Arturo Arroyo.

Pregunta: -Defiende o critica: El modelo nomolgico deductivo no ilumina la

naturaleza de la explicacin. Si alguien quiere saber por qu pas x bajo las
condiciones y, no es iluminador sostener que x es el tipo de cosas que siempre pasa
bajo las condiciones y.
La respuesta a esta pregunta, tanto en su defensa como en su contra depende de la
concepcin que se tenga de explicacin cientfica, de este modo, si concebimos que la
explicacin cientfica es un argumento de carcter lgico deductivo como lo hace Hempell
se logra una crtica adecuada, es decir una defensa del modelo de explicacin de Hempell.
En cambio si asumimos que la explicacin cientfica no posee una estructura
argumentativa, sino que existe una relevancia estadstica en la explicacin como lo hace
Salmon, o bien, si se critica la nocin de relevancia de las premisas como lo hace Salmon y
Rubens, o bien, si se identifica el problema de la simetra en el modelo de Hempell y se
propone una salida pragmtica como lo hace Van Fraseen, entonces se logra una defensa de
la afirmacin en cuestin.
Critica: si acepamos que la explicacin cientfica responde a la pregunta por qu paso (x)
bajo las condiciones (y) es un argumento de orden lgico-deductivo entonces el modelo
ND es vlido. Dicho modelo presupone que la explicacin cientfica tiene una naturaleza
deductiva. Para Hempell el conocimiento cientfico se logra identificando un problema y
proponiendo una hiptesis explicativa para abordarlo, dicha hiptesis sirve para la seleccin
de datos relevantes.
De este modo el hecho (explanandum) es relevante cuando se puede derivar
deductivamente de la hiptesis explicativa (explanas), dicha hiptesis est constituida por
leyes generales, las cuales representan regularidades en la naturaleza y circunstancias
particulares en las que se presenta el fenmeno a explicar.
En concreto, es adecuado pensar que la explicacin cientfica del fenmeno (x) bajo
circunstancias (y) es adecuado ya que la validacin de dicha explicacin se obtiene
mediante la nocin de derivacin deductiva. De este modo una ley muestra como siempre
que existan las circunstancias (y) se presentara el fenmeno (x) y la explicacin se logra
apelando a la ley.
Sin embargo queda abierta la cuestin de cmo obtener leyes autenticas, ya que estn segn
Hempell son afirmaciones de carcter universal. Existen tambin leyes de tipo
probabilstico, pero se presenta el problema de cmo diferencias entre leyes verdaderas y
no simples generalizaciones accidentales, Hempell slo comenta que una ley puede servir
de base para las explicaciones, pero que una generalizacin accidental no.
Defensa:
Rubens: el modelo ND no esclarece la naturaleza de la explicacin ya que puede haber
ejemplos que no cumplan con la exigencia de la deduccin argumentativa, ya que las
premisas pueden ser irrelevantes. Rubens tambin divide la nocin de explicacin en
general y particular, el slo se ocupa de la nocin particular y propone el siguiente caso.
Premisa (ley): todos los metales conducen electricidad

Premisa: todo lo que conduce electricidad est sujeto a la gravitacin

Conclusin: todos los metales estn sujetos a la gravitacin.
En este caso el explanandum no se explica por las premisas (explanas) de este modo no se
logra explicar el por qu. Aunque este esbozo de explicacin tiene una naturaleza
deductiva.
Salmon: el modelo de relevancia estadstica de Salmon, igual que en Rubens las premisas
no son suficientes para la conclusin. Para este autor, la nocin de relevancia del modelo de
Hempell es errnea ya que una cosa es tener consecuencia lgica y otra cosa es explicar por
qu sucede el fenmeno.
En concreto se debe abandonar la nocin nomolgica deductiva de explicacin que propone
el modelo de Hempell ya que presenta el problema de la relevancia del explanas y en
algunos casos, en el modelo ND el explanandum, aunque bien podra seguirse de las
premisas, no logra explicarse el (por qu) sucede dicho fenmeno.
Van Fraseen: Consideremos ahora otra crtica relevante. Es decir el problema de la
simetra que representa el modelo de explicacin cientfica de Hempell. Dicho en pocas
palabras, si asumimos que la explicacin cientfica es de carcter nomolgico deductivo,
entonces el explanandum se deriva del explanas, pero la dificultad de simetra, consiste en
advertir la posibilidad de que se presente en la explicacin el camino inverso, es decir, que
el explanas se derive del explanandum. Si esto sucede, entonces, tampoco se responde de
manera satisfactoria la pregunta de (por qu) sucede tal fenmeno. La estructura de la
simetra es la siguiente. Si alguien quiere saber (por qu) sucede el fenmeno (x:
explanandum) bajo las circunstancias (y: explanas) no es relevante para la explicacin decir
que siempre que se presenten las circunstancias (y) ocurre el fenmeno (x). La objecin de
la simetra consiste en mostrar la circularidad que representa el modelo de explicacin de
Hempell. Para obviar esta dificultad Van Fraseen propone una nocin de explicacin
cientfica que apela al carcter contextual-pragmtico para el desarrollo de la explicacin.
Sin embargo este tema es parte de otra pregunta del cuestionario que se est respondiendo.
En concreto el modelo de la explicacin cientfica en Hempell, presenta la dificultad de
enfrentar se a las nociones de relevancia y simetra.
Asimetra e irrelevancia en la propuesta de Hempel
The second reason, (B), for holding that Hempel's conditions could not be sufficient for
singular explanation has to do with 'explanatory' symmetries. Hempel's account of singular
explanation in terms of derivability from true, empirical premisses permits intuitively
objectionable cases in which (part of) the explanans can be explained by the explanandum,
as well as explain it. How can we amend the account, so that such symmetries of
'explanation' will not arise?
Both James Woodward and Peter Achinstein have argued (or implied) that the explanation
relation is not an asymmetric relation, as is usually supposed, and that there are or can be
bona fide cases of acceptable symmetrical explanation, explanatory mutual dependence
between two singular facts. However, both would of course concede that there are some

cases in which symmetrical explanation must be ruled out (i.e. in the case of causal
explanation). The explanation relation, even if not asymmetric, is surely not symmetric. If
not asymmetric, it must be non-symmetric. This is enough for my argument here. All the
examples I shall consider in this part of the chapter are cases in which symmetrical
explanations are intuitively unacceptable; I do not need to retain the stronger claim that the
explanation relation itself is asymmetric.
There are a number of these symmetry counterexamples which challenge Hempels account
of singular explanation, many of which derive from Sylvain Bromberger and Michael
Scriven. For consider Bromberger's flagpole example: the shadow is so long because the
pole has this height, and not conversely. At first sight, no contextual factor could reverse
this asymmetry, because the pole's height is a property it has in and by itself, and its shadow
is a very accidental feature. The general principle linking the two is that its shadow is a
function f(x, t) of its height x and the time t (the latter determining the sun's elevation). But
imagine the pole is the pointer on a giant sundial. Then the values of f have desired
properties for each time t, and we appeal to these to explain why it is (had to be) such a tall
pole.We have already touched on some of these examples in the discussion of Hempel.
There are two kinds of cases that generate these unacceptable symmetries. First, there are
equations which show that the numerical value assumed by some property of a system at
time t is a function of the values assumed by the other properties of the system at time t or
an earlier time, t (Ohms law, Hookes law, the Boyle-Charles laws for ideal gases, the
length and the period of the pendulum).
Second, there are laws with biconditionals, which can include cases both of laws of
coexistence and of laws of succession. A barometer falls iff [if and only if] a storm is
approaching; the light received from the galaxies exhibits a shift towards the red end of the
spectrum iff the galaxies are receding from us; and (Aristotle's case) a planet twinkles iff it
is not near.
To this, we can add Salmon's confused rooster who explains the rising of the sun on the
grounds of his regular crowing.10 These equations or biconditionals will allow the
derivation of the height of the flagpole from the length of the shadow and the length of the
shadow from the height of the flagpole; the length of the pendulum from its period and its
period from its length; the approaching storm from the fall in the barometer as well as the
fall of the barometer from the approaching storm; the receding of the galaxies from the red
shift as well as the red shift from the recession of the galaxies, the rising of the sun from the
crowing of the cock as well as the crowing of the cock from the rising of the sun.
But, in each of these pairs, the first derivation would be nonexplanatory; the second,
explanatory. Equations and biconditionals permit symmetric derivations; but since at least
these examples do not provide symmetric explanations, there must be more to singular
explanation than what Hempel's theory thus far allows. Hempel, as we saw, 'dealt' with this
by suggesting that there may not really be true biconditionals in such cases (he supposed, it
will be recalled, that there might be cases of Koplik spots without measles). But what we
have to establish is how, given that there may really be true biconditionals or equations of
this kind which allow derivations 'in both directions', we are able to distinguish the
explanations from the derivations which fail to explain (Ruben, pags. 725-726).
Some familiar difficulties beset the covering law model. The asymmetry problem arises
because some scientific laws have the logical form of equivalences. Such laws can be used
"in either direction." Thus a law asserting that the satisfaction of a condition C1 is
equivalent to the satisfaction of a condition C2 can be used in two different kinds of

