Leaders and Laggards

Leaders and Laggards: The Influence of Competing Logics on Corporate Environmental Action
Author(s): Irene M. Herremans, M. Sandy Herschovis and Stephanie Bertels

Source: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Oct., 2009), pp. 449-472
Published by: Springer
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Journalof BusinessEthics (2009)89:449-472

DOI 10.1007/sl0551-008-0010-z
Springer2008
Leadersand Laggards:The Influence

of Competing Logics on Corporate
EnvironmentalAction
ABSTRACT. We study the sources of resistance to

change among firmsin the Canadianpetroleumindustry
in responseto a shift in societal level logics related to
corporateenvironmentalperformance.Despite challenges
to its legitimacyas a result of poor environmentalperformance,the Canadianpetroleumindustrywas divided
as to how to respond,with some membersignoring the
concernsand resistingchange (i.e., laggards)while others
took action to ensurecontinuedlegitimacy(i.e., leaders).
We examine why organizationswithin the same institutional field respondeddifferently,delaying the industry
response. We found that one population of firms was
alignedwith increasingpressuresfrom its stakeholdersfor
improvedenvironmentalperformance,and the other was
influencedby local cultural,political,and economic ideals
less demanding of environmentalactions. Our results
reveal that severalfactorsboth at the institutionalfield
level and the organizationallevel affectedhow these two
populationsreacted to a changing societal logic. Implications for theory, practice, and future research are
discussed.
KEY WORDS: environmental performance, environmental reporting,institutionallogics, legitimacy, corporate responsibility
Introduction
When corporationsare faced with social or environmentallegitimacyconcerns,the extantliterature
attemptsto explainhow they will reactto close the
gap. Sethi's (1979) early work suggestedthat there
are variousbusinessstrategiesfor narrowinga legitimacy gap: the organizationcan change either (1)
business performance;(2) perceptions of performance,but not performanceitself;or (3) the symbols
used to describe performancethereby making it
Irene M. Herremans
M. Sandy Herschovis
Stephanie Bertels
consistent with perceptions. When implementing

strategies,responsescan rangeon a continuumfrom
"do nothing" to "do much" (Carroll, 1979).
Existingtheories, namely, institutional,stakeholder,
and resource dependency, provide insight into response varianceby firms; however, none of these
theories by themselvescan explain why companies
within the sameindustry(i.e., the Canadianpetroto close
leum industry1)chose to responddifferently
the industry'slegitimacy gap. For example, stakeholder theory suggeststhat firmsanswerto different
constituents,thus causingresponsevariance.However, stakeholdertheoryfailsto explainwhy firmsin
our case study did not respondto one of its biggest
stakeholders,its own industryassociation.Similarly,
a resource dependency perspective would predict
response variance due to differencesin access to
resources,proxiedby size. However, thisperspective
does not explain why some of the smallerfirms in
the Canadianpetroleumindustryare industryleaders, while some of the largestcompanieslag when it
comes to corporatesocial responsibility.
Over the period of our study, shifting societal
level logics for improved corporateenvironmental
performancecreatedlegitimacy concerns for many
industries, especially for resource-intensiveindustries. Severalof these industriesrespondedby actually changing their behavior by implementing or
expanding environmentalprogramsand reporting
their environmentalperformance.We investigate
why competing logics on the part of Canadian
petroleum firms created conflicts in establishing
industrynorms for trackingand reportingenvironmental performance,delayingthe industryresponse
compared to other environmentally sensitive,
resource-basedindustries.Some firmsrespondedby

450
Irene M. Herremans et al.
actually changing behavior; yet, others felt that

perceptionsof stakeholders
requiredchangingand did
little or nothing to assesstheir own environmental
performance. Thus, we ask the question: What
impeded the Canadianpetroleum industry'sability
to act collectively?Combining archivaland interview datato conduct a historicalanalysis,we demonstratehow differingresponsesto changingsocietal
logics dividedthe field on the issue of developingan
industry-wide environmental management system
and performance disclosure program. Thus, we
investigatethe resistanceto change by some of the
industry's firms by analyzing forces at both the
organizationand field level to offer contributionsto
the fields of institutional logics and corporate
responsiveness.
Our findingsindicatethatone populationof firms
was more receptive to the societal shift toward a
stakeholder logic and, thus, developed strategies
more alignedwith increasingpressuresfor corporate
environmentalactions, while the other population
remained guided by a shareholderlogic that was
influencedby local cultural,political,and economic
ideals less demanding of environmental actions.
These two populationsperceived and respondedto
legitimacyconcerns with differentstrategiesdue to
differencesin organizationalcharacteristicssuch as
size, geographiclocation of operations,and breadth
of operations.Also, the characteristicsof the institutional field, especiallythe structureof the industry's trade associations and the local context,
influenced the development of two differentlogics
regardingacceptablecorporatesocial behavior.As a
result, a group of the industry'sfirms, unwilling to
participatein the industry association'sefforts to
initiatean environmentalperformanceand reporting
program,delayedthe environmentalresponseof the
industryoverall.
In the next section, we provide a conceptual
frameworkby reviewing relevant literaturein the
areaof institutionallogics andthe collectiveresponse
of industriesto threatsto legitimacyas well as providing background on the Canadian petroleum
industry. We then describe our context in more
detail and outline the methodology for our study.
This is followed by our findings,where we outline
two competing logics around corporate environmentalaction and discussthe factorsthat influenced
why firmsadoptedand appliedthese differentlogics.
We conclude by presentingthe implicationsof our

findings.
Conceptual framework
Institutional theory and corporatesocial responsibility
Institutional theory aims to understandhow an

organizationinteractswith its institutionalcontext to
determine its reaction to societal expectationsand
how such expectations are incorporated in its
activities (Martinez, 1999). Scott (1995) defines
institutionsas "cognitive, normative,and regulative
structuresand activities that provide stabilityand
meaningto socialbehaviour"(p. 33). Earlywork in
the area of institutionaltheory focused on the diffusionof institutionaleffectsacrossinstitutionalfields
through mimetic, coercive, and normative forces,
suggesting that organizationsbecome isomorphic
(i.e., similar)for reasonsof legitimacyandthuscreate
uniformity in organizationalresponses (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott,
1991).
Considerableresearch(e.g., Deegan, 2002; Doh
and Guay, 2006) has investigatedcorporatesocial
responsibilityusing an institutionaltheory framework. For instance, Patten (1992) studiedExxon's
response to its highly publicized oil spill of 1989,
which resultedin a legitimacy threat to the company. Patten found that subsequent to the spill,
Exxon increased its corporate environmental
reportingto demonstrateits good intentionstoward
the environment.As a greatdealof uncertaintyexists
regarding acceptable standardsfor environmental
reporting,isomorphicforcesshouldleadinstitutional
membersto createsimilarproceduresand practices.
Consequently, companies would be expected to
adopt globallyrecognizedenvironmentaland communicationstandards(Bansal,2005).
However, conformityto existing norms may be
difficult when organizationsface different stakeholders with different interests. Many industries,
including the petroleum industry,operatein complex environmentsin which they perceivepragmatic
legitimacy, which serves the economic interestsof
the shareholders,to conflict with moral legitimacy,
which emphasizes the environmentaland health
interests of stakeholders (see Suchman, 1995).

