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Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Volume 7, Number 3, Fall 2004, pp. 391-405
(Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/rap.2005.0013
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The two epigraphs with which I begin this essay epitomize the stasis at the heart of
any discussion of racial reconciliation: the question of credibility. The first comes
from the American social activist Malcolm X.1 The second comes from Captain
Jacques Hechter, a former member of South Africas apartheid security police.2
Taken together, they reveal the double-edged character of rhetorics third blade:
ethos. The question of character as it emerges in language is fundamentally at
stake in any discussion of race,3 and it informs my response to John Hatchs
thoughtful and well-argued essay on enlarging rhetorical coherence through reconciliation.4 Hatch suggests that by forging a rhetoric of coherent reconciliation, we
might contribute to a better public discourse about race in the United States. He
argues that by further theorizing reconciliation as a tragicomically coherent
rhetoric, rhetoricians could help prepare the way for principled practices and constructive critiques of racial reconciliation in the United States.5 I wish to pursue
this suggestion by examining the rhetoric of racial reconciliation in the enlarged
space opened by Malcolm Xs question and Jacques Hechters answer: the space
within which apologies are deemed sincere or simply expedient, within which credibility and character are paramount.
This space is circumscribed by the center/margin relationship that is defined by
what Charles M. Mills describes as The Racial Contract. Unlike the social contract
idealized in Western philosophy and politics, the Racial Contract reveals the ideological presuppositions and material conditions that have constrained race relations
for the past five hundred years. During that time, black rhetors have sought persistently to re-sign the Racial Contract, and have contributed to the crafting in real
Mark Lawrence McPhail is Professor of Communication in the School of Interdisciplinary Studies at
Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.
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terms of the ideals of the social contract. White rhetors, in contrast, have largely
resisted this re-signing, and have instead embraced and reshaped the Racial Contract
in ways more subtle and insidious. Consequently, freedom, equality, and responsibility have been conceptualized and actualized in radically different ways by peoples
of African and European descent: the former see these in terms of the consequences
and material conditions of the Racial Contract, while the latter define these in terms
of abstractions and intentions of the social contract. Closing the gap between the two
is a prerequisite for coherent reconciliation, and this can only be accomplished by a
collective act of white atonement: a resigning of the Racial Contract. 6
Whether or not this re-signing is possible is the question that led me to revisit
the rhetoric of racism and that now confronts John Hatch. Will white people ever be
sorry? Implicitly, Hatch would answer this question in the affirmative. He presents
a compelling and provocative argument for theorizing reconciliation as a tragicomically grounded discourse, one that appeals as strongly to emotion as to reason. I
sympathize with his commitment to pursuing the generative and transformative
potential of discourse, but I remain skeptical about the possibility of genuine racial
reconciliation in either South Africa or the United States. South Africas struggle for
reconciliation, as Hechters comments reveal, remains caught up in questions of
credibility and character. Similar questions are raised by the white racial recovery
rhetorics that dominate discussions of reconciliation and reparations in the United
States.7 In both contexts, while significant numbers of black people have shown a
marked willingness to engage in the symbolic and social discourses and behaviors
that facilitate reconciliation, whites have been overwhelmingly unwilling to do the
same, and have even been openly contemptuous of such efforts.
These differences might best be explained by Kirt H. Wilsons observation that
it is the structure of our collective memory and public discourse that makes racism
a persistent problem.8 Wilsons insightful study points to the role of credibility in
conversations about race in the United States and to the justified skepticism that
black people bring to those conversations: People of color are learned observers
when it comes to Americas racial policies, and, despite some exceptions, the majority believe that their equality has been undermined by deep prejudices that even
well-meaning whites fail to appreciate.9 His analysis offers a starting point for considering the importance of ethos in discussions about race and reconciliation, and
the difficulties that constrain these discussions: The races have difficulty communicating largely because we are collectively ignorant of the cultural assumptions
that guide and inform the deliberative practice of the other race.10 Id like to extend
this analysis in a direction that uncovers another aspect of our collective ignorance,
one that calls the moral ethos of the Wests social contract into question.
Here I will explore reconciliation not as an idealized outcome of discourse but as
a concrete discursive practice, not as a prescribed possibility but as a described phenomenon. As such, I will ground my discussion of reconciliation in the theory of
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the Racial Contract. Mills describes the Racial Contract as an ideological predisposition that informs the beliefs that people of European descent have developed
about themselves and others, and the behaviors in which they have engaged as a
result of those beliefs. Unlike the idealized social contract that accounts for racism
either as abstraction or anomaly, the Racial Contract assumes that racism is the
norm and that people think of themselves as raced rather than abstract citizens,
which any objective history will in fact show.11 To the extent that reconciliation
begins with the recognition of historical responsibility, any attempt to theorize a
rhetorical strategy capable of achieving it must account for the ways in which talk
of reconciliation can be characterized as credible. Reading the rhetoric of reconciliation against the theory of the Racial Contract can, I believe, bring us closer to that
space described by Wilson where we can begin to grapple with the divergent rationalities that hinder open and honest discussion,12 and begin the difficult task of
racial healing and atonement.
I will begin by revisiting South Africas rhetoric of reconciliation to suggest that
it represents a concrete attempt to re-sign the complicity of the Racial Contract into
a coherent social contract. I will argue first that South Africas rhetoric of reconciliation, motivated by forgiveness, apology, and responsibility, is a markedly black
rhetoric, which like black rhetoric in the United States has been unsuccessful in persuading whites to collectively apologize for their historical treatment of people of
African descent. This, I maintain, is not so much determined by the transformative
potential of rhetoric, but by the ethos of the Racial Contract. Here I draw upon
James S. Baumlins reading of Burkes description of ethos as an implicitly violent
practice of self-identification by means of scapegoating,13 to illustrate the pervasive
social and psychological impediments to racial reconciliation sustained by the
Racial Contract. Accordingly, I will argue that the failure of Representative Tony
Halls proposed congressional apology for slavery is not, as Hatch suggests, because
it lacks the necessary rhetorical grounding,14 but because of an unwillingness
among white Americans to resign the Racial Contract.
Thus, as I argue in the conclusion of The Rhetoric of Racism Revisited, I remain
convinced that it will take more than rhetoric to reconcile the long and tragic history of white supremacy and racism. Ultimately, it will require a resigning of the
Racial Contract by whites that complements the black resigning of it. Since much
of my earlier work has focused on how this resignation can be accomplished by
African Americans, in this essay I will focus on European Americans, arguing that
it will require acts of atonement by whites to move the rhetoric of racism through
complicity and toward coherence. This, I believe, is the lesson revealed by South
Africas transition from apartheid to democracy, and concealed by the racial recovery projects that have undermined equality and justice in postcivil rights America.
In light of a collective history marked by black rhetorical efforts to facilitate racial
reconciliation and the refusal and rejection of those efforts, I maintain that racial
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healing and reconciliation are unlikely without a credible commitment on the part
of whites that begins with sincere atonement and culminates in substantive reparations. This would amount to repudiation, dismantling, and resigning of the Racial
Contract.
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Contract establishes a racial polity, a racial state, and a racial juridical system, where
the status of whites and non-whites is clearly demarcated, whether by custom or
law.22 Apartheid enacts in policy and practice the ideological and epistemological
presuppositions of the Racial Contract:
A partitioned social ontology is therefore created, a universe divided between persons
and racial subpersons, Untermenschen, who may variously be black, red, brown, yellowslaves, aborigines, colonial populationsbut who are collectively appropriately
known as subject races. And these subpersonsniggers, injuns, chinks, wogs,
greasers, blackfellows, kaffirs, coolies, abos, dinks, googoos, gooksare biologically
destined never to penetrate the normative rights ceiling established for them below
white persons.23
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THE
RACIAL CONTRACT
The resistance to racial reconciliation among whites is, I continue to believe, a problem of pathology, both social and psychological. It is unlikely that it can be
addressed adequately, as Hatch suggests, through an enlarging of coherence from
the comic to the tragicomic. This move, though certainly a step in the right direction, fails to account for the ethos of the Racial Contract. Baumlins reading of
Burkes extension of ethos beyond its Aristotelian origins moves the discussion of
racial reconciliation beyond the scope of a tragicomic conceptualization of coherence and toward a rhetorical account of the diffidence of racism. According to
Baumlin, Burke situates his theory of rhetoric within a social psychology of scapegoating wherein communal identity is strengthened by the presence and threat,
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is possible demands, in light of the racial realities of the past five hundred years, a
major leap of faith, the same leap of faith that has historically sustained African
American rhetorical practices and theories.
