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1 Leg. Rts. Child. Rev. 2D 14:7 (2d ed.)

Legal Rights of Children
Database Updated November 2014
Donald T. Kramer
Part V. Adolescents and Their Legal Rights
Chapter 14. Restrictions on the Legal Rights and Liberties of Adolescents
II. Restrictions on the Legal Rights and Liberties of Adolescents
References
14:7. Curfews
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Infants

12, 12(5)

Prelude:
First there were boot camps and "scared straight" prison visits to deter teens from lives of crime. In the 1990s, the curfew
has become America's favorite weapon against juvenile violence. But the experience of cities nationwide suggests curfews
do little to deter teen crime. Laws that keep kids off the streets are now on the books in roughly three-fourths of the 200
largest cities and more than 1,000 smaller communities,
Supporters say curfews allow police to break up groups of kids simply hanging out. They praise curfews for protecting
teens from becoming crime victims and for keeping good kids out of trouble. But there is little evidence streets are safer.
Last month, an appeals court declared unconstitutional a Washington, D.C. curfew. Federal judges also have struck down
curfews in San Diego, Pittsburgh and Albuquerque, N.M., and dozens of cases are pending.
Some cities, including San Francisco and Oakland, are turning their backs on curfews or backing off on enforcement, saying
they burden police without making the streets safer. Now, the first comprehensive academic study of curfews is casting doubt
on claims that they prevent crime. "There is virtually no evidence to prove any support to the notion that youth curfews are
effective in reducing youth crime," said Dan Macallair, associate director of the Justice Policy Institute in San Francisco .
The American Civil Liberties Union has vigorously challenged curfews and loitering laws in court on the legal grounds that
the government can infringe on constitutional rights only if it shows an overriding interest, such as preventing crimes.
"Curfew and loitering laws raise serious constitutional questions," said Mark Silverstein, legal adviser to the Colorado
ACLU. "This is supposed to be a free country where individuals can walk the streets or hang around all they want as long
as they commit no crime."
From a story by Genevieve Anton, appearing in The Gazette (Colorado Springs, Colo.), June 21, 1998, p. 1.
A number of localities have enacted curfews 1 restricting the rights of young people to be on the streets or in public places
between certain hours. 2 These curfew laws are typically local (i.e., municipal) ordinances. The hours of restriction vary
greatly from community to community and may vary depending on the age of the minor. The maximum ages to which such
curfews apply also may vary by locality. Exceptions are often provided for young people accompanied by a parent or other
adult, 3 or for young people who are out because of their work or who are on their way to or from work. 4 In some cases
minors may be out if they have their parents' permission. 5 These laws are usually enforced by making their violation a
delinquent act or a status offense. 6 In one case it was held that a minor was not guilty of a delinquent act by violating a
juvenile curfew because that act would not be a crime if committed by an adult. 7
There is little doubt that "absent a genuine emergency a curfew aimed at all citizens could not survive constitutional
scrutiny." 8 Courts, generally speaking, do not favor curfews, because they typically presume that a person (i.e., normally

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a minor) is guilty of doing something wrong by being in a place where he or she normally has a right to be at a time when
he or she normally has a right to be there but for the curfew ordinance. Most civil libertarians view curfews as clearly
unconstitutional, and justifiable only in the most extreme of civil emergencies. Although there is little dispute over the fact
that the laws in all states permit the activities and conduct of minors to be regulated and restricted to a far greater extent
than those of adults, the lack of maturity and judgment of children supplying the government with different and additional
compelling interests in regulating their conduct, nonetheless a Maryland court has recently held a juvenile curfew ordinance
restricting the nighttime activities of persons under the age of 18 violative of the fundamental constitutional rights of minors
and not justified by the children's special vulnerability, their inability to make mature decisions, or the need to preserve the
parental role in child-rearing. A Florida appeals court has held that a general curfew ordinance for minors under the age
of 16, which did provide an exception for minors "on legitimate business," was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 9
Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme Court has held a city curfew ordinance, making it unlawful for any person under the age
of 18 to be upon any city streets, sidewalks, or public places between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. unless accompanied by a parent,
guardian, or other custodial adult, unless such person is going to or from a bona fide place of employment, unconstitutionally
overbroad. 10
A number of cases have suggested the existence of a constitutional right to freedom of movement. 11 These have included
cases dealing with the right to travel in various contexts, 12 and cases holding vagrancy laws unconstitutionally vague. 13
In referring to some of the activities prohibited in vagrancy statutes (i.e., night walking, loafing, wandering, and strolling),
the Supreme Court noted that although they are not mentioned in the Constitution or Bill of Rights, "these activities are
historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them" and that they are closely related to feelings of independence
and to the right to dissent and to be nonconformist. 14
Freedom of movement is also closely related to the exercise of such First Amendment rights as the right to assemble, the
right to association, and the right to free speech. 15 It is an important liberty. There is also concern that police may arrest
a youthful suspect for violation of a curfew when they do not have probable cause to arrest him or her for the commission
of any other crime or misdemeanor. 16
Nonetheless, it is not clear to what extent these constitutional rights extend to juveniles or to what extent they may
be outweighed by governmental interests in regulating the conduct of minors. One author has suggested three possible
governmental interests in such statutes, including preventing juvenile crime, protecting young people from harm from others
and from situations likely to encourage delinquent actions, and reinforcing parental authority. 17 These interests are based on
the perception that minors have lesser reasoning capacity and lesser impulse control, and are more subject to peer pressures
than are adults generally. 18
Juvenile curfew laws have been the subject of a number of attacks on constitutional grounds, ranging from vagueness to due
process challenges, and they have been the subject of a number of commentaries. Juvenile curfew laws have been held void
for vagueness 19 and overbreadth. 20 They have been overturned on the basis that they interfered with parental authority, 21
and because they violated the child's liberty rights 22 and right to freedom of travel. 23
A New Jersey city curfew ordinance, which prohibited minors from being in public places between 9 PM and 6 AM, unless
they were accompanied by a parent or guardian or were out in public because of an "emergency" or on "legitimate business"
consented to by a parent or guardian, was held unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 24 The court pointed out that the
ordinance provided no standard by which a police officer could exercise his "reasonable judgment," and that the term "public
place" was defined to include some privately owned real property. Most significantly, the court held that the ordinance
violated the minors' right to equal protection of the law, as well as their rights to free speech, assembly, religion, and travel,
and served no compelling state interest that would justify such discriminatory treatment of children.
In addition, curfew laws have been struck down because the standard for arrest should be probable cause to believe a crime
was committed and because they were found to exceed the lawful scope of the police power by prohibiting conduct which

