Here's the section of the 47-count indictment against nine FIFA officials and five corporate executives that addresses sponsorship of Brazil's national soccer team.
Here's the section of the 47-count indictment against nine FIFA officials and five corporate executives that addresses sponsorship of Brazil's national soccer team.
Here's the section of the 47-count indictment against nine FIFA officials and five corporate executives that addresses sponsorship of Brazil's national soccer team.
E. CBE Sponsorship Scheme
165, The Brazilian national team won the 1994 World
Cup, which was hosted by the United States in June and July of
that year. Around the same time, a representative of a
multinational sportswear company headquartered in the United
States (“Sportswear Company A”), the identity of which is known
to the Grand Jury, approached CBF to determine whether CBF was
interested in being sponsored by Sportswear Company A. At the
time, CBF already had a sponsorship agreement with another
American sportswear company (“Sportswear Company B”), the
identity of which is known to the Grand Jury. Thereafter Co-
conspirator #11, a high-ranking CONMEBOL and CBF official, and
Co-Conspirator #2, on behalf of Traffic Brazil, which at the
time served as CBF’s marketing agent, began negotiations with
representatives of Sportswear Company A,
166. The negotiations lasted into 1996. The parties
ultimately agreed to a 10-year deal, which required, among other
things, that Sportswear Company A compensate Sportswear Company
B, which agreed to terminate its existing contract with CBF
167. On or about July 11, 1996, the parties met in New
York City for the closing. The contract was signed by Co-
Conspirator #11 on behalf of CBF, Co-Conspirator #2 on behalf of
Traffic Brazil, and four representatives of Sportswear Company
14A, Among other terms, the contract, a 44-page Sponsorship and
Endorsement Agreement (the “Agreement”), required Sportswear
Company A to pay CBF $160 million over 10 years for the right to
be one of CBF’s co-sponsors and to be CBF’s exclusive footwear,
apparel, accessories, and equipment supplier. CBF remitted a
percentage of the value of the payments it received under the
Agreement to Traffic Brazil.
168. Additional financial terms were not reflected in
the Agreement. Sportswear Company A agreed to pay a Traffic
affiliate with a Swiss bank account an additional $40 million in
base compensation on top of the $160 million it was obligated to
pay to CBF pursuant to the Agreement. On July 14, 1996, three
days after the Agreement was signed, a representative of
Sportswear Company A and a representative of Traffic Brazil (Co-
Conspirator #2) signed a one-page letter agreement acknowledging
as follows: “CBF has authorized Traffic, or its designated
banking agent, to invoice [Sportswear Company A] directly for
marketing fees earned upon successful negotiation and
performance of the ... [Agreement].” Between 1996 and 1999,
Traffic invoiced Sportswear Company A directly for $30 million
in payments.
169. Co-Conspirator #2 agreed to pay and did pay Co-
conspirator #11 half of the money he made from the sponsorship
75deal, totaling in the millions of dollars, as a bribe and
kickback.
170. On or about January 25, 2002, the parties agreed
to terminate the Agreement before the end of the 10-year term,
ending any further obligations thereunder between Sportswear
Company A and CBE, and between Sportswear Company A and Traffic
Brazil.
CFU World Cup Qualifiers Scheme #1
171, Since at least in or about 1998, the media rights
to matches played by nations seeking to qualify for the world
Cup have been owned by the home team for each qualifier match
In negotiating the sale of these rights, CFU member associations
agreed to pool their “home team” rights. The value of such
rights was dependent in significant part on the market size of
the opponent of the CFU member association, with Mexico and the
United States generally being the largest markets -~ and thus the
most “valuable” opponents to play - in the CONCACAF region. By
pooling their rights and selling them prior to the draw for the
next round of World Cup qualifier matches, CFU member
associations sought to maximize leverage and increase
profitability to all the members
172. From at least in or about 1998 until in or about
May 2011, the defendant JACK WARNER, as president of CFU, was
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