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AL FACTS: Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount. The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1. HELD: The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”
BALACUIT vs CFI • Movie tickets for children
• An ordinance was passed by the municipal board of Butuan ordering that the price of the admission of children in movie houses and other places of amusements should be half that of adults. • Owners of 4 theaters (petitioners) maintain that Ordinance 640 violates the due process clause for it is unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and amounts to a restraint of trade and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts. • Issue: Is Ordinance 460 a valid exercise of police power? Held: It is not. Ratio: Not lawful subject/ no lawful purpose • The ordinance is not justified by any necessity of public interest. The evidence purpose of it is to reduce the loss in savings of parents, in turn passing the buck to the theater owners. The contention of the city that they are preventing the movie houses from exploiting children is not tenable (they are given the same quality of entertainment). Besides, the city said that movies are attractive nuisance, so why are they encouraging it. The means are clearly unreasonable. How can the theater operators distinguish bet a 13year old an an 11-year old child. The city said that the movie operators can ask the children to bring their birth certificates but that is impractical, said the court (why?) A theater ticket is an evidence of a contract bet the movie house and its patrons. It may also be considered a license, allowing the purchases to enjoy the entertainment being provided. In either case, the ticket is a species of property. The operators, as the owners thereof, have the right to dispose of it at a price it wants and to whom he pleases. The courts have declared valid laws regulating the prices of food and drugs during emergency; limiting the act profit of utilities. But the theater is not of the same nature—it is not a public utility or a public good. Note 3 instances when the exercise of police power by local govt are invalid: a. violates the consti b. violates the act of Congress of the leg c. against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating or in derogation of common rights. Municipality: a valid exercise of policy under the gen welfare clause in their charter.
Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in result Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court
to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead. Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation. Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost” (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with “no substitution,” the patient’s option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority. GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005 MMDA vs. GARIN FACTS: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver’s license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? HELD: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People’s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature. 146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ FACTS: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.
HELD: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power and the production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby. For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria executed a Right of Way Grant# in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon. The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion. On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their report,# recommending as payment for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment,# declaring as wellgrounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair market value of the residential and agricultural property? HELD: The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows: (1) P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565 sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept the recommendation of majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account the evidence of the parties, in tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of the commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to disturb the same. The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners that the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of their lot will affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to buy the remaining portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation. G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987
SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO FACTS: The National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended. ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes “public use” for purposes of expropriation. HELD: YES. This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use". As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007 NAPOCOR, vs. TIANGCO FACTS: Respondents are owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal. NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents’ aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s Segregation Plan# for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents’ land. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and coconut trees. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations, NPC filed an expropriation complaint against the land of the respondent in the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC after paying the deposit requirement. The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the property using the 1984 tax declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in the decision of the supreme court) The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it was denied by RTC. So They filed an appeal and the CA gave merit to the contention of the respondents and made its revised valuation using the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the value of the property). The case went up to the SC. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the property should be valued using the 1984 or the 1993 tax declarations. 2. Whether or not Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by P.D. 938 will apply. HELD 1. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. Normally, the time of taking coincides with the filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the case of Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, et al.The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for the proper determination of just compensation. 2. It should not apply in the case at bar, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994] En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution. Held: The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
REPUBLIC vs. PLDT FACTS: Sometime in 1933, respondent PLDT contracted an agreement with the American company, RCA Communications Inc., connecting calls coming and going from RCA to the Philippines and vice versa. Later, this agreement extended to radio and telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. In 1956, PLDT, complying with their 24-month notice agreement, made known its termination of the agreement, which came to pass in 1958. Created in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up a Government telephone System by renting trunk lines from PLDT. In doing so, the Bureau has agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of PLDT, which includes the prohibition for public use that which was furnished for private use. In 1948, the Bureau extended service to the general public. In 1958, the Bureau entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. PLDT then complained that the Bureau was violating their agreement as the latter was using PLDT’s trunk lines for public use and not just private. PLDT then gave notice that if these activities continued,