argument. From a premise asserting that an object meets C1 , we can use the law to infer
that it meets C2; conversely, from a premise asserting that an object meets C2, we can use
the law to infer that it meets C 1 . The asymmetry problem is generated by noting that in
many such cases one of these derivations can be used in giving explanations while the other
cannot.
Consider a hoary example, (For further examples, see Bromberger 1966.) We can explain
why a simple pendulum has the period it does by deriving a specification of the period from
a specification of the length and the law which relates length and period. But we cannot
explain the length of the pendulum by deriving a specification of the length from a
specification of the period and the same law. What accounts for our different assessment of
these two arguments? Why does it seem that one is explanatory while the other "gets things
backwards"? The covering law model fails to distinguish the two, and thus fails to provide
answers (Kitcher, p. 339).
Explanatory Asymmetries. There are many cases in which a derivation of an explanandum
E from a law L and initial conditions I seems explanatory but a backward derivation of
I from E and the same law L does not seem explanatory, even though the latter, like the
former, appears to meet the criteria for successful DN explanation. For example, one can
derive the length s of the shadow cast by a flagpole from the height h of the pole and the
angle of the sun above the horizon and laws about the rectilinear propagation of light.
This derivation meets the DN criteria and seems explanatory. On the other hand, a
derivation (2.5.1) of h from s and and the same laws also meets the DN criteria but does
not seem explanatory. Examples like this suggest that at least some explanations possess
directional or asymmetric features to which the DN model is insensitive.
Explanatory Irrelevancies. A derivation can satisfy the DN criteria and yet be a defective
explanation because it contains irrelevancies besides those associated with the directional
features of explanation. Consider an example due to Wesley Salmon (Salmon, 1971, p.34):
(2.5.2) (L) All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant
(K) John Jones is a male who has been taking birth control pills regularly
(E) John Jones fails to get pregnant
It is arguable that (L) meets the criteria for lawfulness imposed by Hempel and many other
writers. (If one wants to deny that L is a law one needs some principled, generally accepted
basis for this judgment and, as explained above, it is unclear what this basis is.) Moreover,
(2.5.2) is certainly a sound deductive argument in which L occurs as an essential premise.
Nonetheless, most people judge that (L) and (K) are no explanation of E . There are many
other similar illustrations. For example (Kyburg 1965), it is presumably a law (or at least an
exceptionless, counterfactual supporting generalization) that all samples of table salt that
have been hexed by being touched with the wand of a witch dissolve when placed in water.
One may use this generalization as a premise in a DN derivation which has as its
conclusion that some particular hexed sample of salt has dissolved in water. But again the
hexing is irrelevant to the dissolving and such a derivation is no explanation.
One obvious diagnosis of the difficulties posed by examples like (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) focuses
on the role of causation in explanation. According to this analysis, to explain an outcome
we must cite its causes and (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) fail to do this. As Salmon (1989, p.47) puts
it, a flagpole of a certain height causes a shadow of a given length and thereby explains the

length of the shadow. By contrast, the shadow does not cause the flagpole and
consequently cannot explain its height. Similarly, taking birth control pills does not cause
Jones' failure to get pregnant and this is why (2.5.2) fails to be an acceptable explanation.
On this analysis, what (2.5.1) and (2.5. 2) show is that a derivation can satisfy the DN
criteria and yet fail to identify the causes of an explanandumwhen this happens the
derivation will fail to be explanatory.
As explained above, advocates of the DN model would not regard this diagnosis as very
illuminating, unless accompanied by some account of causation that does not simply take
this notion as primitive. (Salmon in fact provides such an account, which we will consider
in Section 4.) We should note, however, that an apparent lesson of (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) is that
the regularity account of causation favored by DN theorists is at best incomplete: the
occurrence of c , e and the existence of some regularity or law linking them (or x 's having
property P and x 's having property Q and some law linking these) is not a sufficient
condition for the truth of the claim that c caused e or x 's having P is causally or
explanatorily relevant to x 's having Q. More generally, if the counterexamples (2.5.1) and
(2.5.2) are accepted, it follows that the DN model fails to state sufficient conditions for
explanation. Explaining an outcome isn't just a matter of showing that it is nomically
expectable.
There are two possible reactions one might have to this observation. One is that the idea
that explanation is a matter of nomic expectability is correct as far as it goes, but that
something more is required as well. According to this assessment, the DN/IS model does
state a necessary condition for successful explanation and, moreover, a condition that is a
non-redundant part of a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for explanation.
However, some other, independent feature, X (which will account for the directional
features of explanation and insure the kind of explanatory relevance that is apparently
missing in the birth control example) must be added to the DN model to achieve a
successful account of explanation. The idea is thus that Nomic Expectability + X=
Explanation. Something like this idea is endorsed, by the unificationist models of
explanation developed by Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989), which are discussed in
Section 5 below (scientific explanation Stanford).
A second, more radical possible conclusion is that the DN account of the goal or rationale
of explanation is mistaken in some much more fundamental way and that the DN model
does not even state necessary conditions for successful explanation. As noted above, unless
the hidden structure argument is accepted, this conclusion is strongly suggested by
examples like (2.4.1) (The impact of my knee caused the tipping over of the inkwell)
which appear to involve explanation without the explicit citing of a law or a deductive
structure. To assess whether the DN/IS model provides necessary conditions for
explanation, we thus must consider the hidden structure strategy in more detail.
1 Sodium normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one
2 Everything that normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one normally
combines with chlorine in a ratio one-to-one
Sodium normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one
1 Jones ate at least a pound of arsenic at time t

2 (x) (x eats at least 1 lb arsenic at t x dies within 24 hours after t)

Jones dies within 24 hours of t
1 Every man who regularly takes birth control pills avoids pregnancy
2 John Jones has taken his wifes birth control pills regularly
John Jones avoided becoming pregnant in the past year

Formular de manera sucinta cmo entiende Salmon lo que es una explicacin

La explicacin es sealar el lugar que ocupa un evento dentro de un patrn discernible del
mundo.
Donde para identificar el lugar que ocupa x evento, Salmon echa mano de la nocin de
causalidad, y la introduce en su modelo de explicacin como un segundo nivel (siendo el
primer nivel el modelo SR). La explicacin con la nocin de causalidad coloca los
fenmenos en el lugar que les pertenece, dentro de un nexo causal.
As Salmon dice que dar una explicacin cientfica es mostrar cmo los eventos caben en la
estructura causal del mundo. La explicacin del evento x se obtiene cuando ste se subsume
a un patrn de la naturaleza, y por tanto, puede saberse qu lugar de la red causal del
mundo tiene el evento x.
Debe notarse adems que previamente a la subsuncin del evento a su posicin del nexo
causal, existe un primer nivel de la explicacin donde Salmon coloca su modelo Estadstico
Relevante, de forma que permita conocer cul es la informacin relevante del explanans
que da cuenta del evento x. La explicacin as, se define con base en dos niveles: relevancia
estadstica y causalidad.
Finalmente, es importante mencionar que Salmon considera conveniente la nocin de
relacin causal porque con sta se evita caer en problemas de simetra de la explicacin.
(Hasta aqu la respuesta es sucinta, lo de abajo es un aadido, que podra ser importante a la
respuesta, segn lo considere cada uno).
La nocin de relacin causal se introducen en el modelo de explicacin de Salmon cuando
adopta el enfoque ntico de la explicacin. Este enfoque adopta una posicin realista en
relacin a las leyes, donde estas leyes crean patrones en el mundo, los cuales pueden
descubrirse.

