1.

Pre-Employment Policy
Labor Code
ARTICLE 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote
full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work.
ARTICLE 12. Statement of objectives. It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower training,
allocation and utilization;
b) To protect every citizen desiring to work locally or overseas by securing for him the best
possible terms and conditions of employment;
c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity with
the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or
work permit system;
f) To strengthen the network of public employment offices and rationalize the participation of the
private sector in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, to serve
national development objectives;
g) To insure careful selection of Filipino workers for overseas employment in order to protect the
good name of the Philippines abroad.
Constitution
Article II, Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and
an improved quality of life for all.
Article XIII, Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
RA 8042
SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICIES
(a) In the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and while considering national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-determination paramount in its relations
with other states, the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country
or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.
(b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal
services to Filipino migrant workers.

(c) While recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers to the national
economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not promote overseas
employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development. The
existence of the overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity
and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be
compromised or violated. The State, therefore, shall continuously create local employment
opportunities and promote the equitable distribution of wealth and the benefits of development.
(d) The State affirms the fundamental equality before the law of women and men and the
significant role of women in nation-building. Recognizing the contribution of overseas migrant
women workers and their particular vulnerabilities, the State shall apply gender sensitive criteria
in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs affecting migrant workers and
the composition of bodies tasked for the welfare of migrant workers.
(e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any persons by reason of poverty. In this regard, it is imperative that an effective
mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos,
in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are
adequately protected and safeguarded.
(f) The right of Filipino migrant workers and all overseas Filipinos to participate in the democratic
decision-making processes of the State and to be represented in institutions relevant to
overseas employment is recognized and guaranteed.
(g) The State recognizes that the ultimate protection to all migrant workers is the possession of
skills. Pursuant to this and as soon as practicable, the government shall deploy and/or allow the
deployment only to skilled Filipino workers.
(h) Non-governmental organizations, duly recognized as legitimate, are partners of the State in
the protection of Filipino migrant workers and in the promotion of their welfare, the State shall
cooperate with them in a spirit of trust and mutual respect.
(I) Government fees and other administrative costs of recruitment, introduction, placement and
assistance to migrant workers shall be rendered free without prejudice to the provision of
Section 36 hereof.
Nonetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or seabased by
local service contractors and manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged. Appropriate
incentives may be extended to them.
SEC. 4. Deployment of Migrant Workers - The State shall deploy overseas Filipino workers
only in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. The government
recognizes any of the following as guarantee on the part of the receiving country for the
protection and the rights of overseas Filipino workers:
(a) It has existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of migrant workers;
(b) It is a signatory to multilateral conventions, declaration or resolutions relating to the
protection of migrant workers;
(c) It has concluded a bilateral agreement or arrangement with the government protecting the
rights of overseas Filipino workers; and
(d) It is taking positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant workers.
Sec. 5. Termination or Ban on Deployment - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4
hereof, the government, in pursuit of the national interest or when public welfare so requires,
may, at any time, terminate or impose a ban on the deployment of migrant workers.

2. Private Sector Agencies and Entities

a. Parties
1. Worker
(a) Worker means any member of the labor force, whether employed or unemployed.
(a) "Migrant worker" refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been
engaged in a renumerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident to
be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.
2. Private Employment Agency
(c) Private fee-charging employment agency means any person or entity engaged in
recruitment and placement of workers for a fee which is charged, directly or indirectly,
from the workers or employers or both.
(d) License means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a
person or entity to operate a private employment agency.
3. Private Recruitment Agency
(e) Private recruitment entity means any person or association engaged in the
recruitment and placement of workers, locally or overseas, without charging, directly or
indirectly, any fee from the workers or employers.
(f) Authority means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a
person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private
recruitment entity.
b. Recruitment and Placement
1. Local Employment
Art. 13(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
2. Overseas Employment
c. Allowed and Protected Entities
1. Allowed Private Agencies and Entities
ARTICLE 16. Private recruitment. Except as provided in Chapter II of this Title, no
person or entity other than the public employment offices, shall engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers.
ARTICLE 25. Private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of
workers. Pursuant to national development objectives and in order to harness and
maximize the use of private sector resources and initiative in the development and
implementation of a comprehensive employment program, the private employment
sector shall participate in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and
overseas, under such guidelines, rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of Labor.
3

ARTICLE 18. Ban on direct-hiring. No employer may hire a Filipino worker for
overseas employment except through the Boards and entities authorized by the
Secretary of Labor. Direct-hiring by members of the diplomatic corps, international
organizations and such other employers as may be allowed by the Secretary of Labor is
exempted from this provision.
Article 12(f) To strengthen the network of public employment offices and rationalize the
participation of the private sector in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally
and overseas, to serve national development objectives;
2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, Part I, Rule 2, Section 1. Accreditation shall
refer to the grant of authority to a foreign principal to recruit and hire Filipino workers
through a licensed agency for overseas employment.
2. Prohibited Business Agencies and Entities
ARTICLE 26. Travel agencies prohibited to recruit. Travel agencies and sales
agencies of airline companies are prohibited from engaging in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment whether for profit or not.
2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, Part I, Rule 2, Section 2. Administration shall
refer to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

Hornales v NLRC
G.R. No. 118943; Sept. 10, 2001; Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS
Mario Hornales, together with other Filipinos, were sent to Singapore by JEAC
International Management & Contractor Services. Upon arrival, they were met the owner
of Step-Up Employment Agency Victor Lim, and were told that there would be working
as fishermen.
On board the vessel, Hornales and the others were subjected to inhuman working
conditions, such as inadequate supply of food and water, maltreatment by the captain,
and lack of medical attendance. They were also required to work for 22 hours a day
without pay. Unable to bear the situation, Hornales and some other Filipinos left the
vessel while it was docked at Mauritius Islands.
Upon return to the Philippines, Hornales asked JEAC to pay his salaries. In turn, JEAC
required him to surrender his passport promising that they would procure another job for
him, and later gave him P500.
Hornales filed with POEA a complaint for non-payment of wages and recovery of
damages against JEAC, its owner Canayan, and Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation, its surety.
JEAC-Canayans defense: Hornales, Lim, and Min Fee Fishery Ltd are total strangers
to them. This was supported by a
(1) Joint Affidavit of Hornales co-workers in Singapore, stating that Hornales
admitted to them that he didnt apply to any agency , that he went to Singapore
as a tourist, and that he applied directly to Step-Up Agency; and by a
(2) Certification from Step-Up Agency corroborating the statements in the Joint
Affidavit.
Supplemental Affidavit of Hornales:
(1) He claimed he knew Canayan since 1990.
(2) While the vessel was docked at Mauritius Islands, Canayan reminded him of
his loan obligations by sending him photocopies of the PNB checks Canayan
issued in his favour.
(3) Canayan also sent him agreements whereby Victor Lim was authorized to
deduct from his salary the amount of his loan obligations.
POEA in favour of Hornales
NLRC dimissed complaint; no employee-employer relationship
4

o
o
o

gave considerable weight to the Joint Affidavit

Since POEA noted that JEAC is a service contractor not authorized to deploy
fishermen, JEAC, could not have deployed Hornales as an overseas contract
worker.
What is apparent is that Hornales obtained a tourist passport and plane ticket
from JEAC as a travel agent on a clearly fly now pay later plan (Note: If you
didnt read the case in the original, it didnt really say kung saang lupalop ng
NLRC napulot yang pananaw na yan.)

ISSUE/RULING:
WON JEAC and Canayan were responsible for Hornales recruitment and deployment to
Singapore?
YES. NLRC Decision Set Aside. POEA Decision Reinstated.
RATIO:
The Court started by examining each piece of evidence to arrive at its conclusion.
o Joint Affidavit It has no probative value because Hornales wasnt able to crossexamine it and affiants merely swore as to what Hornales told them, but not as to the
truth of the statements.
o Certification It was not sworn, and seemed like a last ditch-effort of Step-Up to help
JEAC.
o PNB Checks and agreements These strongly disprove Canayans total strangers
theory and revealed a contract of agency.
The factual and legal bases of NLRCs conclusions are bereft of substantial evidence
the quantum of proof in labor cases.
o There is nothing on record which shows that JEAC is a mere travel agency.
Even Canayan consistently plead that JEAC is a licensed recruitment agency
authorized to recruit and deploy Filipino contract workers.
o NLRC conveniently closed its eyes to the name of Victor Lim, as mentioned in
the agreements, when it ruled that Lim and Ste-Up are indeed total strangers to
JEAC and Canayan.
POEAs decision was more convincing and supported by substantial evidence:
o The PNB checks representing salaries from the account of Canayan evidences
latters participation in Hornales recruitment and deployment.
o Based from the agreements, the Court wonders where Canayan got the name of
Step-Up if the same is not known to him.
o It is very unlikely for Hornales to go to Singapore as a tourist and then land a job
without knowing anyone.
JEAC and Canayans last argument was that, they cant be held liable because there
was no employment contract between him and and Step-Up Agency had been approved
by POEA. They also claim that the absence of a (1) Special Power of Attorney and (2)
Affidavit of Responsibility, as required by the POEA Rules and Regulations only proves
that they did not employ Hornales to Singapore.
To this, the Court said that the acts can be used as a basis of absolving JEAC and
Canayan. At most, theses act of deploying Hornales to Singapore without complying with
the POEA requirements only made them susceptible to cancellation of suspension of
license as provided by the POEA Rules and Regulations. But of course, such violations
should be threshed out in a proper administrative proceeding.
RE JEACs surety: Its liability is also founded on the POEA Rules and Regulations. Cash
and surety bonds are required precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective
recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants or workers claims, as
well as for all valid and legal claims arising from labor violations.
d. Government Techniques of Regulation Private Recruitment
1. Licensing
a) Qualifications
5

ARTICLE 27. Citizenship requirement. Only Filipino citizens or corporations,

partnerships or entities at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the authorized and voting
capital stock of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens shall be permitted to
participate in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally or overseas.
ARTICLE 28. Capitalization. All applicants for authority to hire or renewal of license to
recruit are required to have such substantial capitalization as determined by the
Secretary of Labor.
Section 1. Qualifications. Only those who possess the following qualifications may be
permitted to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of Filipino workers:
a. Filipino citizens, partnerships or corporations at least seventy five percent (75%) of
the authorized capital stock of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens;
b. A minimum capitalization of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in case of a single
proprietorship or partnership and a minimum paid-up capital of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) in case of a corporation; Provided that those with existing licenses shall,
within four years from effectivity hereof, increase their capitalization or paid up capital, as
the case may be, to Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) every
year.
b) Issuance of a license

ARTICLE 29. Non-transferability of license or authority. No license or authority

shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was
issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority be transferred,
conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business address,
appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of
additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of
Labor.
ARTICLE 30. Registration fees. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule
of fees for the registration of all applicants for license or authority.
ARTICLE 31. Bonds. All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and
surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with
prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of
employment as may be appropriate.
Section 4. Payment of Fees and Posting of Bonds. Upon approval of the application,
the applicant shall pay a license fee of P50,000.00. It shall submit an Escrow Agreement
in the amount of P1,000,000.00, confirmation of escrow deposit with an accredited
reputable bank and a surety bond of P100,000.00 from a bonding company acceptable
to the Administration and accredited with the Insurance Commission. Agencies with
existing licenses shall, within four years from effectivity hereof, increase their Escrow
Deposit to One Million Pesos. The bonds and escrow shall answer for all valid and legal
claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds and escrow shall likewise
guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and
regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and
relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may
impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that notice to the principal is notice
to the surety and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters
falling under POEAs/NLRCs jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety.
The surety bonds shall cover the validity period of the license.

Section 5. Provisional License. Applicants for new license shall be issued a provisional
license which shall be valid for a limited period of one (1) year within which the applicant
should be able to comply with its undertaking to deploy 100 workers to its new principal.
The license of a complying agency shall be upgraded to a full license entitling them to
another three years of operation. Non-complying agencies will be notified of the
expiration of their license.
Section 6. Validity of the License. Except in case of a provisional license, every
license shall be valid for four (4) years from the date of issuance unless sooner
cancelled, revoked or suspended for violation of applicable Philippine law, these rules
and other pertinent issuances. Such license shall be valid only at the place/s stated
therein and when used by the licensed person, partnership or corporation.
Section 7. Non-Transferability of License. No license shall be transferred, conveyed
or assigned to any person, partnership or corporation. It shall not be used directly or
indirectly by any person, partnership or corporation other than the one in whose favor it
was issued.
In case of death of the sole proprietor and to prevent disruption of operation to the
prejudice of the interest of legitimate heirs, the license may be extended upon request of
the heirs, to continue only for the purpose of winding up business operations.
Section 8. Change of Ownership/Relationship of Single Proprietorship or
Partnership. Transfer or change of ownership of a single proprietorship licensed
to engage in overseas employment shall cause the automatic revocation of the
license. A change in the relationship of the partners in a partnership duly licensed to
engage in overseas employment which materially interrupts the course of the business
or results in the actual dissolution of the partnership shall likewise cause the automatic
revocation of the license.
Section 9. Upgrading of Single Proprietorship or Partnerships. License holders
which are single proprietorships or partnerships may, subject to the guidelines of the
Administration, convert into corporation for purposes of upgrading or raising their
capabilities to respond adequately to developments/changes in the international labor
market and to enable them to better comply with their responsibilities arising from the
recruitment and deployment of workers overseas. The approval of merger, consolidation
or upgrading shall automatically revoke or cancel the licenses of the single
proprietorships, partnerships or corporations so merged, consolidated or upgraded.
2. Workers Fees
ARTICLE 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a
private fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall
not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts
or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered
with the appropriate receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary
of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees.
3. Reports/Employment Information
ARTICLE 33. Reports on employment status. Whenever the public
interest requires, the Secretary of Labor may direct all persons or entities
within the coverage of this Title to submit a report on the status of
employment, including job vacancies, details of job requisitions, separation
from jobs, wages, other terms and conditions and other employment data.
ARTICLE 14(d) To require any person, establishment, organization or
institution to submit such employment information as may be prescribed by
the Secretary of Labor.

4. Illegal Recruitment
ARTICLE 34. Prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker
pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to
recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under this Code.
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him to another unless the transfer is designed to liberate the worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or to attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker
who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health
or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor or by his duly
authorized representatives;
(h) To fail to file reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of
foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor.
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department
of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the
periods of expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor;
(j) To become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel
agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency; and
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under this Code and its
implementing rules and regulations.

ARTICLE 38. Illegal recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code. The Department of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three

(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
(c) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Secretary shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and
the closure of companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so.
RA 8042, Section 7. Non-Transferability of License. No license shall be transferred,
conveyed or assigned to any person, partnership or corporation. It shall not be used
directly or indirectly by any person, partnership or corporation other than the one in
whose favor it was issued. In case of death of the sole proprietor and to prevent
disruption of operation to the prejudice of the interest of legitimate heirs, the license may
be extended upon request of the heirs, to continue only
for the purpose of winding up business operations.
Section 8. Change of Ownership/Relationship of Single Proprietorship or
Partnership. Transfer or change of ownership of a single proprietorship licensed to
engage in overseas employment shall cause the automatic revocation of the license. A
change in the relationship of the partners in a partnership duly licensed to engage in
overseas employment which materially interrupts the course of the business or results in
the actual dissolution of the partnership shall likewise cause the automatic revocation of
the license.
Section 9. UPGRADING OF SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP OR PARTNERSHIPS.
License holders which are single proprietorships or partnerships may, subject to the
guidelines of the Administration, convert into corporation for purposes of upgrading or
raising their capabilities to respond adequately to developments/changes in the
international labor market and to enable them to better comply with their responsibilities
arising from the recruitment and deployment of workers overseas. The approval of
merger, consolidation or upgrading shall automatically revoke or cancel the licenses of
the single proprietorships, partnerships or corporations so merged, consolidated or
upgraded.
SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent
for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency,
as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment
contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made
locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive
of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of
the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Non-compliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of cases provided under this
section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolutions within
the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or (c) Dismissal from the service with
disqualifications to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years. Provided, however,
that the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any
such official may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph.
SEC. 11. MANADATORY PERIODS FOR RESOLUTION OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
CASES. - The preliminary investigations of cases under this Act shall be terminated
within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of their filing. Where the
preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecution officer and a prima facie case is
established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24)
hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is
conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist, prosecution officer within
forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.
SEC. 12. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS. - Illegal recruitment cases under this Act shall
prescribe in five (5) years: Provided, however, That illegal recruitment cases involving
economic sabotage as defined herein shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.

b) Undertaken by non-licensees, non-holders

ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSE DUJUA, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 149014-16. February 5, 2004
Facts: Ramon Dujua, his mother Rose, his aunt, Editha Singh, and his uncle, Guillermo
Samson were charged with illegal recruitment in large scale. Only Ramon was arrested.
Four testified against Ramon Dujua. All of them were promised work abroad upon
payment of fees but they were not actually deployed. Ramon pleaded not guilty and
denied the allegations that he was a recruiter.
Issue: Whether or not illegal recruitment in large scale was committed by Raon Dujua, et
al.
Held: The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: 1) The
accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article
13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2) the accused
has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers either locally or overseas; and 3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against
three or more persons individually or as a group.

10

All three elements were established beyond reasonable doubt.

First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses satisfactorily proved that Dujua
promised them employment and assured them of placement overseas. All of them
identified Dujua as the person who recruited them for employment abroad. As against
the positive and categorical testimonies of the three complainants, Dujuas mere denials
cannot prevail. As long as the prosecution is able to establishthrough credible testimonial
evidence that Dujua has engaged in illegal recruitment , a conviction for the offense can
very well be justified.
Second, Dujua did not have any license or authority to recruit persons for overseas
work, as shown by the Certification issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer, World
Pack Travel and Tours, possess such license or authority.
Third, it has been alleged and proven that Dujua undertook the recruitment of more than
three persons.
People vs Domingo
On appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision 1[1] dated
September 28, 2007 affirming the Joint Decision 2[2] dated October 19, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11 which convicted Larry
Domingo (appellant) of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) in Criminal Case No. 1224-M2001 and Estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 1243-M-2001 and 1246-M-2001, and acquitting
him in Criminal Case Nos. 1225-M-2001 to 1242-M-2001 and 1244-M-2001, 1245-M2001 and 1247-M-2001, also for Estafa.
The Information3[3] in Criminal Case No. 1224-M-2001 reads:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Larry Lauro Domingo y
Cruz of the crime of illegal recruitment, defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 38 in relation to Articles 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by presidential Decree Nos. 1920 and 2018, committed
as follows:
That in or about the month of November 1999 to January 20, 2000, in the
Municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and/or place workers under local or overseas employment,
did then and there willfully and feloniously, with false pretenses, undertake illegal
recruitment, placement or deployment of Wilson A. Manzo, Florentino M. Ondra,
Feliciano S. del Rosario, Leo J. Cruz, Norberto S. Surio, Genaro B. Rodriguez,
Mariano Aguilar, Dionisio Aguilar, Mario J. Sorel, Marcial Boy A. dela Cruz,
Edgardo P. Jumaquio, Midel Clara Buensuceso, Remigio S. Carreon, Jr., Romeo
Manasala, Magno D. Balatbat, Jose Armen F. Sunga, Rogelio M. Cambay, Junior
Balisbis, Ma. Leah Vivas, Simeon S. Cabigao, Edcil P. Mariano, Juanito C.
Bartolome, Angelito R. Acevedo, Godofredo P. Samson, Eugenio del Rosario y
Tolentino, William B. Bautista, Rodolfo M. Marcelino, Roberto B. Bohol, Felipe H.
Cunanan, Carlos P. Dechavez, Carlos J. Cruz, Reynaldo C. Chico, Renato D.
Jumaquio, Narciso F. Sunga, Enrico R. Espiritu, Leonardo C. Sunga, Jr., and
Iglecerio H. Perez. This offense involved economic sabotage, as it was
committed in large scale.
Contrary to law. (Underscoring supplied)

1
2
3
11

The Informations4[4] for 23 counts of Estafa, all of which were similarly worded but
varying with respect to the name of each complainant and the amount which each
purportedly gave to appellant, read:
That in or about the month of November, 1999 to January, 2000, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one [Wilson A. Manzo]
by then and there falsely representing that he has the power and capacity to
recruit and employ persons in Saipan and could facilitate the necessary papers in
connection therewith if given the necessary amount, and by means of deceit of
similar import, when in truth and in fact, as the accused knew fully well his
representation was false and fraudulent and designed to inveigle [Wilson A.
Manzo] to give, as in fact the latter gave and delivered the amount of
[P14,000.00] to him, which the accused misappropriated to himself, to the
damage and prejudice of Wilson A. Manzo in the said amount of [P14,000.00].
Contrary to law.
Of the 23 complainants, only five testified, namely: Rogelio Cambay, Florentino Ondra,
Dionisio Aguilar, Ma. Leah Vivas, and Simeon Cabigao. The substance of their
respective testimonies follows:
Rogelio Cambay: Appellant recruited him for a painting job in Marianas Island for which
he paid him the amount of P15,000 in two installments P2,500 during his medical
examination at Newton Clinic in Makati City, and the balance of P12,500 before the
scheduled departure on January 25, 2000.
On his scheduled departure, appellant did not show up at their meeting place in Malolos,
Bulacan, hence, the around one hundred people who waited for him organized a search
party to look for him in Zambales. Appellant was arrested on February 25, 2000 at the
Balintawak tollgate.
A verification5[5] with the Department of Labor and Employment showed that appellant
was not a licensed recruiter.
Florentino Ondra: He was recruited by appellant for employment as laborer in Saipan,
for which he gave P14,700 representing expenses for passporting, NBI clearance, and
medical examination.
Dionisio Aguilar: In September, 1999, he met appellant thru a friend whereupon he was
interviewed, tested for a hotel job, and scheduled for medical examination. He gave
P30,000 to appellant inside the latters car on November, 1999 after his medical
examination. While he was twice scheduled for departure, it did not materialize.
Ma. Leah Vivas: After meeting appellant thru Eddie Simbayan on October 19, 1999, she
applied for a job as a domestic helper in Saipan, for which she paid appellant P10,000,
but like the other complainants, she was never deployed.
Simeon Cabigao: He was recruited by appellant in September, 1999 for employment as
carpenter in Saipan with a guaranteed salary of $375 per month. For the promised
employment, he paid appellant P3,000 for medical fee, and an additional P9,000,
supposedly to bribe the examining physician because, per information of appellant he
(Cabigao) was found to have an ailment. He was scheduled for departure on February
23, 2000, but the same never took place.
He was among those who looked for appellant in Zambales.
4
5
12

Private complainant Cabigao later recanted this testimony, per his affidavit 6[6] dated
March 3, 2003. Testifying anew, this time for the defense, he averred that the one who
actually recruited him and his co-complainants and received their money was Danilo
Gimeno (Gimeno), and that they only agreed among themselves to file a case against
appellant because Gimeno was nowhere to be found.
Appellant, denying all the accusations against him, claimed as follows: He was a driver
hired by the real recruiter, Gimeno, whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for
Manila in September, 2000. It was Gimeno who undertakes recruitment activities in
Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan at the residence of Eddie Simbayan, and that the other cases
for illegal recruitment filed against him before other courts have all been dismissed.
Appellant likewise presented as witnesses private complainants Enrico Espiritu and
Roberto Castillo who corroborated his claim that it was Gimeno who actually recruited
them, and that the filing of the complaint against appellant was a desperate attempt on
their part to get even because Gimeno could not be located.
By Joint Decision dated October 19, 2004, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illega
l Recruitment (Large Scale) and of 2 counts of Estafa, viz:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal case No. 1224-M-2001, for Illegal Recruitment
(Large Scale), this Court finds the accused LARRY DOMINGO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Article 38(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, in
relation to Article 13 (b) and 34 of the same Code (Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
pay a fine of P100,000.00.
Accused is further ordered to pay the following complainants the amounts
opposite their names as actual or compensatory damages, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Rogelio Cambay P15,000.00

Dionisio Aguilar P30,000.00
Florentino Ondra P14,700.00
Ma. Lea Vivas P10,000.00

In Criminal Case No. 1243-M-2001 for Estafa, this Court finds the accused
LARRY DOMINGO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a prison term
ranging from Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision
correcional as minimum up to Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 1246-M-2001 for Estafa, this Court finds the
accused LARRY DOMINGO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under
Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a
prison term ranging from Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and eleven (11)
Days of prision correcional as minimum up to Nine (9) Years of prision mayor as
maximum.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 1225-M-2001 to 1242-M-2001 and 1244-M-2001,
1245-M-2001 and 1247-M-2001, accused is hereby ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, appellant maintained that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, no receipts to show that he actually received money
from private complainant having been submitted in evidence. And he faulted the trial court for
failing to give weight to Cabigaos retraction.
6
13

