BAYAN MUNA VS.

ROMULO DIGEST
G.R. NO. 159618: Feruary 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA, Represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO,
Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner
v.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary , and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the
RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a nonsurrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons
of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as
without force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether the Respondents abused their discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in
contravention of the Rome Statute.
Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective
without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute
First issue
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it
differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each
other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the
ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions
[of the signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly
recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over
serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only
when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable
difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The
Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a
State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument
obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty
would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines
is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy
of international agreements entered into between States,
even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome
Statute.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence
Second issue

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements

without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval
has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history, we have entered executive agreements covering
such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without
such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and
influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is,
as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements
has been confirmed by long practice.
Abaya vs. Ebdane G.R. No. 167919 Feb. 14, 2007
July 25, 2009 at 11:12 am (1)
FACTS :
This a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside and
nullify Res. No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated May 27, 2004 issued by
the Bids and Action Committee (BAC) of the DPWH. This
resolution recommended the award to private respondent
China Road and Bridge Corporation of the contract which
consist of the improvement and rehabilitation of a 79.818-km
road in the island of Catanduanes.
Based on an Exchange of Notes, Japan and the Philippines
have reached an understanding that Japanese loans are to be
extended to the country with the aim of promoting economic
stabilization and development efforts.
In accordance with the established prequalification criteria,
eight contractors were evaluated or considered eligible to bid
as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening of the
respective bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved
Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of
P738,710,563.67. Consequently, the bid goes to private
respondent in the amount of P952,564,821.71 (with a
variance of 25.98% from the ABC). Hence this petition on the
contention that it violates Sec. 31 of RA 9184 which provides
that :
Sec. 31 Ceiling for Bid Prices. The ABC shall be the upper
limit or ceiling for the bid prices. Bid prices that exceed this
ceiling shall be disqualified outright from further participating
in the proceeding. There shall be no lower limit to the amount
of the award.
The petitioners further contends that the Loan Agreement
between Japan and the Philippines is neither an international
nor an executive agreement that would bar the application of
RA9184. They pointed out that to be considered as such, the
parties must be two (2) sovereigns or states whereas in this
loan agreement, the parties were the Philippine government
and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate
juridical personality from the Japanese government.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the assailed resolution violates RA 9184.
RULING :
The petition is dismissed. Under the fundamental principle of
international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is in fact,
embodied is Section 4 of RA9184, any treaty or international
or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this
Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory, shall be
observed. The DPWH, as the executing agency of the project
financed by the Loan Agreement rightfully awarded the
contract to private respondent China Road and Bridge
Corporation.
The Loan Agreement was executed and declared that it was
so entered by the parties in the light of the contents of the

Exchange of Notes between the government of Japan and the

government of the Philippines dated Dec. 27, 1999. Under
the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an
adjunct of the Japanese government. The JBIC procurement
guidelines absolutely prohibits the imposition of ceilings and
bids.
Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern
Sea Trading
3 SCRA 351 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaties vs
Executive Agreements
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which
imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In
1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and
forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to
comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said
circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other
hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into
between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import transactions
between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in
dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan
were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the
executive agreement that the EO was implementing was
never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated
to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST.
The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to
the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which
are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members
of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which
fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments treaties
and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges
of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated agreements or protocols.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the tradeagreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that
they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission
of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration
of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts;
while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.

Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465 Jan 18

2000
Facts
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting
for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in
violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the
Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America, the department
proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of
attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment
as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition
request as well as the documents and papers submitted
therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that
such information is confidential in nature and that it is
premature to provide such document as the process is not a
preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore,
the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.
Issue
1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be
granted access to the official extradition request and
documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or
opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be
furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this
case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of
the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of
the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its
citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential
decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective
extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not
an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On
the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case
causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties
to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The
doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts
should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however,
where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and
municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a
mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both
States accord common due process protection to their
respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a
prospective extradite.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines

v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk
Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it
contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond
what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by
President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on
Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl
Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 19822006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed
RIRR.
Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by
the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be
implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is
in accord with intl agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction,

or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess
of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by
promulgating the RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become
domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere
constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA
resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred
by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec,
21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into
domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to
establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are
customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the
land. For an intl rule to be considered as customary law, it
must be established that such rule is being followed by states
because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such
rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at
least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby
legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the
Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to
24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk
substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are
they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the
option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA
Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Soft law is not part of intl law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the
Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions of
formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes
intended for infants and young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and
respondents are prohibited from implementing said
provisions.
MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)
SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B.
NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, AND JOEL C.
LAMANGAN IN THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS
PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS ACTION NO. MDL 840, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 137, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI
CITY, AND THE ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, THROUGH
ITS COURT APPOINTED LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CLASS
ACTION MDL 840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF
HAWAII, NAMELY: IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND
MARCOS, JR., RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of
whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era,
obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of
the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in
compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations
of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This
Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC
Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying
P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where
the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD
alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati
dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was
capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite
sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee
was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is
the proper filing fee.
Ruling:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to
the same amount required for other actions not involving
property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee
should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or
the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is
clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US
District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the
Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it
is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might
lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC,
etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment.
Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such
jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the
cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of
rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject
matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals
that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if
capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US
District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on
judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit
of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of
the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign
judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving
property.
Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498
03 December 2009
PONENTE: Brion, J.
PARTIES:
1.
PETITIONERS: GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief,
Philippine
National
Police
(PNP);
Police
Chief

Superintendent RAUL CASTANEDA, Chief, Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL
R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
2.
RESPONDENT: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein
represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-inFact
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World
Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together
with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in
Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a
seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at
ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat
ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no
longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text
message to the latters Manila-based secretary, who advised
Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir
N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow
student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance
to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on
December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through
her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror
Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners),
with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA
immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that
the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance
under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that
when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of
the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missingperson case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence,
the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his
family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of
Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their
actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt.
Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the
finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was
involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the
CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution
dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the requirement that the pleader
must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail
in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims
rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition.
2.
Whether or not the presentation of substantial
evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is
sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.
3.
Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt
nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced
disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.
ANSWERS:
1.
No. However, it must contain details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a
cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights

to life, liberty and security through State or private party

action.
2.
Yes.
3.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION
The requirement that the pleader must state the
ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty The framers of the Amparo Rule
never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights.
As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature
and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually
acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the
victim is detained, because these information may purposely
be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently
want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique
Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to
determine whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause
of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life,
liberty and security through State or private party action. The
petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in
terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the
required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State
or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of
the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION
Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo
petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance
and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as
discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses
based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable
case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance
took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the
failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings
The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] namely, of
being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the
required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance
of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the
Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo
situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of
public officials and employees to observe extraordinary
diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected
in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and
enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings,
the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition,
as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses
based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable
case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance
took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the
failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first

opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to

arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To
directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules
so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not
affect the credibility of the witness As a rule, minor
inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative
value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate
suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to
were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated
story.
3.
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE
WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance,
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability , for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance [The writ of amparo is] a
protective remedy against violations or threats of violation
against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a
remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an
individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not
determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand,
refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these
cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in
progress, as its directions and finer points remain to
evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate
[T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ,
as well as the considerations and measures necessary to
address these situations, may not at all be the same as the
standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions
and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo
Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its
directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress
may promulgate.
The concept of enforced disappearances is neither
defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction The Amparo
Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal

killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. We

note that although the writ specifically covers enforced
disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized
in this jurisdiction.
The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that
the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing
an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took
cognizance of several bills filed in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a
clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The
Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the
concerns within its power to address and provided the
appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental
definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As
the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to
carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are
now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on
the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and
what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should
carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature
has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional
scheme and power structure. Source of the power of the
Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances Even without the benefit of directly
applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not
powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts,
since
extrajudicial
killings
and
enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State
or private party violation of the constitutional rights of
individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts
power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that
the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural
rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened
violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial
intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally
in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual
violations of constitutional rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following
terms:
1.
Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered
by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
2.
Without any specific pronouncement on exact
authorship and responsibility, declaring the government
(through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim
Ahadin
Kasim
accountable
for
the
enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
3.
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the
Court of Appeals issued;
4.
Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNPCIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the
disclosure of material facts known to the government and
to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the
obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this
Court;
5.
Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in
this case and holding him accountable with the obligation
to disclose information known to him and to his assets
in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis;

6.

Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for

appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the
PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the
validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall
initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action
for further investigation, periodically reporting their
results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
action;
7.
Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court
a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy
furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as
petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due
at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of
this Decision;
8.
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full
year to undertake their investigations; the Court of
Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of
this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision;
The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of
Appeals made pursuant to this Decision were given to, and
were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the
incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of
contempt from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and
efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
and the circumstances of this case demand.
Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying
attendant circumstances, the aforementioned directives
particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA
are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that
can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the
Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga
City.
China National Machinery v. Santamaria
Facts: On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National
Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), represented
by its chairperson, RenHongbin, entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation
(Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for
the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line
from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM
Bank) and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU),
wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to
the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. 3
The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender,
while the Philippine government named the DOF as the
borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the
DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at
the rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the
Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him
of CNMEGs designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a
Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I
of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos
on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). 7 The contract
price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM
Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement Buyer
Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan
Agreement).In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to
extend Preferential Buyers Credit in the amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to
finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for

Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for
Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and
Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against
CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the National
Economic Development Authority and Northrail.The case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC Br. 145). In the
Complaint, respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement
and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a)
the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184),
otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act;
(c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order
denying CNMEGs Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for
summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs
prayed for should be issued.CNMEG then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,which was denied by the trial court in an
Order dated 10 March 2008.Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA
a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.
the
appellate
court
dismissed
the
Petition
for
Certiorari.Subsequently,
CNMEG
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration,which was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated 5 December 2008.
Petitioners Argument: Petitionerclaims that the EXIM Bank
extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank
was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of
any motivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from
the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely
commercial transaction.
Respondents Argument: respondents alleged that the
Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for
being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No.
9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445,
otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d)
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner CNMEG is an agent of the
sovereign Peoples Republic of China.
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an
executive agreement between two sovereign states.
Ruling: The instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China
National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled
to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an
executive agreement. CNMEGs prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot
and academic.
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in Holy See v. Rosario,to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity,
each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized
only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity
from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities (jure imperii).The mantle of state immunity cannot
be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis).
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive
theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in
United States of America v. Ruiz
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into
between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the
Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG.

Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification

of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions
of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the
entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the
parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as
commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the
Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wangs letter dated 1
October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the
desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of
a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course
of its business.

PCGG VS SB

CHAPTER 2

On 7 April 1986, in connection with criminal

proceedings initiated in the Philippines to locate,
sequester and seek restitution of alleged ill-gotten
wealth amassed by the Marcoses and other accused
from the Philippine Government, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the Federal Office for
Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting
assistance for the latter office to: (a) ascertain and
provide the OSG with information as to where and in
which cantons the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses
and other accused are located, the names of the
depositors and the banks and the amounts involved;
and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such
as sequestration, to freeze the assets in order to
preserve their existing value and prevent any further
transfer thereof (herein referred as the IMAC request).
On 29 May 1986, the Office of the District Attorney
in Zurich, pursuant to the OSGs request, issued an
Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze the
accounts of the accused in PCGG I.S. No. 1 and in the
List of Companies and Foundations. In compliance
with said Order, Bankers Trust A.G. (BTAG) of Zurich
froze the accounts of Officeco Holdings, N.V. (Officeco).
Officeco appealed the Order of the District Attorney
to the Attorney General of the Canton of Zurich. The
Attorney General affirmed the Order of the District
Attorney. Officeco further appealed to the Swiss
Federal Court which likewise dismissed the appeal on
31 May 1989.
Officeco made representations with the OSG and the
PCGG for them to officially advise the Swiss Federal
Office for Police Matters to unfreeze Officecos assets.
The PCGG required Officeco to present countervailing
evidence to support its request, but instead of
complying with the PCGG requirement for it to submit
countervailing evidence, Officeco filed the complaint
with the SB praying for the PCGG and the OSG to
officially advise the Swiss government to exclude from
the freeze or sequestration order the account of
Officeco with BTAG and to unconditionally release the
said account to Officeco.
A motion to dismiss was filed but it was denied
hence, a petition was brought to the SC claiming that
the civil action in effect seeks a judicial review of the
legality or illegality of the acts of the Swiss
government since the Sandiganbayan would inevitably

examine and review the freeze orders of Swiss officials

in resolving the case. This would be in violation of
the act of state doctrine which states that courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another in due deference to the
independence of sovereignty of every sovereign state.
Furthermore, if the Sandiganbayan allowed the
complaint to prosper, this would place the Philippine
government in an uncompromising position as it would
be constrained to take a position contrary to that
contained in the IMAC request. Is the contention
correct?
No. The parameters of the use of the act of state doctrine
were clarified in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398; 84 S. Ct. 923 (1964). There, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that international law does not require the application of
this doctrine nor does it forbid the application of the rule even
if it is claimed that the act of state in question violated
international law. moreover, due to the doctrines peculiar
nation-to-nation character, in practice the usual method for an
individual to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then
repair to the executive authorities of his own state to
persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before
an international tribunal.
Even assuming that international law requires the
application of the act of state doctrine, it bears stressing that
the Sandiganbayan will not examine and review the freeze
orders of the concerned Swiss officials in Civil Case No. 0164.
The Sandiganbayan will not require the Swiss officials to
submit to its adjudication nor will it settle a dispute involving
said officials. In fact, as prayed for in the complaint, the
Sandiganbayan will only review and examine the propriety of
maintaining PCGGs position with respect to Officecos
accounts with BTAG for the purpose of further determining the
propriety of issuing a writ against the PCGG and the OSG.
Everything considered, the act of state doctrine finds no
application in this case and petitioners resort to it is utterly
mislaid. (PCGG, et al. v. SB, et al., G.R. No. 124772, August 14,
2007, Tinga, J).
The classic American statement of the act of state doctrine,
which appears to have taken root in England as early as 1674
(Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct.
923 (1964), citing Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng.
Rep. 992), and began to emerge in American jurisprudence in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, is found in
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed.
456 (1897), where Chief Justice Fuller said for a unanimous
Court:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other state, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its territory,
redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves. (Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct.
923 (1964), citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1897)).
The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which
States prevent their national courts from deciding disputes
which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other

two being immunity and non-justiciability. (EVANS, M.D. (ED.),

International Law (First Edition), Oxford University Press, p.
357). It is an avoidance technique that is directly related to a
States obligation to respect the independence and equality of
other States by not requiring them to submit to adjudication in
a national court or to settlement of their disputes without
their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint
in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative or other
governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within
its territorial limits.
VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA,
HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,
CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.
NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM,
FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA
A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA
CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA
CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA,
LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.BUCO, PATRICIA A.
ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,
ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C.
MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S.
BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO,
CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA
B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M.
CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM,
CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas
Organization,
versus
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary
of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a nonstock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a)
declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to

espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the
Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for
former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the
Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against
Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of
foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should
be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this
region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which

authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally

committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a
general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time
has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion
to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests
of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on
that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further
steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects
and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for
the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may
exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on
whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international
law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are
available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining

redress. All these questions remain within the province of

municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not
shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators
of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states
as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as
a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to
norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory,
do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.