Por qu piensa Salmon que las explicaciones no son argumentos?

Hay dos razones por las que la explicacin no es un argumento en Salmon.

1. Una explicacin para Salmon no es un argumento porque as es posible evitar problemas

de irrelevancia:
Salmon caracteriza la explicacin en dos niveles, donde en el primer nivel se ubica
el modelo estadstico relevante, que es el que prohbe la caracterizacin de
explicaciones como argumentos. Esta prohibicin se da porque los criterios que un
buen argumento debe cumplir son diferentes a los criterios requeridos para una
buena explicacin.
Prueba de ello es que la informacin irrelevante no provoca daos cuando est
instalada en un argumento, y por el contrario, cuando est instalada en una
explicacin es fatal.
Las explicaciones pues, son libres de informacin irrelevante gracias al modelo
estadstico relevante, donde una explicacin la define como un conjunto de
informacin estadsticamente relevante para el explanandum.
Un ejemplo de lo anterior es que el modelo puede identificar que el hecho de que un
hombre tome pastillas anticonceptivas es irrelevante para evitar un embarazo.
Donde el hecho de ser hombre rechaza la primera informacin por ser
estadsticamente irrelevante. Mientras tanto, las explicaciones caracterizadas como
argumentos no detectaran la informacin irrelevante de tomar pastillas
anticonceptivas, en el caso de que un hombre no quiera quedar embarazado.
De esta manera, es conveniente que las explicaciones no sean argumentos.
1. Ergo, las explicaciones sin ser caracterizadas como argumentos evitan problemas de
irrelevancia.
(Esto excluye, por supuesto, los argumentos deductivos e inductivos (IS) del modelo
hempeliano.)

2. Rechazar las explicaciones como argumentos permite que emerjan otros factores
relevantes en relacin a un explanandum:
El del modelo SR rechaza la nocin de argumento porque as puede desecharse el
modelo Inductivo Estadstico.
Se rechaza el modelo inductivo estadstico porque este solo permite que emerja
informacin con muy alta probabilidad en el explanandum.
Al no tener los constreimientos de alta probabilidad del modelo inductivo, pueden
considerarse como relevantes otros conjuntos de informacin que pueden dar cuenta
del explanandum.
Esto es as porque para el modelo Estadstico Relevante los conjuntos d informacin
con baja probabilidad tambin pueden ser explicativos.
Ergo, el rechazo de caracterizar las explicaciones como argumentos permite que otros
factores relevantes en relacin a un explanandum emerjan.
Por 1) y por 2), Salmon no ve las explicaciones como argumentos.
Formular de manera sucinta cmo entiende Salmon lo que es una explicacin causal.

Salmon dice que la explicacin en sentido de Laplace (la idea de que con ayuda de
condiciones iniciales un evento es explicado subsumindolo bajo una o ms leyes de la
naturaleza), puede construirse de tres formas: epistmica, modal y ntica. l se adhiere a la
tercera, la ntica.
La nocin ntica de la explicacin dice que si el universo es determinista, entonces la
naturaleza est gobernada por leyes estrictas que constituyen regularidades naturales; los
enunciados de ley son descripciones de tales regularidades. El patrn del mundo puede ser
descubierto por la investigacin cientfica, as que, explicar un evento (relacionarlo con
condiciones iniciales mediante leyes) es acomodarlo dentro de un patrn discernible.
En otras palabras Explicar un evento es exhibirlo como ocupando su lugar
(nomolgicamente necesario) en el patrn discernible del mundo.
Por qu piensa Salmon que las explicaciones no son argumentos?
De acuerdo a la respuesta anterior, la explicacin en Salmon requiere necesidad
nomolgica, es decir, necesidad (fsica) que deriva de las leyes de la naturaleza (como en la
concepcin modal). Entonces no es necesidad lgica, como lo sera en la concepcin
epistmica, solo en tal caso la explicacin podra considerarse un argumento, pero Salmon
no se adhiere a la concepcin epistmica de la explicacin, sino a la ntica.
a. Formular de manera sucinta cmo entiende Salmon lo que es una explicacin
causal.
Una de las ms importantes declaraciones de Laplace fue:
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all of the forces by which
nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it-an intelligence
sufficiently vast to submit all these data to analysis-it would embrace in the same formula
the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it,
nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. (1951,
p. 4)
Salmon considera que este sera un ejemplo del mximo grado de conocimiento cientfico,
lo cual permitira la explicacin cientfica de cualquier evento. Considera entonces que
existen tres concepciones en que la explicacin de Laplace.
(1) Epistemic conception. On this view, we can say that there is a relation of logical
necessity between the laws and the initial conditions on the one hand, and the event-to-beexplained on the other -though it would be more accurate to say that the relation of logical
necessity holds between the explanans- statements and the explanandum-statement.
(2) Modal conception. Under the same circumstances we can say, alternatively, that because
of the lawful relations between the antecedent conditions and the event-to-be-explained
there is a relation of nomological necessity between them.

(3) Ontic conception. If the universe is, in fact, deterministic, then nature is governed by
strict laws that constitute natural regularities. Law-statements describe these regularities.
Such regularities endow the world with patterns that can be discovered by scientific
investigation, and that can be exploited for purposes of scientific explanation... Looking at
explanation in this way, we might say that to explain an event is to exhibit it as occupying
its (nomologically necessary) place in the discernible patterns of the world.
Salmon declara que su lnea es muy parecida a la de Hempel, slo que de la cita de
Hempel: that it seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by
showing that they fit into a nomic nexus." modifica por casual nexus pgina 27
Salmon reconoce que una concepcin causal de la explicacin implica serios problemas
relacionados con posturas filosficas sobre la naturaleza de la causalidad, pero considera
que no son insalvables.
In view of well-known Humean problems associated with causality, it might seem desirable
to try to avoid reference to causal laws in dealing with scientific explanation. Nevertheless,
I shall try to show that we need not purge the causal notions; indeed, I shall argue that they
are required for an adequate theory of scientific explanation. In order to implement the
causal version of the ontic conception, however, it will be necessary to examine the nature
of causal relations with considerable care, and to show how they can be employed
unobjectionably in a theory of scientific explanation. This problem will be postponed until
chapters 5-7. pgina 28
Salmon considera que el modelo S-R carente de la nocin causal nos ofrecer simplemente
un anlisis estadstico. Para una explicacin estadstica necesitamos considerar a la
causalidad, para ello ms delante desarrollar ciertas caractersticas: distinguir entre
procesos causales e interacciones causales, considerar a los procesos como ms
fundamentales que los eventos.
Si consideramos ejemplos explicativos como el de la altura del poste a partir del largo de su
sombra, y el de los hombres que no se embarazan tomando pldoras anticonceptivas,
observamos que hay un problema de causalidad. Salmon argumenta a flagpole of a certain
height causes a shadow of a given length and thereby explains the length of the shadow,
de la misma manera que el tomar las pldoras anticonceptivas no evita que Ian se embarace.
(Pareciera que una de las razones para salvar el problema de simetra es la causalidad).
Podemos considerar la introduccin de la causalidad en el modelo S-R de Salmon como
una correccin al problema del modelo DN: Explaining an outcome isn't just a matter of
showing that it is nomically expectable. (artculo Scientific Explanation de la SeoP)
b. Por qu piensa Salmon que las explicaciones no son argumentos.
The intuition underlying the SR model is that statistically relevant properties (or
information about statistically relevant relationships) are explanatory and statistically
irrelevant properties are not. In other words, the notion of a property making a difference
for an explanandum is unpacked in terms of statistical relevance relationships.