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision by the challenged Decision dated
September 28, 2007, holding that the straightforward and consistent testimonies of the
complaining witnesses sufficiently supported the trial courts conclusion that appellant undertook
recruitment activities beginning September up to December 1999 in Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan
without the license therefor, and failed to deploy those he recruited.
Respecting the non-presentation of receipts of payment to appellant in consideration of
the promised jobs, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling that the same had no
bearing on his culpability in light of the categorical assertions of the complaining witnesses that
appellant was the one who recruited them.
As for Cabigaos recantation, the appellate court found it immaterial as was the other
complainants failure to prosecute their claims. The appellate court held that the mere retraction
by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate his original testimony and that, in any
event, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that at least three were illegally
recruited by the accused Cambay, Ondra, Aguilar and Ma. Leah.
As for the estafa cases, the appellate court held that the elements constituting the crime,
as penalized under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, were sufficiently
established, viz: Appellant deceived the complainants by assuring them of employment abroad
provided that they submit certain documents and pay the required placement fee; complainants
paid appellant the amount he asked on account of appellants representations which turned out
to be false; and complainants suffered damages when appellant failed to return the amounts
they paid and the papers they submitted, despite demand.
Hence, the present appeal, appellant raising the same contentions as those he raised in
the appellate court.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The term recruitment and placement is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of
the Philippines as follows:
(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, under
which the accused stands charged, provides:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under
this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme
defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group. (Emphasis supplied)
14

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken
by non-licensee or non-holder of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution must prove three essential
elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or
any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he/she did not have the license
or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) he/she
committed the prohibited practice against three or more persons individually or as a group.7[7]
The Court finds that the prosecution ably discharged its onus of proving the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of appellant of the crimes charged.
That no receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the
promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of liability. For even if at the time
appellant was promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still considered as having
been engaged in recruitment activities, since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act
of recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or offered employment
for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.
That one of the original complaining witnesses, Cabigao, later recanted, via an affidavit
and his testimony in open court, does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any
other testimony, the same is subject to the test of credibility and should be received with
caution.8[8] For a testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by
a mere affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time. In the case at bar, the Affidavit of
Recantation was executed three years after the complaint was filed. It is thus not unreasonable
to consider his retraction an afterthought to deny its probative value.9[9]
AT ALL EVENTS, and even with Cabigaos recantation, the Court finds that the
prosecution evidence consisting of the testimonies of the four other complainants, whose
credibility has not been impaired, has not been overcome.
As to the conviction of appellant for two counts of estafa, it is well established that a
person may be charged and convicted of both illegal recruitment and estafa. People v. Comila,10
[10] enlightens:
x x x The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such
an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant, who did not have the authority or license to recruit and deploy,
misrepresented to the complaining witnesses that he had the capacity to send them abroad for
employment. This misrepresentation, which induced the complaining witnesses to part off with
their money for placement and medical fees, constitutes estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
7
8
9
10
15

People vs Gallo
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 11[1] dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Gallo
y Gadot (accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta y Dungo (accused),
which affirmed the Decision12[2] dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 30 in Manila which convicted the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accusedappellant) of syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in
Criminal Case No. 02-206297.
The Facts
Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (Pacardo) and Pilar
Manta (Manta), together with Mardeolyn Martir (Mardeolyn) and nine (9) others, were charged
with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against
eighteen complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza (Dela Caza), Sandy Guantero
(Guantero) and Danilo Sare (Sare). The cases were respectively docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 02-2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02206293, which was filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated
illegal recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were
filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due to
the fact that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case
Nos. 02-206294 to 02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02206309 to 02-206311 were likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and
accused-appellant for failure of the respective complainants in said cases to appear and testify
during trial.
It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence.
Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the
case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-appellant
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297,
both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively.
Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for syndicated
illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02206297.
In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant,
together with the others, as follows:
The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA,
NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON
MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES PACARDO y
JUNGCO, RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR
PANUNCIO and YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of
Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a syndicate and in large scale, as
follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between November
2000 and December, 2001, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V.
DELA CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V.
HUFALAR, ELENA JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR, ROGELIO S.
11
12
16

MORON, FEDILA G. NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN,

DANILO SARE, MARY BETH SARDON, JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO
in Korea as factory workers and charge or accept directly or indirectly from said
FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE BRENDO
P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA
P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO
P35,000.00; RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO P30,000.00;
LUPO A. MANALO P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO S.
MORON P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ
P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN P75,000.00; DANILO SARE P100,000.00;
MARY BETH SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO P35,000.00; and
JOEL TINIO P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their overseas
employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02,
Series 1998, and without valid reasons and without the fault of the said
complainants failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses
incurred by the said complainants in connection with their documentation and
processing for purposes of their deployment.13[3] (Emphasis supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:
That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with [sic] one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to
the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the
effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V.
DELA CAZA to give and deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said accused
the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue
and were made [solely] for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the
said amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to
defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of
P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00,
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14[4]
When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not
guilty to all charges.
On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines Roa, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) representative and private
complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense presented as its
witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.
Version of the Prosecution
On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant
Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national
at the office of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency (MPM Agency) located in
Malate, Manila.
Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar
Martir was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir
and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and
accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys employee who was in charge of the records of
the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked to deliver
documents to the Korean embassy.
13
14
17

Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and

informed Dela Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with
Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP
45,000) and the balance to be paid through salary deduction.
Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the
processing of their application papers for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and their
possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and what to
expect from the company and the salary.
With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well
as the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for
the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001,
he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant
Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official
Receipt No. 401.
Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in
Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street,
Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the agency was
renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (New Filipino). At the new
office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant Gallo.
He was informed that the transfer was done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose
of changing the name of the agency.
Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but
Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On
the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money.
After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other
applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again
moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Seeres and the
Western Police District, they were able to locate the new address at 500 Prudential Building,
Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are
applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo,
together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested.
The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was
dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of the
following documents:
1.
Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the
POEA to the effect that New Filipino Manpower Development & Services,
Inc., with office address at 1256 Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City,
was a licensed landbased agency whose license expired on December 10,
2001 and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on December 14,
2001. It further certified that Fides J. Pacardo was the agencys Recruitment
Officer;
2.
Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect that MPM
International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment;
3.
Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999
regarding placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.
4.
Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on
the placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets, and
5.
Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.
Version of the Defense
For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela
Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a
factory worker. According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because she
was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as
processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform
some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants,
running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for
some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agencys office when
he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never
materialized.
Ruling of the Trial Court
18

On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated
illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I.
Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y
DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02206308;
II.
Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also
ordered to indemnify EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of
FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal
interest from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002
until fully paid.
III.
Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No.
02-206297 is likewise found guilty and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years of prision
correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
IV.
Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206300 and 02206308.
Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all
the criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.
The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is
hereby ordered unless detained for other lawful cause or charge.
SO ORDERED.15[5]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated
March 15, 2007, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case
No. 02-206297, for estafa, appellant is sentenced to four (4) years of prision
correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.16[6]
The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that the accusedappellant, together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and
representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy.
As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage
having been committed by more than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo,
Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal found guilty of
illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa.17[7] The same evidence proving accusedappellants commission of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his
liability for estafa under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.
The Issues
Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.
II
15
16
17
19

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of estafa
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Evidence supports conviction of the crime
of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment
because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that
the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed
an employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence. According to him,
even assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans
evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.
We disagree.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the
offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor
Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; 18[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.19[9] When
illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving
economic sabotage.20[10]
Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not.
After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to
establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency
was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6
of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, viz:
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code
of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than
that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection
with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
18
19
20
20

deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault.
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.
In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A.
8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of
a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00
from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys
purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected
money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.21[11] Such acts were accurately described in the testimony of prosecution witness,
Dela Caza, to wit:
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q:
How about this Rodolfo Gallo?
A:
He was the one who received my money.
Q:
Aside from receiving your money, was there any other
representations or acts made by Rodolfo Gallo?
A:
He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and
he even intimated to me that their agency has sent so many
workers abroad.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q:
Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application
at the agency. Was there any instance that you were able to talk to
Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo Gallo and Pilar Manta?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
What was the conversation that transpired among you before you
demanded the return of your money and documents?
A:
When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr.
Gallo told me I know nothing about your money while Pilar Manta
and Fides Pacardo told me, why should I withdraw my application
and my money when I was about to be [deployed] or I was about
to leave.
xxxx
Q:
And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced
you to those persons whom you just mentioned?
A:
The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the
placement fee in that agency is Php 150,000.00 and then I should
deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have deposited said
amount, I would just wait for few days
xxxx
Q:
They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php
45,000.00 for deposit only?
A:
Yes, maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and then
I would pay the remaining balance of Php105,000.00, payment of
it would be through salary deduction.
Q:
That is for what Mr. Witness again?
A:
For placement fee.
Q:
Now did you believe to (sic) them?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
Why, why did you believe?
A:
Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they
keep on telling me that they have sent abroad several workers

21
21

and they even showed visas of the records that they have already
deployed abroad.
Q:
Aside from that, was there any other representations which have
been made upon you or make you believe that they can deploy
you?
A:
At first I was adamant but they told me If you do not want to
believe us, then we could do nothing. But once they showed me
the [visas] of the people whom they have deployed abroad, that
was the time I believe them.
Q:
So after believing on the representations, what did you do next Mr.
Witness?
A:
That was the time that I decided to give the money.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q:
Do you have proof that you gave the money?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
Where is your proof that you gave the money?
A:
I have it here.
PROS. MAGABLIN:
Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in the
amount of Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record Your Honor, may I
request that the same be marked in the evidence as our Exhibit F.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q:
There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion of
this receipt. Do you know whose signature is this?
A:
Yes, maam, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q:
Why do you say that that is his signature?
A:
Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one
who received the money and he was the one who filled up this
O.R. and while he was doing it, he was flanked by Fides Pacardo,
Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.
xxxx
Q:
So it was Gallo who received your money?
A:
Yes, maam.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q:
And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your
money?
A:
They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with our
agency.
xxxx
Q:
Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused, what
happened with the application, with the promise of employment
that he promised?
A:
Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new
office in Makati, Brgy. San Isidro.
xxxx
Q:
And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?
A:
No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad.22[12]
Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying
accused-appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their
money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and
promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory
workers were waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza
personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an

22
22

official receipt as proof of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants actions constituted
illegal recruitment.
Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he
was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in
the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed the
official receipt belies his profession of innocence.
This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant
and the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of
the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and
the rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception.
Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single
purpose to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment
abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about
the processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible
salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what
to expect from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as
Mardeolyns relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send
many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers visas who were already
allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed and issued an official receipt
acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the
actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show
unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.
In People v. Gamboa,23[13] this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context
of illegal recruitment, viz:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident
from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and
united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such,
all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of
illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that
all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective

Salazar v Achacoso
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure
and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license
23
23

or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was
then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and
Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a
certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,
because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due
process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties
were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article
38
of
the
Labor
Code
Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure
and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held,
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general
warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically
the
things
to
be
seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.
5. Enforcement
a. Regulatory Power and Rule Making Power
Art. 36. Regulatory power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of
this Title and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this Title.

b. Visitorial Power
Art. 37. Visitorial Power. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives
may, at any time, inspect the premises, books of accounts and records of any person or
entity covered by this Title, require it to submit reports regularly on prescribed forms, and
act on violation of any provisions of this Title.
6. Joint and Several Liability of Agent and Principal
f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
24

1. Shall select only medically and technically qualified recruits;

2. Shall assume full and complete responsibility for all claims and liabilities which may arise in
connection with the use of the license;
3. Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not
limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and repatriations;
4. Shall guarantee compliance with the existing labor and social legislations of the Philippines
and of the country of employment of the recruited workers;
5. Shall assume full and complete responsibility for all acts of its officials, employees and
representatives done in connection with recruitment and placement;
6. Shall negotiate for the best terms and conditions of employment;
7. Shall disclose the full terms and conditions of employment to the applicant workers;
8. Shall deploy at least 100 workers to its new markets within one (1) year from the issuance of
its license;
9. Shall provide orientation on recruitment procedures, terms and conditions and other relevant
information to its workers and provide facilities therefor; and
10. Shall repatriate the deployed workers and his personal belongings when the need arises.
For the purpose of compliance with item (1), the agency may require the worker to undergo
trade testing and medical examination only after the worker has been pre-qualified for
employment.
RA 8042, Sec 10 2nd Par
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
e. Jurisdiction
1) RTC over Criminal Action arising from Illegal Recruitment
SEC. 9. VENUE. - A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was
committed or where the offended party actually resides at the same time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed
shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. Provided, however, That the
aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in
court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
2) LA over Money Claims
SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Flourish Maritime Shipping vs Alamnzor
RATIO DECIDENDI: In case of unjust, invalid or unauthorized termination of overseas
employment, where the term of the employment contract is at least one year or more, the
worker shall be entitled to a salary of three months for ever year of the unexpired term, in
accord with Section 10 of RA 8042.

