IN  THE  SUPERIOR  COURT  OF  THE  STATE  OF  DELAWARE  

IN  AND  FOR  KENT  COUNTY  
 
CHRISTOPHER  KING,  d/b/a  KingCast/Mortgage  Movies,  
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)    CASE  NO.  K15C-­‐03-­‐028  
 
Plaintiff,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)      JUDGE  YOUNG  
 
BETTY  LOU  MCKENNA,  HOLLY  MALONE  
 
 
)  
and  JOHN  PARADEE,  ESQ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants.    
 
 
 
 
)  
 
PLAINTIFF’S  THOMAS  PAINE  MOTION  FOR  RULE  59  RELIEF  FROM  JUDGMENT:  
APPLES  TO  APPLES  and  THE  FAILURE  TO  ADDRESS  
POMYKACZ  V.  BOROUGH  OF  W.  WILDWOOD,  438  F.  SUPP.  2d  504  (2006)  
 
 
I.  
Introduction  and  Proof  of  Unlawful  Bias  Against  Plaintiff.1  
 
 
The  Court  downplays  Plaintiff  right  from  the  start  of  its  25  page  Opinion:    
 
Whilst  claiming  to  issue  its  opinion  based  only  on  the  Complaint  and  making  all  
inferences  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  Plaintiff,  the  Court  nonetheless  opines  that  Plaintiff  
fancies  himself    a“guerilla”  journalist.    “Plaintiff  holds  himself  out  to  be  a  type  of  guerrilla-­‐
style  journalist.”  
But  that  purported  belief  is  not  stated  anywhere  in  Plaintiff’s  Complaint.  For  the  
Court,  Defendants,  law  students,  First  and  Fourth  Amendment  scholars  and  reviewing  Court  
edification  Plaintiff’s  Complaint  read,  in  pertinent  part:  
 
THE  PARTIES    
 
2.  Plaintiff  is  a  former  daily  news  reporter  and  escrow  attorney  who  has  
closed  several  dozen  commercial  real  estate  purchases  and  refinances.  He  has  
successfully  tried  several  First  Amendment  Jury  Trials  and  has  operated  
several  politically  and  legally-­charged  online  journals  over  the  past  decade,  
most  notably  Chris  King’s  First  Amendment  Page  and  Mortgage  Movies  
Journal.    
 

                                                                                                               

1  The  core  of  Plaintiffs  arguments  in  favor  of  Rule  56  reversal  are  noted  at  Section  VI  B,  infra.    That  

having  been  said  the  entire  Motion  is  cogent,  germane  and  set  up  for  full  review  and/or  immediate  
appeal  if  necessary.  

 

1  

That  is  what  Plaintiff  holds  himself  out  to  be  as  noted  in  the  Complaint  and  that’s  all  
the  Court  claimed  to  be  reviewing,  so  the  pejorative  “guerrilla”  nomenclature  is  reflective  of  
the  short  shrift  that  this  Plaintiff  ultimately  received  from  the  Court.  Further,  Plaintiff  did  
provide  the  Court  with  excerpts  and  materials  from  his  website  and  such  description  
comports  with  the  information  on  his  website  -­‐-­‐  which  was  not  once  mentioned  by  the  
Court.    The  Mortgage  Movies  Journal  description  has  read  this  way  for  several  years  now:  
 

Mortgage Movies Journal
Christopher King has worked in residential and corporate
real estate in various capacities for the past fifteen
years, clearing title, filing zoning applications and
reviewing wireless tower contracts. He and his
associates are now teaming to provide video coverage
of America's imploding Mortgage market. All images
video and text subject to copyright.
 
 
Mortgage  Movies  Journal    
 
Christopher  King  has  worked  in  residential  and  corporate  real  estate  in  various  
capacities  for  the  past  fifteen  years,  clearing  title,  filing  zoning  applications  and  
reviewing  wireless  tower  contracts.  He  and  his  associates  are  now  teaming  to  provide  
video  coverage  of  America's  imploding  Mortgage  market.  All  images  video  and  text  
subject  to  copyright.  
 
So  in  the  first  instance,  Plaintiff  is  not  a  guerilla;  he  is  a  professional  journalist  as  
well  as  a  mortgage  industry  professional  who  has  made  hundreds  of  thousands  (if  not  
millions)  of  dollars  for  the  banking/mortgage  industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

2  

II.  

The  Court  Incorrectly  Found  that  Commissioner  Freud  Used  Allowable  
Discretion  per  Rule  155  in  Refusing  to  Allow  Plaintiff  to  Run  Video  at  the  11  
June  2015  Hearing.  

 
Let’s  get  one  thing  straight  from  the  get  go:  Commissioner  Freud  in  point  of  fact  did  
not  exercise  any  discretion  at  all.  What  she  did  was  to  say  that  Rule  155  did  not  apply  to  
trial  Court  proceedings,  whilst  cutting  Plaintiff  off.    See  Transcript  (Tr._________)2  The  Plain  
Language  of  Rule  155  states  otherwise,  and,  moreover,  even  if  she  was  exercising  discretion,  
why  would  she  do  so  to  eliminate  video  done  by  a  trained  professional  journalist  and  who  
has  made  courtroom  video  in  six  (6)  different  states?  
But  of  course  by  marginalizing  Plaintiff  as  a  “guerilla”  the  Court  is  shading  things  in  
a  light  that  would  make  the  purported  exercise  of  discretion  more  palatable.  That  matter  
will  be  preserved  for  Appeal  to  the  Highest  Court  of  the  Country  in  a  related  and  
forthcoming  Declaratory  Judgment  case,  and  noted  in  a  documentary  film  about  this  entire  
circumstance.  
 
III.  

Private  Actors  Like  Defendant  John  Paradee  May  Indeed  be  Held  Liable  Under  
42  U.S.C.  §1983.  
First  of  all,  the  Court’s  use  of  the  ellipse  at  p.  8  of  its  ruling  is  completely  absurd  

because  it  eliminates  the  key  predicate  allegation  that  renders  such  a  claim  as  legally  
cognizable.    The  Court  wrote:  
“Interestingly,  Plaintiff  himself  states,  “[Defendant  Paradee  is  not  a  State  Actor….”  
But  that  is  not  all  that  Plaintiff  stated  in  para.  5  of  his  Complaint.  Here’s  the  full  sentence  
from  para  5:  
 
“He  is  not  a  State  Actor  but  did  consult  and  advise  Defendant  McKenna  on  matters  
relative  to  the  election  and  to  First  Amendment,  Free  Press  conduct  of  Plaintiff.”3  
 
 

                                                                                                               

2  Plaintiff  avers  this  as  subject  to  the  Pains  of  Perjury  and  Under  Oath:    The  Transcript  has  been  

ordered  and  Plaintiff  will  file  a  copy  with  the  Court  within  the  next  two  (2)  weeks,  immediately  on  
receipt  of  same.  
3  One  could  argue  based  on  this  alone  this  Court  never  intended  to  give  Plaintiff  a  fair  shake.  Now  
Plaintiff  told  Judge  Young  that  this  case  is  going  to  be  a  legacy  case.  His  actions  are  shaping  that  
legacy  into  something  more  ugly  than  not.  See  also  Section  VI  H,  regarding  the  failure  to  convert  this  
case  to  Summary  Judgment  per  Commonwealth  Constr.  Co.  v.  Red  Clay  Consol.  Sch.  Dist.  2010  Del.  
Super  LEXIS  489  (2010).  

 

3  

Second,  perhaps  the  Guide  from  the  Third  Circuit  will  help:    
4.4.3  Section  1983  –  Whether  a  Private  Person  Conspired  with  a  State  Official  
 
To  prove  a  conspiracy,  [plaintiff]  must  show  that  members  of  the  conspiracy  came  
to  a  mutual  understanding  to  do  the  act  that  violated  [plaintiff’s]  [describe  right].  
The  agreement  can  be  either  express  or  implied.  [Plaintiff]  can  prove  the  agreement  
by  presenting  testimony  from  a  witness  who  heard  [defendant]  and  [Official  Roe  
and/or  another  participant  in  the  conspiracy  with  Roe]  discussing  the  agreement;  
but  [plaintiff]  can  also  prove  the  agreement  without  such  testimony,  by  presenting  
evidence  of  circumstances  from  which  the  agreement  can  be  inferred.  In  other  
words,  if  you  infer  from  the  sequence  of  events  that  it  is  more  likely  than  not  that  
[defendant]  and  [Official  Roe  and/or  another  participant  in  the  conspiracy  with  40  
Roe]  agreed  to  do  an  act  that  deprived  [plaintiff]  of  [describe  right],  then  [plaintiff]  
has  proved  existence  of  the  agreement.    
 
In  order  to  find  an  agreement,  you  must  find  that  there  was  a  jointly  accepted  plan,  
and  that  [defendant]  and  [state  official]  [each  other  conspirator]  knew  the  plan’s  
essential  nature  and  general  scope.  A  person  who  has  no  knowledge  of  a  conspiracy,  
but  who  happens  to  act  in  a  way  which  furthers  some  purpose  of  the  conspiracy,  
does  not  thereby  become  a  conspirator.    
However,  you  need  not  find  that  [defendant]  knew  the  exact  details  of  the  plan  [or  
the  identity  of  all  the    participants  in  it].  One  may  become  a  member  of  a  conspiracy  
without  full  knowledge  of  all  the  details  of  the  conspiracy.  The  second  thing  that  
[plaintiff]  must  show  in  order  to  prove  a  conspiracy  is  that  [defendant]  or  a  co-­‐
conspirator  engaged  in  at  least  one  act  in  furtherance  of  the  conspiracy.  [In  this  case,  
this  requirement  is  satisfied  if  you  find  that  [defendant]  or  a  co-­‐conspirator  did  any  
of  the  following  things:  [Describe  the  acts  alleged  by  the  plaintiff].]  [In  other  words,  
[plaintiff]  must  prove  that  [defendant]  or  a  co-­‐conspirator  took  at  least  one  action  to  
further  the  goal  of  the  conspiracy.]    
 
Comment  Alternative  ways  to  show  that  a  private  person  acted  under  color  of  state  
law.  It  should  be  noted  that  demonstrating  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy  is  not  the  
only  possible  way  to  show  that  a  private  individual  acted  under  color  of  state  law.  
See  supra  Comment  4.4.  For  example,  when  a  private  person  is  acting,  under  a  
contract  with  the  state,  to  perform  a  traditional  public  function,  the  question  may  
arise  whether  that  person  is  acting  under  color  of  state  law.  Cf.  Jackson  v.  
Metropolitan  Edison  Co.,  419  U.S.  345,  352  (1974)  (discussing  “exercise  by  a  private  
entity  of  26  powers  traditionally  exclusively  reserved  to  the  State”);  Richardson  v.  
McKnight,  521  U.S.  399,  27  413  (1997)  (in  case  involving  “employees  of  a  private  
prison  management  firm,”  noting  that  the  Court  was  not  deciding  “whether  the  
defendants  are  liable  under  §  1983  even  though  they  are  employed  by  a  private  
firm”).  
 
 
Note  that  Plaintiff  has  repeatedly  argued  that  Defendant  Paradee  conspired  with  
Defendants  McKenna  and  Malone  in  the  Dispositive  Memoranda.    Who  knows  what  they  
talked  about,  in  the  weeks  between  the  time  that  Plaintiff  telephoned  them  (and  they  all  
completely  ignored  him)  and  the  time  he  arrived  in  Delaware?      

 

4  

We  don’t  know  because  the  Court  never  allowed  any  Depositions.    Plaintiff  further  
described  how  said  Depositions,  while  still  subject  to  Attorney-­‐Client  privilege,  could  
nonetheless  shed  light  and  produce  inferences  from  which  a  Jury  could  infer  that  the  
Defendants  conspired  to  deprive  Plaintiff  of  the  Right  to  ask  a  few  questions  of  high-­‐ranking  
officials  at  Defendant  McKenna’s  office,  with  a  camera  present,  by  threatening  an  unlawful  
arrest  or  seizure  of  his  person  under  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Amendments  to  the  United  States  
Constitution  and  parallel  State  Statutes.  
As  such,  the  Court's  blanket  pronouncement  that  Defendant  Paradee  could  not  
possibly  be  liable  under  42  U.S.C.  §1983  is  legally  incorrect.  The  Court’s  citation  to  Polk  
County  v.  Dodson  454  U.S.  312  (1981)  in  unavailing  because  Justice  Blackmon  dissented  and  
these  claims  are  very  fact  specific,  but  we  cannot  know  the  facts  because  Discovery  was  
truncated  without  Depositions  and  without  Defendants  even  providing  any  answer  as  to  
what  authority  they  believed  they  had  to  deny  Plaintiff  the  right  to  run  a  camera.  
But  this  is  not  surprising  that  the  Court  overlooked  it,  seeing  as  the  Court  somehow  
lost  his  Voluntary  Dismissal  of  his  Tort  claims  (Plaintiff  noted  that  the  docket  entries  are  
now  missing)  and  the  Court  has  also  improperly  held  that  Rule  155  did  not  apply  to  trial  
courts.  See  11  June  2015  Oral  Argument  (TR._____)4  
As  Plaintiff  has  noted  on  prior  occasion  he  worked  for  Constitutional  Scholar  
Edward  L.  (Ted)  Mearns  (RIP)  so  he  already  knew  that  purportedly  private  parties  could  be  
found  liable  under  42  U.S.C.  §1983  so  he  is  not  certain  as  to  how  the  Court  could  overlook  
this  crucial  fact  of  Law.    Further,  consider  the  Learned  Treatise  of  Professor  of  Law  Jack  M.  
Beerman  and  Richard  L.  Godfrey  Faculty  Research  Scholar,  Boston  University  School  of  Law  
in  "Why  do  Plaintiffs  Sue  Private  Parties  Under  Section  §1983  Cardozo  Law  Review  Vol.  26  
(10/9/2005).  
CONCLUSION:    
PROSPECTS  FOR  SUCCESS  IN  SECTION  1983  LITIGATION  AGAINST  PRIVATE  DEFENDANTS    

The  volume  of  section  1983  litigation  against  private  defendants  is  substantial  
enough  for  there  to  have  been  significant  doctrinal  developments  in  the  area,  largely  
concerning  state  action  and  immunities  for  private  defendants.  Are  the  prospects  for  
success  in  such  litigation  great  enough  to  justify  the  volume  of  litigation?    
 
In  general,  plaintiffs  should  be  less  likely  to  prevail  in  section  1983  cases  against  
private  defendants  than  in  cases  against  state  officials  because  of  the  additional  
possibility  of  losing  due  to  a  finding  of  no  state  action  or  no  action  under  color  of  

                                                                                                               
4  See  Fn1,  supra.  

 

5  

law.  In  private  entity  cases  that  do  get  past  the  state  action/under  color  of  law  
hurdle,  the  plaintiff’s  prospects  for  success  should  mirror  his  or  her  prospects  in  
state  official  litigation  unless  other  issues  turn  o  
 
A  private  actor  may  also  act  under  color  of  state  law  under  certain  circumstances.  
 For  example,  it  has  been  held  that  a  physician  who  contracts  with  the  state  to  
provide  medical  care  to  inmates  acts  under  the  color  of  state  law.    See  West  v.  
Atkins,  487  U.S.  42  (1988):  
 
(a)  If  a  defendant's  alleged  infringement  of  the  plaintiff's  constitutional  rights  
satisfies  the  state  action  requirement  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  the  
defendant's  conduct  also  constitutes  action  "under  color  of  state  law"  for  §  1983's  
purposes,  since  it  is  "fairly  attributable  to  the  State."  Lugar  v.  Edmondson  Oil  Co.,  457  
U.  S.  922,  457  U.  S.  935,  457  U.  S.  937.  Thus,  a  state  employee  generally  acts  under  
color  of  state  law  when,  while  performing  in  his  official  capacity  or  exercising  his  
official  responsibilities,  he  abuses  the  position  given  to  him  by  the  State.  Polk  County  
v.  Dodson,  454  U.  S.  312,  distinguished.  Pp.  487  U.  S.  49-­‐50.  
Here  is  another  example,  in  Wyatt  v.  Cole  504  U.S.  158  (1992):  
Immunity  for  private  defendants  was  not  so  firmly  rooted  in  the  common  law  and  
was  not  supported  by  such  strong  policy  reasons  as  to  create  an  inference  that  
Congress  meant  to  incorporate  it  into  §  1983.  See,  e.  g.,  Owen  v.  City  of  
Independence,  445  U.  S.  622,  637.  Even  if  there  were  sufficient  common  law  support  
to  conclude  that  private  defendants  should  be  entitled  to  a  good  faith  and/or  
probable  cause  defense  to  suits  for  unjustified  harm  arising  out  of  the  misuse  of  
governmental  processes,  that  would  still  not  entitle  respondents  to  what  they  
obtained  in  the  courts  below:  the  type  of  objectively  determined,  immediately  
appealable,  qualified  immunity  from  suit  accorded  government  officials  under,  e.  g.,  
Harlow  v.  Fitzgerald,  457  U.  S.  800,  and  Mitchell  v.  Forsyth,  472  U.  S.  511.  Moreover,  
the  policy  concerns  mandating  qualified  immunity  for  officials  in  such  cases-­‐the  
need  to  preserve  the  officials'  ability  to  perform  their  discretionary  functions  and  to  
ensure  that  talented  candidates  not  be  deterred  by  the  threat  of  damages  suits  from  
entering  public  service-­‐are  not  applicable  to  private  parties.  Although  it  may  be  that  
private  defendants  faced  with  §  1983  liability  under  Lugar,  supra,  could  be  entitled  
to  an  affirmative  good  faith  defense,  or  that  §  1983  suits  against  private,  rather  than  
governmental,  parties  could  require  plaintiffs  to  carry  additional  burdens,  those  
issues  are  neither  before  the  Court  nor  decided  here.  pp.  163-­‐169.  
 
IV.  
The  Previously-­Dismissed  Tort  Claims.  
 

As  noted  previously  in  this  filing,  the  Court  did  not  need  to  expend  Judicial  resources  

to  analyse  these  issues  or  claims  because  Plaintiff  had  long  ago  submitted  Voluntary  
Dismissals  of  his  Negligent  and  Intentional  Infliction  of  Emotional  Distress  Claims  with  
Proposed  ORDERS  granting  the  dismissals.  Plaintiff  voraciously  reads  the  Docket  sheet  
online,  he  saw  them  on  the  Docket  Sheet  at  one  point  but  now,  curiously,  those  docket  
entries  have  evaporated  but  there  is  a  reason  the  Plaintiff  did  not  brief  these  matters  at  all:  
It  is  because  he  DISMISSED  THEM  long  ago.  

 

6  

 
V.  

The  Court  Should  Have  Granted  Plaintiff’s  Motions  to  Compel  and  Request  for  
Stay  on  Dispositive  Motions  Until  his  Discovery  was  Completed;  Blanket  Bans  
Have  Been  Held  Unlawful.5  

A.  

The  Most  Relevant  Third  Circuit  Case  of  Pomykacz  Granted  a  Motion  to  Compel.  

 

We  se  now  why  the  Defendants  and  Court  have  failed  to  address  this  case,  which  

appellate  Courts  and  legal  scholars  will  clearly  see  as  the  most  relevant:      
It  involves  a  public  citizen  shooting  a  camera  at  public  officials  not  only  during  working  
hours,  but  at  all  times  of  the  day  and  night.    See  the  overleaf  for  a  screen  capture  of  the  
police  report  indicating  that  she  shot  them  4  to  10  times  during  an  8  hour  shift!    Plaintiff  
doesn’t  even  live  in  the  forum  state  so  it  is  clearly  not  feasible  for  him  to  engage  in  that  sort  
of  Constitutionally-­‐protected  conduct.    At  any  rate  Pomykacz  settled  because  the  arrests  
and  hassles  from  the  government  meted  out  to  Plaintiff  were  Unconstitutional  and  
otherwise  illegal.  See  the  Pomykacz  Court  ORDER  at  Appendix  A.  
 

                                                                                                               
5  Again,  to  be  clear,  these  public  meeting  cases  are  more  of  a  red  herring  than  anything  else.  See  
Section  VI  B  infra.  
 

7  

 

 

8  

B.  

The  Universal  Ban  as  Lawful.    
As  previously-­‐noted,  policy  is  key  here.  Even  though  Whiteland  Woods  is  not  truly  

on  point  with  the  facts  of  this  case,  the  Court’s  Opinion  fails  to  address  the  key  aspect  of  
Whiteland  Woods  that  Plaintiff  has  brought  to  for  forefront:    There  was  a  universal  ban  on  
cameras  that  the  Court  found  vitiated  Plaintiff’s  claims  of  disparate  or  selective,  viewpoint-­‐
based  First  Amendment  discrimination.  As  such,  the  Court  held:  
 
8  Whiteland  Woods  argues  the  Planning  Commission  only  enacted  the  resolution  to  
prevent  Whiteland  Woods  from  video  recording  any  meetings  after  September  25,  
1996.  See  Pltff.'s  Mem.  Opp.  Summ.  Judgment  at  4.  Accepting  that  allegation  as  true,  
it  does  not  change  the  fact  that  the  resolution  was  neutrally  applied  to  all  video  
recording;  the  Planning  Commission  did  not  restrict  Whiteland  Woods  only  based  
on  the  content  of  the  message  Whiteland  Woods  was  attempting  to  spread.  
 
But  as  Plaintiff  has  pointed  out  so  many  times  in  this  case,  we  don’t  have  a  clue  what  the  
real  policy  is,  or  whether  it  is  neutrally  applied.    But  that’s  not  Plaintiff’s  fault.  That  is  the  
Court’s  fault  for  allowing  Defendants  to  escape  the  preceding  Interrogatory  that  asked  what  
authority  Defendant  McKenna  had  for  denying  Plaintiff  access.  That  is  why  Plaintiff  moved  
this  Honorable  Court  to  reconsider  on  that  point  and  moves  for  reconsideration  again  to  
lock  this  matter  in  for  appeal  and  for  review  by  legal  scholars  for  years  to  come.[1]  
 
Defendants  McKenna  and  Malone  Responses  to  Policy  Interrogatory  are  
Sanctionable.  
 
State  what  authority  that  any  Defendant  has  had,  at  any  point  in  time  up  to  
27  November  2014  that  indicates  that  video  was  verboten  in  the  555  Bay  
Road  building  on  or  about  November  25,  2014,  the  only  day  date  and  time  
that  Plaintiff  has  ever  been  at  555  Bay  Road,  Kent  County  Recorder  of  
Deeds.  
 
Defendants’  response  was  that  “this  interrogatory  is  incomprehensible  and  
incapable  of  response.”  
This  assertion  is  dilatory:  The  question  is  patently  clear:    Provide  Plaintiff  with  any  
authority  you  had  prior  to  27  November,  2014  that  video  was  verboten  in  the  555  
Bay  Road  Building  on  [the  only  day  and  date  that  Plaintiff  was  there].  
How  difficult  is  that?  

