Natalia Realty v.

DAR
GR No. 103302
12 August 1993
Bellosillo, J.

PP 1637 set aside

several hectares of
land in Antipolo, San
Mateo,
and
Montalban
as
townsite areas to
absorb
the
population overspill
in the metropolis
which
were
designated as the
Lungsod
Silangan
Townsite,
where
Natalia
Realtys
properties
were
situated.
Estate
Developers
and
Investors
Corporation (EDIC),
the developer of the
Natalia properties,
was granted approval
to develop the said
properties into lowcost
housing
subdivisions.
The
Natalia
properties
then became the
Antipolo
Hills
Subdivision.
When the CARL
came into effect, the
DAR issued a Notice
of Coverage on the
undeveloped
portions
of
the
Antipolo
Hills
Subdivision. Natalia
immediately
registered
its
objection to the said
Notice and requested
the DAR Secretary
to cancel the same.
However, members
of the Samahan ng
Magsasaka
sa
Bundok
Antipolo
(SAMBA) filed a
complaint
against
Natalia and EDIC
before the DAR
Regional Adjudicator
to restrain them from
developing
areas
under
their
cultivation. The RA
issued a writ of
Preliminary
Injunction. Natalia
and EDIC appealed
to the DARAB but
the latter merely
remanded the case to
the RA. Natalia then
requested the DAR
Secretary to set aside
the
Notice
of
Coverage.
Neither
the DAR Secretary

1 | Page

W/N the Natalia

properties
were
validly
converted
from agricultural to
residential land.

W/N the Natalia

properties
are
covered by the
CARL.

YES. Natalia and

EDIC complied with
all the requirements
of law, even securing
prior approval from
DAR. As a matter of
fact, there was no
need for Natalia and
EDIC to do so
because the Natalia
properties
were
within the areas set
aside
for
the
Lungsod
Silangan
Reservation. Since
PP 1637 created the
townsite reservation
for the purpose of
providing additional
housing
to
the
burgeoning
population of Metro
Manila, it in effect
converted
for
residential use what
were
erstwhile
agricultural
lands
provided
all
requisites were met.
NO.
The
undeveloped
portions
of
the
Antipolo
Hills
Subdivision cannot
be considered as
agricultural lands.
These lots were
intended
for
residential use. They
ceased
to
be
agricultural
lands
upon approval of
their inclusion in the
Lungsod
Silangan
Reservation.

Lands not devoted to

agricultural activity
are
outside
the
coverage of CARL.
Agricultural land
refers
to
land
devoted
to
agricultural activity,
and not classified as
mineral,
forest,
residential,
commercial,
or
industrial land.

Caballes v. DAR
GR No. 78214
5 December 1988
Sarmiento, J.

nor
the
DAR
Director concerned
took action on the
protest letters.
Andrea
Millenes
allowed Bienvenido
Abajon to construct a
house on a portion of
her
landholding,
paying a monthly
rental of P2.00.
Millenes
likewise
allowed Abajon to
plant a portion of the
land, agreeing that
the produce thereof
would be shared by
both on a 50-50
basis.
When Millenes sold
her land to the
spouses Arturo and
Yolanda
Caballes,
the spouses told
Abajon that they
intended to build a
poultry close to his
house and persuaded
him to transfer his
dwelling to another
portion
of
the
landholding. Abajon
refused to leave,
even
after
confrontation before
the
Barangay
Captain
of
the
locality.
Subsequently,
Yolanda
filed
a
criminal case against
Abajon for malicious
mischief
for
harvesting bananas
and jackfruit from
their
property
without
her
knowledge. All the
planting
on
the
property
however,
had been done by
Abajon. The trial
court ordered the
referral of the case to
the
Ministry
of
Agrarian Reform for
a
preliminary
determination of the
relationship between
the parties. The
Ministry ruled that a
tenancy relationship
existed between the
parties, and, as such,
the case is not proper
for hearing.
On appeal, the DAR
(the new MAR)

2 | Page

W/N Abajon is an
agricultural tenant.

NO.
To
invest
Abajon with the
status of a tenant is
preposterous.
He
only occupied a
miniscule
portion
(60m2) of a 500m2
lot, which cannot by
any
stretch
of
imagination
be
considered as an
economic
familysized farm. Planting
camote, bananas, and
corn on such a size
of
land
cannot
produce an income
sufficient to provide
a modest standard of
living to meet the
farm familys basic
needs. Thus, the
order sought to be
reviewed is patently
contrary
to
the
declared policy of
RA 3844. Moreover,
there
exists
no
tenancy relationship
between the parties
because
Abajons
status is more of a
caretaker who was
allowed
by
the
owner
out
of
benevolence
or
compassion to live in
the premises and to
have a garden of
some
sort.
Agricultural
production as the
primary
purpose
being absent in the
arrangement, it is
clear that Abajon
was never a tenant of
Millenes.

Essential requisites
of
a
tenancy
relationship:
(1) The parties
are
the
landowner
and
the
tenant;
(2) The subject
is
agricultural
land;
(3) There
is
consent;
(4) The purpose
is
agricultural
production;
(5) There
is
personal
cultivation;
and
(6) There
is
sharing of
harvests.
Unless a person has
established his status
as a de jure tenant, he
is not entitled to
security of tenure nor
is he covered by the
Land
Reform
Program
of
the
Government under
existing laws.
Tenancy status arises
only if an occupant
of a parcel of land
has been given its
possession for the
primary purpose of
agricultural
production.
Obiter:
If justice can be
meted out now, why
wait for it to drop
gently from heaven?

reversed the findings

and declared that the
case was proper for
trial as the land
involved
was
residential. The new
minister of the DAR,
however, set aside
the said order and
declared that the
criminal case was
not proper for trial,
as there was an
existing
tenancy
relationship between
the parties.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

November 6, 2010
175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Valid Classification
Eminent Domain Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and
related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of
an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for
the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This
law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A.
6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They
invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform
program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash.
Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

3 | Page

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under
the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian
reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just
compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree
with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

Roxas and Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals

GR 127876December 17, 1999
Facts: This case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these by the
government under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 9188. Petitioner Roxas and Co. is a domestic corporation
and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. The events of this case occurred
during the incumbency of then President Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987,
Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms
necessary to initially implement the program. Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657; the Act was signed by the President on June
10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the laws effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of EO No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution
by the government under the CARL. Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of
Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioners
application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The Land Bank of the Philippines
trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22,

4 | Page

1993, from the title of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 6654. On October 30,
1993, CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified certain amounts in cash and LBP
bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioners land in Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for
conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6,
1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, sent a
letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner
informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. Respondent
DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs
issued by respondent DAR in the name of the farmers. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are
located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural. Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of
whether the property was subject to agrarian reform; hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for determination.
Petitioner filed a petition with the CA. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process
in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied. Petitioners petition
was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were valid and in accordance with the law.
Held: No, for a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required first the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties and second, the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the
first notice, the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They
are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of
the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners,
there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. In this case, respondent DAR claims that it sent a letter of invitation to petitioner corporation, through
Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico but he was not authorized as such by the corporation. The SC stressed that the
failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give the SC the power
to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. The Court said, to assume the power is to short-circuit the
administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural
lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then
until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to
deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings
over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process.

Alita v. CA
-petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring Presidential Decree No.27 inapplicable to lands obtained thru the
homestead law; 2) Declaring that the 4 registeredco-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners; & 3)
Ejectingtenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, VicenteRicalde and Rolando Salamar, as the
owners would want to cultivate the farmholdingthemselves.-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur acquired by
respondentsReyes through homestead patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141- Reyes wants to personally cultivate these lands, but
Alita refuse to vacate, relying on theprovisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and regulations of MAR/DAR-June 18, 1981: Respondents
Reyes (Plaintiff) instituted a complaint against Minister of Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX P.D.
Macarambon, and Alitaet.al for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and GeneralOrders inapplicable
to homestead lands. Defendants Alita filed their answer with special andaffirmative defenses.-July 19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion
to enjoin the defendants from declaring the landsin litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer
certificates-November 5, 1982: Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, PagadianCity (Regional Trial Court,
9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissingcomplaint and the motion to enjoinOn January 4, 1983, plaintiffs
moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to whichdefendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.RTC: issued decision
prompting defendants Alita et al to move for reconsideration but wasdeniedCA: the same was sustained
ISSUE:

5 | Page

whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by theAgrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
--NO
We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
transferring to them ownership of the land they tillis a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the
social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeatthe purpose of the enactment of the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 toprotect ones right to life itself by give a needy citizen a land wherein they could
build ahouse and plant for necessary subsistence.
Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over therights of the tenants guaranteed
by the Agrarian Reform statute.Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardshipin thedisposition or
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain underlease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of smallsettlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise supports theinapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands
covered by homestead patents like those of the property inquestion,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who stillown the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areasas long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE
REFORM, respondent.

