Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,
vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7
March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for
immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife
Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981,
his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that
address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13
May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that
complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking
advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations
of affiant [complainant] against her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently
sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the"
continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries
(sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and
made a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that
respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital
everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing
respondent but that she had refused to do so;

(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical

appliances where she was living although she had no means of
livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant,
and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by
way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of
hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and
respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May
12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in
Cubao and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12,
1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house
at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with
respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household
appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source
of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU
Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her
(tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between
respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 58, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place
involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street,
Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29,
1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and
complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F'
and 'G').

8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality

against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was
suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her
difficult relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left complainant
because she suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and public
humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at
No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner
of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and
former client whom respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU
Hospital, as assistance in her medical expenses; that he
reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the
hospital which led to their being investigated by the security
guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with
her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45
Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab
him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was
between Priscilla's brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with
complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between
Priscilla's brother, Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that
respondent went there only to intervene upon request of
complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1
Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and
they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their
'ninong'.

3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their

residences being one house away from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for
advice, because of her differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No.
45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the
owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and
former client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying
in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had
indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at
No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was
staying two or three houses away in his mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality
against respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty
and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the
respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of
complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an
affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose
owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his
friend, in spite of his differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious
incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B',
B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when
she was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his
differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself
by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by

complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which

behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The
Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show
that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of
acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to
comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members
of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that
continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in
her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had
carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology
subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that
when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo
forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in
the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose
morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent
Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted

her to approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her
that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June
6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she
should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her
subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant
boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila
Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K",
"K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish
restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three
hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight,
where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then
thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 &
157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent
because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather
than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she
was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation
(p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the
college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be
performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr.
Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she
would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an
injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and
nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an
abortion had already been performed upon her and she was

weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July
17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom
complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant
showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at
Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never
came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24,
1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to
Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet
respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did
not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and
ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15,
tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations
in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against
him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of
the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from
enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is
likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove
that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the
effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila

with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she
would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp.
42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of
Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful
desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6"
pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is
true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that
respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their
testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing
that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973
at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The
dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's)
testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has
been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than
three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to
determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and
academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at
bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation
previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p.
75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor
General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the
investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may
therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the
offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent
of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of
complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had
sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that
date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his
silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court
that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go
v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If
he does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself,
when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand
and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily
gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals
from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439
[1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone
with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children,
respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3)
years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that
since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General
made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his
profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended
during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a
promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of
of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to
respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual
gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she
would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine
where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could
make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to
inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his
own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere

suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact
that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes
admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle
one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its
members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define
the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a
student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under
the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033 October 10, 1995

MARIBETH CORDOVA and CHRISTOPHER CORDOVA, complainants,
vs.
HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region,
Bacolod City; HON. BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON, former Presiding Judge of
Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City; GIA L. ARINDAY, Branch Clerk of
Court, and MARIO P. LAMERA, Court Sheriff, Branch 54, RTC, Bacolod City; ARMANDO
N. ESO, Court Sheriff, and EDGAR DEPAMAYLO, Subpoena Server, Branch 50, RTC,
Bacolod City, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the matter of the order we issued on November 23,
1994, 1 requiring Atty. Salvador T. Sabio, counsel for herein complainants, to show cause and
explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02
and 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Acting on the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Compliance 2 filed
by Atty. Sabio, the Court issued a Resolution on May 30, 1995, 3 further referring the matter to
the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. On July 7, 1995, the latter
submitted a Report and Recommendation 4 finding Atty. Sabio guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and
1.03 of Canon I, which the Court hereby approves with modifications.
The present incident is an offshoot of an administrative complaint 5 filed by complainants
Maribeth and Christopher Cordova, through their aforesaid counsel, Atty. Sabio, against herein
respondents for disbarment, dismissal from office and disqualification to hold public
office with forfeiture of employment benefits for their involvement in Civil Case No. 7092
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City. The administrative complaint,
however, was dismissed by this Court on the basis of a Memorandum Report 6 dated
October 17, 1994 submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis, who likewise
recommended that Atty. Sabio be required to explain why he should not be administratively
dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1103 on the ground that:
Their charge that Atty. Salvador T. Sabio "clearly instigated" the filing of this
complaint is also not totally baseless.
In her comment, Judge Moscardon stated that ". . . the original counsel on record
unquestionably accepted the Decision of the appellate RTC court (sic). On the
other hand, the petitioners now, as well as their present counsel who are not fully

conversant (with) the circumstances surrounding the matter, now attempt to

mislead the High Court . . . ." Also worth mentioning were the allegations that (1)
the respondent sheriffs were criminally charged for robbery, grave threats and
malicious mischief; (2) that the plaintiffs re-occupied the premises after being
ejected therefrom; (3) Atty. Sabio had been charged for crimes involving
dishonesty.
The foregoing points to the possible violations of the Code of Professional Ethics,
particularly Canon I, Rule 1.02 (A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law . . .) and Rule 1.03 (A lawyer shall not, for any
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause).
The main bulk of Atty. Sabio's contentions were premised on the issue of whether the writs of
execution were issued and implemented by herein respondents in gross violation of Sections 8
and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and
with grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. In his Compliance, Atty. Sabio asserts
that the writ of execution was issued pending appeal despite the filing of a supersedeas bond
and the payment of advance rentals. A review of the complaint, comment and answer filed in
this case will readily show that the writs in question were issued strictly in accordance with
Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provide:
Sec. 8. Immediate Execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to
enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the
judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the
judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is
appealed.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
Where defendant appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance,
execution of said judgment, with respect to the restoration of possession, shall
not be stayed unless the appellant deposits the same amounts and within the
periods referred to in Section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner
as therein provided.
The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for ejectment filed against the
predecessor in interest of herein complainants, 7 judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by
the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering defendants

