Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
1. Generally
Ebarle v Sucaldito
Facts:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur
Bienvenido Ebarle, was charged with various violations of certain
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act. The charges are
as follows
For both of which petitioner requested the respective CFI and was granted
a restraining order, but through the subsequent motion of the
respondents, the restraining orders were lifted and the petitions
themselves dismissed.
Thus a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction was
initiated by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, which resulted in the stay
of the implementation of dismissal order. Subsequently, the SC
consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for
decision.
The issue being asserted by the petitioner is that the respondents City
Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED,"
Wherein paragraphs 4 & 6 of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264 outlining the
procedure by which complainants charging government officials and
employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, states that
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the
President in case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial
governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly
acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in
accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials
or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the
innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that
other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the
interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been
exhausted.
The court thus held that it is plain from the very wording of the Order
that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints.
The ratio being that the very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of
criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the
more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials,
reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967, while
paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police
Act of 1966. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these
existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter
of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is
no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such
a resort a secondary measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a
condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued
forthwith by the interested parties, " but that does not, so we hold, cover
proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior
July 9, 1982-
TMX thru SGV & Co. (external auditor) filed with the
Appellate Division of the BIR a claim for refund
representing overpaid income tax for the taxable year
ended Dec. 31, 1981
(Amount: Php 247,010.00 paid in 1st Q).
This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
March 14, 1984TMX filed a petition for review before the Court of
Tax Appeals against the Commissioner praying for the
ordering of the refund.
The Commissioners defense was that granting, without
admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales,
Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than
two (2) years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981)
and the filing of the claim in Court ( March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and
295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended). The Tax Court granted the
petition and viewed the quarterly income tax paid as a portion or
installment of the total annual income tax due.
The Commissioner seeks a reversal of the decision, hence this
case.
ISSUES(S):
RULING:
WON the two-year prescription provided for in sec. 292 of the Tax
Code should be counted from the date when the quarterly income
was paid (May 15,1981).
No, it should start from the filing of the Annual Income Tax Return.
The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in sec. 85 and
implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax
should only be considered mere installments of the annual tax due. These
quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative
figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable
income, should be treated as advances or portions of the annual income
tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or fiscal year. This is
reinforced by sec. 87 which provides for the filing of adjustment returns
and final payment of income tax. Consequently, the two-year prescriptive
period provided in sec. 292 should be computed from the time of filing the
Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of
income tax. Hence, the action has not prescribed since the prescriptive
period starts from April 15, 1982 and the action was filed on March 14,
1984. 2 years have not elapsed.
(Sec. 292 if applied literally to the case, which involves quarterly
income tax payments, may lead to absurdity and inconvenience. It was
then interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order
to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law,
which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
The other provisions are: sec. 85 which provided for the method
of computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on cumulative basis;
and sec. 87 that required the filing of an adjustment returns and final
payment of income tax. Refer to p. 189 of the case for the original
provision)
People v Subido
Refresher: Subido was contending that even though he couldnt pay the
fine & indemnity imposed on him, he couldnt be required to serve the
amount of fine & indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment bec the
judgment didnt expressly & specifically provide for subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Doctrine: The aid to construction here is the use of punctuation marks
w/c may be an aid in the interpretation of statutes when there is ambiguity
(wherein you qualify the punctuation mark). As in this case, the court
based its ruling on the use of a comma in the questioned decision.
* sir stated however, that this must NOT be construed as controlling.
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Refresher: The issue in this case is WON the plaintiffs as share tenants
are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the
purchasers thereof. They invoked the right of redemption granted by Sec.
12 of RA 3844. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the
exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code was given by respondent vendor to
petitioners-tenants. The SC ruled in their favor saying that the very
essence of the Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share
tenancy.
Doctrine: Where the true intent of the law is clear such intent or spirit
must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute.
2. Legislative History
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory [1957]
FACTS:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the
plaintiff-appellant imported sun-dried cocoa beans for which it paid the
foreign exchange tax of 17% totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption
from said tax under Section 2 of Republic Act 601 as amended, it sued the
Central Bank that had exacted payment; and its amended complaint it
included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
Section 2 of RA 601:
the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of
costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into
the Philippines of rice, flour * * * soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt
syrup * * * shall be refunded to any importer making application
therefore, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation * * *.
The suit was filed in CFI, wherein defendants filed motion to dismiss
because:
1. complaint stated no cause of action as chocolate was not cocoa
beans
2. it was a suit against the Government without the latters consent
Judge sustained the motion, and dismissed the case by his order of
November 15, 1954.