25

QUICK FACTS:.Donato (respondent) was a fisherman illegally dismissed. The monetary award,
which was increased by the CA, is also questioned by the petitioner.
FACTS:
Name of Petitioner: Flourish Maritime Shipping and Lolita Uy
Name of Respondent: Donato Almanzor (employee)
49-yo Donato entered into a 2-year employment contract with petitioner Flourish Maritime
Shipping as a fisherman, with a monthly salary of NT15,8400 including free meals everyday.
However, when he was deployed to Taipei as part of a crew of the fishing vessel FV Tsang
Cheng 66, he found out that there were only 5 crew members and that he had to buy food.
Worse, the master of the vessel, gave orders that Donato couldnt understandwhich caused
the master to be enraged and to hit Donato. Lolita talked to the master of the vessel and when
they were docked at the airport, Donato was told that he was going to eb repatriated. When
Donato arrived at the Philippines, he reported to Fluorish Maritime and was declared fit for work.
He was promised that the was going to be redeployed, but it turned out that it was no longer
possible because he was 49 years oldallegedly no longer fit for work.
Donato filed a complaint for illegal dismissal for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract, earned wages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Petitioners, on the
other hand, said that Donato voluntarily resigned, that he failed to comply with the machinery
and arbitration clause in the employment contract, and that he failed to discharge the burden of
proof of illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Held that respondents were guilty of illegal dismissal and entitled to six months
total of salary (NT95,040,000). NLRC Affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters decision CA Upheld the
decision and Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and increased the monetary award, due to the
interpretation of Section 10 of RA8042.
Section 10, RA 8042 Money Claims. In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
According to the NLRC and Labor Arbiter, Donato was entitled to six months because the
contract covered a two-year period and he was dismissed only after 26 days of actual work.
The CA, on the other hand, said that he actually worked for 26 days, so the unexpired portion of
the contract was actually 1 yr, 11 months, and 4 days. The CA held that he was entitled to full
compensation for 11 months and 4 days of the first year, with a total salary equivalent of 14
months and 4 days.
ISSUE:
WON respondent was illegally dismissed from employment
WON the award of the Court of Appeals was correct
DECISION: The SC partially granted the petition in that the monetary award should be
lessened.
HELD
1. No.
The LA and the NLRC correctly concluded, as affirmed by the CA, that respondent was not
actually redeployed for work, in violation of their employment contract. The respondent failed
give conclusive evidence that respondent voluntarily resigned from employment, that
respondent was not physically fit to perform work due to his old age and that the employment
contract provided a grievance machinery. Therefore, the termination of respondents services
was without valid cause. Further, the Court is not a trier of facts, and factual issues have been
resolved already by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as affirmed by the CA.
26

2. No.
The correct interpretation of Section 10, RA 802 has already been resolved in Marsaman
Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC. The provision comes into play only when the employment
contract has a term of at least 1 year or more. In this case, the contract was for two years, and
the overseas contract worker actually worked for only 26 days prior to the dismissal. Thus, the
three months salary rule applies.
SC declares a clause in R.A. 8042 unconstitutional
In a moment of triumph for the workers, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the last
clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, in the case of Antonio M. Serrano vs.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 167614, 24
March 2009.
As it is, Antonio M. Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc. Ltd. under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) approved
Contract of Employment as a Seafarer, more particularly as Chief Officer, for 12 months. When
he was deployed however, on 19 March 1998, he agreed to accept the lower position of Second
Officer upon the assurance of his employer that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998. When he was not made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998, he refused to remain
as Second Officer. Thus, he was repatriated to the Philippines on 26 May 1998, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days out of his 12 month contract.
He filed a case against his employer for constructive dismissal and for payment of his salary for
the
unexpired
portion
of
his
12
month
contract.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring the dismissal of Antonio M. Serrano to be
illegal and awarding him, among others, payment of his salary for three (3) months only out of
the unexpired portion of his contract of employment. Such award was based on the 5 th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042, which provides:
Sec.10. Money Claims. xxx In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Antonio M. Serrano was not satisfied with the award. He maintained that he should be awarded
his full salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract. He elevated his case to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the last clause in the 5 th paragraph of Section 10, Republic
Act (R.A) No. 8042 is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that limiting the award of salaries to three (3) months only under the 5 th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of
Section 1, Article III, Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law. On the other hand, Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article VIII grant all members of
the labor sector full protection of their rights and welfare. Simply put, these constitutional
provisions accord equal protection to all Filipino workers. Meaning, similarly situated workers
should be treated similarly.
Under the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042, Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) are classified into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of less than one year. In case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs
with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more. In case of illegal dismissal, they
are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only three (3) months of the unexpired portion of
their contracts.
27

These different ways of computing the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods discriminate one (1) category whose contracts have an unexpired portion
of one year or more and subject them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for three (3) months or for the unexpired portion thereof,
whichever is less, simply because the other categorys unexpired contracts fall short of one
year.
In addition, those OFWs belonging to the first category are likewise put on a disadvantaged
position compared to local workers with fixed-period employment who are entitled to the award
of salaries for the remainder of their fixed-term employment, in case of illegal dismissal.
Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042 contains a discriminatory classification, since in the computation of
the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause unfairly singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage, thus violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Thus, Antonio M. Serrano won his case before the Supreme Court and he was awarded his
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
3) POEA over Administrative Cases
a) Pre-employment Cases
Sec. 6. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide:
(a) all pre-employment/recruitment violation cases which are administrative in character,
involving or arising out of violations of Rules and Regulations relating to licensing and
registration, including refund of fees collected from the workers or violation of the
conditions for issuance of license or authority to recruit workers; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in
character , involving employers, principals, contracting partners and OFWs processed by
the POEA.
Sec. 7. Venue. Pre-employment/recruitment violation cases may be filed with the POEA
Adjudication Office or at any DOLE/POEA regional office of the place where the
complainant applied or was recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office where
the complaint was first filed shall take cognizance of the case. Disciplinary action cases
and other special cases shall be filed with the POEA Adjudication Office.
b) Disciplinary Cases,
3. Public Sector Agencies - Employment Offices

4. Sanctions
a) Local Employment
Art. 39. Penalties.
a. The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein;
28

b. Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any
provision of this Title or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction
thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than five
years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000, or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
c. Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found
violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon
conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor
more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both
such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
d. If the offender is a corporation, partnership, association or entity, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership, association or entity
responsible for violation; and if such officer is an alien, he shall, in addition to the
penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further proceedings;
e. In every case, conviction shall cause and carry the automatic revocation of the license or
authority and all the permits and privileges granted to such person or entity under this
Title, and the forfeiture of the cash and surety bonds in favor of the Overseas
Employment Development Board or the National Seamen Board, as the case may be,
both of which are authorized to use the same exclusively to promote their objectives.
b) Overseas Employment
Art. 35. Suspension and/or cancellation of license or authority. The Minister of Labor
shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of Labor,
the Overseas Employment Development Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and
other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions.
SEC. 7. PENALTIES (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine
not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00). (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein. Provided, however, that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person
illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority.
5. Issues and Questions on Overseas Employment
6. RA 9208
7. Alien Employment Regulation
a. Coverage; Exemption, Art 40; DO No 97-09, Sec 1, 2
Art. 40. Employment permit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking admission to
the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who
desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment
permit from the Department of Labor.

The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant

employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is desired.

29

For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment

permit may be issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged
with the supervision of said registered enterprise.
Almodiel v NLRC
FACTS:
October, 1987: Petitioner Almodiel, a CPA, was hired as Cost Accounting Manager by
respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable placement firm, John
Clements Consultants, Inc.
As Cost Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out
year and physical inventory; (2) formulate and issue out hard copies of Standard Product
costing and other cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3) set up the written
Cost Accounting System for the whole company.
August 17, 1988: Petitioner recommended and submitted a Cost Accounting/Finance
Reorganization, affecting the whole finance group but the same was disapproved by the
Controller. However, he was assured by the Controller that should his position or
department (which was apparently a one-man department with no staff) becomes unable
to deliver the needed service due to manpower constraint, he would be given a 3 year
advance notice.
In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was installed and used at the
Raytheon plants and subsidiaries worldwide. It was likewise adopted and installed in the
Philippine operations. As a consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting Manager
allegedly entailed only the submission of periodic reports that would use computerized
forms prescribed and designed by the international head office of the Raytheon
Company in California, USA.
January 27, 1989: petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence
of IRD Manager, Mr. Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of
redundancy.
Petitioner pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another
department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the
same has been conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
o LA: complainant's termination on the ground of redundancy is highly irregular
and without legal and factual basis; complainant to be reinstated to his former
position; moral damages, exemplary damages plus attorneys fees are to be
paid.
o NLRC: reversed LA, separation pay to be paid to petitioner instead.
Hence this petition.
o Petitioner
claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the
Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny Ang
Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit.
relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect that corollary
functions appertaining to cost accounting were dispersed to other units in
the Finance Department. And granting that his department has to be
declared redundant, he claims that he should have been the Manager
of the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general
accounting, payroll and encoding: As a B. S. Accounting graduate, a
CPA with M.B.A. units, 21 years of work experience, and a natural born
Filipino, he claims that he is better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a
B.S. Industrial Engineer, hired merely as a Systems Analyst
Programmer or its equivalent in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager
only during the middle part of 1988 and a resident alien.
o Respondent Raytheon
insists that petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager had not
been absorbed by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this
country.

30

claims to have established below that Ang Tan Chai did not displace
petitioner or absorb his functions and duties as they were occupying
entirely different and distinct positions
debunks petitioner's reliance on the testimony of Mr. Estrada saying that
the same witness testified under oath that the functions of the Cost
Accounting Manager had been completely dispensed with and the
position itself had been totally abolished

ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N there was bad faith, malice and irregularity in the abolition of petitioner's position of
Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy rendering termination of
petitioner invalid. NO.
2. W/N there was unlawful discrimination when Raytheon caused corollary functions
appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by Danny Ang Tan Chai, a
resident alien without a working permit. NO.
RATIO:
1. Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is governed by Article
283* of the Labor Code
There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, 1 month before, of the termination
of his employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate
superior; he was also issued a check representing separation pay (but in view of his
refusal to acknowledge the notice and the check, they were sent to him thru registered
mail); also, the DOLE was served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code.
Even conceding that the functions of petitioner's position were merely transferred, no
malice or bad faith can be imputed from said act.
In Wiltshire File Co., Inc v NLRC, Court said that redundancyexists where the services
of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. The characterization of an employee's services as no
longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an exercise of
business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such
characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the
Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary
and malicious action is not shown.
An employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the
operation of its business. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that a cost accounting
system was installed and used at Raytheon subsidiaries and plants worldwide; and that
the functions of his position involve the submission of periodic reports utilizing
computerized forms designed and prescribed by the head office with the installation of
said accounting system. Petitioner attempts to controvert these realities by alleging that
some of the functions of his position were still indispensable and were actually dispersed
to another department. What these indispensable functions that were dispersed, he
failed however, to specify and point out. Besides, the fact that the functions of a position
were simply added to the duties of another does not affect the legitimacy of the
employer's right to abolish a position when done in the normal exercise of its prerogative
to adopt sound business practices in the management of its affairs.
Considering further that petitioner herein held a position which was definitely managerial
in character, Raytheon had a broad latitude of discretion in abolishing his position. An
employer has a much wider discretion in terminating employment relationship of
managerial personnel compared to rank and file employees. The reason obviously is
that officers in such key positions perform not only functions which by nature require the
employer's full trust and confidence but also functions that spell the success or failure of
an enterprise.
2. Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires employment permit refers to nonresident aliens. The employment permit is required for entry into the country for
employment purposes and is issued after determination of the non-availability of a
31

person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang Tan Chai is a resident
alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.
As to Petitioners claims that he is better qualified:
It should be noted, however, that Ang Tan Chai was promoted to the position during the
middle part of 1988 or before the abolition of petitioner's position in early 1989. Besides
the fact that Ang Tan Chai's promotion thereto is a settled matter, it has been
consistently held that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials
over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum
qualifications for the position. In the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that Ang
Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the Court cannot substitute its discretion and
judgment for that which is clearly and exclusively management prerogative. To do so
would take away from the employer what rightly belongs to him.
* Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination
due to installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
b. Conditions for Grant of Permit; Denial,
General Milling Corp vs Torres
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment
issued Alien Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a
United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling
Corporation ("GMC").
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment
whereby the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.
On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from
temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment
permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE
Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February 1990.
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December
1990, was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the
issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April
1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the
ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent,
able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would
redound to the national interest.

