Background Guide

Human Rights Council

Agenda
Surveillance of Individuals and Private Communications:
Rights of Citizens and Responsibilities of the State

MANDATE OF THE COMMITTE:

The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations
system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make
recommendations on them. It has the ability to discuss all thematic human rights issues
and situations that require its attention throughout the year. It meets at the UN Office at
Geneva. It was created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by
resolution 60/251. One year later, the Council adopted its "Institution-building
package" to guide its work and set up its procedures and mechanisms. The Council is
made up of 47 United Nations Member States which are elected by the UN General
Assembly.
On 18 June 2007, one year after holding its first meeting, the UNHRC adopted its
Institution-building package, which provides elements to guide it in its future work.
Among the elements was the Universal Periodic Review. The Universal Periodic Review
assesses the human rights situations in all 193 UN Member States. Another element is
an Advisory Committee, which serves as the UNHRCs think tank, and provides it with
expertise and advice on thematic human rights issues, that is, issues which pertain to all
parts of the world. A further element is a Complaint procedure, which allows individuals
and organizations to bring complaints about human rights violations to the attention of
the Council.
The Human Rights Council does not hold the mandate to discuss Crises, however may
address certain documents or news reports of immediate importance while in session.
INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, news agencies The Guardian and The Washington Post began revealing
information about mass surveillance programmes being run by the National Security
Agency of the USA, along with allied agencies (primarily the GCHQ of the UK), targeting
both their own citizens as well as well as foreign nationals. The stories originated from
Edward Snowden, employed by one of the NSAs contractors, who revealed to these
news agencies that the NSA and GCHQ are able to access information stored by major
US technology companies, often without individual warrants as well as mar-intercepting
data from the fibre-optic cables which make up the backbone of global phone and
internet networks.
The extent of these programmes is vast, even including the undermining of security
standards which the internet, commerce and banking rely upon in todays digital world.
Further leaks have also demonstrated that these programmes worked hand in hand
with espionage programmes targeted at heads of state of various nations, such as
Angela Merkel of Germany and Dmitry Medvedev of Russia (at the time), as well as
corporations such as Petrobras of Brazil, and the latest skeleton to tumble out of the
closet is British spying conducted from their Berlin embassy.

It is in this disturbing setting that this agenda has been chosen for this conference. Mass
surveillance programmes are hardly new, but in the world of today, it has become all
too easy to track and spy upon the everyday activities of regular people without the
scantest regard for due legal process. Programmes like Prism which accesses data
directly from the servers of US companies which means access to millions of peoples
personal information around the world, or the UKs EDGEHILL cryptography cracking
programme which works on breaking down encryptions on the internet, are
dangerously indiscriminate and are carried out without any reason to target particular
individuals.
Innovations in technology have increased the possibilities for communication and
protections of free expression and opinion, enabling anonymity, rapid informationsharing and cross-cultural dialogues. Technological changes have concurrently
increased opportunities for State surveillance and interventions into individuals
private communications. Concerns about national security and criminal activity may
justify the exceptional use of communications surveillance technologies. However,
national laws regulating what would constitute the necessary, legitimate and
proportional State involvement in communications surveillance are often inadequate or
non-existent. Inadequate national legal frameworks create a fertile ground for arbitrary
and unlawful infringements of the right to privacy in communications and,
consequently, also threaten the protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression.
The information relating to this agenda is extremely accessible for delegates, as are the
issues it involves. In light of the same, this background guide will seek to help merely
point you in the right direction in terms of identifying the issues that will be integral to
debate in committee. At the outset, we would like to point out that the agenda is not
restricted to mass surveillance programmes, but surveillance of individuals in any
context, and the framework within which this should exist.

SURVEILLANCE IN GENERAL
Surveillance is the monitoring of the behaviour, activities, or other changing
information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or
protecting them. "Communications surveillance" in the modern environment
encompasses the monitoring, interception, collection, analysis, use, preservation and
retention of, interference with, or access to information that includes, reflects, arises
from or is about a persons communications in the past, present or future.
"Communications" include activities, interactions and transactions transmitted through
electronic mediums, such as content of communications, the identity of the parties to
the communications, location-tracking information including IP addresses, the time and

duration of communications, and identifiers of communication equipment used in

communications.
State surveillance of individuals, therefore, can be defined as an event or process during
which the activities of a particular individual are observed and documented by the state
itself or through its agencies with or without the knowledge of the individual or group
of individuals. Surveillance conducted extra-territorially on the individuals situated in
another states jurisdiction and territorial control is called as cross-border surveillance,
which is mostly carried out with the intention of gathering intelligence but might
severely impair or overstep another nations sovereignty.
Issues to Consider:

Is there a difference between espionage, intelligence-gathering and surveillance?

