Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FILED
15-273
AUG 3 1 2015
No.
3Jn tbe
~upreme
~tates
QUESTION PRESENTED
Is summary judgement proper in a District Court
when a factual dispute exists in a Design Patent action
and the District Court substitutes its own opinion for
that of the ordinary observer?
Factual Disputes:
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), this court articulated the standard that a
District Court must consider evidence presented by the
non-moving party: "the evidence of the non-movant is
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor." Since, Anderson, and without
further guidance from this Court, lower courts have
reformulated the standard to allow summary judgment
when there is a genuine issue as to material fact. The
specific questions presented in this case:
11
lll
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v1
II.
III.
IV.
II.
III.
IV.
CONCLUSION ............................ 18
APPENDIX
Appendix A Judgment in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(June 5, 2015) ................ App. 1
Appendix B Order on Pending Motions in the
United States District Court,
Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division
(September 3, 2014) ........... App. 3
Appendix C U.S. Patent D 500,646 ........ App. 20
Appendix D Ordinary Observer Test Undertaken
by the Petitioner
[Fold-Out Exhibit] ........... App. 26
Appendix E 35 U.S.C. 171 .............. App. 27
35 U.S.C. 271 ............. App. 27
35 U.S.C. 289 ............. App. 35
Fed.R.Civ.P.56
........... App.36
VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................. passim
Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
975 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ........... 15, 16
Celotex v. Catrett,
4 77 U.S. 317 (1986) ................. 3, 10, 11
Crocs, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .............. 9
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,
543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......... 6, 9, 10
Fanimation, Inc. v. Dan's Fan City, Inc.,
Case No. 1:08-cv-1071-TWP-WGH, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 134526 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2010) .. 7
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire &
Rubber Co.,
162 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .......... 15, 16
Gorham Co. v. White,
81 U.S. 511 (1871) ................... passim
Kustom Signals, Inc. u. Applied Concepts, Inc.,
264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ........... 9, 11
LA Gear, Inc. v. Thom MeAn Shoe Co.,
988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ............. 17
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.,
597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........... 8, 11
Vll
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. amend. VII ................. 1, 17, 18
BLANK PAGE
OPINIONS BELOW
The non-precedential opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is not officially
reported, but is available at 2015 WL 3528264, and
reproduced in the Appendix hereto ("App.") at App. 1-2.
The opinion of the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana is not officially reported, but is
available at 2014 WL 4370691, and reproduced atApp.
3-19.
JURISDICTION
The judgment ofthe Federal Circuit was entered on
June 5, 2015. App. 1. The jurisdiction of this court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
3
The approach of the District Court contravenes with
this Court's express precedent in Gorham and abuses
the summary judgment standards established in
Anderson, 4 77 U.S. at 242, Celotex u. Catrett, 4 77 U.S.
317 (1986), and their progeny. Only this Court can
correct this clear departure from its binding precedent.
I.
THE PATENTS-IN-SUIT
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
INFRINGEMENT
AND
THE
I ell
.(I)
6
of material fact that should have precluded summary
judgment ofnon-infringement.
III.
'
Element
Descri,gtion
10
The District Court erroneously applied the ordinary
observer's test by (a) substituting its own observations
and opinion as a non-ordinary consumer for that of the
ordinary consumer in finding non-infringement, and
ignored the rules of evidence in (b) disregarding the
survey evidence (App. 26) of ordinary observer which
created a genuine issue of material fact which should
have precluded summary judgement.
IV.
THE DECISION
CIRCUIT
OF
THE
FEDERAL
11
12
These ordinary observers knew that the function could
be accomplished with different ornamentation and only
considered the ornamental features during their
observation. The survey evidence established that the
participants were deceived into believing that the
accused product was the same as the patented design.
The District Court is not free to disregard this
competent evidence offered by the Petitioner because
"the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, the District
Court did not consider Petitioner's survey evidence
during determination of a summary judgment for noninfringement, and did not even mention nor refer to
this evidence in its written decision.