HONORABLE

SECRETARY

OF

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

AGRARIAN

Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from
performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and
17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures

6 | Page

Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as
they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding
the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a)

Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or

Agricultural Activity."
(b)

Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine

raising . . ."
(c)

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)

Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just

compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e)

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed
within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands
over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross
sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower
ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after
tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year .
. ."

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
xxx

xxx

xxx

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4.

The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,

who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
xxx

7 | Page

xxx

xxx"

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of
the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that
Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is
not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial
livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their
residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations
and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the
raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this
industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less.
The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second
Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding
and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the
intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the
Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the
subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly
show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986,
Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the
word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential
properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not
considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and
therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted
as follows:
xxx

8 | Page

xxx

xxx

"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that
leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own
directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in
piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose
hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively,
the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).
xxx

xxx

xxx

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi
namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito
ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms"
which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their
landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net
profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process
(Rollo, p. 21).
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to
declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and
political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the
awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these
departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v.
Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the
Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA
208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as
the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

9 | Page

SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez,

Jr.,

Cruz,

Gancayco,

Padilla,

Bidin,

Grio-Aquino,

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC)vs Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. SuttonSoliman and Harry T. Sutton
G.R. No.162070
Facts
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision andResolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series
of 1993, null and voidfor being violative of the Constitution.
The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devotedexclusively to cow and calf breeding.
On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarianreform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to
sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coveragefarms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, theCourt ruled that lands devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions
of the CARL insofar as theyincluded livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents filed
withpetitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devotedexclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspectedrespondents' land and found that it was
devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. Herecommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the
CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS andrequested the return of the supporting
papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portionsof private agricultural lands used
for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15,1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining
the area of land to beexcluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits,viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares
for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excludedfrom the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as finaland irrevocable the withdrawal of
their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entirelandholding is exempted from the CARL.
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partiallygranting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying theretention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209
hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.Petitioner ordered the rest
of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire landholding should beexempted as it is devoted exclusively to
cattle-raising. Said motion was denied. Respondentsfiled a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the
reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock indetermining the land
area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case
which declared cattle-raising landsexcluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appealto
CA, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.
Issue
Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted
to livestock raising is constitutional?

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Held
The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulatelivestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximumretention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
ConstitutionalCommission show a clear intent to exclude,inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,swine and poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine andpoultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall
within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or
treefarming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in thisenterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures andfacilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts andgenerators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipmentlike bio-gas
and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevatedwater tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenance.
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by theConstitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing theassailed A.O.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute byCongress without substantial change is
an implied legislative approval and adoption of theprevious law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede
an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881which amended certain
provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definitionof the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming"
by dropping from its coverage landsthat are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this
significantmodification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarianreform.
It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of theConstitution. They cannot amend or
extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform toand be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an
administrative order andthe provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR wasproperly
stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyondthe scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

Milestone Farms vs Office of the President

FACTS:

Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other
livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the
raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect

In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned
ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.

Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the
exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.

Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.

DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property
and recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by
Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary

Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC.

MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone

RTC reversed the decision of MCTC

CA ruled in favor of Milestone

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously
exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for
reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months
earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR
conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential
and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the
property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order, CA had to
acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its

11 | P a g e

amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectareagricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP
HELD:

No.

When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not
be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and
in full force and effect.

As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the
CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry
raising.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. DARAB, et.al., respondents G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992
FACTS: Thepetitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in the town of Musuan,
Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an
agricultural school in Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college until it became what is now known as the CMU,
but still primarily an agricultural university. On January 16, 1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing
from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now
the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several
tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal
reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares
to 3,080 hectares. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by
a written contract. The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical knowhow, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice
projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. It was expressly stipulated that no landlordtenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multidisciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural
technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional
income to augment their salaries. Among the participants in this program wereAlvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero,
Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants (respondents).
Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. In 1986, the agri-business
project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project was discontinued
due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off
when this project was discontinued. The CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMUIEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical
training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on
June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate. The nonrenewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation
from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP. 2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB
RULING: DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP.

Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands
falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and
pilot production centers, etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a
portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND
WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

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Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an
erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The
order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on
an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP.
Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. NEITHER
DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL.

As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to
resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was
given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this
matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land. The evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. The Court declared the
decision of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the
private respondents.

DAR v. DECS
Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied petitioners motionfor reconsideration-Lot No.2509 and Lot
No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares locatedat Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen.
Luna, Sagay, NegrosOccidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Esteban Jalandoni to respondent
DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.-DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years,commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease wassubsequently
renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.-June 10, 1993:
Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of thesubject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage withthe Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.-After investigation, MARO
Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of Coverage to respondentDECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its
representatives for aconference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M.
Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.-August 7, 1998: DAR
Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation and directedProvincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and
distribution of landholdings toqualified beneficiaries.-DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Director.-Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside thedecision
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review
ISSUES
:1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No.6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1998 (CARL)NO2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES The general policy under CARL
is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture aspossible.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. The program shall: cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public andprivate agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229,including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
:(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to orsuitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands toagricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act untilCongress, taking into account, ecological,
developmental and equityconsiderations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the publicdomain;(b) All lands of the
public domain in excess of the specific limits asdetermined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;(c) All other lands owned by the
Government devoted to or suitable foragriculture; and(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of
theagricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.Section 3(c): agricultural land- land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in thisAct and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
agriculture or agricultural activity- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting ofsuch farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer
inconjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. The records of the case show that the subject
properties were formerly privateagricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondentDECS. From
that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the landscontinued to be agricultural primarily planted to
sugarcane, albeit part of the public domainbeing owned by an agency of the government. There is no legislative or presidential

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act,before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral,forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall underthe classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
-DECS:sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derivedfrom its contract of lease with Anglo
Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly andexclusively used for educational purposes.
-DAR:the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are notactually, directly and exclusively used as
school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leasedto Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is
theland, per se, not the income derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used foreducational purposes.
HELD: I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands
which are exemptedfrom the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption:
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for nationaldefense, school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes,
, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.x x x x x x x x x
In order to be exempt from the coverage : 1) the land must be actually, directly, andexclusively used and
found to be necessary; and
2) the purpose is for school sites andcampuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes. The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used andfound to benecessary cannot be
understated. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Theplain meaning rule or verba legisis applicable. Where the words
of a statute are clear,plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied withoutattempted interpretation.We
are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v.Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ,
wherein we declared the land subjectexempt from CARP coverage. However, DECS reliance is misplaced because the
factualcircumstances are different in the case at bar.
1st , in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain because it was reserved by the
late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proc. No.476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU). In this case, however,
thelands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitablefor agriculture.
2nd , in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found tobe necessary for school sites and campuses.
Although a portion of it was being used by thePhilippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a Management
andDevelopment Agreement, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the PhilippinePacking Corporation as part of the
CMU research program, with direct participation of facultyand students. The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the
present andfuture educational needs. On the other hand, the lands in this case werenot actually and exclusively utilized as school sites
and campuses. They were leased toAnglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational but business purposes. Also, it was theincome
and not the lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of theschools.
II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not qualifiedbeneficiaries.
The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretaryof Agrarian Reform pursuant toSection
15, R.A. No. 6657:
SECTION 15.
Registration of Beneficiaries
. The DAR in coordination with the BarangayAgrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all
agricultural lessees,tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potentialbeneficiaries with the
assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;(b)
owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurialrelationship;(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.A copy of the registry or list of all
potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in thebarangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay
where it shall be open to inspection bythe public at all reasonable hours.
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP beneficiariesof the subject properties. Further, on
November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reformthrough the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of
Coverage placingthe subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARPbeneficiaries are matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, itbehooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own
determination of theissue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. Inthis case, there was
none. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism
designed to redistribute to the underprivileged thenatural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. The

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objectiveof the State is that: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest considerationto promote social justice and to
move the nation toward sound rural development andindustrialization.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, thepetition is GRANTED. Thedecision of the Court of Appealsdated October 29, 2002, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 isREVERSED andSET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
placingthe subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED

Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the
deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their
property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared
null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February
26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain
the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners
for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate
the lands of the San Joaquins.
HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would
then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a)
nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders
the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to
dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

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