32

Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for
Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
Laguesma in an Order dated 8 June 1990.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging
that:
1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked
petitioner Cone's alien employment permit; and
2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code
does not empower respondent Secretary to determine if the employment of an
alien would redound to national interest.
Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have
failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the
part of respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23 April 1990, revoking
petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.
The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed by private respondent BCAP was
cured when petitioners were allowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration before respondent
Secretary of Labor.1
Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal
basis at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien
must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to
choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien
employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed out
by the Solicitor-General, no comparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman
Black as the latter is "a long time resident of the country," and thus, not subject to the provisions
of Article 40 of the Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In any case, the term
"non-resident alien" and its obverse "resident alien," here must be given their technical
connotation under our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision
would amount to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in
existence long before petitioners entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly settled
that provisions of applicable laws, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into contracts.2 Private parties cannot constitutionally contract away
the otherwise applicable provisions of law.
Petitioners' contention that respondent Secretary of Labor should have deferred to the findings
of Commission on Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing petitioner
Cone, is, again, bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent
Secretary to make a determination as to the availability of the services of a "person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services
for which an alien is desired."3
In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the
question of availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting
such jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to
carry out the duties of the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations,
specifically Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition
not found in the Labor Code itself. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules,
provides as follows:
33

Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may issue

an employment permit to the applicant based on:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of
Section 2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any
person in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for which the
services of the applicant are desired.
(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will
redound to the national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate
government agencies if the applicant will be employed in preferred areas of
investments or in accordance with the imperative of economic development;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking
admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or
foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the
Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor.
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant
employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is desired.
For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment
permit may be issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged
with the supervision of said registered enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account
the question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national
interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which
seems impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest
is tenuous and unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40
says: "[t]he employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant
employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien
is desired." The permissive language employed in the Labor Code indicates that the authority
granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second
place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of
Labor should, and indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction
granted by the Labor Code,
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved
manpower training, allocation and utilization;
xxx
34

xxx

xxx

c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in

conformity with the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the
national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a
registration and/or work permit system;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial
to require further consideration.1avvphi1
Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of
Labor has reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner
Cone. Petitioners seek to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become
moot and academic.
While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become moot
and academic, the circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by
petitioners are such that we do not feel justified in leaving those questions unanswered.4
Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner Cone,
the basis of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not appear in the
record. If such reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or labor law different from
those here set out, then such employment permit, if one has been issued, would appear open to
serious legal objections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
2. Apprentice/Learners/Persons with Disabilities
B. Human Resource Development
1. Policy Objectives
RA 7796
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - I t is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development in
support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in
accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities.
The State shall encourage active participation of various concerned sectors, particularly private
enterprises, being direct participants in and immediate beneficiaries of a trained and skilled
workforce, in providing technical education and skills development opportunities.
SEC. 3. Statement of Goals and Objectives. - It is the goal and objective of this Act to:
Promote and strengthen the quality of technical education and skills development programs to
attain international competitiveness;
Focus technical education and skills development on meeting the changing demands for
quality middle-level manpower;
Encourage critical and creative thinking by disseminating the scientific and technical
knowledge base of middle-level manpower development programs;
Recognize and encourage the complementary roles of public and private institutions in
35

technical education and skills development and training systems; and

Inculcate desirable values through the development of moral character with emphasis on work
ethic, self-discipline, self-reliance and nationalism.
2. Apprentice
A. Art. 58. Definition of Terms.
As used in this Title:
a. An "apprentice" is a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with
an individual employer or any of the entities recognized under this Chapter.
"Apprentice" is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable occupation
during an apprenticeship agreement (RA 7796, Sec 4(j))
b. An "apprenticeable occupation" means any trade, form of employment or occupation
which requires more than three (3) months of practical training on the job supplemented
by related theoretical instruction.
"Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body
and approved for apprenticeable by the Authority (RA 7796, Sec 49(m))
B. Qualifitcations
Art. 59. Qualifications of apprentice. To qualify as an apprentice, a person shall:
a. Be at least fourteen (14) years of age;
b. Possess vocational aptitude and capacity for appropriate tests; and
c. Possess the ability to comprehend and follow oral and written instructions.
Trade and industry associations may recommend to the Secretary of Labor appropriate
educational requirements for different occupations.
C. Allowed Employment; Requirement Program Approval
Art. 60. Employment of apprentices. Only employers in the highly technical industries
may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. (As amended by Section 1, Executive Order No.
111, December 24, 1986)
NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1
rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker
as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28,
1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable
minimum wage.

36

At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which
he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at
a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office
premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines
without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of
P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:
August 2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang
experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin,
sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay
pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng
hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang
trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang
kanyang sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod
hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo
at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi
ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang
resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang
lahat sa itaas ay totoo.
Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay
aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.) Roberto Capili
Roberto Capili
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner
for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private
respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of
the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for
cause, and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit.
37

The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of

P500.00 as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED. 5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto
Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms
of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to
himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not
have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority
and proper training. 6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The
respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last
performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were
withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is
hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to
dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED. 7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of
petitioner by ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how
an apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on
June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to
conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain
"apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was
respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as
early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure
guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then
behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin
Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div.,
Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid
cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was
illegally dismissed. 8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private
respondent's representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for
Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the
premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l
74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other
places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of
herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of
the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his
backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such
amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
38

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

The issues raised before us are the following:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD
NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN
TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be
considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at
the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already
established an employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements,
including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued
by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship
shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for
wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start
below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered
into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard
model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
"care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner
and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship
Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it
was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be
entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed
apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship
agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not
instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
39

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship
program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government
agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To
translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship
program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare." 9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10
Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.
This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be
dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee can
be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision
to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to
comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This
procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached
by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA
40

498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs.
NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three
days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not
voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it
clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the
latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious
examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
D. Terms and Conditions of Employment
Art. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. Apprenticeship agreements,
including the wage rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six
months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum
wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage,
may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Department shall develop standard model
programs of apprenticeship. (As amended by Section 1, Executive Order No. 111,
December 24, 1986).
Art. 72. Apprentices without compensation. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
may authorize the hiring of apprentices without compensation whose training on the job
is required by the school or training program curriculum or as requisite for graduation or
board examination.
F. Costs
Art. 71. Deductibility of training costs. An additional deduction from taxable income of
one-half (1/2) of the value of labor training expenses incurred for developing the
productivity and efficiency of apprentices shall be granted to the person or enterprise
organizing an apprenticeship program: Provided, That such program is duly recognized
by the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, further, That such deduction
shall not exceed ten (10%) percent of direct labor wage: and Provided, finally, That the
person or enterprise who wishes to avail himself or itself of this incentive should pay his
apprentices the minimum wage.

G. Enforcement
Art. 65. Investigation of violation of apprenticeship agreement. Upon complaint of
any interested person or upon its own initiative, the appropriate agency of the
Department of Labor and Employment or its authorized representative shall investigate
any violation of an apprenticeship agreement pursuant to such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

41

Art. 66. Appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The decision of the
authorized agency of the Department of Labor and Employment may be appealed by
any aggrieved person to the Secretary of Labor and Employment within five (5) days
from receipt of the decision. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
shall be final and executory.
Art. 67. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. No person shall institute any action
for the enforcement of any apprenticeship agreement or damages for breach of any such
agreement, unless he has exhausted all available administrative remedies.
3. Learners
A. Definition
Art. 73. Learners defined. Learners are persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and
other industrial occupations which are non-apprenticeable and which may be learned
through practical training on the job in a relatively short period of time which shall not
exceed three (3) months.
"Learners" refers to persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and other industrial
occupations which are non-apprenticeable. Learnership programs must be approved by
the Authority. (RA 7796, Sec. 4)
B. Allowed Employment
Art. 74. When learners may be hired. Learners may be employed when no
experienced workers are available, the employment of learners is necessary to prevent
curtailment of employment opportunities, and the employment does not create unfair
competition in terms of labor costs or impair or lower working standards.

C. Terms and Conditions of Employment

Art. 75. Learnership agreement. Any employer desiring to employ learners shall enter
into a learnership agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
a. The names and addresses of the learners;
b. The duration of the learnership period, which shall not exceed three (3) months;
c. The wages or salary rates of the learners which shall begin at not less than seventyfive percent (75%) of the applicable minimum wage; and
d. A commitment to employ the learners if they so desire, as regular employees upon
completion of the learnership. All learners who have been allowed or suffered to work
during the first two (2) months shall be deemed regular employees if training is
terminated by the employer before the end of the stipulated period through no fault of
the learners.
The learnership agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representative.
Art. 76. Learners in piecework. Learners employed in piece or incentive-rate jobs
during the training period shall be paid in full for the work done.
4. Persons with Disabilities (Handicapped), ILO Convention 159(1983)
A. Definition
42

Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, these terms are defined
as follows:

(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result
of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or
within the range considered normal for a human being;
(b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of psychological, physiological, or
anatomical structure or function;
(c) Disability shall mean 1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities
of such individual; 2) a record of such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having
such an impairment;
(d) Handicap refers to a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an
impairment or a disability, that limits or prevents the function or activity, that is
considered normal given the age and sex of the individual;
B. Policy Declaration
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy The grant of the rights and privileges for disabled
persons shall be guided by the following principles:
(a) Disabled persons are part of Philippine society, thus the State shall give full support
to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into
the mainstream of society. Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies ensuring the
rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance of disabled persons. It shall develop
their skills and potentials to enable them to compete favorably for available
opportunities.
(b) Disabled persons have the same rights as other people to take their proper place in
society. They should be able to live freely and as independently as possible. This must
be the concern of everyone the family, community and all government and
nongovernment organizations. Disabled persons' rights must never be perceived as
welfare services by the Government.
(c) The rehabilitation of the disabled persons shall be the concern of the Government in
order to foster their capacity to attain a more meaningful, productive and satisfying life.
To reach out to a greater number of disabled persons, the rehabilitation services and
benefits shall be expanded beyond the traditional urban-based centers to community
based programs, that will ensure full participation of different sectors as supported by
national and local government agencies. chan robles virtual law library
(d) The State also recognizes the role of the private sector in promoting the welfare of
disabled persons and shall encourage partnership in programs that address their needs
and concerns.
(e) To facilitate integration of disabled persons into the mainstream of society, the State
shall advocate for and encourage respect for disabled persons. The State shall exert all
efforts to remove all social, cultural, economic, environmental and attitudinal barriers that
are prejudicial to disabled persons.
43

C. Coverage
Sec. 3. Coverage. This Act shall cover all disabled persons and, to the extent herein
provided, departments, offices and agencies of the National Government or
nongovernment organizations involved in the attainment of the objectives of this Act.
D. Rights and Privileges
Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disable person shall be denied
access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be
subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation,
privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied
person.
Five percent (5%) of all casual emergency and contractual positions in the Departments
of Social Welfare and Development; Health; Education, Culture and Sports; and other
government agencies, offices or corporations engaged in social development shall be
reserved for disabled persons.
Sec. 6. Sheltered Employment If suitable employment for disabled persons cannot
be found through open employment as provided in the immediately preceding Section,
the State shall endeavor to provide it by means of sheltered employment. In the
placement of disabled persons in sheltered employment, it shall accord due regard to
the individual qualities, vocational goals and inclinations to ensure a good working
atmosphere and efficient production.
Sec. 7. Apprenticeship. Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code as amended,
disabled persons shall be eligible as apprentices or learners: Provided, That their
handicap is not as much as to effectively impede the performance of job operations in
the particular occupation for which they are hired; Provided, further, That after the lapse
of the period of apprenticeship, if found satisfactory in the job performance, they shall be
eligible for employment.
Bernardo vs NLRC & FEBTC
Facts:
The dismissed complainants, numbering 43, are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods
from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters
through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers". Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank
and Trust Company maintained that complainants were hired temporarily under a special
employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political
personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap"; that the
tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral
part of their duties; that through the "pakiusap" of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this
task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there
is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with
purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations. The LA &, on appeal, the NLRC ruled
against petitioners, holding that they could not be deemed regular employees since they were
hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose
employments were covered by Employment Contracts w/ special provisions on duration of