to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus
P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for rentals from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of
suit. On August 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court affirmed said judgment after finding that there
was no cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision.
A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on September 4, 1995, to
which an Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration was filed by defendants on September 10,
1992. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the writ of
execution was issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the afternoon of September 29,
1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of September 28, 1992 granting
the motion for execution, on the ground that they could not file the supersedeas bond because
the court allegedly failed to apprise them of the amount thereof and, at the same time, attaching
to said motion a bond in the amount of P18,000.00. The motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Regional Trial Court on October 1, 1992, as a consequence of which the writ of execution
previously issued was implemented on October 8, 1992 and plaintiffs were ordered restored to
the possession of the subject premises.
Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with
injunction but was rebuffed therein. In a decision promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 29102, said appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a
result, the lower court granted on April 21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of Execution
filed by plaintiffs and ordered the release of the amounts of P12,000.00 and P18,000.00
deposited by therein defendants. An alias writ of execution was subsequently issued on April 26,
1993.
The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as heirs and
successors in interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around the validity of the writ of
execution issued by Judge Moscardon and the aliaswrit of execution issued by Judge Labayen.
1. The writ of execution issued on September 30, 1992 by Judge Moscardon is being
controverted on the ground that a supersedeas bond had been validly filed in this case and
periodic rentals had been paid, hence said supposed compliance with the Rules of Court should
have legally stayed execution pending appeal.
Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate execution of judgment in
ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal,
(b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the
pendency of the appeal.
The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing
down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is to be
determined from the judgment of said court. The postulation of complainants and their counsel
that the execution sought was effectively stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond was
sufficiently refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the circumstances then obtaining.
First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible from the
dispositive portion of the judgment of the municipal trial court. Hence, it was erroneous, if not
altogether a deliberate falsity, for Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond
because that court failed to determine the same.

Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial court had rendered
judgment against complainants, which judgment was immediately executory, without prejudice
to the right of appeal. As the records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on
September 29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after the aforementioned Regional
Trial Court had already issued an order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. We
cannot, therefore, elude the impression thus created that the filing thereof came only as a
dilatory afterthought on the part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain attempt to remedy the
situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution, but the
same necessarily had to fail for being frivolous.
Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the rendition of the decision
either in the court of origin or in the appellate court. The requirement for the filing of a
supersedeas bond is mandatory. 8 Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter
court without filing a supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright execution of the
judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the appellate court to order the execution of the
appealed decision being thereby ministerial and imperative. 9
Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00 deposited by defendants
therein represented rental payments for the period from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ
of execution had by then already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore,
the amount thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of a supersedeas bond.
Thus:
Finally, anent the prayer for injunction, petitioner contends that she had
deposited with the public respondent court the amount of P18,000.00
representing the money judgment, to stay execution pending appeal. The court
noted that the said amount represented the rental payments only for the months
from May 1991 to April 1992. It is for this reason that this Court, in its Resolution
dated October 9, 1992 (p. 60, Rollo), ordered petitioner to present proof of
subsequent payments made pursuant to Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70. It
appears, however, that a Writ of Execution was already issued and even
implemented (par. 5. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order,
pp. 98-99, Rollo; Delivery of Possession, p. 118, Rollo) that a preliminary
injunction is thereby rendered nugatory. . . . 10
While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which approximates the
monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was filed late, it could not qualify as a
supersedeas bond. What is considered material for purposes of staying execution pending
appeal under Rule 70 is not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the timeliness of the
filing of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the amount of P18,000.00 was correctly applied as mere
rental payments from May, 1991 to April, 1992. On this ground alone, Judge Moscardon was
perfectly justified in issuing the writ of execution and respondent sheriffs in implementing the
same. Of these legal considerations, Atty. Sabio could not have been unaware.
The records, furthermore, do not sustain Atty. Sabio's representations with respect to the
application of the P12,000.00 which complainants supposedly deposited with the court a quo.
Atty. Sabio insists that said amount was intended to answer for monthly rentals falling due after
the rendition of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. This, however, runs contrary to the
facts obtaining in this case. The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
are silent on this point except for a statement found in the higher court's decision that "this

Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 1992, ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent
payments made." Also, in the order of Judge Moscardon dated October 1, 1992, she stated that
"the record does not show that the defendants had likewise paid the periodical rentals." Also, in
the complaint filed in this administrative matter, it is alleged that the defendant consigned the
rentals from May, 1991 until April, 1992 in the amount of P12,000.00.
In view of these conflicting statements of complainants, plus the fact that there is not enough
evidence on hand, we are prevented from making a specific determination thereon.
Nevertheless, whether or not periodic rental payments were made during the pendency of the
appeal no longer carries any weight in view of our earlier finding that execution could not be
legally stayed by reason of the admittedly belated filing of the purported supersedeas bond.
Complainants further contend that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
execution allegedly because it should have forwarded the records of the case to the court of
origin for proper implementation. The argument is specious. The Municipal Trial Court may issue
execution immediately after judgment if no action was taken therefrom by defendants. But, after
the perfection of the appeal, it is obvious that the jurisdiction over the controversy had passed to
the Regional Trial Court, hence the properly filed in and granted by the latter court. 11
2. Anent the issue on the legality of the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen, Atty.
Sabio avers that the same is void for the reason that he was not furnished a copy of the order,
dated April 21, 1993, which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He further insists that
the same was issued despite the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals had not yet
become final and executory since it was still pending review before the Supreme Court.
Under Section 10 of Rule 70, an appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
shall likewise not be stayed unless the appellants deposit the amount of rent due from
time to time. In the case at bar, no proof has been presented to show that the monthly rentals
which fell due after the rendition of the trial court's decision had been duly paid.
Assuming arguendo, as claimed by Atty. Sabio, that the P12,000.00 deposited with the Regional
Trial Court should answer for said rentals, the same was not sufficient to cover rentals due
during the entire pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. At
most, such amount could apply only to rental payments from May, 1992 to December, 1992. Of
these facts, again, Atty. Sabio could not have been completely oblivious.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 31, 1993 and there is absolutely nothing in
the records to show that herein complainants made further payments aside from the P12,000.00
and P18,000.00 deposited with the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court,
respectively. In addition, Atty. Sabio does not refute, and in fact it is admitted in paragraph 6 of
the complaint filed in this administrative matter, that complainants reentered and remained in
possession of the premises, and it appears that they continued to do so despite the prior
implementation of the original writ of execution. Verily, this time for failure of complainants to
make periodic deposits during the pendency of the appeal and their continued occupancy of the
premises, the issuance of thealias writ of execution was a ministerial and mandatory duty of
respondent judges.
Atty. Sabio likewise claims that execution could not issue because he was not served a copy of
the order dated April 21, 1993 12 which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He
rationalizes that:

. . . The fact is that, a copy of the Order dated April 21, 1993 was not furnished
the defendant's counsel.
Truth to tell, this is exactly the ground why undersigned counsel filed his Urgent
Motion to Lift AliasWrit of Execution, . . . .
It is therefore clear that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 issued by
the defendant Clerk of Court, Gia L. Aranday, was improperly issued, considering
that the Order of the court granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
dated April 21, 1993 was
not furnished the undersigned counsel, and, it is only through the
resourcefulness of the undersigned of following-up this case that he came to
know of the said Order dated April 21, 1993.
Undersigned counsel found himself in an embarrassing situation, when he was
confronted by his clients that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 was
issued without his knowledge of the prior Court Order dated April 21, 1993.
It is in this respect, that undersigned honestly believed that he has a well
grounded complaint against respondents Clerk of Court and process server for
their negligent act. (Emphasis in the original text.)13
That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative charge was unwittingly disclosed by the
aforequoted allegations of Atty. Sabio in his compliance. No ratiocination was proffered by him
nor did he invoke any authority of law or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support
his theory that execution should not issue where the adverse party is not served a copy of the
order even where the grant thereof had become a matter of right. The inescapable conclusion,
therefore, is that the filing of the present complaint was, at the very least, ill-conceived and
malicious, and was resorted to as a last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of counsel.
It is worth noting that the administrative complaint was filed against herein respondents only
after the Court of Appeals had rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. This in itself is already a
clear indication that the acts of respondents are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio persisted in
instituting these baseless charges against respondents to their proven prejudice. 14 As correctly
observed by the Bar Confidant, under the given circumstances, it is apparent that complainants
decided to institute the present case only on the advice and/or upon the urging of Atty. Sabio. It
also bears stressing that respondent Judge Labayen even waited for the Court of Appeals'
decision before acting on the motion for an alias writ of execution of plaintiffs, if only to obviate
any imputation of bias or partiality.
We are fully convinced that, despite the misleading assertions of Atty. Sabio, the issuance of the
writ of execution was done in the valid and judicious exercise of the functions and duties of
respondent judges. We have carefully examined and analyzed the procedure adopted by
respondents in the issuance and enforcement of the questioned writs. It would be the height of
injustice were we to impose any sanction on them for complying faithfully with the procedural
mandate of the rules governing the matter.
The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible propensity of
disgruntled litigants, most especially their counsel, of filing totally baseless and
unfounded charges against judges and court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the

dire consequences of their own negligence or in an effort to transgress the lawful orders
of the court. Judges and court personnel should be protected from unjust accusations of
dissatisfied litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to camouflage their
shortcomings. Besides, it goes without saying that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one
of the parties to the case is not enough. There should be evidence to prove the charge, 15 which
is obviously absent in the case at bar.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert,
the administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the
integrity of respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in
flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing
of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but
actually to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct
the desirable norms and course of justice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision. He is warned
that a more severe sanction shall be imposed should he commit another administrative offense.
Let copies hereof be attached to his record and served on the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and on all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concu

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ vs.

HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-22320

July 29, 1968

FACTS:

CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners
resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted
by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple
money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were
filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to
subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners,
while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as
it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble
costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature
deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer
conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision,
was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this
adventure is patent.
FACTS:
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso
Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed
alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be
overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CAG.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to
end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a
piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More

than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be
satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their
counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final
judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out
temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals
decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an
ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with
civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case
39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the
execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs.
Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ
which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale.
It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have
known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the
writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued,
on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso
Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any
evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels
appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following
order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for
hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly
notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving
his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of
execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs.
Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of
another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the
same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case
7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated
anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII,
on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others,
that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez,
as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy,"
as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's abovementioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19,
1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to
the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an
offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as
stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on
December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash
dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent
Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates
the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any
particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a
strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is
equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to
adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until
the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more
than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and
55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of
which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the
remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from
proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied
stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent
injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted
litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and
55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous,
devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as
having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not
be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in
question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for
devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought
the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed
respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled
doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or
interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5
However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and

55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had
the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so.
But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the
above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407,
anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case
7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the
Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in
the said civil case until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of
the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel
happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries
of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior
to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the
participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering
that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is
not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we
said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the
inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the
Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on
record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his
appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior
to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became
petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case
No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala
although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs.
Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby
Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously
enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968
is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay
jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR
VS. ATTY. HAIDE B.VISTA-GUMBA
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
against respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct.
The facts are as follows.
Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a verified
Complaint[1] against respondent, also a resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3,[2]Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the IBP Board of Governors for proper
disposition.
Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent asked to be lent 350,000.00 .
Respondent assured him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She
likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located in Naga City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2055 [3] and registered in her fathers name. Respondent showed
complainant a Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured
complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property. Complainant consulted one
Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus,
complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in
complainants favor an open Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the
SPA. Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with
interest on due date, the deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the amount of 350,000.00
to respondent.
Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite
complainants repeated demands. Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to
register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give respondent the
power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks.
Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts,

but this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted
that respondent committed fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations, respondent filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading [5] but no answer or comment was ever filed by her
before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the IBP-CBD allowed respondent to
answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by complainant but she did not file any answer
thereto.[6] She also chose not to attend the mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13,
2007 and January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed to have waived her right to
participate in the proceedings.
On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered his report [7] finding
respondent guilty of violating Canon 1, [8] Rule 1.01[9] and Canon 7[10] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to be a co-owner of the property as
evidenced by an annotation on the back of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of the property has been sold to
her, it was evident that she employed deceit and dishonest means to make complainant believe, by virtue of
the SPA, that she was duly authorized to sell the entire property.
On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for her failure to submit verified Answer and did
not even participate in the mandatory conference, Atty. Haide V. Gumba
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. [11]
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of the
recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. [12]
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to

continue as an officer of the court. [13] Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly
required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her
through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and
complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted
the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the
property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the open deed of sale if she
fails to pay the loan.[14] By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the
legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which
she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which
provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
xxxx
We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading,
respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for
the mandatory conferences despite due notice. Respondent should bear in mind that she must
acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP.[15]
Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
[16]