The SR model has a number of distinctive features that have generated substantial
discussion. First, note that according to the SR model, and in contrast to the DN/IS model,
an explanation is not an argument either in the sense of a deductively valid argument
in which the explanandum follows as a conclusion from the explanans or in the sense of an
inductive argument in which the explanandum follows with high probability from the
explanans, as in the case of IS explanation. Instead, an explanation is an assembly of
information that is statistically relevant to an explanandum. Salmon argues (and takes the
birth control example (2.6.2) to illustrate) that the criteria that a good argument must satisfy
(e.g., criteria that insure deductive soundness or some inductive analogue) are simply
different from those a good explanation must satisfy. Among other things, as Salmon puts
it, irrelevancies [are] harmless in arguments but fatal in explanations (1989, p. 102). As
explained above, in associating successful explanation with the provision of information
about statistical relevance relationships, the SR model attempts to accommodate this
observation.
To illustrate this idea, suppose that in the birth control pills example (2.5.2) the original
population T
includes both genders. Then P(Pregnancy|T.Male.Takes birth control pills) = P(Pregnancy|
T.Male) = 0,
while P(Pregnancy|T.Female. Takes birth control pills) P(Pregnancy|T.Female) assuming
that not all
women in the population take birth control pills. In other words, if you are a male in this
population,
taking birth control pills is statistically irrelevant to whether you become pregnant, while if
you are a
female it is relevant. In this way we can capture the idea that taking birth control pills is
explanatorily
irrelevant to pregnancy among males but not among females.
More generally, what matters on the SR model is not whether the value of the probability of
the explanandum-outcome is high or low (or even high or low in comparison with its prior
probability) but rather whether the putative explanans cites all and only statistically relevant
factors and whether the probabilities it invokes are correct. One consequence of this, which
Salmon endorses while acknowledging that many will regard it as unintuitive, is that on the
SR model, the same explanans E may explain both an explanandum M and explananda that
are inconsistent with M, such as -M. For example, the same explanans will explain both
why a subject with strep and certain other properties (e.g., T and -R) recovers quickly, if he
does, and also why he does not recover if he does not. By contrast, on the DN or IS models,
if E explains M, E cannot also explain - M.
Resumen captulo uno Salmon y artculo de explicacin cientfica de la SeoP
Para Salmon, las explicaciones cientficas aseguran el cocimiento cientfico.
Existen tres concepciones bsicas de la explicacin cientfica.

Una visin en particular ha tomado el rol predominante desde mediados del siglo XX, el
covering law model, su argumento principal es que las explicaciones son argumentos.
Otra visin relevante que tiene un atractivo de sentido comn toma a las explicaciones
como esencialmente causales.
El objetivo de Salmon es trazar una clara divisin entre estas dos concepciones.
Una tercer concepcin que asocia inseparablemente a la explicacin con la necesidad
Salmon la considerar cientficamente anacrnica. (ya veremos qu significa esto)
Salmon defiende que la concepcin inferencial (no es la de Hempel, ni idea a qu se
refiera) est infectada de dificultades severas que al final la vuelven insostenible.
La concepcin causal tambin padece de serios problemas, Salmon considera que
relacionadas principalmente con posturas filosficas sobre la naturaleza de la causalidad,
pero argumenta que pueden ser salvadas. Y ofrece un trato filsficamente adecuado de
conceptos causales fundamentales, que aborda en los captulos 5, 6 y 7.
Dice que al final del ltimo captulo requiere una transicin radical entre la postura
entiendo inductiva y la causal.
Pgina 6 del pdf.
Salmon menciona que su propuesta es menos formal primero porque cree que esto es
necesario para clarificacin del explanandum. Segundo porque quiere abrir al debate a todo
tipo de pblico.
El captulo 5-8 defiende que la explicacin causal es la llave de las explicaciones tericas.
Ninguna concepcin adecuada de las explicaciones tericas puede ser desarrollada sin un
trabajo amplio en causalidad.
Captulo 1
As these examples show, science provides knowledge of what has happened in the past,
what will happen in the future, and what is happening now in regions that we are not
observing at the present moment. It encompasses knowledge of both particular facts and
general regularities. Pgina 11 del pdf
Not only do we desire to know what happens; we also want to understand why. Pgina 11
During the last thirty-six years (since 1948), a number of quasi-formal 'models' of scientific
explanation have appeared... Quite a few are such familiar friends that philosophers... We
shall meet many of them in the ensuing chapters: deductive-nomological (D- N), deductivestatistical (D-S), inductive-statistical (I-S), statistical- relevance (S-R), deductive-

nomological-probabilistic (D-N-P), expected information (E-I), as well as several others for

which such initialized designations have not been generally adopted. Pgina 12
La preocupacin inicial de Salmon es con lo que Carnap llam "clarification of the
explicandum." 12
Salmon dice que si queremos dar razn de conceptos fundamentales necesitamos primero
dar cuenta del explicandum. Por lo tanto abordar: three general conceptions of scientific
explanation that have venerable histories and contemporary importance. 12
EXPLANATION VERSUS DESCRIPTION
The idea that there are two kinds of scientific knowledge -knowledge of what and
knowledge of why- is not new. 12
Salmon no aboga por el fenomenalismo: Salmon nos habla de cmo incluso algunos grupos
de cientficos identifican que el objetivo de la ciencia es permitirnos construir predicciones
confiables y no explicar nada. Esta postura la atribuye Salmon al fenomenalismo, y dice
respecto a este: Since, in my opinion, phenomenalism has been effectively discredited on a
number of grounds, I do not intend to discuss it further in this book. 13
I shall adopt the standpoint of physicalism, which holds that perception (of a fairly direct
sort) provides us with reliable -though not incorrigible- knowledge of ordinary middlesized physical objects and events. We have, I believe, sound reasons for taking such entities
as flowers, rocks, and sneezes to be real. 13
En la siguiente cita parece que Salmon intenta desacreditar un instrumentalismo en la
actualidad: As I shall explain in chapter 8, it seems to me that nineteenth- century physical
scientists were justified in taking an agnostic view concerning the nature of microphysical
entities, but that decisive evidence for
the existence of atoms and molecules emerged early in the twentieth century. For the
moment, however, I merely want to call attention to the thesis of instrumentalism. 14
Y en el siguiente prrafo argumenta: If, however, atoms and molecules are mere fictions, it
does not seem reasonable to suppose that we can explain the behavior of a gas by saying
that it acts as if it were composed of small particles. Since instrumentalists do not have any
alternative explanation of such phenomena, they have often taken refuge in the view that
providing explanations is no part of the scientific enterprise anyhow. 14
Salmon habla de que el instrumentalismo niega una capacidad explanatoria de la ciencia,
pero tambin argumenta que no van de la mano el hecho de negar un ralismo terico y la
negacin de explicacin en ciencia, utiliza un ejemplo donde: The author of this letter does
not appear to be denying the reality either of quarks or of other microphysical entities. It
would be incorrect to give the impression that a denial of realism is the only ground on
which people maintain that explanation is outside of the domain of science.

