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6 of 6 DOCUMENTS
State of Connecticut v. Connecticut Employees Union Independent
CV146049002S
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW
HAVEN AT NEW HAVEN
2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2476
October 6, 2014, Decided
October 7, 2014, Filed
NOTICE: THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW.
COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THIS
CASE.
CORE TERMS: grievant, arbitrator, public policy, marijuana, arbitrator's award, termination, arbitration award,
quotation marks omitted, present case, arbitration, public policy, depression, disability, confirm, vacatur, vacate,
arbitrator exceeded, arbitration panel, judicial review, well-defined, progressive, confirmed, exceeded, anxiety, message,
arbitrator's decision, de novo, unrestricted, terminated, discipline
JUDGES: [*1] Antonio C. Robaina, J.
OPINION BY: Antonio C. Robaina
OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The state of Connecticut (the State), acting through the University of Connecticut Health Center (UConn Health
Center), has moved to vacate an arbitration award rendered in favor of the defendants, Connecticut Employees Union
Independent (the Union) and Gregory Linhoff (the grievant). The defendants object to the State's motion and
concurrently move to confirm the same arbitration award. According to the record, the parties entered into a collective
bargaining agreement ("the Agreement") containing provisions with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of
employment for mental health professional and support staff within state service. The agreement, which included an
arbitration clause, covered the period from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2012.
The record indicates that, on March 7, 2012, the grievant was arrested for smoking marijuana while at work in a
state owned vehicle. At the time of the incident, the grievant, a member of the Union, was employed as a Skilled
Maintainer in the Environmental Controls Center at the UConn Health Center, a signatory to the Agreement. On June
22, 2012, as a result of his conduct and subsequent [*2] arrest, the grievant's employment was terminated. The Union
subsequently grieved the discharge and this grievance was submitted, in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement,
into arbitration. The arbitration submission was unrestricted.
The issues submitted to the arbitrator were: "Was the dismissal of the Grievant, Greg Linhoff, for just cause? If not,
what shall be the remedy, consistent with the contract?" A hearing was held before the arbitrator on December 19, 2013.
At this hearing, the State argued that, in light of the fact that the grievant had access to "just about everything on
campus, including the day care center," it had just cause to terminate his employment. The State further argued that,

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contrary to the grievant's account of the events, the fact that the grievant drove the van to a secluded area indicates that
he intended to "smoke marijuana while on duty." In addition, the State contended that, even if the amount of
marijuana smoked by the grievant "was not a sufficient amount," the fact that he engaged in such an act at work "raises
serious doubts about [his] decision-making abilities." In his defense at the arbitration hearing, the grievant argued that
there is [*3] no evidence that establishes that he was impaired when he was discovered by the arresting officer. The
grievant further argued that, neither the State's Alcohol and Substance Abuse Policy nor public policy, require
termination as a result of his misconduct, especially in light of the fact that this was his first disciplinary action at work.
The grievant also argued that Connecticut courts have "soundly rejected" the argument that public policy requires
termination for the use of marijuana.
The arbitrator, in his opinion and award, found that the grievant's dismissal was not for just cause. In finding that
there was no just cause for the grievant's dismissal, the arbitrator found that the termination was not "within a proper
range of progressive discipline." Despite his finding that there was no just cause for the grievant's dismissal, the
arbitrator did find that the grievant's conduct was a substantial violation which required significant penalty. The
arbitrator further found that the employer's rules, including its Drug and Alcohol policy, cite termination "as a potential
penalty, and employees are warned, that it could result by way of a first time offense." The arbitrator subsequently [*4]
modified the termination penalty to a six-month, unpaid suspension effective from the date of the grievant's removal.
The arbitrator does not, in his opinion and award, cite to the portions of the Agreement on which he relied in entering
this award.
The State now moves, pursuant to an application filed on February 21, 2014, to vacate the arbitrator's award on the
grounds that the award violates the State's public policy on drug use while on state duty and operating a state owned
vehicle.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
General Statutes 52-418(a)(4) provides in relevant part: "Upon application of any party to an arbitration, the
superior court . . . shall make an order vacating the award . . . if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
"The well established general rule is that [w]hen the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the
arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of [the court's] judicial review of the award is delineated by
the scope of the parties' agreement." State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, 257 Conn. 80, 84, 777 A.2d 169 (2001)
(AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663). Thus, "[t]he authority of the arbitrator [*5] to adjudicate the controversy is limited
only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or
conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of such agreement, an agreement is unrestricted." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Farrell v. Twenty-First Century Ins. Co., 301 Conn. 657, 663, 21 A.3d 816 (2011). "When the
scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so
long as the award conforms to the submission . . . Because [the court favors] arbitration as a means of settling private
disputes, [it undertakes] judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an
efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution . . . Furthermore, in applying this general rule of
deference to an arbitrator's award, [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the [arbitral]
award and of the arbitrators' acts and proceedings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME,
Council 4, Local 2663, supra, 257 Conn. 84-85.
B. Whether Arbitrator Exceeded his Authority
"When the parties have agreed to a procedure and have delineated the authority of the arbitrator, they must be
bound by those limits [*6] . . . An application to vacate or correct an award should be granted where an arbitrator has
exceeded his power." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, supra, 257
Conn. 85-86. "In [its] construction of 52-418(a)(4), [the Connecticut Supreme Court has], as a general matter, looked
to a comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers . . .
The standard for reviewing a claim that the award does not conform to the submission requires what we have termed in
effect, de novo judicial review . . . Although [the Supreme Court has] not explained precisely what in effect, de novo
judicial review entails as applied to a claim that the award does not conform with the submission . . . [the court's]
inquiry generally is limited to a determination as to whether the parties have vested the arbitrators with the authority to

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decide the issue presented or to award the relief conferred." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Comprehensive Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer, 293 Conn. 748, 754-55, 980 A.2d 297 (2009).
Thus, "[i]n determining whether an arbitrator has exceeded the authority granted under the contract, a court cannot base
the decision on whether the court would have ordered the same relief, or whether or not [*7] the arbitrator correctly
interpreted the contract. The court must instead focus on whether the [arbitrator] has authority to reach a certain issue,
not whether the issue was correctly decided." Id., 755.
In the present case, the only argument set forth by the State in support of its position that the arbitrator exceeded his
power in rendering the award of reinstatement is the general assertion that the award violates Articles 5 ("Management
Rights"), 16 ("Grievance Procedure") and 17 ("Dismissal, Suspension, Demotion and Other Discipline") of the
Agreement. The State does not provide any specific arguments as to how the award violates these articles of the
Agreement. Irrespective of any argument that the State may have made in further support of its argument that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers in issuing his award, this court cannot, pursuant to Comprehensive Orthopaedics &
Musculoskeletal Care, LLC, review the accuracy of the arbitrator's interpretation of the Agreement; rather, this court is
solely limited to review of whether the arbitrator had authority to reach the issue of whether termination was proper.
The court finds that the arbitrator did have such authority. In their submission [*8] to the arbitrator, the parties' second
issue requested a finding of the proper remedy, pursuant to the Agreement, if the termination was not for just cause.
Here, once the arbitrator made a finding that the grievant's termination was not for just cause, the parties' submission
authorized him to further delve into the issue of whether the state acted properly in terminating the grievant. Therefore,
the award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Consequently, the court must now
look into the issue of whether the award should be vacated on public policy grounds.
C. Public Policy Argument
The State contends that the arbitration award should be vacated because the award violates the state's well
established public policy on illegal drug use while on state duty. In particular, the state argues that in light of the illegal
nature of the grievant's drug use, "[t]he award violates public policy and/or is in manifest disregard of the law . . ." The
state further argues that, in finding that there was no just cause for the grievant's dismissal, the arbitrator exceeded his
powers in violations of Articles 5, 16 and 17 of the Agreement.
In opposition to the State's [*9] motion to vacate and in support of their motion to confirm, the defendants argue
that the arbitrator's award should be confirmed because the state's own policy of rehabilitation and employment of
workers who violated the drug policy is grounds for confirming the arbitrator's award. Citing the fact that the grievant
was diagnosed with anxiety and depression subsequent to his termination, the defendants further argue that the grievant
is an employee with a disability and that the state is, itself, violating public policy by refusing to accommodate and
reinstate an employee with a disability. In addition, the defendants contend that, in light of the fact that "the State is
currently implementing the legalization of medical marijuana," the States' public policy argument must fail. Lastly, the
defendants argue that there is a public policy of encouraging employers to provide opportunities to those who have
engaged in criminal conduct.
"Although [Connecticut courts] have traditionally afforded considerable deference to the decisions of arbitrators,
[they] have also conducted a more searching review of arbitral awards in certain circumstances . . . [There are] three
recognized grounds for [*10] vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the
award violates clear public policy . . . or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of 52418(a)." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Cummings &
Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 427-28, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000). "The public policy exception applies
only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy . . . A challenge that an award is in
contravention of public policy is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving
conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a
court to enforce such a contract between them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. New England Health Care
Employees Union, 265 Conn. 771, 783, 830 A.2d 729 (2003).
"When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not
concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, "[t]he party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that illegality or
conflict with public policy is clearly demonstrated." Id. Connecticut courts employ "[a] [*11] two-step analysis . . . [in]
deciding cases such as this. First, the court determines whether an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy can

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be identified. If so, the court then decides if the arbitrator's award violated the public policy." North Branford v. Pond,
134 Conn.App. 89, 96, 38 A.3d 198 (2012). Thus, "[i]f . . . it has been determined that an arbitral award does implicate a
clearly established public policy, the ultimate question remains as to whether the award itself comports with that
policy." Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 429. "[T]he question of
whether the award violates public policy requires de novo judicial review." AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, supra,
257 Conn. 90.
Accordingly, the first step of this court's analysis is whether there is a well-defined public policy against the use of
marijuana. Although the defendants argue that the public policy on the use and possession of marijuana is not welldefined, the Appellate Court has found to the contrary. "Our state has a well defined public policy against the use of
marijuana. See, e.g., General Statutes 21a-278, 21a-279; see also State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 152-55, 869 A.2d
192 (2005)." (Emphasis altered.) Enfield v. AFSCME Council 4, Local 1029, 100 Conn.App. 470, 476, 918 A.2d 934
(2007). Consequently, in the present case, the arbitrator's award reinstating the grievant implicates an explicit and welldefined public policy against the use of marijuana. Therefore, the court must [*12] now decide the issue of whether the
arbitrator's award violates public policy.
Because an explicit public policy issue has been established, de novo review is appropriate in determining whether
the arbitrator's award violates public policy. Regardless of the standard of review in analyzing this issue, the court is,
however, limited to the facts as found by the arbitrator. See Enfield v. AFSCME Council 4, Local 1029, supra, 100
Conn.App. 479. In this case, the arbitrator found that the grievant both possessed and used marijuana while at work.
The arbitrator further found that the grievant's testimony as to why he was in possession of and used marijuana at work
was not credible. In addition, the arbitrator found that the grievant's alleged stressors resulting from his personal
problems do not mitigate the nature of his misconduct. The arbitrator's award subsequently reinstated the grievant's
employment on the ground that the circumstances of the "termination [do] not fall within the proper range of
progressive discipline."
The defendants, in arguing that this court must confirm the arbitrator's award, rely on the court's ruling in Enfield.
In Enfield, the grievant, a police dispatcher, was terminated from his employment [*13] after a "small amount of
marijuana" was found in his home upon the execution of a search warrant. Enfield v. AFSCME Council 4, Local 1029,
supra, 100 Conn.App. 471. In ordering that the termination be set aside and the grievant be returned to his position after
a five-day, unpaid suspension, the arbitration panel in Enfield found that, although the grievant used marijuana in his
home, he never used marijuana while on duty and, consequently, his marijuana use had no impact on his work
performance. Id., 472. In reversing the trial court's subsequent vacatur of the arbitration award, the Appellate Court
noted that the reversal was due in part to the trial court's "improper fact-finding rather than affording deference to the
facts as found by the arbitration panel." Id., 477.
Despite the defendants' reliance on Enfield, the facts of this present case are distinguishable. In Enfield, the
arbitration panel found that "the grievant never used marijuana while on duty and that his use had no impact on his
performance at work." Id., 472. In reversing the trial court's vacatur of the arbitration award, the Appellate Court in
Enfield "[emphasized] that [its] conclusion [as to whether the arbitrator's award violates public policy] is grounded on
[these] [*14] facts as found by the arbitration panel." Id., 479. In contrast, in the present case, the arbitrator found that
the grievant "deliberately took marijuana and pipe with him to use when the occasion arose during his work hours."
(Award, 15.) The arbitrator in the present case further found that the grievant's "duties as a Skilled Maintainer . . . both
in the scope of his duties and the areas where he works, make his use of marijuana raise valid concerns on the State's
part as to safety and security issues." (Award, 17.)
In reaching its decision in Enfield, the Appellate Court relied on State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO,
252 Conn. 467, 747 A.2d 480 (2000) (AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO). In that case, the Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's vacatur of the arbitrator's award which reinstated a corrections officer who was terminated for
leaving racist messages on a senator's voicemail. In rendering its decision to affirm the trial court's vacatur, the Supreme
Court stated:
"The [trial] court noted that the arbitrator attempted to excuse [the grievant's] conduct as the outgrowth of various
personal stressors, but did [find] that he did, in fact, leave the stipulated message for the legislator . . . As the trial court
aptly [*15] stated, the termination of [the grievant] as provided for in the [employer's] regulations is warranted . . . A
lesser sanction--a progressive sanction, as suggested by the arbitrator--would, very simply, send the message that stress,
or poor judgment, or other factors, somehow renders the conduct permissible or excusable . . . We do not hold that a
violation of a criminal statute is a per se public policy violation sufficient to justify vacating an arbitrator's decision.

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Instead, we conclude that this case poses a narrow, blatant example of the department of correction's proper exercise its
power to dismiss.
"Accordingly, we conclude that this case rests squarely within the narrow exception carved out of the broad
authority granted to arbitrators. Here, the trial court properly concluded that an arbitration award violated a clearly
defined public policy because the award reinstated a state employee whose conduct blatantly violated both a criminal
statute and the employment regulations as set forth by the [employer]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 47778.
Similar to the finding of the arbitrator in AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, the arbitrator in the present case noted
that the grievant's [*16] use of marijuana allegedly stemmed from "a number of stressors before and at the time he
used the marijuana." (Award, 15.) In addition, as noted by the court in AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, a
progressive sanction of reinstatement as suggested by the arbitrator in the present case would send the message that
stress experienced in one's personal life somehow excuses the use of marijuana in the workplace. Thus, the arbitrator's
award in the present case violates a clearly defined public policy.
In their cross application to confirm arbitration award, the defendants further argue that, due to the fact that the
grievant was diagnosed with anxiety and depression prior to the incident, vacatur of the arbitration award is improper
because public policy discourages discrimination of employees with disabilities. In making this argument, the
defendants rely on General Statutes 46a-60(a)(1). Section 46a-60(a)(1) provides in relevant part that "[i]t shall be a
discriminatory practice . . . [for an employer . . . to discharge from employment any individual . . . because of the
individual's . . . present or past history of mental disability . . ." (Emphasis added.) Although the defendants are correct
in asserting that depression falls under [*17] the ambit of "mental disability" under 46a-60(a)(1); see Bridgeport
Hosp. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 653 A.2d 782 (1995); nothing in the record
indicate that the grievant was discharged because of his depression and anxiety. As indicated in the arbitrator's decision,
the grievant's termination letter stated that his dismissal was "based on his use of a controlled substance while on duty . .
." (Award, 2.) Therefore, the arbitrator's award cannot be confirmed on this ground.
Finally, the defendants argue that, the arbitrator's award must be confirmed in light of the fact that the "State is
currently implementing the legalization of medical marijuana." Although the defendants are accurate in stating the law,
nothing in the records indicate that the grievant was prescribed marijuana. The arbitrator, in his award and opinion,
makes no finding that the grievant was prescribed marijuana or that it was medically necessary for him to use marijuana
to treat his depression and anxiety. As this court's review is limited to the facts as found by the arbitrator, the arbitrator's
award cannot be confirmed on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the State's application to vacate the arbitration award and denies the
defendants' application to [*18] confirm the arbitration award.
Robaina, J.