 

9  

Judge  Young  should  have  wrested  control  of  this  crucial  issue  and  issued  Sanctions  
because  this  is  clearly  a  Bad  Faith  attempt  to  skirt  the  crucial  issue  of  what  authority  
Defendants  believed  they  had  to  forbid  Plaintiff  to  roll  video.  It  might  not  be  the  
prettiest  sentence  that  Plaintiff  ever  wrote  but  to  falsely  claim  that  it  is  an  
incomprehensible  question  is  patently  absurd.  Rule  11  Sanctions  and  an  ORDER  to  
compel  should  have  issued.6  
 
C.  

The  Universal  Ban  as  Unlawful  vis  a  vis  p  17  Fn  47  of  the  Court’s  Opinion.  
Furthermore,  there  is  Peloquin  v.  Arsenault,  162  Misc.  2d  306  (1994)  and  Csorny  v.  

Shoreham-­Wading  River  Cent.  Sch.  Dist.,  305  A.D.2d  83  (2003)  (holding  that  blanket  bans  are  
unlawful.  From  Peloquin:  
Hand-­‐held  audio  recorders  are  unobtrusive  (Mitchell  v  *309309  Board  of  Educ.,  
supra);  camcorders  may  or  may  not  be  depending,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the  
circumstances.  Suffice  it  to  say,  however,  in  the  face  of  Mitchell,  the  Committee  on  
Open  Government's  (Robert  Freeman's)  well-­‐reasoned  opinions  (supra)  and  the  
court  system's  pooled  video  coverage  rules  and/or  options,  a  blanket  ban  on  all  
cameras  and  camcorders  when  the  sole  justification  is  a  distaste  for  appearing  on  
public  access  cable  television  is  unreasonable.  While  "distraction"  and  "unobtrusive"  
are  subjective  terms,  in  the  face  of  the  virtual  presumption  of  openness  contained  in  
article  7  of  the  Public  Officers  Law  and  the  insufficient  justification  offered  by  the  
Village,  the  "Recording  Policy"  in  issue  here  must  fall.  
 
From  Csorny:  
The  petitioners  have  reportedly  been  active  participants  at  the  regular  meetings  of  
the  Board.  Beginning  in  or  about  July  2000,  the  petitioners  brought  a  palm-­‐sized  
video  camera,  mounted  on  a  tripod  at  the  rear  of  the  room,  which  they  used  to  
record  Board  meetings.  This  camera  was,  by  itself,  unobtrusive  and  it  required  no  
additional  lights.  
 
Wright  v.  City  of  Lawrence  (21  Mass.  App.  Ct.  343,  486  N.E.2d  1151  [Mass]),  upon  
which  the  Board  relies,  is  readily  distinguishable.  The  court  in  Wright  dismissed  a  
suit  for  a  declaratory  judgment  challenging  a  recording  ban  due  to  the  inadequacy  of  
the  record,  the  imprecision  of  the  plaintiff's  Open  Meetings  Law  claims,  and  the  
plaintiff's  misguided  attempts  therein  to  frame  the  issue  of  the  city  council's  
prohibition  on  videotaping  as  one  of  constitutional  dimension.  We  agree  that  the  
First  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  does  not  guarantee  the  right  to  
videotape  governmental  meetings  (see  Whiteland  Woods,  L.P.,  v.  Township  of  West  
Whiteland,  193  F.3d  177  [3d  Cir  1999];  Johnson  v.  Adams,  629  F.  Supp.  1563  [US  
Dist  Ct,  E.D.  Tex  1986]).  However,  Wright  does  not  support  the  Board's  argument  
herein,  as  Wright  did  not  decide  the  Open  Meetings  Law  issue  on  the  merits.7    

                                                                                                               
6  Not  only  do  we  not  know  what  policy  there  is,  recall  that  Defendant  Malone  lied  about  the  presence  
of  a  written  policy  as  noted  by  County  Attorney  Sherlock.    That’s  elementary,  Watson.  See  App.  B.  
7  The  Court  ended  its  inquiry  right  there  whilst  ignoring  the  following  paragraph,  which  notes  that  C-­‐
Span  and  C-­‐Span  2  broadcast  from  the  Capitol  and  “we  see  no  reason  to  prohibit  them  from  public  
meeting  rooms  of  school  boards.”  

 

10  

 
Significantly,  however,  Wright  posited  that  "There  may  come  a  time  when  sound  
cameras  will  be  so  thoroughly  accepted,  and  any  idea  that  they  could  distort  or  
prejudice  deliberation  or  offend  decorum  so  anachronistic,  that  to  bar  them  would  
seem  the  equivalent  of  prohibiting  pencil  and  paper"  (id.  at  1153-­‐1154).  The  Wright  
court  rejected  the  notion  that  video  cameras  had  achieved  such  ubiquity  in  1985.  
Today,  17  years  later,  C-­‐Span  and  C-­‐Span  2  broadcast  from  the  Capitol,  and  local  
government  meetings  are  routinely  aired  on  public  access  cable  television.  While  
video  cameras  may  not  yet  have  achieved  parity  with  pen  and  paper  at  the  local  
level,  we  discern  no  legitimate  reason  to  prohibit  them  from  public  meeting  rooms  
of  school  boards.1  1.  The  Board's  citation  to  Combined  Communications  Corp.  v.  
Finesilver  (672  F.2d  818  [10th  Cir  1982])  is  also  unavailing  as  that  case  dealt  with  a  
rule  barring  media  coverage  of  judicial  proceedings  that  were  subject  to  non-­‐
televised  press  coverage.  
 
Given  that  body  of  law  and  the  cultural,  legal  and  technological  developments,  why  
in  the  World  would  this  Court  decide  to  take  a  giant  step  backwards?    PHow  is  it  that  the  
Court  rules  against  Plaintiff  either  which  way  the  unknown  Policy  is  to  be  determined  in  
this  case?  Perhaps  the  answer  lies  in  its  thinly-­‐veiled  culturally  hegemonic  notion  that  
Plaintiff  is  a  guerilla  and  not  a  trained  professional.  That  decision  will  be  part  of  Judge  
Young’s  legacy  and  the  case  and  documentary  movie  develop  in  the  coming  years.  
 
VI.  

The  Court  Improperly  Decided  the  Constitutional  Issues.    

A.  

Delaware  Attorney  General  Opinion  Supports  Plaintiff:  
This  is  No  Different  Then  Plaintiff  Appearing  with  Pen  &  Reporter’s  Note  Pad.  

 

As  Plaintiff  asks  elsewhere  in  this  document,  why  is  the  Court  going  backwards?  

This  is  particularly  true  in  light  of  the  precatory  language  issued  by  the  State  Attorney  
General  on  public  meetings:  More  on  this  at  Section  F,  infra.8  
As  noted  in  Csorny,  in  1985,  a  Massachusetts  court,  denying  the  right  to  record  a  
public  meeting,  stated:  There  may  come  a  time  when  sound  cameras  will  be  so  thoroughly  
accepted,  and  any  idea  that  they  could  distort  or  offend  decorum  so  anachronistic,  that  to  
bar  them  would  seem  the  equivalent  of  prohibiting  pencil  and  paper.  Csorny,  193  F.3d  at  
519  (quoting  Wright  v.  Lawrence,  486  N.E.2d  1151,  1153-­‐1154  (Mass.  App.  1985).  Csorny,  
in  2003,  found  that  “video  cameras  may  not  yet  have  achieved  parity  with  pen  and  paper  at  
the  local  level[.]”  Id.    