What is the relationship between national sovereignty and surveillance of a

nations people by another?

What does Article 2 of the UN Charter have to say on such matters?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Today the issues of privacy, identity theft, and surveillance are always in the news,
but the current "surveillance society" has been developing for many decades, aided
by new technologies. Wiretapping, for example, began as early as the U.S. Civil War,
when both sides tapped into the other force's telegraph lines and simply copied
down the messages. The advent of the telephone made wiretapping somewhat more
difficult, as the rate of information flow on the telephone was much faster. For many
years, there was no easy way to record telephone calls, so that detectives and law
enforcement officials who wanted to listen in had to transcribe conversations in
shorthand.
There are many possible examples of surveillance found in the Bible. One example
found in 2 Samuel, is that of David and Bathsheba found in the second book of
Samuel. David, while walking on the roof of his palace, noticed Bathsheba bathing
and as he continued to watch her his desire grew, even though she was already the
wife of Uriah. In this example, surveillance was used for Davids own personal gains
and pleasure rather than for a greater good.
Another example, as noted by Kieith Laidler, can be found in the Book of Numbers.
Here, details of the information that the spies were required to collect mostly
regarding the land, how many people live on the land, the layout of the towns, the
quality of the soil and the presence of trees (Numbers 13: 17-20). Unlike the story of
David and Bathsheba, here surveillance is being used for very different means. By
collecting information regarding the people and the land, the spies would have been

able to determine the strengths and weaknesses of their enemies. This use of
surveillance satisfies one of the most basic characteristics of surveillance historically
as well as in a modern manner.
World War 1: Air reconnaissance operations during the First World War were not
for the faint of heart. The mortality rate among pilots and observers during the Great
War is legendary. Air crews fell victim to mechanical failure, weather, ground fire
and air-to-air combat. It was not even unheard of for reconnaissance aircraft to be
struck and obliterated by the very artillery rounds they were directing. The concept
of aerial reconnaissance did not originate with the Great War. As far back as 1794,
the French military used observation balloons to detect and monitor enemy troop
movements during the French Revolutionary War. Balloon technology evolved
considerably throughout the nineteenth century. During the American Civil War the
Union forces employed a small number of observation balloons manned by nonmilitary ballooning enthusiasts. They were ineffective from a tactical perspective,
but the experiment did enhance the timeliness of strategic intelligence reporting,
including the first telegraphic transmissions from an observation gondola directly to
the War Department in Washington DC. In the Franco-Prussian War, the French
used untethered balloons to pass communications over the Prussian blockade
during the 1870 siege of Paris. This inspired their Prussian adversaries to develop
the worlds first antiaircraft artillery capability.
Stationary reconnaissance was still the mainstay of aerial observation at the
outbreak of the Great War, and remained an important component of intelligence
gathering throughout the conflict. But balloon observation had serious limitations. A
spherical balloon could not be used in winds greater than 20 miles per hour, and
even a light breeze made for a very unsteady observation platform. Of course the big
shortfall of balloon observation was the fixed position and the limited line of sight
imposed by a tethered platform. As the size and complexity of the battlefield
increased, the need for further penetration necessitated the move towards fixed
wing aircraft for aerial observation.
World War II: During WWII, magnetic tape was used by the Nazis to conduct
surveillance operations. The Magnetophon was developed by AEG, a German
electronics company who had purchased patents from Thomas Edison for his work
on the phonograph.
At the same time, the U.S. government monitored telephone and cable transmissions
between the U.S. and Japan, as well as the Japanese Americans whom they had
placed in internment camps. The House of Representatives had held hearings
regarding whether wiretapping was legal in the case of national defense. Most of the
legislation and court decisions that took place before WWII had strictly limited the
ability of the U.S. government to wiretap citizens. However, in the advent of World
War II, the importance of national security weighed heavily on the legislators.

On a more local scale, the police and detectives used electronic devices like The
Dictagraph (sometimes spelled Dictograph) for their work. The Dictograph had a
highly sensitive transmitter, which allowed it to record conversations from a
distance (most other devices at the time required the speaker to be a few inches
from the recorder).
Cold War: Under a cloak of great secrecy, late in 1950, the Office of Naval Research
(ONR) funded the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) and its
manufacturing arm, Western Electric, to develop an undersea surveillance system
designed to detect and track Soviet submarines using the SOFAR channel. The initial
effort was code-named Project Jezebel. The system that resulted was given the then
highly classified name SOund Surveillance System (SOSUS). Eventually it was given
an unclassified designation, Project Caesar.
In an extraordinary engineering effort, arrays of hydrophones were placed on the
ocean bottom. The hydrophones were connected by underwater cables to
processing centers located on shore called Naval Facilities (NAVFACs). The first
prototype of a full-size SOSUS installation a 1,000-foot-long horizontal line array
of 40 hydrophones laid on the seafloor at a depth of 1440 feet was deployed off
the island of Eleuthera in the Bahamas during January 1952. After tests in which the
array proved able to detect a U.S. submarine, the Navy decided to install similar
arrays along the entire U.S. East Coast.
Eventually, Soviet intelligence learned of the existence of SOSUS and its remarkable
success in tracking Soviet submarines at long ranges, with the help of information
supplied by the Walker-Whitworth spy ring. John Walker was a U.S. Navy warrant
officer and submarine communications expert who sold countless naval messages to
the Soviets from 1968 to his arrest in 1985. Jerry Whitworth was another Navy
communications specialist recruited by Walker to assist with his espionage
activities. The Russian Navy responded by working to quiet their submarines. By the
end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the ability of IUSS to detect and track Soviet
nuclear submarines at long ranges had decreased significantly. Modern dieselelectric submarines are even quieter and more difficult to detect by passive
listening.

MODALITIES OF SURVEILLANCE TODAY

Technological changes have concurrently increased opportunities for State surveillance
and interventions into individuals private communications. Modern surveillance
technologies and arrangements enable States and non-state actors to intrude into an
individuals private life, threatening to blur the divide between the private and the
public spheres. Innovations in technology have facilitated increased possibilities for
communication and freedom of expression, enabling anonymity, rapid information

sharing, and cross-cultural dialogues. At the same time, changes in technologies have
also provided new opportunities for State surveillance and intervention into
individuals private lives. From the inception of the first form of remote
communications, States have sought to intercept and monitor individuals private
communications to serve law enforcement and national security interests. Through
communications, the most personal and intimate information, including about an
individuals or groups past or future actions, can be revealed. Communications
represent a valuable source of evidence upon which the State can draw to prevent or
prosecute serious crimes or forestall potential national security emergencies.
Innovations in technology throughout the twentieth century changed the nature and
implications of communication surveillance. The means by, and frequency with which
people are able to communicate expanded significantly. The transition from fixed-line
telephone systems to mobile telecommunication and the declining costs of
communications services resulted in dramatic growth in telephone usage. The advent of
the Internet saw the birth of a number of new tools and applications to communicate at
no cost, or at very affordable rates. These advancements have enabled greater
connectivity, facilitated the global flow of information and ideas, and increased the
opportunities for economic growth and societal change. The dynamic nature of
technology has not only changed how surveillance can be carried out, but also what
can be monitored. In enabling the creation of various opportunities for communication
and information-sharing, the Internet has also facilitated the development of large
amounts of transactional data by and about individuals. This information, known as
communications data or metadata, includes personal information on individuals, their
location and online activities, and logs and related information about the e-mails and
messages they send or receive. Communications data are storable, accessible and
searchable, and their disclosure to and use by State authorities are largely unregulated.
Analysis of this data can be both highly revelatory and invasive, particularly when data
is combined and aggregated. As such, States are increasingly drawing on
communications data to support law enforcement or national security investigations.
States are also compelling the preservation and retention of communication data to
enable them to conduct historical surveillance.
With changing and evolving technologies the mode of surveillance have been dynamic
and ever-changing, however the most common modalities of communication
surveillance, as described by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Freedom of opinion and expression, are as follows:

Communications surveillance: the monitoring, interception, collection,

preservation and retention of information that has been communicated, relayed
or generated over communications networks;