As mismo argumenta que se puede ser antirrealista y creer en la explicacin cientfica: van
Fraassen, whose agnostic attitude regarding microphysical entities makes him an antirealist,
offers a powerful account of scientific explanation. 16
Por lo tanto la idea en Salmon es que en la ciencia existe una explicacin por encima de la
descripcin cientfica. Criticar la corriente principal de explicacin en ciencia y propondr
una:
It is now fashionable to say that science aims not merely at describing the world; it also
provides understanding, comprehension, and enlightenment. 17
OTHER TYPES OF EXPLANATION
A request for a scientific explanation, in contrast, can always be reasonably posed by means
of a why-question. 18
La diferencia de otra clase de preguntas: In some of the cases, we are asking what
something means, or what is wrong with the car. In other cases, we are asking how a
mathematical proof goes, or how to get
to the party. 18
It is crucial to recognize, however, that not all-or even most-why- questions are requests for
scientific explanations. 18

LAPLACIAN EXPLANATION
Although the elimination of superstitious fears is, undoubtedly, one of the major benefits of
scientific explanations -and I think it is important to keep that fact in mind at times, such as
the present, when irrationalism seems rampant I- it can hardly be regarded as their main
purpose. 20
Salmon argumenta que hay cierta inclinacin a considerar a las explicacones cientficas en
trminos psicolgicos:
There is some temptation, Ibelieve, to view scientific explanation solely in psychological
terms.20
Defiende que esto es un error por dos razones.
We can, quite consistently with this approach, insist that adequate explanations must rest
upon true explanatory bases. Nor need we object on the ground that supernatural
'explanations' are often psychologically appealing. Again, we can insist that the explanation
be grounded in scientific fact. Even with those restrictions, however, the view that scientific
explanation consists in release from psychological uneasiness is unacceptable for two
reasons. First, we must surely require that there
be some sort of objective relationship between the explanatory facts and the fact-to-beexplained... Second, not only is there the danger that people will feel satisfied with

scientifically defective explanations; there is also the risk that they will be unsatisfied with
legitimate scientific explanations.
Por lo tanto concluye:
The psychological interpretation of scientific explanation is patently inadequate. 21
Although this appeal to regularities in nature is a step in the right direction, it certainly
cannot be the whole story. The basic reason is that although some regularities have
explanatory power, others simply cry out to be explained. 22
THREE BASIC CONCEPTIONS
Such an intelligence would exemplify the highest degree of scientific knowledge; it would,
on Laplace's view, be able to provide a complete scientific explanation of any occurrence
whatsoever.
There are, it seems to me, at least three distinct ways in which such Laplacian explanations
can be construed. In order to relate them to the modem context, we will need to introduce a
bit of technical terminology. It is customary, nowadays, to refer to the event-to-beexplained as the explanandum-event, and to the statement that such an event has occurred
as the explanandum-statement. Those facts -both particular and general- that are invoked to
provide the explanation are known as the explanans.
If we want to refer specifically to statements that express such facts, we may speak of the
explanans-statements. The explanans and the explanandum taken together constitute the
explanation. Let us now look at the three conceptions. 24
La primer concepcin se refiere a una que utilizando ciertas leyes y cierto data, podemos
deducir la ocurrencia de un evento, es prediccin de fennemos futuros. La base que
conecta ciertos hechos son leyes, algo que Salmon llama nomic expectability, el cual
Salmon dice es un concepto claramente epistemolgico. Salmon dice que ejmplos de esta
concepcin Hempel, Nagel.
(1) Epistemic conception. This explanation could be described as an argument to the
effect that the event-to-be-explained was to be expected by virtue of the explanatory facts.
The key to this sort of explanation is nomic expectability. An event that is quite unexpected
in the absence of know ledge
of the explanatory facts is rendered expectable on the basis of lawful connections with other
facts. Nomic expectability as thus characterized is clearly an epistemological concept. On
this view, we can say that there is a relation of logical necessity between the laws and the
initial conditions on the one hand, and the event-to-be-explained on the other-though it
would be more accurate to say that the relation of logical necessity holds between the
explanans-statements and the explanandum-statement.
Como la entiendo es un versin ms poderosa de la concepcin epistmica, en la anterior
existe una necesidad lgica, ac hay una necesidad fsica.
(2) Modal conception. Under the same circumstances we can say, alternatively, that
because of the lawful relations between the antecedent conditions and the event-to-beexplained there is a relation of nomological necessity between them.

In the epistemic conception, the relation of logical necessity obtains between the entire
explanans and the explanandum by virtue of the laws of deductive logic. In the modal
conception, the relation of physical necessity holds between particular antecedent
conditions and the explanandum-event by virtue of the general laws, which we are taking to
be part of the explanans."
La tercera concepcin se refiere a que existen leyes en el universo, el papel de los
cientficos es identificarlas.
(3) Ontic conception. There is still another way of looking at Laplacian explanations. If the
universe is, in fact, deterministic, then nature is governed by strict laws that constitute
natural regularities. Law-statements describe these regularities. Such regularities endow the
world with patterns that can be discovered by scientific investigation, and that can be
exploited for purposes of scientific explanation... Looking at explanation in this way, we
might say that to explain an event is to exhibit it as occupying its (nomologically necessary)
place in the discernible patterns of the world.
Salmon nos dice que discutir contra la concepcin ntica, y declara que su lnea es muy
parecida a la de Hempel, slo que de la cita de Hempel: that it seeks to provide a systematic
understanding of empirical phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus."
modifica por casual nexus
In view of well-known Humean problems associated with causality, it might seem desirable
to try to avoid reference to causal laws in dealing with scientific explanation. Nevertheless,
I shall try to show that we need not purge the causal notions; indeed, I shall argue that they
are required for an adequate theory of scientific explanation. In order to implement the
causal version of the ontic conception, however, it will be necessary to examine the nature
of causal relations with considerable care, and to show how they can be employed
unobjectionably in a theory of scientific explanation. This problem will be postponed until
chapters 5-7. pgina 28
There is a strong presumption in contemporary physics that some of the basic laws of
nature may be irreducibly statistical- that probability relations may constitute a fundamental
feature of the physical world.
we must leave open the possibility that some scientific explanations will be unavoidably
statistical. This means that we must pay careful attention to the nature of statistical
explanation.
AN OUTLINE OF STRATEGY
It now seems to me that explanation is a two-tiered affair. At the most basic level, it is
necessary, for purposes of explanation, to subsume the event-to-be-explained under an
appropriate set of statistical
relevance relations, much as was required under the S-R model. At the second level, it
seems to me, the statistical relevance relations that are invoked at the first level must be
explained in terms of causal relations. The explanation, on this view, is incomplete until the

causal components of the second level have been provided. This constitutes a sharp
divergence from the approach of Hempel, who explicitly rejects the demand for causal
laws
It would be advisable, I believe, to adopt an approach similar to one suggested by Wolfgang
Stegmiiller (1973, p. 345), who characterized the kind of subsumption under statistical
relevance relations provided by the S-R model as "statistical analysis" rather than
"statistical explanation. " The latter term is reserved for the entity that comprises both the
statistical- relevance level and the causal level as well.
Parece que para Salmon la nica concepcin adecuada es la ntica.
Chapters 5-8, which make up the second main part, deal explicitly with causality in
scientific explanation. In order to achieve the goal of explicating the role of causality in
scientific explanation, it is necessary to develop a theory of causality that, though it
borrows heavily from other authors,
incorporates various novel elements. Among its conspicuous (though not necessarily novel)
features are (1) it is a probabilistic or statistical concept, (2) it places great emphasis upon
the distinction between causal processes and causal interactions, and (3) it takes processes
to be more fundamental than events.
Del SeoP
Stated more generally, both the DN and IS models, share the common idea that, as Salmon
(1989) puts it, the essence of scientific explanation can be described as nomic
expectabilitythat is expectability on the basis of lawful connections (1989, p. 57).
One obvious diagnosis of the difficulties posed by examples like (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) focuses
on the role of causation in explanation. According to this analysis, to explain an outcome
we must cite its causes and (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) fail to do this. As Salmon (1989, p.47) puts
it, a flagpole of a certain height causes a shadow of a given length and thereby explains
the length of the shadow. By contrast, the shadow does not cause the flagpole and
consequently cannot explain its height . Similarly, taking birth control pills does not cause
Jones' failure to get pregnant and this is why (2.5.2) fails to be an acceptable explanation.
On this analysis, what (2.5.1) and (2.5. 2) show is that a derivation can satisfy the DN
criteria and yet fail to identify the causes of an explanandumwhen this happens the
derivation will fail to be explanatory.
As explained above, advocates of the DN model would not regard this diagnosis as very
illuminating,
unless accompanied by some account of causation that does not simply take this notion as
primitive.
(Salmon in fact provides such an account, which we will consider in Section 4.) We should
note,
however, that an apparent lesson of (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) is that the regularity account of
causation favored by DN theorists is at best incomplete: the occurrence of c, e and the
existence of some regularity or law linking them (or x's having property P and x's having

