Cases Digests in EVIDENCE

Christopher Shaun Harper and Eva Harper;

JULY 12, 2014 Assignment

and
4. Exhibit R-1 - Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court stating that Ellen

Documentary Evidence--Case #09

Harper was married to the deceased, Christian Fredrick Harper and listed
Ellen Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of Christian Fredrik

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC.,

Harper.

Petitioner,versus
ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO

Issue:

GILLERA,
Respondents

WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH

G.R. No. 189998 August 29, 2012

COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

THAT THEY ARE THE WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.

Bersamin, J. :
Ruling:
Facts:
WE rule for respondents.
This a petition for reviewon certiorari of a decision of CA.
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a

Petitioners challenge against respondents documentary evidence on

business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM

marriage and heirship is not well-taken.

Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. He checked

Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide:

in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at Room 1428. He was due to
check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date, however,

Section 24. Proof of official record.The record of public documents referred

he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors.

to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the

The documentary evidence that repondents offered relative to their heirship

officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and

consisted of the following

accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate

1. Exhibit Q - Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper, son of

that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in

Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper;

a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy

2. Exhibit Q-1 - Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen and Christian

or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any

Fredrik Harper;

officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country

3. Exhibit R - Birth Certificate of Christian Fredrick Harper, son of

in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state.Whenever a copy of a

for their admission as evidence in default of a showing by petitioner that the

document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation

authentication process was tainted with bad faith.

must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a

Consequently, the objective of ensuring the authenticity of the documents

specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the

prior to their admission as evidence was substantially achieved. In

official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a

Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, 23 the Court has said that

court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

substantial compliance, by its very nature, is actually inadequate observance

of the requirements of a rule or regulation that are waived under equitable

Although Exhibit Q, 12 Exhibit Q-1, 13 Exhibit R 14 and Exhibit R-1 15

circumstances in order to facilitate the administration of justice, there being

were not attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by

no damage or injury caused by such flawed compliance.

his deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and said
documents did not comply with the requirement under Section 24 of Rule 132

The Court has further said in Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania that

to the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines a certificate of

the focus in every inquiry on whether or not to accept substantial compliance

the person having custody must accompany the copy of the document that

is always on the presence of equitable conditions to administer justice

was duly attested stating that such person had custody of the documents,

effectively and efficiently without damage or injury to the spirit of the legal

the deviation was not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for

obligation. 24 There are, indeed, such equitable conditions attendant here,

the purposes they were intended to serve.

the foremost of which is that respondents had gone to great lengths to

submit the documents. As the CA observed, respondents compliance with

The official participation in the authentication process of Tanja Sorlie of the

the requirements on attestation and authentication of the documents had not

Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the attachment of the official

been easy; they had to contend with many difficulties (such as the distance

seal of that office on each authentication indicated that Exhibit Q, Exhibit R,

of Oslo, their place of residence, from Stockholm, Sweden, where the

Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were documents of a public nature in Norway, not

Philippine Consulate had its office; the volume of transactions in the offices

merely private documents. It cannot be denied that based on Philippine

concerned; and the safe transmission of the documents to the Philippines).

Consul Tirols official authentication, Tanja Sorlie was on the date of signing,

25

duly authorized to legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway. Without a showing to the contrary by petitioner, Exhibit Q,

Their submission of the documents should be presumed to be in good faith

Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 should be presumed to be themselves

because they did so in due course. It would be inequitable if the sincerity of

official documents under Norwegian law, and admissible as prima facie

respondents in obtaining and submitting the documents despite the

evidence of the truth of their contents under Philippine law.

difficulties was ignored.

At the minimum, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 substantially

The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies

met the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 as a condition

and situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid

application of the rules of procedure and the laws. 26 That rules of

rulings in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals 31 (Cabais) and in Heirs of

procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not forbid

Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals 32 (Conti) establishing filiation through a

a showing of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances,

baptismal certificate. 33

27 because substantial compliance does not equate to a disregard of

Petitioners urging is not warranted, both because there is no conflict

basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance and strict adherence

between the rulings in Cabais and Conti, and because neither Cabais nor

are not always incompatible and do not always clash in discord. The

Conti is relevant herein.

power of the Court to suspend its own rules or to except any

In Cabais, the main issue was whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the

particular case from the operation of the rules whenever the

decision of the RTC that had relied mainly on the baptismal certificate of

purposes of justice require the suspension cannot be challenged. 28

Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais. The

In the interest of substantial justice, even procedural rules of the

Court held that the petition was meritorious, stating:

most mandatory character in terms of compliance are frequently

relaxed.

