Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CASE
MARBURY v. MADISON
SHORT FACTS
Petitioner Angara won the election and has taken
his oath as member of the National Assembly (NA). The NA
passed Resolution No. 8, which confirmed the election of
members against whom no protest(s) had been filed at the
time of its passage. He assailed the motion of protest of a rival
candidate for being filed out of the prescribed period, and
contended that although contested elections are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission (EC), the
constitution excludes the power to regulate proceedings of
election, which are reserved to the legislative or the NA. EC
can only regulate proceedings if NA has not availed of its
primary power to regulate.
It was held that the SC has jurisdiction over the EC
and the subject matter of controversy. The EC acted within its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest.
By virtue of an organic act by Congress, Pres.
Adams issued appointments to the judiciary on his last day in
office and the new president refuses to recognize such
appointments arguing it was not delivered before the end of
Adams term.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
DOCTRINE
Separation of powers; system of checks and balances: Each department of
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme in its own
sphere. In cases of conflict, the Judicial Department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine proper allocation of powers among departments and their constituent
units.
Judicial Supremacy: The judiciary mediates constitutional boundaries, not assert
superiority over other departments.
Power of Judicial Review requisites: actual cases and controversies and
constitutional question raised (lis mota).
Although the EC is constitutional organ, it is not a separate department. The SC, which
interprets the constitution, determines conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
(National Assembly vs. Electoral Commission).
The SC has jurisdiction over the EC and subject matter for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as sole
judge of all contests regarding election returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly. Although it may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it is not beyond the reach of the Constitution and its restrictions.
It was held that the appointments are valid. The power has been exercised when the
last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed which is the signing
of the commission by the president.
The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. Congress cannot expand the scope of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution
It was held that PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas and Dimaano;
properties in Dimaano's house which were not in the warrant and were confiscated by the
raiding team are deemed to have been illegally seized.
Thus, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.
It was held that the cause of action is sufficient, order of the lower court is set aside.
Petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants, individually, the
holders of the questioned TLAs.Cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right.
The political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power.
Manila Prince should be preferred over the Malaysian firm. The constitutional
provision on the matter [10(2), XII] is self-executing. The nature and the extent of the right
conferred and liability imposed are determinable
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. Otherwise, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. Nonetheless, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce such provision.
FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
LOZANO v. NOGRALES
SHORT FACTS
The plaintiffs, preferred stockholders of the
Alabama Power Company, had unsuccessfully protested to the
corporation about its contracts with the Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA"). Plaintiffs then brought suit against the
corporation, the TVA, and others alleging breach of contract
and advancing a broad constitutional challenge to the
governmental program.
Decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed;
the government had a right to involve itself with such
construction when it affects national security, enhances
interstate commerce, and produces other general public
benefits, and that Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution gave
it the right to sell property -- i.e. electricity in this case -- that
it had gained legally.
DOCTRINE
"Prudential" rules -- meaning non-constitutional, self-imposed restraints -- are rules to avoid
"passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions" presented to it, despite having
jurisdiction to hear them. The avoidance doctrine, which is an integral aspect of the prudential
rules, consist of a "series" of seven rules:
1. "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding . . .";
2. "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.'"
3. "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'"
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed.
5. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless the plaintiff was
injured by operation of the statute.
6. "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits."
"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
The requisites for judicial review are:
1. Justiciability - opposite of a political question. Political questions are those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
2. Ripeness - For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture
3. Locus standi - or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged
4. Lis mota - Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Court, based on the case-or-controversy requirement, is banned from deciding
on abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, as well as non-ripe cases.
Twofold aspect of ripeness
1. The fitness of the issues for judicial decision
2. The hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration
Also, the petitioners do not have locus standi as taxpayers and concerned citizens, because said
procedures do not require additional public funds. The liberality of disregarding standing based
on transcendental importance should not be abused, too.
Petition dismissed.
SEDITIOUS SPEECH
CASE
US v. DORR
US v. ABAD
US v. APURADO
US v. PERFECTO
ESPUELAS v. PEOPLE
SHORT FACTS
Fred Dorr published an editorial in "Manila
Freedom" entitled "A few hard facts" where he criticized the
government for appointing natives in government, saying
further that they were "men of no personal character". He is
charged with the offense of writing, publishing, and
circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the
United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands based on sec 8 of Act 292 of the Phil Commission.
The defendant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Batangas of the violation of section
8 of Act No. 292, the law defining and punishing treason and
sedition. He is the author of the Tagalog drama ""Tanikalang
Guinto"" (The Chain of Gold). This drama he produced in a
theater at Batangas on the 10th day of May, 1903. The
Government claimed and the lower court held that the drama
was seditious.
The appellants were charged with the crime of sedition. What
were considered seditious were the appellants acts such as
their assembling near the municipal building and crowding
into the municipal chamber demanding the removal of the
present public officials.
Senate records were robbed; Perfecto published a news
article accusing the senators of electoral robbery and that the
thief merely followed the example of the Senators; held guilty
under Act 256.
Espuelas made it appear that he was Alberto
Reveniera and that he committed suicide by hanging himself
from a tree. He took a photo of himself and sent it to different
publications along with a fabricated suicide letter which
states that ashamed of the government under Roxas and
that he cannot hold high his brows to the world with this
dirty government. He was charged and convicted under Art
142 of the RPC.
The court held that it was a scurrilous libel against
the government.
DOCTRINE
Dorr is Acquitted. The statements are not seditious because they don't contain attacks
upon the government SYSTEM by which the authority of the US is enforced in the Philippines
The term "government" is used in the statute in the abstract sense of the existing
political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government (e.g. House of
Congress and Executive). The crime here defined maybe characterized by an attack upon the
lawfully established system of civil government in the Philippine Islands, couched in scandalous
language (scurrilous libel against the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands). Defamation
of individuals may be punished under the general libel law.
Defendant was acquitted.
It is possible to give to almost any play a different meaning than that intended by the
author. To the writings of the greatest dramatists have been given meanings of which the author
never thought. The fact that the That the public who witnessed this performance at the theater in
Batangas did not understand the play as meaning what the Government claims it means further
disproves the theory of the government that the play is, in fact, seditious.
The appellants were not guilty of sedition. The Court held that the right to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances was exercised on the most righteous occasion and in the
most peaceable manner.
The utmost discretion in determining which conducts are disorderly thereby falling
within the crime of sedition must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.
Judgment reversed; defendant and appellant acquitted.Act. 277 repealed Act 256. The former is a
comprehensive law on libel. Furthermore, the crime of lese majeste disappeared in the
Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no
place under the American flag.
The letter referred to the Government as a government of crooks and dishonest
persons and tends to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to
remain loyal to the government.
Criticism per se is not sedition. It is a privilege of any citizen to criticize his
government. But such criticism must be specific, constructive, reasoned, and tempered. Any
contemptuous condemnation is a wholesome attack and an invitation to disloyalty to the
government.
Since the letter is filled with hate and to arouse from the readers a sense of
dissatisfaction with the government, there is seditious tendency.
PEOPLE v. NABONG
PEOPLE v. EVANGELISTA
SHENCK v. US
ABRAMS v. US
WHITNEY v. CALIFORNIA
It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in
a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual
disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order.
Gitlow vs. New York: "Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the
public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate
revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of
a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen."
The acts contemplated in the provisions of law relating to sedition are not protected
by the constitutional provision, being abuses rather than the exercise of the right of speech and
of the use of the press. It is a fundamental principle, that the freedom of speech and of the press
which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish,
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse
this freedom.
Accused is found guilty.
No resulting breach of peace or disturbance is necessary for violation. Inciting
uprising or producing feelings incompatible with the permanency of government is sufficient.
It was not protected speech. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Conviction was constitutional, was not protected by First Amendment.
Established the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST: whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
BAD TENDENCY TEST: permits restriction of freedom of speech by government if it is
believed that a form of speech has a sole tendency to incite or cause illegal activity. The bad
tendency test is more restrictive than the clear and present danger test.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST: whether the words used in such circumstance
will create a clear and present danger that will result to evils that the Congress has a right to
prevent (see Schenck v. US).
Even though the First Amendment extends to all states, freedom of speech and press
do not confer an absolute right to publish or speak without being held responsible for the results
of such speech. The state may regulate to protect its interests in general welfare of its citizens.