Leadersand laggards
Campbellet al. (2003) examinedorganizationsthat
differedin their level of perceivedsocial and ethical
behavior, and found that companies with fewer
critical legitimacy concerns sometimes disclosed
more than their less legitimate counterparts.Based
on their findings,Campbellet al. questionedwhether institutionaltheory accounted for variationin
socialdisclosurein the context of theirstudy.Several
studies have examined the collective response of
industriesto threatsto their legitimacy, which we
discussin the next section. Thereafter,we provide
insight into responsevariancethrough institutional
logics.
The collective response of industries to legitimacy threats
In recent years, severalstudies have examined the

collective use of corporatesocial action at the level
of industriesto preserve or protect their interests
(Barnett,2006a, b; Hofrman,1999; King andLenox,
2000; King et al., 2002). Barnett(2006b) described
how the tobacco, nuclear power, apparel, and
footwear industries all intensified their collective
effortswhen threatenedby a loss of public approval.
Hoffman(1999, 2001a, b) investigatedhow the U.S.
chemical and petroleum industries responded to
increasingregulatorypressuresregardingtheir environmentalperformance,initiallypursuingconfrontationalstrategies,but by the late 1980s, embracing
corporateenvironmentalism.
Industrylevel pressuresfor environmentalactions
may come from customers,industryassociations,or
the competitivepressuresof dominantfirms setting
new standards for environmental performance
(Christmann,2004). At the industrylevel, legitimacy
is a collectivegood andthussubjectto the problemsof
free ridingand the difficultyof mobilizingcollective
action(Barnett,2006a).Regardlessof theirindividual
performance,membersof an industrycan become
"tarredby the samebrush"(Kingand Lenox, 2000).
As a result,firmsmayjoin forcesto fend off a threatto
the legitimacyof the entireindustry.
The chemical industryin Canada,as well as in
other countries,came under severe public scrutiny
primarilydue to the incidentin Bhopal,India(Petrick
et al., 1999). Therefore,in the mid-1980s the CanadianChemicalProducers'Associationintroducedan
industry-wideenvironmentalmanagementsystem,
451
the Responsible Care Program(ResponsibleCareIn-Place Verification,1997, 2001) as a key component of its legitimizationprocess(Schmitt,2001).
Similarly,the Canadianforestryindustrywas threatened by growing disapprovalof the practiceof cutting down old growth forest in British Columbia
(Bansal,2001). Consequently,the forestryindustry
participatedin the developmentof provincialcodes
and then a national forestrystandardthrough the
CanadianStandardsAssociation.Along with higher
performance standards comes a requirement of
accountabilitythroughreporting.After an organization engagesin environmentalactivitiesfor a period
of time, the next step is to disclosethose activitiesto
interestedparties.This disclosureis used both internally and externallyfor decision-makingpurposes.
Previousresearchhas also shown that industriesthat
engage in resource extraction are more likely to
provide disclosure on environmentalactivities by
engagingin reporting(Bewley and Li, 2000; Herremanset al., 1993). Furthermore,it is common to use
environmentalreportingfor testsof legitimacytheory
(e.g., see Hooghiemstra,2000).
Our review thus far suggeststhat in the face of
legitimacy concerns, the Canadian petroleum
industrywould be expected to respondby working
collectively to maintain legitimacy through the
developmentof standardsfor environmentalactions
and reporting.However, this did not happen. Instead, a group of firms, unwilling to participatein
the industryassociation'seffortsto initiate an environmentalperformanceand reportingprogram,delayed the environmentalresponse of the industry
overall. This resistanceto change in the Canadian
petroleum industry is supportedby other studies.
Bansal (2005) found that the Canadianpetroleum
industry lagged behind the mining and forestry
industriesin sustainabilityperformanceand reporting, and Aertset al. (2006) found that the Canadian
petroleumindustryhad low intra-industryimitation
comparedto petroleumindustriesin other countries.
Institutional logics
A focus on institutionallogics may help explain

variation in responses to legitimacy threats. Even
though current work employing an institutional
approachstill sharesan interestin how culturalrules

452
and cognitive structuresshapeinstitutions,the trend

is away from investigationsof how organizational
fields are driven to become similarand static over
time (Hirsch, 1997; Hirsch and Lounsbury,1997;
Hoffman and Ventresca,2002) and toward understandingthe differentialeffectsof institutionson the
behavior of actors. From this perspective,institutional fields are heterogeneous,dynamic, and contested (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997), and
institutionalizationis envisioned as a process rather
than an outcome. Studyinginstitutionalizationas a
processfocuses attention on how institutionsshape
cultural,political, and economic interestsand how
those interests are translatedinto organizational
actions,which are also influencedby cognitive and
culturalframeworks(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991;
Scott, 2001). Individuals and organizations are
constrainedin their choice of actionsby individual-,
organizational-, and societal-level institutions
(Friedlandand Alford, 1991). Furthermore,these
levels arenested,and thusattentionto multiplelevels
is crucialto understandinghow institutionsconstrain
action, which has resulted in a growing research
streamin the areaof institutionallogics (for a recent
review of this literaturesee Thornton and Ocasio,
2008). In studyingthe impactof institutionallogics,
Dillardet al. (2004), and Clegg (1999) have argued
that the field is influenced by organization-level
characteristics
and Battilana(2006) suggeststhat it is
to
important consider all three levels of analysis:
fields, organizations,and individuals.
Scott (2001) describedinstitutionallogics as the
belief systemsand relatedpracticesthat dominatean
institutionalfield and provide guidelines to actors
within the field. These logics "structurethe cognition of actors in organizationsand provide a collective understandingof how strategicinterestsand
decisionsare formulated"(Thornton, 2002, p. 82),
and guide organizationaldecision makingby determining which issues and problems are salient to
management (Lounsbury,2007). In this body of
research,organizationsare embedded within prevailing institutionallogics, which both enable and
constrain organizationaldecisions and outcomes
(Thorntonand Ocasio, 2008).
Recent researchin the areaof institutionallogics
has delved into the notion of competing logics
(Lounsbury,2007; Marquisand Lounsbury,2007;
Thornton, 2002), rather than a dominant logic
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) and how competing