                                                                                                               
8  Again,  Plaintiff  does  not  concede  that  this  is  event  the  correct  analysis,  (see  Section  VI  B,  infra)  but  

to  the  extent  that  Defendants  and  the  Court  want  to  use  public  meeting  law  from  another  State,  
Plaintiff  thought  it  might  be  prudent  to  see  the  direction  that  the  AG  is  taking  in  THIS  STATE.    That  
direction  is  much  more  akin  to  the  direction  in  the  Tarus  and  Pomykacz  cases.    Heck  the  State  AG  
even  quoted  some  of  the  very  same  language  that  Plaintiff  quoted,  fancy  that.  

 

11  

But  in  2011,  when  everyone  has  a  cell  phone,  and  most  cell  phones  have  camera,  
even  video,  capability,  that  time  has  arrived.  To  attempt  to  ban  recording  is  as  pointless  as  
trying  to  prevent  citizens  from  taking  notes.    
CONCLUSION:  The  DOJ  should  advise  its  client  public  bodies  that  to  outright  
prohibit  any  recording  of  public  meetings  is  highly  risky.  The  law  is  evolving  in  a  more  
permissive  direction.  
Indeed  as  Plaintiff  has  been  saying  –  now  buttressed  by  the  AG’s  office9  -­‐-­‐  Courts  are  
increasingly  holding  that  there  is  no  difference  between  a  pen  &  paper  and  a  video  camera  if  
used  in  an  unobtrusive  manner.      See  Peloquin,  infra.  Even  though  Peloquin  was  decided  on  
statutory  ground  the  analysis  is  still  the  same:  Is  the  equipment  unduly  obtrusive  or  not?  
Similarly,  the  principles  of  Tarus  v.  Borough  of  Pine  Hill,  189  N.J.  497  (2007)(shatter  
all  of  those  ancient  notions  in  Whiteland  Woods).  
 
The  common  law  therefore  has  evolved  to  embrace  additional  means  for  
documenting  public  proceedings,  not  fewer.  Over  time,  quill  and  parchment  
gave  way  to  pen  and  pad;  audio  recording  devices  supplanted  stenography.  
 
A  member  of  the  public  has  the  right  to  videotape  a  public  meeting  and  the  public  
body  involved  has  no  power  to  arbitrarily  forbid  such  action.  There  is  a  right  to  
videotape  municipal  proceedings  in  the  State  of  New  Jersey  and  no  per  se  
constitutional,  statutory,  or  common  law  impediments  to  the  use  of  a  video  camera  
to  tape  record  exist.  
 
The  common  law  therefore  has  evolved  to  embrace  additional  means  for  
documenting  public  proceedings-­‐-­‐not  fewer.  See  Higg-­‐A-­‐Rella,  Inc.  v.  County  of  
Essex,  141  N.J.  35,  52,  660  A.2d  1163  (1995)  (finding  that  common  law  is  flexible  
and  can  be  adapted  to  advancing  technology);  Atl.  City  Convention  Ctr.  Auth.,  supra,  
135  N.J.  at  64,  637  A.2d  1261  ("The  essence  of  the  common  law  is  its  adaptability  to  
changing  circumstances.").  Sudol,  supra,  [**1044]  emphasized  the  need  for  the  law  
to  adapt  to  that  recording  evolution,  [***25]  and,  in  doing  so,  illustrated  how  the  
common  law  applies  common  sense:  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  [local  public  
body]  had  attempted  to  prohibit  the  use  of  pen,  or  pencil  and  paper,  at  the  sessions  
held  by  them;  such  a  measure  would  at  once  strike  anyone  as  being  an  improper  
means  of  exerting  official  power,  and  the  surprise  and  dissatisfaction  generated  by  
such  an  arbitrary  rule  would  undoubtedly  lead  to  a  prohibition  by  the  courts  of  such  
a  foolish  attempt  to  exercise  governmental  power.  [Id.  at  154,  348  A.2d  216  
(quoting  Nevens  v.  Chino,  233  Cal.  App.  2d  775,  44  Cal.  Rptr.  50,  52  
(Dist.Ct.App.1965)).]  Thus,  over  time,  quill  and  parchment  gave  way  to  pen  and  pad;  
audio  recording  devices  supplanted  stenography.  

                                                                                                               

9  Plaintiff  respects  the  State  AG’s  offices:  He  was  one.  In  fact,  he  was  the  go-­‐to  guy  for  Appellate  issues  

in  the  employment  section.  That  ability  is  clearly  borne  out  in  this  document.  

 

12  

So  then  for  the  Court  to  hold  that  Plaintiff  does  not  have  a  Constitutional  Right  
to  ask  a  question  or  two  of  a  high-­ranking  public  official  with  a  camera  is  the  same  as  
saying  he  does  not  have  a  Constitutional  Right  to  do  the  same  with  a  pen  and  a  
notepad.    As  that  finding  would  be  patently  Unconstiutional  this  Court  must  reverse  
its  prior  Opinion.10  
 
B.  

The  Public  Meeting  Cases  are  Not  Germane;  What  is  Germane  is  the  Senator  Kelly  
Ayotte  Comparison,  Iacobucci  v.  Boulter,  1997  U.S.  Dist.  Lexis  7010,  No.  CIV.A.  94-­‐
10531  (D.Mass,  Mar.  26,  1997),  the  Third  Circuit  case  of  Pomykacz  v.  Borough  of  W.  
Wildwood,  438  F.  Supp.  2d  504  (2006)  that  the  Court  completely  failed  to  address.  

 
The  Court  chides  Plaintiff  at  Fn  47,    by  ignoring  Pomykacz  and  finding  something  to  
distinguish  his  other  cited  cases  by  stating    
“Needless  to  say,  these  cases  are  all  inapplicable  to  the  First  Amendment  
question  presently  before  the  Court.”    
 
Well  on  that  note,  the  Court  is  not  entirely  accurate  (just  as  it  was  wrong  about  
Private  Actor  liability  under  42  U.S.C  §1983  because  Iacobucci  did  in  fact  address  the  
Reporter’s  First  AND  Fourth  Amendment  Rights.    Iacobucci  was  wrongfully  arrested  for  
conduct  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.  So  for  the  Court  to  say  that  Iacobucci  addressed  
only  the  Fourth  Amendment  is  intellectually  disingenuous  because  without  a  First  
Amendment  protection  you  don’t  reach  the  Fourth  Amendment.    
Plaintiff  was  threatened  with  arrest  as  his  Complaint  clearly  states  –  and  as  noted  by  
the  Court  at  p.4  of  the  Opinion,  “Plaintiff  alleges  that  he  was  told  he  would  be  arrested  if  he  
persisted  in  his  efforts  to  videotape  the  offices.”    As  his  prior  Fn5  to  his  Reply  Memorandum  in  
Support  of  Reconsideration  stated  further,  if  it  is  illegal  to  arrest  a  citizen  journalist  for  First  
Amendment  conduct  of  shooting  a  public  official,  it  is  equally  illegal  to  threaten  arrest  for  
same.  That’s  so  simple,  it  hurts.  But  to  make  it  clear  Plaintiff  included  the  Fourth  
Amendment  claim  in  his  First  Amended  Complaint  inasmuch  as  it  unlawfully  chills  the  
exercise  of  First  Amendment  Rights.  
As  Plaintiff  noted  in  his  Reply  Memorandum  in  Support  of  Summary  Judgment:  

                                                                                                               

10  Plaintiff  will  be  filing  a  Common  Law  Claim  and  Fourth  Amendment  Chilling  of  Speech  claims  in  his  

First  Amended  Complaint,  filed  contemporaneously  with  this  Motion,  that  exactly  mirrors  Tarus  and  
buttress  the  body  of  law  set  forth  and  ignored  by  the  Court  in  Pomykacz.  