A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of

filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of

Similarly, the procedural rules should definitely be liberally

truth contained in such public document. This is pursuant to the rule that

construed if strict adherence to their letter will result in absurdity

entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public

and in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a partys cause are

officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary

apparent and outweigh considerations of non-compliance with

nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of

certain formal requirements. 29 It is more in accord with justice that

strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.

a party-litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the

On the contrary, a baptismal certificate is a private document, which, being

merits of his claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty,

hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the same

honor or property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of

probative value as a record of birth, an official or public document. In US v.

procedure are intended to promote substantial justice, not to defeat

Evangelista, this Court held that church registers of births, marriages, and

it, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. 30

deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and

the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by

In fine, the Court sees no reversible-error on the part of the CA.

duly authorized public officials.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Court of Appeals; and

Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of baptism such as the one herein

ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

controversy is no longer regarded with the same evidentiary value as official

records of birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is consistent and

DAGDAG KO NA LANG ITO BAKA TANUNGIN NI LUNABLES. HEHE.

uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to

prove recognition. 34

Petitioner urges the Court to resolve the apparent conflict between the

The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners stance that the RTC had

instant case.

apparently erred in relying on the baptismal certificate to establish filiation,

Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official act of

stressing the baptismal certificates limited evidentiary value as proof of

the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,

filiation inferior to that of a birth certificate; and declaring that the baptismal

whether of the Philippines, or a foreign country. The baptismal certificates

certificate did not attest to the veracity of the statements regarding the

presented in evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish

kinsfolk of the one baptized. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately ruled that it

priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are

was respondents failure to present the birth certificate, more than anything

authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries

else, that lost them their case, stating that: The unjustified failure to present

contained therein.

the birth certificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under

consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any other means recognized

The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S.

by law weigh heavily against respondents. 35

Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder,
was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil.

In Conti, the Court affirmed the rulings of the trial court and the CA to the

105 [1914], thus:

effect that the Conti respondents were able to prove by preponderance of

. The entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made

evidence their being the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo.

in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception

The Conti petitioners disagreed, arguing that baptismal certificates did not

to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its

prove the filiation of collateral relatives of the deceased. Agreeing with the

transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book

CA, the Court said:

of the church during this course of its business.

We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence

It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the

submitted xxx are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents

administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4)

are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.

baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that

xxx Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall

Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as

be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special

indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida

laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parents admission of such

Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and

legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent.

sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such

Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial

baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation. 36

admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of

Obviously, Conti did not treat a baptismal certificate, standing alone, as

witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of

sufficient to prove filiation; on the contrary, Conti expressly held that a

Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the

baptismal certificate had evidentiary value to prove filiation if considered

alongside other evidence of filiation. As such, a baptismal certificate alone is

property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap property is

not sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation.

tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the husband[7] of

Unlike Cabais and Conti, this case has respondents presenting several

respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by

documents, like the birth certificates of Harper and respondent Jonathan

petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]

Harper, the marriage certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and the
probate court certificate, all of which were presumably regarded as public

The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of

documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary evidence sufficed to

Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the

competently establish the relationship and filiation under the standards of our

loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI

Rules of Court.

eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title

(TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14,

Best Evidence Rule --Case # 01

1985 was issued for the Murong property.

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ,Petitioners

On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots

versusELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO,

from RBBI. The Deed of Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:

OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and

NEMI FERNANDEZ,Respondents

x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and

unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,...

Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the

As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the

contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not

barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the

its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold

property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property.

otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical

There is no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the

errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who

continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised

Facts:

acts of ownership over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent
Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of

respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property

agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located at

-- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner.

Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the

The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later,

other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong

on July 1, 1994.[12]

owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of

belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and

Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,[15] executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land

exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also

Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of

argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was

the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an

actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and

agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836

possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.

