digests article III sections 5-8, constitutional

law
Garces vs. Estenso
Facts: The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc
City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his
annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should
have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San
Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".
Issue: Is the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, valid and constitutional?
Held: Yes. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring
the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then
any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his
image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair.
Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of
the lives of the masses.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?
Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its
right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or
to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and
pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its
payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it
to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution

Manosca vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth
site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: The expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born, valid and constitutional?
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.

Ebralinag vs. DepEd

Facts: All the petitioners in the original case were minor school children, and members of the sect, Jehovah's
Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who were expelled from their classes by various public school authorities
in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by
Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the
Department of Education. Aimed primarily at private educational institutions which did not observe the flag
ceremony exercises, Republic Act No. 1265 penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal to
observe the flag ceremony with public censure on first offense and cancellation of the recognition or permit on
second offense.
Issue: Does refusal to take part in the flag ceremony, on account of religious belief, so offensive as to prompt
legitimate state intervention?
Held: No. While conceding to the idea adverted to by the Solicitor General that certain methods of religious
expression may be prohibited to serve legitimate societal purposes, refusal to participate in the flag ceremony
hardly constitutes a form of religious expression so offensive and noxious as to prompt legitimate State
intervention. It bears repeating that their absence from the ceremony hardly constitutes a danger so grave and
imminent as to warrant the state's intervention. In the case of a regulation which appears to abridge a right to
which the fundamental law accords high significance it is the regulation, not the act (or refusal to act), which is
the exception and which requires the court's strictest scrutiny. In the case at bench, the government has not
shown that refusal to do the acts of conformity exacted by the assailed orders, which respondents point out
attained legislative cachet in the Administrative Code of 1987, would pose a clear and present danger of a
danger so serious and imminent, that it would prompt legitimate State intervention.

Estrada vs. Escritor?

Facts: Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a
child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing
an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Issue: What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?
Held: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still
remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has
demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the
RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a
compelling state interest. It is the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her
conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents
claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must
be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the
states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice.

Rubi v. Provincial Board

39 Phil 660
Facts:
The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one
permanent settlement. The said resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior as required under
Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment of nonChristian sites to be selected by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now herein assailed on
ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the provincial officials.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid
The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.

Pamil vs. Teleron?

Facts: The novel question in this case concerns the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal
position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal
mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit was then filed by petitioner, himself
an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall
there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality."
Issue: Is the prohibition imposed on ecclesiastics from holding appointive or elective municipal offices a
religious test?
Held: No. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the
remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of
validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by
the writer of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no
choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father
Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members, led by the
Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for certiorari must be granted.
It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on
what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged
Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or
appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so
exclude them is to impose a religious test.
Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office.
There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an
express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on
holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It suffices to answer that no question was raised as to its
validity.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de
la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the
order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal
because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.
Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?
Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to
the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts
to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions.
Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of
civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

Soriano vs. La Guardia

Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue: Are Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a
public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right
to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re
the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the
State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on
the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be
expressed by the use of less offensive language.

Section 6
Yap vs. CA
Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was
convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess
of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.
Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to
travel?
Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the
circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that
petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the
amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

Cojuangco vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: This petition for prohibition seeks to dismiss Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., now pending before respondent Sandiganbayan and to prohibit said court
from further proceeding with the case. Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to due process, a speedy trial,
and a speedy determination of his cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Further, he
prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondent Sandiganbayan from further enforcing and/or implementing its order dated February 20, 1995
which bans petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said court.
Issue: When a person is criminally charged, is his right to travel absolutely curtailed?
Held: No.The travel ban should be lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing. The rule laid down
by this Court is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail does not have an
unrestricted right to travel, the reason being that a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints
imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. But, significantly, the Office of the
Solicitor General in its Manifestation dated November 20, 1998 indicated that it is not interposing any
objection to petitioners prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad based on the following considerations: (1)
that it is well within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, including the second paragraph, Section
23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that the petitioner has always returned
to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman
of the Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes, more
often than he had done in the past.

Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways.
Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.
Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all motorized vehicles
created equal?
Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as
limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws,
rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate
a power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification
among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created
equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to
some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer
models.46 We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of
motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a
truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more
easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

Section 8
Jacinto vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the period
September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then
staged; and on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario immediately issued a return-to-work order.
They were administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized
mass actions; ignoring report-to-work directives; unjustified abandonment of teaching posts; non-observance
of Civil Service law, rules and regulations; non-compliance with reasonable office rules and regulations; and
incurring unauthorized absences without leave, etc.
Issue: Were the public school teachers penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to
petition the government for redress of grievances?
Held: Improper Exercise of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and to Petition for a Redress of Grievances. There
is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. Although the Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to
assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances, there is no like express
provision granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to strike is restrained by
the proviso that its exercise shall be done in accordance with law.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of
classes in several public schools during the corresponding period.

MPSTA vs. Laguio

Facts:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some
800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September
17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" 1 the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
Issue: Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?
Held:
these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform, undertaken for essentially
economic reasons, should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not
identical.

Air Philippines vs Pennswell Inc. Gr. 172835

Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. While,
respondent was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals,
solvents, and special lubricants. In particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded by respondent for its
previous sale. Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and
ingredients of respondents products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products
Issue: Can chemical components of Pennswell products be accessed pursuant to RA 7394, 8203, 6969 and
right to information under Sec. 7, Art III?
Held: No. Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets. There is a
privilege not to disclose ones trade secrets. Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking
transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the
Constitution.
Petitioner cannot rely on Section 77 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to
compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all consumer
products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or
active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondents
specialized lubricants are not consumer products. Its products are not intended for personal, family, household
or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and
engines.
Petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the
disclosure of the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground. Respondents products are outside the
scope of the cited law. They do not come within the purview of a drug which, as defined therein, refers to any
chemical compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for use in the treatment,
prevention or diagnosis of disease in man or animals. Again, such are not the characteristics of respondents
products.
Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, also
contains a provision that limits the right of the public to have access to records, reports or information
concerning chemical substances and mixtures including safety data submitted and data on emission or
discharge into the environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge trade secrets, production
or sales figures; or methods, production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor; or
would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or
distributor.

Akbayan vs. Aquino , GR 170516

FACTS: This is a Petition for mandamus and prohibition requesting respondents to submit to them the full text
of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of
the government to disclose the said agreement violates there right to information on matters of public concern
and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and
reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.
ISSUE: Are the JPEPA negotiations within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?
HELD: No. Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
The Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific
showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter
of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that
the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege,
must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to
effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making. The constitutional
right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the
Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of
the constitutional guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic
or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on
PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not
include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
ISSUE: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee
of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of
public concern: Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The State policy (Sec
28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations
of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government.

Jacinto vs. CA
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the period
September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then
staged. Consequently, due to their failure to heed the return-to-work order, DECS Sec. Cario immediately
issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them.
ISSUE: Were the public school teachers penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to
petition the government for redress of grievances?
HELD: The petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in
the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of
students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time -recess, after classes, weekends or holidays -- to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one -- not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court -- could have held
them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage
of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by
the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN

ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated vs.
HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR
A "mass action" was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning
associations to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The petition
alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and the
attempts to negotiate their correction.
ISSUE: Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?
HELD: Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to
strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement
of such working conditions as are not fixed by law.
Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during class
hours, for then this would be a strike, which is illegal for them.

Re-request for IBP Dues Payment Exemption of Atty. Arevalo, BM 1370

Petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the
USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP
dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he
was working in the USA.
ISSUE: Is the compulsory payment of IBP Dues violative of the right to associate?
HELD: No. An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. This
requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
his annual dues. The SC, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar
- which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong.