P O L I T I C AL STU D IES: 2000 VO L 48, 421

Understanding Policy Networks:

towards a Dialectical Approach
David Marsh
University of Birmingham

Martin Smith
University of Sheffield
This article has two aims. First, we develop a dialectical model of the role that policy networks play
in any explanation of policy outcomes. Our model is based upon a critique of existing approaches
and emphasizes that the relationship between networks and outcomes is not a simple, unidimensional one. Rather, we argue that there are three interactive or dialectical relationships involved between: the structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the network
and the context within which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome. Second, we
use this model to help analyse and understand continuity and change in British agricultural policy
since the 1930s. Obviously, one case is not sufficient to establish the utility of the model, but the
case does illustrate both that policy networks can, and do, affect policy outcomes and that, in order
to understand how that happens, we need to appreciate the role played by the three dialectical
relationships highlighted in our model.

Discussions of policy networks are common in the analysis of public policy in

Britain, Europe and the USA. Of course, there are major distinctions in the
approach to networks within this literature. So, whilst many agree on the utility
of the concept, there is less agreement on the nature and role of networks. In
particular, the German and the Dutch literature is much more ambitious, treating
networks as a new form of governance; in this sense as an alternative to markets
and hierarchies. In contrast, most British and American literature is narrower in
focus, concentrating upon the role networks play in the development and implementation of policy.1 Our approach here is firmly located in this latter literature.
More specifically, in the context of this literature, we shall argue, contra Dowdings
claim that analyses of policy networks have no theoretical basis,2 that there are
different approaches to policy networks which have different strengths and weaknesses but which can be used to develop a more useful explanatory framework;
what we shall call a dialectical approach.
The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section outlines our dialectical
approach, building on brief critiques of the existing literature. The second section
then examines the development of the agricultural policy network in Britain since
the 1930s to demonstrate some of the advantages of our approach.

Towards a Dialectical Model of Policy Networks

There are four main existing approaches to the study of policy networks which, to
different extents, see policy networks as a potentially useful explanatory variable:3
the rational choice approach; the personal interaction approach; formal network
Political Studies Association, 2000.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

UND E R S TA N D I N G P OL I C Y N E T W OR K S

analysis; and the structural approach. We have analysed these approaches at some
length elsewhere;4 here we shall merely identify their strengths and weaknesses in
order to develop our own position. Our overall view is that, while each approach
has considerable strength, all fail to recognize that any attempt to use policy networks as an explanatory variable involves three dialectical relationships between:
structure and agency; network and context; and network and outcome.
However, first we need to be clearer about what we mean by a dialectical relationship, given that the term can be easily misunderstood. In our usage a dialectical
relationship is an interactive relationship between two variables in which each
affects the other in a continuing iterative process. The process is easily illustrated if
we briefly consider the relationship between structure and agency. Any approach
which stresses exclusively either structure or agency has severe limitations. It is
more adequate to see the relationship as dialectical, as involving what Hay terms
a strategic learning process.5 Here, action is taken by an actor within a structured
context. The actor brings strategic knowledge to the structured context and both
that strategic knowledge and the structured context help shape the agents action.
However, the process is one of almost constant iterations, as the action affects both
the actors strategic knowledge and the structured context, which then, in turn,
shape, but of course do not determine, the agents future action.

Beyond Structure Versus Agency

All four existing approaches privilege either structure or agency. So, Dowdings
rational choice approach suggests that networks themselves cannot explain outcomes;
rather outcomes are the result of the bargaining between agents in the networks.6
McPherson and Raabs anthropological approach7 sees networks as based on
personal relationships between known and trusted individuals who share beliefs
and a common culture. In contrast, Laumann and Knokes formal network analysis
argues that it is the position and roles which actors perform which are crucial and
the relationships between these roles, not the individuals who occupy them, which
defines the network.8 Marsh and Rhodess structural approach also emphasizes the
importance of the structural aspect of networks and downplays interpersonal
relations.9
Of course, all these authors are right to an extent. Structures matter, as Knoke and
Marsh and Rhodes, emphasize, but it is agents who interpret these structures and
take decisions; so Dowding and McPherson and Raab are also right to stress the role
of agents. What we need of course is a model which recognizes the role of both
structures and agents.
Networks as agents. We wish to emphasize two points: first, networks are structures which constrain and facilitate agents; and second, the culture of a network
acts as a constraint and/or opportunity on/for its members. Policy networks are
political structures, although, of course, not unchanging structures. The relationships within the networks are structural because they: define the roles which actors
play within networks; prescribe the issues which are discussed and how they are
dealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and contain organizational imperatives, so
that, at least, there is a major pressure to maintain the network.

D A VID MA RSH , MA RTIN SMITH

Networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particular

forms of behaviour. They are organizations which shape attitudes and behaviour.
Networks result from repeated behaviour and, consequently, they relieve decision
makers of taking difficult decisions; they help routinize behaviour. They simplify
the policy process by limiting actions, problems and solutions. Networks define roles
and responses. In doing so they are not neutral, but, like other political institutions
and processes, they both reflect past power distributions and conflicts and shape
present political outcomes. Thus, when a decision is made within a particular
network, it is not simply the result of a rational assessment of available options, as
rational choice theorists like Dowding would suggest, but rather reflects past conflicts and the culture and values of decision makers. As such, networks do affect
policy outcomes but not in a simple way. They are the structuration of past conflicts and present organizational power. By examining networks we are looking at
the institutionalization of power relations both within the network and within the
broader socio-economic and political context, a point we shall return to later.
In addition however, as McPherson and Raab emphasize, it is important to realize
that there is a strong cultural dimension to policy networks. Within tight networks,
policy communities in the Marsh and Rhodes usage, there is a shared world view,
a common culture, and this is, in effect, a structural constraint on the action of
network members. As such, we need to understand how the culture of a network
patterns behaviour, how it reproduces and how it changes.
The shape of the network also affects the range of problems and solutions which
are considered; the network plays an agenda-setting role. As an example, tight
policy networks persist, in large part, because they are characterized by a large degree
of consensus, not necessarily on specific policy but rather on the policy agenda, the
boundaries of acceptable policy. In addition, these shared values and ideology will
privilege certain policy outcomes.
Similarly, rules of the game within the network constrain who is included in
the network and how participants act. They limit types of behaviour which are
unacceptable. By defining the sort of behaviour which is acceptable they are again
privileging certain alternative outcomes. Those who do not abide by the rules are
likely to be excluded. Indeed, networks, like other organizations, are, in large part,
the sum of past policy decisions and outcomes and this is likely to privilege certain
alternative policy options.
The Role of Agents. Despite this, outcomes cannot be explained solely by reference to the structure of the network; they are the result of the actions of strategically calculating subjects. Three points are important here. First, the interests
or preferences of members of a network may not be defined merely, or perhaps
even mainly, in terms of that membership. For example, they may have, at least
partially, contradictory interests as members of another network. Second, the
constraints on, or opportunities for, an agents action which result from network
structures do not happen automatically; they depend on the agents discursive
construction of those constraints or opportunities. Third, network members have
skills which affect their capacity to use opportunities or negotiate constraints.
So, agents matter. It is agents who interpret and negotiate constraints or opportunities. However, these agents are located within a structured context, which is

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provided by both the network and the broader political and social-structural context within which the network operates and those contexts clearly affect the actors
resources. Most significantly, the agents do not control either aspect of that structured context. At the same time, they do interpret that context and it is as mediated
through that interpretation that the structural context affects the strategic calculations of the actors.
Overall, while networks are both structural and causal, we need to understand
how actors interpret these structures. Certainly, the causal processes involved are
not simply unilinear in the way that rational choice models suggest.
Agents Change Structures We need to acknowledge that network structures, and
the resource dependencies which they entail, are not fixed. What is more agents
choose policy options, bargain, argue and break up networks. So, agents can, and do,
negotiate and renegotiate network structures. As such, any explanation of change
must emphasize the role of agents, while also acknowledging that the broader
context within which the network operates affects the interests and actions of
network members. Certainly, the relationship between the network and its context
is crucial for explaining change in both networks and outcomes and it is to that we
now turn.

Beyond Network Versus Context

When trying to explain network change, and consequent policy change, the existing
literature tends to stress either endogenous or exogenous factors. So, for example,
Dowding suggests that any policy change will result from a change in the pattern
of resource dependencies within the network. In contrast, Marsh and Rhodes argue
that most network change results from exogenous factors; they focus on four,
economic, ideological, political and knowledge-based.
Once again both of these approaches have limitations. Most importantly, the
distinction between exogenous and endogenous factors is difficult to sustain. In
order to understand how networks affect outcomes, we also need to recognize that
there is a dialectical relationship between the network and the broader context
within which it located. There are two different, but related, points here. First, policy
networks reflect exogenous structures; for example, class and gender structures.
So, the structure of networks is likely to reflect the broader pattern of structured
inequality within society. Certainly, policy networks are structures which cannot
be treated as given; we need to explain their origin and a key part of doing this is
showing how they are inscribed with other structural divisions. At the same time,
agents are located in various structural positions and, while membership of a policy
network may give them structural privilege, other exogenous structural positions,
for example based on class, gender or ethnicity, may be both more important generally and reflected in network membership. Second, network structure, network
change and the policy outcome may be partially explained by reference to factors
exogenous to the network, but these contextual factors are dialectically related to
network structure and network interaction. Certainly, if we argue that networks
affect policy outcomes and, thus, that changes in networks can result in policy
change, then we also have to address the question: what leads to network change?

