Datu Michael abas kida vs senate

DECISION
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153,
entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for
Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM
elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter,
to coincide with the countrys regular national and local
elections. The law as well granted the President the power
to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became
RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their
validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756
were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These
petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section
15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed
Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous
regions to concretely carry into effect the granted
autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic
act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional
consultative
commission
composed
of

representatives appointed by the President from a

list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative
of the constituent political units. The organic acts
shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6,
1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No.
6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting

provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and

Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date
not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic
Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended)
was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first
defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA
No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first
regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054,
toNovember 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to
ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held
on August
14,
2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join
ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress

to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday
of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No.
9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of
Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the
postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred
ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its
own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756),
on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably
for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments,

and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153

into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153
came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No.
196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No.
4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity
of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the
constitutional
plebiscite
requirement.
Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno inG.R. No. 196305 filed
another petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No.
9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the
COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a)

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by

Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of
Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

b)

Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by

Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c)

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction

and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok
Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R.
No. 197392; and

d)

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by

Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito
Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan

Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with
the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a
political party with candidates in the ARMM regional
elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9] against the
COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority
Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro
Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to
Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-inIntervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the
Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the

Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions

relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No.
2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9,
2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were
instructed to submit their respective memoranda within
twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation
of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective
officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions
should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA
No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to
become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further
maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section

26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as

grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage
of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the elective and representative character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue
that the power of appointment also gave the President the
power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation
of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues
were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral
arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I.

Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates

the synchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153

violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153

requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM
regular elections constitute an amendment
to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No.
9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority
vote for amendments or revisions to RA
No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section
16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite
apply only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV.
Whether RA No. 10153 violates the
autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint
OICs violates:
A. Section 15,
Constitution

Article

of

the

1987

VI.

B. Section 16,
Constitution

Article

of

the

1987

C. Section 18,
Constitution

Article

of

the

1987

Whether the proposal to hold special

elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are

presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and
thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional
mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the

Congress under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to
be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members
of the Congress. It shall include the election of
all Members of the city or municipal councils in
the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992,
the first twelve obtaining the highest number of
votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and VicePresident under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections,
the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from
the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination
date for all elective officials, done among others through
the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators
with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national or local
to once every three years.[12] This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read
with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and

local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992

and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the
synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on
Elections,[14]we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of
the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized
to end on the same hour, date and year noon
of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of
the above-mentioned Sections that the term
of synchronization is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure
on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and the local

officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to

be synchronized with the election for President
and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM
elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the
words used should be understood in the sense that they
have in common use and given their ordinary meaning,
except when technical terms are employed, in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. [15] As this
Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its
language should be understood in the sense that it may
have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local
refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a
particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM

for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional

assembly representatives obviously fall within this
classification, since they pertain to the elected officials
who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous
regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the
Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to
21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local
Government. That an autonomous region is considered a
form of local government is also reflected in Section 1,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions
of
the
Republic
of
the Philippines are
the
provinces,
cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and
theCordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the
synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not
include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the
course of our discussions below, as this concept

permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in

this case and must be recalled time and again for its
complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA
No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge
the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to
comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by
either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity
of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
[19]
explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with
the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the

bill has passed three readings on separate days

and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the
President, the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can
be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court
which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on
second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968]
after the bill had been certified by the President
as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. [20] Following
our Tolentino ruling,
the
Presidents
certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to
comply with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed

for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was
no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again
we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or
the existence of a national emergency justifying
the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject
to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be of hazard. But the factual
basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress,
certainly should elicit a different standard of
review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the

exercise of their legislative discretion gave full
recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly
enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing
short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two

houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our

power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with
any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence,
while the judicial department and this Court are not bound
by the acceptance of the President's certification by both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent
exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal
branches of government in matters committed to them by
the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the
two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three
readings on separate days of every bill must always be
observed to enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to
them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members
of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters
they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is in progress through the enactment process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on
the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the
proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present
their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA
No. 10153 on the cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not

amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
has also been challenged because they did not comply
with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended
or revised by the Congress of the Philippines
upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members
of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this
Organic Act shall become effective only when
approved by a majority of the vote cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than
ninety (90) days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No.
10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these
laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the
schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the

date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for

the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333
and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No.
9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in
the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054
or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections
to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed
that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic
Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the
subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date
of the first ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be
fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA
No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No.
8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since
these laws did not change or modify any part or provision
of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter

law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to

any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which
lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first
elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140[30] to
reset
the
date
of
the
ARMM
elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also
scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second
Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among
the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve
RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,
[31]
which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear
intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date
of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153
without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054.

III.

B. Supermajority
voting
requirement
unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153

did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3)
voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII
of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA
No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring
more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides
that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the
members of the House of Representatives or the Senate
are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to
conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a
vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend
RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is
higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage
of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had

passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v.

GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason
for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to
democratic principles for a legislative body to
have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both assemblies
are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual
infallibility is not one of the attributes desired
in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or
repeals of its enactments labors under delusions
of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making
power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by
the federal constitution or limited or restrained by
its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by
enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or
abolish the acts passed by itself or its

predecessors. This power of repeal may be

exercised at the same session at which the original
act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or
the effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against
a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement
found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required
an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the
plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3,
Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite
requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the

Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and,

hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that
the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the
autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,
[35]
questions on the extent of the matters requiring
ratification may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the
obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to
be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly
states that The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by the majority of the votes
case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret
the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to
the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic

structure of the regional government; (b) the regions

judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant
and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under
any of the matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes
and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in
the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial
amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national
and local elections is a constitutional mandate that
Congress must provide for and this synchronization must
include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing
law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the
forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166
already provides for the synchronization of local elections
with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what
RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local
governments
(with
the
exception

ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections

where
the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is
technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the
law, given that regional elections are in reality local
elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has
to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on
RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May
2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the
three options open to Congress in order to resolve this
problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No.
9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant
to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below,
Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to

appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No.

10153 as a completely valid law.
V.

The Constitutionality of RA No.

10153
A.

Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain

underlying material premises must be fully
understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; thesecond is the constitutional
mandate for the synchronization of elections; and
the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general and comprehensive.[39] The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government.[40]Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. [41] Except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.[42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power

are either express or implied. The express limitations are
generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the
provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional
provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of
Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions
of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The
implied limitations are found in the evident purpose
which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular
provision as a part of organic law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy
specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the
Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative
power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its
parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited
power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present
case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic
structure of government i.e., that the government must
have an executive department and a legislative assembly,
both of which must be elective and representative of the
constituent political units; national government, too, must
not encroach on the legislative powers granted under

Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly

reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and
functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should
likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe
in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the
autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no
doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of selfrule or self-government, in particular, the power to
legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these
provisions are the permeating principles of national
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as
expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
15.[44] In other words, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion
of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and
the synchronization of national and local elections are
recognized and established constitutional mandates, with
one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling
force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage;
synchronization operates on and affects the whole

country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests

directly carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the
powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA
No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that
faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the
regional elections with the national, congressional and all
other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to
provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening
period between the expiration of the term of those elected
in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one
(21) months away of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim
measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the
Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence,
and with the respect due to the concept of
autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange
phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The
Constitutions
Transitory
Provisions
themselves
collectively provide measures for transition from the old
constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new
concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of
elective terms and of elections towards the goal of

synchronization first transpired under the Transitory

Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems
that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would
entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government units also
represents instances when interim measures are
required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and
Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the
President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor
and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the
appointive officials were to serve until a new set of
provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified.
[50]
A similar authority to appoint is provided in the
transition of a local government from a sub-province to a
province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated
by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the
goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do
violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted
norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures
was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these

concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address
the problems brought about by the synchronization of the
ARMM elections, properly understood as interim
measures that Congress had to provide. The proper
understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the
passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given
the constitutional objective of synchronization that
cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its
discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed
through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that
the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who
were elected in executive and legislative positions in the
ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that
Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three

years and no such official shall serve for more

than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,
they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their
term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v.
COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to
extend the term of officers by providing that
they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has
in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on
which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors
fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been
stated as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the
legislature cannot, by an act
postponing the election to fill an
office the term of which is limited by

the Constitution, extend the term of

the incumbent beyond the period as
limited
by
the
Constitution.
[Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of
the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates
that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so
determined or mandated should be respected until the
Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal
through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary
corollary is that none of the three branches of government
can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only
as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress
may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
operationalize the constitutional command or to
implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this
Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate
if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term
has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no
room for any implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three
years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as

fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by

holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is
effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint
the occupant for the new term. This view like
the extension of the elective term is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55]Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President.[56] Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm
option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of
cases where the question of holdover was brought before,
and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The
present case though differs significantly from past cases
with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v.
Comelec,[59] where the Court ruled that the elective

officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over

capacity.
All
these
past
cases
refer
to
elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present
case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials
the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose
terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section
8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their
constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an
extension beyond the term for which they were originally
elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it
explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a

policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of

Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannotpass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order
special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R.
No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section
5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially
legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by,
the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature,
provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by
law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall
be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but

applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided
by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for xxx
the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no
elections may be held on any other date for the positions
of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution
of that power.[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections

by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional
elections
synchronized
with
the
presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive
nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this
call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision
and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not
without the power to declare an act of Congress null and
void for being unconstitutional or for having been
exercised in grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our power
rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress
itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No.
197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for
special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the

constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with
the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of,
elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
[65]
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the
holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific
statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5
and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone
elections to another date. However, this power is limited
to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms
and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When
for
any
serious
cause
such
as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election
paraphernalia or
records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu
proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the
election therein to a date which should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure

to elect but not later than thirty days after the

cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on
account
of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it

is meant to address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but have to
bepostponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c)
loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records,
(d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such
a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political
subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the
term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the
holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous
causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those
situations where elections have already been scheduled
but do not take place because of (a) force majeure,
(b)violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6

addresses instances where the elections do not occur or

had
to
be
suspended
because
of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the
ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional
policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate
of synchronization of national and local elections. By no
stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the
same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to
extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of
elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of
a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers.
[66]
Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can
apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no
legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special
elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of
elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the
Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections,
no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected
ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM

officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have

assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to
adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the
Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of
elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown
when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve
Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and extended the
terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in order
to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this
same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70] More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this
Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local
officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the
constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering
would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective
ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will
happen a term of less than two years if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while

synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a

violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure
of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections
instead of acting on their term (where the term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as of right and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another, while the tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective
term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis
to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They
would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse
their discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress
chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the
ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should
be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the limitations on or

qualifications to the exercise of this power should be

strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. [73] The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the
heads
of
departments,
agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers
that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments;

ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.[74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant
to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions
to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA
No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires
that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be
elective and representative of the constituent political
units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation

whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the

appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this
alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real
and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to
bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No.
10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in
terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who
shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is
far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of
the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of
the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal
reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it

was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.

[75]
Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the
interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to
adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization
unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and
based on the above considerations, given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the
unavailability of constitutional possibilities for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power
to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the
President under other situations or where the power of
appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period
for synchronization would be to foster a government that
is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples
right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to
besystemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would
frontally breach the elective and representative

governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the

Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very
limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153
where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms
of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be
touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously
been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary
measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization
will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys
choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation
of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that
interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units[76] and the adjustments
of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. [77] These
measures, too, are used in light of the wider national
demand for the synchronization of elections
(considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The
adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police
power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the

reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the

given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the
chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the elective
aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of
OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to
address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law,
concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner
and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No.
10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not
violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy
provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued
during the oral arguments that upholding the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent of giving the President the power to cancel

elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to

replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an acrossthe-board cancellation of elections is a matter for
Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of
its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed
above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake
with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011
elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose
the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary
means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections.
Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives
this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot
be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation
of elections and call for special elections can occur only
in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials
cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the
expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel
the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court
now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in
governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it

should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or
close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and
the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their
terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many developments, some of
them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys
Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they
transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to
assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor,
an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional
Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under
the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power
to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither
novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth
Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, the President is empowered to
make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may

occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the

filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary
provision in the Local Government Code and
in the best interest of public service, we see no
cogent reason why the procedure thus
outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit.
As between the President who has supervision
over local governments as provided by law and
the members of the board who are junior to the
vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in
favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation
and finds no approbation under the law for it
deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the
majority rules through their chosen few, and if
one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there

will be a consequent delay in the delivery of

basic services to the people of Leyte if the
Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80]
(Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM
Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2
years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the
delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper
management of the affairs of the regional government,
and in responding to critical developments that may arise.
When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment
power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable
measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or
to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to
the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized
Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional
autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over
the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates

a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis
valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be
given importance over the other except where the primacy
of one over the other is clear.[82] We refer to the Courts
declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be
construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently, conflicting provisions should be
reconciled and harmonized in a manner that
may give to all of them full force and
effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that
this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way
that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the
measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with
the least disturbance on the interests that must be
respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be
respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not
in any way alter, change or modify its governing features,
except in a very temporary manner and only as
necessitated by the attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM

elections should not be synchronized with the national
and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of
the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from
the rough and tumble of nationwide and local
elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of
its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while
autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with
independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus
continues to operate within the larger framework of the
State and is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific areas
reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous
determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a
complete
separation
from
the
central
government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region and
the central government. We see this as an
effective partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy

is not really thought of as complete
independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of
self-government within the larger political
framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis
supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in
the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section
1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially
proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it
to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers
granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers
decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it
clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the
powers of the autonomous government. Those not
enumerated are actually to be exercised by the
national government[.][85] Of note is the Courts

pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which

we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local
autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose
of the delegation is to make governance more
directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still
lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis
ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM
cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not
just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM
cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in

accordance with a national policy mandated by no less

than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a
constitutional mandate the synchronization of national
and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This
Court cannot question the manner by which Congress
undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply
the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot
repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by
which Congress should address what is essentially a
legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power to
enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be
guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.
[89]
The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel
COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of
authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into
the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one
of the most basic principles of a republican and
democratic government the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act

because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153,
acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an
array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds
and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive
duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no
reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave
abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is
unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule
that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has
in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts,
and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the
onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any
reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be

resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court

declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the
other departments. The theory is that as the
joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No.
10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the
validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued
in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.