44

contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, the terms of the contract shall be the law between
the parties.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have become regular employees
Held:
Only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed
are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal. The facts, viewed in
light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the
petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the
contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer,
the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with Art. 80 LC w/c provides
for the requisites in the employment agreement between an employer who employs
handicapped workers. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons), 13 however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped
workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified
or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these
tasks for more than six months. Thus, the twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular
employees.
The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank
determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the
lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees.
16
No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public
interest. Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties
are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other." Clearly, the agreement of the parties
regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied
45

employees.
An employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of
the mode or even the reason for hiring them.
E. Discrimination
Sec. 32. Discrimination on Employment. No entity, whether public or private, shall
discriminate against a qualified disabled person by reason of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, promotion, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
The following constitute acts of discrimination:
(a) Limiting, segregating or classifying a disabled job applicant in such a manner that
adversely affects his work opportunities;
(b) Using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out a disabled person unless such standards, tests or other
selection criteria are shown to be job-related for the position in question and are
consistent with business necessity;
(c) Utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that:
(1) have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(2) perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative
control.
(d) Providing less compensation, such as salary, wage or other forms of remuneration
and fringe benefits, to a qualified disabled employee, by reason of his disability, than the
amount to which a non-disabled person performing the same work is entitled;
(e) Favoring a non-disabled employee over a qualified disabled employee with respect to
promotion, training opportunities, study and scholarship grants, solely on account of the
latter's disability;
(f) Re-assigning or transferring a disabled employee to a job or position he cannot
perform by reason of his disability;
(g) Dismissing or terminating the services of a disabled employee by reason of his
disability unless the employer can prove that he impairs the satisfactory performance of
the work involved to the prejudice of the business entity: Provided, however, That the
employer first sought to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled persons;
(h) Failing to select or administer in the most effective manner employment tests which
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude or other factor of the disabled applicant or employee
that such tests purports to measure, rather than the impaired sensory, manual or
speaking skills of such applicant or employee, if any; and
(i) Excluding disabled persons from membership in labor unions or similar
organizations.

46

Sec. 33. Employment Entrance Examination. Upon an offer of employment, a

disabled applicant may be subjected to medical examination, on the following occasions:
(a) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of disability;
(b) information obtained during the medical condition or history of the applicant is
collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated
as a confidential medical record; Provided, however, That:
(1) supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the
work or duties of the employees and necessary accommodations;
(2) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate, if the disability
may require emergency treatment;
(3) government officials investigating compliance with this Act shall be provided relevant
information on request; and
(4) the results of such examination are used only in accordance with this Act.
F. Enforcement
Sec. 44. Enforcement by the Secretary of Justice.
(a) Denial of Right
(1) Duty to Investigate the Secretary of Justice shall investigate alleged violations of
this Act, and shall undertake periodic reviews of compliance of covered entities under
this Act.
(b) Potential Violations If the Secretary of Justice has reasonable cause to believe
that
(1) any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
under this Act; or
(2) any person or group or persons has been discriminated against under this Act and
such discrimination raises an issue of general public importance, the Secretary of
Justice may commence a legal action in any appropriate court.
Sec. 45. Authority of Court. The court may grant any equitable relief that such court
considers to be appropriate, including, to the extent required by this Act:
(a) granting temporary, preliminary or permanent relief;
(b) providing an auxiliary aid or service, modification of policy, practice or procedure, or
alternative method; and
(c) making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.

Sec. 46. Penal Clause. (a) Any person who violates any provision of this Act shall
suffer the following penalties:

47

(1) for the first violation, a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than
six (6) months but not more than two (2) years, or both at the discretion of the court; and
(2) for any subsequent violation, a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) or
imprisonment for not less than two (2) years but not more than six (6) years, or both at
the discretion of the court.
(b) Any person who abuses the privileges granted herein shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months or a fine of not less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court.
(c) If the violator is a corporation, organization or any similar entity, the officials thereof
directly involved shall be liable therefor.
(d) If the violator is an alien or a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service
of sentence without further deportation proceedings.
3. Women Workers
A. Women under the Constitution
Art. II, Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Art. XIII, Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.
PASEI vs Drilon
Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is
assailed for "discrimination against males or females," that it 'does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills," and that it is violative of
the right to travel. It was likewise held to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police
power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." In addition, it was contended that Department Order
No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It was claimed to be in violation of the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
48

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female domestic helpers is valid under our
Constitution.
Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The concept of police power is well-established
in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no
satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under
the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they
are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4)
they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy
plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms
of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon
to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts. Discrimination in this case is justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the
terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
49

permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary

malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons.
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic
policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is
true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an
authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the
Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's
power of regulation.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. vs NLRC
FACTS:
This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.
Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented
that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to
explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed
from work.
Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor
Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed
by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.
Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her
concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty,
which was why she was dismissed from work.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for
employment was discriminatory
Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to
loss of confidence
Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:
There was discrimination
50

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage
of a female employee.
Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded
all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to
petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her
dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not
be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did
mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never
be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be
sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted
temporary suspension of Grace from work.
Grace attained regular status as an employee
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal.
When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the
probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on
September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was
winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her
from earning security of tenure.
There was illegal dismissal
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the
family as the foundation of the nation.
Petition dismissed.
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
51

discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those
provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor
laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T
were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in
the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of
her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible
and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the
foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order
but also imperatively required.
B. Coverage
SECTION 1. General statement on coverage. This Rule shall apply to all employers, whether
operating for profit or not, including educational, religious and charitable institutions, except to
the Government and to government-owned or controlled corporations and to employers of
household helpers and persons in their personal service insofar as such workers are
concerned.cralaw

C. Prohibited Acts
1. Night Work/Exception
Art. 130. Nightwork prohibition. No woman, regardless of age, shall be employed or
permitted or suffered to work, with or without compensation:
a. In any industrial undertaking or branch thereof between ten oclock at night and six
oclock in the morning of the following day; or
b. In any commercial or non-industrial undertaking or branch thereof, other than
agricultural, between midnight and six oclock in the morning of the following day; or
c. In any agricultural undertaking at nighttime unless she is given a period of rest of not
less than nine (9) consecutive hours.
Art. 131. Exceptions. The prohibitions prescribed by the preceding Article shall not apply in
any of the following cases:
52

a. In cases of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident, fire, flood,

typhoon, earthquake, epidemic or other disasters or calamity, to prevent loss of life or
property, or in cases of force majeure or imminent danger to public safety;
b. In case of urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installation, to
avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer;
c. Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods;
d. Where the woman employee holds a responsible position of managerial or technical
nature, or where the woman employee has been engaged to provide health and welfare
services;
e. Where the nature of the work requires the manual skill and dexterity of women workers
and the same cannot be performed with equal efficiency by male workers;
f.

Where the women employees are immediate members of the family operating the
establishment or undertaking; and

g. Under other analogous cases exempted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in
appropriate regulation.
2. Discrimination
Art. 135. Discrimination prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate
against any woman employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment solely on
account of her sex.
The following are acts of discrimination:
a. Payment of a lesser compensation, including wage, salary or other form of remuneration
and fringe benefits, to a female employees as against a male employee, for work of
equal value; and
b. Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to promotion, training
opportunities, study and scholarship grants solely on account of their sexes.
Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided in this Article or
any violation of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to Section 2 hereof shall be
penalized as provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this Code: Provided, That the institution of
any criminal action under this provision shall not bar the aggrieved employee from filing an
entirely separate and distinct action for money claims, which may include claims for
damages and other affirmative reliefs. The actions hereby authorized shall proceed
independently of each other. (As amended by Republic Act No. 6725, May 12, 1989).
3. Stipulation against Marriage
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs Glaxowellcome Phils.
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation
53

that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking

position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's
competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of
the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors
informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either
he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo
transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request
against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and
while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxo's policy was valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and
other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal
or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot
be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to
the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array
of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely
privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply
with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed
manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion
in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the
instant case.
HELD:
The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long
period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to
eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Betsy, but he never
availed of any of them.
4. Discharge on Account of Pregnancy
Art. 137. Prohibited acts.
a. It shall be unlawful for any employer:
54

1. To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to
discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her
from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code.
2. To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on leave or
in confinement due to her pregnancy;
3. To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her
work for fear that she may again be pregnant.
D. Facilities and Safe Working Conditions
Art. 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish
standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he
shall, by regulations, require any employer to:
a. Provide seats proper for women and permit them to use such seats when they are free
from work and during working hours, provided they can perform their duties in this
position without detriment to efficiency;
b. To establish separate toilet rooms and lavatories for men and women and provide at
least a dressing room for women;
c. To establish a nursery in a workplace for the benefit of the women employees therein;
and
d. To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination
in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.
RA 9710, Sec. 22 (b) The State shall further ensure:
(1) Support services and gears to protect them from occupational and health hazards taking
into account women's maternal functions;
(2) Support services that will enable women to balance their family obligations and work
responsibilities including, but not limited to, the establishment of day care centers and
breast-feeding stations at the workplace, and providing maternity leave pursuant to the
Labor Code and other pertinent laws;
(3) Membership in unions regardless of status of employment and place of employment; and
(4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples' cultural practices even in the
workplace.
SECTION 25. Right to Decent Work The State shall progressively realize and ensure decent
work standards for women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions of
freedom, equity, security, and human dignity.
A. The DOLE in the case of private sector and the CSC in the case of public sector shall:
1. Advance womens right to decent work by promoting womens rights at work, creating
opportunities for women employment, enhancing social protection coverage, and
strengthening tripartism and social dialogue. To achieve this, the DOLE and CSC
shall facilitate adequate consultative mechanisms with workers and employers
groups, government and non-government organizations;
2. Together with other concerned agencies ensure the provision of support services and
gears to protect women from occupational and health hazards taking into account
womens maternal functions. Further:
55

a. Women workers shall be protected against safety and health hazards, including,
but not limited to, exposure to hazardous chemicals, infections, conditions leading
to musculoskeletal disorders, work environment leading to noise-induces hearing
loss, and exposure to radiation and psychological stressors.
b. By reason of the hazardous nature of work that may cause injury or impairment in
the function of any part of the body, every employer shall provide their women
employees with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to prevent injury
or impairment in any part of their bodies as well as ensure proper maintenance of
the PPE used in the workplace.
c. The DOLE, through its concerned agencies, shall make available occupational
safety and health (OSH)-related programs and services to women workers in the
formal and informal sectors. These include, but are not limited to, the conduct of OSH
orientations and trainings, medical surveillance and research, screening tests for
reproductive tract diseases, provisions for technical support/advice, and development
of information, education and communication materials.
3. Work closely with both the employers and unions or worker representatives, in the
private sector in promoting a safe and healthy workplace. Further:
a. Employers both in the public and private sectors shall provide services in support
to balancing family obligations and work responsibilities. These include family
health services but not limited to: day care and child minding centers,
breastfeeding or lactation stations with appropriate facilities and corresponding
nursing/lactation breaks, health education, counseling on breastfeeding, seminars
on responsible parenthood and family planning, non-sexist child-rearing, shared
parenting and family responsibility, annual family day, flexible work arrangements,
and anti-sexual harassment initiatives.
Compliance by government agencies and private employers shall be monitored by
the CSC and DOLE, respectively. In establishing facilities as required by law, the
LGUs shall make compliance thereof a pre-requisite in the grant of any form of
building and business permit.
b. In the exercise of their labor rights, women workers are free to exercise their right
to self-organization and are encouraged to form unions and join associations. The
DOLE and CSC shall ensure that such rights are respected regardless of the
workers status and place of employment. DOLE and CSC shall also support
programs that will encourage women to develop their leadership skills to
accelerate their qualifications in positions of leadership.
c. Employees who are members of indigenous communities shall be allowed to
observe their cultural practices in the workplace provided that the employer is
notified by the applicant or employee about the cultural practice/s that she needs
to observe and the cultural practice/s will neither hamper work efficiency of the
employee nor be prejudicial to the operation of the workplace.

