SAMPAYAN vs .

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005
FACTS:
- On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and
Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered
and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon without their
knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. In their
complaint, Crispulo and Florencia asserted that they were co-owners pro-indiviso of the said lot, their mother
Cristita Quita being the ownerand actual possessor thereof. Upon the latters death and while they were absent
from the said lot, Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, allegedly built a house on the lot, to their
exclusion. After repeated demands, Cesar Sampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said lot. Thus, they filed an
action for unlawful detainer.
- In his defense, Cesar Sampayan asserted that his occupation of the lot was by tolerance of the lots true owners,
Mr. and Mrs. Terrado, who were then residing in Cebu. The permission was given by the lots overseer, Maria
Ybanez. Sampayan further asserted that Crispulo and Valencias action had long prescribed, inasmuch as the
said lot had already been owned and possessed by the spouses Oriol since 1960, as evidenced by the latters
payment of taxes. The Oriols, in turn, sold half the land to the Terrados. Together, they maintained possession of
their respective portions.
- Both the plaintiff siblings and defendant Sampayan submitted their respective evidence consisting of affidavits
and tax declarations. Meanwhile, the MCTC judge also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, where he
found improvements. The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his
predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on
the land in question. The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that it is clear that defendants have been in
possession for more than one year and that the appropriate remedy would have been accion publiciana or lenaria
de possession. Upon appeal to the RTC, it reversed the decision, relying on the involvement of Cristita Quita,
plaintiffs mother, in a cadastral case involving the lot in 1957.
- Sampayan then appealed to the CA, which denied the same. Thus this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry would prosper
2. Whether or not the petitioner had prior physical possession
HELD:
1. YES. In Sarmiento vs. CA, the Court held:
[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. . . .
It is clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the
complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof
by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. The complaint in this case makes such an
averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action
for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC continues to
have that jurisdiction.
2.YES. To begin with, the Court is at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his
ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now
petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut
trees, and others on the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a
time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-ininterest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously,
adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
x x x
The Court noted that in the assailed decision herein, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that
private respondents mother, Cristita Quita, was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. The Court ruled and held that the
mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all
oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.