logics shapeinstitutionalfields.These studiessuggest
thatseveralorganizational
populationscan existin an
institutionalfield. Organizationswithin a population
"sharesimilarinterestsand may, under appropriate
circumstances,bandtogetherto protect [theirmember organizations]"(Scott and Davis, 2007, p. 117).
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggested that
organizationsin the same institutional field are
embeddedwithin an enactedcontext wherein higher-order societal institutions (such as the family,
religion, government,and the professions)shapean
organization'svision of the world. Seo and Creed
(2002)havesuggestedthatinstitutionalcontradictions
- that is to say, the variousinconsistenciesthat develop within and among institutionalsystems lead
some actorsto tryto initiateinstitutionalchangein an
effort to resolve the inconsistencies.Mattinglyand
Hall (2008) have emphasized the importance of
competing societal logics in explaining the social
forcesthatshapecollectiveactionandwhetheror not
it provesto be effective.They note thatlogics guide
"the types of action that tend to seem reasonableto
variousfactionsin an organizationfield" (Mattingly
andHall, 2008, p. 69). Furthermore,suchcompeting
logics can be a source of resistanceto change, as
demonstratedby Marquisand Lounsbury(2007).
According to the institutionallogics perspective,
in additionto organizationandfield-levelinfluences,
how organizationsinterpretthe meaning and consequencesof externalthreatsto legitimacywill also
be contingenton their social context (Friedlandand
Alford, 1991). Legitimacyis a perception that the
actionsof an entity are appropriatewithin a socially
constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs
(Suchman,1995). Corporationsgenerallyattemptto
demonstratecredibilityand legitimacyby conforming to the institutionalizeddemandsof constituents
(Hunter and Bansal, 2006); and to do so, often
organizationswill imitatethe responsesof successful
peers (Deephouse, 1996; Lamertzet al., 2005). As
noted by Deephouse and Carter(2005, p. 351), "if a
firm's actions or structures do not meet social
expectations,a firm can have its legitimacy questioned and challenged," and low environmental
legitimacycan pose a riskto profitability(Payneand
Raiborn, 2001).
Our study builds on this body of researchby
examining why firms in the Canadianpetroleum

Leadersandlaggards
industry responded differentlyto the institutional
contradictionspresentedby a shift in societal level
logics relatedto corporateenvironmentalreporting.
We do this throughthe lens of competinglogics by
examining factors at both the organizationaland
field levels.
453
(AmericanPetroleumInstitute)beganreporting,and
well behind other environmentallysensitive industries, such as the chemicaland forestryindustries.
Data sources and analysis
We draw from multiple sources to develop our

analysis.Two major types were used: archivaldata
and interviews.
Method
Drawing from multiple data sources, and using a
generalanalyticalinductive approach,we followed
Eisenhardt's(1989) and Yin's (1998, 2003) recommendationsfor case studyresearchand the processes
suggestedby Miles and Huberman(1994) for analyzingqualitativedata.While our interviewdatahave
an emphasison the organizationallevel, we also
analyzethe field level using both archivaland interview data to explain institutionalforces that motivated differentstrategicresponsesby the industry
members.Attention to both levels was crucial for
how the firmsin this industrydiffered
understanding
in their responsesto societallevel changesthrough
environmentalperformanceand reporting.
Study context
Accordingto the CanadianAssociationof Petroleum

Producer's (CAPP) website, Canada is the third
largestproducerof naturalgas and the ninth largest
producerof crude oil in the world. In this industry,
even thoughall the majormultinationalcorporations
havea presencein Canada,over 200 producersmake
up the industry.Many of the remainingcompanies
operateonly in Canadaor in Canadaand the United
States. The Board of Governors for CAPP was
formedwith equalrepresentationfrom each of three
segments:small,medium, and large (10 representatives each). Due to this governance structure,the
largerfirms do not dominate as much as expected
basedon productionor revenues.Thus, the industry
lacksa dominatingforce that could provide homogeneity. In 1999, CAPP introducedits Stewardship
Program to improve environmentalperformance
and reportingof performance.However, the introduction of this programcame severalyearsafterthe
industry'slargest producers began environmental
disclosure,six years after CAPP's US counterpart
Archival data
We used archival data to assess the state of the

industry'sreputationand to understandthe context
in which the industrywas operating.Studies from
independentpollingagencieswere usedto determine
the perceptionof the industry'sreputationduringthe
decadeof the 1990s.Then, we used key searchterms
and digitizeddatabasesto searchthe most prominent
national (The Globe and Mail) and local (The
CalgaryHerald) newspapersto count positive and
negative newspaperarticlesabout the industryand
individualcompaniesfor a ten-year period. These
articleswere coded aspositiveor negativeby research
assistantsand compared for agreement. Any disagreementswere solved with the assistanceof the
lead researcher.Communicationby the industryand
individualcompanieswas monitored over the same
period of time (environmentalreports, websites,
greenhouse gas emissions reports, annual reports,
reporting awards) to determine which companies
were reporting,and the quality of, and motivation
were
for, the reports.Organizationalcharacteristics
and
from
Bloomberg
Benjamin
gatheredprimarily
Financial databases.Benjamin Financial database
specializesin the collection of both financial and
operational data on the North American energy
industry.Tradeassociationdatawere gatheredfrom
the membershiplistsof the varioustradeassociations.
Finally,a review of election resultsgave us a senseof
the economically conservativepolitical atmosphere
in the provincein which most petroleumcompanies
are headquartered. This conservative ideology,
which we discussin the resultssection, was reinforcedin our interviews.
Focused interviews
We conductedtwo sets of interviewsover a six-year

period, with on-going contact with subject matter

454
Irene M. Herremans et al
expertsbetween the two sets. To determineappropriate questions for the interviews, we reviewed
archival data, such as corporate environmental
reports;consultants'reportspreparedfor the industry
on environmental reporting; watchdog organizations' reports; reports by environmental
non-government organizations (ENGOs); and
environmentalreporting guidelines used by other
industries.In the first set, we held eight groups of
interviewswith two to four subjectmatterexpertsin
each group (24 total), representingsix categories:
eight corporateenvironmentalmanagers(threefrom
large corporations, three intermediate, and two
small); four from environmentalgroups; six from
government/regulatorygroups; three consultants;
one industrywatchdog;and two accountinggroups
involvedwith environmentalsystems.Companysize
was defined as per CAPP's tier structure,in which
the 20 top producersaretier 1 (or large),the next 40
are tier 2 (intermediate),and the remainingfirmsare
tier 3 (small).We deliberatelyselected categoriesof
persons known to hold different perspectiveson
corporatesocial responsibility(Yin, 2003), to maximize our opportunityto understandthe different
logics held by industryparticipants.
Subject matter experts in each category were
asked the same core question, (e.g., where does
society think the petroleumcompaniesare in regard
to addressing environmental performance and
reporting?)The researchersallowed some flexibility
for participantsto provide informationunique to
their knowledge base.
During this first set of interviews, it became
apparentthatthe industrywas not readyto publically
disclose information on industry environmental
performance (dissimilarto other environmentally
sensitiveindustriesin Canadaand the same industry
in the United States).This conclusionwas basedon
the strong,conflictingpoints of view from company
managersabout the notion of industrytransparency,
the lack of current actions and reporting,and the
historyof failedattemptsto agreeon even a basicset
of reportingindicators.Although we observedvarious stages of readinessby industry members, we
found that different fundamentalbeliefs were a
barrierto moving forward as an industry.At this
time, there was very little attempt to boost legitimacy through reporting,with only two firms providing any substantialenvironmentaldisclosure.
After six years, when more corporatereporting

had occurred, we conducted follow-up interviews
(two hours each)using semi-structuredquestions to
determine motives. We interviewed five environmental managers representing three companies
consideredto be environmentalleadersin performanceandreporting.We conductedone finalthreehour interview with a representativeof CAPP,
asking questions about the industry'sStewardship
Programand Report, the motivationfor producing
the report, cooperation of the industry'smember
companies, and future plans for attaining higher
levels of performanceand reporting.During the first
roundof interviews,very little reportingactivityhad
occurredin the industry.For the second round,we
specifically targeted those companies who were
leadersto more clearlydeterminetheir motivations
for changing.Because the tradeassociationhadjust
initiatedits StewardshipProgramand had an overall
perspectiveon its members'views on thisprogram,a
representativefrom CAPP helped to clarify the
resistanceto change for the laggards.This information sourcewas deemedappropriateconsideringthat
CAPP was wrestlingwith the laggardsregardingthe
need for change.
Guidedby the initialinterviewquestions,we read
each interview transcript several times to gain
familiarity with the material. Initially, we used
descriptivecodes to label chunks of informationin
each transcript.The initial codes that emerged included the following: ideology/philosophy of the
industry;ideology/philosophyof society; usefulness
of environmentalpolicies; control system elements
(e.g., environmentalaudits);environmentalperformance of the industry;costs/benefits of environmental performance; communication of the
industry; usefulness of a benchmarking system;
processof creatinga benchmarkingsystem;size;role
of CAPP; and self-policing.
We then looked for patternsamong the codes,
eliminating redundanciesand broadening or narrowing the categorieswhere necessaryuntil major
themes evolved. Our analysis began to cluster
around the differing attitudes of two dominant
groupswith regardto severalkey issues.Aftermore
sorting and clustering,we were able to group the
codes into the following themes regardingattitudes:
environmentalperformance,regulation,shareholders, and how these factors shaped environmental

Leadersand laggards
reporting.These themes were used to describetwo
different institutionallogics guiding the strategic
actionsof the firmsin this industry.
To improvethe reliabilityof our analysis,we used
coding consistencychecks (three researchassistants
looked for inconsistenciesbetween transcriptsand
coding with any discrepanciesresolved)and stakeholder checks (review of the final manuscriptwith
subjectareaspecialists).Although observation,participation, and archivaldata were not codified for
this study, one author'scontinued associationwith
the industrythrough participationin severalstakeholder reviews of environmentalreports,review of
industrycommunicationdocuments,and participation on board meetings of a major communication
foundation for the industry helped to ensure the
validityof the transcriptinterpretation.These multiple sourcesof evidence helped to yield richer insight and understandingof our interview data, the
context, and the phenomenon studied (Eisenhardt,
1989; Scanduraand Williams,2000; Yin, 2003).
Findings
An industryunderattack
The archival data revealed that the petroleum

industryfaced concernsregardingits reputationand
legitimacy due to shifting societal expectations.
Throughoutthe 1980s and 1990s, severallocal and
internationalincidents createdskepticismregarding
the industry'sabilityto meet society'sdemands(see
Table I). Public concerns over industry conduct
reduced industryaccess to drillingrights in several
communities. Furthermore,the regulatoryagency
requiredall companiesto engage in public consultation with communitiesdue to increasingconflicts
(EUB, 1999). Our searchof one of Canada'smajor
nationalnewspapers,the Globe and Mail, revealeda
3:1 ratioof negativeto positivearticlesregardingthe
environmentalperformanceof the industrybetween
1991 and 2001.
Severalpolls taken between 1994 and 2002 (see
Table II) illustratethe declining reputationof the
industryat the same time that society'sdemandsfor
improvedenvironmentalperformanceand reporting
were increasing.In 1994, when Canadiansconsistently cited the environmentas equalin importance
455
to crime and taxes (AngusReid Group, 1994), the