 

13  

See  also  Iacobucci  v.  Boulter,  1997  U.S.  Dist.  Lexis  7010,  No.  CIV.A.  94-­10531  
(D.Mass,  Mar.  26,  1997)  (unpublished  opinion)  (finding  that  an  independent  
reporter  has  a  protected  right  under  the  First  Amendment  and  state  law  to  
videotape  public  meetings.  
From  Iacobucci:  
In  the  next  decade,  the  SJC  narrowed  this  definition  of  disorderly  conduct  to  
encompass  only  activities  not  implicating  the  “lawful  exercise  of  a  First  Amendment  
right.”  ….  
 
and  
Boulter's  repeated  demands  that  Iacobucci  cease  recording  do  not  change  the  
disorderly  conduct  calculus.  A  police  officer  is  not  a  law  unto  himself;  he  cannot  give  
an  order  that  has  no  colorable  legal  basis  and  then  arrest  a  person  who  defies  it.  So  
it  is  here:  because  Iacobucci's  activities  were  peaceful,  not  performed  in  derogation  
of  any  law,  and  done  in  the  exercise  of  his  First  Amendment  rights,  Boulter  lacked  
the  authority  to  stop  them.  Id  at  678.  
   
Next,  Court’s  reliance  on  Capital  Cities  Media  v.  Chester,  797  F.2d  1164  (1986)  is  
woefully  misplaced.  In  this  relatively  ancient  case  -­‐-­‐  decided  well  before  the  advent  of  any  of  
the  technology  that  exists  today  -­‐-­‐  the  Court  addressed  a  Public  Information  document  
request  and  in  so  doing  noted:  
The  First  Amendment,  however,  seeks  to  promote  the  ideal  of  an  informed  
electorate  by  barring  government  interference  with  the  flow  of  information  and  
ideas  to  the  public.    
 
Capital  Cities  cited  Houchins  v.  KQED,  Inc.,  438  U.S.  1,  98  S.Ct.  2588,  57  L.Ed.2d  553  
(1978),  which  the  Third  Circuit  Pomykacz  court  impliedly  rejected  the  Houchins  analysis  in  
a  context  that  did  not  involve  prison  access.11  
Recall  that  the  original  cornerstone  of  Defendants  arguments  was  the  Kelly  Ayotte  
case,  as  they  prattled  on  about  how  Plaintiff  did  not  understand  the  distinction  between  
public  and  private.  However,  on  further  review  the  Record  reflects  that  Ayotte  was  not  an  
elected  official  at  the  time  that  prior  litigation  started,  and  the  Court  held  that  the  hotel  situs  
for  the  Republican  Party  rally  was  a  private  venue.  
 

In  reality  Senator  Ayotte  could  be  sued  under  the  First  and  Fourth  Amendment  were  

she  to  threaten  to  have  Plaintiff  arrested  for  filming  her  or  her  staff  in  public  places,  
including  her  office.    This  is  why  Plaintiff  provided  these  pictures  and  videos  to  the  Court,  
which  must  have  misunderstood  the  point:  

                                                                                                               
11  Alas,  the  Defendants  and  the  Court  have  nothing  to  say  about  Pomykacz.  Absolutely.  Nothing.  
 

14  

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl4tS0W7RcQ  

 

 

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLS0N_hH-­‐cc  
Here  one  of  her  constituents  said  that  Ayotte  “Is  pleasant  and  sweet  and  full  of  shit.”

 

 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXlHu2002Vc

 

 

15  

 
But  let’s  move  on  to  the  case  most  directly  applicable  to  the  case  at  bar  because  they  are  
both  Third  Circuit  cases  that  address  the  right  of  a  citizen  activist  or  journalist  to  run  video  
of  public  officials  whilst  working  in  their  buildings.  In  2006,  a  federal  district  court  in  New  
Jersey  decided  the  case  of  Pomykacz  v.  Borough  of  W.  Wildwood,  438  F.  Supp.  2d  504  (2006)  
• Pomykacz  was  a  self-­‐described  “citizen  activist”  who  expressed  concern  that  a  

suspected  romance  between  the  town’s  mayor  and  a  police  officer  were  leading  to  
nepotism,  conflicts  of  interest  and  preferential  treatment.  These  suspicions  led  
Pomykacz  to  “monitor”  the  two,  which  included  taking  photographs.  Eventually  
she  was  arrested  on  charges  of  stalking,  though  the  charges  were  downgraded  to  
harassment.  Pomykacz  ended  up  filing  suit  asserting,  among  other  things,  that  she  
was  arrested  in  violation  of  the  First  Amendment  retaliation  for  her  monitoring  
activities.  
 
On  the  night  of  October  7,  2002,  on  her  way  to  Wildwood,  Pomykacz  drove  past  
the  borough  municipal  building  and  observed  Officer  Ferentz  working  on  
renovations  while  she  was  on  duty.  Later  that  night,  after  Pomykacz  had  returned  
from  Wildwood,  she  photographed  Officer  Ferentz  in  the  police  
headquarters.  7  Another  police  officer  and    [*508]    Mayor  Fox  were  also  present  in  
the  police  station  at  the  time.  According  toPomykacz,  Mayor  Fox  came  out  of  the  
building  and  began  yelling  at  her.  Pomykacz  walked  home  without  responding.  

 
U.S.  District  Judge  Joseph  E.  Irenas  noted,    
 
Pomykacz  has  put  forth  sufficient  evidence  that  she  was  a  concerned  citizen  who  at  
times  spoke  her  mind  to  Borough    [*513]    officials  and  other  citizens  about  her  
concerns  regarding  the  official  conduct  of  the  police  department  and  the  mayor.  
Such  speech  is  clearly  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.  14  See  Mills  v.  
Alabama,  384  U.S.  214,  218,  86  S.  Ct.  1434,  16  L.  Ed.  2d  484  (1966)  HN15 ("a  major  
purpose  of  [the  First]  Amendment  was  to  protect  the  free  discussion  of  
governmental  affairs.");  Roth  v.  United  States,  354  U.S.  476,  484,  77  S.  Ct.  1304,  1  L.  
Ed.  2d  1498  (1957)  ("The  protection  given  speech  and  press  was  fashioned  to  
assure  unfettered  interchange  of  ideas  for  the  bringing  about  of  political  and  social  
changes  desired  by  the  people.").  
 
Again,  Plaintiff’s  Fn5  to  his  Reply  Memorandum  in  Support  of  Reconsideration  
clearly  notes  that  if  it  is  illegal  to  arrest  Pomykacz  it  is  illegal  to  threaten  to  arrest  
Pomykacz.  The  same  goes  for  Plaintiff,  Apples  to  Apples.  
 
C.  

To  the  Extent  that  the  Public  Meeting  Cases  are  germane,  the  court  has  
ignored  the  key  issues  regarding  policy,  as  noted  in  the  preceding  section.  

 

 

16  

D.  

The  Court’s  Reading  of  Cirelli  is  Fundamentally  Flawed.  

 

The  Court  held  that  it  was  essential  that  Cirelli  was  a  public  employee.    
“The  Court  notes  that  the  holding  of  Cirelli,  and  the  authority  on  which  it  
relies,  presupposes  that  the  Plaintiff  alleging  the  violation  of  the  First  
Amendment  is  a  government  employee.    Based  upon  the  pleadings  alone….  
Plaintiff  does  not  fall  into  this  narrow  First  Amendment  protection.”  
 