(which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).[16]

RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of

subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied

P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land

committing a grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith

Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on

in the disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking

September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of

rules and regulations.

agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs were

registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred

the respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor

in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners

of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional

were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the

numbers indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in

cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by

determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents Deed of Sale expressed

petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary

that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to

land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based

them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and

on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the

CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should

petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as

be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property. Respondents

documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that

added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property,

their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong

their CLOAs should be cancelled due to their lack of qualification.

property.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong

embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the

property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have

best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which

always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the

was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject

is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is

Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject

the property that the respondents repurchased.

of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the

original document itself and no other evidence (such as a

The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the

reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general

property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap

rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of

property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is

undetected tampering with the document.[42]

located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical

error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best

more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly

Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of

describes the properties metes and bounds.

the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents

Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the

Issue:

petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in

Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the

Barangay Murong.

subject of the contracts

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents
Ruling:

adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties.

As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it

Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?

refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of
the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).

Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that
the Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to

As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836

the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of

(corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and

Sale stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title

the petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was a typographical

for the Murong property then the property repurchased by the respondents

error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay

was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between

Murong reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836

petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap

was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts,

property then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap

arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the

property.

true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to
evidence outside of the instruments.

Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best

The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the

Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:

documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the
actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best
Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to

the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

Rule instead, which provides:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and

between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such

agreement of the parties thereto;

terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[43]

Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described
the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party

they also describe the subject property as being located in Barangay

seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid

Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the

agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied

Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property), but

in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the

RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short,

contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The

it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the

appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and

true intent of the parties.

refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the

examination of the parties respective parol evidence, in order to determine

case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs

the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it

executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written

is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the

contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is

soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes,

exclusive only as between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The

inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and

parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to

precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of

the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in

agreements.

question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument.[44]

In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code
involving the interpretation of contracts:

Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence

Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no

decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the

doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its

dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of

stipulations shall control.

petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA

decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the

parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed

October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally

January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The

considered.

Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank
of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while

Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of

the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396

documents is likewise enlightening:

of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The
Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary

Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the

proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was

corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this

Decision. Costs against respondents.

made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it,
may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those

Best Evidence Rule--Case # 02

whose language he is to interpret.

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, petitioner
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was

Vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN LEE, repondent

intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs

G.R. NO. 183622 February 8, 2012

were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be
seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.

SERENO, J.:

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between

Facts:

respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836,
while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly

396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In

obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he

consequence, the CAs ruling against RBBI should not be executed as such

contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the CAs

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the RTC of Dagupan

Hence, this Petition.

City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her

appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. N March 3,

Issue:

2005. Same petition was filed by respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of

the children of Orlando from his first marriage

Is the lower court's decision on the bigamy case enough to rule on the issue
of the two petitions for the issuance of letters of administration (filed with the

The two cases were consolidated.

other court/s)?

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of respondents petition on the ground of

Ruling:

litis pendentia as such also covers the same Estate.

No.
Whereas, respondent alleged that petitioner is not qualified to file the

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to

aforementioned petition. Respondent alleged that a bigamy casevwas filed

appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was

against petitioner by Orlando's first wife.Having contracted second marriage

never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that,

to Orlando despite having been married to Eusebio Bristol.

because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings

Such case was dismissed by the RTC as the deceased was a divorced

of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol,

Anerican citizen. And since divorce was not recognized under the Philippine

both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the

jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

estate of Orlando.

The trial court found that petitiner have never been married to Eusebio

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim.

Bristol.

Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that

spouse of foreign nationality.

the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was
acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have

with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of

enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:

bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is

given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice

presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is

of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.

proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a

Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are

judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written

supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial

act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign

notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the

country.

subject should be resolved in the negative.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by

validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the

either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer

marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to

having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the

remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to

Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the

establish the fact of divorce.

proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service

stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent

authenticated by the seal of his office.

marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of

administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an

issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the

authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is

deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the

be demonstrated.

divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of

administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

Also stated in the cited case:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or

GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20

thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases,

June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let

plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint

this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,

when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of

Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

PAROL EVIDENCE RULE--Case #01

LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRADO Q.