petroleum industry was viewed as a "poor environmentalperformer"(Angus Reid Group, 1994).
Two years later, Canadiansperceived the energy
industry as the furthest from sustainability(Environmental Monitor, 1996). In 2000, the industry
had the highest level of negative ratings of any
industry tested. Forty-three percent of Canadians
indicated that their opinions of the industry had
worsened ((PCF) Petroleum Communications
Foundation,2000). Finally,in 2002, the percentage
of Canadiansthat viewed the industry as causing
significantenvironmentaldamage continued to increase.The resultsof the polls, reduced drillingaccess, increasednumber of hearingsto access land,
and negativemedia attentionall suggestthe industry
was facing an increasingthreatto its legitimacy.
Competing institutional logics: resistance to change
Our analysisof the interview and archivaldata revealed that firmswithin the industrywere drivenby
different institutional logics with one population
guided by a logic aligned with increasingsocietal
pressures for improved corporate environmental
performanceand reporting(labeled"leaders,")and
the other guidedby a logic shapedby local, cultural,
political, and economic ideals less receptive to
environmentalperformanceand reporting (labeled
"laggards").In realitythese two populationsare not
entirely mutuallyexclusive, but ratherfirms in the
industry are more likely placed on a continuum.
However, for simplicityin discussingour findings,
we will speak only of the extremesin the differing
logics of leadersand laggards.For these two populations, we detected key differences in attitudes
toward the following themes: environmentalperformance, regulation, and the emphasison shareholdersvs. stakeholders.These differentattitudesin
turn resultedin differentactionson the partof these
companies, including their willingness to improve
environmentalperformanceand to disclose their
actions.This dichotomyin attitudesand actionswas
consistentlyexpressedby the respondentsthat participatedin the interviews.
When publichostilityandprotestincreasedto the
extent that it was interferingwith access to lands
for oil exploration and development, the industry

IreneM. Herremanset al.
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IreneM. Herremanset al
association attempted to convince all association

members to engage in a Stewardship Program designed to improve and report environmental performance. Knowing that this required considerable
persuasion, industry association staff engaged those
companies that already had extensive environmental
programs to convince other industry members that
the program was necessary. Initially, the Stewardship
Program was voluntary, allowing laggards to remain
part of the association during a learning period.
Eventually, in 2004, the Program became mandatory. An industry representative explained the process in this manner.
We've been talking about industry association
[environmental] reporting probably since the late
1980s, and what really brought it to the front...was
the series of events that happenedaroundthe Weibo
Ludwig affair and the unfortunatedeath of Patrick
Kent (see Table I). It was becoming obvious that we
needed to do a betterjob as an industryof telling the
public what we're about...are we getting better?...worse? We didn't even know ourselves...Over
the period of 1998 and 1999 we got the [Stewardship] Programunderway, and I have to say that the
initial industry leadershipquickly vanished. I'm not
sure why. I would say the CAPP staffnot pushing it
was probably70%of the problem,and the other 30%
was that people did not see value in it... A lot of the
companiesthat were... influentialin getting it passed,
were already reporting so it wasn't a big deal for
them.
Our explorations revealed that the industry was
divided on how to respond to these legitimacy
concerns. Leaders recognized their lowered credibility, but the laggardstended to blame the criticisms
of the industry on the inability of stakeholders to
understand. One respondent noted that "people's
perceptions about the environment are so engrained
that even if they see it all laid out, they won't believe
it. We are fighting people's perceptions, not what is
real." Although both populations perceived that
their environmental reputation was poor, the laggards did not perceive this as a concern. Their primary concern was their investors, and laggards even
suggested that attention to environmental concerns
would hurt rather than help the shareholders' perception of the industry. While the leaders perceived
environmental concerns, the laggards did not.
Consequently, the two organizational populations
employed different response strategies. The leaders

initiated environmental actions and various types of
disclosure, which tended to be of a higher quality
(e.g., use of indicators, audit processes, and reporting
standards). In addition, several of these leaders engaged stakeholders in various ways to determine if
the company's level of environmental performance
was adequate. In contrast, the laggards made use of
avoidance and defiance strategies (Oliver, 1991).
Tables III, IV, V, and VI provide more detail about
these logics with sample quotations to support our
analysis. These differences in attitudes toward environmental reporting, regulation, and stakeholders
are now described in more detail.
Attitudes towardenvironmental
performance
The two institutional logics were evidenced, first
and foremost, by the differences placed on the person responsible for environmental performance (see
Table III). The environmental position held by
leaders generally had direct reporting to senior
management. In contrast, laggards often had only a
part-time or no environmental position. To ensure
that environmental performance became part of
every worker's day-to-day activities, leaders had
decentralized decision making for local subsidiaries,
performed third-party audits, began to implement
legislation before it was passed, and provided every
worker with principles to guide decision making.
These guiding principles flowed throughout the
organization, even to field employees. One environmental technical specialist (independently employed) commented that "the guys who are doing
the routine operation and those who operate the
weed sprayers and bulldozers are all aware of the
kinds of things they are not suppose to be doing and
why, and they are excited about it." Laggards differentiated the petroleum industry from the chemical industry, rationalizing that their operations were
less hazardous environmentally. Because they did
not perceive the petroleum industry to be particularly hazardous, they did not perceive a need for
environmental reporting.
Attitudes towardregulation
Regarding regulation and the role of government
(see Table IV), leaders moved beyond compliance
and were concerned about qualifying for ethical
investments, benchmarking against their peer group,

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performingself-audits,and ensuringthat they were
good role models. In contrast,laggardswere modeled by a governmentthat believed environmental
actionsand economic developmentwere trade-offs.
Largely due to the local government (discussed
later),they attendedto signalsby an "extremeright
wing ideology that says less government,less government, there is no room for governmenthere."
Weak enforcement,due to lack of sufficientfunding
by the government, supported this attitude. For
instance,the CAPP representativeindicatedthat the
attitudeof the laggardswas often to "get in, get out
what you can, and somebody else will clean up the
mess."
Attitudes toward stakeholders
Leaders recognized stakeholders' demands for

informationabout oil industryoperations,especially
in their communities(see Table V). "Opennessand
transparency"became key values for these firms.
Some of these firms were even willing to turn in
licenses if they perceived that the public objected
stronglyto drillingin a particulararea.One company
commented:"My feeling is that if the community
doesn't want you maybe you should not be there
despite all the approvals."Leadersactively invited
stakeholdersto provide opinions on a variety of
operationalactivities and shared data with them
throughlocal committees.
In contrast,the attitudeof the laggardswas one
of independence."I came up by my bootstraps,and
I am going to do things my way." To them,
independencemeant freedom "from anybody telling you the way you've got to do it." They
rationalizedthat shareholdersdid not "give two
hoots" about the environmentand that society did
not understandthe oil business and its environmental impact. This attitude toward stakeholders
was maintainedthroughan associationthat "doesn't
like being told what to do" and a governmentthat
"questioneda number of times the environmental
conditionsthat [regulatorydepartments]would like
to place on industry."
Attitudes toward environmental reporting
These attitudestoward environmentalactions, regulation, and shareholdersinfluenced the firms'

decisions to report performance.Leadersindicated
that they reaped "opportunity cost savings,"
461
"competitive edges," internal economic improvements, and opportunitiesfor operatingpartnerships.

