Civ Pro 31-37 Cases

Civil procedure bulsu col
G.R. No. 128567
September 1, 2000
HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SYNDICATED MANAGEMENT GROUP
INC., respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors.
Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory
by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the
enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing
justiciable controversies with finality.
The Case
At bar is a petition assailing the Decision, dated November 14, 1996, and
Resolution, dated March 11, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
38747, which set aside the Order, dated July 21, 1995 and Order, dated
September 4, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, in Civil Case
No. 89-5424. The aforesaid orders of the trial court held that petitioner had the
right to redeem subject pieces of property within the one-year period prescribed
by Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337 otherwise known as the General
Banking Act.
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 provides that "in case of a foreclosure of a mortgage
in favor of a bank, banking or credit institution, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, the mortgagor shall have the right, within one year after the sale
of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to
redeem the property."
The Facts
The facts that matter are undisputed:
Page
In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction

filed on October 19, 1989, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5424 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the herein private respondent sought the
foreclosure of four (4) parcels of land mortgaged by petitioner to Intercon Fund
Resource, Inc. ("Intercon").
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Private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 89-5424 as mortgagee-assignee of

a loan amounting to P8.5 million obtained by petitioner from Intercon, in whose
favor petitioner mortgaged the aforesaid parcels of land as security for the said
loan.
In its answer below, petitioner questioned the assignment by Intercon of its
mortgage right thereover to the private respondent, on the ground that the same
was ultra vires. Petitioner also questioned during the trial the correctness of the
charges and interest on the mortgage debt in question.
On April 30, 1992, the trial court, through the then Judge now Court of Appeals
Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, came out with its decision "granting herein
private respondent SMGI's complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage",
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the following:
(1) P8,500,000.00 representing the principal of the amount due;
(2) P850,000.00 as penalty charges with interest at 6% per annum,
until fully paid;
(3) 22% per annum interest on the above principal from September
6, 1998, until fully paid;
(4) 5% of the sum total of the above amounts, as reasonable
attorney's fees; and,
(5) Costs.
All the above must be paid within a period of not less than 150 days from
receipt hereof by the defendant. In default of such payment, the four
parcels of land subject matter of the suit including its improvements shall
be sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs, in the manner and under
the regulations that govern sales of real estate under execution."1
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, the
appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39243 before the Sixth Division of the
appellate court, which dismissed the case on June 29, 1993 on the ground of late
payment of docket fees.
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Dissatisfied with the dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 39243, petitioner came to this
Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112044, which this
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court resolved to dismiss on December 13, 1993, on the finding that the Court
of Appeals erred not in dismissing the appeal of petitioner.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition in G.R.
No. 112044 was denied with finality in this Court's Resolution promulgated on
February 16, 1994. On March 10, 1994, leave to present a second motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 112044 or to submit the case for hearing by the
Court en banc was filed, but to no avail. The Court resolved to deny the same
on May 11, 1994.
On March 14, 1994, the Resolution dated December 13, 1993, in G.R. No.
112044 became final and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
On July 4, 1994, private respondent filed with the trial court of origin a motion
for execution of the Decision promulgated on April 30, 1992 in Civil Case No.
89-5424. The said motion was granted on July 15, 1994.
Accordingly, on July 15, 1994 a writ of execution issued and, on July 20, 1994,
a Notice of Levy and Execution was issued by the Sheriff concerned, who
issued on August 1, 1994 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale for the auction of subject
properties on September 6, 1994.
On August 23, 1994, petitioner filed with the same trial court an Urgent Motion
to Quash and Set Aside Writ of Execution ascribing to it grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned Writ of Execution. To support its motion,
petitioner invited attention and argued that the records of the case were still with
the Court of Appeals and therefore, issuance of the writ of execution was
premature since the 150-day period for petitioner to pay the judgment obligation
had not yet lapsed and petitioner had not yet defaulted in the payment thereof
since no demand for its payment was made by the private respondent. In
petitioner's own words, the dispute between the parties was "principally on the
issue as to when the 150-day period within which Huerta Alba may exercise its
equity of redemption should be counted."
In its Order of September 2, 1994, the lower court denied petitioner's urgent
motion to quash the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-5424, opining that
subject judgment had become final and executory and consequently, execution
thereof was a matter of right and the issuance of the corresponding writ of
execution became its ministerial duty.
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Challenging the said order granting execution, petitioner filed once more with
the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
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preliminary injunction, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, predicated on the

same grounds invoked for its Motion to Quash Writ of Execution.
On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale of subject pieces of properties
proceeded and the private respondent was declared the highest bidder. Thus,
private respondent was awarded subject bidded pieces of property. The covering
Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was registered with the Registry of Deeds
on October 21, 1994.
On September 7, 1994, petitioner presented an Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification asking the trial court to "clarify" whether or not the twelve (12)
month period of redemption for ordinary execution applied in the case.
On September 26, 1994, the trial court ruled that the period of redemption of
subject property should be governed by the rule on the sale of judicially
foreclosed property under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner then filed an Exception to the Order dated September 26,
1994 and Motion to Set Aside Said Order, contending that the said Order
materially altered the Decision dated April 30, 1992 "which declared that the
satisfaction of the judgment shall be in the manner and under the regulation that
govern sale of real estate under execution."
Meanwhile, in its Decision of September 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals
resolved the issues raised by the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, holding
that the one hundred-fifty day period within which petitioner may redeem
subject properties should be computed from the date petitioner was notified of
the Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 112044; and that the 150-day period within
which petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption expired on September
11, 1994.
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"Petitioner must have received the resolution of the Supreme Court dated
February 16, 1994 denying with finality its motion for reconsideration in
G.R. No. 112044 before March 14, 1994, otherwise the Supreme Court
would not have made an entry of judgment on March 14, 1994. While,
computing the 150-day period. Petitioner may have until September 11,
1994. within which to pay the amounts covered by the judgment, such
period has already expired by this time, and therefore, this Court has no
more reason to pass upon the parties' opposing contentions, the same
having become moot and academic."2 (Emphasis supplied).
Thus:
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Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086. In its Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18,
1994, petitioner theorized that the period of one hundred fifty (150) days should
not be reckoned with from Entry of Judgment but from receipt on or before July
29, 1994 by the trial court of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424 from the
Court of Appeals. So also, petitioner maintained that it may not be considered in
default, even after the expiration of 150 days from July 29, 1994, because prior
demand to pay was never made on it by the private respondent. According to
petitioner, it was therefore, premature for the trial court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment.
The trial court deferred action on the Motion for Confirmation of the Certificate
of Sale in view of the pendency of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35086.
On December 23, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086. Absent any further action with
respect to the denial of the subject motion for reconsideration, private
respondent presented a Second Motion for Confirmation of Certificate of Sale
before the trial court.
As regards the Decision rendered on September 30, 1994 by the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 35086 it became final and executory on January 25,
1995.
On February 10, 1995, the lower court confirmed the sale of subject properties
to the private respondent. The pertinent Order declared that all pending
incidents relating to the Order dated September 26, 1994 had become moot and
academic. Conformably, the Transfer Certificates of Title to subject pieces of
property were then issued to the private respondent.
On February 27, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Clarification seeking "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1)
year period for the redemption of the properties in question.
In its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals merely noted such
Motion for Clarification since its Decision promulgated on September 30, 1994
had already become final and executory; ratiocinating thus:
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"We view the motion for clarification filed by petitioner, purportedly

signed by its proprietor, but which we believe was prepared by a lawyer
who wishes to hide under the cloak of anonymity, as a veiled attempt to
buy time and to delay further the disposition of this case.
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Our decision of September 30, 1994 never dealt on the right and period of
redemption of petitioner, but was merely circumscribed to the question of
whether respondent judge could issue a writ of execution in its Civil Case
No. 89-5424 . . .
We further ruled that the one-hundred fifty day period within which
petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption should be counted, not
from the receipt of respondent court of the records of Civil Case No. 895424 but from the date petitioner was notified of the entry of
judgment made by the appellate court.
But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of
redemption of petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this
case is judicial. and as such the mortgagor has only the equity not the
right of redemption . . . While it may be true that under Section 78 of
R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a
mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit institution, whether the
foreclosure was donejudicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one year
from the auction sale within which to redeem the foreclosed property, the
question of whether the Syndicated Management Group,. Inc., is a bank
or credit institution was never brought before us squarely, and it is
indeed odd and strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a
rhetorical question in its motion for clarification."3 (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, if petitioner did really act in good faith, it would have ventilated before
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its pretended right under Section
78 of R.A. No. 337 but it never did so.
At the earliest opportunity, when it filed its answer to the complaint for judicial
foreclosure, petitioner should have averred in its pleading that it was entitled to
the beneficial provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337; but again, petitioner did
not make any such allegation in its answer.
From the said Resolution, petitioner took no further step such that on March 31,
1995, the private respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession
with the trial court.
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Page
On May 2, 1995, in opposition to private respondent's Motion for Issuance of

writ of Possession, petitioner filed a "Motion to Compel Private Respondent to
Accept Redemption." It was the first time petitioner ever asserted the right to
During the hearing called on April 21, 1995, the counsel of record of petitioner
entered appearance and asked for time to interpose opposition to the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession.
redeem subject properties under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, the General
Banking Act; theorizing that the original mortgagee, being a credit institution,
its assignment of the mortgage credit to petitioner did not remove petitioner
from the coverage of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Therefore, it should have the
right to redeem subject properties within one year from registration of the
auction sale, theorized the petitioner which concluded that in view of its "right
of redemption," the issuance of the titles over subject parcels of land to the
private respondent was irregular and premature.
In its Order of July 21, 1995, the trial court, presided over by Judge Napoleon
Inoturan, denied private respondent's motion for a writ of possession, opining
that Section 78 of the General Banking Act was applicable and therefore, the
petitioner had until October 21, 1995 to redeem the said parcels of land, said
Order ruled as follows:
"It is undisputed that Intercon is a credit institution from which defendant
obtained a loan secured with a real estate mortgage over four (4) parcels
of land. Assuming that the mortgage debt had not been assigned to
plaintiff, there is then no question that defendant would have a right of
redemption in case of foreclosure, judicially or extrajudicially, pursuant
to the above quoted Section 78 of RA 337, as amended.
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Page
Since the period to exercise defendant's right of redemption has not yet
expired, the cancellation of defendant's transfer certificates of title and the
issuance of new ones in lieu thereof in favor of plaintiff are therefore
However, the pivotal issue here is whether or not the defendant lost its
right of redemption by virtue of the assignment of its mortgage debt by
Intercon to plaintiff, which is not a bank or credit institution. The issue is
resolved in the negative. The right of redemption in this case is vested by
law and is therefore an absolute privilege which defendant may not lose
even though plaintiff-assignee is not a bank or credit institution
(Tolentino versus Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 513). Indeed, a contrary
ruling will lead to a possible circumvention of Section 78 because all that
may be needed to deprive a defaulting mortgagor of his right of
redemption is to assign his mortgage debt from a bank or credit institution
to one which is not. Protection of defaulting mortgagors, which is the
avowed policy behind the provision, would not be achieved if the ruling
were otherwise. Consequently, defendant still possesses its right of
redemption which it may exercise up to October 21, 1995 only, which is
one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale of subject
properties (GSIS versus Iloilo, 175 SCRA 19, citing Limpin versus IAC,
166 SCRA 87).
illegal for being premature, thereby necessitating reconveyance (see Sec.

63 (a) PD 1529, as amended).
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:
(1) The Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession is hereby
denied;
(2) Plaintiff is directed to accept the redemption on or before
October 21, 1995 in an amount computed according to the terms
stated in the Writ of Execution dated July 15, 1994 plus all other
related costs and expenses mentioned under Section 78, RA 337, as
amended; and
(3) The Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Bulacan is directed (a) to
reconvey to the defendant the following titles of the four (4)
parcels of land, namely TCT Nos. V-38878, V-38879, V-38880,
and V-38881, now in the name of plaintiff, and (b) to register the
certificate of sale dated October 7, 1994 and the Order confirming
the sale dated February 10, 1995 by a brief memorandum thereof
upon the transfer certificates of title to be issued in the name of
defendant, pursuant to Sec. 63 (a) PD 1529, as amended.
The Omnibus Motion dated June 5, 1995, together with the Opposition
thereto, is now deemed resolved.
SO ORDERED."4
Private respondent interposed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking the reversal
of the Order but to no avail. In its Order dated September 4, 1995, the trial court
denied the same.
To attack and challenge the aforesaid order of July 21, 1995 and subsequent
Order of September 4, 1995 of the trial court, the private respondent filed with
this court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed as G.R.
No. 121893, but absent any special and cogent reason shown for entertaining
the same, the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, for proper
determination.
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Docketed as G.R. No. 387457 on November 14, 1996, the Court of Appeals
gave due course to the petition and set aside the trial court's Order dated July 21,
1995 and Order dated September 4, 1995.
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In its Resolution of March 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on November 14,
1996 in CA-G.R. No. 38747.
Undaunted, petitioner has come to this Court via the present petition, placing
reliance on the assignment of errors, that:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN
HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH
DIVISION) IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 HAD RESOLVED "WITH
FINALITY" THAT PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA HAD NO RIGHT
OF REDEMPTION BUT ONLY THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.
II
IGNORING THAT PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA POSSESSES THE
ONE-YEAR RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A.
NO. 337 (THE GENERAL BANKING ACT).
III
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT SYNDICATED
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. IS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.5
In its comment on the petition, private respondent countered that:
"A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT IT RESOLVED WITH FINALITY IN C.A.-G.R. SP NO. 35086
THAT PETITIONER ONLY HAD THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION IN
RESPECT OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
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B. THE PETITION IS AN INSIDIOUS AND UNDERHANDED

ATTEMPT TO EVADE THE FINALITY OF VARIOUS DECISIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND ORDERS WHICH HELD THAT, PETITIONER
ONLY POSSESSES THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IN RESPECT
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
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C. PETITIONER IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL FROM BELATEDLY

RAISING THE ISSUE OF ITS ALLEGED 'RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.
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D. IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD THE 'RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION' OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, THE TRIAL
COURT MADE A MOCKERY OF THE 'LAW OF THE CASE."'6
And by way of Reply, petitioner argued, that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 COULD NOT
HAVE POSSIBLY RESOLVED THEREIN WHETHER WITH
FINALITY OR OTHERWISE - THE ISSUE OF PETITIONER
HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78,
R.A. NO. 337.
II.
THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL HERE. PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA
INVOKED ITS RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A.
NO. 337 IN TIMELY FASHION, i.e., AFTER CONFIRMATION BY
THE COURT OF THE FORECLOSURE SALE, AND WITHIN ONE
(1) YEAR FROM THE DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF SALE.
III.
THE PRINCIPLE OF 'THE LAW OF THE CASE' HAS ABSOLUTELY
NO BEARING HERE:
(1)
THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337
IS IN FACT PREDICATED UPON THE FINALITY AND
CORRECTNESS OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 89-5424.
Page
THUS, THE RTC'S ORDER RECOGNIZING PETITIONER HUERTA

ALBA'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
37 DOES NOT IN ANY WAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF AMENDING,
10
(2)
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MODIFYING, OR SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE

NO. 89-5424.
The above arguments and counter-arguments advanced relate to the pivotal
issue of whether or not the petitioner has the one-year right of redemption of
subject properties under Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337 otherwise known
as the General Banking Act.
The petition is not visited by merit.
Petitioner's assertion of right of redemption under Section 78 of Republic Act
No. 337 is premised on the submission that the Court of Appeals did not resolve
such issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086; contending thus:
(1)
BY NO STRETCH OF LOGIC CAN THE 20 MARCH 1995
RESOLUTION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 BE INTERPRETED TO
MEAN THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD RESOLVED 'WITH
FINALITY' THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER HUERTA
ALBA HAD THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION WHEN ALL THAT THE
RESOLUTION DID WAS TO MERELY NOTE THE MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION.
(2)
THE 20 MARCH 1995 RESOLUTION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 IS
NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE. IT IS NOT EVEN
A JUDGMENT OR ORDER TO BEGIN WITH. IT ORDERS
NOTHING; IT ADJUDICATES NOTHING.
(3)
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 37 WAS NOT AN ISSUE AND WAS NOT IN
ISSUE, AND COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN AN ISSUE NOR
IN ISSUE, IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086.
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THE 30 SEPTEMBER 1994 DECISION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086

HAVING ALREADY BECOME FINAL EVEN BEFORE THE FILING
OF THE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, THE COURT OF
APPEALS NO LONGER HAD ANY JURISDICTION TO ACT OF
11
(4)
THE MOTION OR ANY OTHER MATTER IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086,

EXCEPT TO MERELY NOTE THE MOTION. EASIHa
II.
IN STARK CONTRAST, THE ISSUE OF PETITIONER HUERTA
ALBA'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337 WAS DIRECTLY RAISED AND JOINED BY THE PARTIES,
AND THE SAME DULY RESOLVED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78 OF R.A. NO.
337 IS MANDATORY AND AUTOMATICALLY EXISTS BY LAW.
THE COURTS ARE DUTY-BOUND TO RECOGNIZE SUCH RIGHT.
IV.
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE
WELL-SETTLED POLICY OF THE LAW TO AID RATHER THAN
DEFEAT THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.
V.
THEREFORE THE 21 JULY 1995 AND 04 SEPTEMBER 1995
ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE VALID AND PROPER IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE LAW.
From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be gleaned that
what petitioner has been adjudged to have was only the equity of redemption
over subject properties. On the distinction between the equity of redemption and
right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,7 comes to the fore. Held the Court in the said case:
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The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage understood in the

sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration
of the foreclosure sale exists only in the case of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial
foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National
Bank or a bank or banking institution.
12
"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be
confused with the right of redemption.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the

mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the
registration of the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right
of redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale
'when confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the
rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by
law.' Such rights exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e., even after
confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of
the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General
Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his
successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right
to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the
court of the foreclosure sale which right may be exercised within a
period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial
foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or
banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed
by an order of the court. . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.' There then
exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the
right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day
period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or
even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that
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This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above

stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period 'from the
date of service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale itself,
provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such
13
'. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the
complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon
the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid
into court within a period of not less thanninety (90) days from the date of
the service of such order, and that in default of such payment the property
be sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs.'
order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any

longer."8 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner failed to seasonably invoke its purported right under Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337.
Petitioner avers in its petition that the Intercom, predecessor in interest of the
private respondent, is a credit institution, such that Section 78 of Republic Act
No. 337 should apply in this case. Stated differently, it is the submission of
petitioner that it should be allowed to redeem subject properties within one year
from the date of sale as a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage constituted
thereon.
The pivot of inquiry here therefore, is whether the petitioner seasonably invoked
its asserted right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 to redeem subject properties.
Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its "right" in "timely fashion", that is, after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale, and within one (1) year from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale. Indeed, the facts show that it
was only on May 2, 1995 when, in opposition to the Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession, did petitioner file a Motion to Compel Private Respondent
to Accept Redemption, invoking for the very first time its alleged right to
redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner to invoke
a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed to assert a
right to redeem in several crucial stages of the proceedings.
For instance, on September 7, 1994, when it filed with the trial court an Ex-part
Motion for Clarification, petitioner failed to allege and prove that private
respondent's predecessor in interest was a credit institution and therefore,
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 was applicable. Petitioner merely asked the trial
court to clarify whether the sale of subject properties was execution sale or
judicial foreclosure sale.
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Then, too, nothing was heard from petitioner on its alleged right under Section
78 of R.A. No. 337 and of the predecessor in interest of private respondent as a
14
So also, when it presented before the trial court an Exception to the Order and
Motion to Set Aside Said Order dated October 13, 1994, petitioner again was
silent on its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, even as it failed to
show that private respondent's predecessor in interest is a credit institution.
Petitioner just argued that the aforementioned Order materially altered the trial
court's Decision of April 30, 1992.
credit institution, when the trial court came out with an order on February 10,
1995, confirming the sale of subject properties in favor of private respondent
and declaring that all pending incidents with respect to the Order dated
September 26, 1994 had become moot and academic.
Similarly, when petitioner filed on February 27, 1995 a Motion for Clarification
with the Court of Appeals, seeking "clarification" of the date of commencement
of the one (1) year redemption period for the subject properties, petitioner never
intimated any alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 nor did it invite
attention to its present stance that private respondent's predecessor-in-interest
was a credit institution. Consequently, in its Resolution dated March 20, 1995,
the Court of Appeals ruled on the said motion thus:
"But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of
redemption of petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this
case is judicial, and as such. the mortgagor has only the equity. not the
right of redemption . . . While it may be true that under Section 78 of
R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a
mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit institution, whether the
foreclosure was done judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one
year from the auction sale within which to redeem the foreclosed
property, the question of whether the Syndicated Management Group.
Inc., is bank or credit institution was never brought before us squarely,
and it is indeed odd and strange that petitioner would now sarcastically
ask a rhetorical question in its motion for clarification."9 (Emphasis
supplied).
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Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it submitted its answer to the complaint
for judicial foreclosure, petitioner should have alleged that it was entitled to the
beneficial provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but again, it did not make
any allegation in its answer regarding any right thereunder. It bears stressing
that the applicability of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges on the factual
question of whether or not private respondent's predecessor in interest was a
credit institution. As was held in Limpin, a judicial foreclosure sale, "when
confirmed by an order of the court, . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such
rights of redemption as may be allowed by law',"10 which confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor,
the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the
15
If petitioner were really acting in good faith, it would have ventilated before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its alleged right under Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337; but petitioner never did do so.
court of the judicial foreclosure sale. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to
the beneficial provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 since private
respondent's predecessor-in-interest is a credit institution is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim which should have been averred in petitioner's answer
to the compliant for judicial foreclosure.
". . . A counterclaim is, most broadly, a cause of action existing in favor
of the defendant against the plaintiff. More narrowly, it is a claim which.
if established, will defeat or in some way qualify a judgment or relief to
which plaintiff is otherwise entitled It is sometimes defined as any cause
of action arising in contract available against any action also arising in
contract and existing at the time of the commencement of such an action.
It is frequently defined by the codes as a cause of action arising out of the
contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the
plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action."11 (emphasis
supplied)
"The counterclaim is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action,
so that when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to
the matters stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous
actions pending between the same parties, wherein each is at the same
time both a plaintiff and a defendant. Counterclaim is an offensive as well
as a defensive plea and is not necessarily confined to the justice of the
plaintiff's claim. It represents the right of the defendant to have the claims
of the parties counterbalanced in whole or in part, and judgment to be
entered in excess, if any. A counterclaim stands on the same footing, and
is to be tested be the same rules, as if it were an independent
action."12 (emphasis supplied)
The very purpose of a counterclaim would have been served had petitioner
alleged in its answer its purported right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337:
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The failure of petitioner to seasonably assert its alleged right under Section 78
of R.A. No. 337 precludes it from so doing at this late stage case. Estoppel may
be successfully invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the early stages
of the proceedings.14 Thus, "a party to a case who failed to invoked his claim in
the main case, while having the opportunity to do so, will be precluded,
subsequently, from invoking his claim, even if it were true, after the decision
16
". . . The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the disposition of

a whole controversy of interested parties' conflicting claims, at one time
and in one action, provided all parties' be brought before the court and
the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party."13
has become final, otherwise the judgment may be reduced to a mockery and the
administration of justice may be placed in disrepute."15
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that the trial court
erred in still allowing petitioner to introduce evidence that private respondent's
predecessor-in-interest was a credit institution, and to thereafter rule that the
petitioner was entitled to avail of the provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
In effect, the trial court permitted the petitioner to accomplish what the latter
failed to do before the Court of Appeals, that is, to invoke its alleged right under
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 although the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. no.
35086 already found that 'the question of whether the Syndicated Management
Council Group, Inc. is a bank or credit institution was never brought before (the
Court of Appeals) squarely." The said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals
unerringly signified that petitioner did not make a timely assertion of any right
under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 in all the stages of the proceedings below.
Verily, the petitioner has only itself to blame for not alleging at the outset that
the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent is a credit institution. Thus,
when the trial court, and the Court of Appeals repeatedly passed upon the issue
of whether or not petitioner had the right of redemption or equity of redemption
over subject properties in the decisions, resolutions and orders, particularly in
Civil Case no. 89-5424, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, and
CA-G.R. SP No. 38747, it was unmistakable that the petitioner was adjudged to
just have the equity of redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that is,
without any right of redemption allowed by law.
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There is, therefore, merit in private respondent's contention that to allow

petitioner to belatedly invoke its right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 will
disturb the "law of the case." However, private respondent's statement of what
constitutes the "law of the case" is not entirely accurate. The "law of the case" is
not simply that the defendant possesses an equity of redemption. As the Court
has stated, the "law of the case" holds that petitioner has the equity of the
redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that is, without the right of
redemption afforded by Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Whether or not the "law of
the case" is erroneous is immaterial, it still remains the "law of the case". A
contrary rule will contradict both the letter and spirit of the rulings of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, and CA-G.R.
38747, which clearly saw through the repeated attempts of petitioner to forestall
so simple a matter as making the security given for a just debt to answer for its
payment.
17
The "law of case" holds that petitioner has the equity of redemption
without any qualification.
Hence, in conformity with the ruling in Limpin, the sale of the subject
properties, as confirmed by the Order dated February 10, 1995 of the trial court
in Civil Case No. 89-5424 operated to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in private respondent. There then existed only
what is known as the equity of redemption, which is simply the right of the
petitioner to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment became
final. There being an explicit finding on the part of the Court of Appeals in its
Decision of September 30, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 35086 that the herein
petitioner failed to exercise its equity of redemption within the prescribed
period, redemption can no longer be effected. The confirmation of the sale and
the issuance of the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties to
private respondent was then, in order. The trial court therefore, has the
ministerial duty to place private respondent in the possession of subject
properties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals, declaring null and void the Order dated 21 July 1995 and Order
dated 4 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil
Case No. 89-5424, AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
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18
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999

EULALIA RUSSELL, PUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO,
SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO,
JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA,
AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND
MARILYN PERALES, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTlL, ADRIANO TAGALOG,
MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN,
RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order dated January 12,
1995 issued by respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioners on ground of lack of jurisdiction, as well as his Order dated February
13, 1995 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.
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On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private

respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The complaint, in substance, alleged
that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan,
Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land
was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho.
Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs,
herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained
undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A
PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6,
1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as
heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners
claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents
were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had
been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be
19
The facts of the case are as follows:
declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the
heirs. 1
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 2 the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the
total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33
(3) 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 4 falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Curt of Liloan,
Compostela. 5
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 6 saying that the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(1)
of B.P. 129, as amended. 7
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion
to Dismiss. 8 A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by
petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because
their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an
action to annul a document or declare it null and void, 9 hence, one incapable of
pecuniary estimation falling within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the
motion for reconsideration. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial
Court is for the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION
OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus,
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
20
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for repartition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint
is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
Page
For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are
reproduced hereunder:
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xxx xxx xxx

3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long
time ago;
4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a
certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land containing 56,97740 square meters,
more or less, located at Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu.
designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification
issued by the Office of the Land Management copy of which are
hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "A-1" and are made part
hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;
5. That the passed to the children of the spouses (who are all
deceased except for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely: Zacarias,
Epifania, Vicenta, Felecisimo, Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and
which in turn passed to the plaintiffs and defendants upon their
death they being their descendants and legal heirs;
6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by
and among the legal heirs of said previous owners;
7. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public document,
which is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a
previous oral agreement of partition, affecting the land executed by
and among the defendants whereby defendants divided the
property among themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs who are
entitled thereto; attached hereto as Annex "B" and is made part
hereof is xerox copy of said document;
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9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had

procured tax declarations of the land for their supposed "shares" to
the great damage and prejudice of plaintiffs;
21
8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a

complete nullity because the defendants are not the only heirs of
Casimero Tautho; plaintiffs are also heirs and descendants of said
deceased; moreover, there has been no oral partition of the
property;
10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven

(7) equal parts since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had
seven children;
11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at
the barangay level; attached hereto as Annex "C" is Certification to
file Action;
12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act of
defendants, plaintiffs were forced to bring instant action and
contract the services of the undersigned counsel with whom they
bind themselves to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court to declare null and void the document (Annex "B") of
declaration of heirs and confirmation and to order the partition of
the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall respectively go
to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho and considering six
(6) of them died already the same shall go to their children or
descendants, and to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs attorney's
fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and
equitable under the premises. 11
We agree with petitioners.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless
one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the
jurisdiction of said court.
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[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of

which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum
of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such where the subject of the litigation may not be
22
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we had the occasion to rule that:
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by

courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific
performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of
judgment; 14 also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, 15 annulling a
deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid 16 and for rescession,
which is a counterpart of specific performance. 17
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC,
METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does
exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the
value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional
Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). 18 However, the subject
matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and
void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only
heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his
property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be
legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein. 19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Order dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order denying the
motion for reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City is ORDERED to proceed
with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. MAN-2275. No costs.
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23
SO ORDERED.
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SOFIA ANIOSA SALANDANAN,
G.R. No. 160280
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
SPOUSES MA. ISABEL and

Promulgated:
BAYANI MENDEZ,
Respondents.*
March 13, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
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Page
This refers to the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the June 27, 2003
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 3, 2003 Resolution[2] in CAG.R. SP No. 76336 denying the petition for clarification and intervention filed by Sofia
Aniosa Salandanan (petitioner) and affirming in toto the March 6, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 02-104406 which
24
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
affirmed the August 9, 2002 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 172530 ordering Delfin Fernandez[3] and Carmen
Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez) and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate
and surrender possession of a house and lot located at 1881 Antipolo St., corner Vision
St., Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject lot) to Spouses Bayani Mendez and Ma. Isabel S.
Mendez (respondents) and to pay the latter monthly rental of P5,000.00 from January
29, 2002 until they vacate the property andP15,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by respondents

against Spouses Fernandez before the MeTC on April 18, 2002.
In their Complaint,[4] respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject
property as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila; that they became the owners thereof by virtue of a deed of donation;
that Spouses Fernandez and their families were occupying the subject property for free
through the generosity of respondent Isabels father; that a letter of demand to vacate
the subject property was sent to Spouses Fernandez but they refused to vacate the
same; that respondents brought the matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible
settlement but the same failed.
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Further, Spouses Fernandez claimed that respondents were able to transfer the
subject property to their name through fraud; that sometime in November 1999,
respondents went to the house of Spouses Salandanan in Dasmarias, Cavite and asked
the latter to sign a special power of attorney; that the supposed special power of attorney
was in fact a deed of donation wherein Spouses Salandanan was alleged to have
25
In their Answer,[5] Spouses Fernandez denied the allegations of the complaint

and averred that Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan (Spouses Salandanan) are the
registered owners of the subject property and the improvements therein; that respondent
Isabel is not a daughter of Spouses Salandanan; that Delfin Fernandez (Delfin) is the
nearest of kin of Pablo Salandanan being the nephew of the latter; that Delfin has
continuously occupied the said property since time immemorial with the permission of
Spouses Salandanan; that they did not receive any notice to vacate the subject property
either from respondents or their counsel.
donated in favor of respondents the subject property; that said deed of donation was
simulated and fictitious and that by virtue of the alleged deed of donation, respondent
Isabel was able to transfer the title of the subject property in her name; that in fact, the
subject property is the subject of a separate case filed on July 31, 2001 before the RTC
of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 01101487[6] for annulment, revocation and
reconveyance of title. By way of counterclaim, Spouses Fernandez prayed for moral
damages and attorneys fees.
On August 9, 2002 the MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondents and
against Spouses Fernandez, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter and all persons
claiming rights under them to peacefully vacate the premises and
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs and for the defendants to pay
plaintiffs: 1) P5,000.00 a month beginning January 29, 2002 (when the
demand letter was received by defendants by registered mail) until they
finally vacate the premises and 2) the amount of P15,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees.
The counterclaim of the defendants is dismissed for lack of merit.
Page
Dissatisfied, Spouses Fernandez appealed to the RTC. Respondents then filed a

Motion for Execution Pending Appeal with the RTC. On December 9, 2002, the RTC
issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to place respondents in
possession of the disputed property on the ground that Spouses Fernandez failed to
periodically deposit the monthly rentals as they fell due. The Writ of Execution was
issued on January 10, 2003. The Spouses Fernandez moved for reconsideration of the
Order for issuance of the writ of execution, but the same was denied.
26
SO ORDERED.[7]
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Thus, on February 20, 2003, the sheriff went to the subject premises to
implement the writ of execution but found the place padlocked. The sheriff also found
the petitioner, an old woman, all alone inside the house. Taking pity on the old woman,
the sheriff was unable to implement the writ. On the same day, respondents filed an
Urgent Motion to Break Open, alleging that Spouses Fernandez fetched petitioner
earlier that day from her residence in Dasmarias, Cavite and purposely placed her
inside the subject premises so the old woman could plead for mercy from the executing
sheriff.
On March 6, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of
the MeTC of Manila,[8] and on April 8, 2003, the RTC also issued an Order authorizing
the sheriff to employ the necessary force to enable him to enter the subject premises
and place the plaintiffs-appellees in actual possession thereof.[9]
Meanwhile, on April 4, 2003, Spouses Fernandez filed before the CA a petition

for review with prayer for a temporary restraining order seeking to stay the immediate
execution pending appeal.[10] In a Resolution dated April 15, 2003, the CA granted the
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.
On June 27, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision affirming in toto the decision of
the RTC and ordered Spouses Fernandez and all persons claiming rights under them
including petitioner to vacate the premises, ruling thus:
Verily, the only issue to be resolved in the present ejectment case

is who between petitioners [Spouses Fernandez] and respondents has the
better right to possess the disputed premises. The issue as to who
between Sofia Aniosa Salandanan and respondents is the real owner of
subject premises could be properly threshed out in a separate proceedings,
which in this case is already pending resolution in another court.
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27
Interestingly, nowhere in any pleadings of petitioners submitted

below could We find any allegations to the effect that their possession of
the disputed premises sprung from their claim of ownership over the
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same nor, at the very least, that they are in possession of any document
that would support their entitlement to enjoy the disputed premises.
As between respondents' Torrens Title to the premises juxtaposed

that of petitioners' barren claim of ownership and absence of any
document showing that they are entitled to possess the same, the choice is
not difficult. Simply put, petitioners plainly have no basis to insist that
they have a better right to possess the premises over respondents who
have a Torrens Title over the same. Hence, the MTC, as well as the RTC,
correctly ordered petitioners to vacate the premises since respondents
have a better right to possess the same by virtue of the latter's Torrens
Title.[11]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The assailed Decision, dated 06 March 2003, of Hon. Judge Lucia
Pea Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Brach 50,
affirming on appeal the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MTC for brevity), Branch 15, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby LIFTED. As a
legal consequence, petitioners and all persons claiming rights under
them, including Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are hereby ORDERED to
vacate the premises immediately upon receipt hereof. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
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28
On July 29, 2003, Spouses Fernandez filed their motion for reconsideration.[13]
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On even date, Sofia Salandanan (petitioner) filed a Motion for Clarification and
Intervention[14] and attached a Motion for Reconsideration.[15] In her motion for
clarification and intervention, she alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real
owners of the subject property; that she was not a party to the case for ejectment and did
not receive any notice therefrom; and that by virtue of the said decision, she was about
to be evicted from her property without having participated in the entire process of the
ejectment proceeding.
Petitioner further claims that sometime in 1999, respondents went to their house
and showed certain papers purportedly copies of a special power of attorney but which
turned out to be a deed of donation involving the subject property; that by virtue of the
said donation, respondents were able to register the subject properties in their name and
were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767; that on July 31, 2001, Spouses
Salandanan with the assistance of Delfin, filed a civil case before the RTC of Manila for
Revocation/Annulment of the said title and Reconveyance; and that consequently,
petitioner was forced to intervene in order to protect her interests over the subject
property. Petitioner prayed for (1) clarification of the CAs decision asking whether the
said decision applies to her as a relative of Spouses Fernandez claiming right under
them or as possessor of the subject property in her right as owner of the subject
property; (2) that she be allowed to intervene in the appeal; and (3) that the attached
motion for reconsideration be admitted.
In a Resolution dated September 3, 2003, the CA denied the motion for

reconsideration filed by Spouses Fernandez and petitioners motion for clarification and
intervention, for lack of merit,[16] thus:
We have carefully perused petitioners Motion and find the

arguments raised therein a mere rehash, if not a repetition, of the
arguments raised in their petition, which have already been thoroughly
discussed and passed upon in our Decision.
Page
29
Anent the movant Sofia Salandanans Motion for Clarification and

Intervention, We hereby deny the same on the ground that it is belatedly
filed by virtue of the rendition of Our Decision on June 27, 2003.
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Section 2, Rule 19 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly

provides:
Section 2. Time to Intervene. The motion to

intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. x x x
Moreover, it is undisputed that on 31 July 2001, movant Sofia

Salandanan represented by petitioner has already instituted a Civil Case
for Revocation/ Annulment of T.C.T. 246767 and Reconveyance before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 and docketed as Civil
Case No. 01101487. As such We find movants motion to be wanting of
merit as her rights are already fully protected in said separate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for

Clarification and Intervention are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
30
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT INCLUDED PETITIONER IN ITS
ADVERSE JUDGMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE LATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE
INSTANT CASE AND DOES NOT DERIVE HER RIGHT TO
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1.
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2.

JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION BY PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT IT
WAS ONLY BY VIRTUE OF ITS DECISION DATED JUNE 27,
2003 THAT PETITIONER WAS INCLUDED IN THE
EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND THE EARLIEST
OPPURTUNE TIME WHEN PETITIONER COULD HAVE
INTERVENED WAS AFTER THE COURT OF APPEALS
RULED AGAINST HER.
3.

JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF
WHO HAS BETTER POSSESSION.
4.

JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT SUSPEND THE CASE
DESPITE THE EQUITABLE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT IN
THE CASE AT BAR IN THE LIGHT OF THE AMAGAN VS.
MARAMAG CASE.[18]
Page
Petitioner contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it

included petitioner in its decision despite the fact that she is not a party in the ejectment
case, thus, violating her right to due process; and considering that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person, she cannot be bound by the Decision of the CA.
31
STAY IN THE CONTESTED PROPERTY FROM THE SPOUSES

DELFIN AND CARMEN FERNANDEZ.
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Petitioner also asserts that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion for
clarification and intervention. According to her, she was constrained to file a motion for
clarification and intervention because the CA included her in its decision in spite of the
fact that she was not impleaded as a party to the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion when the CA failed to resolve the
issue of ownership in order to determine the party who has the better right to possess the
subject property. She asserts that the CA should have suspended the unlawful detainer
case since the ownership of the subject property is in issue.
Finally, petitioner maintains that she is the owner of the property by virtue of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9937 issued on October 2, 1947 by the Register of
Deeds of Manila. Hence, as the owner of the subject property, she has all the right to
use, the right to allow others to use and the right to exclude others from using the
same. Petitioner further claims that respondents were able to transfer the title of the
subject property in their name through manipulation wherein respondents asked her and
her deceased husband to sign a special power of attorney but later turned out to be a
deed of donation. As a matter of fact, upon learning of the said transfer, petitioner filed
before the RTC of Manila a case for annulment and/or revocation of the title.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Let us first tackle the issue of whether petitioner should have been allowed to
intervene even after the CA had promulgated its Decision.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provide:
Page
32
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest

in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
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of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in

the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be

filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of
the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on
the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the

trial court. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore because
intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation.[19] The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention
of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same,[20] but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts
are nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether or not to
allow intervention. The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties
and whether the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Keeping these factors in mind, the courts have to give much consideration to the
fact that actions for ejectment are designed to summarilyrestore physical possession to
one who has been illegally deprived of such possession.[21] It is primarily a quieting
process intended to provide an expeditious manner for protecting possession or right to
possession without involvement of the title.[22] In Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v.
Booc,[23] the Court elucidated the purpose of actions for ejectment in this wise:
Page
33
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary

proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. It
does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a time
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procedure designed to remedy the situation. Stated in another way,

the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to
provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an
alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his
possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of
peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally
deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide
as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the
same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued
wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of
social order which must be restored as promptly as
possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be
avoided.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as stated above, ejectment cases must be resolved with great dispatch.
Moreover, petitioner's intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a

complete adjudication of her rights. The issue raised by petitioner is mainly that of
ownership, claiming that the property in dispute was registered and titled in the name of
respondents through the use of fraud. Such issue cannot even be properly threshed
out in an action for ejectment, as Section 18, Rule 70 provides that [t]he judgment
rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the
possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. x x x In Malison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court held thus:
Page
34
Verily, in ejectment cases, the word possession means nothing

more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense
contemplated in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is entitled
to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independently of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the partylitigants. It does not even matter if the party's title to the property is
questionable.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
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Hence, a just and complete determination of petitioner's rights could actually be had in
the action for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title that she had previously
filed, not in the instant action for ejectment.
It is likewise for this reason that petitioner is not an indispensable party in the
instant case. The records bear out that the disputed property is in the possession of
Spouses Fernandez. Even petitioner does not allege that she was in the possession of
subject premises prior to or during the commencement of the ejectment
proceedings. Since her claim of ownership cannot be properly adjudicated in said
action, she is, therefore, not an indispensable party therein.
It is also misleading for petitioner to say that the earliest opportune time when
petitioner could have intervened was after the CA ordered her to vacate the subject
property in its Decision dated June 27, 2003. As early as when the sheriff attempted to
implement the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the RTC, when she pleaded
not to be evicted from the subject premises, she already became aware that the RTC had
ordered to place respondents in possession of the subject property pending appeal with
the RTC. That would have been the proper time for her to intervene if she truly
believed that her interests would be best protected by being a party to the ejectment
case.
Page
There is also no merit to petitioner's argument that it was grave abuse of

discretion for the CA to include her in its Decision because she is not a party to
the ejectment case, and neither is she claiming right to possession under the
Spouses Fernandez, but as its alleged rightful owner.
35
Verily, allowing petitioner's intervention at this late stage of the ejectment

proceedings would only cause undue delay without affording petitioner the relief sought
since the issue of ownership cannot be determined with finality in the unlawful detainer
case.
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Note that the MeTC, RTC, and the CA unanimously found that the disputed
property is presently registered under the Torrens System in the name of
respondents. The lower courts then concluded that respondents presented the best proof
to establish the right to possess the same. It should be borne in mind that unless the case
falls under one of the recognized exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27]
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Page
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when property is registered under the
Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and cannot
be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer.[29] In this
particular action where petitioner's alleged ownership cannot be established, coupled
with the presumption that respondents' title to the property is legal, then the lower courts
36
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court, more so when the CA affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[28] This case
does not fall under any of the exceptions, thus, the factual finding of the lower courts,
that the new registered owners of the subject premises are respondents, must be
respected and upheld by this Court.
are correct in ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession of the subject
premises.
Petitioner's ownership not having been fully established in this case, she cannot,
therefore, claim that the lower court's decision divesting the Spouses Fernandez of
possession should not apply to her. In Stilgrove v. Sabas,[30] the Court held that:
Page
Of particular significance is the fact that in Spouses Fernandez's Answer, they

never alleged that petitioner was in actual possession of the disputed property. In fact,
in said Answer, they stated that it was Delfin Fernandez, Jr. who has continuously
occupied the premises since time immemorial and that petitioner resides in her house in
Dasmarias, Cavite. Likewise worthy of note is the fact that the Spouses Fernandez
never refuted in their Opposition to Amended Motion to Break Open the allegation of
respondents that petitioner was merely fetched by the Spouses Fernandez from her
residence in Dasmarias, Cavite on the day (February 20, 2003) that the sheriff was to
implement the writ of execution, and placed her inside the subject premises so the old
woman could plead for mercy from the executing sheriff. In the petition for review
dated April 3, 2003 filed with the CA, Spouses Fernandez admitted that it was only
after the RTC issued its Order dated February 10, 2003, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Order for issuance of the writ of execution, that petitioner
took possession of the subject premises.[32]
37
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to

another is in personam. x x x Any judgment therein is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to
be heard. However, this rule admits of the exception, such that even a
non-party may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where
he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the
defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of
the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or
(f) member of the family, relative or privy of the
defendant.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
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Taking the foregoing into account, it is clear that petitioner, even though a nonparty, is bound by the judgment because aside from being a relative of or privy to
Spouses Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she occupied the property
after the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in order to frustrate the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2003 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and its Resolution dated September 3, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No.
76336, denying the petition for clarification and intervention filed by Sofia Aniosa
Salandanan, are AFFIRMED.
Cost against petitioner.
Page
38
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. L-17468
July 31, 1963
PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and

SALVADOR
V.
DEL
ROSARIO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon
City,
Branch
III,
SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.
Cornelio
S.
Ruperto
for
petitioners-appellants.
Vicente
M.
Magpoc
for
respondents-appellees.
Damian L. Jimenez in his own behalf as respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party

complaint; and on the following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to
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Page
In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants
commenced a suit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties
against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (No. 5230), and then, on
November 4, 1958, filed a motion in the municipal court to suspend proceedings
in the summary action before it until after the termination of the case in the
Court of First Instance.
39
This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Branch II), dated June 4, 1960, dismissing appellants' petition
for certiorari and mandamus to review four orders of the municipal court of
Quezon City (Branch III) in civil case No. 5039 entitled "Sancho R. Jacinto, et
al. vs. Pilar T. del Rosario, et al." That case was one of forcible entry under
Rule 72, involving two parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto
and Domingo C. Bascara, now respondents-appellees, are the registered owners
under transfer certificates of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. These lands had been acquired by them
through purchase from the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc.
In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now petitioners-appellants,
claimed ownership of the same properties by purchase from one Macaria
Fulgencio and her husband Carlos Javier and alleged that they were and had
been in actual physical possession thereof even before the purchase from J.M.
Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees. Appellants, after a second amended complaint
had been filed by appellees, submitted their answer thereto dated October 2,
1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffs themselves as
well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed for an
award of damages.
suspend proceedings. In both instances appellants moved to reconsider and were

turned down in two other separate orders, dated October 24 and November 27,
1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of appellants' petition
for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and now on appeal before us.1wph1.t
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Page
With respect to the other order that denying appellant's motion to suspend
proceedings it is enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance
and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim
should take precedence, was filed by them when the forcible entry case was
already pending, and was obviously intended to delay the proceedings therein;
and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is
not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The
very petition formandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject
of this appeal is likewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only
one of the numerous actions previously resorted to by appellants and decided
unfavorably to them. There was special civil action No. 5318, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed by Judge Andres Reyes for lack of
jurisdiction and then refiled in Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by
Judge Nicasio Yatco on July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil
action No. 5500, Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R.
Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of these actions were instituted after the
ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought to suspend the trial
thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole pursued by
appellants.The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
40
The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and
Bascara, since they were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as
to whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc.
was concerned, the allegation against it is that it had entered into a compromise
agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of lands
involved therein (including those now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase
and that the ejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that
compromise agreement. We fail to see how such "agreement to which appellees
were strangers, could have anything to do with their right of action to recover
the material possession of the lands in question. The prayer in the third-party
complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should be
the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue
of possession may not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The
admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in the
present instance there was no abuse of discretion in the order of denial
complained of.
[G.R. No. 162704. November 19, 2004]
MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA, petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL BOOKSTORE, INC., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two certificates of title in the names of two different persons cover one
and the same piece of land. The question in this case is who is the rightful
owner of the property.
The land in question is located at the corner of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) and Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City. It was originally part
of a larger piece of land designated as Lot No. 4-B-2-B of the subdivision
plan Psd-20172,[1] being a portion of Lot 4-B-2 of Plan SWO-16797, per
original survey for Valentin Afable, et. al. dated March 3, 1944. Lot No. 4B-2-A of said plan was in the name of Valentin Afable, while Lot No. 4-B-2B of the same plan was in the name of Eugenio Evangelista. Lot 4-B-2-B
had an area of 8,371 square meters.[2]
Page
On December 4, 1978, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista executed a

deed of sale with mortgage of Lot 4-B-2-B in favor of the spouses Nereo
and Gloria Paculdo, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 219636 and
the issuance of TCT No. 251175[6] in the names of the Paculdo spouses,
with the mortgage lien annotated thereon. For failure of the Paculdo
spouses to pay their obligation under the mortgage contract, the mortgage
was extra-judicially foreclosed and the land sold at public auction to the
Heirs of Simeon Evangelista. On August 7, 1981, on the basis of the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale[7] executed in favor of the Heirs, TCT No.
251175 of the Paculdo spouses was cancelled and TCT No. 279654[8] was
issued in the name of the Heirs[9] of Simeon Evangelista.
41
Lot 4-B-2-B was later recorded in the names of the Heirs[3] of one
Simeon Evangelista under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-219636,
issued on June 22, 1976.[4] The title indicated that the land was originally
registered under Act No. 496 on October 3, 1927, in the registration book of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Vol. T-51, Page 218, pursuant to Decree
No. 917, G.L.R.O. Record No. 197.[5]
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In 1982, an unsegregated portion measuring 906 square meters of Lot

4-B-2-B was expropriated by the Government for the widening of Aurora
Boulevard. The unsegregated portion was designated as Lot 4-B-2-B-1.
The remaining portion of 7,465 square meters was designated as Lot 4-B2-B-2, the subject land. On May 23, 1983, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista
sold the subject land, to respondent National Bookstore Inc. through
a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage.[10] Respondent took possession
of the subject land, declared the same for taxation purposes [11] and was
issued TCT No. 300861[12] covering the subject land.
In 1994, petitioner Memoria G. Encinas, through her attorney-in-fact
and herein co-petitioner Adolfo Balboa, filed a Petition[13] for the
administrative reconstitution of her title, TCT No. 179854, which was
supposedly burned in the fire that razed the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City on June 11, 1988. To support her petition, she presented a copy of
her Tax Declaration No. B-040-01639[14] for the year 1985 allegedly
covering the subject property and a certification[15] from the Acting Chief of
the Revenue Collection Office of the Quezon City Treasurer stating that the
real property taxes on the said property have been paid up to 1994 under
Tax Declaration No. 1639. On October 20, 1994, the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA), after investigation and verification that
the titles to be reconstituted do not overlap other properties, issued an
order[16] reconstituting several transfer certificates of title, including
petitioner Encinas TCT No. 179854. Pursuant to the order, the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No. RT-103022[17] in petitioner Encinas
name on November 9, 1994.
Petitioner offered the property covered by the reconstituted title for sale
to Alfredo C. Ramos, the president of respondent. It was then that
respondent discovered that its TCT No. 300861 and petitioners TCT No.
RT-103022 referred to the same property, Lot No. 4-B-2-B-2.
Petitioner Encinas as defendant denied respondents allegations and

stubbornly claimed that she was the real and absolute owner in fee simple
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Page
On February 28, 1996, respondent as plaintiff filed an action for quieting

of title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, alleging
that it was the true and lawful owner of Lot 4-B-2-B-2 as evidenced by its
TCT No. 300861. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9626716.
42
On July 17, 1997, after conducting an investigation on titles alleged to

have been illegally reconstituted, the LRA Reconstitution Officer issued a
Supplemental Order dated July 17, 1997 and an Order dated June 8, 1999
which set aside the previous order of reconstitution dated October 20,
1994, and in particular, directed the exclusion of the reconstitution of the
original of TCT No. T-179854.[18]
of the subject property and neither she nor her predecessor-in-interest ever
sold the property to anybody. She relied on the legality and regularity of
the reconstitution of her title to the subject property.[19]
On June 21, 1999, the RTC decided in favor of respondent. The trial
court declared that while a reconstituted title has a prima facieappearance
of legality, the reconstitution of said title is subject to the proviso that no
other certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the
records of the registry. A certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, if
found or recovered, prevails over the reconstituted title. In Civil Case No.
Q-96-26716, the original transfer certificate of title covering the property,
TCT No. 300861 in respondents name, is on file with the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City and is one of the titles which were not burned in the fire of
June 1988. The owners duplicate copy of the title is intact and in
respondents possession. Furthermore, respondent was able to show how
it acquired the property from its immediate predecessors and was able to
account for the previous major transactions involving the subject property
until ownership thereof was transferred to respondent.
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Page
Petitioners promptly moved for reconsideration. On November 10,

1999, the trial court granted the same and set aside its earlierDecision.[21] In
a complete reversal of its previous ruling, the trial court upheld the validity
of petitioner Encinas title. According to the trial court, petitioner Encinas
title, TCT No. 179854, was registered and issued on August 25, 1972
which should have served as constructive notice to respondent whose title,
TCT No. 300861, was issued only on June 6, 1983. The trial court also
pointed out that there is a manifest defect in respondents title as to its
origin: respondents title is a derivative of an original certificate of title
issued pursuant to Decree No. 917, GLRO Record No. 197; however, said
GLRO Record No. 197 referred to a piece of land located in Bataan, not
43
Petitioner Encinas, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence to

show how she acquired ownership of the property. She merely alleged that
she was the owner in fee simple. To support her claim of ownership, she
presented a tax declaration covering the property. But it was shown that
said tax declaration was tampered with and apparently falsified. Petitioner
Encinas relied mainly on the presumption of validity of her reconstituted
title. However, as the trial court noted, the LRA Administrator eventually
issued the Supplemental Order of July 17, 1997 and Order of June 8, 1999
excluding petitioner Encinas title from the reconstitution order. To the trial
court, not only was respondent able to prove its ownership of the subject
property with preponderant evidence, but the case had already become
moot and academic by virtue of the LRAs cancellation of petitioner
Encinas reconstituted title. Hence, it upheld respondents title to the
subject property and ordered the cancellation of petitioner Encinas
reconstituted title.[20]
Quezon City. Respondents title referred to a piece of land in Bataan and

not the subject property. Hence, in the Order dated November 10, 1999,
the RTC nullified respondents title, and declared petitioner Encinas
reconstituted title valid.
Respondent appealed the RTC Order of November 10, 1999 to the
Court of Appeals. On October 27, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the RTC Order and reinstated the RTC Decision of June 21,
1999.[22] The appellate court found that the antecedents leading to
respondents acquisition of the property were clearly shown in the records
and even annotated in its TCT No. 300861. On the other hand, petitioner
Encinas failed to describe the circumstances of her ownership or
possession of the land and to identify her predecessor-in-interest or the
manner by which she acquired the property. Petitioners again raised the
argument that the erroneous entry of the GLRO record number in
respondents title is a fatal defect which proves the titles invalid source.
However, the appellate court concluded that based on the testimony of
petitioners own witnesses,[23] the variance was merely a typographical or
clerical error. The same witnesses testified that in cases of such clerical
errors, it is the technical description which controls. The technical
description in respondents title described the subject property, Lot 4-B-2-B2, located in Quezon City.
On the other hand, the technical description in petitioner Encinas title
refers to a different parcel of land. Her title describes a parcel of land
which is a portion of Lot 2-E-2 of plan SWO-16797, certainly not the subject
property.
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Page
Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the appellate

courts decision but this was denied on March 12, 2004.[26]Hence, they filed
this Petition for Review on Certiorari, alleging that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in upholding the validity of [respondents] purported TCT No.
300861 notwithstanding the abundance of competent evidence
demonstrating positively that said title is spurious and fake. Petitioners
insist that the variance in the entries in respondents TCT No. 300186 and
44
The Court of Appeals also observed that respondent was able to

present tax declarations and real property tax bill receipts in its name and
in the name of its immediate predecessor, the Evangelista clan. While
petitioners also presented a tax declaration and certification from the
Revenue Collection Office of Quezon City, upon closer scrutiny, said
documents showed that petitioners had declared Lot 4-B-2-B-1 for taxation
purposes, and not Lot 4-B-2-B-2, the property subject of this case.[24] It
should be remembered that Lot 4-B-2-B-1 refers to the portion which was
expropriated by the government.
GLRO Record No. 197 is not a mere typographical or clerical error, but
instead an indication of the fraudulent nature of respondents title.
Petitioners submit that respondents evidence failed to show that it
proved its ownership of the subject property. In particular, petitioners take
issue with the Court of Appeals alleged disregard of its evidence which
allegedly demonstrates that respondents title to the subject property is fake
and spurious. Petitioners harp on the supposed incongruity between the
entries in the GLRO Record Numbers in respondents and petitioners
respective titles to the property.
Respondent, in its Comment, seeks to have the Petition dismissed on
the ground that it raises only questions of fact which this Court cannot
entertain via a petition for certiorari.[27]
Indeed, this Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, there are several
exceptions to the rule, namely: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. [28]
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the
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Page
The issue before this Court is whether petitioners were able to

discharge their burden of proving the superiority of their title over the title of
respondent. The Court of Appeals upheld the initial Decision of the RTC
and found the quantum of evidence presented by petitioners insufficient. A
review of the evidence reveals no compelling reason to reverse the
appellate courts ruling.
45
This case falls under one of the exceptions, as the factual conclusions
of the trial court and the appellate court are in conflict with each other.
Hence, although the petition raises questions of fact since it entails a
review of the evidence at hand, it may be entertained by this Court.
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the
evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.29
Respondent as plaintiff was able to overcome the burden of proof and
prove by preponderant evidence that it has a superior right and title to the
subject property. In contrast, petitioners as defendants seem to rely only
on the alleged weakness of respondents evidence, without asserting any
proof other than her reconstituted title to the subject property.
From the evidence, respondent derived its title from the title of its
vendor, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista, via a deed of sale. The Heirs
obtained their title from their predecessor-in-interest Simeon Evangelista.
Prior to the transfer of the title to respondent, the Heirs had sold the subject
property to the Paculdo spouses in whose names another title was issued.
However, the Heirs were able to reclaim the property upon the failure of the
Paculdo spouses to pay their mortgage obligation on the property. All these
transactions involving the property are well-documented.[29] From the time
respondent obtained the property, it protected its interest therein by fencing
off the property and designating security guards around its
perimeter.[30] Respondent also exercised its obligation as owner by paying
real property taxes on the property it had acquired, evidenced by tax
declarations issued in its name by the Quezon City Assessors Office.[31]
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Page
Petitioners also cannot rely on Tax Declaration No. B-040-01639

allegedly issued in petitioner Encinas name, since a tax declaration with
the same number was also issued in the name of respondent. Indeed,
according to petitioners witness, Dante M. Veloria, Assistant City Assessor
46
In contrast, petitioner Encinas asserts her right to the subject property

via a reconstituted title, also presented in evidence. However, other than
the allegation in her Answer to respondents Complaint (for quieting of title)
that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject property, petitioner
Encinas failed to disclose before any of the judicial levels how she was able
to acquire title to the property. The trial court had intimated during the
hearings that to get to the truth of the matter, it is important to trace the
origins or source of the titles of the properties.[32] Counsel for petitioners
had manifested time and again that petitioner Encinas herself, who was
then in Detroit, Michigan, would be presented to testify on the acquisition of
the property,[33] but the hearings terminated without petitioner Encinas ever
making an appearance. Neither was her co-petitioner and attorney-in-fact
Adolfo A. Balboa able to shed light on the matter, as he clearly had no
knowledge of the circumstances of petitioner Encinas acquisition of the
property.[34]
of Quezon City, there are many cases of duplication of tax declaration

numbers in their office, and such duplication does not necessarily mean
that the duplicate tax declaration is spurious. The Assessors Office
rectifies the duplication by adjusting the tax declaration number and
annotating the correction at the back of the tax declaration and notifying the
persons concerned. The same witness noted that trouble arises when
such duplications are not corrected, as in this case.
Instead of presenting evidence to prove the superiority of petitioner
Encinas title, petitioners rely only on the apparent weakness of
respondents title, that is, the alleged fatal defect in GLRO Record No. 197
perpetuated in the titles of respondent and its predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioners cite Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Court of Appeals[35] in
arguing that these errors cannot simply be qualified as mere typographical
errors. However, the facts of the cited case differ from the case at bar, and
the ruling thereon cannot be blindly applied to this case.
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Page
The same cannot be said of the alleged defect in respondents title in

the case at bar. In Lorenzana, the erroneous entries were too numerous
and evident, and involved significant portions of the titles. On the other
47
The Lorenzana case involved a large tract of land traversed by a

railroad and divided into two parcels designated as Lots 1 and 2, both
parcels covered by a reconstituted title Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. (1020) RO-9. A separate OCT for Lot 1, OCT No. (1898) RO-58 was
issued, while Lot 2 remained covered by OCT No. (1020) RO-9. Lots 1 and
2 were subsequently subdivided and titles to the resulting parcels of land
were issued. However, the TCTs covering the subdivided parcels of Lot 1,
while correctly indicating OCT No. (1898) RO-58 of Lot 1 as its source,
contained the technical description lifted from the OCT No. (1020) RO-9
covering Lot 2. Subsequent transactions of the subdivided parcels of land
of Lot 1 resulted in the issuance of TCTs containing the incorrect technical
description as well as the inaccurate description of the location of the
properties. The controversy arose when Lorenzana, et al., learned that the
same parcels were being claimed by therein respondent B.E. San Diego,
Incorporated, based on titles registered in the latters name. The trial court
found for respondent B.E. San Diego, as its titles were not blemished by
any defect and were regularly issued. The trial court also considered in
respondent B.E. San Diegos favor its open, adverse and continuous
possession of the disputed land since 1966 and its consistent payment of
taxes thereon. This Court upheld the ruling of the trial court. The defects
appearing on the titles of Lorenzana, et al. relating to the lots mother title,
technical descriptions and locationsjudicially admitted by Lorenzana, et
al.were too glaring that they could not be dismissed as clerical and
harmless in character. The discrepancies in Lorenzana, et al.s titles
cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of B.E. San Diego.
hand, the claimed flaw in respondents title and the title of its predecessorsin-interest is GLRO Record No. 197, which petitioners assert should be
GLRO Record No. 917. It is obvious that such a defect involves only an
interchanging of numbers. It is certainly believable that such variance in
the copying of entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error.
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, petitioners own
witnesses explained that the inconsistency in the entries in the GLRO
record number could be due to clerical error, and in such case, the
technical description in the title should prevail over the record number.
It must be noted, too, that the original of respondents title still exists
and is with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City as it was not one of the
titles that were destroyed by the fire. Petitioner Encinas title, on the other
hand, is a reconstituted title, which was later withdrawn by the same office
which issued it, pursuant to the Supplemental Order dated July 17, 1997
and Order dated June 8, 1999.[36]
Respondent has established by preponderant evidence that it is the
rightful owner of the subject property. Petitioners have not.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED, no
reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals having been adduced.
Costs against petitioners.
Page
48
SO ORDERED.
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TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN

INSURANCE
COMPANY
INCORPORATED, ALMA PEALOSA,
KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI NISHIDA,
TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and
ANTONIO B. LAPID,
G.R. No. 150107
Petitioners,
versus -
JORGE VALDEZ,
Respondent.
x ------------------------------------------ x
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN
INSURANCE COMPANY
INCORPORATED and TERESITA H.
QUIAMBAO,
G.R. No. 150108
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
versus -
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
49
Respondent.
Promulgated:
Page
JORGE VALDEZ,
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January 28, 2008
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution are two (2) consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated September 13,
2001 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No.
56579.
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine),

petitioner in these cases, is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance
business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except Antonio B.
Lapid, one of Tokio Marines consultants.
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Page
On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 35, Manila a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as
Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms
of the Unit Management Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his
commissions, and bonuses. Respondent prayed for the following reliefs: a)
actual damages in the total amount of P71,866,205.67 and the corresponding
50
Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of

Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit Management Contract entered into between
them on August 16, 1977.
interests; b) moral damages of P10,000,000.00;

c) exemplary damages
amounting to P10,000,000.00; d) attorneys fees corresponding to 30% of the
said amounts; and e) costs of the suit.
Eventually, respondent filed with the trial court an Urgent Ex

Parte Motion For Authority To Litigate As Indigent Plaintiff.
On October 28, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, the pertinent
portions of which read:
The Court hereby allows the plaintiff to litigate as pauper there

being sufficient showing that he is an indigent. He does not own any
real property in the City of Manila or elsewhere.
The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to accept the
complaint for filing without payment of filing fees computed as SIX
HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO AND
EIGHTY-THREE CENTAVOS (P615,672.83) which amount, however,
shall constitute a lien upon any judgment to be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff.
On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed their separate motions to

dismiss the complaint.
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Page
On January 20, 1999, the trial court issued an Order[2] denying

petitioners motions to dismiss. They then filed motions for reconsideration,
but they were likewise denied.
51
On December 17, 1998, respondent manifested before the trial court

that he filed various criminal complaints against petitioners with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
On March 12, 1999, petitioners filed their Answer Ad Cautelam in Civil

Case No. 98-91356.
On May 24, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals assailing the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1999 denying
their motions to dismiss, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.
On October 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing

the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial court from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356 during the pendency
of CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.
Then on December 7, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals

an Urgent Notice of Taking of Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private
Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending Case
And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be Warranted By Existing Law and
Jurisprudence. It appears that respondent was already 75 years old and
sickly.
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Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP

No. 52914.
52
On December 13, 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition to cite respondent in contempt of court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
56579. Petitioners alleged therein that in filing with the appellate court an
urgent notice of taking his deposition, respondent violated the preliminary
injunction issued by the said court.
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On December 14, 1999, the deposition of respondent was taken by Atty.

Alberto A. Aguja, a Notary Public for Manila. On the same date, he filed with
the Court of Appeals respondents deposition.
On September 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 dismissing
the petitions and lifting and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the consolidated petitions filed

by the petitioners are hereby DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary
injunction dated October 18, 1999 issued by this Court enjoining
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 is hereby LIFTED and
DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
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Page
On the first issue, it is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over
any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.[3] As we held
in Magaspi v. Ramolete,[4] the correct docket fees must be paid before courts
can act on a petition or complaint. The exception to the rule on payment of
53
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in denying their
motion to dismiss respondents complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 for
nonpayment of docket fees; (2) for not finding that respondent engaged in
forum shopping; and (3) in not declaring that he is guilty of contempt of court.
docket fees is provided in Section 21, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, thus:
SEC. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate

his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex
parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who
has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of
docket and other lawful fees and of transcripts of stenographic
notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount
of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was
exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in
the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court
should determine after hearing that the party declared as an
indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected
by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed
by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent

litigant are provided for in Section 19, Rule 141,[5] of the Revised Rules of
Court, which reads:
Page
54
SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.

INDIGENT LITIGANT (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF
THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE
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THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO

DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS
STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT
FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the
case favorable to the indigent unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant
shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not
earn a gross income abovementioned nor they own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the litigants affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested
person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action
or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
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Page
In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondents ex

parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was not
accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate
members of his family. The argument lacks merit. Section 19 clearly states
that it is the litigant alone who shall execute the affidavit. The Rule does not
55
For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is not really a

pauper, but is properly a person who is an indigent although not a public
charge, meaning that he has no property or income sufficient for his support
aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to work and in
employment.[6] The term immediate family includes those members of the
same household who are bound together by ties of relationship but does not
include those who are living apart from the particular household of which the
individual is a member.[7]
require that all members of the litigants immediate family must likewise
execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Petitioners next argue that respondents ex parte motion is not

supported by sufficient evidence to show his indigent status.[8] Suffice it to
state that this Court is, first and foremost, a court of law. It is not its function
to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of
factual determination.[9] Thus, petitioners cannot now ask us to review the
evidence anew.
Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that respondent committed

forum shopping when he failed to report to the trial court that he filed criminal
cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals[10] describes forum shopping as the act

of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely
by some other courtto increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another. Differently put, it is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.[11]
Page
56
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be

allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts as it
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and
adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[12]
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Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,

provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff

or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
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Page
Respondents Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
57
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirement shall not

be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 reads:
FURTHER, that he has not heretofore commenced any other

action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, except the criminal case for SWINDLING (ESTAFA) under
Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) and for FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS under Art. 172, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code to be filed before the Makati
Prosecutors Office, criminal case for violation of the Insurance
Code of the Philippines to be filed before the Makati Prosecutors
Office, and the administrative case for violation of the Insurance
Code Commission; that to the best of his knowledge no such other
action is pending in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing certification is a

substantial compliance with Section 5 of Rule 7. Moreover, it should be
recalled that respondent manifested before the trial court on December 16,
1998 that he actually filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
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Page
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the

court: such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the
law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their
witnesses during litigation.[13] Succinctly, it is the despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court.[14] Rule 71 provides for two forms of
contumacious acts direct and indirect.
58
On the final issue, petitioners claim that the deposition of respondent

taken on December 14, 1999 violated the injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals on October 15, 1999. Such act, petitioners assert, is tantamount to
indirect contempt of court.
Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the

sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of
or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful
interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.[15] It is governed by Section 3,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or rejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
59
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process

or proceeding of a court not constituting direct contempt
under Section 1 of this Rule;
Page
(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
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(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and

acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of any person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent
the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court,
or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be

compliance with the following requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b)
an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by
counsel.[16] Records show that these requirements were complied with.
The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56579, dismissed the charge

for indirect contempt, holding that respondents deposition was done in good
faith, thus:
Page
60
It should be emphasized that what triggered the holding of

private respondents deposition last December 14, 1999 was the
use by the petitioners of the June 09 and 28, 1999 depositions
when at that time no orders were issued by Us enjoining any
proceedings below. The use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28
depositions have been vigorously objected to by the private
respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created
when the private respondent was cross-examined by the counsel
for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to clarify such
misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14,
1999 deposition was taken.
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We see no reason to depart from the foregoing findings by the

appellate court. Moreover, the taking of respondents deposition is not a part
of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered by the
writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. Let it be stressed at this
point that we have always abided by the dogma that courts must exercise their
contempt powers sparingly.
In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. The challenged Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Page
61
SO ORDERED.
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DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ
G.R. No. 141524
FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,

LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO
Present :
CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners,
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS

OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
62
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
Page
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
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OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.

ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents. Promulgated :
September 14, 2005
x-----------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners
Faustino,
Lolito
Domingo
Neypes,
Victoriano,
Jacob
Luz
Faustino,
Obania
and
Rogelio
Domingo
Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles

of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development,
Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.
petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial
63
court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to
Page
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both
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declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the

Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to
dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by

public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the
foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development
in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but
denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the
Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was
denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters
that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to
dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on
prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters
that could be determined only after trial.[1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of

the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the
trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from
the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the
In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court
64
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action
Page
trial proper.
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had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of

the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15 th day
thereafter
or
on
March
18,
1998,
filed
motion
for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another

order
dismissing
the
motion
for
reconsideration[3] which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27,
1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal
fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of

appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.[5] This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998.[6]
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had

seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22,
1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When
Page
days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary
65
they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five
period for appeal.[7]
cai
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA)

dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly

dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement
is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and
executory.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the

aforementioned decision.
This was denied by the Court of
Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the

Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed
Page
66
by the appellate court:
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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING
THE
PETITIONERS
PETITION
FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE
ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES
WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER
THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED

IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF
THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE
OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL
DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
Page
67
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED

IN RULING THAT THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION
3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY
12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER
DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY
PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
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IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED

IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO,
INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE
FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR
TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.[9]
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period

within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural

right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure
to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[10] The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP
129,[11] as amended, provides:
Page
68
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final

orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
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corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight

hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall

be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely

motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension
of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken

within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it.
considering
the
It is an adjudication on the merits which,

evidence
presented
at
the
trial,
declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or
Page
69
it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.[12]
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As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of

July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be
construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order
which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy
of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22,
1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet
lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the final order,

receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the
trial court declared petitioner Quelnannon-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal,
he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus
motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order
had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of
appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed
out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed

within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which

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Page
the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
70
the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case

of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the
order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as
the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners

view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the

start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners
in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
Under
Rule
41,
Section
3,
petitioners
had 15
days
from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the

trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March
18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial
court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal
one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the
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Page
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only
71
period.[15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the
notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they

were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there
that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal
period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this
rule in similar cases,[16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted
by
law
jurisdictional.[17] The
is
rule
not
is
only
also
mandatory
founded
on
but
also
deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of

occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the

1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Page
72
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by

serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial
court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record
on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the
judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 37.
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But where such motion has been filed during office hours
of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must
be perfected within the day following that in which the party
appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.[19]
(emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period

previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this
appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee
on Judicial Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d
etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of
appeal[21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice.
We have since required strict observance of this reglementary
period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices
of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional instances to better serve
the ends of justice.
In National
Waterworks
and
Sewerage
Authority
and
Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23]however, we declared

that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the
rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has
on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not
depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of
Page
73
technicalities.
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In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a

rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be
followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the
filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing
party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due

course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities
were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine
the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten
to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent
the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the
courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that
every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposition of his cause.[25]
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all

courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time,
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Page
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly
74
process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules
based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file

their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and

to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. [30]
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule

40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies

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Page
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
75
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It

should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final
order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of

Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30
days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner,
the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to
resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the

confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
from receipt of notice of final order appealed from (July 22,
Page
1998).
76
counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or
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To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of

appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the
final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed
ofonly if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998
or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.[34]
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability

of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals
never even referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the

assailed decision of the Court of AppealsREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
________________________________________________________________
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Page
77
No costs.

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Civil procedure bulsu col

G.R. No. 128567

HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC., petitioner,

In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction

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Private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 89-5424 as mortgagee-assignee of

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preliminary injunction, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, predicated on the

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Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

"We view the motion for clarification filed by petitioner, purportedly

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On May 2, 1995, in opposition to private respondent's Motion for Issuance of

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illegal for being premature, thereby necessitating reconveyance (see Sec.

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B. THE PETITION IS AN INSIDIOUS AND UNDERHANDED

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C. PETITIONER IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL FROM BELATEDLY

THUS, THE RTC'S ORDER RECOGNIZING PETITIONER HUERTA

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MODIFYING, OR SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE

THE 30 SEPTEMBER 1994 DECISION IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086

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THE MOTION OR ANY OTHER MATTER IN CA G.R. SP NO. 35086,

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage understood in the

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Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the

This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above

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order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any

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". . . The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the disposition of

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There is, therefore, merit in private respondent's contention that to allow

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G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999

On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private

The facts of the case are as follows:

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xxx xxx xxx

9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had

8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a

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10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we had the occasion to rule that:

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estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by

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SOFIA ANIOSA SALANDANAN,

G.R. No. 160280

SPOUSES MA. ISABEL and

March 13, 2009

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The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by respondents

In their Answer,[5] Spouses Fernandez denied the allegations of the complaint

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