Let  us  review  what  really  happened,  however,  in  the  same  way  that  we  
reviewed  the  true  law  of  Private  Actor  42  U.S.C.  §1983  liability  for  working  with  
government  officials,  as  well  as  the  prior  Iacobucci  analysis,  which  clearly  and  
patently  involved  First  and  Fourth  Amendment  issues:  
At  any  rate,  such  was  not  the  holding  in  Cirelli  however  because  the  Court  
specifically  found  that  Cirelli  was  only  entitled  to  run  video  in  places  where  the  
general  public  was  allowed:  
While  I  agree  with  plaintiff  that  the  defendants  have  no  legitimate  interest  in  
prohibiting  the  dissemination  of  the  fruits  of  plaintiff's  labors,  
defendants  do  have  a  legitimate  interest  in  restricting  
unconditional  access  to  the  school  building.  Thus,  if  plaintiff  wishes  to  
videotape  at  these  times,  she  must  abide  by  the  application  process  
generally  applicable  to  other  members  of  the  public.  
Cirelli  at  669.  
 
That  is  consistent  with  the  essence  of  Pickering,  to  which  the  Court  cited  at  
Fn46  because  Pickering  held  that  the  government  employee  has  no  more  or  no  less  
rights  than  the  general  public.  Plaintiff  recalls  studying  Pickering,  again  under  the  
inestimably  brilliant  Ted  Mearns,  Esq.  (RIP).  From  Pickering:  
To  the  extent  that  the  Illinois  Supreme  Court's  opinion  may  be  read  to  
suggest  that  teachers  may  constitutionally  be  compelled  to  relinquish  the  
First  Amendment  rights  they  would  otherwise  enjoy  as  citizens  to  comment  
on  matters  of  public  interest  in  connection  with  the  operation  of  the  public  
schools  in  which  they  work,  it  proceeds  on  a  premise  that  has  been  
unequivocally  rejected  in  numerous  prior  decisions  of  this  Court.  E.  g.,  
Wiemanv.  Updegraff,  344  U.S.  183  (1952);  Shelton  v.  Tucker,  364  U.S.  
479  (1960);  Keyishian  v.Board  of  Regents,  385  U.S.  589  (1967).  "[T]he  theory  
that  public  employment  which  may  be  denied  altogether  may  be  subjected  
to  any  conditions,  regardless  of  how  unreasonable,  has  been  uniformly  
rejected."  Keyishian  v.  Board  of  Regents,  supra,  at  605-­‐606.  
 
 
 
 

 

17  

Plaintiff’s  Complaint  alleged  that  he  was  present  to  lawfully    gather  
information  and  to  disseminate  it,  and  let’s  be  real  about  it,  the  material    
misstatements  about  Candidate  Gunn  as  alleged  in  Plaintiff’s  Complaint  are  a  matter  
of  public  concern  when  uttered  by  an  incumbent  candidate.  There  is  no  Court  in  the  
Free  World  that  could  hold  otherwise.12    
 
E.  

The  Court’s  Reading  of  Iacobucci  v.  Boulter,  1997  U.S.  Dist.  Lexis  7010,  No.  
CIV.A.  94-­10531  (D.Mass,  Mar.  26,  1997)  is  Fundamentally  Flawed.  
 
The  Iacobucci  Court  gets  it:  
“This  case  involves  a  small-­‐town  journalist,  a  small-­‐town  police  officer,    
and  rights  as  grand  as  the  Constitution  itself.”  
 
As  such,  he  had  a  right  to  run  video  without  fear  of  being  arrested,  unlike  Plaintiff.  

See  Section  VI  B,  infra,  clearly  noting  that  Iacobucci  does  not  reach  the  Fourth  Amendment  
without  first  implicating  the  First  Amendment.  Accord  Tarus  v.  Borough  of  Pine  Hill,  189  N.J.  
497  (2007)(shattering  all  of  those  ancient  notions  in  Whiteland  Woods).      
 
F.

The Court’s Reading of Csorny v. Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch. Dist., 305
A.D.2d 83 (2003) is at Odds with the Delaware State Attorney: Csorny applies to
Plaintiff’s Benefit.
The Court wrote at Fn. 47
“however, in so doing, court recognized that the First Amendment does not “guarantee
the right to videotape government meetings,” citing Whiteland Woods.

 
The  1  April  2011  AG  Opinion  “Right  of  Public  to  Record  Open  Meetings  of  Public  Bodies”  
 
However,  the  majority,  like  the  majority  of  courts  that  have  considered  this  
question,  found  that  there  is  “no  legitimate  reason  to  prohibit  [video  cameras]  from  
public  meeting  rooms[.]”  Id.  Csorny  rejected  each  argument  against  allowing  
recording.  It  called  “’wholly  specious’”  the  argument  that  speakers  at  a  public  
meeting  that  is  being  recorded  will  feel  inhibited  from  speaking  freely  (or  at  all):  
“While  the  Board  adduced  affidavits  from  three  parents  who  expressed  their  fears  of  
being  videotaped  at  meetings,  the  Board  may  not  hold  the  law  hostage  to  the  
personal  fears  of  a  few  individuals.”  Csorny,  193  F.3d  at  518  
 

                                                                                                               
12  The  Court  noted  that  Plaintiff  did  not  specifically  mention  that  he  was  there  to  review  general  
fraud  and  MERS  issues  in  his  Complaint,  but  instead  noted  as  much  in  his  Affidavit,  but  such  
distinction  is  not  of  crucial  importance  in  this  analysis.  

 

18  

As  noted  in  Csorny,  in  1985,  a  Massachusetts  court,  denying  the  right  to  record  a  
public  meeting,  stated:  There  may  come  a  time  when  sound  cameras  will  be  so  
thoroughly  accepted,  and  any  idea  that  they  could  distort  or  offend  decorum  so  
anachronistic,  that  to  bar  them  would  seem  the  equivalent  of  prohibiting  pencil  and  
paper.  Csorny,  193  F.3d  at  519  (quoting  Wright  v.  Lawrence,  486  N.E.2d  1151,  1153-­‐
1154  (Mass.  App.  1985).  Csorny,  in  2003,  found  that  “video  cameras  may  not  yet  
have  achieved  parity  with  pen  and  paper  at  the  local  level[.]”  Id.    
 
But  in  2011,  when  everyone  has  a  cell  phone,  and  most  cell  phones  have  camera,  
even  video,  capability,  that  time  has  arrived.  To  attempt  to  ban  recording  is  as  
pointless  as  trying  to  prevent  citizens  from  taking  notes.    
 
CONCLUSION  The  DOJ  should  advise  its  client  public  bodies  that  to  outright  prohibit  
any  recording  of  public  meetings  is  highly  risky.  The  law  is  evolving  in  a  more  
permissive  direction  
 
The  question  remains,  then,  why  the  Defendants  and  the  Court  are  moving  backwards.13  
 
G.  

The  Court  Incorrectly  Overlooked  Arguments  on  Expressive  Conduct.  

 

But  there’s  more  from  the  First  Amendment  Center:  
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/photography-­‐the-­‐first-­‐amendment  
“The  First  Amendment  literally  forbids  the  abridgment  only  of  ‘speech,’  but  we  have  
long  recognized  that  its  protection  does  not  end  at  the  spoken  or  written  word  …  we  
have  acknowledged  that  conduct  may  be  ‘sufficiently  imbued  with  elements  of  
communication  to  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  First  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.’  
 
“In  deciding  whether  particular  conduct  possesses  sufficient  communicative  
elements  to  bring  the  First  Amendment  into  play,  we  have  asked  whether  [a]n  intent  
to  convey  a  particularized  message  was  present,  and  [whether]  the  likelihood  was  
great  that  the  message  would  be  understood  by  those  who  viewed  it.”  Texas  v.  
Johnson(1989)  
 
Six  years  later,  the  Supreme  Court  reiterated,    
 
“To  achieve  First  Amendment  protection,  a  plaintiff  must  show  that  he  possessed:  
(1)  a  message  to  be  communicated;  and  (2)  an  audience  to  receive  that  message,  
regardless  of  the  medium  in  which  the  message  is  to  be  expressed.”  Hurley  v.  Irish-­
American  Gay,  Lesbian  &  Bisexual  Group(1995)  
 
While  these  are  more  expressive  conduct  cases,  it  is  likely  that  Defendants  uttered  
some  nonsense  about  Plaintiff  not  being  media  to  try  to  get  around  Hurley  but  that  fails.  
Plaintiff  has  thousands  of  followers  and  subscribers  and  millions  of  hits  on  videos  and  

                                                                                                               
13  Let’s  see  what  happens  with  Plaintiff’s  Common  Law  claim  in  his  First  Amended  

Complaint,  filed  contemporaneously  with  this  Motion.  

 

19  

journal  pages.  Some  of  his  work  has  been  reproduced  by  other  alternative  media  as  well  as  
mainstream  press,  so  he  meets  all  the  requirements,  much  to  Defendants’  chagrin.  All  of  this  
is  set  forth  in  Plaintiff’s  Affidavit,  which  Defendants  try  to  ignore.    
So  speech  or  conduct  (taking  photographs)  that  satisfies  both  of  the  elements  above  
is  allowed  and  protected  in  the  “public  forum.”  Using  this  guide,  we  can  look  to  the  
courts  and  find  one  type  of  photography  that  is  not  protected  by  the  First  
Amendment:  private  recreational  photography  that  is  for  one’s  own  personal  
use…..14  
 
Obviously  the  Court  may  take  Judicial  Notice  that  this  is  not  recreational,  personal  
use  photography  even  if  the  Court  chooses  to  categorize  Plaintiff  as  a  mere  guerrilla  
reporter.  
 
H.  

The  Court  Incorrectly  Assessed  this  as  Judgment  on  the  Pleadings  and  Violated  
Plaintiff’s  Due  Process  Rights.  
 

While  the  Court  is  claiming  that  this  is  a  Judgment  on  the  Pleadings  it  really  

isn’t.    Plaintiff  has  put  substantial  amounts  of  information  into  the  Record  that  the  
Court  should  have  considered  but  did  not.    Defendants  cited  to  issues  beyond  the  
Pleadings  in  their  Memoranda.    
 

What  the  Court  essentially  did  was  to  take  all  of  Defendants’  legal  arguments  

set  forth  in  Dispositive  Motions,  then  deny  the  Plaintiff  the  benefit  of  any  of  the    
materials  or  arguments  he  set  forth,  including  but  not  limited  to  his  Affidavit,    and  
the  Kelly  Ayotte  information  showing  Plaintiff  doing  EXACTLY  what  he  does  all  of  
the  time  in  several  other  Jurisdictions,  without  incident.  
See  Commonwealth  Constr.  Co.  v.  Red  Clay  Consol.  Sch.  Dist,  2010  Del.  Super.    
 

 

LEXIS  489  (2010).  
   
On  a  motion  for  judgment  on  the  pleadings,  if  matters  outside  the  pleadings  
are  presented  and  not  excluded,  the  motion  is  converted  to  a  motion  for  
summary  judgment  and  is  disposed  of  as  one  for  summary  judgment  under  
Rule  56.  3  When  such  materials  are  presented  the  Court  must  give  all  parties  
a  reasonable  [*5]  opportunity  to  present  all  pertinent  material  needed  for  a  
motion  for  summary  judgment.    
 
 

                                                                                                               
14  Plaintiff  reasonably  believes  the  Court  could  take  Judicial  Notice  that  Plaintiff  is  not  engaged  in  
recreational  photography  in  this  instance.  
 

20  

As  such,  Plaintiff  is  returning  to  the  Court  his  Offer  of  Proof  Video  that  demonstrated  
him  doing    
exactly  what  he  wanted  to  do  in  Kent  County,  in  King  County,  Washington’s  Registry  of  
Deeds.:  Only  Dirty  Deeds  Recorders  Like  Kent  County  DE's  Betty  Lou  McKenna  Restrict  
Media  Access  and  Cameras  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uPuF-­‐Z_Ft415  
 

 
 
Add  that  to  the  abject  failure  to  analyse  Pomykacz  and  the  material  misstatements  
regarding  the  Law  on  Private  Actor  42  USC  §1983  liability  and  you  have  the  distinct  
impression  that  Plaintiff  did  not  get  a  full  and  fair  review  in  this  case.  

                                                                                                               

15  This  record  on  Appeal  will  be  as  full  as  it  should  be,  the  Court’s  disdainful  commentary  regarding  

Plaintiff’s  detailed  Motion  for  Reconsideration  nothwithstanding.  

 

21  

I.  

The  Court  Failed  to  Address  All  Issues  in  Plaintiff’s  Motion  for  
Reconsideration.  
The  Court  at  one  point  in  its  Opinion  made  a  disdainful  comment  about  the  length  

and  thorough  nature  of  Plaintiff’s  Motion  for  Reconsideration.  What  the  Court  did  not  do,  
however,  was  to  take  any  initiative  to  determine  why  the  Court  placed  pictures  of  his  image  
throughout  the  Courthouse  on  or  about  10-­‐11  June,  2015.  
For  the  Record,  Plaintiff  wrote:  
I.

Background:    It  was  Completely  Inappropriate  to  Have  Plaintiff’s  Image  Scattered  
Throughout  the  414  Federal  Street  Building  as  if  he  Were  a  Person  of  Interest.  

 
Plaintiff  is  aware  that  there  was  at  least  one  meeting  with  security  about  him,  and  he  is  
further  aware  that  his  image  was  posted  throughout  the  building.  Plaintiff  carries  a  Canon  but  he  
is  not  some  sort  of  dangerous  black  man  who  should  be  on  a  wanted  poster.  He  is  a  mortgage  
industry  professional  who  has  worked  for  major  and  small  press.  He  is  the  new  face  of  
journalism  in  the  Modern  Era,  much  as  he  was  in  1998  when  he  advised  the  Court  of  his  right  to  
run  video  in  a  Courtroom,  which  obviously  worked  or  you  wouldn’t  be  seeing  this  today:  

.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVNVyijeQKU  

 

 

Further,  the  Court  refused  to  analyse  or  to  even  consider  the  Ayotte  facts  or  the  
Gunlocke  Affidavit  even  though  the  case  should  have  been  converted  to  Summary  Judgment,  
as  noted,  infra.  But  one  way  or  another  some  Gunlockes  will  be  involved,  even  if  we  have  to  
wait  until  we  get  to  SCOTUS,  which  renders  its  Decisions  from  Gunlocke  chairs.  

 

22  

In  Sum,  Thomas  Paine  is  still  rolling  in  his  grave.  
 

 

 
 
 
Respectfully  Submitted,  
 
_____________________________________________  
CHRISTOPHER  KING,  J.D.  
kingcast955@icloud.com  
mortgagemovies007@gmail.com  
http://affordablevideodepo.com  
http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com  
617.543.8085m  
206.299.9333f  
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

23  

 

APPENDIX  A  
 
Case 1:03-cv-05677-JEI-JS Document 15 Filed 12/17/04 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 123

 

24  

 

 

 

 

25  

 

 

26  

CERTIFICATE  OF  SERVICE  
 
I,  the  undersigned,  swear  that  a  true  and  accurate  Courtesy  copy  of  this  document  
was  sent  via  email  and  via  Tracked  U.S.  Mail  to:  
 
Joseph  Scott  Shannon,  Esq.  
Art  C.  Arnilla,  Esq.  
1220  North  Market  Street  
5th  Floor  
P.O.  Box  8888  
Wilmington,  DE  19899-­‐8888  
 
and  to:  
 
John  A.  Elzufon,  Esq.  
Peter  McGivney,  Esq.  
300  Delaware  Avenue,  
Suite  1700  
P.O.  Box  1630    
Wilmington,  DE  19899  
 
This  8th  day  of  July,  2015  
 
________________________________  
CHRISTOPHER  KING,  J.D.  
 
 

 

27