D A VID MA RSH , MA RTIN SMITH

Many empirical studies of networks have highlighted change within the networks
they identified and attempted to explain those changes largely in relation to changes
in the environment or the context within which the networks are located. As such,
the change is usually explained in terms of factors exogenous to the network; as
the external environment changes it may affect the resources and interests of actors
within a network. However, the extent and speed of change is clearly influenced
by the networks capacity to mediate, and often minimize, the effect of such change.
Networks are often faced by very strong external uncertainties and that does affect
network structure, network interactions and policy outcomes.10
As we said, Marsh and Rhodes emphasize four broad categories of change in the
network environment which may undermine the certainties and values within
particular networks economic, ideological, political and knowledge-based.11
Political authority is perhaps the most important external constraint.12 If a minister,
or particularly the Prime Minister, is prepared to bear the costs of breaking up a
policy community, he or she has the resources and the authority, although the
cost of doing so may be high. Certainly, it is often argued that the Thatcher government successfully challenged existing policy networks, although at the cost of
significant implementation problems.13 As a specific example, in both health and
education, it is clear that political goals and ideology affected both the membership
and policies of the network.14 The key point is that it is difficult, although far from
impossible, for network members to ignore direct political pressure for change.
However, economic, ideological and knowledge-based change are also important.
For example, in the case of nuclear power it is clear that technological advances
were a crucial source of network change, while the shift to a more commercial
ethos by key actors and organizations in the network owed much to the deepening
economic recession in the early 1970s.15 Similarly, new knowledge about the relationship between smoking and health and concerning salmonella in eggs affected
relationships within the respective networks.16 In addition, it must be recognized
that these exogenous factors are related.
At the same time, Marsh and Rhodes fail to examine another important exogenous
constraint on networks: other networks. In a complex polity, the relationship
between networks is clearly crucial. In fact, there are at least two related problems
here. First, the context within which networks operate is composed, in part, of
other networks and this aspect of the context has a clear impact on the operation
of the network, upon change in the network and upon policy outcomes. This point
is well reflected in Daugbjergs analysis of how the shape of, and the outcomes
from, the agricultural policy networks in Sweden and Denmark were affected by
the rise of the environmental networks in the two countries.17 Second, the issue of
the relationship between sectoral and sub-sectoral networks is particularly important. Authors like Jordan et al., argue that networks only exist at the sub-sectoral
level.18 In contrast, Marsh and Rhodes argued that it is an empirical question whether
there are networks at both levels. However, in our view, sectoral networks do exist
and, more importantly, provide a crucial aspect of the context within which subsectoral networks operate. Overall, it is evident that exogenous changes can affect
the resources, interests and relationships of the actors within networks. Changes in
these factors can produce tensions and conflicts which lead to either a breakdown
in the network or the development of new policies.

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However, these changes do not have an effect independent of the structure of, and
interactions within, the network. All such exogenous change is mediated through
the understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/
norms and interpersonal relationships within the network. So, it is important to
re-emphasize that any simple distinction between endogenous and exogenous
factors is misleading.19

Beyond Networks Versus Outcomes

All the existing literature concentrates upon the question of whether, and, if so,
to what extent, networks affect policy outcomes. There is no recognition that
policy outcomes also affect the shape of the policy network directly, as well as
having an effect on the structural position of certain interests in civil society and
the strategic learning of actors in the network. Certainly, there is not a unidirectional
causal link between networks and outcomes.
Outcomes may affect networks in at least three ways. First, a particular policy
outcome may lead to a change in the membership of the network or to the balance
of resources within it. In this way, Conservative industrial relations policy in the
1980s led in large part to the exclusion of trade union interests from the youth
employment policy network. In 1988, the Manpower Services Commission, on
which the trade unions had a third of the membership, was abolished and replaced
by a system of Training and Enterprise Councils (with Local Enterprise Companies
in Scotland) on which unions had very limited, if any, representation.20 Similarly,
the changing Government policy on health, while it clearly did not lead to the
exclusion of the doctors from any networks, nevertheless weakened their bargaining position within those networks.21
Second, policy outcomes may have an effect on the broader social structure which
weakens the position of a particular interest in relation to a given network. Thus,
a whole series of economic policies, as well as industrial relations policy, weakened
the position of trade unions in civil society, removed them from a series of interest
groups and virtually ended their role in the policy-making process.22
Third, policy outcomes can affect agents. Clearly, agents learn by experience. If
certain actions within a network fail to produce an outcome beneficial to an actor
within the network and the organization he represents, or more broadly, to the
network as a whole, then that actor is likely to pursue other strategies and actions.
As Hay emphasizes, strategic learning is obviously an important feature of political
activity.23

The Dialectical Model

We outline a dialectical model of policy networks in Figure 1. It highlights the three
dialectical relations identified to date. More specifically, it acknowledges that:

The broader structural context affects both the network structure and the
resources that actors have to utilize within the network.

The skill that an actor has to utilize in bargaining is a product of their innate
skill and the learning process through which they go.

D A VID MA RSH , MA RTIN SMITH

10

Figure 1: Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes: A Dialectical Approach

Network
structure

Structural
context

Actor's
resources

Policy
outcome

Innate
skill

Network
interaction
Actor's
skill

Actor's
learning

Causal influence

Feedback

The network interaction and bargaining reflects a combination of the actors

resources, the actors skill, the network structure and the policy interaction.

The network structure is a reflection of the structural context, the actors

resources, the network interaction and the policy outcome.

The policy outcome reflects the interaction between the network structure and
network interaction.

Almost all the relationships are interactive or dialectical. This is reflected in the fact
that the arrows are two-way.

The Agricultural Policy Network in Britain

since the 1930s
Five points need emphasizing before we examine our case study. First, and most
importantly, we need to say something about the status of our model. In epistemological terms we are critical realists.24 This means that, unlike epistemological
relativists, we do believe in the possibility of developing a causal explanation of
policy outcomes. However, unlike epistemological positivists, like Dowding, we do
believe that any such explanation must recognize that institutions, like networks,
the cultures within networks and the resources and attitudes of network members

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11

are all, to an extent, socially or discursively constructed. As such, we see all the relationships, but particularly that between structure and agency, as dialectical. This
also means that we would never envisage a simple causal model which predicted
that a certain network structure, or a particular set of resource dependencies within
a network, would lead to a particular policy outcome.
Second, we are not here offering such a complicated causal model. Our knowledge
of networks is far too limited to make such a thing possible. Rather, we are arguing
that any link between policy networks and policy outcomes is much more
complicated than many have suggested. We have attempted to outline the
complexities involved and identify the relationships which need to be considered
if any causal model is to be developed. Our model will stand or fall according to
whether it has any utility for researchers using the policy network concept to
analyse policy making. It might be suggested that our model is too complex; that
we sacrifice parsimony at the altar of explanatory power. In our view that is an
empirical question; only further research will indicate if the model is too complex
and whether a stripped down model can adequately explain outcomes.
Third, no single case study can illustrate most, let alone all, of the points made in
our conceptual discussion. Rather, here we use an analysis of the development of
British agricultural policy since the 1930s to illustrate the broad utility of our
model. We have chosen agriculture because it is one which is well analysed; this
means that not only is there ample empirical material available but also, if we can
offer a fuller understanding of the case than existing studies provide, it will suggest
that our model is worth pursuing by other researchers.
Fourth this means that the main aim of our case study is to show that in order fully
to understand agricultural policy in Britain since the 1930s we need to appreciate
the three dialectical relationships we have identified. Any analysis which concentrates on either structure or agency, and/or either network or context and/or
either network or outcome is inadequate. Fifth, in order to establish not only
that all these relationships are important, but also that they are dialectical, we need
a temporal perspective. We cannot offer a snapshot of a network now, we need to
examine how it was formed and how it and policy outcomes have changed over time.
Overall, we contend that the dialectical approach adds to an understanding of the
development of agricultural policy:
1. an appreciation of the way the formation of the network is affected by a
combination of external factors and the decisions of agents;
2. an acknowledgement that policy outcomes are the product of the interaction
between agents and structures, not merely the sum of the effect of structures
and agents;
3. the recognition that change in the network is the product of an interaction
between context and networks;
4. an appreciation that outcomes affect the network.
We shall look at each of these contributions in turn, but first we need to provide
some background to the case. The agricultural policy network has been analysed in

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D A VID MA RSH , MA RTIN SMITH

detail through the lens of a conventional network approach.25 Whilst this provided
a corrective to the traditional pluralist accounts of agricultural policy making,26 it
emphasized structure over the agent-centred aspects of the network and consequently it lacked a dialectical element. However, an analysis of the agricultural
case through a dialectical approach helps the development of a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of the agricultural policy community.
Between at least 1945 and 1980 the agricultural policy community provides the
paradigm case of a closed policy community. It had a restricted membership being
confined largely to officials within the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)27 with occasional, and ad hoc,
input from the Countryside Landowners Association (CLA), the National Union of
Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUAAW) and MPs with agricultural interests.
This network was supported by structures which were institutional and ideological
(beliefs, values and cultures); there was a shared world view of the problems
and solutions for agriculture. The institutional elements included the existence of
MAFF which provided an institutional base within Whitehall to defend the interests of farmers. With MAFF the community had a single decision-making centre
with the authority to make agricultural policy. MAFF also conducted the Annual
Review of Agriculture which existed specifically as a body to review the economic
situation of agriculture (with the NFU). This review both excluded actors other
than the producers from the policy-making process and enshrined into the policy
procedures the principle that agricultural prices should rise annually and that it
was beyond question that farming should be subsidized by the state.
After 1973 these domestic institutions were supplemented by EEC institutions.
These include the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the Directorate General
VI of the Commission. The EC reinforced the closed nature of agricultural policy
making by ensuring that policy was developed in a closed circuit of national agricultural ministries, various farmers organizations and the Commission which had
little if any contact with non-farm and environmental groups.

The Formation of the Network and the Relationship

between Agents, Structures and Context
Before World War II the relationship between the National Farmers Union and the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was limited and at best followed the pattern
of traditional pluralist interaction between farmers and the Ministry. Essentially
the farmers and the state wanted different policies. The farmers wanted certain
guaranteed prices in order to deal with the impact of the Depression whilst the
British government was committed to a generally laissez-faire policy in order to
maintain a cheap food policy and to ensure a market for imperial goods. The only
concession the government made was to introduce temporary measures, such as
tariffs or price supports, to help farmers in certain difficult circumstances.
The formation of the network occurred within a particular context which affected
the interests of the actors and the development of the network in a way that
shaped future policy decisions. It was essentially the demands of war which created
the agricultural policy community. War meant that food production had to be

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increased. The government could only achieve this end by including the farmers in
the policy process. However, the wartime arrangements were seen as essentially
temporary. Government was prepared to provide support to farmers only for the
duration of the war.
The context of the war and the need for increased production changed the relationships within the developing agricultural policy community. The war years were a
period of continued habit forming as procedures of consultation became more
routine. Practices were initiated as a result of war which became institutionalized
and habitualized; as such, they did not end with its termination and subsequently
structured the future patterns of behaviour of actors within agricultural policy. The
context of the war increased the importance of both the Ministry of Agriculture
and the National Farmers Union. The Ministry became a key department within
Whitehall and the NFUs support and approval became essential to the goal of
increasing production.
The government wanted to expand as much as possible but not at all costs.28
However, the government was constrained by the need to retain the confidence of
the farmers. Fresh in the collective memory of the NFU was the Betrayal of 1921,
when wartime subsidies established for World War I were suddenly abandoned.
Farmers had to be reassured that, if they increased production during the war, they
would not again be left overproducing without government support. In November
1940, in response to dissatisfaction with present prices, the Minister of Agriculture,
R. S. Hudson, announced the government would continue the system of fixed
prices: for the duration of the hostilities and for at least one year thereafter.29
This pledge is significant. It indicates that at this stage the government was not
committed to a long-term system of support for agriculture but more importantly
it was the first time that the government had considered price support after the war
and so it made support in peacetime an acceptable option. In addition, the minister
announced that prices were to be reviewed in the event of any substantial changes
in costs, thus placing the government in a position of assuring that there was a link
between farmers costs and farmers prices. Despite these assurances, the Treasury
and other ministers were prepared to contest the farmers demands for a precise
link between costs and prices. The Ministry of Agriculture was arguing that the
pricecost link should be mechanical and automatic, whilst the Treasury argued
that there were wider economic and agricultural factors involved.
In 1942 and 1943 there were disputes over prices and in 1943 the prevalence of
the Treasury view led to protests from farmers. The government was keen to pacify
the farmers, fearing a decline in production. As a consequence, the Minister of
Agriculture announced in 1944 that maximum production would have to continue
well after the war was finished. He also said that he wanted to consult with the
farmers over a better machinery for fixing prices and said that he would look at
the possibility of a 4-year plan which would continue guaranteed prices until
1947.30 This was again a significant choice, which, to some extent, isolated the
nascent community from Treasury supervision; in future the Treasury would
be unable to question the existence of support nor the link between costs and price.
The structure was consciously constructed and through its institutionalization
this decision had an important impact on future policy choices. Therefore, whilst