property Q and some law linking these) is not a sufficient condition for the truth of the
claim that c caused e or x's having P is causally or explanatorily relevant to x's having Q.
More generally, if the counterexamples (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) are accepted, it follows that the
DN model fails to state sufficient conditions for explanation. Explaining an outcome isn't
just a matter of showing that it is nomically expectable.
Much of the subsequent literature on explanation has been motivated by attempts to capture
the features of causal or explanatory relevance that appear to be left out of examples like
(2.5.1) and (2.5.2), typically within the empiricist constraints described above. Wesley
Salmon's statistical relevance (or SR) model (Salmon, 1971) is a very influential attempt to
capture these features in terms of the notion of statistical relevance or conditional
dependence relationships. Given some class or population A, an attribute C will be
statistically relevant to another attribute B if and only if P(B|A.C) P(B|A)that is, if and
only if the probability of B conditional on A and C is different from the probability of B
conditional on A alone. The intuition underlying the SR model is that statistically relevant
properties (or information about statistically relevant relationships) are explanatory and
statistically irrelevant properties are not. In other words, the notion of a property making a
difference for an explanandum is unpacked in terms of statistical relevance relationships.
Esto puede ser la explicacin de por qu no un argumento, y el siguiente un ejemplo de eso.
To illustrate this idea, suppose that in the birth control pills example (2.5.2) the original
population T
includes both genders. Then P(Pregnancy|T.Male.Takes birth control pills) = P(Pregnancy|
T.Male) = 0,
while P(Pregnancy|T.Female. Takes birth control pills) P(Pregnancy|T.Female) assuming
that not all
women in the population take birth control pills. In other words, if you are a male in this
population,
taking birth control pills is statistically irrelevant to whether you become pregnant, while if
you are a
female it is relevant. In this way we can capture the idea that taking birth control pills is
explanatorily
irrelevant to pregnancy among males but not among females.
On the SR model, an explanation of why some member x of the class characterized by
attribute A has
attribute B consists of the following information:
i. the prior probability of B within A : P(B|A) = p.
ii. A homogeneous partition of A with respect to B, (A. C 1 , ... A. C n ), together with the
probability of
B within each cell of the partition: P(B|A.C i ) =p i and
iii. The cell of the partition to which x belongs.
3.2 The SR Model and Low Probability Events
Respuesta a por qu no es un argumento.

The SR model has a number of distinctive features that have generated substantial
discussion. First, note that according to the SR model, and in contrast to the DN/IS model,
an explanation is not an argument either in the sense of a deductively valid argument
in which the explanandum follows as a conclusion from the explanans or in the sense of an
inductive argument in which the explanandum follows with high probability from the
explanans, as in the case of IS explanation. Instead, an explanation is an assembly of
information that is statistically relevant to an explanandum. Salmon argues (and takes the
birth control example (2.6.2) to illustrate) that the criteria that a good argument must satisfy
(e.g., criteria that insure deductive soundness or some inductive analogue) are simply
different from those a good explanation must satisfy. Among other things, as Salmon puts
it, irrelevancies [are] harmless in arguments but fatal in explanations (1989, p. 102). As
explained above, in associating successful explanation with the provision of information
about statistical relevance relationships, the SR model attempts to accommodate this
observation.
A second, closely related point is that the SR model departs from the IS model in
abandoning the idea that a statistical explanation of an outcome must provide information
from which it follows the outcome occurred with high probability. As the reader may check,
the statement of the SR model above imposes no such high probability requirement;
instead, even very unlikely outcomes will be explained as long as the criteria for SR
explanation are met. Suppose that, in the above example, the probability of quick recovery
from strep, given treatment and the presence of a non-resistant strain, is rather low.
More generally, what matters on the SR model is not whether the value of the probability of
the explanandum-outcome is high or low (or even high or low in comparison with its prior
probability) but rather whether the putative explanans cites all and only statistically relevant
factors and whether the probabilities it invokes are correct. One consequence of this, which
Salmon endorses while acknowledging that many will regard it as unintuitive, is that on the
SR model, the same explanans E may explain both an explanandum M and explananda that
are inconsistent with M, such as -M. For example, the same explanans will explain both
why a subject with strep and certain other properties (e.g., T and -R) recovers quickly, if he
does, and also why he does not recover if he does not. By contrast, on the DN or IS models,
if E explains M, E cannot also explain - M.
3.4 Causation and Statistical Relevance Relationships
We may take this to consist of two ideas: (i) explanations must cite causal relationships and
(ii) causal relationships are captured by statistical relevance relationships. Even if (i) is
accepted, a fundamental problem with the SR model is that (ii) is falseas a substantial
body of work [10] has made clear, casual relationships are greatly underdetermined by
statistical relevance relationships. Consider another example from Salmon (1971): a system
in which atmospheric pressure A is a common cause of the occurrence of a storm S and the
reading of a barometer B with no causal relationship between B and S. Salmon claims that
in such a system B and S will be correlated but that B is statistically irrelevant to S given A
i.e. P(S|A.B) = P(S|A). By contrast, (Salmon claims) A remains relevant to S given B
i.e., P(S|A.B) P(S|B) . Similarly, S is irrelevant to B given A but A remains relevant B

given S. In this way, Salmon's SR model attempts to capture the idea that A is explanatorily
(and causally) relevant to S while B is not and that A is explanatorily and causally relevant
to B while S is not.
These contentions about the connection between causal claims and statistical relevance
relations are consequences of a more general principle called the Causal Markov condition
which has been extensively discussed in the recent literature on causation.[11] A set of
variables standing in a causal relationship and an associated probability distribution over
those variables satisfy the Causal Markov condition if and only if conditional on its direct
causes every variable is independent of every other variable except possibly for its effects.
Two relevant points have emerged from discussion of this condition. The first, which was
in effect noted by Salmon himself in work subsequent to his (1971), is that there are
circumstances in which the Causal Markov condition fails and hence in which causal
claims do not imply the screening off relationships described above. This can happen, for
example, if the variables to which the condition is applied are characterized in an
insufficiently fine-grained way.[12] The second and more fundamental observation is that,
depending on the details of the case, many different sets of causal relationships may be
compatible with the same statistical relevance relationships, even assuming that the Causal
Markov condition is satisfied.
PREGUNTA:
De manera sucinta resumir el concepto de reduccin de Nagel. Explicar los conceptos
bsicos y en particular el concepto de principio puente. Por qu se requiere este tipo de
principio?
RESPUESTA:
En primer trmino, la reduccin es un tipo de explicacin. Se llama reduccin cuando teora
TP puede derivarse de una teora TF. Por Tanto, una teora TP se reduce a una TF sii la
primera se puede derivar de la segunda. Tal como las explicaciones cientficas estn
tpicamente caracterizadas por estar representadas por una estructura lgica argumental
deductiva, la reduccin tambin puede verse como un argumento deductivo (donde las
premisas son los enunciados reductores y la conclusin el enunciado reducido ms algunos
supuestos auxiliares).
Nagel identifica dos tipos de reduccin.
-HOMOGNEA: en sta los trminos relevantes encontrados en la conclusin tambin son
encontrados en las premisas (los trminos de TP estn en TF) o pueden definirse mediante
los trminos de TF (la teora reductora).
-HETEROGNEA: En este caso hay por lo menos un trmino que se encuentra en la
conclusin (TP) pero no se encuentra en las premisas y tampoco puede definirse
directamente utilizando los trminos de las premisas.
Esta ltima reduccin ha sido muy problemtica y controversial, por lo que Nagel defiende
la propuesta de CORRESPONDENCIA para darle solucin.
PROPUESTA DE CORRESPONDENCIA: Uno de los supuestos de esta propuesta lidia
con el principal problema de esta concepcin heterognea de la reduccin, es decir, lidia
con la dificulta de que al suponerse que la reduccin heterognea tiene una estructura
deductiva es difcil explicar slo mediante recursos lgicos por qu hay trminos en la
conclusin que no se encuentran en las premisas, por lo cual, segn la propuesta de Nagel,
es necesario echar mano de otros recursos, es decir, de las LEYES PUENTE o REGLAS

