Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EKATERINA
TSAREGORODTSEVA
M.A.
Politics
and
Economics
in
Eurasia,
MGIMO,
2014
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
Introduction
The most widespread criticism of Russia in the modern civilized world
is probably the alleged lack of democracy in the country. It often stands accused
by Western politicians of allowing a level of political pluralism that cannot
represent an actual threat to its current regime and only serves as a faade for a
phony democracy.
However, the Russian political landscape does present numerous political
parties, non-governmental organizations and various civil society structures, as
well as individual figures of opposition, for example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky
and many others. Therefore the question we will seek to answer through the
present essay is the following: are opposition parties merely puppets of the
Stateallowing for a certain level of managed pluralismor is there some real
and viable opposition force?
We will start by a rapid historical overview of the emergence of political
pluralism in Russia, then we will analyze the present-day situation of systemic
and non-systemic actors of Russian opposition. Finally, we will study the
emergence of a new mechanism of recruitment of the political elite in Russia.
This mechanism may lay the foundation for a future political order that is
alternative to the classical democratic process.
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
Moscow on February 4th, 1990. After the collapse of the Union, political parties
flourished here and there in Russia. However, they did not yet have neither
political experience, nor clear political platform to effectively compete in
parliamentary or presidential elections. The chaos of the 1990s had little to do
with the concept of democracy: in 1996, Boris Yeltsinbacked by oligarchs who
conducted numerous PR campaignswon the presidential elections although it
was the Communist party which was the front-runner in opinion polls.
After this period of democratization in the 1990s, conditions for the
creation of a political party were tightened under Vladimir Putin. For example,
the minimum threshold to be represented in Parliament has been increased from
5 to 7% in Russia in 2006. Given that most European democracies have a
threshold of 5% and that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) recommends not setting a threshold higher than 3%, criticism of Russia
for making access to Parliament more difficult for new parties seems legitimate.
However, it is interesting to note that in 2007 and 2011 no parties have
surpassed 4% of votes (apart from United Russia, the Communist Party,
Spravedlivaya Rossiya and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia).
Moreover, starting from 2016, the threshold is to be decreased back to 5%. As
for the minimum number of members and representation of a minimum number
of federal subjects, these conditions seems rather adequate for a country of the
scale of Russia. More than that, United Russia, often accused of having too
much power, has actually lost 77 seats in the State Duma in 2011 elections, as
compared to the 2007 elections.
The official rhetoric on political pluralism is in favor of the latter. For
instance, in 2006, at a session of the Valdai Discussion Club in Novo-Ogarevo,
Vladimir Putin acknowledged: We need to continue developing our countrys
Page 3 of 10
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
Vladimir Putins meeting with participants in the third meeting of the Valdai Discussion
Club, 9 September 2006. <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/8351>
2
G. Zyuganov: I will do everything to see the Eurasian Union succeed, official website of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Russian
Federation,
28 December 2012.
<http://kprf.ru/rusk/113973.html>
3
G. Zyuganov: Our country cannot survive without a national idea, official website of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 20 September 2013. <http://kprf.ru/partylive/cknews/123292.html>
Page 4 of 10
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
decision on the main political issues, all while harshly criticizing the incumbent
regime4. The LDPR has seldom opposed major legislative proposals drafted by
United Russia. It is generally anti-Western (mostly anti-American) and
nationalist in its rhetoric5. This can be considered consistent with the Kremlins
desire to find a third way for Russia and not blindly follow the Western
model of development.
Finally, Spravedlivaya Rossiya s Sergei Mironov has repeatedly admitted
supporting the position of V. Putin on several matters. The party itself has
played the role of a left-leaning opponent of United Russia (just not of
Vladimir Putin).
Actual
opponents
of
the
regime
(Dmitri Gudkov,
Gennady Gudkov, Ilya Ponomarev), who took part in 2011-2013 street protests,
were asked to to choose, within a month, between either being members of
Spravedlivaya Rossiya, or being members of civic organizations, whose
political aims go against the partys interests.6 Gudkov father and son did leave
the party, Ponomarev remained. However, after being the only Member of
Parliament to vote against the annexation of Crimea, he was asked once again
by S. Mironov to leave the party. 7 Although the four systemic parties do
disagree on a number of domestic issues, it is true that they have achieved a
consensus on matters of foreign policy, especially in the present-day situation,
The Nationalist Zhirinovsky: Putins Most Loyal Opponent, Der Spiegel Online,
1 March 2012.
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nationalist-schirinowski-putinstreuester-gegner-a-818348.html>
5
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the LDPR, Foreign Policy, 7 November 2011,
<http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/07/vladimir-zhirinovsky-and-the-ldpr/>
6
V. Kara-Murza, Back on the Leash: The End for A Just Russia, Institute of Modern
Russia, 29 January 2013. <http://imrussia.org/en/politics/377-back-on-the-leash-the-end-fora-just-russia>
7
Mironov Asks Ponomarev to Give Up His Mandate, ITAR-TASS, 29 April 2014.
<http://itar-tass.com/politika/1156831>
Page 5 of 10
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
after the Ukrainian crisis. In that way they are supportive of the Kremlins
political course.
On the other hand, the non-systemic oppositionsuch as parties that did not
pass the threshold into State Duma or various NGOs and individual political
figuresplay an important role in Russian politics. The party Yabloko, created
in 1993, promotes the ideas of democracy and social liberalism. It was fairly
popular during the 1990s, since then, however, public support for it has
decreased and Yabloko missed the required threshold to get into Duma both in
2007 and 2011. There were rumors, not backed by proof, that the party received
foreign financing. However, the party did receive practical assistance from
foreign organizations. For example, the US National Democratic Institute (NDI)
has held seminars for Yabloko on subjects like regional party building and
campaigning strategy and techniques. 8 Moreover, Mikhail Khodorkovsky
provided financial backing for the party, as Yavlinsky himself admitted several
times.9 These facts might be one of the reasons for the decline in Yablokos
popular support, as Russians in general disapprove of foreign backing for a
party
and
have
little
compassion
for
the
oligarch
in
disgrace
Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Opposition parties in Russia do exist and are not less legitimate than
opposition parties in any other democratic country. Even if their political course
is either consistent with the Kremlins, or is almost irrelevant due to their little
influence on Russian politics, they do prove there is some political pluralism in
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
Russia, but more importantly they serve as a background on which the current
political regime looks more fair and efficient in the eyes of the population. What
might be more important is that the real confrontation is taking place within the
ranks of the executive power between the supporters of liberal economy, often
associated with the rule of oligarchs, and hommes dtat or gosudarstvenniki.
Liberal economists are the people who have participated in and benefited
from the creation of the Russian liberal economy of the 1990s. Today they want
to maintain, at least, this level of liberalization to keep the privileges they have
acquired in the 1990s. On the other hand, state oriented politicians, with
Vladimir Putin as their leader, want more the economy to serve the State and
not the other way around. The opposition between them, although implicit,
appears more real than the one between different parties in Parliament.
Vladimir Putin, it seems, tries to remain above such confrontation, and his
political course includes both reinforcing the State in itself and taking some
liberalization measures to boost the economy.
Page 7 of 10
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
for rampant corruption and only let into governing ranks people with substantial
financial power.
Today one might consider that another shift in the recruiting of the elite is
taking place. Its goal would to be to distance the business class from power, and
instead replace it with people interested in the well being of the country and not
only in personal profit. Measures consistent with this theory are for example the
reinforcement of the army. Military men have a very different mindset from the
business cast: their priority is being loyal to the country and serving its
interests. In the same way, in his annual address to the State Duma (2014),
Vladimir Putin
highlighted
the
necessity
to
support
the
productive
10
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
the country and willing to work for its future and prosperity.12 The ONF would
allow them to apply their skills for the good and future of Russia by
implementing new means of social mobility. It will favor the ascension of a
new, result-oriented and loyal elite, badly needed by the State in the first place.
Interestingly enough, the movement refers to itself as a suprapartisan entity
( )13, possibly hinting at the possibility of an elite
recruitment and renewal that would be alternative to todays election process. If
the ONF does succeed in this enterprise, it would significantly reduce the role
of political pluralism in its classical democratic sense.
Conclusion
With its representative system and effort of transparency, the principle of
democracy seems to be formally respected more in Russia than in some Western
countries. Plus, any regime needs a constructive opposition that provides new
ideas and serves as a source of objective criticism. The original activities of
A. Navalny were indeed useful and allowed to stop some corrupted politicians,
until he decided to go into politics himself, without having any consistent and
credible political program. Using populist rhetoric, non-constructive opposition
merely exploits popular discontent (which is always present, in any country, in
different proportions) and often does so in order to gain political power for
itself. In this sense it can be associated to color revolutions and foreign agents
who aim at toppling the regime and grasping political power.
Are political parties in Russia artificial Kremlin gadgets or viable
channels of representation? The answer would be neither. The current regime
12
13
Ekaterina Tsaregorodtseva
14
(1996-2014),
Page 10 of 10
Levada
Center
opinion
polls.