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wartime agricultural policy can partly be explained by reference to the context of

the war and the need to increase production, the actual form policy took, that is
long-term price guarantees, was a consequence of actions within the network.
It also reflected strategic learning by the NFU, who were not prepared to allow
another swift abandonment of wartime support. The farmers and the Ministry of
Agriculture pushed the Treasury for a link between costs and prices and for the
guarantees to be retained after the war. Context and network interacted to produce
the policy but only as mediated through the strategic choice of some actors, particularly the NFU, to push for a particular policy. Neither the network nor the actors
and their choices can be understood independently; the network shaped choices
and choices reinforced and institutionalized the network.
At the same time, the agricultural policy network and its attendant policy were not
inevitable. By extending the period of the guarantees and institutionalizing price
fixing through creating policy-making machinery, the government made price
support more acceptable. Moreover, by including the farmers in the policy-making
machinery which was established, they could bias the new procedures towards the
farmers interests. The procedure established, later known as the Annual Review,
resulted in the Ministry of Agriculture (and its sister departments in Northern
Ireland and Scotland) and the NFU reviewing the economic conditions of agriculture; subsequently, the government, in consultation with the farmers and
in relation to expected demand, decided what prices would apply to crops in the
following year. After the first Review, markets and prices were assured for cattle,
sheep and lambs up to 1948, and for cereals, potatoes and sugar beet up to 1947.
More importantly, the context of the war had enabled the farmers to institutionalize their role in the policy-making process and within the agricultural policy
community. Nevertheless, the governments stated aim continued to be to restore
a more balanced agricultural policy after the war with production closer to pre-war
levels and a shift away from arable crops. The aim was not self-sufficiency in
agriculture but a return to the traditional policy of importing from the cheapest
sources abroad.31 However, two external events further institutionalized the high
price/high production policy.
First, a combination of the end of the war, which disrupted production and dislocated population, and a series of droughts led to a severe cereal and rice shortage
throughout the world. As a consequence, the government had rapidly to reverse
the shift away from arable production. Second, with the rapid abandonment
by the USA of Lend-Lease, Britain faced a severe shortage of dollars and, therefore,
government saw increasing food production as a means of saving dollars. The result
was a 100 million expansion programme. In 1947 the minister told farmers:
Nothing less than maximum production of which the industry is capable will
suffice to meet the needs of the situation.32 The economic context ended any
argument over the need to increase production and the Treasury was prepared to
provide support for agriculture over the foreseeable future. According to one
Treasury official: the prospect of a dollar shortage has created the greatest opportunity for British agriculture that has occurred in peacetime for a hundred years
(W)e are now in the position where agriculture may be under fire for not expanding enough In these circumstances the time may come when certain advances
which have hitherto been regarded as visionary may become practical politics.33

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The changing context created a situation which actors within the policy community could use to further their interests. The external context changed the
available choices within the network and this enabled the NFU further to
institutionalize their position. The government, in the person of the Lord President
of the Council, wished to break the link between costs and prices. Following a
special review in 1946, the farmers were unhappy that the government only
considered increased labour costs. The NFU protested and, after consultation, the
government agreed both that a wider range of data would be collected and that
a comparison with the income of other classes in the rural community would
be made. Moreover, with the 1947 Agricultural Act the Annual Review was
enshrined in statute and farmers were effectively legislated increasing price
support and a place in the policy process. Thus, the closed policy community
developed within a context of a food and a dollar shortage. At that particular
moment the policy of high support and high production was unchallenged.
Consumers were short of food and the policy of guaranteed prices meant that it
was the taxpayer, rather than the consumer, who paid. Hence, the subsidy was
hidden. Likewise, the Treasury was prepared to support the policy because of its
apparent economic benefit.
If we analyse these developments from a dialectical perspective a number of interesting points emerge. The interests of the farmers, MAFF and government were not
independent or objective, rather they were constituted through the development
of the policy community and its relationship to the external context. Perceptions of
what was possible in terms of policy changed dramatically between 1930 and 1947.
In 1930 the farmers wanted some support and, at the same time, they wished to
limit the involvement of government. By 1947 farmers were demanding a comprehensive and long-term policy which was guaranteed in law and involved
farmers intimately in the development of policy. The transformation of these
interests cannot be explained without reference to the interactions between both
the farmers and the external context and the farmers and government actors.
There was a long process of strategic learning which involved the NFU firstly
learning the rules of the game as insiders interacting with government officials and
secondly learning what demands could be made within the changing external
context.
Two sets of actors, the NFU and MAFF, used the context of war to institutionalize
the privileges which they had obtained in the war. Other actors in government
had little choice but to develop agricultural policy through MAFF and the NFU,
thus unintentionally reinforcing the nature of the policy community. However,
these new demands were only feasible, or even conceivable, within the context
of the Treasurys changed perception of the world financial system. The Treasury
calculated that Britain could save dollars by producing more food. The assessment
that it was cheaper to grow food at home rather than import it was by no means
unquestionable; for example, it might have saved more dollars to have imported
food and placed the extra resources into other import savers. The assessment
was developed within the context of a policy community which was, on the one
hand, able to deliver the policy by providing the state with the infrastructural
power to develop agricultural policy and, on the other, prepared to push the argument that Britain had to increase food production.