E. Family Planning Services

Art. 134. Family planning services; incentives for family planning.
a. Establishments which are required by law to maintain a clinic or infirmary shall provide
free family planning services to their employees which shall include, but not be limited to,
the application or use of contraceptive pills and intrauterine devices.
b. In coordination with other agencies of the government engaged in the promotion of
family planning, the Department of Labor and Employment shall develop and prescribe
incentive bonus schemes to encourage family planning among female workers in any
establishment or enterprise.
56

F. Special Women Workers

Art. 138. Classification of certain women workers. Any woman who is permitted or suffered
to work, with or without compensation, in any night club, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or
similar establishments under the effective control or supervision of the employer for a
substantial period of time as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, shall be
considered as an employee of such establishment for purposes of labor and social legislation.
G. Leaves and Other Benefits (for Gynecological Disorders)
Section 18. Special Leave Benefits for Women. - A woman employee having rendered
continuous aggregate employment service of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12)
months shall be entitled to a special leave benefit of two (2) months with full pay based on her
gross monthly compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders.
M.Gynecological disorders refers to disorders that would require surgical procedures such
as, but not limited to, dilatation and curettage and those involving female reproductive organs
such as the vagina, cervix, uterus, fallopian tubes, ovaries, breast, adnexa and pelvic floor, as
certified by a competent physician. For purposes of the Act and these Rules and Regulations,
gynecological surgeries shall also include hysterectomy, ovariectomy, and mastectomy;
T. Special leave benefits for women refers to a female employees leave entitlement of two
(2) months with full pay from her employer based on her gross monthly compensation following
surgery caused by gynecological disorders, provided that she has rendered continuous
aggregate employment service of at least six (6) months for the last 12 months;
SECTION 21. Special Leave Benefits for Women
A. Any female employee in the public and private sector regardless of age and civil status
shall be entitled to a special leave of two (2) months with full pay based on her gross
monthly compensation subject to existing laws, rules and regulations due to surgery
caused by gynecological disorders under such terms and conditions:
1. She has rendered at least six (6) months continuous aggregate employment service
for the last twelve (12) months prior to surgery;
2. In the event that an extended leave is necessary, the female employee may use her
earned leave credits; and
3. This special leave shall be non-cumulative and non-convertible to cash.
B. The CSC, in the case of the public sector including LGUs and other State agencies, and
the DOLE, in the case of the private sector, shall issue further guidelines and appropriate
memorandum circulars within sixty (60) days from the adoption of these Rules and
Regulations to operationalize said policy, and monitor its implementation and act on any
violations thereof.

H. Sexual Harassment (RA 7877)

Philippine Aelous Automotive United Corp. vs NLRC
FACTS: Private respondent was a company nurse for the Philippine Aelous United Corporation.
A memorandum was issued by the personnel manager of petitioner corporation to respondent
Cortez asking her to explain why no action should be taken against her for (1) throwing a stapler
at plant manager William Chua; (2) fro losing the amount of Php 1,488 entrusted to her; (3) for
asking a co-employee to punch in her time card one morning when she was not there. She was
then placed on preventive suspension. Another memorandum was sent to her asking her to
explain why she failed to process the ATM applications of her co-employees. She submitted a
written explanation as to the loss of Php 1,488 and the punching in of her time card. A third
memorandum was sent to her informing her of her termination from service for gross and
57

habitual neglect of duties, serious misconduct, and fraud or willful breach of trust.
ISSUES:
1. W/N petitioner was illegally dismissed.
2. If such dismissal was illegal, W/N petitioner should be entitled to damages.
HELD:
1. Yes. The grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee
must be strictly construed. As to the first charge, respondent claims that plant manager William
Chua had been making sexual advances on her since her first year of employment and that
when she would not accede to his requests, he threatened that he would cause her termination
from service. As to the second charge, the money entrusted to her was not lost, but given to the
personnel-in-charge for proper transmittal as evidence by a receipt signed by the latter. As to
the third charge, she explains that she asked someone to punch in her card as she was doing
an errand for one of the companys officers and with the permission of William Chua. As to the
fourth charge, she asserts that she had no knowledge thereof. To constitute serious misconduct
to justify dismissal, the acts must be done in relation to the performance of her duties as would
show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts of did not pertain to her
duties as a nurse nor did they constitute serious misconduct. However due to the strained
relations, in lieu of reinstatement, she is to be awarded separation pay of one month for every
year of service until finality of this judgment.
2. Yes. Private respondent admittedly allowed four years to pass before coming out with her
employers sexual impositions; but the time to do such varies depending upon the needs,
circumstances and emotional threshold of the employee. It is clear that respondent has suffered
anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act
complained of. Thus, she should be entitled to moral and exemplary damages for the
oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal and to serve as a warming to
officers who take advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at
the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. Secretary Laguesma
submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in
accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP issued AO 119, disagreeing with the recommendation that respondent
be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case because of the nature of the position of Reyala as occupying the
highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. Long digest by Ernani Tadili.It was ordered
that Rayala be dismissed from service for being found guilty of grave offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of
suspension of service for the maximum period of one (1) year.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.

58

Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not
guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831 Domingo Petition 1. The President has the power to remove presidential appointees; and
2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential appointees.

G.R. No. 155840 Rayala Petition

In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
1. Hes act does not constitute sexual harassment;
a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued
employment; or
c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and
3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual harassment in RA 7877 by applying
DOLE AO 250.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or
request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion.
According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely
Domingos perception of malice in his alleged acts a "product of her own imagination"25 that
led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum
prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual
harassment is considered an offense against a particular person, not against society as a
whole.
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he
assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may be committed in
any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates,
outings or the like for the same purpose;
59

d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification
which is generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not
constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making
power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters.
The law did not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide
other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual
harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700 - Republic
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts
constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual
nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the penalty imposed by the
OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove
the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the
law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it
will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that
even though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under
the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute
grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.32 The Republic adds that Rayalas
position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be
dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code,
which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only
during good behavior.33 Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior,
he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? - guilty
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty? - suspension
CA and OP were unanimous in holding that RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment. They only
differ in the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is,
therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial
evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings
should bind us.40
60

He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did
not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor
as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala
urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful
acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An
action for each can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to
sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines
work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor
laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act
of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training
Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related,
educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of
acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of
office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly
approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
61

representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual

harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for
unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include,
among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or
training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual
harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with
other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors
and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of
sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases
constituting sexual harassment.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or
post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis
of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal
infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating
Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the
administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he
would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement
of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with
her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with
deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement
be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile
environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating
Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the
last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum
prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the
acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges
against him.
The SC reiterated that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus,
whether the crime ofsexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
The SC also rejected Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy
to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. On the contrary, ill
62

motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that
time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and
charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the
Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs
decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised
Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for
"disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and total nullity."
The SC held that Rayala was properly accorded due process.The records of the case indicate
that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the
beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he appeared, personally
and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the
offense is not controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation
of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral
conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability
for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment,
we now determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service
Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged
administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of
imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand,
Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code
of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is
punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until
he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by
law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This
power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the
President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief
Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided
by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the
administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the
63

Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED (Modification of
Penalty). Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are
DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

4. Minors
A. Minors under the Constitution
Article II, Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
B. Coverage

RA 9231, Sec 2, Employment of Children - Children below fifteen (15) years of age shall not
be employed except:
"1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his/her parents or legal guardian
and where only members of his/her family are employed: Provided, however, That his/her
employment neither endangers his/her life, safety, health, and morals, nor impairs his/her
normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said
child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or
"2) Where a child's employment or participation in public entertainment or information through
cinema, theater, radio, television or other forms of media is essential: Provided, That the
employment contract is concluded by the child's parents or legal guardian, with the express
agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment: Provided, further, That the following requirements in all instances are strictly
complied with:
"(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and normal development of
the child;
"(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination
taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of
working time; and
"(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of
competent authorities, a continuing program for training and skills acquisition of the child.
"In the above-exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first
secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall ensure observance of the above requirements.
"For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall apply to all persons under eighteen (18) years
of age."
SECTION 1. General statement on coverage. This Rule shall apply to all employers, whether
operating for profit or not, including educational, religious and charitable institutions, except to
the Government and to government-owned or controlled corporations and to employers of
household helpers and persons in their personal service insofar as such workers are concerned.
64

C. Minimum Employable Age

SECTION 2. Employable age. Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be allowed to
work under the direct responsibility of their parents or guardians in any non-hazardous
undertaking where the work will not in any way interfere with their schooling. In such cases, the
children shall not be considered as employees of the employers or their parents or guardians.
Art. 139. Minimum employable age.
a. No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be employed, except when he works
directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or guardian, and his employment
does
not
in
any
way
interfere
with
his
schooling.
b. Any person between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) years of age may be employed for
such number of hours and such periods of the day as determined by the Secretary of
Labor
and
Employment
in
appropriate
regulations.
c. The foregoing provisions shall in no case allow the employment of a person below
eighteen (18) years of age in an undertaking which is hazardous or deleterious in nature
as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
RA 7610, Sec. 12. Employment of Children. Children below fifteen (15) years of age
may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or
legal guardian and where only members of the employer's family are employed:
Provided, however, That his employment neither endangers his life, safety and
health and morals, nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That
the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed
primary and/or secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or
information through cinema, theater, radio or television is essential: Provided,
The employment contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the
express agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the
Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, That the following requirements
in all instances are strictly complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of the
child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or
discrimination taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and the
duration and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and
supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for training and skill
acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer
shall first secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of
Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary
for the effective implementation of this Sec.
Sec. 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. The Department of
Education, Culture and Sports shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal
education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of
working children who have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary
education. Such course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most
effective under given circumstances.
65

Sec. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements.

No person shall employ child models in all commercials or advertisements promoting
alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and violence.
Sec. 15. Duty of Employer. Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for
in Articles 108 and 109 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
Sec. 16. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall
suffer the penalty of a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months
but not more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That,
in case of repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to
operate shall be revoked.
D. Hours of Work
RA 9231, Sec. 2-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. - Under the exceptions provided in Sec.
12 of this Act, as amended:
"(1) A child below fifteen (15) years of age may be allowed to work for not more than twenty (20)
hours a week: Provided, That the work shall not be more than four (4) hours at any given day;
"(2) A child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall not be allowed to work for
more than eight (8) hours a day, and in no case beyond forty (40) hours a week;
"(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be allowed to work between eight o'clock in
the evening and six o'clock in the morning of the following day and no child fifteen (15) years of
age but below eighteen (18) shall be allowed to work between ten o'clock in the evening and six
o'clock in the morning of the following day."
E. Prohibitions against Worst Forms of Child Labor

RA 9231, Sec. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child Labor. - No child shall be
engaged in the worst forms of child labor. The phrase "worst forms of child labor" shall refer to
any of the following:
"(1) All forms of slavery, as defined under the "Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", or
practices similar to slavery such as sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom
and forced or compulsory labor, including recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; or
"(2) The use, procuring, offering or exposing of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography or for pornographic performances; or
"(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal or illicit activities, including the production
and trafficking of dangerous drugs and volatile substances prohibited under existing laws; or
"(4) Work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is hazardous or
likely to be harmful to the health, safety or morals of children, such that it:
"a) Debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
or
"b) Exposes the child to physical, emotional or sexual abuse, or is found to be highly stressful
psychologically or may prejudice morals; or
"c) Is performed underground, underwater or at dangerous heights; or
"d) Involves the use of dangerous machinery, equipment and tools such as power-driven or
explosive power-actuated tools; or
66

"e) Exposes the child to physical danger such as, but not limited to the dangerous feats of
balancing, physical strength or contortion, or which requires the manual transport of heavy
loads; or
"f) Is performed in an unhealthy environment exposing the child to hazardous working
conditions, elements, substances, co-agents or processes involving ionizing, radiation, fire,
flammable substances, noxious components and the like, or to extreme temperatures, noise
levels, or vibrations; or
"g) Is performed under particularly difficult conditions; or
"h) Exposes the child to biological agents such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, protozoans,
nematodes and other parasites; or
"i) Involves the manufacture or handling of explosives and other pyrotechnic products."
RA 9231,Sec. 5. Sec. 14 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. - No child shall
be employed as a model in any advertisement directly or indirectly promoting alcoholic
beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts, gambling or any form of violence or
pornography.
F. Discrimination
Art. 140. Prohibition against child discrimination. No employer shall discriminate against
any person in respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his age.
G. Jurisdiction
RA 9231, Sec. 9. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding new sections to Sec. 16 to
be denominated as Sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C to read as follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Jurisdiction - The family courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there
are no family courts yet, the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction depending on the penalties prescribed for the offense charged.
"The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of filing.
"If the preliminary investigation establishes a prima facie case, then the corresponding
information shall be filed in court within forty eight (48) hours from the termination of the
investigation.
"Trial of cases under this Act shall be terminated by the court not later than ninety (90) days
from the date of filing of information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of
fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case.
5. House helpers/Caregivers/Homeworkers
A. Definition
Rule XIII, Sec 1 (b) The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term
"domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services
in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer's family.
B. Coverage
67