The naming of the Racial Contract has been a persistent rhetorical strategy used
by black speakers to question the credibility of the social contract. From Frederick
Douglasss claim that the problem of race in America is, at its root, a question of
whether the American people have honesty enough, loyalty enough, honor
enough, patriotism enough to live up to their own Constitution,39 to Martin
Luther Kings call for America to Be true to what you said on paper,40 black rhetors
have consistently called for coherence between the nations constitution and its
social contracts. Black rhetoric has always shown a commitment to creating, and recreating, self, other, and society, to seeking dialogue, and to striving toward coherence. But too often the responses of whites have been marked by a certain kind of
blindness, a dialogic deafness, a discursive dumbness: see no evil, hear no evil, speak
no evil. The Racial Contract is sustained through this rewriting of the history of
race. Creating the right mix for a rhetoric of coherent reconciliation will require
not a rewriting of race history, but an acknowledgement of its erasure.
In the case of both South Africa and the United States, it will require coming to
grips with the past in order to construct a new vision for the future. Deborah F.
Atwater and Sandra L. Herndon point to the challenges that we face: What is the
collectively held history of South Africa and the United States? Is it unthinkable to
expect to live in a world without racism? A world before and after Jim Crow and
apartheid?41 Atwater and Herndon suggest that, at the center of both rhetorical situations, the question of ethos continues to be raised: Both countries are experiencing the complicated issues of how one speaks about a cultural history and, even
more importantly, who will listen.42 If racial reconciliation is to become a reality,
we all must be able to speak candidly, and we all must be willing to listen.
Otherwise, conversations and debates about responsibility, reparations, and racial
healing will remain mired in a dangerous dialectic . . . between self and other, the
self needing the other in order to fashion and defend its own self-image.43 This
hegemonic dialectic, which has defined our racial rhetorics and histories for far too
long, can only be transformed through that self-reflexive awareness of complicity
that cultivates an understanding of implicature,44 and culminates in atonement.
Aaron David Gresson IIIs powerful exploration of the rhetorics of racial pain,
recovery, and healing reveals the centrality of atonement for reconciliation, as well
as the powerful psychological impulses at work that resist it. Commenting on
Representative Tony Halls proposed apology for slavery and the anti-reparations
rhetoric of David Horowitz, Gresson implicitly points to the need for an acknowledgement of the Racial Contract. For a healing discourse to have a chance of working in the American dreamscape, it ultimately comes back to power and how one
negotiates with specific individuals who comply with powers hegemonic hold, he
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explains.45 For Gresson, white racial recovery narratives that deny the existence of
the Racial Contract while simultaneously affirming the basic principles of the social
contract undermine the possibility of atonement and coherent reconciliation:
I have done nothing to anybodythe past is not upon my head. This pervasive and
passionate sentiment is uttered from the depths of the soul. From the mouths of those
identified as heirs of the powerful and dominant, these words issue from persons
determined to be fair, forthright, and productive citizens. Still I am troubled by them.
My concern is that these utterances will delay the transformative shifts we need if society is truly to become more democratic and righteous.46
I too am troubled by the absence of empathy and implicature such statements convey. With Gresson and Hatch, I agree that a more intimate emotional connection
between black and white Americans will go a long way toward creating a context for
racial healing.47 I also believe that an understanding of the Racial Contract is necessary if that intimacy is to create the social and psychological conditions necessary
for the commitment to forgiveness and atonement, and for the articulation of a
credible and coherent discourse of racial reconciliation.
RESIGNING
THE
Apartheid is not over in South Africa, writes Erik Doxtader in his important
exploration of the rhetorical dimensions of South Africas transition to democracy.48 While hopeful about the prospects for racial reconciliation after apartheid,
he nonetheless recognizes the challenges and uncertainties that remain. If it did
shape the South African transition, it is not clear how reconciliation has addressed
or engaged the material aftermath of apartheid. It can be argued credibly that the
politics of reconciliation created black rule but preserved white power.49
Doxtaders analysis, like Hechters apology, should serve as a reminder that the
relinquishing of racial privilege is not simply a matter of change at the social level,
but at the psychological level as well. Hechter made these comments shortly after
appearing before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In his public prepared
statement he remarked, I am sorry about the loss of lives. I hope this will result in
reconciliation in South Africa.50 Only later, in one of the unofficial fora of South
African reconciliation, did he express how he really felt. Doxtaders observation
that we should listen to the unofficial story of reconciliation, as well as to its public pronouncements, should be heeded as we consider the possibilities of reconciliation within the context of the United States.
In considering those possibilities, I believe that we must take into consideration the similarities and differences between the two contexts. The most obvious
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This neoconfederate rhetoric, which resists all of the requirements necessary for
genuine reconciliation, has had a profound impact on conversations about race in
the United States. Its impact can be seen in the national unwillingness to apologize
for slavery, and in the anti-reparations rhetoric that dominates public discourse.53
Neoconfederates have no interest in apologizing for slavery, addressing its history,
or taking responsibility for its consequences. They deny the need for reparations.