Gitlow was convicted. This case rejected Schenk v US (1919)s clear and present danger test and
instead opted for the less government-restrictive BAD (or dangerous) TENDENCY TEST:
The freedom of speech does not protect disturbances to the public peace, attempts to
subvert the government, inciting crime, or corruption of morals. The danger is none the less real
and substantial because the effect of a given utterance cannot be seen. Just as with the offense of
conspiracy, or other preparatory steps, the government need not wait until the spark has kindled
the flame. It can act toward any threat to public order, even those that do so only remotely.
Requirement of due process: A penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties and be
couched in terms that are not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.
The equal protection clause can be used only to declare a law unconstitutional if it is
without a reasonable basis and purely arbitrary.
The freedom of speech secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right
to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose; and that a State in the exercise of its
police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to public welfare,
tending to incite crime, disturb the peace, or endanger foundations of organized government and
threaten its overthrow by unlawful means.
DENNIS v. US
BRANDENBURG v. OHIO
PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO
REYES v. BAGATSING
COX v. LOUISIANA
SHORT FACTS
An action for mandamus instituted by petitioner
Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties, against respondent Valeriano Fugoso, as
Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a
permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on
Sunday Afternoon, November 16, 1947. Mayor refused to
issue a permit on the basis of the possibility of speeches being
delivered that will undermine public order.
The Anti-Bases Coalition including retired Justice
JBL Reyes sought a permit from the City of Manila to stage a
rally from Luneta Park until the sidewalk near the US
Embassy. The permit was not acted upon and it was after they
filed a suit for mandamus that they found out that their permit
was denied because a rally would violate Ordinance No. 7295
of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding or staging of
rallies within a radius of 500 ft from any foreign mission or
chancery.
Reverend Cox and other protesters held a
demonstration near the courthouse.
Cox ended the
demonstration with an encouragement that the students sit in
at lunch counters that still practice segregation. There was
muttering and grumbling among the white onlookers as a
reaction to Coxs statement. The Sheriff told them that what
they are doing now is a disturbance of the peace and that it
has to be broken up. Cox and the demonstrators did not then
and there break up the demonstration. Eventually, the police
threw tear gas at the crowd which quickly dispersed.
DOCTRINE
Mayor does not have power to refuse to grant permit, only to specify places where
meeting may be held. Petitioner may be allowed to assemble in Plaza Miranda for a meeting.
An applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject
only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder.
The CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST should be the standard for refusal or
modification of the permit.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the rally would start. Neither can
there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy.
There was no showing that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is
less than 500 ft.
The dispersal order had nothing to do with any time or place limitation, and thus, on
this ground alone, it is clear that the dispersal order did not remove the protection accorded
appellant by the original grant of permission.
It is unconstitutional for a statute to enable a public official to determine which
opinions will be permitted and which will not. What is permitted is limited discretion, under
properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of
the streets for public assemblies, provided that such limited discretion is exercised with
uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or
inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination.
IBP v. ATIENZA
BAYAN v. ERMITA
Mayor Atienza should have stated his reasons and given the applicants an opportunity
to be heard on the matter.
Perceived IMMINENT AND GRAVE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVIL is the only
justification that will warrant limitation of the said right.
BP880 is only a regulation as to time, place and manner of the assemblies. The permit
can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.
It is true that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties.
Government personnel's situation is different however.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., it is held that employees
in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of
work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.
Gesite v. Court of Appeals - The right of government employees to organize is limited to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that
public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may
be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
PENERA v. COMELEC
MUTUC v. COMELEC
ADIONG v. COMELEC
SHORT FACTS
The COMELEC disqualified Rosalinda A. Penera as a
candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections, in violation of
Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election
Code). She alleged that under Sec. 15 of RA 8436 (as amended
by RA 9369), one is considered a "candidate" only at the start
of the campaign period, and therefore her political/partisan
acts before campaign period were not considered electoral
offenses.
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to
the Constitutional Convention. COMELEC prohibited him from
using campaign jingles to be played from mobile units. Their
justification was the application of ejusdem generis on a
provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, disallowing
the use of "the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets."
It was held that the COMELEC prohibition banning
the use of jingles is violative of freedom of speech.
Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate 1992
elections assails COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 which
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places
like cars and other moving vehicles
Petition was granted.
DOCTRINE
She was not guilty.
A person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of such campaign period. The law does not state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but become
unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Such a law would curtail the freedom of
expression and speech of the candidates.
OSMENA v. COMELEC
There is no ban, but rather, a regulation. While 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of
print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to allocate to the
candidates space and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a
regulation of the time and manner of advertising. The aim of the statute is to equalize the
opportunity of candidates to advertise themselves. The Court held this to be a content-neutral
regulation. The Court formally adopts the content-based and content-neutral tests for free
speech cases.
"[Mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
SYMBOLIC SPEECH
CASE
US v. OBRIEN
TEXAS v. JOHNSON
SHORT FACTS
David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned
their draft cards on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse
in front of a crowd. He was indicted for violating sec.
462(b)(3) of the Selective Service Act.
It was held that Sec 462(b)(3) is not
unconstitutional
After publicly burning an American flag as a means
of political protest during a political demonstration (the
purpose of which was to protest the policies of the Reagan
administration and of certain Dalls-based corporations),
Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of desecrating a
venerated object (the US flag) in violation of a Texas penal
law. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
conviction and acquitted Johnson, holding that the State could
not, consistent with the First Amendment, punish Johnson for
burning the flag in these circumstances.
TCCA Decision was affirmed. Johnson acquitted.
DOCTRINE
A government regulation is sufficiently justified
1. if it is within the constitutional power of the government.
2. if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest.
3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
4. if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
In deciding whether a particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring
the First Amendment into play, we should answer the following questions:
1. whether intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
2. whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it.
If the conduct is expressive/communicative, the next question to ask is whether there
is a governmental interest at stake, so that we could determine whether a restriction of that
expression is valid. If the governmental interest is related to the suppression of expression, then
the restriction must be subject to the "most exacting scrutiny". The bedrock principle of the First
Amendment is that "the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable
SORIANO v. LAGUARDIA
SORIANO v. LAGUARDIA
Motion for Reconsideration
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN
SHORT FACTS
A newspaper was declared a nuisance pursuant to a
statute declaring that one who engages "in the business of
regularly and customarily producing, publishing," etc., "a
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
or other periodical," is guilty of a nuisance.
US sought to enjoin NYT and Washington Post from
publishing contents of a classified study on Viet Nam policy.
Lower courts for all the cases filed decided against the
Government.
The host of Ang Dating Daan made allegedly
obscene remarks against Iglesia Ni Cristo on a 10pm show.
INC members filed a complaint against Soriano.
Soriano
suspended by MTRCB for 3 months.
II.
III.
2. Focus on Content
Test: Clear and Present Danger
1. Words when used under such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
state has a right to prevent
2. Focus on Content and Context
Test: Balancing of Interest
1. The courts should balance the public interest served by legislation and the
freedom of speech or any other constitutional right
2. The courts will then decide where the greater weight should be placed
3. Focus on weighing Government and Private Interest
DOCTRINE
Unconstitutional as a prior restraint
The chief purpose of the freedom of the press is to prevent previous restraints upon
publication and not to prevent subsequent punishment. The guaranty against previous restraint
extends to publications charging official derelictions that amount to crimes
Government action to enjoin publishing of a classified study is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. The Court would not be favorably disposed to stifling the
press on the order of the government.
Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average
child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Analysis in this case
should be CONTEXT BASED and the utterances were found to be obscene after considering the
use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show,
which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers, who would easily
understand the uttered words literally rather than contextually.
The suspension does not constitute prior restraint because it partakes of the nature of
subsequent punishment for a past violation committed by Soriano. The vulgar language of
Soriano on prime-time television can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is
wholly inappropriate for children. the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the
State is duty bound to prevent. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse.
Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His actions were namecalling and use of foul language.
MTRCB did not approve or ban the showing of the program nor did it cancel
respondents permit. It merely penalized their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for its
review and approval; hence, the constitutional issue need not be resolved.
There has been no declaration by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a Preferred Status (unlike freedom of religion). If the SC did not
exempt religious programs (Iglesia ni Cristo) from the jurisdiction and review power of MTRCB,
with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story (public affairs
program). The only exceptions are tv programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels.
CASE
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO
ROSALES v. COMELEC
GUINGONA v. COMELEC
SHORT FACTS
Valmonte sought to obtain from GSIS the list of
Congress members who got unsecured loans from GSIS
arguing right to information on matters of public concern.
GSISs defense is confidentiality of their relationship to
customers.
It was held that they have a right to access the
information but they cannot compel GSIS to prepare the list
themselves. They have to research it themselves.
DOCTRINE
The right to information is not absolute and is limited to:
1. matters of public concern.
2. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
GSIS funds, coming from government employees, have a public character and thus a
matter of public concern. The confidentiality defense is not a limitation provided by law but only
a policy consideration. The law also does not distinguish even if granting loans is a proprietary
function of the GSIS because it discharges the same function of service to the people and thus
covered by the right to information. Thus, GOCCs are also covered.
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the
threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. In determining whether or not a
particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
It is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. From the nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
In determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a
specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether
it is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege,
and it has established that the information is indeed covered by it, then the party demanding it, if
it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the
satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social,
political, and economic decision-making.
The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
The right of information, in this case, outweighs the state interest to preserve
confidentiality of certain matters. No national security or like concerns are involved here and the
statutory basis of COMELEC in favor of confidentiality does not refer to the list requested. Also,
the court frowns upon interpretation of law that would hinder free and intelligent casting of
votes.
The right to information (7, III) is self-executory. It is a right of the citizens (public
right) and a duty of the government. It may be enforced through mandamus.
In order that a petition for mandamus may be given due course, it must be instituted
by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. If a petition is anchored on the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in
interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to
show any special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such,
are interested in the faithful execution of the laws. The peoples constitutional right to
information is intertwined with the governments constitutional duty of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest. For every right of the people, there is a corresponding
duty on the part of those who govern to protect and respect that right. It is not enough, however,
that the information petitioners seek in a writ of mandamus is a matter of public concern. For
mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
LIBEL/TORT
CASE
HUSTLER v. FALWELL
VASQUEZ v. CA
SHORT FACTS
Sullivan was one of three Commissioners of
Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was defamed in a
full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The
advertisement was entitled, Heed Their Rising Voices and it
charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had
been directed against those who participated in the civil rights
movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the
advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not
mention the Sullivan by name.
A lead story in issue of Hustler Magazine featured a
"parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad
campaign, claiming that Rev. Falwell had a drunken
incestuous relationship with his mother. Falwell sued to
recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on
the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of
$150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.
NEWSWEEK v. IAC
DOCTRINE
The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official
conduct, malice must be proved. Without the showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a
defamation action in this case would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech and
expression that are guaranteed in the First Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
The public figure plaintiff in this case "may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without
showing that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with actual
malice. BASES: A) the Court stresses the jury's finding that "the ad parody could not 'reasonably
be understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which he
participated.' B) the Court focuses on the "prominent role" that satirical cartoons have played in
public and political debate. '"
Cause of action for torts: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. Four elements of
intentional infliction of emotional distress: 1) intentional or reckless conduct by a defendant; 2)
which is extreme and outrageous; 3) causing severe emotional distress; and, 4) of which
defendant's conduct was the proximate cause
The barangay captain is a public officer. As long as the criticisms are related to the
duties and responsibilities of the public officer, malice cannot be presumed. The offended party
has to prove ACTUAL MALICE (knowledge that it is false or reckless disregard of whether it is
false or not)
Libel can only be committed against individual reputation. In cases where libel is
claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be
said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group members
reputation.
It is essential that the victim is identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be
named. Defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the
imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers could have
identified the personality of the individual defamed.
It is also ruled that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group/class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him.
There was no cause of action by the whole Muslim community. Defamation, which
includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements the statements published by petitioners in the instant
FERMIN v. PEOPLE
case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the
subject of the alleged libelous publication.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an
identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a
particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all
impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press,
under the Bill of Rights.
Individuals must be identifiable to allege that his person has been injured.
It was held that the Newspapers not liable, malice was not proven.
Presumption of malice does not apply to fair commentaries on public interest. Fair
commentaries on public interest, even if wrong, give rise to damages only if there is evidence of
malice.
Art. 360 of the RPC makes a publisher liable for libel to the same extent as if he were
the author. It doesnt require that he knowingly participated or consented to the preparation of
the libelous article.
How to determine whether the statement is defamatory: the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used
and understood in another sense
Press is given wide latitude to publish criticism against public officials in their official
duties, but criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionality.
Imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment is preferred in libel cases, depending on
the attendant circumstances of each case.
It was held that Freedom of speech and press not absolute, and all the elements of libel
are present. They are also not covered under the exceptions in the libel law.
Not all speech is protected. Libel is an example of an unprotected speech. The article
was not a private communication. A private communication is a communication made bona fide
upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained incriminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous
and actionable.
COMPELLED SPEECH
CASE
SHORT FACTS
Red Lion Broadcasting Co challenged the FCCs
Fairness Doctrine, which required the holders of broadcast
licenses to both present controversial issues of public
importance and to do so in a manner that was, in the
Commission's view, honest, equitable and balanced, citing the
First Amendment.
Appellant Miami Herald printed editorials critical of
appellee's (Exec Director of Classroom Teachers Assoc)
candidacy for Florida HoR. Appellee demanded that appellant
print his replies, premised on a Florida Statute which provides
that if a candidate for nomination or election is assailed
regarding his personal character by any newspaper, the
candidate has a right to demand that the newspaper print,
free of cost, any reply the candidate may make to the charges
of the newspaper, which statute appellant seeks to declare
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE
Fairness Doctrine
1. It required broadcasters to devote some of their airtime to discussing controversial
matters of public interest.
2. It also required them to air contrasting views regarding those matters.
The Court held that the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed the
freedoms of speech protected under the First Amendment, balancing public concerns, and so it is
constitutional
The Florida Statute is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because of its intrusion into the function
of editors. In the case of Associated Press, it has been held that any such compulsion to publish
that which "reason' tells them should not be published" is unconstitutional. The SC held that the
Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding
appellant to publish specified matter.
The choice of material to go into a new paper, and the decisions made as to limitations
on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public official constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
2.
3.
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
DAVID v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
PEOPLE v. SITON
4.
5.
Facial Invalidation an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operations to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected SPEECH or
ACTIVITIES.
SHORT FACTS
DOCTRINE
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and t one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon unprotected speech.
When is a statute vague?
It is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
When a statute is vague, it is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 aspects:
1. It violates due process.
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
TEST for determining whether a criminal statue is VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY: Whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice
VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE: A statue which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential element of due process of law.
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE:A governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
It was held that PP017 is constitutional. Facial challenge is not applicable, it passed the
constitutional basis test and as applied challenge.
The OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a
facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. Facial challenge vs. as applied challenge:
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. It is
applicable to criminal statutes, not only in free speech cases.
SHORT FACTS
PITA v. CA
MILLER v. CALIFORNIA
DOCTRINE
The State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, has the right to suppress smut provided it is
smut. But the burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must
not only be:
1. clear but also,
2. present,
to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow the speech. The
Court provided a process to be followed by the city government:
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant
prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code;
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
properties seized are indeed "obscene"
Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Obscenity is to be determined by
applying "contemporary community standards. This case overturned the Memoirs Test which
required for its third step proof that the material is "utterly without redeeming social value."
This standard by the Memoirs Test was hard to hurdle.
MILLER TEST:
1. whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
2. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
3. whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value
Prohibition is constitutional. The States have a legitimate interest in regulating
commerce in obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene material in places of
public accommodation, including so-called "adult" theaters from which minors are excluded.
Nothing precludes the State of Georgia from the regulation of the allegedly obscene material
exhibited in Paris Adult Theatre I or II, provided that the applicable Georgia law, as written or
authoritatively interpreted by the Georgia courts, meets the First Amendment standards set
forth in Miller v California.
The law is overbroad and unconstitutional.
The prospect of crime by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.
The law prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production.
Although the power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly
broad, and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in
both urban and rural communities, zoning power is not infinite and unchallengeable; it "must be
exercised within constitutional limits; it is also subject to judicial review. When a zoning law
infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently
substantial government interest. The regulation must be rationally related to legitimate state
concerns.