In this case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension more appropriate but finds the recommended

penalty of suspension for one year too severe. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court

believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily intended as a
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively liable for grave
misconduct. She isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and
notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.

Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign

Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered
by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's
act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect
that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of
all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term
medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject
of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and
that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of
the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts

contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered
by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law
student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between
a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of
the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which
is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be

concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon
the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of

the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively
at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such
term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent
to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certainAtty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and

then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270).
It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services
are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its

President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may
serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that
which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the

conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge
of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess
rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must
be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory
and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole.
I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to
the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of
the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which
he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that
if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since
the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority

granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of

parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a
party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services
(See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as
that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to
that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice
on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference
to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve

giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law

(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may
be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a

high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as
computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent

than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila.
No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you
for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem
has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, outpatient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and
you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained
to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich

relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop
of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as
a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and
the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of
attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by
the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection
of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while

there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such
as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption
of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned
that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious
Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are
involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by
the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,

constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his

talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client
as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He

may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the
case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,

of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

FIRST DIVISION

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN,

A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised
them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce
them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a
loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City

Tel: 362-7820
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
and circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9]found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated
in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended
that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit
a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR
provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL

USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of
legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents
office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule

2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule
that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain
him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again
the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list
nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied
Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the
CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception
is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with
the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the
case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead
the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As
previously
mentioned,
any
act
of
solicitation
constitutes
[25]
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation
of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. [26]Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the

prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A
lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are
only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded
the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03,
2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement;
but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for
"the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct
in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further
mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and
that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for
the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing
circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,

complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of
the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a
separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered
in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the
counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso
Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary
responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment
by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and
the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR
and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was
merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached
to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the
respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of
Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in
said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on
October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta
and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel
spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing
conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain
against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their
appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for

using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National
Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership
dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed
her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester
Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault
in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in
the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the
IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the
bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP
membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as
required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the
IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
(pp. 2-4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again
that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and

HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,

counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about

pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in
a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice

and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the

public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make
a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for

appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission

on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In

either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in

which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups,
in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation
law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting
and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach
to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that
arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the

business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as
the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and
with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys
employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management.
( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of
his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune
to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do
their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role.
For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including
the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decisionmaking roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements

within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer visa-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to
understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international
joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as
firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the
legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the

firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing

improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former

Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which
is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such
a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed
only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the

Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School

of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open
to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat
debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal
of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol.
15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may
the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that
the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore,
respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in
good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants
in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and
is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution
of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the
prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not
prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of
the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so
by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the
patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or
is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc.
(R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the
use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business
has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this,
but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an
invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in
any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for
more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the
right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of
three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such
as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if
the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable
terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by
reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine
or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws,
legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience
for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation
of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any
other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent
Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to
a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is
not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the
legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a
patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior
public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training,
should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other
qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may
require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and
scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to
submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents
are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized
as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and
prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the
provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the
Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before
any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States
who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register
of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and

shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine
whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the
qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as
follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce
may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or
other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may
require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good
moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise
to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner
of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either
generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person,
agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall,
with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word,
circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall
be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United
States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as
the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law

authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist
their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be
held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our
attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority
to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect
the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner
of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the
transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would
be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where
the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books
of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients,
shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ,
Complainant,

- versus -

A.C. No. 9387

(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA,

Respondent.

June 20, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the
handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case
filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang),
the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter
pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the

case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution [2] dated 16 December
2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the
couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with deceit,
unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law. [3]Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal,
because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she
asked respondent several times about the status of the appeal, but despite inquiries he deliberately
withheld response [sic], to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. [4]
The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the
Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of
the Resolution.
On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint [5] with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the
following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in
the amount of 350,000.
Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan
ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer, [7] respondent
prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the
mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it
was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband
despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period
given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days. [8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that it is this pleading which was required. [9]
Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to settle the case. The
latter allegedly gestured approval of the advice. [10]
After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When
respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Duigan, he instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of
communication, but to no avail.[11] Thus, when complainants husband went to the office of respondent to
tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CAs Resolution dismissing the

case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA
KAYO.[12]
In his 5 January 2009 Report, [13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found
that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He
recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010.
Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [14] He prayed for the relaxation of the application of
the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX2012-17[15] partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from
the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa,
through a letter[16]addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining
to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees
with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension
the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the
disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in
the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including
complainant and her husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following sentence: DEFENDANT[S]APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x
x x.[18] Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainants husband
cannot be treated as a client-lawyer relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a
fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client
entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x[19]

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges
that complainants husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal.
According to respondent, this behavior was very unusual if he really believed that he engaged the
formers services.[20]
Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her
case and an acceptance fee in the amount of 7,000.
According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he charged 7,000
as acceptance fee, the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a
Memorandum of Appeal: x x x.[22]
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the clients cause. [23] Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence. [24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants husband asked from
him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he honestly believed that
this was the pleading required, based on what complainants husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is
correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was
respondents duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have
known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary
appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all
such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.[25]