SALONGA, Respondents
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and
damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz ** in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City alleging that in the course of their business transactions of buying and
selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of P35,000.00,
evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982

The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00 had been paid,
leaving a balance of P10,000.00; that in August 1982, he and the defendant
agreed that the latter would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the
harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain loan
accommodations; that pursuant thereto, Salonga delivered to Cruz various
loans totaling P15,250.00, evidenced by four receipts and an additional
P4,000.00, the receipt of which had been lost; and that Cruz failed to comply
with his part of the agreement by refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of
the fishpond and the amount of his indebtedness.

Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special
defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several hectares of a fishpond
owned by Nemesio Yabut and that sometime in May 1982, he entered into an
agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in
certain areas of the fishpond from May 1982 to August 15, 1982. They also
agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga would sublease (bubuwisan) the
same fishpond for a period of one year

Cruz admitted having received on May 4, 1982, the amount of P35,000.00

and on several occasions from August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, an
aggregate amount of P15,250.00. He contended however, that these
amounts were received by him not as loans but as consideration for their
"pakyaw" agreement and payment for the sublease of the fishpond. He added
that it was the private respondent who owed him money since Salonga still
had unpaid rentals for the 10-month period that he actually occupied the
fishpond. Cruz also claimed that Salonga owed him an additional P4,000.00
arising from another purchase of fish from other areas of his leased fishpond.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private
respondent to pay the former the sum of P3,054.00 plus P1,000.00 as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and the costs. Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. found that the transactions between the petitioner and the private
respondent were indeed "pakyaw" and sublease agreements, each having a
consideration of P28,000.00, for a total of P56,000.00. P

Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction behind Exhibit
"D." What only gives the semblance that Exhibit "I" is an explanation of the
transaction behind Exhibit "D" are the oral testimonies given by the
defendant and his two witnesses. On the other hand, Exhibit "I" is very clear
in its language. Thus, its tenor must not be clouded by any parol evidence
introduced by the defendant. And with the tenor of Exhibit "I" remaining
unembellished, the conclusion that Exhibit "D" is a mere tentative receipt
becomes untenable.
ISSUE:
1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in (1)
disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I" despite the fact
that these documents fall under the exceptions provided for in Sec. 7,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and thereby in (2) making a sweeping
conclusion that the transaction effected between the private
respondent and petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a
contract of lease.
RULING:
Our ruling follows:
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides: 1
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such
terms, and therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the

true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is
put in issue by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.

The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have
reduced their agreement to writing they have made such writing the only
repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing
must be understood to have been waived or abandoned.

The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is
predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an
agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a
receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from
the private respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not
been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As
a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that gave
rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual
memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment
of the receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the private
respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not
covered by the parol evidence rule.

A receipt i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one party to the other,

of the manual custody of money or other personality will in general fall
without the line of the rule; i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive memorial,
and the facts may be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt. This is
because usually a receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction
independently existing, and, like other admissions, is not conclusive. 3

A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the

instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by
parol evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the
terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the parties

and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement

other than the contents of the writing."

The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just

a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of
payment made by the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does not make it part
of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced
to explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the
amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount was received.

Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol
evidence rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper. The
record shows that no objection was made by the private respondent when the
petitioner introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the
execution and issuance of the said instruments. The rule is that objections to
evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. 6 In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made
when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer. 7

For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by

the petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence
rule. Thus, in Abrenica v. Gonda, 8 this Court held:
. . . it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper
time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived. The
proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question
addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be inferred.

It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible
by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus:

. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well

as the allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on the
stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his
right by timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any
case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case
for what it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole
reason that it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to
strike it out on its own motion. (Emphasis supplied.) 9

We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to disregard the parol
evidence introduced by the petitioner and to conclude that the amount of
P35,000.00 received on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner was in the nature of a
loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have considered the
partial stipulation of facts and the testimonies of the witnesses which sought
to explain the circumstances surrounding the execution of Exhibits D and I
and their relation to one another.