NITAFAN VS CIR

Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PM

G.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 [Salaries of the members of Judiciary, Tax
Exemption]
FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR,
all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary
to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating
that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,"
even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in
and by said Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income
taxes.
HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that
the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution
of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens
whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet
subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

Facts:
The

Government

Service

Insurance

System

(GSIS),

pursuant

to

the

privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50

dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers
check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender
of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII

Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which

is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or

enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against
constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well

used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In
the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the
granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters
involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over
the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to
Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44
per share and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

ALFREDO M. DE LEON vs. HON. BENHAMIN B. ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602)

Case Digest
Facts:
In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B.
Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate
Memorandum with the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing
the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with the other petitioners filed a
petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the
respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners
maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace
them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6)
years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
Issue:
Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:
The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it
was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already
in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in Section 27
of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to
the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
Wherefore, the designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay
Officials was declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for
Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/takeover of petitioners position subject of this petition.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

G.R. No. 174153Lambino Vs. ComelecG.R. No. 174153Oct. 25 2006Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition tochange the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and
sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.the proposed changes will shift the
present

bicameral-

presidential

form

of

government

to

unicameral-

parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law

governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that
RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to the
Lambino Groups petition.
Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to
show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading
which renders the initiative void.2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between
amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2
art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution.
Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a
constitutes a revision.3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
present petitionviolated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply
with the constitution before complyingwith RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.

Imbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1)

Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970
RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2
delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be
composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts
according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2
delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their
candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the
election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final
adournment of the ConCon.

Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving
support/representing a delegate to the convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related
petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention
assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and
validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and
whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a
Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners
are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose
amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were
attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that
the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by
Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces
with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number
of delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify
members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a
safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to
allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.

- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure
candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their
individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not
create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all
organizations.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs.
COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to
amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through
Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC
issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco,
the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center,
and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenorsoppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the
ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein
Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The

constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can

only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,
not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore
it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the
Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering
the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a
revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution
has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress
does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that
what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari
potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that
of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision
cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the
above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment
has become academic.

Tolentino vs COMELEC
41 SCRA 702
Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO
Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and
the Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus,
Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose
Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and Juan V. Borra
Facts
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on
Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which
the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of

Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,

submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing
resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law
for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of
the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16,
1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all
elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation
thereof, Republic Act 6132.
Issue
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the
holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?
Decision
The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called
for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November
8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all
acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and
void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a
convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments
proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well
as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution
No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing
Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby

enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision
immediately executory.

JAVELLANA VS. COMELEC

50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of
the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec

Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution.
Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated
by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the
election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being
intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC
justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made
by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives.
Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation
during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973
Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is

Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of
the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law
was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments
are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not
a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing
to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international
law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq.
na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.