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As such, there is a complex interaction between the interests of three sets of actors,
the farmers, MAFF and the Treasury, to an extent representing the wider state, the
policy community and the external conditions. There is no single causal relationship, with say the interest group activity of the farmers, or an economic crisis, leading to agricultural policy. Rather, wartime agricultural policy affected the perceptions
of agents concerning how to deal with the post-war crises. This solution impacted
back on the community which provided the institutional means through which to
deliver the policy, reinforcing the belief that there was no alternative to agricultural
expansion. Once it was accepted that this was the only viable policy, there was no
need to include other actors, such as consumers or even the Treasury, in further
discussions of agricultural policy and hence, the boundaries of the community and
the processes of exclusion were further institutionalized. Once this institutionalization occurred it was very difficult to change perceptions of agricultural policy.
A virtuous cycle developed in which beliefs in agricultural production reinforced
a closed policy community which was then unable to consider alternatives. The
combination of war and post-war crises structured the nature of agricultural policy
long after those conditions which had shaped agricultural policy, and the structure
and values of the policy community, had changed. The interests of the actors could
not be separated from the context or the community. In an important sense, they
did not exist independently, but were shaped by the dialectics of exchange. This
may make causality more complex but it helps us to understand the development
of policy.
The most important point is that this policy, which was developed within the
context of particular economic conditions, was created by human agency but then
formed the structure of agricultural policy making even when conditions changed.
The network institutionalized a set of beliefs concerning agricultural expansion
which then shaped the future direction of policy. It is also interesting to note how
the Treasury discursively constructed the future of agricultural policy; it saw agriculture as a means of facilitating economic expansion.

Outcomes as a Product of Interactions between

Agents and Structure
Hay emphasizes that networks are strategically selective and, whilst actors make
choices, they do so within a network that privileges particular outcomes.34 In
Britain the policy outcomes between 1947 and 1980 were increased production
and increased prices for farmers. It could be argued that these were outcomes
which resulted from the external conditions prevailing in Britain. However, the
important point is that from the 1950s onwards the dollar shortage and balance of
payments problems were greatly reduced and, indeed, it is arguable that an expansionist agricultural policy contributed to increased imports through the use of
extra fuel, fertilizers and pesticides. A dialectical approach emphasizes how choices
made concerning agricultural policy cannot be understood without examining how
actors interacted with structures to produce outcomes.
Decisions were made within an institutional arena, the Annual Review, in which
farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture had to consider the economic conditions of
agriculture and the extent to which prices should change accordingly. Actors

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17

within the network believed that agricultural prices should be increased. Their
cultural world was one in which the actors believed that agricultural production
should be increased. The crucial point is that network structures, the external context and actors interacted to produce a particular view of agricultural policy which
both reinforced the network and produced certain policy outcomes. Actors or
groups who held alternative policy views were excluded. Data on the economic
conditions was provided by agricultural economists, the NFU and MAFF officials,
all of whom were committed to increasing production.
Thus, to return to the notion of strategic learning, actors had to make decisions
within a context structured by the Annual Review, past decisions on agricultural
policy and the perceived external economic situation. Within that context they
made choices about the nature of agricultural policy and, as they made decisions
to continue the policy, the structure of the network was reinforced. The network
was the institutionalization of values and beliefs about the nature of agriculture
and agricultural policy and these beliefs informed the decisions of actors within the
network. Thus, a shared view developed in the network; perceptions of agriculture
could not be separated from the nature of the network. Agricultural expansion
was not a right policy; it was constructed as the only possible option within the
context of the policy community and the perceived external constraints.
Perhaps this dialectical process can be best illustrated by examining the role of
the Treasury. In the 1950s the Treasury was becoming concerned with the cost of
agricultural support35 and Treasury approval was necessary for any increase in
agricultural expenditure. This concern was exacerbated when there were signs of
overproduction in the late 1950s. However, the context within which decisions were
made remained the policy community and the widespread belief that increasing
agricultural production was a mechanism for improving Britains balance of payments. Even the hard-nosed Treasurys position was shaped by the existing
community. The Treasury failed to threaten the high production and high subsidy
policy because it could not undermine the balance of payments argument. In
Cabinet Committee the Minister argued against any drastic cuts invoking the
structures of the Agricultural Acts and the notion that it would undermine agricultures
contribution to the restoration of the national economy.36 Remarkably, despite contrary economic evidence, the final position of the Chancellor, Harold Macmillan,
seemed to be shaped by these beliefs. He argued in a memorandum to the Cabinet
that a stable and efficient agriculture is in the national interests and therefore he
accepted the need for increased production.37 Thus, the view of the Treasury was
clearly shaped by the structures of the policy community. This then impacted on the
continuation of the high production policy. Policy outcomes were shaped by the
policy process and the nature of the community. Without the structure of the policy
community, it is difficult to see the Chancellor making the decisions that he did.