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is essentially innocent. 25 Some curfew laws have been struck down because they gave too much discretion to city officials
to "selectively enforce" their provisions. 26
A lesser, but still a large, number of cases have validated juvenile curfews, 27 and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari
in one case in which a lower court held a juvenile curfew law to be valid. 28
A curfew ordinance in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 29 which found that
the city had a compelling interest in protecting youths and curtailing juvenile crime. The court said that the curfew ordinance,
which restricted juvenile activities for only a narrow period of time in "public" places and which exempted juveniles
accompanied by adults from the constraints of the ordinance, was drawn as narrowly as possible, was not unconstitutionally
overbroad, and did not impermissibly intrude upon the constitutional rights of such juveniles to freedom of movement and
travel, association, assembly, free speech, expression, or religion. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently upheld
a Dallas, Texas, ordinance establishing a curfew that prohibits juveniles from being in public places between 11 p.m. and 6
a.m. on weeknights, and from 12 midnight to 6 a.m. on weekends. 30
City's juvenile curfew ordinance, which made it unlawful for any minor to "remain" in public areas or on the premises of
an establishment during curfew hours, was not unconstitutionally vague; the import of the prohibition was that minors were
required to be at home during curfew hours, and challengers to the ordinance failed to provide sufficient reason to conclude
that the term "remain" was incapable of being understood by ordinary people. Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d
252 (Alaska 2004).
City's juvenile curfew ordinance, which provided an exception to prosecution "if the minor was involved in an emergency"
during curfew hours, was not unconstitutionally vague; the ordinance provided a nonexclusive list of specific examples,
which adequately provided notice of what could constitute an emergency. Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d
252 (Alaska 2004).
City's juvenile curfew ordinance, which provided an exception to prosecution for events sponsored by the city, the school
district, "a civic organization, or other similar entity" during curfew hours, was not unconstitutionally vague; the addition of
"civic organization or other similar entity" simply included the general class of organizations that may be thought analogous to
schools, religious organizations, or governmental entities. Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004).
City's juvenile curfew ordinance, which provided an exception to prosecution when the minor was on the public right-ofway immediately abutting the minor's residence or that of a next-door neighbor who did not complain about the minor's
presence, was not unconstitutionally vague; the "sidewalk" exception was sufficiently clear and did not give undue discretion
to neighbors to implement the ordinance. Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004).
City's juvenile curfew ordinance did not violate constitutional right of parents to determine how to raise their children; city's
interest in protecting minors and reducing crime was compelling, the curfew ordinance was the alternative that was the least
restrictive of parental rights while meeting city's goals, and ordinance provided parents with methods in which to avoid the
effects of the ordinance. Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004).
In Florida, strict scrutiny under the Constitution applies when reviewing a juvenile curfew ordinance. Cities' juvenile
curfew ordinances were supported by compelling governmental interest, as element of strict scrutiny of impairment of
juveniles' constitutional rights to privacy and freedom of movement; cities faced the challenges of protecting juveniles from
victimization and of reducing juvenile crime. Two cities' juvenile curfew ordinances were not narrowly tailored to serving
compelling governmental interests of protecting juveniles from victimization and reducing juvenile crime, as element of
strict scrutiny of impairment of juveniles' constitutional rights to privacy and freedom of movement; statistical data failed to
establish necessary nexus between governmental interest and classification created by one city's ordinance, broad city-wide
coverage of both cities' curfews included otherwise innocent and legal conduct by minors even where they had permission of
their parents, and curfew ordinances imposed criminal penalties on juveniles and parents for second and subsequent curfew
violations, and one city's ordinance imposed criminal penalties on business operators knowingly permitting juveniles on
their premises during curfew hours. Where a juvenile curfew sweeps too broadly and includes within its ambit a number of

