You are on page 1of 39
eR LCL tt eee The Politics of Representation and State Violence in Ethiopia: Multiversity & Citizens International A SmarTrip® card is a permanent, rechargeable f r pir farecard that can 0 $300 in rail and hd parking value. “ I faster, safer and easier to #7 se than a paper tareara 1 @ Sales location near you, “visit wmata.com. é fal Politics of Representation and State Violence in Ethiopia: The Oromo Colonial i he chu Megerssa and Aneesa Kassam Dissenting Knowledges Pamphlet Series (no. 14) Vinay Lal, Founding Editor MI come O “Multiversity & Citizens International 2014 Globalization, pildcdty the Conquest of Knowledge, and ! Epistemological Territotialization: General Introduction to the Dissenting Knowledges Pamphlet Series and 2 Foreword to The Politics of Representation and State Violence in Ethiopia MULTIVERSITY Malaysia Vinay Lal 2014 Founding Editor ‘This pamphlet series is one of several initiatives commenced under the auspices of Multiversity, a collective of public intel- lectuals, scholass, and activists from the global South that met forte first time in 2002 at Penang, a city that for centuries has been at the cxossroads of numerous cross-culeutal exchanges, One of the most widely circulated words in our times is ‘glo- balization’, and there has been much discussion, inthe popular Printed by ‘media just as much among academics, ofthe effects of allegedly Seg : porous borders, the massive expansion in the flow of goods, the Sung Pinang inter-connectedness of national economies, and the opening up |600 Penang, Malaysia Of hitherto closed economies to the ‘principles’ of free trade, Neither the economic meltdown of 2008, whether precipitated 4s some say by sheer irresponsibility and speculation in the ‘American housing market and the unchecked greed of lending institutions or by structural problems in global capitalism, no: the attention lavished on (Islamic) terrorism can obscure the ISBN 978-983-3046-22-5, fact that the dominant story throughout the 1990s, and into the twenty-first century, has been the apparent crumbling of all resistance to the onward march of the market. To be sure, the stories of dissent and rebellion, from Zapatismo, the dra- matic staging of disenchantment in Chiapas against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the protests in Seattle against the WTO regime in 1999, to various global incarnations of the ‘Occupy’ movement and the emergence ‘over the last few years of the masses as a political force in the Arab world and elsewhere, suggest that the encroachments of the market and the imposition of ‘ftec trade’ regimes are everywhere highly resented, There are all too visible signs of the immense chasm between the 99 percent and the 1 percent. Nevertheless, another—and in many respects rival—narrative has staked a greater claim, calling attention to the awakening, from the deep slumber of centuries, of the Asian giants—India and particularly China—and the apparent resurgence of Aftica, now commonly described as the fastest growing continent. By this nothing more sophisticated is meant than the brute fact that ancient civilizations have come atound to the view that being old and venerable earns one little purchase in the unforgiving and relentless world of the market economy. Its all very well to be the land of the Buddha snd the Mahatma, but, as India thas apparently learned to its chagrin, nothing is to be gained from such a spiritual and cultural inheritance except for a few and largely meaningless gestures of goodwill. ‘The mounting literature on globalization has also generated ‘numerous clichés, among them the aphe 1e world is slobal village’ and some—albeit few—genuine insights, 4 them the awareness that the slave trade, which encompassed lage parts of the globe, involved numerous middlemen, vastly enriched some sl ers and entrepreneurs, and respected few borders, can also be construed as a form of globalization ‘Thisis not likely to be music to the eats of the World Bank, the IME, or the countless number of economists and policy wonks ‘who, animated by what they construe as the noblestintentions, ntly been making the case for globalization. One have to search very far to find other reprehensible instances besides the slave-trade of globalization in humanity's past since the ‘what school textbooks often describe as the ‘modern age’. ‘That is omly one season among many why ‘one might reasonably be wary of celebrating globalization. How far one can speak of a globalized world in the age of European imperialism or catlier still when the Indian Ocean trading system accounted for large chunks of the world’s trade is thus an interesting question. But, for the present, it suffices to say that since ‘globalization’ appears to have captured and. even monopolized our imagination, it behooves us to probe farther its polities. Inthe contemporary world as globalization’ loudest cheeslead- ers are inclined to argue, the exchange of goods and servic: rate: they point to economy’ as the greatest instantiation of the potential of glo- balization, and are emboldened in advancing this argument on. the grounds that the internet democratizes the public sphere and ensures that flows of information are not unidirectional Globalization’s contemporary histories have also revolved to 5 ‘ ‘unip zoqper ‘suowoury Jrueurwuopard aroan summa ap asne9 4 Sao por “upede 206 ‘wonezyeqoys Jo wa0y v—deuw jeqoyeh 24p wo wsts01399 med] 309) ‘wspoasa Sussaaddns yo owweu yp ut ayqyssod awoooq ase ton 30 saxo [Ty SuPpUN Imo wo svoREIapIswOD poNpS ssersosn49 02 axoiand up awod9q sey LSHOLI yeep UIEAIDD st ar Sast02101 9 pasod Lanu2ip paw wopoayy wecny on sad oyp SBADWWH|AL “WOH Jo seaxKp ay Jo $M pura 29u0 46 JEM ‘Sisye>s U1, ¢st>q, Poursap as0Wp Jo AnuD ayy 108 Sutseasour 22a2 quia FuyoNWoU 3940 pow axp sapBOUNE woRwIARLET 23e dygy “2oq(d 8 ut 20109 aaey—apnos uacop ssoqufizu 100d Bop WON sorHDUEY Apream yo SUR panp e YseIs] wos e2tp Suppiap soypoue ‘epur pur ysopefveg, uaesiog zopI0q 218 Buo|" ouo—s10%n Aue Ing “uREIG UT GOP DW [eA 280 gatdoad 30 Gayrqow 2x2 uo suopousses snasofit apeid ue siopsoq ary aoqjod or patmuaiep os a1ous 4949 awadde savas uoney Sioasty urotins snomexd Jue re 430 suontpuoa aus 30 pay soy spoo8 Jf uasa Sey a sf Aug “Uonezteqos 30 siuauodoxd 2xp 03 posod aq 01 suonsonb aanueasqns 210ur feeus are as34p “woneozumuniio Jo sjooox0sd pue surz0y sou Bunear oe so ~ojouo% eatip Huey Spprdes soy 10 ‘12p30q sso S391} AO} sPoog 323 oY 30 voREsOpysuoD 2xp WoY} apIse SoaaMOp} SPwUL “HFN ‘Yosorogy “PHO “U ) TI 01 3040 pos axp pores$ Aaynqisia oxp Buyquuasoy Ajprouror uaxa Sompive tars uoneiodio9 30 penpratpur aff ¥ s9pt9ap osu s940 uy paonposd iow sey dzisnpur zaandiuon affay Serpe seep toe ep jo suez.F09 axe Kup uas9 Inq ‘seeIpUy OF 9 Panui uooq aay ‘sox0% uBfas03 poqrys 103 panzoson‘anEIg PoHUA 9tp o) sears uomfojduis sueeSow-Uow Ey-44 ax 30 {0S steak oeuos wr aap 29% 249 og asvo Seu Sse appr WEIPUL OL, una ae seep Syoot we sea auoygt aM ayy PB AH aznosqo roMU ey INg day Aq passu0D S34 x>4sUUN ain onur poddes Apuragrufis ancy few ‘Soruonao> ur auawe Surpeoy amp se JPomr paysyqese mou sey sep awawofsu09 rerox © Sionsues sna raneax, pur Jvonesouuy, 309 fapou 28 Somsrony Sqesesur ‘xepduio aqp soysosny Snmosos Sem] UeDHOUIY EMR apeUL 9q 01 zUoMN UE ‘SSIn0D Jo ‘St SILL CUE Saete, 09 apr ayqenas v 81 wos PIO seaK-gy Sus 2 "YeHoUY guossiey sMoRPY ZeUBIsap awed ysIpamg ppe ©2 24H] pros 2uo ‘p19¢ Ssenuel uf Supizn SnoN) aang Pion Jo 1padse Buruyap v seai—ernyeg pu sopeiog ‘ino Puno} sa40 ppow 943 og Buno$ 30 sauared sse aypprur se “vowo puo—sowe8 opuauiN pur ‘efuews ‘uoneurue &q pozt “ersemnyo “apna dod asaurclef yo wonerayqoxd prasdsoptas Pov pide aun Sopeoap 22uyp 01 om 249 SuIpPLUOS zos “ama {w9POW J0 suedr poziBoses SqeqoHH Kuo 2x9 YIN BIOs tow S20P sae PaUEA 2p Te yons Spuapyjns pozyeqors ‘Uaaq JPS sey ConBzreqOTF Jo eapr amp zeUp asofns 07 19809 av seit20ape [ap90qD QuoREANEGOHS nq ‘UOD:pazteqo‘ 0 Santa sup ast2j36 ur doe pedo v soxdnooo sous pam SL 90rd Syqun asous 249 ut parmenoaus ‘stuouasHasape 1909 Sfomys2uI25, $9405 pu ‘oqojs 24p punoxe aouasexd soy sbign v aaey tprqss “soupy wopjoo, spreuoqaeyy pun op Ie? Its uonveseqo(? uew @, s20ys aN ox soup saLng oxy ‘soumeu pow, st poyruip sisolqo apppod wm ur oun ~jrpe Sooure ‘urprol rua (pains «ou axp) poo, DELL “ureeyDag prarcy So.9paq 2904 ‘ss9y¥ JoUOF| soon Sunsods apnpout asaqp_suoor punowe auawxe ajqeiapssuca + [ibyans, Somalians, Pakistanis, Indians, or Nicaraguans—now requires no justification. (Let us recall that Le Monde, the most prestigious French-language newspaper in the world, ran an editorial on September 13, 2001, declaring: tragique, . 4 nous sommes tous Améi the first thing cans!” Hada simi ‘one imagine Le Monde pronouncing in a are all Ethiopians’, or ‘We are all Indians’? “America, as Malcolm X might have said, the entire world acts like ‘house Negroes’: when the master falls sick, the healthy servant must declare himself diseased, too; when America is ‘hurt all of us must experience that pain in our heart, and if wwe do not we are just heartless) ‘Whatever the raising of walls between nation states says about tensified patrolling of borders, the more interesting ques- tion is whether borders and boundaties are now accompanied by a new set of significations. What, if we may pose a dif- ferent set of questions, might be the new forms of inequality outsourcing is a palpable permits the wealthier nations to ‘without the presumed hazards of immigrant growth? Have the indentured laborers of the nineteenth century paved the way for the cyber-coolies of the twenty-first century, and do the ‘Harminders, Satinders, and Jatinders who man the phones at call centers in India (and the Philippines) , masquerading undet the monikers of Harry, Sam, and Jesse, respectively, signal the advent of new opportunities for young women and men of ‘developing’ nations or do they only serve as an assurance to the ‘developed’ world that the world labor markets still skewed heavily in its favor? ‘Tounderstand just what are the ramifications of globalization, ‘we should call to mind the decisive part played by colonialism in the shaping of modern history. Vast chunks of the world ‘were held in an iron grip by a few marauding nations wholly unrestrained by any principles or moral standards. The age of exploration and navigation, which commenced in Europe a litle over 500 years ago, eventually paved the way for the colonization of the Americas, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Near East, Polynesia, and other parts of the world over the course of the next 200-300 years, Historians have deawn distinctions between plantation col other colonies with varying degrees of direct and indirect cule In the Americas and Australia, the indigenous populations ‘were wiped out; in South Africa, black and colored people -were confronted with stern subjugation under the Boers; and in the Congo, the same re tion of the native people by the Europeans, were achieved in Buropean-owned rubber plantations. The history of the British in India is bookended by massive famines: 10 million perished in Bengal in the wake of Clive’s ‘conquest’ of India, and of the many hugely unsavory patting gifts that the bestowed on India on the eve of their departure, almost isas striking as the death toll of three million from starvation in Bengal—all so that the troops fighting to ‘save the world” from totalitarianism could be adequately fed, Much more, needless to say, could be said in this vein, 9 f the many idioms in which the great game of colonialism ly is in those numerous discussions that seek to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ colonialisms. British ira- perial historians, holding chaired professorships at Cambridge, Harvard, and elsewhere, stil engage with unbridled enthusiasm in this puesile exercise; the pros and cons of colonialism are ‘weighed with sobriety and seeming judiciousness, and the ‘massacres, famines, and economic exploitation are set against the blessings of Christianity the system of roads, posts, and telegraph, and—above all—the introduction of law and order to natives who everywhere are thought to have been starved of good government Dut ‘the rule of la the country that gave the mass murderers, heartless fiends, ‘east Aftiea in 2005, Chancel- lor Gordon Brown, inted Prime Minister of Great declased candidly: “P've talked to many people on my Africa and the days of Britain having to apologise for its colonial history are over. We should celebrate much of our ppast rather than apologise for ie” (Daily Mail, 15 January 2008). Considering that rendering apologies has become a pastime for imperial powers, pethaps it is best that Britain is no longer jn the mood for repentance. Modesty was never the strong suit of colonial powers: about the same time that Brown was declaring himself pleased with his predecessor's achievements, the aw of 23 February 2005? was passed in France, requiring school teachers to “acknowledge and recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in 10 or tyrants, Ona st North Aftica.” We should not be surprised if today some in France, mindful of the revolutions that have swept the Arab world and the Maghreb, ate congratulating themselves on their supposed legacy of liberty and fraternity and taking th credit for (in George Antonius’ phrase) ‘the Atab awakening”. Finally, the press ia the West seems to agree, the individual is ‘emerging in societies hitherto characterized only by the pres- ence of collectivities. ‘The crowning of the individual, raised ‘0 new heights of awareness and the aspiration for freedom, is apparently ‘the end of history’—even if, as now seems to be the ease, the individual often has litte more than the freedom to choose between McDonalds and Burger King, or Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola, In the free world, one must be allowed one’s inane choices, never beyond Tveedledee and Tweedledum. eis thus an indisputable fact, except to those who live in ab- solute awe of the Enlightenment’ categories and have decided that all of our universalisms are to be derived from European thought, that Europe's colonization of the world, when it did ‘not lead to the outright decimation or extermination of na- tive peoples, resulted in the extinction of lifestyles, cultural life forms, and the biological, cultural, and social inheritance of colonized societies. Everywhere the colonizers sought to impose upon the colonized their worldview. Nothing should consequently be allowed to obscuse the fundamental fact of colonialism and the post-colonial era every conquest is, in the first instance, a conquest of knowledge. The epistemologi cal imperatives of the colonial state have only in the last few decades begun to receive the critical sctutiny of scholars and commentators. ‘The British in India, to adduce the example a of peshaps the most significant enactment of colonialism anywhere in the world, devoted themselves to an exhaustive study of India's social and intellectual traditions: grammars of Indian languages were created; translations of scriptural texts were authorized; the legal texts of Hindus and Muslims were codified; the land was mapped and its inhabitants counted, ‘measured, and classifieds and ‘communities’ were enumerated, marked, and named In the present conditions of globalization, Western knowledge systems have sought, largely with success, to gain complete ‘dominance across the globe in neatly all spheres of life. The world as we know it today is understood almost entirely through categories that are largely the product of Western knowledge systems and the academic disciplines that have been charged ‘with codifving, disciplining, organizing, institutionalizing and transmitting knowledge not only about the physical and mate- tial world, but also about the various social, political, culsura, religious, and legal institutions and practices found among diverse human communities. The economists’ conceptions of growth, poverty, scarcity, and development, marketed by all the socialsciences, have created a virtual monopoly of knowledge about the social world. ‘Yet, the sum total of Western social science has been to mire the so-called developing world in ever more acute levels of poverty, and even forestall the possibility of worldviews and lifestyles that do not synchronize with the conception of the ‘good life’ that prevails in the ‘developed’ West. ‘The entire theory of development is predicated on a time-lag: countries that have variously been described as under- developed of (as is more frequently the case today) developing, 2 seek to emulate the developed countries, but by the time they have seemingly caught up, the developed countries have gone ‘well beyond to another plane of development. The native, to speaksina different congue, always arrive late at the destination; indeed, the theory of development condemns the underdevel- oped to live not their own lives, but rather to full someone clse’s conception of life. Colonialism sought to compel the conquered to jettison their past; globalization seeks to hijack their futures If the native’s present is the Buropean's past, the native’ future is the European’ present the voluminous literature on globalization that has recent years, there is scarcely the recognition, then, that what has been most effectively globalized are the knowledge systems of the West. There is presently no more urgent task than understanding the political and epistemological ‘consequences of the imposition of the West upon the entire ‘world, and at the same time endeavoring to work, in myriad towards the decolonization of academic disciplines. ‘What is also distinctive about the knowledge edifice of the ‘modern Westis its refusal to concede parity o other knowledge systems, of even to recognize that there can be a plurality of knowledge systems. What histories and cultures of science did ‘modern science suppress in its march towards ascendaney? It ig a telling fact, to take one illustration, that though Goethe ‘would be crowned as one of the supreme figures of Western humanism, venerated as a poet, novelist, dramatist of letters’, his equally large body of work in scientific od, anim: ignored. Working against the positivist framework of modem 13 science associated with Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, Goethe argued that “natural objects should be sought and investigated as they are and not to suit observers, but respectfully as if they ‘were human beings” [see Goethe's Way of Stience:A Phenomenal gy of Nature, eds. David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc, 1998). Such a view cannot be reconciled with che impulse, which has dominated the modera West, that man should establish his dominion over nature If Goethe could be silenced and ridiculed by the scientific ‘communities of the West, we should barely be surprised that the notion that aboriginal and tribal people may be possessed. of knowledge was greeted with derision and stil receives scant respect among practitioners of modern science, even if rmul- ticulturalism, plaralism, and the pacans sung to diversity ate all inscribed into the official ideologies of the modern West. Sometimes Western scientists have had to concede that there is much in the ‘ways of knowing’ of ‘others’ that might reason- ably pass for knowledge. Pacific Islanders, for example, must have dawn upon a vast storehouse of knowledge to be able to. traverse thousands of miles without modern navigational aids, (Of course, no department of philosophy in the United States or Europe would deign to offer a course on traditional, aboriginal or local knowledges, this being the provenance of anthropol- ogy. The West always has the advantage of ex-nomination, it being understood that philosophy means Western philosophy, like conclusion might be drawn with respect and so on. When we wish to convey som philosophy, then we can designate it as Aftican philosophy, 4 Indian philosophy, or Chinese philosophy. Musie departments in American universities generally confine themselves toa study of what s apparently proper music, namely the (classical) music of the West; che musical traditions of others are embraced under the rubric of ‘ethnomusicology’, just as the sciences of others are ‘ethnosciences’ The critical task before us isto aid in the transformation of ‘knowledge’ into ‘knowledges’ and restore those knowledge systems that have been marginalized, rubbished, and browbeaten into submission to their fll ntel- lectual and cultural dignity, Even the burden of oppression did not fll evenly upon every- ‘one, None were as brutally colonized as the people of Attica — sold off into slavery, severed from their homelands, estranged from the ordinary tes of hearth and home, maimed from head to toe, stripped of their names, and mercilessly beaten into submission, ‘There is a peculiar cunning of reason by which the atrocities of the Holocaust become marked as ‘crimes against humanity’—a category of atrocities first wrought into legal existence at the Nuremberg war crimes trials—and as erimes which demeaned the dignity of every human being, while the unspeakable horrors of the slave trade, carried out not over the course of a decade but over several centuries, are deplored. only as the crimes committed against Africans, Some pcople have even pretended that people of African origins who would in time become patt of the global African diaspora ought £0 be grateful to the slave-ownets who sold their ancestors into slavery and brought many of them over to the ‘New World? for spating several generations of them the horrors that continue to afflict the many millions of Africa still ensnared in civil 15 ‘wars, the brutal tyrannies of dictatorships, and the woes of hunger and disease “The intellectual colonization of Africa was, correspondingly, ‘of a magnitude that has seldom been comprehended—and this, brings us to the subject of the present pamphlet, The Pats of Representation and State Violence opie: The Oromo Calotial Experiena, by the anthropologists Gemetchu Megerssa and ‘Aneesa Kassam. In a previous pamphlet in this series, the ‘African-American scholar Molefi Asante, who argues that cen- tuties of colonization robbed Afticans of their land, spricual tance, and ultimately and most devastatingly hegemonic worldview chat is best calculated, in his judgment, to restore Africans and people of African origin to a notion of centcedness that would be liberatingin every respect. However, as this text by Megerssa and Kaseem suggests, the history of Ethiopia offers an interesting instantiation of the complexities of the ‘colonial experience’, Various histories of colonial domi- nation and class struggle have amply shown that those who are subalterns to elites may yet stand in a hierarchical relationship of domination to others; moreover, there are various forms of “internal colonization’. One notable example is furnished by the liish, whose alleged slavish subjection to the Pope and the ‘Church made them the objects of vile abuse by the English; suggest that the ‘G Famine’ was a consequence not only of policies which gave English Protestant absentee landlords all the rights without any corresponding obligations butalso of a blind faith in the “free market’ that bordered on a 16 genocidal impulse on the part of Protestant ‘who thought of their Catholic subjects as Yet its the lish who, in British colonies such as India, played ‘more than a willing role alongside their English brethren in putting down ‘inferior natives’. The example of the Oromo in Ethiopia is, of course, not entirely analogous: as Megerssa and Kaseem point out, though the Oromo constitute about half of Ethiopia's population of some 80 million, comprising “the largest ethno-linguistic group in modern-day Ethiopia and ‘minorities in Kenya and Somali.” they faced acute political and epistemological violence from “successive political regimes as partof the Euro-Abyssinian colonial project” What the case of the Oromo, who have however not occupied the positions ‘of both the colonizer and the colonized, does underscore is the importance of querying whose Aftica we have in mind ‘when we speak of Africa, and the circumstances under which indigenous forms of oppression sometimes enter into a pact ‘with the colonial project: Echiopia has very often been viewed as an anomaly, and not ‘only for the reason that it remained one of the very few coun- tsiesin the global South to escape European colonization, bar- ringa short period of occupation of the country by the Italians. (1936-41). Its apparent anomalousness is derived rather from the fact that Ethiopia could not be assimilated to the notion Of black Africa that prevailed among Europeans. Ethiopia had an indigenous written script, and its history pointed to a ‘well-developed state; Christianity had established in Ethiopia «foothold in the first century CE, and the extraordinary archi- tectural monuments of Aksum—an empire that flourished in v northern Ethiopia and Esitrea—gave the lie to the view that black Africa was ineapable of producing great artefacts of intellectual orartistic labor. ‘That paragon of racism, the much celebrated philosopher Hegel, had given it as his considered opinion that black Affica was to be likened to “the land of Idhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious his- tory, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night” (This is what passes for “the philosophy of history” in the enlightened West, ‘where the habit of iteration, of mindless repetition, of such supposed truths is deeply engrained in popular and intellectual culture alike) Ethiopia's susprising worthiness, so to speak, ‘was to be explained by supposing that its civilization was the outcome of Semitic setters who found black people, as Sir E. Wallis Budge was to write, “savages, and taught them civiliza- tion and culture” Edward Ullendorf, the highly influential Britain-based scholar and one-time confidant to Emperor Haile Selsassi, readily took recourse to the crudest form of physical anthropology in defense of the Semitic hypothesis: “Generally spealking, the predominant Ethiopian type reveals fairly close anthropometric affinities to that commonly found among the ‘Azabs of South Arabia, ic. medium stature, long face, a fairly straight and thin nose—all characteristics not encountered among the neighbouring African peoples. The hair is curly of ftizzy, lips are thinner and very much Jess protruding than is otherwise the case in Afric.” ‘Thus, as generations of Eu- ropean commentators and scholars came to believ and persistent grafting of a white element on bla had given ivits distinct characteristics and so saved it from the fate that befell he rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Ullendorf makes an appearance in the present text by Mé and Kaseem as well, but their criticism marks him as. 7 Ethiopianist” who was contemptuous of the Oromo: “The Galla [Oromo] had nothing to contribute to the civilization ‘of Ethiopia; they possessed no material or intellectual cul- ture and their social organization was at a far lower stage of development than that of the population among whom they settled.” ‘The burden of their critique is that Ethiopianism, itself moulded from Orientalism and fied by the ambition to ‘consolidate the “Semitic, Oriental, Judaco-Christian image of the [dominant] Ambara, presenting them as the forgers and enlightened rulers of a ‘Greater Ethiopia’ and as natural allies of the West is deployed in the interest of “physica, systemic and epistemological violence perpetrated against the Oromo.” "Though Megerssa and Kaseem do not state tas such, neatly all of the conflicts in Africa have been engendesed by the imposi- tion of the diseased idea of the nation-state: the hopes which ‘give tise to the nation-state in the wake of every liberation movement were squashed, to be sure, but the notion of the nation-state, which has everywhere been a rather bloody affai, itself represents a form of colonization, and in this respect ‘we can say that one of Ethiopianism’s more rorten fruits is the idea that the Amhara are the genuine inheritors of what i called Ethiopia. Megerssa and Kaseem dedicate their pam- philet, revolving around the suppressed histories and warped tepresentations of the Oromo, to a study of what might be described as epistemological torttoriazaton ‘This pamphlet series, as I noted at the outset, is one of several enterprises to have emerged out of the desire of some scholass, 19 academics, activists, and public intellectuals, who first convened together in Penang, Malaysia in early 2002, to create a new foram. Multiversity aims to provide a rigorous and searching ctitique of the frameworks of modern knowledge, and thus work towards more ecumenical political and cultural futures. Muhtversity’s member be conversely facilitate of the South. Long, before India, China, Southeast Africa interacted with Burope, they interacted wi ‘Ocean was a global world, a crossroads, but part of the effect of colonialism has been to obscure a common awareness of these eatlier histories, The conception of what constitutes the ‘world? has narrowed so considerably thar everywhere outside Eutope it means knowledge only of one’s own country and of the Euro-American world, ‘These, apparently, ae the borders of our supposed cosmopolitanism. es can be no intercultural dialogue or genuine exchange of rms of the conversation are set exclu- is synonymous with consumer choice and white domination 20 (sometimes appearing in the relatively more beniga form of primus inter par), is now ironically poised to become a template for societies where the ground reality has always been plural. Multiversity aims at resisting, through such initiatives as this pamphlet series, insidious forms of resurgent colonialism and creating the conditions that would permit dissenting knowl ‘edges to flourish, ‘Pamphlets have long had an association with revolutions, move- ‘ments for social change, and popular demands for reform of government, Many of the most famous works of politcal dissentin the West itself originated as pamphlets, among them aine’s Common Sense and 'Thoreau’s On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, Pamphlets played an instrumental role in creating, the conditions for change at 2 ow and education was the priv Areopagiica (1644), which beats the subtitle, of Unlicensed Printing’, suggests the conditions under which a pamphlet literature germinated and flourished. The American Revolution, it would be no exaggeration to say, was fought ‘with pamphlets as much as with canons, and pamphlets by monarchists, patriots, and rebels flew thick across the Adantic. History’s most famous pamphleteer may have been Marx, and it is striking that Engels, in his eulogy to his friend on 17 March. -membeted him as the author of ‘a host of militant ”, Marx famously wrote in the Eighteenth Brumaire, tepresented”. Mars passionate defense of the au Paris commune of 1871 likewise appeated as a pamphlet, The Gisil War in France, ‘The social history of pamphlets must allow for much else, such as their role in workers’ education and the creation of a class of autodidacts. Pamphlets contributed much to the vivid expansion of the public sphere that took place in most societ- ies in che 19" century. Demands for lifting estictions on the struggles were often waged not only with arms but on the back of pamphlets, and interestingly, given the subject matter of the present pamphlet, the Italian Fascist invasion and occupation of Ethiopia (1935-41) furnishes one of the best examples of the art of politcal pamphleteering, A defense of I lands for displaying” their “virtues of organization” and “ca- pacity for work” —was mounted by apologists of colonialism in those by the British-Italian the Societa Dante Aligheti ("Italian Civilisation in Ethiopia", London, 1936], and Giulio Baravelli[“The Last Stronghold of Slavery: What Abys- sinia Is”, Rome, 1935]. However, a much greater number of pamphlets were published in concerted opposition to Italy’s designs upon Ethiopia, and the League of Nations Union, the highly respected journal Tde New Stateman, the British Red Cross Society, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, alongside well-known British intellectuals and pacifists such as Leonard Woolf, Sir Norman Angell, Lord Davies, and Oliver 2 Baldwin were among those who offered a principled and often impassioned critique of Italy's colonial ambitions in Ethiopia and the doctrine of Abensranm. Itis possible to argue that the etry of masses into politics, 1 process that took place over decades if not a few centuties, and the gradual growth of the franchise in many countries, eventually diminished the appeal of pamphlets even if such developments were simultaneously facilitated by the pamphlet. What is certain is