The reason | agree is that Eller's dichotomy fails to recognize the distinction between an ignostic stance which would reject any given interpretation or meta- theory as logically inconsistent versus other stances which concede logical consistency but then take various evidential stances, The evidential stances would fallout along an epistemic continuum, just for an oversimplified example - of impossible, improbable, implausible, uncertain, possible, plausible, probable to certain. Generally, regarding meta-theoretic stances, such as regarding realities like cosmogony, speculative cosmology, quantum interpretations, abiogenesis (biopoiesis) and philosophy of mind, much less even putative primal or ultimate realities, we're dealing with logical consistencies (possibilities) coupled with uncertainties, implausibilities and plausibilities. Unless and until methodological constraints are overcome or paradigm shifts occur which then foster inductive testing, such meta-theoretic interpretations cannot be considered robustly probabilistic.One can then accept an interpretation as plausible, reject it as implausible, or remain agnostic and uncertain. One needn't accept a verdict of proved or disproved but may apply the Scottish verdict, not proved. The most vague god-conceptions of philosophical theology, coupled with the general overarching ideas, from the perspective of modern comparative theology, interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism, do seem to affirm a common vague polydoxic, pneumatological (spirit-referenced) reality --- not only among and between the great traditions, but —- even among indigenous religions. I point this out over against Eller's overly narrow, hege-monistic (double entendre intended) constructions of both theism and atheism and cursory dismissal of agnosticism. There's broad consensus that these philosophical interpretations are logically consistent, as logically consistent as any other cosmogony, quantum interpretation or philosophy of mind, for example. There's also broad philosophical consensus that suchignosticism is incoherent and cannot be substantively differentiated from logical positivism and radical empiricism, projects that were abandoned 60 years ago. In their anxiety to annihilate metaphysics, they subvert the meta- theoretic natural sciences. Metaphysical and theological agnosticisms remain alive and well. Atheological and theological interpretations compete and aren't a prion unreasonable. An ignostic atheism is not going to be terribly compelling to many because it's not distinguishable from defunct positivistic epistemologies. david eller, ignosticism, agnosticism, atheism, logical positivism, radical empiricism, ignostic atheism, cosmogony, quantum interpretations, philosophy of mind, pneumatology of world religions, polydoxy,