(b) Communications data: information about an individuals communications (emails, phone calls and text messages sent and received, social networking
messages and posts), identity, network accounts, addresses, websites visited,

books and other materials read, watched or listened to, searches conducted,
resources used, interactions (origins and destinations of communications, people
interacted with, friends, family, acquaintances), and times and locations of an
individual, including proximity to others);
(c) Internet filtering: automated or manual monitoring of Internet content
(including websites, blogs and online media sources, as well as e-mail) to restrict
or suppress particular text, images, websites, networks, protocols, services or
activities.
In addition to the modalities states above by which the communications of individuals
of a private nature are tracked and intercepted, the individuals might be subject to state
and cross-border surveillance through direct video surveillance, audio surveillance and
other means.
Changes in technology have been paralleled by changes in attitudes towards
communications surveillance. When the practice of official wiretapping first
commenced in the United States of America, it was conducted on a restricted basis, and
was only reluctantly sanctioned by the courts. It was viewed as such a serious threat to
the right to privacy that its use had to be restricted to detecting and prosecuting the
most serious crimes. Over time, however, States have expanded their powers to conduct
surveillance, lowering the threshold and increasing the justifications for such
surveillance.
In response to the increased data flows across borders and the fact the majority of
communications are stored with foreign third party service providers, a number of
States have begun to adopt laws that purport to authorize them to conduct extraterritorial surveillance or to intercept communications in foreign jurisdictions. This
raises serious concern with regard to the extra-territorial commission of human rights
violations and the inability of individuals to know that they might be subject to foreign
surveillance, challenge decisions with respect to foreign surveillance, or seek remedies.
Issues to Consider:

Are there any international standards or procedures in place to regulate the

technologies of today related to surveillance (satellites, internet connections,
even smartphones)

What kind of domestic rules exist for regulation of such technologies and/or
which allow surveillance to be carried out using them?

Is there a difference between data and metadata?

WHY SURVEILLANCE?
This is a question to which we do not seek to provide too many answers, but rather
make delegates think. The thought of this kind of Big Brother behaviour seems
grotesquely perverse to us, but thats because were helplessly at the receiving end, so
such views might be biased. Notwithstanding the numerous arguments against such
activities, it is nevertheless important to try and understand why states run surveillance
programmes or dedicate such massive amounts of resources to surveillance agencies
and technology.
The standard reasons are obviously national security, and the responsibility that states
have to protect their people, territory and resources from all manner of threats be they
terrorists, or drug dealers. The kind of activities traditionally targeted by surveillance
has gone from merely foreign spies or insurgents to even the war on crime, which, as
any watcher of Homeland or The Wire will understand is frightening yet necessary. The
extent and nature of such surveillance is of course, not so easy to accept, but the
requirement of surveillance cannot be ignored. States have access to a number of
different techniques and technologies to conduct communications surveillance of a
targeted individuals private communications. Real-time interception capabilities allow
States to listen to and record the phone calls of any individual using a fixed line or
mobile telephone, through the use of interception capabilities for State surveillance that
all communications networks are required to build into their systems. An individuals
location can be ascertained, and their text messages read and recorded. By placing a tap
on an Internet cable relating to a certain location or person, State authorities can also
monitor an individuals online activity, including the websites he or she visits.
Access to the stored content of an individuals e-mails and messages, in addition to
other related communications data, can be obtained through Internet companies and
service providers. The initiative of the European standards-setting authority, the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute, to compel cloud providers to build
lawful interception capabilities into cloud technology to enable State authorities to
have direct access to content stored by these providers, including e-mails, messages and
voicemails, raises concerns.
Thus, it is essential that delegates recognise that this debate should not only involve the
rights of individuals, but also the interests of states in such programmes and tune their
policies and research accordingly.
Issues to Consider:

Are there any international or regional standards on surveillance, either

domestic or extra-territorial?

Are there any UN Resolutions regarding this matter?

What is the framework of rights within which a states actions to protect national
security must be carried out?