that the art of pamphleteering suffered a precipitous decline inthe second half of the twentieth century, at least in the modern West, and the advent and eventually wide dispersion of other forms of media, commencing with the radio and television and now encompassing technologies that have taken us to an altogether different threshold of what ‘used to be called the ‘information revolution’, have appeared to obviate the necessity of a pamphlet culture, However, the apparent democratization of the media, which has also been. accompanied by the relentless concentration of ownership of ‘media in its various forms in a few hands, has arguably created anew the conditions for a revival of what I would like to call ‘the pamphlet culture’, Perhaps, asin Milton's time, pamphlets may well be the mode of generating new ideas and a culcare of dissent in the midst of staggering conformity, untold number Of platieudes about ‘commitment to excellence’, diminishing numbers of serious readers, and the propensity towards the ‘sound bite’, There is certainly much more agreement about the role played by samizdat—srall pamphlets, and various forms of self publishing and cheap reproduction of print literature—in creating dissident cultures of resistance in the former Soviet 23 Union than there is about the much-touted and inconsequen- tial role of Twitter in helping foment Iran’s Green Revolution of 20009. In India, down to the present day, civil society and hhuman rights movements have relied heavily on the pamphlet to disseminate information. The revival of the pamphlet may bbe one of the many necessary steps that have to be taken to generate @ renewed sense of political urgency. ‘This pamphl ‘mote public and accessible forum of informed and dissenting opinion than is customarily available through scholarly mono- ‘graphs and learned journals. It is hoped that this pamphlet, and others in the seties of which itis part, will be inspiring toall who are committed to harvesting theories of knowledge, livelihoods, and forms of political awareness that are calculated to lead to more genuine forms of equality, justice, and plurality. Readers are invited to learn more about the pamphlet series and Multiversity by accessing hup:/ /wwammultiworldindia ong and betp://vlalboluclacdu/muliversity/ Los Angeles 31 January 2014 ‘The Politics of Representation and State Violence in Ethiopia: ‘The Oromo Colonial Experience Gemetchu Megerssa and Aneesa Kassam anthropology’s 3 @)the changing @) national anthro- ; (4) the imploding crises in anthropology and its attempts to “re-invent” the discipline; and elsewhere in his work (5) the matetial and epistemological forms of violence to which indigenous peoples have been subjected by the State and the Academy respectively 1992: 342) begins his essay with the following obser- 1 mid-nineteenth century, anthropology has status OF a science—sometimes stridently, some- 25 Anthropology is not a dispassionate science like astronomy, ‘which springs from the contemplation of things ata distance, Ttis the outcome of a historical process which has made the larget part of mankind subservient to the other, and dusing ‘which millions of innocent human beings have had their re= sources plundered and their institutions and beliefs destroyed, whilst they themselves were ruthlessly killed, thrown into ‘bondage, and contaminated by diseases they were unable to sesist. Anthropology is the daughter ins capacity to assess more objective! the human condition reffects, on the epistemol state of affairs in which one part of mankind teat the ofher asa ebjct [ou ales. “To take the argument even further, by claiming this “scientific” status and by reifying the “Other”, anthropology has provided intellectual legitimacy for acts of physical violence against in- digenous peoples by the Stave and multinational corporations and some of its theoretical constructs can be said to constitute ‘a form of “epistemic” or “epistemological” violence in the Sartrean and post-structuralist senses.! “These and other modalities of violence have not diminished ia the contemporary world. ‘To the contrary, they have bes even more widespread and lethal. According to Yates (20) citing William Butler Yeats? form part of a “widening gyre”, an expanding spiral that is en- 26 compassing the entite globe, as “things fall apart” everywhere in these troubled post 9/11 times, Relatively under-documented until recently, there is now a bourgeoning literature on the topic of violence. One example from anthropology is Patrick ‘Tierney’s 2000) controversial study of the Yanomani Indians, Darkness in E! Dorado. The Yanomarni, who inhabit a remote re- gion on the border of Venezuela and Brazil, have been depicted in the anthropological literature as exemplars of Hobbesian “primitive” violence. Tierney, like other researchers, questions themselves the manifold abuses that he alleges, Ticency maintains that the ‘Yanomami served as guinea pigs in cesearch projects fanded by the US Atomic Energy Com responses to radiation and to observe the spread of epidemics like measles. Its these disturbing claims which have catalysed the latest crisis in the discipline and have instigated calls for a more “engaged” or “committed” anthropology. Asin the criss of the late 1960s, which implicated anthropology in the colonial project, and the “crisis of representation” of the 1980s, which provoked critiques European Enligh ment “knowledge project” (Gee Said 1989; Stocking 1 the individual and institutional responses to the current one 7 j appropriated and given an ahistorical, neo-liberal interpretation, other individuals and departments, with a longer-term vision of the problem, are making gemuine attempts to make reparations for the pastand to find new ways forward (see Scheper-Hughes 2004: 61-68). Other institutional responses have included the setting up of a task force by the American Anthropological ‘Association to investigate the Yanomami affair, resulting in a statement on the subject in 2003 (later rescinded) and a review of the ethical procedures for carrying out fieldwork. Generally, however, it would seem that sis, like the preceding ones, is being “domesticated” and after the inital furore has dicd down, it will, predictably, be followed by a return to “busi- ness as usual”, as Stocking (1992: 359) aptly puts it. From the point of view of many indigenous peoples today, on the other hand, mainstream Western anthropology no longer has Gf iteverhad) any legitimacy or authority to represent them, In the 2010 documentary film, Secret of the Tribe, for example, a sentiment echoed elsewhere in the Americas, a Ynomami community spokesman declares: “We no longer want anthto- pologists. You should no longer want to study over here...Do not come... We do not want you to work in our land.” For our part, as non-Western insider-outsider collaborative anthropolo- gists approaching this topic in the reconciliatory spirit of the ancient Oromo democratic practice of lag’ ilaami (“listening and talking to another”), like eatlier scholars, we argue that if anthropology’ methods could be applicd in a mote politically informed, committed and empowering way, it could pave the ‘way to a new revolutionary praxis and ethic of responsibility (ee Huizer and Mannheim 1979). 28 ‘There ate a number of ways in which the experiences of the communities themselves can be represented, including biog- taphy and participatory video. As part of an approach that combines views from both within and without, using ethnohis- tory, history and critical theory, we examine the problem of the Oromo in Ethiopia, th have been subjected by st the Euro-Abyssinian col and the epistemologi- cal violence and systematic tation that they have suffered through what we call “Ethiopianism”, the set of popular, academic and media discourses about the country that mutually inform each other, modelled on Edward Saie’s (1995) Foucauldian-inspired analysis of “Orientalism”. Like Foucault and other critical theorists, we believe that such a reflection is not merely an academic exercise, but represents a form of praxis, or “action-practice”, through which “strategic knowledge” about problema one, can be built? Such a stance tisan, Having contextualized our dis of the larger set of issues affecting anthropology today, to which we will return in our conclusion, we now turn to these more local concerns and show how they are articulated with broader imperial and neo-imperial geopolitical designs in the Hom of Africa, ‘The Colonial Situation and the Oromo Experience ‘The Oromo, whose language belongs to the Eastern-Cushitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic linguistic family, constitute the larg- est ethno-linguistic group in modern-day Ethiopia and minosi- ties in Kenya and Sotnalia There are also pockets of Oromo in. 29 ‘other countties of the region, which have been absorbed into ‘other communities as a result of long-term historical processes. a Ethiopia, the Oromo number some forty million, making ‘up about half of the total population. Icis difficult to provide precise figures on their demography due to the policies of the Ethiopian administrations, which have been dominated historically by members of the Semitic-speaking Ambara ian elites. This “politics of ians and scholars of the Oromo, as well as by a “politics of representation”, through which the negative portrayals made of the Oromo have been challenged. ‘According to our rendering of the oral traditions, in the pre- ‘conquest period, the Oromo formed a “nation”, in the North. ‘American Indian sense, a confederacy made up of five paired territorial groups, which was governed by their own ancient ‘democratic customs, subsumed under the institution of Gadaa* This indigenous form of governance operated through locally ‘lected assemblies which functioned on the basis of a centrally are among the southern Boorana pastoral groups today), and through which the offensive and defensive engagements of the ‘wo military leagues were regulated. The titular leader of this ‘traditional polity was the Supreme Qaallw (or Abba Muadad, “Father of Anointment”), a shaman-ptiest to whom tribute ‘was paid by the five phratries as part of a pilgsimage made to “anoint” and be “anointed” by him. Until the conquest of the 30 ‘Oromo by the Abyssinians atthe end of the ninercenth century, this centre was located, frst literally, then symbolically, in the vicinity of the present-day capital of Addis Ababa (which the Oromo call Finfinnee, meaning “the place of producing and reproducing the cultural traditions”), in the fertile highlands of the present administrative province of Shoa (which they call Shegar, “the beautiful land”), For centuries before the coming of Christianity and Islam, the Oromo, who emerged 2s a distinct entity through a series of historical transformations from the ancestral group, had been, ‘by many accounts, an important cultural force in the Horn of Afriea, an influence This ascendancy was no some Western anthropologis «framework of mods of being, thinking, believing and doing, ‘common to many of the other Sudano-Sahelian communities of the region, as well as through the exchange of goods and produce and the creation of bond friendships and networks across ethnic and linguistic borders Tt was also shaped by technological and intellectual innovations made to cope with the environmental constraints, which included the elaboration of a calendar for predicting cyclical disasters and recording cli- ‘matic history, using the fo \dover/ takeover of custodial power in the Gadae system (and its variants) every eight years as a chronological framework and mnemonic device. Through the military alliances and pacts that they forged with other smaller »guistically related groups, the Oromo became tend 9, guining an edge over other communi ties by their combat strategies and use of cavalry. This external warfare was conducted according to well-established rules of 31 sli ae ills ‘engagement and protocols of conflict resolution. Internally, this alliance, which s inclusive indigenous philosophico-moral system differed dls- ‘metrically from the repressive theopolitical one espoused by the Abyssinian ruling classes, which was based on the exclusive, “divine right” to rule, conquer, colonize, subjugate, enslave and exterminate. With the coming of Christianity in northern “Ethiopia” in the fourth century and of Islam along the Red Sea coast in the seventh and the expansion of these two competing forces inwards and downwards in the centuries that followed, a new set of politico-economic and religious factors and military technologies were introduced, leading to varying responses on the part of the Oromo and other indigenous groups caught in the pincers of these contending powers. In the different zones of conflict and depending on their internal dynamics, these included resistance, nominal conversion, assimilation, collabo- zation, espousal of the new religio-cultural values by co-opted lites, taking sides in the confit in the name of religion against thei own kinsmen, fight from the areas affected, capitulation, ora combination of these reactions, giving rise to the religious ‘and regional differences and producing the political factional- ism that characterizes inter-Oromo relations today. 32 ‘Traditional historians represent these twin forces as a double- ter, called Dygha “Drinker” (of blood) or Likimsra “Swallower” (of flesh), which was bent on devouring them and their rch resources. According to these elders, the Oromo, centre, which was previously located at the source of the Blue Nile at Lake Tana, moved to a new location within the inde- peadent territory of the centeal Macea-Tullama phratries in the region of Shoa, in order to avoid forced Christianization by the clergy accompanying the encroaching settler-colonialists (Megerssa Oral Teachings; Oromia Culture and Tourism Bu- eau, 2006, henceforth OCTB). This move probably occurred between the ninth or tenth centuries AD (sce OCTB 2006: 50), Subsequently, as Amhara colonists expanded into the same ‘Shoan region, the entourage of the Abka Muudaa was forced to relocate southwards again and again for security reasons, whilst siill holding Finfinnee to be the legitimate supra-centre of the Oromo, to which it would strive to return. It did s0 between {n the aftermath of the anti-Abyssinian struggle ahim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Geagn, the ained from the Ottoman Turks, in which many Islamized Oromo participated in order to regain their conquered lands, This interpretation provides a different angle on the so-called Oromo sixt “expansion” thesis propounded by Ethiopianis This image of a rapacious and self destructive two-headed ‘monster succinctly captures the complex inter-ethnic, religious ‘and politico-economic realities of the unfolding situation. One oral historian advances a thesis suggesting that its trunk was composed of indigenous Cushitic groups which had inter- snixed with Semitic scttler-colonial ones and with other peoples 3 tianity and Islam, pulling it (Megerssa Oral Teachings). ‘The elder calls this ethnic by-produet Dagamsnn “mixed/mixed ‘up people”. This idea of admixture is not a novel one, but one ‘that has Jong been in circulation in popular thought and in the literature to explain one of the meanings of the Europeanized name “Abyssinian” (Habasba) (“of mixed blood”). In the following centuries, a triangular confict developed between the Oromo, the Christians, and Muslims, in which other smaller ethnic groups were caught up. In the case of the Christians and Muslims, it formed part of a bid for control of the agriculturally rich region of Shoa, which also served 8 a nodal point linking the network of lucrative trade routes westwards, northwards and southwards. These Christians and Muslim groups were armed and supported by a series of external powers with vested interests in “Ethiopia”, as the cempire-state forged by the Abyssinians came to be known. For the Oromo, it was part of a vital struggle to preserve their autonomy, In the northern and western tettitories inhabited by the Oromo, this led to the formation of kingdoms where temporary “war leaders” (abba dulad) assumed permanent politico-economic control of their communities and instituted dynastic rule (montunmad), modelled on the Christians and Islamic ones. The majority of the Oromo, however, created initia groups to resist these two enemies. The epicentre of this conifict became the Shoan plateau and its lowlands, which ‘was inhabited by ancestral Oromo groups. 34 Following a pattern set by the Orientalist Carlo Conti-Rossini in the early twentieth century in his translation of Arabic writings on Ethiopia, most Ethiopianist scholars have denied the pres- ence of the Oromo in Shoa, despite the historical evidence to the conteary. They claim that the atea was inhabited by other Eastern-Cushitic speakers named “Sidama”, since, in their ver- sion of events the “Galla” nomadic hordes, as they derogatively ‘Taddessse Tamrat (197 groups occupied an “extensive area south of the Jama River, the plateau of Shawa, Harar, and Bali, and extended right across the basins of the Rift Valley lakes as far west asthe left ile and beyond the river Didessa.” Yet this co-extensive with the tettitories inhabited historically by Oromo communities. In the Oromo language, the term “siddaamaa” is made up of the fusion of wo terms sid hamaa, meaning “bad enemies”. Itwas the ame given by cal historians to the Ambara Christians who were setling on theirlands. The confusion with the Siddaamoo or Siddzancoo, «group which had historically interacted and allied with the mo, thus arose through this misunderstanding of two similar sounding (when the final vowels are not voiced, as is often the case), but semantically different words. ‘According to Oromo omal traditions, the Shoan plateau and its lowlands were inhabited by sedentary and nomadic clans and sub-clans such as the Abbicha, Ada’a, Galan, Guyyoo Salgan, Grarya, Jiddaa, Karrayyun, Laalo, Liban, Odituu, Maaya, Meta, Salaale, Yaayyaa, Waayyun (Waa), and Warijh (see OCT 2006; Balcha 2011: 131-222) Many of these names, recognisable 35 even when they were incorrectly spelt or deformed, are also ‘mentioned in early Arab writings and in medieval Ethiopian hagiographical traditions and royal chronicles. These and other inconvenient historical facts relating to the demonstrable pres- ence of Oromo groups in the Shoa region long before the sixteenth century (see Hassen 1994: 44-45; OCTB 2006, Bulcha 2011: 142-200), have been glossed over by scholars, given a ‘vague attribution such as “pagan”, or omitted altogether from. their discussions, especially when these data contradicted the “Galla” expansion thesis. To return to the conflict in the region, between 1329 and 1331, in a series of battles, the Amhara king Amda-Siyon (r 1314-134) defeated the seven Muslim sultanates that had hed in the region, some of which may once have groups fleeing from the storm centre” 99). This displacement was one of the causes of the famine that afflicted the segion during this time. ‘This pattern of conquest, plunder, violence, and displacement resulting in famines, was continued by Amda-Siyon’s succes- sors and persists in a different form to the present day. These acts of violence increased in scale with the arrival of modern firearms provided to the Christian kings by emissaties of the European powers or purchased from them through the heavy tribute imposed on the subjugated populations. length a first-hand account of one such app ing massacre of the Shoan Meta Oromo in Decem which w: by Captain W. Cornwallis Hatt diplomatic and trade mission to Abyss led India, members of which accompanied spedition led by the Amhara warlord Sahle Sela (1814-1848): ‘A mipid detour thence to the westward in an hour disclosed the beautifully secluded valley of Finfinai [Finfinnee], which, in addition to the attfcial advantage of high cultivation, and snug hamlets, boasted a large share of natural beauty. Mead- lows of the tichest green tuef, sparkling cleat rivalets leaping down in sequestered cascades with shady groves af the most ‘magnificent juniper lining the slopes, and waving their moss- grovn branches above cheerfol groups of circular wigwams, plements of agriculture, proclaimed a district which had long escaped the hand of wrath, This had been se- ‘ected as the spot for the royal plunder and spoliation (...) every bush for the hunted foe, Women and gid from their hiding places to be husried into helpless captivity, (Old men and young were indiscriminately clain and mutilated among the ficlds and groves; flocks ancl herds were driven off in triumph, and house after house was sucked and con- signed to the flames [...]. Whole groups and families were surrounded and speared within the walled courtyards, which ‘were strewn with the bodies of the slain, [.,] In the course ” hours the division lef the desolated valley laden with spoil, and carrying with them numbers of wailing females and mnotilated orphan children, together with the barbarous trophies that hadl been stripped from the mangled bodies of their murdered victims. Similar brutal atcacks against other neighbouring Oromo groups were also witnessed during the same period by the Get- ‘man Protestant missionaries CW. Isenberg and JL. Keapf and have been described in their journals. These predatory expedi- sions were intensified by Sahle Selasie’s grandson, Menelik Il (r 1889-1913), who between 1865 and 1889, conquered in turn the Oromo inhabited regions of Shoa, the Gibe states, Wal- Jaga, Bale, Harraghe and Boorana, with an arsenal of weapons received from Britain, Italy, Russia, and, in particular, France (Gee Darkwah 1975). Some of Menelik’s bloodiest campaigns «were fought against the eastern Atssi Oromo, Ar the battle of ‘Azul in 1886, itis estimated that twelve thousand men fell. ‘A year later, at Anole, a trap was laid for unarmed men and ‘women, during which the right hands of the men and the tight breasts of the women were cut off, The severed body parts were tied to the necks of the victims and they were ordered +o walk home in this traumatised condition (Abbas Haji 1995: 15). These and othet episodes in the Oromo resistance strug- gle are discussed in greater detail by Hassen (1999; 2000) and Bulcha (2011; 321-378). In his treatment of the vanquished, ‘Menelik was emulating his former mentor (and captor), the Emperor ‘Tewodros II (r 1855-1868), described as “one of the most violent of all monarchs” through his repression of the Muslim Yajju and Wollo Oromo communities of northern. Ethiopia (Crammey 1972: 65). 38 In January 1887, Menclik led a force of more than 30,000 ‘men against the city of Harar, which had become the capital of Islam in Ethiopia, and defeated its small army at the battle ‘of Challango, at which mutilation was again practised. This victory marked a decisive turning point in the conflict with the Oromo, Shortly after his teiumphant return to Shoa, Menelik began the construction of his new capital of Addis Ababa at the site of the mineral hot springs in Finfinnee that had long, been sacred to the Oromo nation (see Holcomb and Ibssa 199%: 106-7). From this strategic base, he was able to conduct his final conquests of the southern Boorana and Gabra “pagan” ‘Oromo in 1888-9, through which he was able to more than double the size of his empire. He even pursued the refugees, Aeeing inco British-occupied Northern Kenya, claiming that they were bir tribute-paying subjects. In many of these conquests, Menelik was aided by the formida- ble Abbichu war leader Goobanaa Daacee. In Oromo history, the latter is viewed as the atch-traitor of the nationalist cause ‘and his name is synonymous with betrayal, buthe was probably ‘acting for complex reasons of his own (see Bassi and Megersaa 2008). The Abyssinian empire-state forged by Menelik and over ‘which he was to rule from 1889 to 1913 was, thus, founded oon these acts of ‘or “democratic”, has reverted to terr0 often, itis shameful to adit, with the participation of co-opted Oromo individuals, ian Colonialism and its Theopolitical Ideology Following a trend in colonial and post-colonial studies that has been critically #e-examining and interrogating the different mo- dalities of colonialism, we reject the commonly held view that “Abyssinia, lie Liberia, was spared the humiliation of European occupation, apart from a short period between 1936 and 1941 by Mussolin’s Italian forces and “self-governing”, “independ colonial petiod. Subjectively, many of the peoples of Bthiopia, and primarily the Oromo, have experienced Abyssinian rule as @ colonial one, but objectively, what is the nature of this colonialism? Since the “Ethiopian” experience does not ft into the generic pattern, how should we characterize it? Does it represent a special case in the history of the subje literature, there are two perspectives on the colonialism, which we term “internalist” and According to proponents of the internalist thesis, the Abyssin- jan elite was not doing the bidding of any of the metropolitan powers, but acted independently in the conquest of “Ethio- pia”, For instance, Reid (2011: 21), who reiterates the view of the Earl of Lytton (1966) and of other British officials of the time, holds that Ethiopia's colonial experience was one of “Affican-on-Aftican imperialism”, As evidence of this position, Menelik circular letter to the “Great Powers” in 1891, in which he portrays himself as “a colonial empire-builder in his own tight” (Hassen 1999: 116-117), is usually cited. In this letter (reproduced by the Fatl of Lytton 1966: 256), Menelik states I signify My Intention. ..to re-establish the ancient frontiers of Ethiopia as far as Khartoum and Lake Nyanza [Vietoria, with 40 all the Galla territories. Ihave not the leas intention of remain- ‘ng a disinterested onlooker if Powers from a distance come with the notion of dividing Africa between themselves” The externalist thesis was advanced by an American anthro- pologist, Bonnie Holcomb and the late Oromo political activ- ist, Sisai Ibssa( -24), who charactetize Ethiopia as a “dependent colonizer”, “In the dependent colonial model;" they argue, “an agent country was made to catty out the work of colonizing a designated region in alliance with a specific ‘national capitalist class.” This collaboration “wotked to the ‘mutual benefi: of the metropolitan capitalists and the coun- tries who became their agents in Africa. The agents, as junior partners, benefited by furthering thei own internal ambitions and relieving their own internal problems, Therefore, because the world economic order was operating to their advantage, the dependent colonizers did not (and sill do not, in the Ethiopian case) want to challenge or question that order ar the position they have taken in it" The majority of Oromo scholars sup- port this view: One of us (Megerssa 1997: 479.500) took the thesis of de- pendent-colonialism a step further, by examining its ideological ‘underpinnings and discussing its parallels with modern Israeli settler-colonialism. As Megerssa and others have shown, the Shoan Amhara monarchy’s claim to be a Chosen People and to possess a divine mandate to colonize the Promised Land of “Ethiopia” is enshrined in its myth of state. According to this myth, the founder of the “Solamonic” dynasty in Ethio- pia, Menelik J, the illegitimate son of the hypothetical union of the Jewish King Solomon with Makeda, the “Ethiopian” 4a Queen of Sheba, returned to Jerusalem in early adulthood, was recognized by his father, but for unknown reasons, decided to take the Ark of the Covenant from the Temple and bring it to Abyssinia. It was later housed in Axum, which became the “New Jerusalem” and Abyssinia became the “Second Zion”, legitimating the military conquest of the tettitory inhabited by non-Christians and rendering theie subjugation to be the religious duty and sacred mission of its kings, as well as jus- tifying their use of violence in achieving these goals. In these campaigns, all the kings claimed to be restoring the borders of the ancient “Solomonic” state, In terms of the reafpoitie of imperialism, this theopolitical ideology has served similar regional and global class interests, and has unified the Amhara and Tigrayan nationalisms, despite their differences and dif- ferential claims to possess the emblematic Judaic Ark of the Covenant. ‘This myth subsequently became the political charter for the cempire-state, was incorporated into the 1931 and 1955 consti- tutions by Emperor Haile Selassie I. Athis coronation in 1930, Haile Selassie, like Menelik Il, was crowned “King of Kings, Lord of Lords, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God, and Light of the Wosld”, epithets applied to Jesus in the Book of Revelation (Callahan 2006: 175). The 1955 consti- tution was drawn up with the help of a Jewish lawyer, Nathan Marein (Btlich 1994: 168). This legal assistance formed one Of the many nodes in the deepening relations between Israel and “Ethiopia”, based| not so much on theit purported bibli- cal connections, but as part, more pragmaticaly, of the Iseacli “Periphery Strategy”. As Erlich (1994: 168-9) explains: 42 Beginning in 1967, Israelis were invited to advise Ethiopia on all positions of sensitivity, the security branches, the secret he police forces, the territorial army, to texin the cite ‘units (mainly the paratroopers) to teach in the army's staff college, and to advise in the various military units, mainly in Divisions II and IY, in some cases, inchiding even the battalion levels. In about 1970, the Tstaeli embassy in Addis Ababa ap- peared to be one of the country’s major nerve centres... Inthe spring of 1968, the two countries agreed to work secretly for the establishment of a military alliance, Followinga mecting berween Israeli officials and the emperor, an Ethiopian mis- sion spent a week:in Iselin mid-Apell. A program under the code name “Coffee Project” was designed, Itinvolved close Ethio-Istecli military cooperation in the Red Sea, the turning Of Assab Port into a joint naval base, with Israel obtaining. ground facilities for the use of its aie force on Ethiopian soil. In return, Israel was to build a new mechanized brigade and supply Ethiopia witha sophisticated radar system, Moreover, «joint committee was appointed to plan cl imiltary intelligence. Israel was also to ext into further modernization of the Ethiopian armed forces, Cassiter (1979: 19) observes that: “To inquire into the ‘truth’ of 2 political myth is as meaningless and as ridiculous as to ask for the truth of a machine gun ora fighter plane. Both are weapons: and weapons prove their truth by their efficiency." Ethiopia's political myth (which draws on the biblical Zion tradition of holy land, chosen people, and sacred icon), survived the military junta of Mengistu Haile Mariam from 1974 t0 1991 and its reign of Red Terror, With the implicit consent of the present 43 Hille Selassie and the Derg, respectively, gure the polices of Ambatization and of ne Ethiopia” thiopia Tikden) through which local knowledges were repressed, nomSetnieg Broups were denied the right to speak their ovn languages, prrtse theit own traditional cultures and religions, marry and bury thei dead according to thei own rts, use their org Persona names. In such manner was the dominant history Promoted in curricula and text-books. At both the national gatekeepers, “Through these practices of censorship, hard-line Fthiopiansts erable, up © about the mic-1980s and perhaps beyond), that challenged the dominant One. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, which bad been the principal supplier of armas to the Derg regime, the state also began to break up under the pressuse of she war, that the military was fighting on a number of fronts Against the armed movements for sclf-determiation. In parallel with these politcal developments, the zegime’s discourse of “One ‘ibiopa also began to fragment. The fracture lines included, firstly, narratives contesting the hegemonic one formulsteq by political activists and exiled scholars of the vatious ethnec ‘ational movements, often supported by Euro-American nen, dlemics sympathetic to their causes. Secondly reflec distancing themselves from these dissident discour ‘were considered to be imaginatively 48 were two academic works by international scholars who had previously undertaken anthropological and historical research in the Ethiopian bordelands (see Donham and James 1986, James et al, 2002), It is these works which are said to have brought about a paradigmatic shift in Ethiopian studies from the centre to the peripheries. Like other forms of knowledge, Ethiopianism is a dialect cally totalizing one, In the new approaches, the older themes of Ethiopianism have been refigured to reflect the realities of

You might also like