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innocent activities which are constitutionally protected, it does not satisfy the narrowly-tailored aspect of strict constitutional
scrutiny. State v. J.P., 2004 WL 3404162 (Fla. 2004).
A city juvenile curfew ordinance that furthered substantial State interest of preventing juvenile crime and victimization was
enacted through least restrictive means necessary to vindicate that interest, and therefore did not violate due process; Supreme
Court had not clearly articulated a intrastate right to travel, ordinance was most effective means of protecting juveniles, and
ordinance allowed parents to exempt children from ordinance when they had legitimate business during curfew hours. State
v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 231 P.3d 1016 (2010).
The language in that ordinance providing that juveniles could not loiter, idle, wander, stroll, play, or otherwise be upon
was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. The intent of ordinance and what was prohibited was clear, there were no
discretionary calls to be made by an officer, nor did it appear that a reasonable person would not have known what conduct
was prohibited. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 231 P.3d 1016 (2010). In addition, the language providing where the minor is
upon emergency errand or other legitimate business with some form of documentation as an exception to the curfew was
not unconstitutionally vague on its face. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 231 P.3d 1016 (2010).
Although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for concern,
sympathy, and paternal attention. States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences because minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 231 P.3d 1016
(2010).
Cities and municipalities may pass curfews, based solely on age, that discriminate against minors and limit their liberty. In
re Walter P., 170 Cal. App. 4th 95, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668 (3d Dist. 2009), review denied, (Apr. 15, 2009).
Penal provisions of city curfew ordinance, which authorized police officers to detain a minor or take a minor into custody
for violation of curfew, were inconsistent with Family Court Act provision that authorized police officers to take a child
under the age of 16 into custody only in cases in which an adult would have been arrested for a crime, despite argument that
officer taking minor into custody under ordinance was akin to officer taking truant back to school or a runaway home or to a
shelter. Furthermore, the curfew ordinance, insofar as it provided that violation of the curfew by a minor under the age of 16
constituted a violation under Penal Law, were inconsistent with the Penal Law statute establishing 16 as the minimum age
for criminal responsibility, and thus the curfew was not a legitimate exercise of city's police power. Jiovon Anonymous ex
rel. Thomas Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 56 A.D.3d 139, 865 N.Y.S.2d 804 (4th Dep't 2008), aff'd, 2009 WL 1585815
(N.Y. 2009).
Six-hour curfew by ordinance on persons under 17 years of age, even on weekends, is narrowly tailored to achieve the
legitimate goals of preventing crime by and against juveniles and, therefore, does not violate state constitutional right to
freedom of movement or equal protection clause; no violation occurs if the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian,
involved in First Amendment speech or religious activity, engaged in an employment activity, or on an errand at the direction
of the minor's parent or guardian. The ordinance is reasonable, balanced, and narrowly tailored, especially in light of
government's need for flexibility when acting to protect children, and, therefore, does not violate state constitutional right
to freedom of movement or equal protection clause; police officer's act of approaching apparent minor on street late at
night to ask for identification alone acts as deterrent, repeated citations for curfew violations can lead to identification of
minor in need of services, $50 civil penalty provides measure of deterrence without being financially or otherwise ruinous,
and insofar as civil enforcement does not provide for arrest, it reflects a proper balancing of minor's liberty interest with
public interest and ensures that such intrusions will not become a tool of harassment. Criminal processes and punishments
provided in the ordinance for curfew violations were not, however, the least restrictive means of accomplishing legitimate
objectives of protecting minors, preventing crime, and promoting parental supervision and authority and, therefore, violated
state constitutional rights to freedom of movement and equal protection; criminal prosecution of minor, with potential for
commitment, was extraordinary and unnecessary response to status offense and would be contrary to the State's treatment
of similar conduct, and state's arguments about authority to arrest juveniles and community service were nothing more than
conjecture. Com. v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 913 N.E.2d 832 (2009).

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City ordinance that provided a juvenile curfew was not facially overbroad; ordinance was valid enactment within the power
of the city, ordinance served substantial government interest in preventing juvenile crime and victimization, government
interest in keeping juveniles off the streets was unrelated to the suppression of expression, and ordinance did not impact more
conduct than necessary to carry out its purposes. Language in the ordinance providing that juveniles could not loiter, idle,
wander, stroll, play, or otherwise be upon was not unconstitutionally vague on its face as the intent of ordinance and what
was prohibited was clear, there were no discretionary calls to be made by an officer, nor did it appear that a reasonable person
would not have known what conduct was prohibited. Language providing that where the minor is upon emergency errand
or other legitimate business with some form of documentation as exception to curfew was not unconstitutionally vague
on its face as the conduct being proscribed was clear and the ordinance was sufficiently definite in its terms. The court stated
that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as
are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for concern,
sympathy, and paternal attention. It added that States may validly limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in
the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences because minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919,
231 P.3d 1016 (2010).
City juvenile curfew ordinance that furthered substantial State interest of preventing juvenile crime and victimization was
enacted through least restrictive means necessary to vindicate that interest, and therefore did not violate due process; Supreme
Court had not clearly articulated a intrastate right to travel, ordinance was most effective means of protecting juveniles, and
ordinance allowed parents to exempt children from ordinance when they had legitimate business during curfew hours. State
v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 231 P.3d 1016 (2010).
Intermediate, not strict scrutiny applied on juvenile's substantive due process challenge against city curfew ordinance, which
prohibited juveniles from being in public places during certain hours under penalty of detention and arrest; intermediate
standard was sufficiently skeptical and probing to provide rigorous protection of son's right to freedom of movement, yet
flexible enough to accommodate legislation carefully drafted to address minors' vulnerabilities. Anonymous v. City of
Rochester, 13 N.Y.3d 35, 886 N.Y.S.2d 648, 915 N.E.2d 593 (2009).
Welfare and Institutions Code provision generally requiring officer to cite and release first-time curfew violator did not
superimpose a prior warning requirement before an ordinance could validly treat a curfew violation as a misdemeanor;
statute required municipality to adopt a resolution to implement the prior citation requirement to have effect, and even in
such cases, the requirement would be relevant only to actions for recoupment against the minor or parent, and would be
irrelevant to whether the minor violated the underlying curfew ordinance. However, discrepancy between curfew ordinance
and codification of that ordinance, when coupled with the charge contained in wardship petition, offended the fair-notice
protection encompassed by the due process clause, where petition alleged that minor violated the ordinance, rather than its
codification, but the codification omitted ordinance's exception for going to or coming home from accepted minor activities
from curfew law's proscriptions; by omitting exception, minor was precluded from interposing it as an affirmative defense.
In re A.G., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1454, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 593 (4th Dist. 2010).
Language in city juvenile curfew ordinance providing that juveniles could not loiter, idle, wander, stroll, play, or otherwise
be upon was not unconstitutionally vague on its face; intent of ordinance and what was prohibited was clear, there were no
discretionary calls to be made by an officer, nor did it appear that a reasonable person would not have known what conduct
was prohibited. Language in city juvenile curfew ordinance providing where the minor is upon emergency errand or other
legitimate business with some form of documentation as exception to curfew was not unconstitutionally vague on its face;
juvenile engaged in clearly proscribed conduct, and ordinance was sufficiently definite in its terms. The court also pointed
out that the ordinance furthered a substantial State interest of preventing juvenile crime and victimization and that it was
enacted through least restrictive means necessary to vindicate that interest, that the Supreme Court had not clearly articulated
a intrastate right to travel, that the ordinance was most effective means of protecting juveniles, and that the ordinance allowed
parents to exempt children from the ordinance when they had legitimate business during curfew hours. State v. Doe, 148
Idaho 919, 231 P.3d 1016 (2010).

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Footnotes
The word "curfew" has an interesting linguistic origin. It is said to come from the French words covrir (to cover) le feu (the fire),
1
which in middle English became the word covrefeu.
Courts continue to wrestle with the constitutionality of curfew ordinances. A federal district court held that a Charlottesville, Va.,
curfew ordinance was constitutional, the court saying that (1) the curfew law did not infringe on juveniles' right to freedom of
movement; (2) the law did not violate parents' constitutional rights to raise their children; and (3) the exemption to the law for juveniles
who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights after midnight or 1:00 a.m. was not unconstitutionally vague, especially as
applied to political discussions and theater rehearsals. The court said: "[A]dults can go outside for whatever reason they wish, and
their children are generally permitted to engage in church, school, civic, and like activities. Further, jobs, emergencies, and parental
errands qualify as exemptions to the curfew law. Children may exercise their First Amendment rights and may not be prohibited
from engaging in interstate travel. The only thing that parents cannot do is authorize their children to go outside when none of these
exceptions apply. Such circumstances, undoubtedly, will be rather limited. In circumstances where a parent, but for the curfew law,
would permit his or her child to attend an all-night 'rave' party or to slip out for an unchaperoned midnight soda, no doubt that
parent's 'right' is restricted. But the restriction is minimal and not one of constitutional significance. This should become particularly
apparent when one considers the gravity of the countervailing government interest: preventing children below the age of seventeen
from wandering the streets late at night, where they might become victims or perpetrators of crime . Mindful of the fact that the
parent's right of control is a qualified right and that the [curfew law] furthers several important governmental interests, including
those of keeping juveniles from roaming the streets without adult supervision during the nighttime hours and imposing a duty on
parents to know the whereabouts and activities of their children at night, it is clear that the [curfew law] fosters in a constitutional
manner the welfare of both minors and the general community. The parents' constitutionally protected interest with respect to the
upbringing of their children, upon which the [curfew law] infringes only minimally, is outweighed by [Charlottesville's] interest in
protecting immature minors and in controlling and preventing nocturnal juvenile mischief and crime."
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 992 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998). This decision has
subsequently been affirmed by the Fourth Circuit at 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir.(Va.), Oct 20, 1998), where the Court of Appeals said
that (1) as required by First Amendment, the city's juvenile curfew ordinance was substantially related to its stated purposes of
reducing juvenile violence and crime, protecting juveniles from crime, and strengthening parental responsibility for children; (2) the
limited curtailment of juvenile liberty in the curfew ordinance did not violate the parents' constitutional right to direct their children's
upbringing without undue government interference; and (3) exceptions to curfew did not render the ordinance unconstitutionally
vague.
On the other hand, the San Diego, Calif., curfew ordinance was held unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit which said that: (1) the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; (2) it violated equal protection in that it was not narrowly tailored to promote the city's
compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization; (3) the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad in that
it restricted minors' legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights; and (4) it violated the parents' fundamental right to rear their
children without undue governmental interference. Nunez by Nunez v City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
The District of Columbia's curfew law was held unconstitutional in Hutchins by Owens v. District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798 (D.C.
Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 156 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) and on reh'g en banc, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1999). But a reenacted curfew law has been held constitutional. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
curfew implicates no fundamental rights of minors or their parents. Even assuming the curfew does implicate such rights, the court
said that the curfew survives heightened scrutiny, and does not violate the First or Fourth Amendment rights of minors. The court
noted that the District of Columbia Council, determining that juvenile crime and victimization in the District was a serious problem
and growing worse unanimously adopted the Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995, which bars juveniles 16 and under from being in
a public place unaccompanied by a parent or without equivalent adult supervision from 11:00 p.m. on Sunday through Thursday to
6:00 a.m. on the following day and from midnight to 6:00 a.m. on Saturday and Sunday, subject to certain enumerated defenses. See
D.C.CODE ANN. 6-2182, 6-2183 (1996). The curfew provides that a minor (defined as "any person under the age of 17 years,"
but not "a judicially emancipated minor or a married minor") cannot remain in a public place or on the premises of any establishment
within the District of Columbia during curfew hours. A parent or guardian commits an offense by knowingly permitting, or through
insufficient control allowing, the minor to violate the curfew. Owners, operators, or employees of public establishments also violate

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3
4
5
6
7
8

10
11
12

13
14
15

the curfew by knowingly allowing the minor to remain on the premises, unless the minor has refused to leave and the owner or
operator has so notified the police. The curfew contains eight "defenses": it is not violated if the minor is (1) accompanied by the
minor's parent or guardian or any other person 21 years or older authorized by a parent to be a caretaker for the minor; (2) on an
errand at the direction of the minor's parent, guardian, or caretaker, without any detour or stop; (3) in a vehicle involved in interstate
travel; (4) engaged in certain employment activity, or going to or from employment, without any detour or stop; (5) involved in an
emergency; (6) on the sidewalk that abuts the minor's or the next-door neighbor's residence, if the neighbor has not complained to the
police; (7) in attendance at an official school, religious, or other recreational activity sponsored by the District of Columbia, a civic
organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or from, without any detour or stop, such
an activity supervised by adults; or (8) exercising First Amendment rights, including free exercise of religion, freedom of speech,
and the right of assembly. If, after questioning an apparent offender to determine his age and reason for being in a public place, a
police officer reasonably believes that an offense has occurred under the curfew law and that no defense exists, the minor will be
detained by the police and then released into the custody of the minor's parent, guardian, or an adult acting in loco parentis. If no one
claims responsibility for the minor, the minor may be taken either to his residence or placed into the custody of the Family Services
Administration until 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Minors found in violation of the curfew may be ordered to perform up to 25
hours of community service for each violation, while parents violating the curfew may be fined up to $500 or required to perform
community service, and may be required to attend parenting classes.
An Allentown, Pa., curfew law was invalidated in Gaffney v City of Allentown, 1997 WL 597989 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
A Mentor, Ohio, curfew was held unconstitutional in In re Spagnoletti, 122 Ohio App. 3d 683, 702 N.E.2d 917 (11th Dist. 1997).
A Vernon, Connecticut curfew was held valid in Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Conn. 1999),
certified question answered, 254 Conn. 799, 761 A.2d 705 (2000) and rev'd, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).
See Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New Standard of Review, 41 Wash U J Urb & Contemp L 16392 (1992).
See also Annotation, Validity, construction, and effect of juvenile curfew regulations, 83 ALR4th 1056. And see Prelude to this
chapter.
See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 213, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 345, 220 N.E.2d 126, 127 (7th Dist. Lake County
1966).
See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 66 Ill. 2d 36, 37, 4 Ill. Dec. 308, 360 N.E.2d 55, 56 (1976).
See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 795, note 1, 514 P.2d 1059, 1060, (1973).
See Chapter 20, infra, for information regarding status offenses.
In re Doe, 87 N.M. 466, 535 P.2d 1092 (Ct. App. 1975).
Marshall, J, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Bykofsky v. Boroough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965, 97 S. Ct. 394,
50 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1976). In Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ga. 1977), a court held that curfews are constitutionally
permissible only where there is some real and immediate threat to the public safety which cannot be adequately met through less
drastic alternatives. The court said that the curfew must be tailored in duration and application to meet the specific crisis without
unnecessary infringement of individual liberties.
K.L.J. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991). See also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995)
(holding a Maryland juvenile curfew ordinance unconstitutionally vague).
Where a juvenile appealed his conviction for resisting arrest, admitting that he ran from an officer who tried to cite him for violating
the Bellingham, Washington, curfew, BMC 10.62, but argued that he was entitled to passively resist the citation because the curfew
was unconstitutional, the court held that the Bellingham curfew ordinance in effect when the juvenile was arrested, and as later
amended, infringed on minors' fundamental freedom of movement and expression, was not narrowly tailored to address the problem
of juvenile crime, and was unconstitutionally vague. State v J.D., 86 Wash. App. 501, 937 P.2d 630 (Div. 1 1997).
City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992).
See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964); and U.S. v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281,
293, 41 S. Ct. 133, 65 L. Ed. 270 (1920) (disapproved of by, U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966)).
See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S. Ct. 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 925 (1975); Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 39 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L.
Ed. 2d 274 (1972).
See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972).
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972).
See Comment, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 Mich L Rev 109, 122 (1977).

