d muqaddar), the propositions applied to mental
entities remain, in a sense, logically restricted (maAB<r:t). The judgment
that applies to an individual does not extend to other in re individuals
(MQ, 223.1619).76 For instance, something that would possess
attributes x, y, z, . . . would constitute a representation of a Phoenix
or, for that matter, a representation of Sherlock Holmes. They would,
nonetheless, possess distinctive mental existences. Representations, such
as miniatures depicting the Phoenix or novels and films about Sherlock
Holmes, only provide external representations of that which only exists
in the mind.
Mull: 4adr: notes that these clarifications can answer most of the
objections that have been leveled against this particular demonstration.
He then concludes by stating that modalities that are shared by many
activities and the comprehensive judgment that can encompass different
individuals and apply to numerous objects, for example, the concept of
colour, can only exist in another kind of vessel that does not exist in the
external reality and whose origin (mansh:8) is other than what the
external senses can contemplate (MQ, 223.2023). Such concepts exist
as mental entities.
178
THE THIRD DEMONSTRATION
77
Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 272.413 (third demonstration); cf. id., alShaw:hid, 26.1227.5 (second demonstration).
78
For a discussion of the associated notion of intentionality, see Rizvi, Mull:
4adr:, 845.
The third demonstration from al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya rests on the ability

of the human soul to conceive of universal concepts or notions (ma6n:), a
demonstration that Mull: 4adr: included in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a (third
demonstration) and his al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya.77 He also concedes
that this third demonstration shares some resemblance with the previous
one.
The first premise is that individual beings with specific (faBliyya)
determinations (bi-ta6ayyun:ti-h:) exist.78
The second premise is that it is possible to abstract a single universal
concept or intention, either generic or specific (ma6nan w:Aidan naw6iyyan
aw jismiyyan), from individual beings, making it thus possible to judge of
the correspondence or conformity of these concepts with existing
entities, the soul existentiating them.
The third premise is that everything that exists in the external world is
something that is individualized (MQ, 224.14).
The fourth premise is that abstracted notions (ma6n:) cannot exist in
the external reality as individual instantiations. If an abstracted notion
a universalexisted as an individual entity in the external reality, then
we would necessarily have a single entity, qualified with opposing
attributes, on account of the various specified determinations (ta6ayyun:t
mutab:yina) that characterize beings in re and of the incompatible
properties (law:zimu-h: al-mutan:fiyya) that it would then possess and
that would negate its universal character. Mull: 4adr: notes that the
attribution of universals to particular in re entities only occurs by way of
qualification, of its many individual instantiations, since everything that
exists in the external world is something that is individualized,
something a universal cannot be (MQ, 224.57).
The universal is a notion that is singular, while being predicated of the
many entities it encompasses. Its intellective and universal existence can
be applied to sensible and particular beings (wuj<d:t) (MQ, 224.79).
The universal cannot exist in the world of the sense and of dimension; in
such cases, it would be particularized and ascribed a distinctive place and
a distinctive condition (MQ, 224.1012). The concept that encompasses
the various common modalities and distinctions shared by many
individual beings must, therefore, possess another type of existence.
For Mull: 4adr:, this should incite the one who seriously investigates to
179
79
Mull: 4adr: uses the terms existence (wuj<d) and being (mawj<d)
interchangeably.
80
For Mull: 4adr:, being cannot be apprehended by the mind. He states,
where he distinguishes universal and particular in terms of their effects and
efficiencies: Thus for each existing reality there is but one mode of realization.
Thus there is no mental existence for existence. That for which there is no mental
existence [that is, the mode of being of a logical concept] is neither universal nor
particular, nor general nor specific, see Mull: 4adr:, The Metaphysics of Mulla
Sadra [K. al-Mash:6ir] (transl. Parviz Morewedge; New York: Society for the
Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science, 1992), i. x9, 7.
necessarily conclude that the universal does not belong to the category
of individual beings.79 In accordance with Mull: 4adr:s theory of
gradation of being, the essential unicity (waAdati-hi al-dh:tiyya) of
universals expands in stages of being (a3w:r min al-kawn) and
possesses, in as much as these are universals, different and various
effects (:th:r) and modalities (anA:8), for example, dimension (MQ,
224.1317), but whose distinctive existences only occur in the mind.
Mull: 4adr: then notes that it can be objected that entities such as
genera (ajn:s), species (anw:6) and, more generally, universal natures
(3ab:8i6) all possess an existence in the receptacle of particular entities
(wuj<d:t ashkh:Bi-h:). Since these different concepts are unitedin
existencewith individual in re being (wuj<d kh:rij), then, why would
they possess an existence other than the one revealed through the
existentiation of each individual in re being (MQ, 224.1922). For Mull:
4adr:, this objection rests on a common confusion over the various
meanings of the term universal.80 In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, he
distinguishes three different meanings for the term universal: universal
can mean a mental attribute (Bifa 6aqliyya) that can be logically
predicated of a number of subjects (maw@<6:t) in the mind; a universal
can mean the quality of being attributed (ma6r<@) in actuality to
particular individuals; and universal can also mean the quiddity qua
quiddity (m:hiyya min Aaythu hiya hiya) whose nature it is to be
qualified by the first meaning of universal above-mentioned when it is
abstracted or liberated from its sensible determinations (quy<d). Mull:
4adr: notes that this whole discussion of the notion (ma6n:), or concept,
of universals, and of the beings (mawj<d:t) associated with these
individuals (shakhBiyy:t) only refers to the second meaning of universal
above-mentioned. Again, he concludes these short comments by referring
the reader to discussions about quiddity he included in his other works
(MQ, 225.16) (especially those found in his al-Asf:r al-arba6a).
Mull: 4adr: notes that this discussion is relevant for understanding
quiddities themselves. If the quiddity is described with a universal
180
81
These are individuals endowed with inner revelation (kashf) and direct
experience (shuh<d), like the mystic Ibn 6Arab, but Mull: 4adr: may well allude
to all those endowed with presential knowledge that discloses the reality of
being, see Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 8891.
attribute and is the most general, it exists by means of a modality of the

existence of the material sensibles, and if it is united with existence of its
individualities in the external reality, then it would be necessary that the
quiddity consists of a unique objective (6ayn) entity in the external
reality, individualized through its numerous attributed (mar<@) individualities (tashakhkhuB:t), all of which would be opposed to the notion
of universal, a view he takes to be manifestly false (MQ, 225.611).
Mull: 4adr: goes on to explain the comprehensiveness of intelligibles
in terms of their unity (waAda). He writes that the unity of an intellective
being (mawj<d 6aql) such as universals, inasmuch as, first, it possesses a
more elevated existence (wuj<d) than the sensible beings which it
subsumes and, second, it possesses greater unity than the type of unity
possessed by sensible entities, for example, objective (wa@6iyya) and
extensional unities (waAd:t), is able to encompass sensible multiplicity. It
possesses comprehension (Aay3a) and range (si6a), as opposed to the
limited and restricted nature of sensible entities. As individual
(fard:niyya) concepts, universals can, therefore, encompass the multiple
instantiations that are subsumed under their own comprehensiveness and
extension (MQ, 225.1316).
The unity of the object (maw@<6) refers only to its situational and its
sensible unity. It does not involve intellective or mental unity. If the latter
type of unity were included, then it would necessarily follow that
intellection would, in a sense, be corporeal, and capable of being
attributed to opposing entities. Naturally, this is not the case (MQ,
225.1719). Mull: 4adr: notes that his discussion on this type of
particularization, regarding the unity of the subject of opposition
(taq:bul), is not generally known (something on which he does not
elaborate further), but he adds that mystics (ahl al-kashf wa-l-shuh<d)81
have indicated and alluded to this important issue, one that pertains to
the ends of theology and which is part of discussions on Platonic Ideas,
whereas, he asserts, most philosophers and logicians did not mention it
(MQ, 225.7226.3).
In the remainder of the third part of al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, Mull:
4adr: discusses general philosophical positions regarding the relation of
mental existence with the various internal faculties. Most philosophers
have located particular, as opposed to universal, notions (ma6:n
juz8iyya) in the estimative faculty, while they have located material
forms in the passive imagination (khay:l). This classical Avicennan
181
position taken up or criticized by later philosophers has raised a number

of problems. In al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, Mull: 4adr: discusses five of
these problems (ashk:l) succinctly, 82 but one needs to turn to his alAsf:r al-arba6a for more extensive discussions and arguments addressing
those problems.
MENTAL EXISTENCE IN AL-MAS28IL

AL-QUDSIYYA
82
All these and the reasons why Mull: 4adr: continues the discussion in that
particular direction, all quite tantalizing, need further study: for the first sense,
cf. MQ, 226.15239.11; Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 277.6299.1; for the second,
cf. MQ, 239.12244.15; Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 299.2304.5; for the
third, cf. MQ, 244.16249.2; Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 304.6307.21; for the
fourth, cf. MQ, 249.3252.18; Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 308.1311.5; and for
the fifth, cf. MQ, 252.19254.5; Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 311.6312.2. In alAsf:r, he includes a sixth problem, cf. Mull: 4adr:, al-Asf:r, i.1. 312.3314.5.
83
Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 50. In fact, as Rizvi notes, The concept and reality of
being are quite distinct; the former is a secondary intelligible posited in the mind
whose reference is the reality of being in the extra-mental realm, see ibid, 41.
84
For further insight into Mull: 4adr: epistemology, see Kalin, Knowledge.
An understanding of Mull: 4adras views on mental existence is quite