"Time, place, and manner" Restriction Test: whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time; To be
reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions not only must serve significant state interests,
but also must leave open adequate alternative channels of communication
The ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of the speech. Speech
treating women in the approved way, in sexual encounters premised on equality, is lawful no
matter how explicit, and speech treating women in the disapproved way, as submissive in sexual
matters or enjoying humiliation, is unlawful no matter how significant the literary, artistic or
political qualities of the work taken as a whole. Under the First Amendment, the government
must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas. This ordinance is thought patrol. It establishes
an approved view of women, of how they must react to sexual encounters and how the sexes
may relate to each other. This speech is protected no matter how insidious.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Rules on Assembly in Public Places:
1. Applicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place, and the time
when the assembly will take place
2. The application should be filed ahead of time to enable public official concerned to
appraise whether there are valid objections to the grant of permit or to its grant, but in
another public place. The grant or refusal should be based on the application of the Clear
and Present Danger Test.
CASE
NAACP v. ALABAMA
SHELTON v. TUCKER
SHORT FACTS
Alabama brought this suit to enjoin the NAACP
from conducting further activities within, and to oust it from,
the State, for failure to comply with the qualification statute.
The State moved for the production of a large number of
NAACPs records and papers, alleging that there were
necessary for adequate preparation for the hearing. NAACP
eventually partially complied, but refused to release its
membership lists.
Arkansas statute required every teacher, as a
condition to employment in a state-supported school or
college, to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation
every organization to which he has belonged or regularly
contributed within the preceding five years. Mr. Shelton, an
Arkansas teacher for twenty-five years, who was a member of
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
refused to file an affidavit. As a consequence, his contract with
the school was not renewed.
In a "closed shop" agreement between the ElizalDe
Rope Factory and its labor organization, membership in the
said organization was a precondition for employment for all
permanent employees. Victoriano is a member of a religious
3.
4.
If public authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter
The decision of the public authority, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
the applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so desire, have recourse
to the proper judicial authority
Rule on Assembly in Private Properties: Only the consent of the owner of the property or person
entitled to possession thereof is required
DOCTRINE
It was held that a production order for disclosure of membership lists, absent a
compelling state interest, is unconstitutional.
Effective advocacy is undeniably enhanced by group association, as the Court has
recognized the close nexus between freedoms of speech and assembly. State action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. The fact
that Alabama has taken no direct action to restrict the right of petitioners members to associate
freely, does not end inquiry into the effect of the production order. The abridgment of rights,
even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of government action.
The state has the right to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it
hires to teach in its schools. However, to compel a teacher to disclose all their associational ties is
to impair that teachers right of association. The statute does not require the information be kept
confidential nor is the statute limited in any way. Unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the
statute
RA 3350 is constitutional.
The constitutional right to associate and join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any such union.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the
Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace.
IN RE VICENTE SOTTO
IN RE MACASAET
PEREZ v. ESTRADA
BORJAL v. CA
SHORT FACTS
Minnesota had imposed a sales tax on most of the
goods; during this period, Star Tribune enjoyed an exemption
provided for periodic publications. Minnesota Legislature
amended the scheme to impose a use tax on the cost of paper
and ink products. Star Tribune was among those that paid the
tax.
Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement in
connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel
Parazo, which was published in the Manila Times and other
daily newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty.
Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with
contempt of court.
Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt and show cause why
he should not be disbarred.
Macasaet published several articles in Malaya containing
statements and innuendos about an alleged bribery incident
in the SC involving a staff (Cecilia) of a lady Justice (YnaresSantiago) and a box full of cash (~ P10M) allegedly in
connection with a case wherein a Filipino-Chinese
businessman was acquitted from charges of corruption.
Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court for
failing to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism (failure
to confirm the accuracy of his story).
KBP requested live media coverage of the criminal
cases against former President Estrada citing right to
information and freedom of the press. Defense is that live
media coverage causes nervousness to the accused and
witnesses and pressures judges to decide based on popular
sentiment infringing the right of the accused.
Stevenson, moved to have the proceeding closed to
the public. Neither the prosecutor nor anyone else present,
including two reporters, objected to the motion. The judge,
acting pursuant to a state statute, authorizing the court in its
discretion to exclude from the trial any persons whose
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, ordered the
courtroom be kept clear of all parties, except the witnesses
when they testified.
Richmond Newspapers, moves to have a judicial
order for closure of a criminal trial to the press and the public
overturned as a violation of the First Amendment
Borjal, several times on his column, alleged
anomalous activities to a certain organizer of a conference,
describing the latter as a self-proclaimed hero, a conference
organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash
tucked inside his closet, thick face, a person with dubious
ways, and so on. Wenceslao, the head of the organizers of a
transportation conference, reacted, saying [that he was
almost certain] that he was the organizer alluded to. He filed
a civil action based on libel.
DOCTRINE
Use tax imposed on ink and paper consumed by publications is unconstitutional. A tax
that burdens rights protected by the First Amendment cannot stand unless the burden is
necessary to achieve an overriding governmental interest (US v. Lee). Differential treatment,
unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the
regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, which is presumptively
unconstitutional.
Mere criticism or comment about the decisions of the court may be tolerated as it may
contribute to the correction of an error, but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous; it
should in no way influence the court in modifying its decision. Constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of
liberty of the press should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. Both the press and the
Court should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution, from which the former
receives its prerogative, and the latter its jurisdiction.
FALSITY AND NEGLIGENCE TEST (In Re Jurado). By disproportionately informing the
public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about
corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the
publics faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government.
Macasaet published highly speculative articles based on specious information, without any
regard for the injury it will cause to the reputation of the judiciary and the effective
administration of justice. The terms he used such as thieves and basket of rotten apples
directly undermine the integrity of the justices. He resorted to speculations and as admitted by
him, did a fishing expedition in the hope of actually creating a story.
Live coverage is not allowed as jurisprudence shows that the right of the accused must
be preferred with the possibility of losing not only liberty but also the very life of an accused. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. Within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process. Unlike other government offices, courts do not
express the popular will of the people.
The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees both the public and the press a
right to attend criminal trials. However, this right is not absolute and may be outweighed where
the judge finds an overriding interest that cannot be accommodated by less restrictive means.
The right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the First
Amendment of the Constitution. This right is not absolute and the trial judge can order the trial
closed to the public and press by finding an overriding interest that cannot be overcome by less
restrictive means. In this case the judge failed to show an overriding interest for excluding the
public and press, thus, the decision to close the courtroom was reversed.
The supposed victim was not identifiable since Wenceslao was not named as
organizer in the print-outs of the conference. In addition, the articles constitute fair
commentaries on matters of public interest. Wenceslao also failed to prove actual malice.
Fair commentary on a matter of public interest is also qualifiedly privileged, in
addition to those enumerated in the RPC. It constitutes a valid defense against libel. Also, in cases
involving public figures, the actual malice rule applies.
IN RE EMIL JURADO
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING
NETWORK INC. & CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. DY
GUINGGUING v. CA
It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other person are not
shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Those
who invoke freedom of speech publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials must exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements they publish
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to
all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on
speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the
danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to
balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and
(c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has
a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ""extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
The action of respondents was a content-based restraint. Prior to 2002, petitioners
easily obtained the various local government requirements. However, in 2002, the local
government started to impose new requirements to the petitioners.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms
of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Jurisprudence distinguishes
between a content-neutral regulation - merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards; and a contentbased restraint or censorship - the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. Content-based laws are treated as more suspect.
Actual malice was not proven. Torralba is a public figure because he is a journalist.
Definition of a public figure: A person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or
by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a public personage. If the statements made against the
public official are true, then there is no libel. Criminal charges were of public record.
The Court held that Vidals telecast report is privileged and was not actionable under
libel law. What GMA aired is basically a NARRATION of the contents of the mandamus petition.
Note that not all imputations of a discreditable act or omission are considered malicious thus
supplying the ground for ACTIONABLE libel. Although malice is presumed in a defamatory
imputation, such presumption will not attach on matters considered PRIVILEGED.
There are two kinds of privileged matters:
1. Absolutely privileged not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact
2. Qualifiedly privileged not actionable if there is no malice in fact
The GMA news telecast falls under Qualifiedly Privileged Communication and the use of
the 1982 PGH demonstration is not malicious. Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even
if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation.
CASE
ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR
SHERBERT v. VERNER
WISCONSIN v. YODER
SHORT FACTS
The case was brought by a New Jersey taxpayer
against a tax funded school district that provided
reimbursement to parents of both public and private schooled
children taking the public transportation system to school.