they would disconnect service. When no reply was received, OLDT pulled the plug on the Bureau, causing an isolation of the RP from the rest of the world, except the US. The Bureau proposed an interconnecting agreement, but as negotiations wore on, neither party could come to a compromise. Petitioner Bureau of Telecommunications is prayed for a judgment commanding PLDT to execute an agreement, allowing the Bureau to use PLDT’s facilities, as well as a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent from severing existing connections as well as restoring those already severed. While the lower court directed respondent to reconnect the severed lines and refrain from disconnecting more, as well as to accept incoming international calls, PLDT filed its answer denying any obligation it has to the Bureau, as well as assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. PLDT also claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations, which was in excess of its authority. The court then said that it could not compel the parties to enter into agreement, that under EO 94, establishing the Bureau, said Bureau is not limited to government services, nor was it guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of PLDT’s poles, as well as declared the injunction permanent. The complaint and counterclaims, however, were dismissed. Hence this appeal. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the trial court can coerce the parties to enter into agreement. 2) Whether the court of first instance had jurisdiction. 3) Whether the Bureau of Telecommunications is empowered to engage in commercial telephone business. 4) Whether these commercial services created unfair competition, and the Bureau is subsequently guilty of fraud and abuse. 5) Whether PLDT has a right to compensation for the use of the Bureau of PLDT’s poles. HELD: 1) No the trial court may not. 2) Yes, the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. 3) Yes, the Bureau is empowered to engage in commercial telephone business. 4) No, these services did not create any unfair competition. 5) No, PLDT has no right to compensation. The court here stated that contracts and agreements must be made freely and not tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence. EPZA vs. DULAY (April 29, 1987) Ponente: J. Gutierrez, Jr. FACTS: • Jan 15, 1979: Pres Marcos issued PD 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land in Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority. However, not all reserved areas were public lands. So petitioner offered to purchase the parcels of land in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sec 92 of PD 464. Despite this, the parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the properties. • Petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession, pursuant to PD 66, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones. • Feb 17, 1981: respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned. A second order was issued, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. • June 19: the 3 appointed commissioners recommended that P15/sq.m. was the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties
• July 29: petitioner filed Motion for Recon on the ground that PD 1533 has superseded Secs. 5-8 of Rule 67 or the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners. MFR was denied by the trial court. ISSUE/HELD: WON PD’s 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sec 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by its assessor, whichever is lower NO Held: PD 1533 (and the other PDs which it amended) is unconstitutional and void
ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC. vs. TREASURER of FACTS: • The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.” (Section 1) Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Co, Inc (OSCI) totaling P12,087.50. OSCI filed a complaint in the CFI of Leyte alleging: 1. the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation 2. it is an export tax forbidden under Sec. 2887 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) 3. the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City is authorized to impose under Sec. 15-kk of its charter and under Sec 2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) 4. the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of par. 1 of Sec 2 of RA 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. CFI upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES: 1. WON defendant Municipal Board has authority to levy such an export tax 2. WON constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation were infringed HELD: CFI decision REVERSED. Ordinance declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Defendants ordered to refund the P12,087.50 paid. PEOPLE vs. CAYAT FACTS: Being a member of a non-Christian tribe, the accused, Cayat, acquired and had under his possession a bottle of A-1-1 gin, a liquor other than the native wines of his tribe. This was in violation of Act. No. 1639 (sec 2 and 3). While he admitted to the facts, the pleaded not guilty. He was found guilty and fined to Php50. Sec. 2 makes it unlawful for any Philippine non-Christian native to buy or possess any alcoholic beverage or liquor other than the “so-called” native wines and liquors that they have been made accustomed to. It is then the duty of the police or any authorized agent to seize and destroy the liquor.
Sec. 3 fines a violator of not more than Php200 or imprisoning them of as term not exceeding 6 months. Cayat now challenges the constitutionality of the Act for being: 1) discriminatory and denies equal protection of the laws 2) violative of due process 3) an improper exercise of police power ISSUE 1) Whether or not Act. No. 1639 satisfies the requirements of proper classification 2) Whether or not Act. No. 1639 is violative of the due process clause 3) Whether or not it is an improper exercise of police power HELD 1) Yes it does. 2) No it is not. 3) No it is not. SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE FACTS: On or about June 21, 1954, Emilio Suntay took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge with her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. Alicia’s father, Dr. Antonio Nubla, filed a verified complaint against accused in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. On January 10, 1955, the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. He left the Philippines for San Francisco, where he enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." Hence, this petition to annul the order. ISSUES: 1. WON the Court’s order for the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport is illegal. 2. WON the Secretary for Foreign Affairs can exercise his discretion of cancelling the passport without hearing. HELD: The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. The petition is denied.
VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position paper. Public respondent rendered judgment and dismissed the case for some of the employees; other employees were entitled to payments by the complainant. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners' counsel at his address, through the receptionist. According to Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing the decision Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served. On November 23,1987, petitioners, through new counsel, filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that the decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory. Hence, this petition to annul the judgment by public respondent and the writ of execution be set aside. ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process of law because Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing. HELD: Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, it was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both motions.
The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
People v. Hernandez [GR L-6025-26, 18 July 1956] Resolution En Banc, Concepcion (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, were accused of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is charged with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on 28 December 1953, which was denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated 2 February 1954. A similar petition for bail was filed by Hernandez on 26 June 1954 and renewed on 22 December 1955.
Issue: Whether Hernandez is entitled to right to bail. Held: Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code constitute one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, the Supreme court has never in the past convicted any person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder”. What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports (US vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; US vs. Baldello, 3 Phil. 509, US vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155), the defendants therein were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers. The ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential elements, thus clearly indicating that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein. National, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. The policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty. Further, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Although the Government has, for the past 5 or 6 years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution the established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. Furthermore, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. Thus, in conclusion, under the allegations of the amended information against Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. People v. Isinain [GR L-2857, 28 February 1950] Second Division, Bengzon (J): 8 concur Facts: In the morning of 7 March 1947, Urbano Cruz, the encargado of the coconut grove of Arturo Eustaquio in Latuan and Balagtasan, City of Zamboanga, was informed by one of the guards that there were 3 persons stealing coconuts in the said plantation. Cruz called Ernesto Fargas, Eustaquio’s truck driver, and accompanied by some laborers, proceeded to the plantation. There the group saw 3 persons, chopping coconuts. When they approached, the trespassers started to run away, but Cruz fired a shot into the air, and one stopped and was apprehended. He turned out to be Moro Isnain, who, upon investigation by the precinct commander of the police station (Lt. Bucoy) acknowledged his culpability, asked for pardon and identified his confederates as Moros Addi and Akik (who are still at large). Before the justice of the peace he pleaded guilty to the charge. However, in the Court of First Instance (CFI), he changed his mind. He admitted he had been arrested during the raid, but submitted the flimsy excuse that he had merely gone to the place because he was thirsty, and confessed that he joined the other two thieves in order to drink coconut water. His attorney de officio raised the constitutionality of Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as it allegedly punishes the larceny of such products (the stealing of coconuts) more heavily than the taking away of similar produce (rice and sugar) and thereby denies Moro Isinain equal protection of the laws. Issue: Whether the harsher penalties in the theft of coconuts over other objects of theft renders the penal law contrary to the constitutional guaranty on equal protection of the law. Held: No. Although the constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike, in the same place and under like circumstances and conditions, of all persons subjected to state legislation; a state, as a part of its police power, may exercise a large measure of discretion, without violating the equal protection guaranty, in creating and defining criminal offenses, and may make classifications as to persons amenable to punishment, so long as the classifications are reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in the same class, and, where a reasonable classification is made
as between persons or corporations, the persons or corporations in each class may be dealt with in a manner different from that employed with regard to the persons or corporations in other classes. Herein, on the theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of the national economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be the favorite resort of thieves. There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the industry and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely without basis. Ah Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 took no part Facts: Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979, Memorandum Circular 39, which imposed “the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles” found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39 does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in specified time, are constitutional and/or valid. Held: A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. When a questioned statute deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power, and which is asked to be declare void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation (require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems; strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; strict observance of traffic rules; effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses; rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five o’clock p.m. to nine o’clock p.m.; prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law. Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J): 10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part Facts: Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin, Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for declaratory relief with the lower court, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by the lower court as its availability being
dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure. Held: The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.” The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. It has made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence and it has continued to be. TIRO VS. HONTANOSAS FACTS: Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No. 21. Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 21 impairs the obligation of contracts. HELD: NO. Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do. The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.
Synthesis: Del Roasario vs Bengzon The Supreme Court sustained the Generics Act, which requires doctors to prescribe generic drug products rather than specific brand medicines, some of which may cost more than others because of the advertising cost that is added to their price. According to Justice Carolina Grino Aquino: The purpose of the Generics Act is to carry out the policy of the State to “promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counterparts” for the therapeutic effect of a drug does not depend on its “brand” but on the “active ingredients” which it contains. The medicine that cures is the “active ingredient” of the drug, not the brand name by which it has been baptized by the manufacturer. Lozano vs Martinez The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of B.P. No. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law. The unanimous decision penned by Justice Pedro L. Yap declared in parts as follows: The effect of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. MMDA vs. GARIN Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is no provision in R.A 7924 that empowers the Metro Development Authority or its Council “enact ordinances, approve reolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. RA 7924 does not grand the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validy enacted by the legislature or those agencies ot whom legislative power has been delegated(the city of Manila, in this case: suspended or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffice ecucation programs. CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL R.A 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Act of 2003”. Is a legitimate exercise of police power. Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the Department of Health, providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior citizens shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicine but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicine, whether branded or generic is valid. When conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by the due process clause, must yield to the general welfare. BALACUIT vs CFI An ordinance was passed by the municipal board of Butuan ordering that the price of the admission of children in movie houses and other places of amusements should be half that of adults. Owners of 4 theaters (petitioners) maintain that Ordinance 640 violates the due process clause for it is unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and amounts to a restraint of trade and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on the individuals.
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