important for our understanding of his gradation of being ontology, as
mental existence remains one of the three modes of being at the heart of
this novel ontology. As such, mental entities possess various ontological
modes of beings and are subject, like linguistic and extra-mental entities,
to the modulation of being.83 In his al-Mas:8il al-qudsiyya, a later work,
Mull: 4adr: discusses only three of the six proofs he included in his alAsf:r al-arba6a to demonstrate the existence of mental entities, three
proofs, we may assume, he deemed rather important. A first proof is
based on the ability to judge (between two mental concepts), that is, the
ability of the mind to predicate positive propositions onto non-existents,
an argument that goes back at least to the works of Fakhr al-Dn al-R:z,
Mull: 4adr: being an attentive reader of not only the latter but of both
Avicennas and NaBr al-Dn al-F<ss works. A second important proof is
based on the universality of mental concepts. More importantly,
however, Mull: 4adr: provides additional insights with a more
elaborate exposition of his third teleological proof (object of divine
insight), a demonstration he had introduced far too succinctly in his alAsf:r al-arba6a.84 With this latter demonstration, he argues that ends
being postulated as causes of motion or action can exist both in the
182
mind, as well as in the natural universals (for example, universal nature),

and become the metaphysical providers of ends to which naturals aspire,
the depositors of these ends, the final ends guiding material beings
toward their completion. The additional elements that Mull: 4adr:
provides for this particular demonstration illustrate his skills at creative
philosophical investigation and his capacity to elaborate novel arguments regarding one of the issues that still remains of paramount
importance for the history of philosophy of mind in the Islamicate
world.85 Indeed, Mull: 4adr:s intellectual endeavours are the fruits of a
true philosopher at work.
85
al-Sabzav:r further builds on Mull: 4adras proof and adds a distinction

between different types of agents: agents endowed with the ability to choose
(ikhtiy:r) and to utilize (taskhr), as opposed to agents moved by compulsion
(qasr), and finally, guided (hid:y:t) agents, cf. 2mul, RaAq-i makht<m, i.4. 86.

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Published online 7 April 2011

Journal of Islamic Studies 22:2 (2011) pp. 153182

AL-MAS28IL AL-QUDSIYYA AND MULL2

Presentations of earlier versions of this paper include Mental Existence in

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Aristotle noted that representation occurs through particular mental

Aristotle, De Memoria et reminiscentia (transl. J. I. Beare) in The Works of

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at the heart of cognition and the construction of knowledge. The soul

MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

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MULL2 4ADR2S PREDECESSORS

Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya, with the complete Glosses

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included in his al-Shaw:hid al-rub<biyya f l-man:hij al-sul<kiyya

MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

al-F:r:b (d. 339/950) would have, before Avicenna, discussed mental

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Shlomo Pines, Studies in Abul-Barakat al-Baghdads Poetics and

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Ab< l-Barak:t al-Baghd:d (d. ca. 1160) alluded similarly to the

MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

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Qu3b al-Dn al-Shr:z, Durrat al-t:j (ed. MuAammad Mishk:t; Tehran:

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MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

MENTAL EXISTENCE (WUJ?D DHIHNI ) IN

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In a number of his works, Mull: 4adr: discusses the nature of mental

A FIRST PRELIMINARY REMARK

Mull: 4adr:, al-Shaw:hid, mashh:d 1, sh:hid 2, 24.635.9.

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MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

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existence of mental entities, their nature, their epistemological function,

Diagram 1: Correspondence of quiddities in the mind

therefore, of paramount importance in Mull: 4adr:s ontology, whereby

Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 68.

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Diagram 2: Modalities of mental existence

MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

For a study of this concept in Avicenna, see Deborah L. Black, Mental

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existencerepresented by Ax1. These mental entities correspond to

A SECOND PRELIMINARY REMARK

Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 62.

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becomes possible via their corresponding quiddities found in the mind,

MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

DEFINITION OF MENTAL EXISTENCE

In his al-Asf:r al-arba6a, Mull: 4adr: presents a similar definition of

This section is introduced with an important example taken from Ibn

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being within Mull: 4adr:s modulation of being ontology. This is the

DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF

Ibid, 268.10269.13; cf. Rizvi, Mull: 4adr:, 80.

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1. An argument based on the possibility of conceiving entities that do not have a

MULL2 4ADR2 ON MENTAL EXISTENCE

THE FIRST DEMONSTRATION

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All of Mull: 4adr:s demonstrations of mental existence were

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