Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 179275

December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDE
NT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO
M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,
respondents-intervenors
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking officia
l of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legi
timacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-colla
pse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello G
arci" tapes, allegedly contained the President s instructions to COMELEC Commissio
ner VirgilioGarcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidenti
al elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Le
ader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and
set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees
on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, I
nformation and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (re
spondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapp
ed conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (
NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI De
puty Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alle
ged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. Af
ter prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibili
ty and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the c

hambers of the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearin
gs indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based o
n the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) fi
led with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for T
emporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.
R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from
using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversation
s in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that
the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the recor
ds of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from f
urther using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci
tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator PanfiloLacson roused the slumbe
ring issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In h
is discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnish
ed truth
the what s, when s, where s, who s and why s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought
an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to par
ticipate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson s speech was referred to t
he Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purch
ase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Phi
lippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Se
nator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the m
atter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privileg
e speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans
the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garc
i" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of
the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or o
ther government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and OswaldoAgcaoili, retired j
ustices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibit
ion with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senat
e from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main tha
t the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article
III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its pub
lic hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14
2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., BenignoNoynoy
C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.
S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on Se
ptember 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of th
e resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179
275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings,
they have different objectives the first is poised at preventing the playing of th
e tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, an
d the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second,
G.R. No. 179275.
- I Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the is
sue on the parties standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that " [l]egal standing or locus standi ref
ers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sus
tained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act
x xx," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the alleged
ly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable a
ction.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a pers
onal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversen
ess which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de
pends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Co
urt, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Mac
apagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing o
rdinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute acti
ons involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings
."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the b
roadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the cont
roversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Tele
communications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current po
licy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedura
l barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal question
s that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court s duty under t
he 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government ha
ve kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tape
s. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committ
ees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner G
arcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and charg

es of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petiti
on for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by al
leging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They
are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will
further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public
funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They ar
e worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legisl
ative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
IntervenorSagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that h
e is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of h
is rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Gover
ning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the
useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the
questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution o
f the laws and that intervenorSagge asserts his constitutional right to due proc
ess,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controver
sy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31
we find sufficient petitioners Ranada s and Agcaoili s and intervenorSagge s allegatio
n that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquir
y will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted
that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Represent
atives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in thi
s case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers,
members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of t
he bar and of the legal profession which were also supposedly violated by the ther
ein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioner
s and intervenorSagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Th
e issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public b
ut also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all
.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it
has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenorS
agge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repea
tedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actua
l cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropr
iate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for ot
herwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power
of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attemp
t at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determin

e a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case

becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge i
n academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be e
nforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementi
oned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Commit
tees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their commi
ttee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records o
f the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already pl
ayed in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicize
d fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed an
d submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain th
e doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an
act already accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate can
not be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquir
y without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitu
tional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published ru
les of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to sati
sfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, f
or it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen fo
r the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not e
ven a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2
of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral arg
ument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislati
on had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2
006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of whic
h the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was unde
rtaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we s
aid:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees like
wise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the i
nquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote t
he OSG s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Cong
ress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Sena
torial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate s membe
rship, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having pu

blished its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation condu
cted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces
this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legisla
tive body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are electe
d every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senat
ors expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to conti
nue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, r
equires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying
the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constituti
on is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue
into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be r
epublished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Moti
on for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue
a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institutio
n is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national electi
on or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its d
ay-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently
of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirm
s this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (
1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the f
irst time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpass
ed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Cong
ress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is me
rely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinishe
d matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The l
ogic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Se
nate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different compositi
on as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliber
ations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing bo
dy even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will n
ot be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matte
r of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the oppo
site nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules
of the Senate (i.e. the Senate s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the prec
eding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the

Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at
least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Sena
tors present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composit
ion of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revi
sion of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senato
rs shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are in
tended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or rep
ealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply st
ate "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for
the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In v
iew of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the n
ext Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules f
or its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the in
quiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is c
ategorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legisla
tive inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly st
ate that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inqui
ries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the
same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated public
ation by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite
that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and acces
sible to the public at the Senate s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justi
fy the Senate s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Arti
cle VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Se
nate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accor
dance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction
whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constituti
onal mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tra
dition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illumi
nating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pa
mphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera
ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspap
er of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "s

hall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of gener
al circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accord
ance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because t
he Rules of Procedure put a person s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Ru
les of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwis
e known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers
an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalen
t of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, i
n violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative in
quiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of le
gislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the public
ation of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly publi
shed rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedur
e Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Ma
nila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent
publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited
by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the l
egislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the re
spondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear con
travention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the o
ther issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R
. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senat
e of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conductin
g any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On leave.
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3 Id. at 9.
4 Id. at 1-38.
5 Id. at 36-38.
6 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
7 Id. at 169.
8 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of t
he Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.

10 Id. at 3-17.
11 Id. at 7-13.
12 Id. at 24.
13 Id. at 44.
14 Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
16 Id. at 71-90.
17 Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the Oc
tober 2, 2007 Oral Argument:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees govern
ing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in accor
dance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes," violat
es Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id.
at 66.)
18 Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 2
6, 2007.
19 Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
20 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
21 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
22 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736,
755.
23 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2
006, 489 SCRA 160.
24 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id.at 218.
25 G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26 Id.
27 Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.
29 Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.

30 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.

31 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32 Francisco, Jr. v.The House of Representatives, id.at 897.
33 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
34 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110
, 139.
35 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standard
s that have to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, name
ly: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and subst
antial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the f
unction be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
36 LaBugal-B laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004)
.
37 Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 4
6.
38 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
40 See news article "Separate findings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac publish
ed in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5 House commit
tees in Garci probe file report on Monday" published in The Manila Bulletin on Mar
ch 25, 2006.
41 Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 2
29 SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.
679.
43 Taada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).
44 As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing fo
r the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of Ge
neral Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9
-10.
46 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47 Id. at 297-298.
48 Dated September 4, 2008.
49 TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
50 Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commerci
al and Non-Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use The
reof and For Other Purposes," approved on June 14, 2000.

51 MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, O

ctober 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52 Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:
Sec. 6.Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information shall not be denied leg
al effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the da
ta message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely re
ferred to in that electronic data message.
Sec. 7.Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents.
Electronic documents shall hav
e the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal wr
iting, and
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met
by an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrit
y and reliability, and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent re
ference, in that
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the
addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arise
s in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which i
t was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an o
bligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not b
eing presented or retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its origi
nal form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from t
he time when it was first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to
be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any an
d all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the execution of
documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equival
ent of a written document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of ele
ctronic data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to auth
entication and best evidence.
Sec. 10.Original Documents.
(1) Where the law requires information to be present
ed or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic da
ta message or electronic document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated i
n its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic document is shown
by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information is
capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.

(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an o
bligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information no
t being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has re
mained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and an
y change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display
; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the p
urpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all relevant
circumstances.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation