300

encounter with Christ

as judge and source of eternal life (notes 63-6,76

As a share in Christs death, iLL was a participation in the defeat of the
powers of evil and so in the redemption (note 22); and as the acquisition of
the grace of final perseverance, it healed from sin (notes 68-71 ). Like the
other sacraments, it was a gift from God designed to help man in his
infralapsarian condition (notes 51,54-7) and a means to deeper lasting life
(notes 25,62). As an ecclesial activity it gave a new relationship to the
militant and triumphant Church (notes 74-5,77). This is why human death
could not be put on the same level as biological death: man could never die as
if he were merely animal,&dquo; and mans death was not an anticlimax but the
culmination of his lifes work (notes 24,25,67-9,73).
To some extent the attempt to extract a system from or impose oraer on
six hundred years of theological endeavour is bound to be artificial and the
conclusions reached brittle and provisional. Further, our enquiry has led us to
extrapolate from what is predominantly moral and spiritual theology to
dogmatic theology, and some distortion is inevitable. With these remarks in
mind, the reader will, I hope, agree that the conclusions, as far as they go, are

above).

justified.
JEREMY MOISER

83.
Alcuin, Epistola 11, PL 101,158: nullatenus homo perire poterit sicut
quodlibet. Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 1,18, PL 158,384.

animal

ROBERT GROSSETESTES UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH

pointed out that the conclusions set forth in this

on
an
extensive and substantial body of material and
based
paperl
Not
all
of this supporting evidence can be incorporated
evidence.
supporting
into this brief paper. Robert Grossetestes understanding of truth is for me
more than the object of sheer inquiry, for it is my belief that his doctrine of
truth contains emphases and motifs that ought to be recovered and retrieved,
especially in view of certain problematical developments in more recent
coherence and correspondence notions of truth.
At the outset it should be
are

This paper was read at the Seventh Conference

1.
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

on

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Medieval Studies (1972) at

301

Through offering a brief exposition of certain basic features of Grossetestes

doctrine of truth, it is maintained that the latter occupies a crucial position in
the understanding of truth within the Augustinian tradition. It is not that
Grosseteste introduced new notions or a new terminology, for the latter was
derived largely from St Augustine and St Anselm. However, there are a number
of factors operative in the thought of Grosseteste which along with his own
temperament and interests give his work its own unique character, as well as
setting him somewhat apart from St Augustine and St Anselm. These factors
include the logica 110m in addition to other major works of Aristotle, the
Pseudo-Dionysian treatises, the legacy of Chartres, and Greek and Arabic
scientific treatises. Grosseteste was especially innovative in the area. of
scientific methodology and experimental science where he appeals to
experimentum along with ratio and auctoritas, but he also has something to
offer us in his understanding of the nature of truth. Because of the rather
diffuse, fragmentary, and encyclopaedic activity and writing uf Grosseteste
a considerable number of his treatises and opuscula have to be examined in
uncovering his doctrine of truth. He does give us, as did St Anselm, a little
treatise with the title De Yeritate. But other statements concerning truth
must be culled from a number of texts including De Scientia Dei, De Veritate
Propositionis, De Unica Forma Omnium, De Libero Arbitrio, and Quaestiones
Tlzeologicae. In evaluating his doctrine of truth certain consequential
deficiencies should also be cited.
Grosseteste speaks of truth as being and truth as right or correct relationships. These two notions or basic categories persist throughout his whole
doctrine of truth. For truth as being he uses such expressions as id quod est ;,
which he takes from Augustines Soliloquia (IL5.8), rei entitas ;2 idem veritas
et entitas,3 and the rationes aeternae rerum J4 or rationes rerum increatae :5S
Id quod est covers, of course, the whole spectrum of being and signifies more
than a Wittgensteinian state of affairs or what Heidegger terms Vorhandenheft : Grosseteste also draws from Augustine the notion that truth is that quae
ostendit id quod est.6 Here veritassignifies a being in terms of its disclosing
2.

De

Veritate, BW 130. BW is abbreviated form of the following: L. Baur, Die

Werke des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln, Band IX of

Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, hg. C. Baeumker (Muenster i.
W.: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1912). In the above volume L. Baur offers
us a critical edition of a number of Grossetestes treatises. The number following
BW is
the page number in Band IX cited above.
3. De Libero Arbitrio, 8, BW 188.
4.
Ibid., BW
191.
Comm. Post. 1.7 (Venetiis 1552), f. 8. Reference is here made to book and chapter
5.
of Grossetestes commentary on Aristotles Posterior Analytics. As indicated, the 1552
Venice edition, an early printed edition, is being used. The above and subsequent folio
numbers refer to this edition. At the beginning of Liber Primus of Grossetestes
commentary we find the following: Divi Roberti Linconiensis Archiepiscopi Parisiensis,
in Aristotelis Posteriorum Analiticoru Libros, Elegantissima commentaria Feliciter
incipiunt. The text that I have read and examined is in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
6. De Vere Religione 36.66, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 32:230. The
abbreviation CCSL is used hereafter.

philosophischen

Beitraege

zur

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302

its

own

being

or

course, different

the being of other entities. In truth as being there are, of

degrees and levels of being. We cannot elaborate on all of

these here.
In speaking of truth
terms as

as correct or right relationships Grosseteste uses such

adaequatio. Icoequatio. Icollformitas, similitudo, rectitlldo,

reettis, and similis. Here we note that he derives terms from Augustine,
Anselm, and the traditional definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus.
He operates with all these expressions and the meaning may shift depending
on a particular usage or application.
Grossetestes understanding of truth is made up of four basic categories of
truth: viz., the summa veritas which may be termed ontological truth, the
veritas rerum which I term ontic truth, intellectual or cognitive truth, and
logical or propositional truth. In having these four basic categories Grosseteste
is certainly not offering a striking innovation within the Augustinian tradition,
but what is noteworthy is his persistent concern that these categories be

strictly and carefully ordered in accordance with ontological priority.

Although he. initiates his inquiry into the nature of truth by focusing on
logical or propositional truth, his reason for beginning here is stated as
follows: Consuevimus autem usitatius dicere veritatem orationis enuntiativae.7
However, according to Grosseteste neither human- speech, nor the human
intellect is the primary locus of truth. The summa vritas is ultimate and

foundational for all other truth, and the former includes the Verbum Dei or
Senno Patris as ground and norm of created truth. Grosseteste begins his
treatise on truth by citing John 14:b: &dquo;Ego sum via veritas et vita&dquo;. Hic ipsa
Veritas dicit se esse veritatem.3 He shares Anselms concern to distinguish
sharply and clearly between the truth which is foundational and measures and
that truth which is relative and measured. This is very explicit where he states:
Et complectitur haec definitio etiam summam veritatem, quae est rectitudo
rectificans simul cum veritatibus rerum, quae sunt rectitudines rectificatae.99
Elsewhere he states that the human intellect is not determinative of the
principles of being: Non est enim intellectus effectivus principiorum ....10
Grosseteste is very insistent that subordinate truth be kept subordinate. This
concern is expressed repeatedly in a number of different ways and places.
Another facet of Grossetestes doctrine of truth, which could be predicated
of his thought in general, may be considered a corollary of the feature just
cited. This facet concerns the matter of coherence and the attempt to achieve
a grand synthesis or coherent system. As far as I know, Grosseteste has given
us no grand and coherent synthesis or system in the form of a magnum opus
or theological-philosophical summa. Father Daniel Callus argued that he
planned to compose a Summa Tlzeologiae or Summa Sententiarum.l1 One
7.
8.
9.
10.

34.
De Veritate, BW
De Veritate, BW 130.
De Veritate, BW 135.
Comm. Post. II. 6, f.43.

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303

could argue that he didnt achieve such because of his wide range of interests
and inquiry, his temperament, and the need to assimilate a vast amount of .
new sources at his disposal. In view of his doctrinal stance, I do not believe
that such assimilation would have been a prerequisite to composing such a
system or synthesis. Over against the above, I would propose that he neither
felt compelled nor was he especially concerned to construct a grand coherent
intellectual or doctrinal system. Furthermore, I believe that he sensed a
certain inadequacy in the face of the ineffable grandeur of the truth. I dont
doubt that he had the ontological foundation required for such a system. He
speaks of an ultimate visio of the truth. However, because of his stress on
ontological and ontic truth, and his firm belief in a radical coherence and
symmetry in the very being of the st~rnrrta veritas, the eternal ratiolies
expressed by the Verbum Dei, and the consequent coherence within the
created order, it could be expected that he felt less of a need to achieve
coherence and synthesis in terms of an intellectual or doctrinal system. This
does not mean_ that the latter is of no importance to him nor that it cannot
be realized in some measure. hlans intellectual effort should mirror something
of the ratio and coherence within the truth of being. In passing, I would also
point out that Grosseteste does not make extensive use of what I term strict
coherence, viz., necessary logical truth. Augustine uses the latter more than
Grosseteste. This difference in appeal to strict coherence brings us to another
facet of Grossetestes doctrine of truth which may be contrasted with another
emphasis found in Augustines understanding of truth.
Grosseteste does not share Augustines urge and need to turn from without
oneself and to turn within oneself in the quest for truth and certitude. Gordon
Leff states that Grossetestes position was founded upon St Augustines
conception of truth as in the mind.12 D.E. Sharp asserts that Grossetestes
theory of knowledge becomes, like that of Augustine, a metaphysics of inner
experience .... , 13 I do not believe that such statements can be accepted
without some important qualifications. It is true that Augustine attaches
considerable importance to the human mind as a locus of truth and to the
reflection of the mind upon itself in seeking knowledge of the truth. He
stresses that the interior truth and teacher must be listened to. 14 Truth is the
interior light&dquo; with which the mind has immediate contact. Truth and
certainty is to be sought within ones own mind. Ratio says: Avertere ab
umbra tua, revertere in te ....16 Elsewhere he says: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum

D.A. Callus, The Summa Theologiae of Robert Grosseteste, Studies in Medieval

11.
History, ed. R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin, and R.W. Southern (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1948) 180-94.
12.
G. Leff, Medieval Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962) 187.
13.
D.E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (London:
Oxford University Press, 1930) 34-5.
14.
De Magistro 11.38-12.40.
De Vera Religione 55
15.
.113, CCSL 32:259-60.
16.
Soliloquia II.19.33, Migne, PL 32:901.

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304

redi. In interiore homine habitat veritas. 17 Grosseteste certainly does not

emphasize this turning within to the degree that Augustine does. He does not
experience doubt and the need for certitude experienced by Augustine. He
puts greater emphasis on turning to the world of ontic truth, physical entities,
phenomena, and their causes. I do not find Grosseteste making frequent
appeals to the truth within. Grosseteste does not seem to have been radically
shaken by doubt. Anselm and Grosseteste both seem to devote more attention
to the truth of created res than does Augustine. Grossetestes interest in
physics and causes immanent in the created order attests to this.
Another facet related to the one just discussed is Grossetestes belief in the
indestructible character of truth. Although there is nothing to indicate that he
ever radically doubted whether there was any truth, in attempting to refute
the sceptic he does use an argument much like theorem 17 found in Stoic
logic and an argument akin to that of Augustine in his Soliloquies: If notT,
then t; if t, then T; therefore, if not T, then T. In other words, even the
negation or denial of truth is considered to be an affirmation of truth. How.
ever, for Grosseteste himself, certitude concerning truth is rooted in his whole
understanding of truth and in his explication of the nature of truth. Veritas is
bound up with esse and through the method of division the affirmation of
truth follows upon the affirmation of being. It is not through an elaborate
argument that he arrives at certainty concerning the being of truth. His
assurance concerning the imperishable character of truth arises from a vision
of the truth itself. The being of truth is hardly jeopardized by statements that
deny its being. He concludes: Quomodocunque sit, manifeste inextinguibilis
est lux veritatis, quae etiam sui illustrat extinctionem, nec aliquo modo

corrumpi potest.8
Although several other features of Grossetestes doctrine of truth are
worthy of consideration, only a couple of additional facets can be discussed
here. Like Anselm, Grossetests wrestles with the question whether truth is
single or multiplex, a question tied up with the whole matter of the
pluralitatem et distributionem of the name of truth, the application of
concepts, universals, etc. One would miss what is at stake here if one were
simply to dismiss the issue as arising from linguistic confusion and a lack of
critical acumen regarding language and meaning. For Anselm and Grosseteste
something very important is at stake here. Both Anselm and Grosseteste are
very concerned to point out that the summa veritas has its own unique status
which is radically different from that of created and contingent entities.
Grosseteste wants it clearly understood that when we speak of a true created
entity, we do not thereby intend to attribute to it divinity.9 He states: Item:
in nullo communicant creator et creatura. Univoca autem in aliquo communicant. Ergo creator et creatura in nullo univocantur.20 While Grosseteste
17.
18.
19.

De Vera Religione 39.72, CCSL 32:234.

De Veritate, BW 139.
De Veritate, BW 130.

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305

seeks to guard against sheer equivocation, he stresses that words like ens and
veritas cannot be applied to particular beings without diversity in intentio .
He even believes that the sense of terms applied to the summa veritas must be
intuited and perceived in the summa veritas himself. The supreme truth has
its own unique status and is always in view no matter what kind of truth is
being discussed. Grosseteste makes this point when he says: But perhaps the
name of truth is nowhere applied except to signify in some way, at least
adjacently or obliquely, the supreme truth as form of the name. For as the
truth of a thing can not be understood except in the light of the supreme
truth, so perhaps it is not to be hypostasized through the name of truth
except when it bears the significance of the supreme truth 21
Grossetestes epistemology is very much determined by and bound up with
his doctrine of truth. There is a type of realism in his epistemology which
corresponds to his emphasis on created singulars and the twofold plenitude of
being of created things. He holds that the human knower can have direct
knowledge of things themselves and their truth. The cognitive subject comes
to know things themselves, not merely an image, a concept, or a phantasm
which represents the thing. A phantasma may be required as a means to an
end, but it is transcended inasmuch as intdlectus, enim, et scientia
apprehendunt res in puritate essentiae suae, sicut in seipsis sunt 22 By virtue
of such factors as divine illumination, the intelligibility of truth, right willing,
etc., one can directly perceive the degree of being and truth of the singular
thing. In the light ~of the supreme truth one can view the truth of things.
In conclusion, certain consequential deficiencies in Grossetestes doctrine
will be pointed out. By virtue of the fact that only the immutable and
intelligible really deserve to be termed truth, although everything that is may
be termed true insofar as it is, it follows that the mutable, the contingent, and
the sensible are relegated to an inferior position. Grosseteste refers to
contingent reality as corruptible truth: Item: in futuris et contingentibus
videtur esse veritas corruptibilis. Veritas autem, quae Deus est, nullo modo
est corruptibilis.23 Truth&dquo; is most properly applied to what is wholly
abstracted from time, change, and even the possibility of change. The
immutable-mutable and eternity-time dichotomies affect Grosgetestes view
of the corporeal and the contingent, and the latter is consequently viewed
more as a sacramental and symbolic order which simply reflects that which
really deserves to be termed truth, viz., eternal immutable truth. Moreover,
the inherent value and intrinsic worth and efficacy of mutable entities and
historical events are brought into question. It also follows that such as Gods
redemptive acts in history tend to be eclipsed and taken less seriously than
they should be.
De Libero Arbitrio 16, BW 217.
R. McKeon (ed. and trans.), Selections from Medieval Philosophers Vol. I (The
Modern Students Library; New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1957) 275. This is
De Veritate, BW 139.
McKeons translation of Grossetestes statements in

20.
21.

22.
23.

Comm. Post
. 1.19, f.27.
De Veritate, BW 130.

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306

The dichotomies in Grossetestes doctrine of truth also left their mark on

the whole of his thought, including his epistemology and methodology. This
is apparent in his conception of fides, the different grades of knowledge, and
intellectual vision. The lowest form of knowledge has to do with contingentia
erratica&dquo;,24 while the highest level of knowledge is the cognition of immutable
and eternal truth. The question is whether contingent and singular entities and
events can ever be objects of intellectus and visio. Faith and authority were to
be transcended.
A number of questions may be also raised in connexion with Grossetestes
understanding of truth as correspondence. Just what is intended in the use of
words like 4conformitas, 4similitudo, 4adaequatio, and rectitudo? Further
clarification should be offered concerning intelligible correspondence and the
manner in which right relations may differ depending on whether we are
speaking of things, propositions, events or actions. It may also be asked
whether the conception of truth as correspondence can be maintained in the
face of the epistemological realism cited earlier. If I am able to perceive
things directly, then what is it that corresponds to the thing? On the other
hand/if my mind in some way corresponds to the intelligible thing, then how
can I at the same time affirm that I directly perceive the thing itself?
Furthermore, if there is no factor of correspondence or representation
involved in my perception of intelligible things, then how can I ever be in
error? In other words, is error possible in the face of Grossetestes
epistemological realism? Of course, if one cannot know things themselves,
then how can one ever ascertain whether or not one knows that which is the
case? Grosseteste teaches that perception does not terminate in a phantasma.
But how can one know this? How can one possibly perceive and know more
than one perceives and knows? These are difficult questions and obviously
arise not only with regard to Grossetestes doctrine of faith. Grosseteste does
not really address himself to such questions and this may be due in part to his
belief in factors such as divine illumination, exemplarism, the intelligibility of
truth, the possibility of intellectual vision, faith, gratia iuvans, auctoritas, etc.
Finally, from a biblical point of view one could wish that Grosseteste
would have incorporated more of the biblical notions and content into his
understanding of truth. Although his application of terms in his doctrine of
truth is generally in accordance with scriptural usage and application, the
content or sense of his terms is often determined more by metaphysical and
ontological notions and categories derived largely from Neoplatonism and
other extra or non-biblical sources. Even though he frequently cites the
scriptures and offers some commentary on the same, much of the biblical
sense and teaching is blocked out by philosophical and ontological notions
which he has adopted.
ROBERT J. PALMA

24.

Comm.

1.2, f.2.
Post.

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