ISSUE: WON cocoa beans may be considered as chocolate for the
purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by RA 601
as amended.
RULING: NO
RATIO:
Appellants: dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably use the words
chocolate, cacao, and cocoa.
August 8, 1986 Adela Blas, without the knowledge of her coowners, sold her share to Zenaida Bosier, another sister of
petitioner
Civil Case No. 15510
o August 5, 1992 petitioner received summons with a copy
the complaint in Civil Case No. 15510, filed by respondent
demanding her share in the rentals being collected
o Petitioner informed respondent that she was exercising her
right of redemption as a co-owner
o August 12, 1992 petitioner deposited P10,000 as
redemption price to redeem the property permissive
counterclaim
o Case was dismissed after respondent was declared nonsited and petitioners counterclaim was consequently
dismissed
Civil Case No. C-17055 with the RTC
o Petitioner alleged
ISSUE
WON May 30, 1992 letter notifying petitioner of the sale and
attached Deed of Sale can be considered sufficient as compliance
with the notice requirement of Art 1623 for the purpose of legal
redemption
DECISION
Petitioner
o Cited cases are not relevant because case at bar does not
concern the particular form in which notice must be given
o Issue is whether a notice sent by the vendee may be given
in lieu of that required to be given by the
vendor/prospective vendor
Butte
o Effect must be given to the change in statutory language
notice must come from VENDOR
FACTS
September 14 and 22, 1992. On the same day of September 22, 1992,
the court Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS
QUO pending filing of comments on the original supplemental
manifestation.
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent
Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 and in a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required
respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted
its Comment on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading entitled Omnibus Submission.
Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them.
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Supplement
to Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22
September 1992 Resolution and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor
General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that
xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners preventive
suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; xxx.
This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required
respondent Secretary to comply with the said status quo order stating
that:
xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx
wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective
positions, the Court hereby ORDERS
that petitioners be allowed to
perform the duties of their respective positions xxx, and that respondents
and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain
from performing any act xxx until further orders from the Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints
filed against said officials and employees.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 Preventive Suspension
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, and that the status in question is
procedural. In contrast to penal statutes, which are strictly construed,
procedural statutes are liberally construed.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias
in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that
the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting
favorably on their recommendation.
The motion for Contempt which charges the lawyers of petitioners with
unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and
disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by he Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health cannot prosper. The motion should be filed, as in fact
such a motion was field, with the Ombudsman. The court find the acts
alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by
said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive
suspension of their clients.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers, as
he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. As such, said statute, particularly its provisions, should be
given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives
of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.
xxx.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the status quo ordered to be
maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
As to the Motion for Disbarment, it has no place in the instant special civic
action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and
quasi-judicial officers.
CONCURRING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J.
I agree as to the authority of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any
government official or employee administratively charged before him
pending the investigation of the complaint to avoid prejudice in
respondents continued stay in the prosecution of the case.
But in the case at bar, the facts that were presented were not adequate to
reasonably place the petitioners under preventive suspension. It is also
3. Contemporary Construction
Nestle Philippines Inc. vs. CA
Refresher: Nestle increased their capital stock from 3 million to 6 million.
They paid the necessary fees for the said increase. They issue 344,500
shares out of previously authorized unissued capital stock. They filed for
an exemption fro payment which the SEC denied. SEC said it did not fall
within the exemptions but could be considered under a different category.
Doctrine: The construction given by the SEC should be upheld because
interpretation and application of a statute given by the administrative
agency charged with its application is entitled great respect and accorded
great weight unless it is shown that such construction is in sharp conflict
with the governing statute or Constitution and other laws. Officials are
presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the consideration
pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law. Their competence,
4. Statutory Directives
Valderama v. NLRC
Refresher: Andrea alleged that she was illegally dismissed by COMMODEX
due to her pregnancy. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
her. In the dispositive portion, only COMMODEX was ordered to pay the
backwages and damages. Andrea filed a motion for clarification to include
Valderama, as the employer in the dispositive portion wherein the Labor
Arbiter granted the prayer. Valderama contends that the Labor Arbiter's
decision is final and executory hence cannot be amended. NLRC affirmed.
The SC ruled in favor of Andrea.
Doctrine: General rules of procedure are merely suppletory in character
vis-a-vis disputes which are primarily governed by labor laws.
Furthermore, as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code, all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this code, including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor. The rule that the
NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in order to give life to the
constitutional mandate for the protection of labor is well settled.