They viewed good environmentalperformanceas an
investment in future access to land for exploration
and againstbad publicity. One company continued
its environmentalperformanceand reporting even
when it was experiencing financiallosses. Several
companies tied their profit-sharingor bonus programspartiallyto environmentalperformanceindicators. One firm commented: "It is an element in
everyone'sperformancecontract."In contrast,laggardssaw environmentalprotectionas a "cost item"
and regulation as "expensive." This attitude was
supportedby an investmentcommunitythat, at that
time, was "not a great supporterof environmental
protection" because of the demand for high quarterly earningsand the perceptionthat "doing more
than what they needed to do to comply...would be
wasting money." Neither did they believe that the
Responsible Care programhelped to improve the
chemical industry'sreputation;therefore, a similar
programwould not improve the petroleum industry'sreputation.
Leaders felt that reporting is "part of being
transparentand engaging the stakeholders."Most
were engaged in global trade and understood"the
demand for comparativeanalysis."They felt that
reportingopened marketsin foreigncountrieswhere
their reputationswere not well known. Reporting
companies were driven by values of honesty and
integrity.They would reportbad performancealong
with good performance and avoided reporting
indicatorsin which dataintegritymight be an issue.
Several indicators in the reports were reviewed
through third-partyassurances.Leaders also used
their reportsto improve internalmanagementand
saw an overlap between economic and environmentalperformance.They were disappointedto see
the lack of progressin industryreportingand triedto
convince laggardsthatit was the rightthing to do. In
contrast,laggardsfelt that "no news is good news."
They were unwilling to "put their company data
with their name forwardin the document" as the
information "may be used against them." They
rationalizedthat any measuringinstrumentwould
not be fair "because our plant is different."They
were unwillingto do anythingthatwas not required
by regulationand did not believe that reportingled
to better management.

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The interaction of field level and organization level
influences
We found that a diverseset of field level influences
and organizationalcharacteristicsled to the differences between these two organizationalpopulations.
As we discussthese factorsin the next sections, we
frequentlyrefer to Table VII which providesinformation on the characteristicsof 36 petroleum
companies(makingup more than 85%of Canadian
oil production),including environmentaldisclosure
indices,membershipin tradeassociations,numberof
countries in which firms operate, listings on stock
exchanges,and companysize (basedon production).
Two primaryinfluences at the field level contributedto these contrastingorganizationalpopulations:the structureof the industry'stradeassociation
coupled with an organization'slevel of exposureto
the local cultural,political,and economic climate.
Lack of a coordinated trade association
Barnett(2006a)notes that industryand tradeassociationsprovidethe primarylegalmeansof intentional

coordination.However, accordingto Scott (2001,
p. 140), "organizationsvary in the extent to which
they are under the jurisdictionalauthorityof oversight agencies."Scott suggeststhat "the influenceof
various regulatory and normative bodies varies
depending on the institutional logics dominant
within the wider institutionalenvironments"(2001,
p. 158). Indeed, the industryassociation'stask was
difficult.In the wordsof an industrymember,"trying
to police the oil industryis like tryingto herd cats."
As mentioned earlier,over 200 producersmake up
the industryassociation(Also, The Small Explorers
and ProducersAssociationof Canada(SEPAC),another trade association with over 450 members,
representsthe emergingjunior oil and gas companies).The Boardof Governorsfor CAPPwas formed
with equal representationbased on size categories
rather than larger producershaving greatervoice.
Due to this governancestructureof absolutenumbers,the majorproducersdo not dominateasmuch as
expectedbasedon productionor revenues.Thus, the
industrylacksa dominatingforce that could provide
homogeneity.CAPP, therefore,dealswith divergent
attitudestoward environmentalconcerns among its
many membersbecauserepresentationis not determined by productionlevels.
As shown in Table VII, the majority of the

weakest reporters(laggards)were membersof only
one trade association, that is, CAPP, (the trade
association for upstream producers). In contrast,
most of the strongreporters(leaders)were receiving
signals from other trade associations,such as the
Canadian Petroleum Products Institute (CPPI),
whose membershave refining and retailoperations
andhave providedan environmentalreportfor some
time. Other strong reporterswere membersof the
CanadianChemical ProducersAssociation(CCPA)
and/or its Responsible Care program and the
AmericanPetroleumInstitute,whose memberswere
also providing environmentalreports. Yet, others
were members of internationaltrade associations,
such as the InternationalPetroleumIndustryEnvironmentalConservationAssociation(IPIECA).
The differing exposure to local cultural, political,
and economicforces
Along with a weak tradeassociation,a key difference

between these two groups of firms related to the
degreeto which thesefirmswere exposedto the local
provincial context. The leading firms generally
operatedin a moreinternationalcontextmoreattuned
to changing societal expectations about environmental performanceand reporting.In contrast,the
laggardsin our studyattendedonly to selectedsignals
from their immediate geographic context (e.g.,
shareholderdemands,politicalideology)andignored
broader societal expectationsthat could endanger
both their own legitimacyand that of the Canadian
petroleumindustryas a whole. Instead,the laggards
reflectedthe localprovincialculturethatexhibitedless
concernfor the environmentandwere lessconcerned
with addressingstakeholderexpectations.Therefore,
laggardsperceivedenvironmentalactions,reporting,
andregulationto be an unnecessarycost ratherthana
meansto accesslandsfor producingproduct.
This culture was supported by the provincial
government, led by the ProgressiveConservative
party, Canada'sright of center party.The Progressive Conservativepartyand its equallyconservative
predecessor,the Social Credit Party, have been in
office since 1935 without interruption.This government emphasizes economic liberalism (e.g.,
deregulation,tax cuts) and social conservatism(e.g.,
reducedspendingon social programs).The provincial government perpetuated laggard perceptions