The appellant challenged the reimbursement made to parents
of private parochial school students and contended that it
violated the constitutional prohibition against state support of
religion, and the taking of taxpayers' money to do so violated
the constitution's Due Process Clause.
The University of Virginia collects an activities
fee. Registered student organizations may use the funds for
their expenses; but UVA student organizations that involve
religious activities" are excluded. The policy defined
religious activity as one that primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality. Wide Awake Productions published a magazine and
asked for reimbursement, but the fund administrator denied
their request, as this was interpreted to be funding an
ineligible religious activity.
Appellant, a Seventh Day Adventist, was discharged
by her employer because she would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security
Commission disqualified her from the benefits under the
Unemployment Compensation act because of her restriction
upon her availability for Saturday work.
Petitioners who were members of the Amish
religion, were subjected to the Wisconsin statute, which
required compulsory school attendance to private/public
schools of children until 16 years of age. The said respondents
declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15 to public
school after they completed 8th grade.
Bob Jones denied admission to applicants engaged
in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial
marriage or dating. The University also imposed a disciplinary
rule that prohibited interracial dating. Bob Jones assails the
constitutionality of IRS regulations that limited tax-exempt
status to private schools without racially discriminatory
DOCTRINE
Statute and the resolution passed pursuant to it was not in conflict with the nonestablishment clause
The establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the benefits of state
laws to all citizens without regard for their religious affiliation and does not prohibit tax raised
funds to form part of a general program under which students from both public and private
parochial schools may benefit
The denial was a violation of freedom of speech as it amounted to viewpoint
discrimination. Funding them would not have been a violation of the non-establishment clause.
The government may not "regulate speech when the specific motivating ideology or
the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction". The government
acts neutrally when it follows neutral criteria and policies in extending benefits to recipients
representing a wide range of political and religious ideologies. The Establishment Clause does
not require government to refuse free speech rights to religious organizations participating in
neutral-design government programs.
The disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of religion .
Although the consequences of such a disqualification are only an indirect result of the welfare
legislation, the effect of the law still places an impediment on the observance of religion. It is
apparent that appellants ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion.
Moreover, it is also apparent that the legislation pressures her to forego that practice. The
legislation forces her to choose, and is therefore invalid.
Amish children could not be placed under compulsory education past 8th grade, as it
violated their parents' fundamental right to freedom of religion.
States interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing Process
when it impinges on their fundamental rights such as in this case the free exercise of religion and
the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
Religion clauses of the First Amendment do not prohibit the Internal Revenue Service
from revoking the tax exempt status of a religious university whose practices are contrary to a
compelling government public policy, such as eradicating racial discrimination.
The Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis and found that the "Government has a
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . [which]
substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [the University's]
ZORACH v. CLAUSON
LEE v. WEISMAN
STONE v. GRAHAM
EPPERSON v. ARKANSAS
EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD
LYNCH v. DONNELLY
TARUC v. DE LA CRUZ
The first privilege sought is well taken since there is statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of
P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322. Regarding the month of Ramadan.
But there is no statutory basis for the declaration of every Friday, the Muslim Prayer
Day, as one of the recognized holidays.
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year. The
Muslim employees invoked P.D. No. 291 as amended by P.D.
No. 322, which was issued to reinforce national unity by
recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of our
national holidays.
The Court granted the first but denied the second.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. CA
The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer
Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the
Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
without any break during the month of Ramadan finds statutory support; there is no such basis
to excuse them from work from 10 a.m. to 2: p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during
the entire calendar year.
The Iglesia ni Cristo program is constitutionally protected as a form of religious
exercise and expression. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil.
The CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST was applied in this case: whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The
clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene
speech, commercial speech and defamation. There is reason to apply the clear and present
danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could
readily provoke hostile audience reaction.
Benevolent neutrality (Accommodation) * associated with Williams, founder of the
Rhode Island colony; the wall is meant to protect the church from the state, i.e., the garden of the
church must be walled in for its own protection from the wilderness of the world with its
potential for corrupting those values so necessary to religious commitment.
As a standard, the benevolent neutrality or accommodation can result to three
situations: 1) Accommodation is required state has no other option but to accommodate the
religious belief; 2) Accommodation is permissible state may or may not accommodate the
religious belief; 3) Accommodation is prohibited state cannot accommodate the religious belief
Questions that should be answered when using the benevolent neutrality standards
(three step process, also referred to as the two-step balancing process)
1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?
2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious
liberty?
3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state?
The OSG has failed to satisfy the quantum of proof needed, following the guidelines
laid down by the Supreme Court in the 2003 case.
In arguing that Escritor should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she
had was illegal per se by universally recognized standards, the OSG failed to appreciate that the
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests
Even assuming that the OSG proved compelling state interest, it was still not able to demonstrate
that the State has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed
any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. The administrative complaint
is dismissed.
CASE
AGABON v. NLRC
SHORT FACTS
The Agabons were hired as gypsum board and
cornice installers in a construction company. They were
dismissed on the ground of abandonment of work. The
Agabons then filed for illegal dismissal against the said
company.
The court upheld the dismissal for it was found
that there was justifiable cause, for the petitioners abandoned
their work and sought employment from a competitor
company. However, the due process requirement of notice
was not complied with.
e.
III.
IV.
DOCTRINE
Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule: where the employer had a valid reason to
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be
upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee.
The requirement is payment of full back wages from the time of dismissal until the
time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. This means that the
termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law.
Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right
and just. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures
him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process
found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly
terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.
The due process requirements for civil cases:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit
evidence in support thereof
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate
7. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered
GOLDBERG v. KELLY
A pre-termination evidentiary hearing before the stopping of financial aid satisfies the
constitutional guarantee of due process. This is a unique situation because the personal
interest involved is the sustenance of the everyday needs of the people as opposed to the state
interest of cutting down the budget and conserving energy. Hence, personal interest overrides
state interest here.
All that due process requires is to be heard. Hence, the pre-termination interview need
not be a formal judicial proceeding. Together with the right to be heard, the appellees should also
be given an opportunity to confront and to cross-examine the witness of the state.
The decision maker should be impartial. He should be able to state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he has relied on.
It was held that hearing before non-renewal not required if it cannot be shown that a
liberty or property interest has been deprived. In this case, no liberty or property interest was
shown to be deprived. Roth was not barred from being hired by another school, and there was no
promise to rehire him.
Due process applies only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the range of interests protected is not infinite. To determine
whether due process requirements apply, the Court must look at the nature of the interest at
stake, not to the weight of the interest. Liberty does not involve merely freedom from bodily
restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, etc. To have a property interest, a
person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.
CASE
SHORT FACTS
Ling Su Fan was accused of exporting from the
Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins" contrary to the
provisions of Act No. 1411 of the Philippine Commission. He
pleaded not guilty and claimed he was denied due process
because 1. the Philippine Commission had no authority to
pass said law, and 2. he was being denied his property
(Php20,600 worth of silver coins was forfeited in favor of the
government) without procedural due process.
C.
D.
interest so great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional rights (the courts
make the decision of WON the purpose of the law makes the classification necessary
Intensified Means Test - In this situation the Court accepts the articulated purpose of the
legislation but it should closely scrutinize the relationship between the classification and the
purpose based on a spectrum of standards, by gauging the extent to which constitutionally
guaranteed rights depend upon the affected individual interest. The balancing test or the
equality test is used.
Immediate Scrutiny Test - A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on
gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig.
While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United
States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well (White Light Corp v. City
of Manila)
DOCTRINE
Definition of Due Process
Story of the Constitution: Due process of law"" is not that the law shall be according to the
wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply
First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government;
Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and
Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.
It was held that Phil Commission acted on the authority given to it by the US Congress. Ling Su
Fan was detained according to procedure. Due process was upheld."
LOCHNER v. US
US v. TORIBIO
PEOPLE v. POMAR
There is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power of the state, otherwise the
14th amendment would have no efficacy.
Lochner test: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of
the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the
individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may
seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public
health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation,
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be
held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
There is no connection between the number of hours the baker may work and the
healthful quality of the bread made by the workman."
It is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
retrain such particular use of the property. Rights of property are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious. This is different from
the right of eminent domain or use of private property for the public. It is a mere restriction or
limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public
welfare. It is for the general welfare that the legislature enacted special provisions on the
registration of large cattle as well as restriction of their slaughter for food. This is a case of police
power, not of eminent domain.