Change in the Network Involves an Interaction Between

Context and Network
Since the 1980s there have been significant changes in agricultural policy and
the agricultural network. However, the network has clearly mediated the nature
of the change. With Britains accession to the European Community in 1973 the

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structural context of agricultural policy changed greatly. Overproduction and the

rising costs of agricultural policy have made a set of values based on increasing
prices and increasing production untenable. By 1984 most major products were
in surplus and by 1986 the cost of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) meant
that the EC was, in principle, bankrupt. In addition, consumer groups, the environmental movement and an increasing number of international agricultural
producers were pressuring the EC for a change in policy. A rational response to the
problems would have involved a radical reform of the CAP. However, any reform
process could only occur through the agricultural policy community, now
expanded to include elements of the EC and the agricultural interests in other
member states. As such, the response did not involve radical reform, but rather
damage limitation. By controlling the reform process the community was able to
ensure that any changes in policy did not adversely affect the interests of the
community. The community accepted that prices and production would have to be
reduced and that certain concessions would have to be made to environmental
interests. However, the changes in policy only had a limited impact on the interests
of the community because it was the community that implemented reform.
The first major reforms of the CAP in 1988 had only a limited impact on agricultural
costs and surpluses. The main features of the CAP were still in place, with produce
continuing to receive artificially high prices in order to maintain production. As an
example, the level of cereal production at which penalties came into play was
higher than the level of cereal production at the time. Prices remained at double
world prices, the costs of export refunds remained high and production was well
above demand.38 By 1991 the CAP budget had risen by a further 7.9 million ECU.
Further pressure on the community for more radical reform came from GATT, the
USA and environmental and consumer groups. Such were the concerns in the
international community over CAP reform that the GATT talks ground to a halt.
The spectre of GATT collapsing had a salutary effect. As the majority of the nations
within the EU are industrial nations they had a greater interest in maintaining free
trade than in agricultural subsidies. The combination of US and world-wide pressure caused cracks in the EC farm alliance and Germany moved to support the
British and Dutch position which argued for some compromise on CAP reform.
As a consequence the EC Commission proposed a radical plan for the reform of the
CAP. The plan, outlined by the Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry, involved
a 35% cut in cereal prices, cuts of 15% for butter and beef and 10% for milk. These
plans unleashed general hostility from the policy community. Despite Britains
continual call for reform, the Minister of Agriculture, John Gummer, said the proposals for reform were preposterous and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the view
from GATT was that the cuts did not go far enough. Eventually, the Council of
Agricultural Ministers agreed on a reform plan which reduced prices for cereal
by 29%, for beef and poultry by 15% and for dairy products by 5%. However,
in compensation, 3 billion was to be made available over three years for farmers.
In addition, farmers were to receive large subsidies for taking land out of production
in the set-aside programme. According to The Independent:
The basic apparatus of CAP remains. There will still be guaranteed prices, albeit at a lower level,
with export subsidies and Community preference. The cost to the Community budget will be no

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19

lower, and probably higher, in the short term. It is also far from certain that lowering cereal prices
and setting aside land will significantly reduce production.39

Despite the external pressure, the community managed to control the reform
process and, thus, despite growing opposition to subsidies and increasing costs,
the outcome of reform was a policy which continued to protect the interests of
the community. The changing context placed pressure on the network and
reconstituted its interest away from increasing production to preserving as much
as possible of existing policy. The community accepted that it had little choice but
to reform CAP but it managed to control changes in a way that had the least
damaging impact.
The actors within the network made a strategic calculation that they had to accept
reform. In doing so they were able, to some extent, to control the reform process;
without the existence of the policy community such a response would have been
impossible and the final reform package would have been very different. Of course,
this is a counter-factual argument, but if we consider what happened during the
same period in the USA, it seems a plausible argument. In the USA where there
was also a closed policy community for much of the post-war period, it was much
less able to resist reform because there were structural weaknesses in the network.
The community was made up of a number of farm organizations representing
different regions and products. In addition, there were a number of important
ideological differences between the various farm groups. Consequently, when
faced with increased external pressure because of changing economic circumstances it was much more difficult for the community to retain a united front. As
a result, the new pressure resulted in conflicts of interest which split the
community, thus allowing the imposition of rapid and radical reform.40

Outcomes Affect Networks

A final dialectical relationship is between outcomes and networks. Policy outcomes
feed back into the community and, subsequently, affect the next set of outcomes.
There are a number of examples of this in the agriculture case.
First, during World War II the NFU were not convinced of the governments sincerity in providing support and the government were concerned to retain the confidence of the farmers. As a consequence of farmer dissatisfaction the government
made the pledge discussed earlier. This commitment changed the basis of agricultural policy because it was the first time that the government was prepared to
consider a comprehensive system of price support outside of wartime and thus
it changed the expectations of the farmers in terms of government policy.
Second, as we saw above, in 1947 the Treasury made a commitment to all-out expansion in agriculture to ensure economic survival. This decision effectively passed
policy making to the agricultural policy community ending any discussion of
alternative policies. The decision effectively froze, or institutionalized, the wartime
decision-making processes, thus ensuring that critics of the expansionist policy
were excluded. This decision therefore had important long-term consequences. For
most of the post-war period alternative views on agricultural policy were excluded.
The dominance of the policy community was ensured by Treasury legitimation.