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See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972).
See Comment, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 Mich L Rev 109, 132 (1977).
Comment, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 Mich L Rev 109, 135 (1977).
A Norwich, New York, curfew ordinance was held void for vagueness, in Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976),
because it failed to provide a time at which the daily curfew would end. The ordinance, which failed to give parents and minors fair
notice of when children under the age of 17 were permitted to return to the streets, was thus void for vagueness. The court said that
it was also susceptible to arbitrary, capricious, and erratic enforcement. To meet the constitutional requirement of definiteness, said
the court, an ordinance must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden and must
not be so worded as to encourage arbitrary enforcement.
The curfew law enacted by Bellingham, Wash., was held unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness in State v J.D., 86 Wash. App.
501, 937 P.2d 630 (Div. 1 1997).
See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); In Interest of Doe, 54 Haw. 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973).
Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). In one case, a juvenile curfew ordinance passed by the city of Keene,
New Hampshire, was struck down on all three of these grounds. In McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984), the
district court found that the city's ordinance contained several unconstitutional provisions. First, the court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad, because it encompassed a wide range of innocent behavior under the category of prohibited conduct.
Second, the ordinance infringed upon juveniles' liberty interest in freedom of movement as guaranteed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the ordinance intruded into parents' privacy and liberty interests in family and child-rearing by
imposing parental liability even when a parent was exercising reasonable control and supervision over a child.
A curfew ordinance, which made it unlawful for minors to loiter, idle, wander, stroll, or play in or upon a public place or establishment
during certain hours, was held to deprive minors of their fundamental rights without a compelling state interest. It was also held
constitutionally invalid for vagueness and overbreadth. In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 13 Ohio Op. 3d 290, 394 N.E.2d 368 (C.P.
1978). And see T.F. v. State, 431 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983), which held that a municipal curfew ordinance that
prohibited any child under 16 years of age from being on the streets between the hours of 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. impermissibly invaded
the personal rights and liberties of juveniles and was unconstitutional, especially since it did not make exceptions for legitimate
nocturnal pursuits of minors in public places.
Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., Butte County, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (3d Dist. 1957).
The fundamental right involved in a curfew case is the fundamental right to free movement. In re Spagnoletti, 122 Ohio App. 3d
683, 702 N.E.2d 917 (11th Dist. 1997).
Allen v. City of Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557, 524 A.2d 478 (Law Div. 1987).
City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973).
A Florida municipal ordinance which prohibited any minor child under the age of 17 from being on the streets after 10 p.m. or before 5
a.m. without a permit from the chief of police, said the court, prohibited a myriad of legitimate activities, bristled with the potential for
selective enforcement, and failed to provide sufficient guidelines within which the chief of police could exercise his authority. Since
the ordinance did not purport to be needed to meet an emergency, it was held unconstitutional. S.W. v State, 431 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983). For a similar holding, see In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 13 Ohio Op. 3d 290, 394 N.E.2d 368 (C.P. 1978).
A Colorado municipal curfew ordinance, which prohibited loitering by minors after curfew hours, was held not to infringe any
juvenile rights under either the state or federal constitutions. The court said that the juvenile defendant's liberty interest in freedom
of movement did not constitute a fundamental constitutional right. The court also said that the state's interests justified the juvenile
curfew, and the ordinance was carefully drawn so as not to unduly infringe upon the liberty interests of minors. People in Interest of
J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989). For another case in which municipal curfews have been upheld, see Naprstek v. City of Norwich,
545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976).
A juvenile curfew statute enacted by Dade County, Florida, was upheld against charges that it violated both the United States and
the Florida Constitutions. Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1995).
A Ravenna, Ohio, Ordinance 509.08 provides, in relevant part:
(b) No minor fourteen years of age or older and under the age of sixteen years shall be upon the streets, sidewalks, parks or other
public places within the City between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. of the following day.

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(d) The provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) hereof shall not apply to any minor accompanied by his or her parent, guardian
or other adult person having the care and custody of the minor or when the minor is upon an emergency errand or legitimate
business directed by his or her parent, guardian or other adult person having the care and custody of the minor.
The ordinance was upheld against a charge that it was unconstitutional. The court said that " there is a compelling governmental
interest in reducing juvenile crime while promoting juvenile safety and well-being. The ordinance in question uses the least restrictive
means of accomplishing its goals by containing an exception clause that permits minors to remain in public places during the curfew
hours in cases of emergency or when directed by his parents for legitimate business." In re Osman, 109 Ohio App. 3d 731, 672 N.E.2d
1114 (11th Dist. Portage County 1996).
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) and (rejected by,
Brown v. Ashton, 93 Md. App. 25, 611 A.2d 599 (1992)).
City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988).
See Prelude (2) to this chapter.

End of Document

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2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.