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have been
elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code
reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded
in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his
failure to file the proper pleading was that he did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly
with the factual milieu of the case. The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty
originally imposed.
Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does
not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate
court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle.
If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by
complainants husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of
whatever pleading he could come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals. [27]
Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong
pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court,
he chose to ignore the CAs Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her
husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the
latters Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the
moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed
against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His
failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have
done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have
thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them. [28] His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling
the clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling
their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. [29]
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his
client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. [30]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03,
18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS andSTERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES DAVID and
MARISA WILLIAMS,

A.C. No. 6353

Complainants,
Present:

- versus -

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 27, 2006
x----------------------------------- ---------------x
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with
conduct unbecoming an attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment[1] filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
[2]

13443 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Dumaguete City where complainants are the
defendants. According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is
Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American citizen. [3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged
her with falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34. [4]
The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied
this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically
lost her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to
own land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.
2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites
Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose
her citizenship when she married an American unless she renounced it in a specific act.
2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that
her act of marrying her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also
doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his position, not Marisas
(Annex A-4).[5]

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows that the false charge
(that Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in the end. [6]
In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss, [7] respondent enumerated matters which to his
mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the
complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against the
complainants, and that the charges against him were bereft of any factual basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [8] Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled
the case for mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were then
directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had maliciously and knowingly
filed fabricated cases against them and that his acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted
their joint complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of
the Republic of the Philippinesas a result of her marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6)
months. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution

No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification that respondent be reprimanded, with
a warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients.
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations. As found by the
Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa BacatanWilliams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage,
which does not show that she has automatically acquired her husbands citizenship upon
her marriage to him. The cases cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is
clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a)
elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice,
and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re:
Integration of the Bar of thePhilippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the
Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do
this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and
jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws,
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the
Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations
and other rules promulgated by other competent authorities engaged in the administration
of justice. The lawyers life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill
and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due
to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.) [9]

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence. [10] Indeed, when the
law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed
of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client. [12] In this case, the
law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, [13] the most basic law of the land.
[14]

Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and with

utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases,
a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should
likewise espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical
ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws. [17]
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating Commissioner. It must be
stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of

misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and
member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. [18] Pursuant to the IBP
Commission on Bar Disciplines Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, [19] and considering further
that this is respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as recommended by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly invoked their
arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which
have yet to be determined on the merits in the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE,

for

gross

ignorance

of

the

law,

Atty.

Rudy

T.

Enriquez

is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give to his clients. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2001-9-SC

July 14, 2006

DOROTEO IGOY, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GILBERT F. SORIANO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 11, 2001, this Court unanimously ruled to dismiss respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano
from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned
or controlled corporations, and indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law. We denied
with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on June 10, 2003.
On March 31, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of
Suspension from the Practice of Law alleging that his dismissal from the service and
suspension from the practice of law for more than five years now is ample penalty for his
transgressions. He claimed that at 61 years of age, he may no longer find gainful employment
but as a lawyer, he could still be a productive citizen and family provider. On even date,
respondent also filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Recover Money Equivalent of Respondent's
Accrued Leave Creditswhich he earned during his 28 years of service in the judiciary.

On May 22, 2006, respondent filed a Supplement to Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to
Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law and submitted certifications attesting to his
good moral character issued by (a) Rev. Fr. Ariel O. Tecson, Parish Priest of Our Lady of the
Most Holy Rosary Parish, Paraaque City; (b) Sr. Silvana Rescigno of the Franciscan Sisters
Adorers of the Cross; (c) Rev. Fr. Christopher Salonga of the Fr. Hannibal Foundation Center in
Paraaque City; (d) Rev. Fr. John Lucas of Di-Francia Center of Studies in Paraaque City; (e)
Joseph Tan of the Knights of Columbus; and (f) Eduardo Timbungco, Bgy. Secretary of Manuyo
Dos, Las Pias City. At the same time, respondent prayed for the lifting of the prohibition for his
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
In fine, respondent is now asking this Court (a) to lift the order suspending him from the practice
of law; (b) to release the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits; and (c) to lift the
order prohibiting his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Without overlooking respondent's infractions which caused his dismissal from the service and
suspension from the practice of law, we take a second look at the penalties imposed upon him.
The suspension of a lawyer is not intended primarily as a punishment, but as a measure of
protection of the public and the profession,1 the lifting of which is based on the same criterion
used by the Court in applications for reinstatement to practice law, that is, whether or not "the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
[respondent's] participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law."2 The
respondent must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person
of good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into
consideration his character and standing prior to the suspension, the nature and character of
the charge for which he was suspended, his conduct subsequent thereto, and the time that has
elapsed after his suspension.3
In this case, respondent manifests that he is sincerely repentant and deeply remorseful for the
wrong he committed having realized that as a lawyer of the Highest Court of the Land, he
should have "lived up to the strictest standards of integrity in the public service bearing in mind
that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of
the men and women who work thereat." He also undertakes to always faithfully abide by the
ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession once his suspension is lifted.
Respondent has been suspended from the practice of law since October 11, 2001. Thus, for
more than five years, respondent had ample time and opportunity to amend his erring ways and
rehabilitate himself as proven by the certifications attesting to his moral character. Thus, he has
shown that he is worthy once again to enjoy the privilege of being a member of the Bar. The
lifting of the order suspending him from the practice of law is therefore in order.
Similarly, we find merit in respondent's plea for the release of the monetary equivalent of his
accrued leave credits. Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides in part:
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
The above Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, specifically Section 86
thereof, repealed Section 9, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), which provides for the forfeiture of not
only the retirement benefits but of the leave credits as well. By so repealing, it must have been
the intent of the framers of the Rules to exclude the forfeiture of the latter as one of the penalties
inherent in the penalty of dismissal.
In Villaros v. Orpiano,4 the Court noted that even when the penalty is dismissal, the forfeiture of
the leave credits is not imposed by the applicable rule found in Section 58 of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In Paredes v. Padua,5 the Court held that despite
their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that
they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they
may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.
Considering the foregoing cases and the provisions of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, the release of the monetary equivalent of respondent's accrued leave
credits is hereby ordered.
However, we cannot grant respondent's plea for the lifting of the prohibition for reemployment in
the government service. The records show that during the investigation of the instant case,
respondent offered to retire not once, but twice. In the Memorandum of the Office of
Administrative Services dated December 3, 2001, it was noted that
Lastly, respondent claims that his offer to resign was erroneously construed as an
admission of guilt. He broached the idea that such offer came at a time when he was
emotionally, intellectually and physically wrecked by the filing of the complaint. The OAS
cannot simply bite this self-serving claim. The offer to retire/resign came initially as part
of the first comment submitted by respondent on November 6, 2000, where in the
ultimate portion, he stated that "if you find that I have committed a misconduct in helping
Mr. Taneo despite my explanation, may I request Your Honor that I just be allowed to
retire from the service" (underscoring supplied). By saying so, all along respondent
honestly believed that he committed a misconduct.
It may be true that by then, respondent was still emotionally bothered, which is why he
reacted the same. However, what OAS cannot surmise is why on January 8, 2001,
respondent reiterated the same offer through a letter of even date addressed to the
Honorable Chief Justice. This only means that he made this reiteration after he already
had sufficient opportunity to determine the consequence or effect of the first offer.
Considering that he is bent in doing so, it is reasonably assumed he made the
subsequent offer to resign/retire freely and voluntarily.
We also note that when respondent filed the Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order
of Suspension from the Practice of Law on March 31, 2006, he prayed only for the lifting of his
suspension from the practice of law. In fact, he admitted that he is no longer interested in
appealing his "dismissal from the service" considering the denial with finality of his motion for
reconsideration. He likewise conceded that at "61 years of age, a senior citizen and almost in
the twilight of [his] life x x x [he] may no longer find a gainful employment x x x."