To justify police power, it must:
1. Appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference
2.
That the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals
It was held that rights can be taken away but only in accordance with the due process
of the laws. The difference in treatment to the Manguianes is valid as they are classified
according to their level of civility.
"Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the
citizens of the state or to all of a class." Classification is not violative of the equal protection
clause as long as it has a reasonable basis and not arbitrary. The statute which classifies must
apply to all members of the said class.
The Legislature can deny the registry of the vessel to corporations having alien
stockholders.
While a corporation having alien stockholders is entitled to the protection afforded by
the due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause, legislation taking away privileges
from the same is valid as long as it does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation
which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within
the purview of the police power.
The right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual,
protected by the "due process of law" clause. The law has deprived, every person, firm, or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of his right to enter into
contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. It creates a
term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore,
deprived of their liberty to contract.
VILLAVICENCIO v. LUKBAN
MEYER v. NEBRASKA
CALALANG v. WILLIAMS
ACCFA v. CUGCO
The 170 women were isolated from society and transported without consent and
opportunity to consult friends and relatives before being employed as laborers in Davao. The
mere fact of the presence of police and constabulary + use of night as cloak in this transportation
points to the fact of coercion or deprivation of liberty. No law supports these actuations of the
executive, and even the President does not have the prerogative to relocate people against their
will, Besides, Penal Code punishes this very act. Law defines power and the remedies for official
repression are civil action, criminal action or Habeas Corpus.
The law is a violation of the 14th Amendment. The 14th amendment also includes of
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. The
State has not shown that there is a clear harm when a child learns a language other than English.
Appellees have business and property for which they claim protection. These are
threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are
exercising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed appellees right against the deprivation of their property without due process of law.
The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and
duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
Right to engage in a useful business or profession is considered a property right which
is covered by the protection given by the due process clause
The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the
right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children
This law may not be the least restrictive means to achieve the states purpose, but the
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. The Court
will no longer use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions because they may be unwise, improvident
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. For protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.
There is a difference between delegating power to make the law (cannot be done), and
conferring an authority or discretion as to executing the law (can be done). The prohibition here
does not confer legislative power. The authority therein conferred is not to determine what
public policy demands, but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down. To promulgate
rules and regulations is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official. But this
is not the making of the law.
With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land
Reform Code it is considered an office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions. The Unions are not entitled to the certification election because the personnel are
subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries.
They cannot bargain in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
CASE
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION INC. v.
MAYOR OF MANILA
ANONYMOUS v. RADAM
SHORT FACTS
Petitioners assail Ordinance No. 4760 as violative
of the due process clause. It required customers to give their
personal information such as name, contact number,
residence, et al. It also made it unlawful to lease or rent more
than twice every 24 hours; and cancelled licenses of motels
for subsequent violation.
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC),
owner of Victoria Court, filed suit to declare invalid and
unconstitutional a Manila ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and
which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants,
and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law the Ordinance
which prohibits short-time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses, and similar establishments in
the City of Manila. Petitioners (White Light Corp, Titanium
Corp, Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corp) filed for a
motion to intervene, on the ground that the ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of the drive-in
hotels and motels in Manila.
Ordinance is unconstitutional
These 3 petitions challenge the constitutionality of
Sec.36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
certain offenses, among other personalities.
It was held that Mandatory drug testing for (a)
candidates for public office - unconstitutional; (b) students constitutional; (c) public and private employees constitutional; and (d) persons accused of crimes unconstitutional.
A utility worker in the Office of Clerk of Court was
charged with immoral conduct for having begotten a child
without a father. However, the father was himself unmarried.
It was held that she is not administratively liable.
DOCTRINE
The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals, such as fornication, adultery, and prostitution.
For an ordinance to be valid it must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy;
6. must not be unreasonable.
The interests of the public that requires interference with private rights of individuals
must have reasonably necessary means, and must not unduly oppress private rights. There is no
other alternative for accomplishment of purpose that is less intrusive of private rights. There
must be a reasonable relation between purposes of the measure and the means for its
accomplishment because personal rights and private property rights must not be arbitrarily
invaded. The exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty, or property
is affected. The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited; can be
diminished by existing laws
Reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of
the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.
To determine whether a governmental intrusion is reasonable, two factors must be
considered: (1) the nature of the privacy interest, and (2) the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. *Note also that the case says that a student's right to privacy is
minimized, or even considered as waived, by his/her entry to a school since this is voluntary
submission of their person to the school's parental authority.
If the father of the child is himself unmarried: the woman is not ordinarily
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. If the father of the child is himself
married to another woman: there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father
or the mother.
For a particular conduct to constitute ""disgraceful and immoral"" behavior under civil
service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It
cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor
should it be grounded on ""cultural"" values not convincingly demonstrated to have been
recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. "
GUEVARRA v. EALA
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT
EISENSTADT v. BAIRD
LOVING v. VIRGINIA
BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT
ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL
Eala was a lawyer. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Vitug
v. Rongcal: We disagree that a brief and discreet extramarital affair is not so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to
merit disciplinary sanction.
"Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition
against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interest cannot be denied. It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection
clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it
has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause
erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. || The status of a person
in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will (legitimate or illegitimate, married or single, etc). The
comprehensive term "status" include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. A
persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status.
Though the (U.S.)Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the
various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to
privacy. The 3rd Amendment stops soldiers, meaning police power or the executive branch, from
quartering soldiers in one's home. The 9th Amendment means that the explicit and heretofore
decided implicit guarantees
The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons under
the Massachusetts law violates the Equal Protection Clause.
First, the deterrence of premarital sex cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose
of the law, because the ban has at best a marginal relating to the proffered objective.
Second, if health is the rationale of the law, it is both discriminatory and overbroad.
Third, the right to obtain contraceptives must be the same for married and unmarried
individuals.
Since miscegenation statute rests solely on distinction based on race, it must be shown
to be necessary to accomplish some permissible state objective. However, there can be no valid
legislative purpose in making the color of skin the test of whether a conduct is a criminal offense.
Also, marriage being a basic civil right, it cannot be infringed without due process.
Equal application is not enough to satisfy equal protection. The burden of justification
imposed upon statutes based on race is one which involves a "most rigid scrutiny."
The statutory requirement violates due process.
It is indubitable that appellants are indigents that could barely survive the expenses of
daily living. Given the basic position of marriage, and the state monopolization of the means for
legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely
because inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages.
The statute is unconstitutional because it significantly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right and is not supported by sufficiently important state interests and is not closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests.
TURNER v. SAFLEY
ROE v. WADE
LAWRENCE v. TEXAS
A right to privacy under the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution extends to a woman's decision to have an abortion, but that right must
be balanced against the state's two legitimate interests for regulating abortions: protecting
prenatal life and protecting the woman's health. Saying that these state interests become
stronger over the course of a pregnancy, the Court resolved this balancing test by tying state
regulation of abortion to the woman's current trimester of pregnancy.
The court adopted the Roe Trimester Framework.
Court upheld 4 of the provisions except for the spousal notification. Only spousal
notification imposes undue burden and it gives too much power to husbands and worsens
situation of spousal abuse.
Court overturned Roe v. Wades strict trimester rule. Viability, is the point at which
the state interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the right of the woman; abortion may be
banned entirely except where it is necessary for the preservation of the life of the mother.
Eisenstadt v. Baird: the right to privacy is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person asthe decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Undue burden rule: the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
It was held that the state law prohibits the act if done by same sex couples but allows
the same if done by non- same sex couples. Thus, the state law is invalid, for violating equal
protection. Acts done consensually and in private are protected by the individual's right to
privacy.
LOFTON v. SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES
WASHINGTON v, GLUCKSBERG
The statute is upheld. The legislature is the proper forum for this. Adoption is not a right but a
statutory privilege. Florida has a duty to determine what adoptive home or environment would
best serve all aspects of the childs growth.
There is no fundamental right to private sexual intimacy. Lawrence vs. Texas only
established that there should be greater respect for the right of consenting adults to engage in
private sexual conduct. Besides, Lawrence v. Texas does not apply to the case at bar
This procedural requirement does not violate the United States Constitution, as the
State has an interest in the preservation of human life and in protecting against potential abuses
(on the part of guardians or surrogates) in such situations. The State may legitimately protect the
personal element of the choice between life and death by imposing heightened evidentiary
requirements. The clear and convincing standard employed by Missouri is an appropriate
standard of proof to employ in advancing its interests. The interests at stake are more
substantial (individually and socially) than in other civil cases.