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467
that environmental attention was unimportant

through poor enforcementof environmentalregulations, impeding key environmental initiatives,
cutting regulatoryboards' budgets, and ignoring
recommendationsmade by environmentaldepartments and professionals.Consequently,local firms
were generally unwilling to participate in the
industryassociation'seffortsto initiatea performance
and reportingprogram.
reporting. They dismissedthe need for improvements to environmental performance, instead,

emphasizingfinancialperformance.Laggards,more
likely to be local, upstreamfirms and less likely
to have boardcommitteesto addressenvironmental
issues, were reluctant to disclose information
regardingtheir environmentalperformancedue to
the presenceof a differentinstitutionallogic.
Organizational level characteristics
Discussion
alsoplayed
level characteristics
Severalorganizational
a role in determiningwhich logic was more salient
for these firms (see Table VII). For instance,leaders
tended to have operationsin more countries and
were listed on more stock exchangesand/or stock
exchangesoutside Canada.Laggardswere less likely
to have a boardcommitteeto addressenvironmental
issues.Of those companiesthat had board committees, a review of their duties showed a focus on
meeting regulatoryrequirementsand avoiding fines
ratherthan addressingthe broad level sustainability
demandsof their stakeholders,as the leaders'committees did. Furthermore,as shown in Table VII,
many of the leaderswere integrated,operatingin
both the upstream(explorationand production)and
the downstream(transportation,
refining, and enduser sales)sides of the petroleumbusiness,whereas
few of the laggardsoperated in the downstream
sector (retailsector).Also, if a companyhas operations in a numberof countriesand is integrated,it is
likely that it will be a large company with less
dependencyon scarceresources.Even though many
of the leadersare large companies,size is not the
only variablethat helps to understandthe existence
of two logics within the industry(See Table VII).
We summarizeour findings as follows. Leaders
were guided by a logic aligned with increasing
societal pressuresfor improved corporateenvironmental performance and reporting. They were
attemptingto improve environmentalperformance
in response to pressuresfrom a variety of stakeholdersand were willing to disclose their progress,
thereby moving beyond compliance. Leadersgenerallyoperatedin a more internationalcontext, were
listed on foreign exchanges,and were integrated.In
contrast,laggardswere guided by a logic shaped
by local, cultural, political, and economic ideals
less receptive to environmentalperformanceand
Our objective is to understandwhy some firms

within the Canadianpetroleumindustrywere more
resistant to adapting to changing societal logics
regarding corporate environmental action. The
competing logics perspective points to possible
sources for the heterogeneity in responses.Jones
et al. (2007) characterizedorganizations'approaches
to stakeholdersas either self-regardingor otherregarding, depending on the willingness of the
organizationto consider its own interest or the
interests of others in decision-making processes.
Along these same lines, Mattinglyand Hall (2008)
s (1985) logic of
found that Alford'sand Friedland'
to
motivate
more
stakeholderallitends
democracy
ances and inclusivenessof parties external to the
organization,while their logic of capitalismhas the
oppositeeffect.These frameworksappearto describe
the various attitudesof the leadersvs. the laggards
not only toward stakeholdersbut also toward environmental performance,regulation, and environmental reporting.
It appears that these firms are influenced by
competing logics; our interest is in understanding
how differencesin organizationalactors and their
contexts affect the salienceof these competing logics. We found that the answerlies in severalinterrelated factors at multiple levels. Factors at the
organizationallevel include organizationalsize, the
geographicextent of operations,and the breadthof
operations (productionvs. retail or both). At the
field level, we found that organizationswere influenced to varying degrees by the industry'strade
associationandby the degreeto which they attended
to the local vs. the internationalpolitical and economic climate and culture. In caseslike this, where
the local political climate differsfrom the internationalpoliticalclimate,these findingsunderscorethe

468
importanceof looking to organizationalfactors to

understandhow differentaspectsof an organization's
institutional context will affect its behavior. For
instance, consistent with the findings of Marquis
et al. (2007), we found that institutionalpressuresat
the community level can shape corporatesocial action. However, while these authors highlight the
role of community isomorphism in influencing
similaritiesin patterns,we found thatdifferentdegrees
of exposureto these communitiesand theirpressures
can promote different
responses.Thus, organizational
factorsinfluencedthe degreeof salienceof prevailing
local vs. internationallogics, which in turn influenced organizationalaction. It appears that the
leading group of firms had differentorganizational
characteristics
that led them to have more exposure
to the institutional contradictions posed by the
internationalarena than the lagging firms, which
were under much less pressurelocally to change.
One might argue that a stakeholderperspective
(Carroll, 1989; Freeman, 1984; Frooman, 1999;
Phillips, 2003) also offers insight into the different
responsesof these firms because these two populations answered to different constituents. Also,
Cormier et al. (2004) found that environmental
managers'attitudestoward certaingroups of stakeholders affect the decision to disclosure environmentalperformance.For example,most leadershave
more extensive internationaloperationsand/or are
listed on internationalsecurities exchanges. As a
consequence,leadersare exposedto differentpolitics
and regulationsand are influenced by stakeholders'
expectationsoutside of their home province headquarters.Most leadersalso operatein both the upstreamand downstreamsectors. Downstreamfirms
sell their product to the retail consumer and as a
consequence must attend to the concerns of yet
another stakeholdergroup, the consumer. In contrast, given that most laggardssell to a confined
market (business-to-business),they are less affected
by consumer choice. Under these conditions, the
stakeholderperspectivesuggeststhat leaderswould
be influencedby the societal shift toward demands
for better corporateenvironmentalperformanceand
thus engage in environmentalactionsand reporting.
Yet, while the stakeholderperspectivehelps us to
understandpartof the variancein response(why the
laggardsdid not perceive the legitimacyconcernsof
the industry),it is less able to explainwhy, once they
were faced with the pressuresfrom their industry