Art. 141. Coverage. This Chapter shall apply to all persons rendering services in households
for compensation.
"Domestic or household service" shall mean service in the employers home which is usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof and includes ministering to
the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the employers household, including
services of family drivers.
C. Non-Household Work
Art. 145. Assignment to non-household work. No househelper shall be
assigned to work in a commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise at a wage or
salary rate lower than that provided for agricultural or non-agricultural workers as
prescribed herein.
Apex Mining Co vs NLRC
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular
employee of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on
May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del
Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she
was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a
month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her
laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her
immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result
of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for
medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to
P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to
work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of
Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the
labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte,
to pay the complainant, to wit:
1 Salary
Differential P16,289.20
2. Emergency Living
Allowance 12,430.00
3. 13th Month Pay
Differential 1,322.32
4. Separation Pay
(One-month for
every year of
68

service [1973-19881) 25,119.30

or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS
AND 42/100 (P55,161.42).
SO ORDERED.1
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division
thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed
decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated
June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a special civil
action for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such. 2 The main
thrust of the petition is that private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or
domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper"
or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic
servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is
employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment
of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry
women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in
staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and
other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to
then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its
premises. They may not be considered as within the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic
servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of
said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic
servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the
difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the
family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in
business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the
staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a
regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to
certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may
be considered as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the
business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its
staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that
such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of
the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in
Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
69

Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent
abandoned her work.1wphi1 This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show
that because of an accident which took place while private respondent was performing her
laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She
is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as
private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the
payment of separation pay to her is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public
respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
D. Conditions and Benefits

Art. 142. Contract of domestic service. The original contract of domestic service shall not last
for more than two (2) years but it may be renewed for such periods as may be agreed upon by the
parties.
Art. 143. Minimum wage.
a. Househelpers shall be paid the following minimum wage rates:
1. Eight hundred pesos (P800.00) a month for househelpers in Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, and Caloocan cities and municipalities of Makati, San Juan, Mandaluyong,
Muntinlupa, Navotas, Malabon, Paraaque, Las Pias, Pasig, Marikina,
Valenzuela, Taguig and Pateros in Metro Manila and in highly urbanized cities;
2. Six hundred fifty pesos (P650.00) a month for those in other chartered cities and
first-class municipalities; and
3. Five hundred fifty pesos (P550.00) a month for those in other municipalities.
Provided, That the employers shall review the employment contracts of their househelpers every
three (3) years with the end in view of improving the terms and conditions thereof.
Provided, further, That those househelpers who are receiving at least One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) shall be covered by the Social Security System (SSS) and be entitled to all the
benefits provided thereunder. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7655, August 19, 1993)
Art. 144. Minimum cash wage. The minimum wage rates prescribed under this Chapter shall be
the basic cash wages which shall be paid to the househelpers in addition to lodging, food and
medical attendance.
Art. 145. Assignment to non-household work. No househelper shall be assigned to work in a
commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise at a wage or salary rate lower than that provided
for agricultural or non-agricultural workers as prescribed herein.
Art. 146. Opportunity for education. If the househelper is under the age of eighteen (18) years,
the employer shall give him or her an opportunity for at least elementary education. The cost of
education shall be part of the househelpers compensation, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
Art. 147. Treatment of househelpers. The employer shall treat the househelper in a just and
humane manner. In no case shall physical violence be used upon the househelper.

70

Art. 148. Board, lodging, and medical attendance. The employer shall furnish the househelper,
free of charge, suitable and sanitary living quarters as well as adequate food and medical
attendance.
Art. 149. Indemnity for unjust termination of services. If the period of household service is
fixed, neither the employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration
of the term, except for a just cause. If the househelper is unjustly dismissed, he or she shall be
paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen (15) days by way of indemnity.
If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason, he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due
him or her not exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Art. 152. Employment record. The employer may keep such records as he may
deem necessary to reflect the actual terms and conditions of employment of his
househelper, which the latter shall authenticate by signature or thumbmark upon
request of the employer.
SECTION 1. - Household Service (n)
Art. 1689. Household service shall always be reasonably compensated. Any stipulation that
household service is without compensation shall be void. Such compensation shall be in
addition to the house helper's lodging, food, and medical attendance.
Art. 1690. The head of the family shall furnish, free of charge, to the house helper, suitable and
sanitary quarters as well as adequate food and medical attendance.
Art. 1691. If the house helper is under the age of eighteen years, the head of the family shall
give an opportunity to the house helper for at least elementary education. The cost of such
education shall be a part of the house helper's compensation, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
Art. 1692. No contract for household service shall last for more than two years. However, such
contract may be renewed from year to year.
Art. 1693. The house helper's clothes shall be subject to stipulation. However, any contract for
household service shall be void if thereby the house helper cannot afford to acquire suitable
clothing.
Art. 1694. The head of the family shall treat the house helper in a just and humane manner. In
no case shall physical violence be used upon the house helper.
Art. 1695. House helper shall not be required to work more than ten hours a day. Every house
helper shall be allowed four days' vacation each month, with pay.
Art. 1696. In case of death of the house helper, the head of the family shall bear the funeral
expenses if the house helper has no relatives in the place where the head of the family lives,
with sufficient means therefor.
Art. 1697. If the period for household service is fixed neither the head of the family nor the
house helper may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term, except for a just
cause. If the house helper is unjustly dismissed, he shall be paid the compensation already
earned plus that for fifteen days by way of indemnity. If the house helper leaves without
justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any salary due him and unpaid, for not exceeding fifteen days.
Rule XIII, SECTION 18. Employment records. The employer may keep such records as he
may deem necessary to reflect the actual terms and conditions of employment of his
househelper which the latter shall authenticate by signature or thumbmark upon request of the
employer.
E. Termination
71

Art. 150. Service of termination notice. If the duration of the household service is not
determined either in stipulation or by the nature of the service, the employer or the househelper
may give notice to put an end to the relationship five (5) days before the intended termination of
the service.
Art. 151. Employment certification. Upon the severance of the household service relation, the
employer shall give the househelper a written statement of the nature and duration of the
service and his or her efficiency and conduct as househelper.
Art. 1698. If the duration of the household service is not determined either by stipulation or by
the nature of the service, the head of the family or the house helper may give notice to put an
end to the service relation, according to the following rules:
(1) If the compensation is paid by the day, notice may be given on any day that the
service shall end at the close of the following day;
(2) If the compensation is paid by the week, notice may be given, at the latest on the first
business day of the week, that the service shall be terminated at the end of the seventh
day from the beginning of the week;
(3) If the compensation is paid by the month, notice may be given, at the latest, on the
fifth day of the month, that the service shall cease at the end of the month.
Art. 1699. Upon the extinguishment of the service relation, the house helper may demand from
the head of the family a written statement on the nature and duration of the service and the
efficiency and conduct of the house helper.

SECTION 14. Indemnity for unjust termination of service. If the period for household
service is fixed, neither the employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the
expiration of the term, except for a just cause. If the househelper is unjustly dismissed, he or
she shall be paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen (15) days by way of
indemnity.
If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason, he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due
him or her not exceeding fifteen (15) days.
SECTION 15. Employment certification. Upon the severance of the household service
relationship, the househelper may demand from the employer a written statement of the nature
and duration of the service and his or her efficiency and conduct as househelper.
F. Indemnity for Unjust Termination
Art. 149. Indemnity for unjust termination of services. If the period of household service is
fixed, neither the employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration
of the term, except for a just cause. If the househelper is unjustly dismissed, he or she shall be
paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen (15) days by way of indemnity.
If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason, he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due
him or her not exceeding fifteen (15) days.
5. Homeworkers
A. Coverage and Regulations
Art. 153. Regulation of industrial homeworkers. The employment of industrial homeworkers
and field personnel shall be regulated by the government through the appropriate regulations
72

issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to ensure the general welfare and protection
of homeworkers and field personnel and the industries employing them.
Art. 154. Regulations of Secretary of Labor. The regulations or orders to be issued pursuant
to this Chapter shall be designed to assure the minimum terms and conditions of employment
applicable to the industrial homeworkers or field personnel involved.
Art. 155. Distribution of homework. For purposes of this Chapter, the "employer" of
homeworkers includes any person, natural or artificial who, for his account or benefit, or on
behalf of any person residing outside the country, directly or indirectly, or through an employee,
agent contractor, sub-contractor or any other person:
1. Delivers, or causes to be delivered, any goods, articles or materials to be processed or
fabricated in or about a home and thereafter to be returned or to be disposed of or
distributed
in
accordance
with
his
directions;
or
2. Sells any goods, articles or materials to be processed or fabricated in or about a home
and then rebuys them after such processing or fabrication, either by himself or through
some other person.
Rule XIV, SECTION 1. General statement on coverage. This Rule shall apply to any
homeworker who performs in or about his home any processing of goods or materials, in whole
or in part, which have been furnished directly or indirectly by an employer and thereafter to be
returned to the latter.
B. Definition
SECTION 2. Definitions. As used in this Rule, the following terms shall have the meanings
indicated hereunder:
(a) "Home" means any room, house, apartment, or other premises used regularly, in whole or in
part, as a dwelling place, except those situated within the premises or compound of an
employer, contractor, and the work performed therein is under the active or personal supervision
by, or for, the latter.
(b) "Employer" means any natural or artificial person who, for his own account or benefit, or on
behalf of any person residing outside the Philippines, directly or indirectly, or through any
employee, agent, contractor, sub-contractor; or any other person:
(1) Delivers or causes to be delivered any goods or articles to be processed in or about a home
and thereafter to be returned or to be disposed of or distributed in accordance with his direction;
or
(2) Sells any goods or articles for the purpose of having such goods or articles processed in or
about a home and then repurchases them himself or through another after such processing.
(c) "Contractor" or "sub-contractor" means any person who, for the account or benefit of an
employer, delivers or caused to be delivered to a homeworker goods or articles to be processed
in or about his home and thereafter to be returned, disposed of or distributed in accordance with
the direction of the employer.
(d) "Processing" means manufacturing, fabricating, finishing, repairing, altering, packing,
wrapping or handling any material.
C. Registration
D. Conditions of Employment/Deductions
73

SECTION 3. Payment for work. (a) Immediately upon receipt of the finished goods or articles,
the employer shall pay the homeworker or the contractor or sub-contractor, as the case may be,
for the work performed; Provided, However, that where payment is made to a contractor or subcontractor, the homeworker shall be paid within the week after the contractor or sub-contractor
has collected the goods or articles from the homeworkers.
(b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall from time to time establish the standard
minimum piece or output rate in appropriate orders for the particular work or processing to be
performed by the homeworkers.
SECTION 4. Deductions. No employee, contractor, or sub-contractor shall make any
deduction from the homeworker's earnings for the value of materials which have been lost,
destroyed, soiled or otherwise damaged unless the following conditions are met:
(a) The homeworker concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for the loss or damage;
(b) The employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why deductions should not be
made;
(c) The amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall not exceed the actual loss or
damages; and
(d) The deduction is made at such rate that the amount deducted does not exceed 20% of the
homeworker's earnings in a week.
SECTION 5. Conditions for payment of work. (a) The employer may require the homeworker
to re-do work which has been improperly executed without having to pay the stipulated rate
more than once.cralaw
(b) An employer, contractor, or sub-contractor need not pay the homeworker for any work which
has been done on goods and articles which have been returned for reasons attributable to the
fault of the homeworker.

E. Joint and Several Liability of Employer/Contractor

SECTION 7. Liability of employer and contractor. Whenever an employer shall contract with
another for the performance of the employer's work, it shall be the duty of such employer to
provide in such contract that the employees or homeworkers of the contractor and the latter's
sub-contractor shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Rule. In the event that
such contractor or sub-contractor fails to pay the wages or earnings of his employees or
homeworkers as specified in this Rule, such employer shall be jointly and severally liable with
the contractor or sub-contractor to the workers of the latter, to the extent that such work is
performed under such contract, in the same manner as if the employees or homeworkers were
directly engaged by the employer.
F. Prohibitions
G. Enforcements

74

75

76