The District Court agreed that there were certain
similarities between the two products:
It is true that there are certain similarities
between the two products, including the
cylindrical body of both tool handles with
extensions protruding from the front end of the
main body. In short, it is true as Plaintiff argues
that the patented design and the accused
product share certain general similarities, to
wit, they are both tool handles with unprotected
functional front and back ends that have
cylindrical main bodies with knurling located
somewhere on the handle. [App. 14].
13
similarity is a matter of fact to be determined by a
presentation of evidence to the trier of fact, in this
instance a jury, and not to be decided on summary
judgment, even before the close of discovery.
The District Court abused the established summary
judgment standard by entering summary judgement
without finding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact such that no reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the non-moving party. In determining
summary judgment of non-infringement, the District
Court should have inquired whether or not a
reasonable jury could conclude that ordinary
purchasers would find the designs to be substantially
the same. The proper way to make this inquiry was to
consider the evidence already before the Court (App.
26), deny summary judgement, allow discovery to be
completed and have the factual determination tried
before the jury.
The Federal Circuit by affirming the District
Court's decision maintained that District Courts are
not required to consider, even at the summary
judgment stage, competent evidence that validates
confusion amongst ordinary purchasers regarding the
patented and accused designs.
II.
14
15
Product appear visually similar. The Plaintiff provided
twenty eight instances of ordinary observers confused
or "deceived" by observation into thinking that the
accused device was depicted in the design patent
drawings. The Respondents did not refute this
evidence. The Respondents did not present any survey
or other evidence from any ordinary observers. The
District Court did not address this evidence in its
decision.
III.
A JUDGE IS
OBSERVER
NOT
AN
ORDINARY
16
purchasers and users of the tires that incorporated the
patented design. In Braun, the Federal Circuit held the
ordinary observer to be a member of the general public
or an ordinary juror. In departing from the standards
set forth in Gorham and applied in Goodyear, and
Braun the Federal Circuit, in affirming the decision of
the District Court here, has shifted the infringement
inquiry away from the ordinary observers.
The methodology wherein a District Court can
conduct design patent infringement analysis from their
own personal points of view, and not through the eyes
of ordinary observers, as Gorham mandates, IS
substantively and procedurally flawed.
IV.
17
functions, not those of a judge. Anderson, 4 77 U.S. at
242,255. Under Rule 56( c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, "the judge's function at the summary
judgment stage is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter, but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."
Instead the District Court, acting as a fact finder,
wrongly made its own finding of non-infringement. The
District Court should not have decided the issue as a
fact finder.
Design patent infringement is a question of fact,
which a patentee must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence. LA Gear, Inc. v. Thom MeAn Shoe Co., 988
F.2d 1117, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Anderson
standard should apply equally to Petitioner because the
Petitioner presented survey evidence that
demonstrated disputes with regard to material facts.
The disputed material facts are genuine and must be
heard by a jury to determine the verdict of
infringement. Petitioners right to secure a jury trial for
an issue which belongs to the jury was denied by the
improper entry of summary determination. The
Federal Circuit's affirmance is a denial of Petitioner's
constitutional right to a jury trial.
This Court should grant certiorari to decide whether
in a design patent infringement action, where a jury is
timely demanded, the Seventh Amendment permits
judges to resolve, as a matter oflaw, a genuine factual
dispute regarding design patent infringement. In
affirming the District Court's finding of no
infringement, the Federal Circuit ignored the
precedent of this Court, its own binding precedent and
18
more importantly, the right to a jury trial provided by
the Seventh Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully
requests that the Court grant this Petition for A Writ
of Certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH J. ZITO
Counsel of Record
DNL ZITO
1250 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036
202-466-3500
jzi to@dnlzito.com
PATRICK R. DELANEY
DITTHAVONG & STEINER, P.C.
44 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 322
Alexandria, VA 22314
703-822-7140
pdelaney@dcpa ten t.com
Counsel for Petitioner