Records show that this Court denied on June 10, 2003 respondent's motion for reconsideration
of his dismissal from the service. The denial was with finality hence it should no longer be
disturbed. Likewise, pursuant to Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, dismissal from the service carries with it the cancellation of eligibility and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service.
Besides, mere passage of time is not a license to overlook the infractions of the respondent
which were committed within the hallow grounds of this Court. Lest it be forgotten, we reiterate
our findings thus:
Respondent's acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the public in
the entire judicial system. What makes his infraction worse is the fact that he is
not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of
the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of government service spanning
twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as
a whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to apply disciplinary sanction on an
errant member, and again it will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court
imposes on respondent the only penalty that he deserves that of dismissal from
the service.
Finally, respondent is sternly warned that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of legal profession are the conditions
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.6
ACCORDINGLY, the order suspending respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the practice of law
is LIFTED. The monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits is ordered RELEASED.
However, respondent shall REMAIN DISQUALIFIED for re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is directed to compute the monetary equivalent of
respondent's accrued leave credits and release the same to him.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let this Resolution be also made of
record in the personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4354. April 22, 2002]
LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the suspension
from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6) months, with a
stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly
represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15
and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[1]
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration, [2] respondent now comes before this Court to challenge the
basis of the IBPs resolution, and prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of
December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St.,
Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a Japanese
national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony
Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela.[3]
The destruction of the complainants carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her small
business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial
constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. [4]
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia, Villapez
and one Bernardo Sia.[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami
and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant. [6] For his services, complainant paid the respondent
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10, 000.00) as attorneys fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
as filing fee.[7] However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the
complainant and her husband.[8]
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages against
the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001.[9]
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment against
the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to
represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was
scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its postponement although all
the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainants persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did
not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainants
consent.[10]
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While
acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said
document was even printed in respondents office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent
who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with
her consent.[11]
Respondent denied the complainants allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part as
the complainants lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was
uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the complainant and made
known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed

relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to grant respondents manifestation and
advised the complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and
instead, sought the dismissal of the case.[12]
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on
August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted
as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare Echavias Answer but he
declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked respondents secretary to print the
document. Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations
against him to compel him to pay the amount of P500,000.00.[13]
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas
Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment
complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[14] Commissioner Ingles did
not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the findings of
the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBPs resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating
Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses against
him. He argues that the Investigating Committees finding that he represented Echavia is contrary to court
records and the complainants own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt on the credibility of the
Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations considering that the Investigating
Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277.
Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering
that his private practice is his only source of income. [15]
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter,
this Court is inclined to uphold the IBPs resolution.
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a
need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. [16] Due process is
fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in
support of their arguments.[17]
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the hearings,
prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainants evidence ex parte and to set the case
for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence:
The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely December 12,
1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.

The Commission for the last time, will cancel todays hearing and can no longer tolerate any further
postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at 2:00 P.M. Said
hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia, also
affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same and understood the
contents thereof.[18]
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to crossexamine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after he
has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondents contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the records
and the complainants own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola was
Echavias counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk of
court,[19] and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q:

Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia
as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact when you say he is
counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil
Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?

A:

What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case before Judge
Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty. Maderazo is
appearing for me because he will be the one to coordinate with Allans case.

Q:

So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was
Atty. Alviola stated by you now?

A:

Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavias counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of
record of Allan Echavia.[20]

Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-of-record
of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the
adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting interests of record--although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that
the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse
and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the
adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest
form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances of his
relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of the counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose. (emphasis supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule
inoperative.[21] The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising
rules of professional ethics. Thus:
The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question
is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasars wife, not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.[22]
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his clients
cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to his
clients cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all facts and
consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to
establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the
Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the
imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.[23]
A perusal of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with the
complainants claims. It reads:
1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it pertains to the
personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the allegations in Paragraph
One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6),

ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the Complaint are DENIED for lack of
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. [24]
By way of prayer, Echavia states:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing plaintiffs
complaint.[25]
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating Committee
found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to respondents bare denial. As
pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after
some sessions in the latters office, asked him to return and sign a document which he later identified as
the Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondents defense weak. Respondent did not bother to present
his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient
excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the
complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the
document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavias Answer to the Amended
Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find any
reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not
stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainants stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how she
could have prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as
complicated as the present case.
Respondents attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial
decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial.
This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the
Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that Commissioner Ingles would be
biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latters inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we
could not find any hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead
us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities. [26] The suspension of the respondents privilege to practice law may result
to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance this concern
with the injury he caused to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon 6
of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a
stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
November 29, 1989
A.M. No. 3249 SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
, J.:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty.

Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a
verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and
submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version
of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in
default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her
evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25
January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and
second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant
failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission
that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989,
the Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before
it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to
file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission,
the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding
respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the
future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate
family as a responsible parent should.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in
Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job
as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G.
Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with
respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his
wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely
Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig,
while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and
brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to
neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found,
upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter
Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's)
children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along
with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant,
compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate
family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,
stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We
also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and
necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required
to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the
contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the
Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that
"the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for
the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension
or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for
disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here
refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge
of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3
In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a
single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a
son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with
the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was
disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member
of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was
found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently
bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous
relationship with another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of
"reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with
her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent
flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary
obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes,

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP")
held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following
were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their
alternates) and proclaimed as officers:

NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and
the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of
president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C.
Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which
prohibit such activities. The Supreme Courten banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into
the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the
canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by
Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants
and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to
prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and
extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president
of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday,
June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya,
June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in
an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial,
entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "votebuying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal
candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured
heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because
Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of
distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional
directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted
leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's
informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma
Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that
government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened
and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged
from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which
were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly
involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they
plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention
Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989,
directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal
officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20,
1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the
problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of
existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying
nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of

Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental
assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with
the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a
widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth,
that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as
expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or
indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the
other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were
committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The
Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by
the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels
the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their
supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport
Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and
the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to
win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge
that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor
Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor
officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections.
Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of
the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt
the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and

every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be
penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position
in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he
files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts
and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member,
directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a
statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legalsize sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as
the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or
to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness
of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any
article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a
promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any
person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without
prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive
vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the
country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP
President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar
dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon
(t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced
their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the
forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter
presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B.
Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T.
Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano
Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T.

Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F.
Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he
had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal
commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The
reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit
"M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show
that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural
Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD
(Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane
manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong.
Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed
by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified
that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the
projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for
a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official
business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As
Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group,
could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol
was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP
chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10,
1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her
group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol
to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon
that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning
that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the
Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary
Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In
Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n.,
July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for
the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive VicePresident; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez
(Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern
Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P.
Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr.
(Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice
President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil
Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose
Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon
Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B.
Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama,
Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P.
Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from
Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a
written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that
of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not
use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to
be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs.
Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the
plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar
Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of
Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn,
which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly
ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of
the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his
delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo
Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus
Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban,
Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy
Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel
Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano
Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores,
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio
Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse
Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus
Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24)
rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings
were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68).
The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where
her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites.
According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract
that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a
group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an
outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He
made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons
contributed for that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

(b) Antonio Carpio

P 25,000

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time
the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates
could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the
Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was
registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She
admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the
Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto
Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D.
Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C.
Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla,
Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio
Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix
Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave
P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm
could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar

and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary
Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the
candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her
husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm
who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty.
Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6,
1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt
Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of
P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of
P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department
manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty.
Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, FJacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed
themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E.
Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo,
Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion,
Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo,
Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C.
Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP
By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed
at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty.
Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked
about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of
Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma
Rho."

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which
included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy
Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and
weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of
P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to
Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys
Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor,
Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign
strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the
supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the
ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP
dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining
whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are
issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any
election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a nonelection year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of
paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his biodata and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon
and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by
his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by
the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention
floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention
site this year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July
6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate
for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were
distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law
firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate
(Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's
slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite
meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio
City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin
and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the
Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her
support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier
committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This
statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged
offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an
IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated
(t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor
became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the
presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs.
Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas,
expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from
one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was
met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine
Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer
to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation
(t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three
candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the
Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the
elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned
Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to
give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp.
101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry
Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was
already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty.
Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p.
101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of
this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed
about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of
Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the
expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his
purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms,
food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of
P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the
national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections
on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a
"strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for
them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes
of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the
national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of
candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or
Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be
filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the
expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of
her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol
provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the
case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed
girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of

Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and
escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their
support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to
another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the
IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of
their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect
for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed
to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules
that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association
detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor
elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates,
during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had
been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive
it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the
campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See.
8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among
whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of
nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of
the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court,
and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate,
expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently
concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the
Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates
(approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following
national officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP
under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right
of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration
of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an
Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President
shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run
for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have
a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective
regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors
to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman
and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary,
Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from
the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the

members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month
before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the
governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the
first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be
held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are
hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this
Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within
three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30)
days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect
from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these
special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989,
particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single
Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities
attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any
position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to
administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are
without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are
warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN
MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G.
DORONILA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March 17,
1994[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier order
cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-92383 and T-5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246,
respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended complaint[2] before
the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose B.
Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for
"annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages.
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an
affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of the
previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties registered in
his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among
them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among several
heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the
properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful
heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner caused
to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546, [3] which
covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were
derived or transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the
name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three
separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.[4] All
these motions were denied.[5]
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision[6] dismissing petitioner's
complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's cause of
action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal [7]on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco
filed a motion for cancellation of the notices oflis pendens[8] dated December 21, 1993; this was
denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994. [9] He filed a "Second Motion for
Reconsideration"[10] which was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994. [11] Displaying
remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration." [12] This time,

however, his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order[13]dated February 14, 1994, the
respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof so
that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal
and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which
finding is based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was registered
way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if
not totally nil and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which
are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco
based on the same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the
ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were alleged as formerly
paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much
less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was
declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at
all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots consisting only a
total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens title
covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect
of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and upon further
review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so
holds that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the
defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights,
if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration. [14] On March 4, 1994, the public
respondent issued an Order[15] reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the
notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration[16] against the Order
dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of
this petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although appeal had already
been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a
matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted to the appellate
court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling
the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation
of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area
of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be
taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby

reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens.
[17]

Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE
AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID
BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still within
the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment
or decree by subsequent alienation.[18] The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result
of the litigation over said property.[19]
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [20] and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529,[21] otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provide the statutory
bases for notice of lis pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper
only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land or the
use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.[22]
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject
property to put the property under the coverage of the rule. [23] It is not necessary for her to prove
ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[24] or substance,[25] the rule is that a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for
the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[26]

The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27] that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies
or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the
policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28] thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand injunction) is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which
may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August
14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the qualifying
phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely to relieve this
Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which,
but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to
be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even

their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ
of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no
discernible special and important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information and guidance
of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the judicial
hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,[29]
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate
recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,[30] Aleria v.
Velez, [31] and Tano v. Socrates.[32] Only the presence of exceptional and compelling reasons
justified a disregard of the rule.[33]
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or
non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition
could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[34] we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in
an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended
merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal
with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the
continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on
the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal with

and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final
judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference
only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional
remedies. [emphasis supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and
would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence of the
said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will be
incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical language employed by respondent
Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed
both before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana
Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not
red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to
conceal her faulty grammar,"[35] is impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as
counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her
own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[36] a retired police major described by
respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"[37] an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who
lives with plaintiff for being houseless [38] who rents a place on the subject property sought to be
recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is
variously described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready
to skin defendant alive for not being a bastard,"[39] and a "horned spinster and man-hungry
virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and
injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply
desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh
at her behind her back."[40] He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's
Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to
be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her office-mate who
simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to
catch him by sheer brass and audacity.[41] In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a
"marriage bureau for her own benefit.[42] Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will
come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no
happiness."[43]
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal
darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he does
nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays
only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson
in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to comport
themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before the
courts.
In Romero v. Valle,[44] we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some
latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both
written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as
may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate
language invites the disciplinary authority of the court. [45] We are aghast at the facility with which
respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing party and her
counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1., [46] we dismissed as
totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner,
Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty.
Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready audience
in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui
auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.[47]
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2200. July 19, 1990.]
BASILIO C. GUTIERREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO N.
ZULUETA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM.:

This case pertains to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein complainant

Basilio C. Gutierrez against the herein respondent Atty. Leonardo N. Zulueta.
On October 13, 1980, the complainant filed with this Court a sworn letter-complaint
dated October 11, 1980 seeking the disbarment of the respondent lawyer on the
grounds of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession.
The complainant alleges that the respondent lawyer was his counsel in two cases,
namely, a workmens compensation case and a civil case filed with the then Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga Del Sur. The complaint concerns the latter
case. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The complainant filed the said civil case against his former employer, the Singer
Sewing Machine Company. The trial court ruled in his favor. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, the said appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and
ruled in favor of the company. It is categorically stated in the said decision that the
complainant did not file a brief. Thus, he maintains that the case was resolved
against him primarily because his lawyer, the herein respondent, did not file the
required brief with the appellate court and such omission is attributable to the
dishonesty of the respondent lawyer.
In support of his contention, the complainant alleges that sometime in August
1976, the respondent lawyer, who was then in Manila, wired him to send the
amount of P400.00 to cover the expenses in relation to the preparation and printing
of the appellees brief, and upon receipt of the message, he sent the said amount to
the respondent lawyer through the Philippine National Bank. He also alleges that he
sent a telegram to the respondent lawyer for the purpose of informing the latter
that the P400.00 can be obtained at the Sampaloc, Manila branch office of the same
bank.
It appears that sometime thereafter, the respondent lawyer assured the
complainant that the brief had already been filed in court and that a copy thereof
will be made available to the latter in due time.
It also appears that immediately after the complainant received a copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, he reported the matter to the provincial governor
inasmuch as the respondent lawyer is the provincial legal counsel. An investigation
ensued but the same failed to settle the problem.
As stated earlier, the complainant eventually brought the matter to the attention of
this Court. On April 20, 1981, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
In the investigation that ensued, the respondent lawyer testified that he received
the amount of P400.00 from the complainant for the purpose of preparing the said

brief and that he gave the said amount to his secretary to cover the expenses to be
incurred in such preparation. He also testified that he had to leave for Pagadian City
at that time and that he instructed his secretary to attend to the filing of the brief.
He likewise stated that sometime thereafter, his secretary assured him that the
brief had been filed already. He also said that he could not furnish the complainant
with a copy of the brief inasmuch as his secretary, for undisclosed reasons, left the
office, taking with her his records and his typewriter. The respondent lawyer admits
that he received the additional amount of P100.00 from the complainant for the
purpose of securing a copy of the brief for the latter. 1
In due time, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its report recommending therein
that the respondent lawyer be found guilty of not having exercised the due
diligence required of a member of the legal profession in connection with his duties
to his clients and accordingly impose upon him the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one year. 2
The record of the case undoubtedly discloses that the respondent lawyer failed to
exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client, the
herein complainant. The failure of the respondent lawyer to undertake the
necessary measures to submit the required brief certainly caused material prejudice
to the complainant inasmuch as the appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court which was in favor of the latter. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is
attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible
lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the
pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility, lock,
stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible members
of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply
disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the
office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.
In sum, therefore, this Court is of the well-considered opinion that the respondent
lawyer failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal
profession. His suspension from the practice of law is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonardo N. Zulueta is hereby suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year effective from the date of his receipt of this
resolution. He is advised to henceforth exercise greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duties towards his clients. This decision is immediately
executory and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
will be entertained. Let copies of this resolution be attached to his personal record
and circulated among the different courts.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and

Regalado, JJ., concur.