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Third, the decision to join the European Community effectively ensured that the
policy community was isolated from control by national government. Once Britain
joined, agricultural policy decisions were made by a new policy community based
around the Agricultural Commission which had good relations with both agricultural pressure groups and the Council of Agricultural Ministers which was made
up of the agricultural ministers of member states. This insulated agricultural policy
making from individual national governments and, more particularly, from national
finance ministers. Reform could only be imposed once there was agreement
between national governments, but even then it was the policy community which
had responsibility for developing and implementing the reforms. However, that
process of reform and the concomitant politicization of agricultural policy has
resulted in the community becoming more permeable, with new interests such
as consumers, environmentalists and food retailers entering the policy process; this
has resulted in further politicization, less consensus and reforms of the CAP which
the community have been less able to control.41

Conclusion
This article has had two aims. First, we have developed a dialectical model of the
role that policy networks play in any explanation of policy outcomes. Our model
is based upon a critique of existing approaches and emphasizes that the relationship
between networks and outcomes is not a simple, unidimensional one. Rather, we
argue that there are three interactive or dialectical relationships involved between:
the structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the network
and the context within which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome.
Second, we use this model to help analyse and understand continuity and change
in British agricultural policy since the 1930s. Obviously, one case is not sufficient
to establish the utility of the model, but, in our view, the case does illustrate both
that policy networks can, and do, affect policy outcomes and that, in order to
understand how that happens, we need to appreciate the role played by the three
dialectical relationships highlighted in our model.
(Accepted: 11 April 1999)
About the Authors
David Marsh, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; e-mail: marshdz@bss1.bham.ac.uk
Martin Smith, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK; e-mail:
m.j.smith@sheffield.ac.uk

Notes
1 See D. Marsh, Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998, pp. 410.
2 A. McPherson and C. Raab, Governing Education. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988.
3 K. Dowding, Model or metaphor? A critical review of the policy network approach, Political Studies,
43 (1995), 13658.
4 D. Marsh, The Development of the Policy Network Approach in Comparing Policy Networks.
5 C. Hay, Structure and Agency in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science.
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 189208.

UND E R S TA N D I N G P OL I C Y N E T W OR K S

21

6 Dowding, Model or metaphor?.

7 McPherson and Raab, Governing Education.
8 D. Knoke. Political Networks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 7.
9 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds), Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.
10 See the contributions to Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks.
11 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology in Marsh
and Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 22968.
12 D. Judge, The Parliamentary State. London: Sage, 1993.
13 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, Implementing Thatcherite Policies. Buckingham: Open University Press,
1992; J. Moon, Evaluating Thatcher: sceptical versus synthetic approaches, Politics, 14 (1994), 439.
14 G. Wistow, The Health Service in Marsh and Rhodes, Implementing Thatcherite Policies; K.-C. Hu, Policy
Networks in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes (University of Sheffield, Unpublished Ph.D., 1995).
15 M. Saward, The Civil Nuclear Power Network in Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 7599.
16 M. Read, Policy Networks and Issue Networks; the Politics of Smoking in Marsh and Rhodes, Policy
Networks, pp. 12448; M. J. Smith, From policy community to issue networks: Salmonella in eggs and
the new politics of food, Public Administration, 69 (1991), 23555.
17 C. Daugbjerg, Similar Problems, Different Policies: Policy Network and Environmental Policy in
Danish and Swedish Agriculture in Marsh, Comparing Policy Networks, pp. 7589; Smith, Salmonella in
eggs; and W. Grant and A. MacNamara, When policy communities intersect: the case of agriculture
and banking, Political Studies, 43 (1995), 50519.
18 G. Jordan et al., Characterising agricultural policy, Public Administration, 72 (1994), 50526.
19 R. Stones, Labour and International Finance in Marsh and Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 20025.
20 D. Marsh, Youth Employment Policy, 19701994: towards the Exclusion of Trade Unions in Marsh
and Rhodes, Policy Networks, pp. 16799.
21 Wistow, The Health Service.
22 D. Marsh, The New Politics of British Trade Unions. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992.
23 Hay, Structure and Agency.
24 For an outline of this position, see D. Marsh et al., Post-War British Politics in Perspective. Cambridge:
Polity, 1999, ch. 1.
25 M. J. Smith, The Politics of Agricultural Policy Support: the Development of an Agricultural Policy Community.
London: Dartmouth, 1990.
26 P. Self and H. Storing, The State and the Farmer. London: George Allen, 1962.
27 The Ministry concerned was the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries until 1955 when it became the
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries: we have used the acronym MAFF for convenience.
28 NFU Record (October 1939).
29 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 367, c. 90.
30 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 397, cc. 7256.
31 MAF 53/171, Post-War Agricultural Policy (Memos, Correspondence etc.), 194346. London: Public Records
Office; CAB 127/170, Agricultural Policy. London: Public Record Office.
32 NFU Record (September 1947).
33 CAB 124/572, Cabinet Post-War Agricultural Policy. London: Public Record Office.
34 C. Hay, The Tangled Webs We Weave: The Discourse, Strategy and Practice of Networking in Marsh,
Comparing Policy Networks, pp. 3351.
35 CAB 134/896, Committee on Food and Agriculture. London: Public Records Office.
36 CAB 134/896.
37 CAB 129/66, Cabinet Memoranda, 51100. London: Public Records Office.
38 House of Lords Committee on the European Communities, Farm Price Proposals 199091, HL 34
Session 198990. London: HMSO, 1990.
39 The Independent (22 May 1992).
40 M. J. Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.
41 W. Grant, The Common Agricultural Policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.