re: it is often the "technical" explanation by apologists<<<<< And there's the rub, as some fail to distinguish between mere descriptive adequacy, wherein we adequately account for observations and impart heuristic value, for clear explanatory adequacy, whereby we adequately explain those observations and impart predictive value. Still, abusus non tollit usum, the abuse of something is no argument against its proper use. I'll repost my comment from another forum: >>>>> The HPoC raises questions regarding sentience not sapience. Whether regarding either of those two, the different interpretive accounts, at best, plant flags to mark where the tips of our descriptive probes have gone and offer suggestions on which direction they might head next. They add nothing in the way of information to these scientific probes but merely try to make the methodological norms and stipulations of science explicit. Such descriptive flag planting and normative explication do not explain anything, they only label the problem.I like the Aristotelian account of causation and commend it to any in search of conceptual bookmarks, but I wouldn't urge it on anyone as if it were robustly explanatory. It's more like a mnemonic device. To me it's like a set of flash cards to help me remember some recurring themes in some otherwise diverse subjects, But if someone else finds that using a hi-liter to mark key passages in their textbooks works for them, I wouldn't a priori suggest that they'll fail the test because they aren't using my flashcards. All that said, Thomistic Hylomorphism goes beyond the Aristotelian account ina dualistic way, so might not be the best exemplar for planting the flag on the interpretive neutral ground between materialism and dualism. <<<<< Addendum: None of this is to deny that our interpretive heuristics, which will need to have attained a modicum of descriptive adequacy and which will have employed a mix of theoretic (negotiated), semiotic (non-negotiaable) and heuristic (still-in-negotiation) concepts, will nothave gone beyond mere flag-planting vis a vis our labeling of problems. Competing interpretations are said to compete precisely because they each plant another flag, which has further normative implications, like probe here next. So, we can thus apply a vector analysis to them by evaluating both the direction and the distance between the two flags, the first being an observational accounting, the second being a metaphysical suggestion. How far in any given direction those vectors extend would then indicate how dogmatic any given interpretation is. Dogmatism, which presents in various degrees, typically, will thus be revealed by the number of dogmatic concepts that have been thrown into the pre-existing mix of theoretic, semiotic and heuristic concepts. Not all competing interpretations, then, even if otherwise epistemically virtuous, will necessarily be equiplausible, equally compelling or enjoy the same level of normative impetus --- notbecause they will have necessarily violated any rules of evidence, but --- because they'll have exposed themselves to progressively higher burdens of proof. descriptive adequacy, explanatory adequacy, dogmatic concepts, theoretic concepts, heuristic concepts, semiotic concepts, epistemic virtue, normative impetus, hard problem of consciousness, Aristotelian Hylomorphism, Thomistic Hylomorphism, interpretive heuristics, philosophy of mind