The right to life is deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition. Theres also no
liberty interest in determining the manner and time of ones death. Other rights are not as
important as the right to life, which the State aims to forward. It also protects mentally-ill and
disabled people from medical malpractice and coercion to end their lives.
The right to assisted suicide is not protected by the Due Process Clause. The
Washington law against assisted suicide is constitutional.
This has been overturned by legislation. In 2008, Washington State voters adopted an
assisted suicide law by a wide margin."
PEOPLE v. CAYAT
SHORT FACTS
Cayat was a native of Benguet, Mountain Province,
sentenced to pay a fine or subsidiary penalty for violation of
Act 1639, prohibiting possession of intoxicating liquor other
than the so-called native wines which members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of the act. He challenges the constitutionality of the
act as violative of the equal protection clause
It was held that Act 1639 is not unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE
The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on
reasonable classification. For the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act 1639 satisfies such
requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. It is based on the
degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief,
but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." It
is germane to the purpose of the law-- to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes.
The law applies for as long as the conditions exist and also apply equally to all members of the
class.
PEOPLE v. ROSENTHAL
DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC
QUINTO v. COMELEC
The spurious sale of stocks is precisely what the legislature seeks to prevent. The law
is within the power of classification which a state has. If a class is deemed to present a
conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to
de dealt with although otherwise and mere logically not distinguishable from others not
embraced in the law.
The law is constitutional.
The equal protection clause permits a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2.
The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class
A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: must
satisfy the following requirements:
1. it must rest on substantial distinctions;
2.
it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
In the case of RA 8282, the concern is concededly valid since it intends to prevent
sham marriages just for the purpose of enabling one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated death of the other spouse. However, the classification based on the date of the
marriage, i.e. whether before or after the retirement, bears no relation to the achievement of the
policy objective of the law
Yrasuegui's dismissal can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is
an actual qualification for performing the job.
The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). BFOQ is valid
""provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."
BFOQ Test: 1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated between appointive and elective officials.
Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second
requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. If the purpose of the automatic
resignation rule is the prevention of the use of government positions to promote candidacy, or
neglect of duties, there is no reason to exclude elected officials from the coverage of the law.
Fears are equally applicable to elected and appointive officials alikefails the test of equal
protection. It is also overbroad since it pertains to all, regardless of position, so even utility
workers are deemed to use position to influence.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
BRADWELL v. ILLINOIS
GOASAERT v. CLEARY
CRAIG v. BOREN
ROMER v. EVANS
WASHINGTON v. DAVIS
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the
Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace.
US Doctrine: Whatever are the privileges and immunities of a citizen in one State, such
citizen, emigrating, carries them with him into any other State of the Union. This is the import of
the fourteenth amendment. Before, each State could determine for itself what the privileges and
immunities of its citizens should be.
Cummings v. Missouri: While the legislature may prescribe qualifications for entering
upon this pursuit, they cannot, under the guise of fixing qualifications, exclude a class of citizens
from admission to the bar. A qualification, to which a whole class of citizens never can attain, is
not a regulation of admission to the bar, but is, as to such citizens, a prohibition.
The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have
determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems
against which it may devise preventive measures." The Constitution "does not preclude the
States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes", and the Court is in no position to "crossexamine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."
It was held that the statutory scheme denies the equal protection of the laws
The statistics cannot support the conclusion that gender-based distinction serves that
objective. They broadly establish that .18% of females and 2% of males were arrested for DUI.
While this is not trivial, it can hardly form the basis for employment of a gender line. Proving
broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, in tension with the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
State laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students
unconstitutional for being in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The decision overturned
the Plessy v. Ferguson on separate but equal doctrine. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal."" Education in public schools is a right, which must be made available to all
on equal terms"
The protection offered by antidiscrimination laws was not a "special right" because
they protected fundamental rights already enjoyed by all other citizens. Instead of applying
"strict scrutiny" to Amendment 2, the Court held that it did not even meet the much lower
requirement of having a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose:
It was held that the Exam did not discriminate against them.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it alone does not trigger the rule that
racial classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The police forces
efforts to recruit black police officers are evidence that the police department did not
intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. The exam is rationally related to the legitimate
government purpose of ensuring that police officers have acquired a particular level of verbal
skill. TEST: Rationally related.
GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
All racial classifications imposed by the government must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is not " strict in theory, but fatal in fact " Although all governmental uses
of race are subject to Strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. Statutes will be declared
constitutional if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. in this
case, the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. To be
narrowly fit, a university may consider race only as plus factor (as opposed to being a decisive
factor). this, the law school's admission process did
ALIENAGE
GENERAL RULE: The general rule is that a legislative act may not validly classify the citizens of the State on the basis of their origin, race or parentage.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In times of great and imminent danger, such as a threatened invasion or war, such a classification is permitted by the Constitution when the facts so warrant (e.g. discriminatory legislation against
Japanese citizens during WWII).
2. The political rights of aliens do not enjoy the same protection as that of citizens.
3. Statutes may validly limit to citizens exclusively the enjoyment of rights or privileges connected with the public domain, the public works, or the natural resources of the State.
4. The rights and interests of the state in these things are not simply political but also proprietary in nature; and so the citizens may lawfully be given preference over aliens in their use or enjoyment.
CASE
YICK WO v. HOPKINS
SHORT FACTS
A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell &
Co. (Ltd.) against Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of
the port of Cebu, to compel him to issue a certificate of
Philippine registry to the former for its motor vessel, Bato.
Natividad, the collector, refused to issue the certificate
because all the stockholders of the company were not citizens
of either the US or of the Philippines, pursuant to Act. No.
2761. It was held that the Legislature can deny the registry of
the vessel to corporations having alien stockholders.
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese
laundrymen in Manila, was questioning the validity of a
Manila City ordinance requiring receipts in duplicate in
English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and
number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and
cleaning establishments. Kwong Sing's claim was that the said
ordinance was a class legislation, and that it is invalid, being
arbitrary, unreasonable and not justified under the police
power of the Manila.
Yick Wo, a native and subject of China, was
convicted and imprisoned for operating a laundry in a wooden
building. but the statute seemed to apply only to the Chinese
and not the American laundry owners.
The Chinese Bookkeeping Law (making it unlawful
to keep account books in any language other than English,
Spanish, or any local dialect) was assailed. It was held that
even Chinese aliens are entitled to the efficacy of the Bill of
Rights.
DOCTRINE
The 14th Amendment, as well as its corresponding clause in the Philippine Bill of
Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. Notwithstanding this provision, the
Government may enact laws for the benefit and protection of its own citizens, and for the selfpreservation and integrity of its domain. Therefore, an anti-alien shipping act to encourage
Philippine ship-building is not violative of the Constitution.
It was held that the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact Ordinance
No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it is
valid.
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for certain purposes are permissible under
the police power. Even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even
if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
If a law which appears fair on its face has a discriminatory purpose or is administered unequally,
courts will apply the Fourteenth Amendment and strike down the law.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, etc.: Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens,
meaning that their life, liberty, or property cannot be taken without due process of law, and they
are entitled to the equal protection of the laws, without regard to their race. If an act invades no
fundamental rights, impairs no personal privilege, is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in
its operation, applies to all without distinction, does not privilege, discriminate, nor make
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
II.
III.
Search Warrants
A. The Applicant must show that the items sought are in fact:
1. Seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity
2. Will be found in the place to be searched
B. Note that the judge must personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them
C. Search warrants prescribes in 10 days
Warrant of Arrests
A. The Applicant must show:
1. Probable cause that an offense has been committed; and
2. The person to be arrested has committed it
B. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses; instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors
report and require submission of affidavits of witnesses
C. Warrant of Arrests prescribes until served
Searches and Seizures
A. GENERAL RULE: Search and seizures are unreasonable
B. EXCEPTION: Authorized by a validly issued search warrant
C. If there is a VALID WARRANT, search and seizure is valid when:
1. A probable cause exists and is determined personally by the judge
2. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause
3. Judge must examine under oath the complainant and the witnesses the
applicant may produce
4. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and person
or things to be seized
5. It must be in connection with one specific offense
D. If there is NO SEARCH WARRANT, search and seizure may be valid (see separate
section below)
IV.