They have influenced, and are in confederation with, many of the most powerful
white people in America. Systematically the Lost Cause supporters have erased or
eliminated opposition and gotten the national government to honor Confederates.
Over the years little has stood in their way to re-write history.54 Their rhetoric of
reconciliation returns us again to the question with which I began this inquiry: Will
white people ever be sorry?
The most credible answer, I believe, is that some will. There have always been,
and will always be, people of European descent committed to resigning the Racial
Contract. Some have actually given their lives for the strugglethe white
American antislavery revolutionary John Brown, the white members of the African
National Congress, who died trying to abolish apartheid, notes Mills. But the mere
fact of their existence shows what was possible, throwing into contrast and rendering open for moral judgment the behavior of their fellow whites, who chose to accept
Whiteness instead.55 The foundation for such moral judgments will rest upon the
coherence between principle and practice, between words and deeds, between
rhetoric and action. It will also be defined by a willingness to atone, to reconcile
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with self. To the degree that this willingness is faithfully felt, is sincere, thenand
only thencan it be judged credible. The third blade of rhetorics propeller, ethos,
then, frames fundamental questions with which we must grapple if we are to discover
or create dialogic coherence somewhere in the process of reconciliation.56
In concluding, I return to the questions of credibility and character with which
I began this inquiry, and again to the words of Malcolm X. Many black men, the
victimsin fact, most black menwould like to be able to forgive, to forget the
crimes. But most American white people seem not to have it in them to make any
serious atonementto do justice to the black man.57 This is the sentiment I
expressed in The Rhetoric of Racism Revisited, and if we are to take seriously Hatchs
call it must enter our theoretical and political conversations about race. As I have
argued in much of my research, for black people this means acknowledging the
ways in which we are implicated in systems of racial oppression and embracing
coherence in order to re-sign the rhetoric of racism. It means much the same for
whites, but it demands more than a re-signing of the rhetoric of racism, and a more
credible response than a rewriting the history of race. If we are to achieve genuine
racial reconciliation, white people must resign the racial contract. That is, they must
relinquish the power and privileges conferred upon them by virtue of their race.
To resign the Racial Contract, whites must collectively atone for the history and
consequences of white supremacy. I continue to believe that this collective atonement is unlikely. However, in theorizing reconciliation as Hatch suggests, we can
look to those whites who have made an unambiguous and credible commitment to
racial justice and equality through their actions.58 Rhetorical scholars might then
examine the success with which they are able to convince other whites to do the
same, and translate that success into a coherent rhetoric of reconciliation. While
there is much to learn from black rhetoric, as well as from the ways in which blacks
and whites complicitously construct racial difference and identity, I believe that the
most fruitful future inquiries into the rhetoric of racism will focus on questions of
character and credibility. I conclude with Malcolm Xs advice:
Where the really sincere white people have got to do their proving of themselves is not
among the black victims, but out on the battle lines of where Americas racism really
isand thats in their own home communities: Americas racism is among their fellow whites. Thats where the sincere whites who really mean to accomplish something
have got to work.59
NOTES
1. Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 370.
2. Quoted in Lyn S. Graybill, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model? (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 52.
402
3. James S. Baumlin, Ethos, in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 263.
4. John B. Hatch, Reconciliation: Building a Bridge from Complicity to Coherence in the Rhetoric
of Racism, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6 (2003): 73764.
5. Hatch, Reconciliation, 755.
6. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). In exploring
the Racial Contract from a rhetorical perspective, Ive chosen to invoke a Burkean perspective
by incongruity and crack open the term resign. Reading the rhetoric of race in black and white,
the term has dual uses: for black rhetors, it portends a re-signing, that is, a calling into question
and redefinition of the terms of the contract, while for white rhetors it amounts to both this and
an active giving up of those powers and privileges. For more on Burkes perspective by incongruity, see Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3d ed. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984).
7. Aaron David Gresson III, The Recovery of Race in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1995). In the aftermath of the civil rights movement, Gresson argues, white political and
economic recovery efforts in America have resulted largely in judicial, occupational, and symbolic losses for Blacks and others previously targeted for so-called mainstreaming (12).
8. Kirt H. Wilson, The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate: The Politics of Equality and the Rhetoric
of Place, 18701875 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 198.