DE CORRESPONDENCIA, con el fin de que la reduccin de TP a TF sea posible. TP se

deriva de TF sii se agregan a la derivacin las leyes puente.
En general se puede caracterizar a las LEYES PUENTE como que establecen conexiones
entre los trminos de TP que no estn en TF y los trminos de TF. En concreto, Nagel
apunta que las leyes puente formulan HIPTESIS EMPRICAS. Sin embargo, esas
hiptesis no son evaluables confrontndolas con instancias observables de las relaciones
que postulan. Empero, eso no quiere decir que sea postulaciones arbitrarias y s deben ser
evaluadas comparndolas con varias consecuencias implicadas por el sistema de hiptesis
al que pertenecen con el resultado de observaciones controlables.
Existen dos tipos de leyes puente:
a) Las leyes puente de este tipo especifican las condiciones (ya sean estas condiciones
en ocasiones necesarias y suficientes, en ocasiones slo necesarias o en ocasiones
slo suficientes) formuladas en trminos de la teora reductora, mediante las cuales
un atributo de la teora reducida ocurre (atributo: es lo que se predica de algo, un
trmino debe referirse a un atributo).
b) En stas se establecen identificaciones anlogas entre clases de entidades
designadas por diferentes predicados, pertenecientes a una y otra teora. Las leyes
puente designan ciertas expresiones que no son equivalentes en ambas teoras, no se
pueden usar indistintamente en una u otra teora pero describen entidades idnticas.
Cul es el problema de la simetra, por qu se presenta en el modelo de Hempel, y
cmo piensa van Fraassen que puede superarse con un modelo pragmtico de la
explicacin?
El problema de la simetra en el modelo de Hempel radica en cmo se puede evitar que el
explanans explique al explanandum y que ste explique al explanans. Es decir, el problema
de la simetra es que del hecho de que A explique B no significa que B sirva para explicar
A. Un ejemplo que da van Fraassen es el siguiente: podemos decir que la estructura atmica
A- de cierto elemento explica por qu tiene determinado espectro B-; pero no podemos
explicar que a partir de su espectro por qu tiene esa estructura atmica. Dicho autor piensa
que este problema puede superarse mediante su modelo pragmtico de la explicacin.
A continuacin marcamos los puntos ms importantes del planteamiento de van Fraassen.
El <<contexto>> es fundamental porque determina: (a) qu hechos hacen verdaderos a las
preguntas y respuestas; (b) qu mundos posibles son los adecuados para dar una respuesta
en funcin de la teora que utilicemos; (c) a qu proposicin nos estamos refiriendo; y, (d)
el contexto nos dice cundo pedimos una explicacin con base a cul pregunta estamos
formulando.
El tipo de pregunta por la cual solicitamos una explicacin es por qu P?. Lo importante
es ver a qu aspecto de la pregunta se le pone el nfasis. Por ejemplo, en la pregunta Por
qu John se comi la manzana? el nfasis se pone en John, mientras que en Por qu fue
la manzana la que se comi John? el nfasis se pone en la manzana; as, aunque ambas
preguntas expresen la misma proposicin no piden o no pueden drseles la misma
explicacin, pues la clase de contraste es diferente en cada caso para responder a la
pregunta.
El contexto nos determina la clase de contraste X del tema P donde se pone el nfasis- de
dicha; con ello debemos de encontrar una relacin de relevancia R entre las alternativas X
que nos permita dar una respuesta a la pregunta Por qu P?. Sin olvidar que todo esto

depende de la teora que aceptamos y bajo la cual estamos preguntando. Asimismo, la

respuesta puede verse como una causa eficiente.
En suma, la propuesta de va Fraassen para resolver el problema en cuestin es: identificar
el tema P de una pregunta Por qu?, lo cual nos dar una clase de contraste X; luego,
tenemos que buscar la relacin de relevancia R entre X y P para encontrar la respuesta,
dentro de una teora aceptada. Todo lo anterior lo determinar el contexto. As, para ilustrar
lo anterior, se superara el problema del espectro y la estructura atmica porque preguntar
por qu el elemento K tiene tal espectro? nos abre una clase de contraste X diferente a la
que surge si preguntamos por qu el elemento K tiene tal estructura atmica?. Nos dice
van Fraassen que podemos ver la respuesta a la primera pregunta apelando a la longitud de
ondas
etc., que explican por qu tiene tal espectro; mientras que para la estructura
atmica valdra otra respuesta. Como se ve asumiendo una teora aceptable, respondiendo a
una pregunta por qu? (P, X, R) y dndole un papel fundamental al contexto superamos
el problema de la simetra.
Exactamente en qu la perspectiva pragmtica de la explicacin de Kitcher y el
modelo nomolgico deductivo de Hempel entran en conflicto? Pueden ser ambos
correctos?
Voy poner en rojo las partes que me parecen fundamentales para responder (de acuerdo a lo
que yo considero la mejor respuesta) y en azul las partes que coinciden con la forma en que
se podra desarrollar de forma ms precisa y tcnica esta respuesta, y que pueden servir ms
o menos de gua.
De acuerdo con el modelo nomolgico deductivo una explicacin es un argumento lgico
que impone ciertas restricciones. Se debe partir de ciertas condiciones iniciales, se debe
usar una ley (o varias), y se debe derivar un explanandum a partir de las condiciones y la
ley (explanans). Aunque Kitcher tambin usa la nocin de argumento para elucidar lo que
es la explicacin, l no sostiene que los argumentos SON explicaciones. La explicacin
para Kitcher es una actividad. Los argumentos sirven de base para dar actos explicativos.
Esta es la primera diferencia entre Hempel y Kitcher. Sin embargo, se podra defender que
este no es un punto de conflicto tan grave puesto que el tipo de argumento que nos da el
modelo de Hempel (independientemente de que l lo hubiera concebido as) podra en
principio servir tambin de base para dar actos explicativos. El verdadero punto de
conflicto radica en la forma en que cada uno caracteriza lo que es un argumento
explicativo.
Hay que recordar que para Kitcher hay un subconjunto de argumentos E(K) que constituye
el almacn explicativo relativo a un conjunto de creencias K. Para Kitcher, el modelo de
Hempel no podra determinar de forma precisa qu argumentos entraran en E(K). Pues
este modelo no podra otorgar condiciones necesarias ni suficientes para caracterizar un
argumento susceptible de explicar o ser usado en una explicacin. No da condiciones
necesarias porque exige que el argumento contenga por lo menos una ley, y Kitcher dice
que no hay ninguna razn para asumir que solamente los argumentos que contienen leyes
amplen nuestro entendimiento. No da condiciones suficientes porque admite los
contraejemplos de irrelevancia y simetra. En cambio el modelo de Kitcher no exige que los
argumentos contengan leyes (aunque las pueden contener) y, en otro sentido (relacionado
con la nocin de rigidez de un patrn argumentativo), es ms exigente en cuanto a la clase
de argumentos que podemos considerar para apoyar actos de explicacin.
Los argumentos son instancias de patrones argumentativos que incluyen ciertas reglas de