associationand a change in attitudeof local stakeholders,they still resisted.
Bansal (2005) found that both resource and
institutionalfactors influence sustainablepractices.
Therefore,one could proposethat our resultscould
be explainedwith referenceto resource(cashflow
and capability) arguments (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978). This perspectivewould argue that laggard
firms were reluctant to comply because they are
smallerin size and held fewer resourcesthanleading
firms. Yet, regulatorscommented that some very
small companiesdid a tremendousjob and put the
majors to shame. Furthermore,Table VII reveals
that the top three companiesin terms of environmentaldisclosureare mid-sizedcompanies,whereas,
the first, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh largest
companies,while providingsome disclosure,are far
less comprehensivein termsof disclosurethan some
of the smallerindustrymembers.The initiallevel of
the CAPP StewardshipProgramallowed firms to
choose amongfourlevels of stewardship.The lowest
level only requireda commitment to stewardship,
and no other action, yet some firmsdid not participate. These firms could simply have employed a
strategyof avoidanceor weak compromise(Oliver,
1991) or respondedin a ceremonialmannerthrough
decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) or loose
coupling (Weick, 1976). Therefore,we hesitateto
offer the simple solution of different responses
resultingfrom simpleresourcearguments;thatis, the
laggardscould not affordit.
It is throughthe lens of competinglogics thatwe
see that the laggardsand the leadersare separatedby
differencesat the organizationallevel that reinforce
the degreeto which these two groupsdid or did not
perceive threatsto the their legitimacy.Makinguse
of the notion of competing logics, our analysis
underscoresthe need to understandthe institutional
sources of constraint on organizationalaction at
multiplelevels (Thorntonand Ocasio, 2008). Consistentwith Dillardet al. (2004) and Thornton and
Ocasio (2008), we propose that understandingthe
interplaybetween field level influencesand organizationalcharacteristics
is importantin explainingthe
institutional
differing
logics and responsesof these
two organizationalpopulations.Even though higher-ordersocietalinstitutionsshapean organization's
vision of the world (Suddaby and Greenwood,

Leadersand laggards
2005), we stressthe importanceof understandingthe
nested natureof these constraintsat multiplelevels.
Also, we found that competing logics can form
the roots of resistanceto change, similarto Marquis
and Lounsbury(2007). As suggested by Seo and
Creed (2002), institutionalcontradictionsprove to
be a source of changefor the leadingorganizations;
however, our study also provides insights into the
conditions under which the lagging organizations
resist this change. Our case study adds to the
developmentof the competinglogics perspectiveby
highlighting that differencesat the organizational
level lead to differentlevels of saliencefor the contradictionsthat develop at the level of the institutionalfield. In our study,firmsthatwere larger,with
a more internationalorientation,and with a larger
breadthof operationswere more attunedto changes
in the institutionalfield calling for corporateenvironmental action. In contrast, the smaller, local,
upstreamfirms were more apt to pay heed to the
local politicalclimate that was criticalof regulation
and wary of the need for environmentalimprovements. We demonstrate that differences in the
interaction between organizationalcharacteristics
and field level influencesshapedthe way that these
firmsperceivedpossiblelegitimacyconcernsand also
how thev respondedto these pressures.
Conclusions
This study goes beyond the mere specificationof
institutionallogics to investigate the fundamental
sourcesof resistanceto shiftinglogics in a given field.
In particular,we find that some organizationsresist
conformingto changesin societallogics as a resultof
factorsat both the organizationaland the field level.
Thus, we contributeto a growing interestin heterogeneity in institutionalfields by studying the
roots of resistance as a strategic organizational
responseto shifting societal logics and how competing logics create variationin the practicesand
behaviorsof distinctgroups of actors, thereby creatingdifferingpopulationswithin institutionalfields.
Furthermore, these different populations may
perceive and respond to external expectations
differently.
Our resultsmust be temperedby potentiallimitations. Our study is exploratoryin natureand is a
469
case study of only one industryin one country and

therefore is not directly generalizable to other
industrysettings.However, it provides insight into
why the Canadianpetroleumindustryrespondedto
political,economic and culturalpressuresdifferently
than other resource-based Canadian industries.
Future studies could examine and compare other
industriesand other countriesto refineand assessthe
generalizabilityof our results. We also used an
arbitrarycut scoreapproachto separatelaggardsfrom
leaders. In reality, the progressionfrom laggardto
leader is more likely to fall along a continuum.
Finally,our study has focused at the level of organizations and institutionalfields. Despite the need
for researchthat considersall three levels of analysis
(Battilana,2006; Friedlandand Alford, 1991), we
have not explicitlyconsideredthe individuallevel in
our analysis.Thus, we are not able to comment on
the potential role of individual change agents or
institutional entrepreneurs in exploiting the
contradictionspresent in the institutionalenvironment to promote change in the leading firms or to
resistchange in the laggingfirms.
Our study makes several contributions.First, it
begins to addressa questionposed by Marquiset al.
(2007), regardinghow social action changes as the
scope of firms' venues and activities expandsfrom
local to nationalto global. Our findingssuggestthat
as the scope of a firm'sactivitiesexpand,so does its
tendencyto adjustto shiftsin societallevel logics. In
contrast,the firms in our study that resisteda shift
consistentwith societal logics were generallythose
with a more limitedgeographicexposure.Our study
also addressesa call by Hirschand Lounsbury(1997)
for more researchthat examinesthe mechanismsby
which major changesand events shape institutions.
Marquisand Lounsbury(2007) suggestedthat it is
equallyimportantto attendto the forcesof resistance
as it is to understandthe mechanismsof diffusion.
Furthermore, Thorton and Ocasio (2008) have
noted that most researchon institutionallogics tends
to emphasizeone level over another. Here, we attempt to link institutionalinfluencesat the both the
organizationaland field levels. Finally, our work
provides explanationsfor corporatesocial practices
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003). From a practical
standpoint,understandingthe conditionsthat influence the logics of corporate decision makers will
improve our understandingof what motivatesfirms

470
to engage in corporate social practices. Understandinghow and why firms incorporateenvironmentalconsiderationsinto their actionsis crucialfor
both policy-makersand businessstrategists(Bowen,
2000).
Note
Petroleum industryrefersto the upstreampetroleum
and naturalgas industryconsistingprimarilyof exploration and development.
Acknowledgments
The authorswould like to thank Nick Turnerand Tom
Lawrencefor their helpful comments on an earlierdraft
of this manuscript.The authorsgratefullyacknowledge
the financial support of Environment Canada and the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada.An earlierdraftof this manuscriptwas presented
at the 65th annualAcademyof Managementconference.
All authorscontributedequallyto this manuscript.
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Irene M. Herremans
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E-mail: irene.herremans@haskayne.ucalgary.ca
M. Sandy Herschovis
I. A. Asper School of Business,
University of Manitoba,
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E-mail: sandyJhershcovis@umanitoba.ca
Stephanie Bertels
Simon Fraser University,
Vancouver, BC, Canada
E-mail: StephanieJbertels@sfu.ca


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Leaders and Laggards: The Influence of Competing Logics on Corporate Environmental Action

Author(s): Irene M. Herremans, M. Sandy Herschovis and Stephanie Bertels

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Journalof BusinessEthics (2009)89:449-472