Definition of Probable Cause refers to such facts and circumstances, which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested (warrant of arrest) or that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched (search warrant)
V.
2.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
VI.
VII.
D.
E.
VIII.
Custodial Investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation
A. It applies to testimonial compulsion; not applicable to the body of the accused
which is proposed to be examined
B. Take note of the Miranda Rights
C. When available:
1. After a person has been taken into custody
2. When a person is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
3. When a person is merely invited for questioning
4. The investigation is being conducted by the government with respect to a
criminal offense
5. Signing of arrest reports and booking sheets
CASE
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
PEOPLE v. MARTI
SHORT FACTS
42 search warrants were issued by respondent
prosecutors and judges to search persons and/or premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences and to seize and
take possession of personal property subject of the offense.
Petitioners allege that the search warrants were null and void
as violative of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Inspection of package was conducted by the
husband of the proprietress(a private person) of a forwarding
agency as a final procedure. Marijuana was found. The NBI
was called and verified it was a Marijuana. Defense is right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. It was held that
the evidence is admissible.
F.
G.
IX.
DOCTRINE
It was held that Petitioners cannot assail the validity of the warrants to search the
offices because they have a separate identity from the corporation. The warrants for the search
of the residences of petitioners are null and void for violating the constitutional mandate against
general warrants (probably cause determined by the judge and particularly describe the things
to be seized).
Exclusionary Rule - All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in a State. It is the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. (Right of privacy and against unlawful
searches and seizures secured by the Due Process Clause).
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search.
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
RAMIREZ v. CA
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier any.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
SALAZAR v. ACHACOSO
Only the judge may issue an order for search and seizure. The only exception:
President in relation to a deportation case.
The essential requisite of probable cause for warrantless arrests was conspicuously
absent. The arrest was not legal from the beginning. But even assuming that the arrest of
petitioner was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his petition
moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest.
First, he is now released. Second, formal deportation proceedings have now been filed against
him.
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA
PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT
TERRY v. OHIO
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
1.
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or
2.
if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
It was held that Judge Felix committed a grave abuse of discretion when he relied
solely on the Prosecutors certification and issued the assailed order without having before him
any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.
The 1987 Constitution mandates that probable cause is to be personally determined
by the judge, not by any other officer or person.
If a judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor where all the records of
the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not PERSONALLY determined probable cause
since the determination was done by the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the MTC and reviewed by the Fiscal were still in
Masbate, there was no basis for Judge Felix to make his own personal determination regarding
the existence of probable cause
The doctrine in Soliven v. Makasiar is controlling.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. The term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected
drug dealer must be caught red handed.
While the rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver
must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence and with
the assistance of counsel.
Searches and seizures even without a search warrant:
1. when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;
2. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
3. when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
4. when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling
or immigration laws;
5. when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
6. or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations."
It was held that the Search is valid. Conviction affirmed.
Search warrant is not needed if there is probable cause. Probable cause is defined as
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
It was held that the revolver was admissible evidence. A stop and frisk of a suspicious
person is a reasonable search and seizure. Terry was armed and presented an immediate threat
to the safety of the police officer
Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated
when a police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him without probable cause to
arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is
overcoat
MANALILI v. CA
PEOPLE v. MUSA
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
PEOPLE v. AYSON
PEOPLE v. MAHINAY
committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person ""may be
armed and presently dangerous.
The scope of the policemans search must be justified by the circumstances that led
the police to undertake it in the first place.
It was held that stop-and-frisk concept in Terry v. Ohio held to be valid, and is an
exception to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures.
Interest in effective crime prevention and detection allows for such a search, even if
there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. It did not, however, abandon the
rule that police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. There are many
instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest.
For the plain view doctrine to apply for discoveries, the three-prong Horton test requires:
1. the officer to be lawfully present at the place where the evidence can be plainly
viewed,
2.
the officer to have a lawful right of access to the object, and
3.
the incriminating character of the object to be immediately apparent.
Since the marijuana leaves werent in plain view, their subsequent police seizure was illegal.
Therefore, the bag of dried leaves could not be used as evidence.
The accused must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. If the accused earlier waived his rights, he can still
invoke them anytime subsequent to such waiver.
The adversary system of criminal proceedings commences when the individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The safeguards mentioned above should be applied at
this point.
The ruling does not say that all confessions are inadmissible, but only those that were
extracted without giving the individual warnings as to his rights."
It was held that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation when the
admission and statement were taken. They were taken under the investigation of PAL, not under
investigation of the police.
There are 2 rights under Sec. 20, Art. VI, 1973 Constitution (now Secs. 12, 14 and 17):
1. Rights of the accused in a criminal case:
a.
to be exempt from being a witness against himself (against self-incrimination)
b. to testify as witness in his own behalf
2. Rights of a person in custodial interrogation (apply to suspects in criminal cases):
a.
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right
b. nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him
c.
any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence
The court updated enumeration of Miranda Rights.
1.
The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information
or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer,
one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or
messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed
that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be
warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any
time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any
time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained
in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE v. BALOLOY
PEOPLE v. LUGOD
PEOPLE v. AMESTUZO
PEOPLE v. ESCORDIAL
PEOPLE v. SALONGA
PEOPLE v. ENDINO
PEOPLE v. PERALTA
PEOPLE v. SUELA
PEOPLE v. VELARDE
It was held that his right to counsel was not violated, but accused was acquitted
because his alibi was credible.
Right to counsel attaches only upon the start of a criminal custodial investigation, and
this does not include the presentation of suspects to complainants for identification. Alleged
infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction.
The warrantless arrest was invalid in this case but was cured due to Escordials failure
to question the warrantless arrest before arraignment. Such constituted a waiver.
He has also not shown that, as a result of his custodial investigation, the police
obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory which was used in
evidence against him.
The out-of-court identification should have been inadmissible because identification
of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the
start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. However, again,
failure to object when these pieces of evidence were presented constituted a waiver.
Nonetheless, he was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
It was held that the Extra-judicial confession admissible; Conviction sustained.
Legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to those
extra-judicial confessions obtained during custodial investigation
It was held that he is still guilty, and the admission of video confession was proper.
The footage showed the accused admitting his guilt willingly, and such confession
does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media
men. It should never be presumed, though, that all media confessions described as voluntary
have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be
thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult
and arduous task for the courts to make, and it requires persistence and determination in
separating polluted confessions from untainted ones.
It was held that the confession and notes inadmissible as evidence; Warrantless arrest,
search and seizure, unlawful.
The confession was inadmissible because of the absence of proper counsel during
investigation. The PAO as "saksi" was not sufficient, as the Court requires effective and vigilant
counsel, not just someone to stand by while the accused is being questioned. The warrantless
arrest was also unlawful because the circumstances did not give rise to probable cause, i.e. done
only five days after, working on a hunch. The notes, then, are inadmissible as evidence because
they were obtained through an illegal search and seizure, subsequent to the warrantless arrest.
The notes were then, fruit of the poisonous tree.
Right to competent and independent counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates
not mere presence of lawyer but the ability to assist and advise ones client on the nature and
consequences of an extrajudicial confession. In this case, the lawyers were not able to fully
explain to their clients their constitutional rights and the consequences of their extrajudicial
confession inadmissible.
What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of
competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's defense
without any intervening conflict of interest. The Mayor of Malolos had a duty to prevent crime
PEOPLE v. ORDONO
VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS
- END -
and enforce peace and order; this was inconsistent with his responsibilities to Velarde, who
stands as the main suspect in a criminal case.
Their extrajudicial statements without any counsel during custodial investigation are
inadmissible as evidence but their confessions to the radio announcer during the interview are
admissible.
Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel
although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under
the Constitution however the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights
that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect
the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies.
The accused were acquitted. Signing of names on the cereal boxes is tantamount to an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. thus,
evidence is inadmissible.
The Order of the trial judge should be understood as subject to certain limitations, but
is considered as legal
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. An ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. Torture of force
shall be avoided.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This
prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to
criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking
the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal,
and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend
to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by
counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to
incriminate the witness is improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the
position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke
the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.
It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.
It was held that Pascual cannot be compelled to take the witness stand without his
consent.
Cabal v. Kapunan (The accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.) is applicable as Pascual would be
similarly disadvantaged if a penalty were imposed on him as a result of the case. The right cannot
be diluted by taking against him his refusal to testify.