LEGAL ISSUES
As the agenda clearly looks at the rights of individuals, it is evident that the legalities of
this issue need to be addressed by delegates. To begin with, one must understand how
surveillance programmes are conducted domestically, and what procedures are
followed to do so. Do states recognise the right to randomly keep tabs on an individuals
phone and movements? Or do they instead have to obtain warrants, by demonstrating
that there is some threat posed by the individual? These questions are important for
understanding whether or not the rights of individuals are being infringed by
surveillance or not. Domestic procedures and rights may differ across countries, but
before moving on to an analysis of the international framework, one must understand
the domestic one, if only to defend a programme conducted by your country. These
questions are also essential to an analysis of mass surveillance, which may not be able
to satisfy even domestic standards.
The obvious rights violated by surveillance programmes are the right to privacy and
right to freedom of expression. Right to freedom of movement may also be infringed. Yet
before one moves forward, one has to understand what the content of such rights is and
whether such rights are available to everyone. Note that not every country may grant
these rights, as is their sovereign right, so one has to then examine international human
rights law to see whether or not such rights are internationally guaranteed and then to
what extent if so.
Again, we do not wish to spoon-feed you on these matters, especially as this is the
Human Rights Council after all. You will be expected to find the relevant human rights
instruments as well as understand the nature of their content just because something
is universally acknowledged does not mean it creates binding obligations on states. And
at the end of the day it is crucial to remember that the bedrock of human rights law is
not the existence of a right but the existence of a law that guarantees it which is most
often in the hands of states, not some international institution.
The right to freedom of opinion and expression is guaranteed under articles 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which affirm that everyone has the right to hold opinions without
interference, and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds through
any media and regardless of frontiers. At the regional level, the right is protected by the
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (art. 9), the American Convention on
Human Rights (art. 13); and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (art. 10). At both the international and regional levels, privacy
is also unequivocally recognized as a fundamental human right. The right to privacy is

enshrined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 12), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, art. 17), the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (art. 16), and the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (art. 14). At the regional level, the right to
privacy is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (art. 8) and the
American Convention on Human Rights (art. 11).
Despite the widespread recognition of the obligation to protect privacy, the specific
content of this right was not fully developed by international human rights protection
mechanisms at the time of its inclusion in the above-mentioned human rights
instruments. The lack of explicit articulation of the content of this right has contributed
to difficulties in its application and enforcement. As the right to privacy is a qualified
right, its interpretation raises challenges with respect to what constitutes the private
sphere and in establishing notions of what constitutes public interest. The rapid and
monumental changes to communications and information technologies experienced in
recent decades have also irreversibly affected our understandings of the boundaries
between private and public spheres. Privacy can be defined as the presumption that
individuals should have an area of autonomous development, interaction and liberty, a
private sphere with or without interaction with others, free from State intervention
and from excessive unsolicited intervention by other uninvited individuals.
The right to privacy is also the ability of individuals to determine who holds information
about them and how is that information used.
The second half of this agenda clearly talks about responsibilities of states. Part of this is
about utilising their ability to carry out surveillance in the right manner. This means not
only following the prescribed procedure as laid down in law such as the FISA in the USA,
but also about who is involved in doing so. Thus, the involvement of private
corporations in data collection or analysis comes under scrutiny, much like the usage of
private military contractors in wars. While it may be easy to attach responsibility and
liability on a state for violations of the rights of individuals, to attach the same to a
private corporation throws up myriad questions. Of course, this first requires
understanding the involvement of private contractors in such activities, which is
something for you to do.
Issues to Consider:

What kinds of rights are guaranteed in international human rights law?

What rights may be violated by surveillance programmes?

What are the obligations of states to ensure that they do not violate such rights?

Are there any exceptions to these rights and does the state have any overarching
rights?

What happens when a states surveillance does not violate its own laws but does
affect and violate the rights of individuals of another?

Are there any distinctions to be drawn between classes or types of individuals

and the protections afforded to them? (Think journalists or human rights
defenders, for instance)

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PIRVATE SECTOR:

The vital developments in technology that have enabled new and dynamic forms of
communication have been occurred primarily in the private sector. In this sense, many
of the changes in the way we communicate, receive and impart information are based
on the research and innovations of corporate actors.
The private sector has also played a key role in facilitating State surveillance of
individuals, in a number of ways. Corporate actors have had to respond to requirements
that digital networks and communications infrastructure be designed to enable
intrusion by the State. Such requirements were originally adopted by States in the
1990s and are becoming compulsory for all communications services providers.
Increasingly, States are adopting legislation requiring that communications service
providers allow States direct access to communications data or modify infrastructure to
facilitate new forms of State intrusion.
In developing and deploying new technologies and communications tools in specific
ways, corporate actors have also voluntarily taken measures that facilitate State
surveillance of communications. In its simplest manifestation, this collaboration has
taken the form of decisions on how corporate actors collect and process information,
which allows them to become massive repositories of personal information that are
then accessible to States upon demand. Corporate actors have adopted specifications
that enable State access or intrusion, collect excessive and revelatory information, or
restrict the application of encryption and other techniques that could limit access to
information by both the companies and governments. The private sector has also often
failed to deploy privacy-enhancing technologies, or has implemented them less than
secure ways that do not represent the state of the art. In the most serious
circumstances, the private sector has been complicit in developing technologies that
enable mass or invasive surveillance in contravention of existing legal standards. The
corporate sector has generated a global industry focused on the exchange of
surveillance technologies. Such technologies are often sold to countries in which there is
a serious risk that they will be used to violate human rights, particularly those of human
rights defenders, journalists or other vulnerable groups. This industry is virtually
unregulated as States have failed to keep pace with technological and political
developments. States' human rights obligations require that they not only respect and

promote the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, but protect individuals from
violations of human rights perpetrated by corporate actors. In addition, States should
exercise adequate oversight in order to meet their international human rights
obligations when they contract with, or legislate for, corporate actors where there may
be an impact upon the enjoyment of human rights. Human rights obligations in this
regard apply when corporate actors are operating abroad.
States must ensure that the private sector is able to carry out its functions
independently in a manner that promotes individuals human rights. At the same time,
corporate actors cannot be allowed to participate in activities that infringe upon human
rights, and States have a responsibility to hold companies accountable in this regard.
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Germany and Brazil have circulated a draft resolution to a UN General Assembly
committee that calls for an end to excessive electronic spying. The resolution comes
after leaks revealed mass surveillance by the US. The draft would also call on UN
member states "to take measures to put an end to violations of these rights and to
create the conditions to prevent such violations, including by ensuring that relevant
national legislation complies with their obligations under international human rights
law."
The resolution will likely undergo changes as it is debated in the General Assembly's
human rights committee.
The United Nations in communication with the United States has said that the US has
pledged not to spy on the world bodys communications after a report that the National
Security Agency had gained access to the U.N. video conferencing system. A greater role
for the United Nations needs to be looked at to curb the impact of mass surveillance.

CONCLUSION
The last section of this background guide deals with an extremely vast area and is in no
way exhaustive. Understanding rights and the framework within which they exist is
essential to this debate and a thorough understanding of the same is expected from all
delegates. We shall seek to provide certain resources which may not be regularly
available which we feel would benefit the committee, but they will be uploaded later.
At this time, we would like to point out that there remains one crucial aspect which this
guide has not discussed, and that is the formulation of solutions or proposals to address
the issues created by surveillance of individuals. To do that, we request delegates to
clearly understand the nature of the committee they are attending and what is the scope
of its mandate and powers. It will also be essential to understand the limits of such
powers within the framework of international law and politics. It is important to note

that we are not necessarily looking for a universal resolution that makes us feel happy
at night, rather we are looking for the kind of results that actually incorporate global
realities, both legal and political, and will therefore be practical. Results can therefore
include resolutions either recommendatory or declarative, joint statements,
presidential statements but most importantly, must be arrived at after exhaustive
debate on ALL the issues.
The content of solutions to this issue is also vast. Some useful starting points can include
the aforementioned UN Special Rapporteurs Report on Freedom of Expression and
Opinion, or the recent resolution put forward by Germany and Brazil regarding this
matter (in conjunction with espionage) in the General Assembly. The Council of Europe
has also undertaken some efforts regarding the same, in form of instruments as well as
guidelines. To gain a better understanding of the facts and issues involved in such an
agenda, the Guardians website has a fantastic section on the NSA Files that includes
news reports and analysis of the issues.
If delegates have any queries, they can mail me personally at darthvakasha@gmail.com.
LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:

https://www.aclu.org/blog/tag/government-surveillance
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/may13/Symposium_9477.php
http://www.globalresearch.ca/mass-surveillance-and-europes-policestate/5357562
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1/statesurv.pdf
http://www.granpol.gov.ba/propisi/zakoni/?cid=30,1,1