llenado y de clasificacin. Las reglas de llenado nos dicen qu expresiones sustituir por
variables y las reglas de clasificacin nos dicen qu status tienen las premisas y qu tipo de
inferencia usar para derivar unas de otras. Lo ideal sera tener conjuntos de argumentos que
se instanciaran de conjuntos de patrones muy estrictos en cuanto a las reglas de llenado y
clasificacin y que a la vez nos permitieran derivar un nmero grande de conclusiones
(oraciones aceptables en K). E(K) es el conjunto de argumentos que mejor unifica a K. El
poder de unificacin es directamente proporcional a la cantidad de conclusiones que se
pueden derivar , directamente proporcional a la rigidez (y parecido entre s) de los patrones
argumentativos de los que cada argumento del conjunto en cuestin es una instancia, e
inversamente proporcional al nmero de patrones argumentativos necesarios para instanciar
los argumentos. De acuerdo con los criterios de unificacin se determina qu argumentos
entran en el almacn explicativo. Kitcher sostiene que estos criterios no dejaran que la
clase de argumentos que se dan como contraejemplos a Hempel (irrelevancia y simetra)
entraran en el almacn. En los casos que ejemplifican irrelevancia y simetra nos quedamos
con un dilema: o inflamos la base de patrones argumentativos sin incrementar las
conclusiones posibles de nuestro conjunto de argumentos o reducimos la cantidad de
conclusiones sin simplificar la base. Por ejemplo, en el caso en el que alguien explicara la
disolucin de la sal apelando al agua bendita, tenemos que decidir qu hacemos para
explicar los casos en que el agua se diluye en agua no bendita. Una opcin es crear patrones
argumentativos independientes para los distintos tipos de agua, en cuyo caso complicamos
la base de patrones sin aumentar las conclusiones. La otra opcin es quedarnos con la
misma base y excluir los casos de agua no bendita, en cuyo caso reducimos el nmero de
conclusiones sin simplificar la base. Ambas alternativas violan los criterios de unificacin
y, por lo tanto, el argumento en cuestin queda excluido de E(K). El caso de la simetra es
muy similar.
En otras palabras, el modelo de Kitcher est diseado para evitar los contraejemplos al
modelo de Hempel.
Pueden ser ambos correctos? Haciendo una sntesis de lo que dije anteriormente, el
componente pragmtico de Kitcher (el hecho de que tome a las explicaciones como
actividades) no excluye LGICAMENTE el modelo de Hempel, puesto que en principio se
podra tambin usar este modelo para caracterizar argumentos base en actos explicativos.
Sin embargo, el modelo de Kitcher y el modelo de Hempel no pueden ser ambos correctos
en un sentido relevante y significativo, puesto que difieren tanto en las condiciones
suficientes como en las condiciones necesarias que deben caracterizar a los argumentos
relacionados con la explicacin.
- Qu es una explicacin para Kitcher?
Respuesta corta: La explicacin es un par ordenado que consiste en una proposicin y un
acto tipo. La explicacin es esencialmente una actividad en la que se responde a una
pregunta "por qu?" de un interlocutor o una audiencia. En el caso de la explicacin
cientfica las preguntas "por qu?" se contestan con una proposicin que tiene una relacin
pertinente con algn argumento perteneciente a la mejor sistematizacin de nuestro
conjunto de creencias E(K). El mximo objetivo de la explicacin siempre ha sido la
unificacin: comprender un mximo conjunto de hechos en trminos de un mnimo
conjunto de principios y conceptos tericos.

Respuesta larga:
Describir el modelo de Kitcher que expliqu.

Explanation by Van Fraassen

o Answer to a question: why Pk? = {Pk, X, R}

Pk: topic of the question

X = {P1,Pk}: contrast class

R: relevant relation

o Pk? > context that includes a body of background knowledge K + includes

presuppositions
a) Pk is true
b) Each Pj in X is false if j # k
c) At least one true proposition (A) that bears relation (R) to {Pk, X}
o Context of the Question = if the background knowledge (K) entails the
presuppositions a, b and do not entail the falsity of c
o If the Question dont arise in the context it SHOULD be rejected rather than
answer directly
o Direct answer if the context is evocated: Pk, in contrast to the rest of X,
because A (The topic of the question, in contrast to the rest of the contrast
class, because this true proposition) = Because A

Conditions met
a) A is true
b) Pk is true
c) No member of X other than Pk is true
d) A bears R to {Pk, X}

o The person who ask and the person who answer are operating in a common
context with a common body of background knowledge K determined by the
state of science at the time

Person who answer = point to items in K

Relevance if {Pk, X}

Evaluation of answers to why-questions

o Probable in the light of our knowledge

o If they favor the topic against the other members of the contrast class
o Are they make wholly or partially irrelevant by other answers that could be
given

Kinds of relevance relations

o Physical necessitation
o Etiologically relevant (origins of causes)
o Fulfilling a function
o Statistical relevance
o Intentional relevance

a. Por qu mienten las leyes de la fsica segn Cartwright?

Respuesta tentativa:
Las leyes de la fsica mienten segn Cartwright porque no describen la realidad o cmo es
el mundo. Esto por dos razones principales:
1.- Porque las leyes de la fsica entendidas clsicamente como enunciados universales y
necesarios pretenden concebir que las regularidades que afirman estn, de algn modo, en
la realidad concebida como nica. Cartwright piensa que dicha idea de las regularidades en
la nica realidad es inaceptable pues la evidencia emprica no da buenas razones para
sostener tal cosa. Para Cartwright, en cambio, la evidencia emprica muestra que la realidad
es mltiple y desordenada: que el mundo es moteado. (Ntese que Cartwright es realista y
emprica a la vez: slo que no es una realista unvoca que acepta una sola realidad- ni una
emprica clsica). As, las leyes de la fsica mienten en tanto que suponen una falsa nocin
de la realidad como nica o unvoca y esto no es as: la realidad o el mundo es moteado, no
unvoco, plural.
2.- Porque al ser las leyes de la fsica concebidas como de aplicacin universal y necesaria,
se afirma una falsedad: no hay ley con aplicacin universal y necesaria, sino slo leyes con
clusulas ceteris paribus (o con clusulas del tipo todas las otras circunstancias
permanecen iguales, sin cambios). Por ejemplo, para Cartwright la ley de gravitacin
universal, aludida como aplicable en todo el universo de manera necesaria nos miente
porque no existe tal, i.e. no es verdad que sea necesario y universal (cuando sea y dnde
sea) que la fuerza de atraccin de dos cuerpos est dada por la frmula F= Gmm/d 2. Esto
es as porque hay circunstancias en las cuales el clculo de esta fuerza es alterado por otras
circunstancias relevantes: por ejemplo, en el caso en el que esos dos cuerpos sean cuerpos
cargados, la Fuerza entre tales cuerpos no va a ser indicada solamente por la frmula del
principio de gravedad entre dos cuerpos sino que se tendr que tomar en cuenta la Ley de
Coulomb y la fuerza que sta expresa y realizar la suma de fuerzas (suma vectorial).

Infinidad de casos en los que se espetan leyes de la fsica como verdaderas, universales y
necesarias, segn Cartwright, nos mienten al decirnos que no se requiere su formulacin
como conteniendo una clusula ceteris paribus. (Cartwright tiene mayores razones para
espetar su concepcin de ley ceteris paribus. Su razn es que las leyes relevantes slo son
aplicables en el contexto de una mquina nomolgica deductiva, i.e. toda ley, que seala un
comportamiento de regularidad, es producto del funcionamiento de una mquina
nomolgica).
Conceptos claves para la respuesta que deben estar claros:
Ley falsa en Cartwright: Concepcin clsica de una ley como un enunciado universal y
necesario que refiere la presencia de una regularidad. (Cartwright cita como tales a leyes
histricas de la fsica tales como: ley de gravitacin universal, ecuaciones de Maxwell,
ecuaciones de Schrdinger y ecuaciones de la relatividad general).
Ley verdadera en Cartwright: Enunciado de forma universal que contiene una clusula
ceteris paribus.
Clusula ceteris paribus (CP): la explcita mencin aadida a una ley de que no deben de
suceder ciertas circunstancias distintas a las sealadas por el enunciado legal (o bien, la
mencin explcita de que todas las dems circunstancias imaginables se mantienen tal como
se encuentran)
Ejemplos:
De ley verdadera:
a) si no hay fuerzas distintas a las de gravitacin (CP), entonces dos cuerpos ejercen
entre ellos una fuerza que vara inversamente al cuadrado de la distancia que los separa y
vara inversamente al producto de sus masas
De ley falsa: dos cuerpos ejercen entre ellos una fuerza que vara inversamente al
cuadrado de la distancia que los separa y vara inversamente al producto de sus masas,
universal y necesariamente.