9. Wilson, Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, 198.
10. Wilson, Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, 199.
11. Mills, The Racial Contract, 130.
12. Wilson, Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, 199.
13. Baumlin, Ethos, 276.
14. Hatch, Reconciliation, 755.
15. Eric Yamamoto, Interracial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in PostCivil Rights America (New
York: New York University Press, 1999), 254.
16. According to Graham C. Kinloch, the improvement of race relations and the reduction of racism
in colonial societies require increase in the participation of minorities in the decision-making
process. Graham C. Kinloch, The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1974), 218.
17. Philippe-Joseph Salazar, An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa
(London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), xvii.
18. Mark Lawrence McPhail, The Rhetoric of Racism Revisited: Reparations or Separation? (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), ix.
19. Graybill observes: There is no precise definition for ubuntu, but it connotes humaneness, caring, and community. Ubuntu derives from the Xhosa expression Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye
bantu (People are people through other people). Graybill, Truth and Reconciliation in South
Africa, 32.
20. I discuss the notions of an integrative Afrocentricity and spiritually inspired militancy as
black rhetorical practices that correspond to rhetorical coherence. More recently, I have suggested
that black rhetoric is reconstitutive in character, and that this aspect of black rhetoric reveals the
ways in which race shapes and constrains interracial rhetorical situations. See Mark Lawrence
McPhail, From Complicity to Coherence: Rereading the Rhetoric of Afrocentricity, Western
Journal of Communication 62 (1998): 11440; Mark Lawrence McPhail, Dessentializing
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Difference: Transformative Visions in Contemporary Black Thought, Howard Journal of
Communications 13 (2002): 7796; and Mark Lawrence McPhail, Louis Abdul Farrakhan, in
Contemporary American Orators, ed. Richard Leeman and Bernard Duffy (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, in press).
21. Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa (New York: Random House, 1985), 20.
22. Mills, The Racial Contract, 1314.
23. Mills, The Racial Contract, 1617.
24. Salazar, An African Athens, 79.
25. Salazar, An African Athens, 91.
26. Don Foster, What Makes a Perpetrator: An Attempt to Understand, in Looking Back, Reaching
Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. Charles VillaVicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000), 229.
27. Graybill, Truth and Reconciliation, 22.
28. Biko writes: The victims of apartheid have shown huge tolerance regarding those responsible for
their suffering. Yet, while the National Party changed its name to the New National Party, FW de
Klerk still cannot remember for what he needed to apologize. PW Botha also did not think it necessary to apologise. Nkosinathi Biko, Amnesty and Denial, in Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd,
Looking Back, Reaching Forward, 197.
29. Yamamoto, Interracial Justice, 273.
30. Foster, What Makes a Perpetrator, 21920.
31. Hatch, Reconciliation, 754.
32. Mills, The Racial Contract, 18.
33. Baumlin, Ethos, 275.
34. Mills, The Racial Contract, 19.
35. Positive self-representation is an important persuasive strategy of symbolic and modern racism.
According to Teun A. van Dijk, argumentative and rhetorical strategies will typically play a role
as part of an overall strategy of persuasion, whereas semantic moves of apparent denial or concession may be used in a combined strategy of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the Other. Teun A. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage,
1993), 35.
36. Hatch focuses on my comments regarding the possibility of race being transformed by rational
means, but elsewhere I have suggested also that even approaches more focused on the emotional
and dialogic approaches to discourse fail to achieve racial transformation. See Mark Lawrence
McPhail, Race and the (Im)possibility of Dialogue, in Dialogue: Theorizing Difference in
Communication Studies, ed. Rob Anderson, Leslie A. Baxter, and Kenneth N. Cissna (Thousand
Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004), 20924.
37. Hatch, Reconciliation, 754.
38. Mills, The Racial Contract, 133.
39. David J. Cope, African Americans in the White City: The Worlds Columbian Exposition of
1893, http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/resources/lessonplans/hs_es_columbianexposition.htm.
40. Martin Luther King Jr., I See the Promised Land, in I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that
Changed the World, ed. James M. Washington (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1992), 197.
41. Deborah F. Atwater and Sandra L. Herndon, The Use of Public Space as Cultural
Communicator: How Museums Reconstruct and Reconnect Cultural Memory, in Understanding
404
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of whom were white, went to Mississippi to live and work with black people, and their narratives
offer important insights into the ways in which individuals, when confronted with the lived reality of the Racial Contract, become energized to dismantle it. See Elizabeth Sutherland Martinez,
ed., Letters from Mississippi: Personal Reports from Civil Rights Workers of the 1964 Freedom
Summer (Brookline, Mass.: Zephyr Press, 2002), or Doug McAdam, Freedom Summer (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988).