PQDLLD —— ESSENCE OF DECISION Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Second Edition Graham Allison Philip Zelikow Harvard University Univesity of Virginia 8 LONGMANpy ou 9 Aes oy 2049 0F UDA SOL ap ae pans persue PuE EP apep 24h Ov aSpUH AYO SAAS8. é fo ‘ollabeth and Paige — ¢ | Contents, é | soci Eto: Jone rrison é | Macketing Manager Megan Galvin | Reem Slt Degen Sus ubshig Seen é Coke Delp targe ney Diy ' é oes ey Day Preice_ vi {SERED eT aan Meta é aoe eee! e ES hartge Hh Comfort ' 1 Model TheRaonaL Aor 13 Schl Hn Sue Piling Server. Store sta of Aion 16 i ttn der A Dn SoC ‘null AcorBiaigm 23 t one Pinter Phi Calor Cory ‘eChsiat Mad! red 26 Meo Nepean Src Rai f Lary of Cong alg Paton it err astute. rates Wi E ‘ee Gains anal Cie : Bertin: nisin te aban Mi ise bn writin Croft Clan Model 48 F ‘Pina lip. Zotac i ar 2 The aban Mise Cec Fie Oat, 77 i aiid TAS OURS non Desde wo Pace fee Missin ! Sawossrobe Char 7 Peril 6.12 PI St ipa Defoe. pti Cel iat. i ali ‘te Site ne panes brie ata er ap G masa seas Bi te ses Respond tothe Mise Deplpment é ca threes 109 tie: Do ing Alert 2: Diplomatic q Copyright © 1999 by Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. ‘Pressures. Alternative 3: A Secret Approach f0 Caste, : Irie iain date Se i ‘Aight reserved No prt ofthis publi maybe reproduced, sored ‘Aleratv 6: Blockade. i ‘Rare genome faye mes, Wy bites Uon Whew the Misa 121 e Soi mec pny eng or tee woe « ‘ror writen permission of he pue Piedin he United Sit 3 Model it: Orgmizatonal Behavior 43 , DegaiairelLopesndfieney 47 & Flee vit our websites pd Rngman acm SrecionalLope and Orson Cae 153 qi Intreclne Conposiy 158 e ssevosztoime2 NASA Haan Goat_160 | Stina Bear Prd 163 ¢ 79930.00C-040302 &Conn 4 The Guban Mise Crisis: A Second Cut_ 197 Deploymeat of Soviet Missin Cuba 201 ‘The Sore Build-up in Detail Orgenzatonal Inpleneraion. Imposition ofa US. Blockade of Cubs 217, ‘Organizational Inligence Organisational Options. Organizational implementation ‘TheWithdrawal of Soviet Miles fom Cubs 236 5 Model Il: Governmental Polis 255 ‘Toe Governmental Polis Model Mststed. 258 1 Sepa ostintions hring Power 2. The Power to esa Bering Acari Pees Pner Byun octet Out latte? intrationa eletone Group bocene sad Therion Chis and Action 263 ener Desons 2 The Agency” robe: Picpal, ‘act and Payers 3 odin Wh lesion fee vn snc Seti eas Crop 2c fn Aton. ‘Goverment Polis Paradigm 294 6 The Cuban Missile Grsic A Third Cut 325 ‘The Impostion ofa Blockade by the United Stats 329 ‘The Blt of Discovery. The Polit of Choice. Soviet Withraal ofthe Mine rom Cuba 347 ‘Soviets Klan American U-2 Ps. The President and he Chairman, The “Dea” Resolving the Turkish Problem, ‘The "Dea Resolving the Cuban Probe. 7 Concasion 379 Summing Up: Diferences in Interpretation 379 Summing Up: Diferent Answers or Different Questionst 385 ‘Where Do We Go fom Here? 352 Index 408, Preface decison to revise «bests in political scence that hasbeen in pint continuously for over a quarter century requires justii- cation First the historical evidence about the Cabar mise crisis has ‘grown dramatically mulated bya series of oral history conferences find delsscation effort and culinatng in 1997-1998, With pub- lication of heretofore classified documents inthe relevant volumes of the Foreign Relation ofthe United States series published by the Department of State (which must be used in conhnetion withthe [Rehm and ens contol volumes for the Renmedy amis ppublaed eatin the 1990) exploration of een fs from Soviet government in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Natal’ book, “One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Casa, and Kennedy 1957"1964, apd fialy, transcription and publieaion ofthe secret {perth Renny Adonitatonsdletions ducing the ei ty Henest May sind Philip Ztkow in The Rene Tape side the White House Dring the Cub Mize Cris the mest important eve dence about the esse now avallable This new evidence shows 2 ‘numberof explanations inthe orginal edition ohare ben incorzect, Gnd others nsulficent. Forth coauthor of thi vevised edition of “Esenc, the mot pleasurable part ofthe endeavor his been to see how this new evidence listens when examined through alternative con- ‘cepa! lenses. This book the frst analytical syntbeis of al that vi- ‘ence, Student ofthis event will nodes, perhaps wih some surprise, that despite the many books written on the musi rss the expla tations for key choices and events in the eis deserve, and get, @ fees interpretation in this book. ‘Second, analytical an theoretical scholarship frm which the cone arguments inthe original edition of ence drew hae advanced: in ‘adie of interational afar inthe disciplines of politcal science, ‘conomics, sociology, social psychology, organzction theory, and secon ma tl in nporan ey api wens ding public policy and business. The fist edition engaged central questions In each ofthese aenae and bas subsequently been egaged by authors in each Beneath these debates es the fundamental question to which FRR RAK oypes sey se om se eanas por iy ores Hoe eyo 29 Sh ‘somata ang a9 BunsenooD par Suedthat group. The group ltr matin the lat 19608 and cry 1970538 the Research Seminar on Bureucray Plt and Policy ofthe Instat of Politics in the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Membership inthe group inci eancls Mc ators I ower, ills MM. Capra, fiche Crore, Pipi Heymann, Albert Hirschman, Stanley Hoffmann, Henry D. Jacoby, Doris, Kearns, Tapes Liebman, David S. Mande, Edin O. Reicher, Thomas C. Salling, John Stinbruner, James Q.Wison, Srmcl L Wilisson. and AdaraYarmalinsk. To this group, and to each ofthe members individually we re most grateful in additon to members of the May Group a large aumber of other reader ofeed pertinent criticisms and suggestions on drafts ofthe ‘orginal edion For services beyond an al of duty or esponsibility, swe thank Aleaner L Georg, Wilam K. Hanns, Hoge san, “Theodore R. Marmor, WamerC.Sciling, Leon V. Sigal, Harrison Wellford, Martin S. Wishnatsky, Albert Wohlsetter, Roberta Wioblstee, and Chasis Wol, J. he ‘Many instations provided support during the research and weit- ing ofthe origina edition incudng the Intitte of Poles, the Rand Corporation the Center for International AMfais t Harvard, andthe (Council on Foreign Relations. Four individual deserve special not for the ftellectual and per- sonal debts Alon incurred. The inuence of Thomas C. Seheing willbe obvious in the chapter on Model. The impact of Andrew W ‘Marshal ideas is marke, especialy in the chapter on Mode I. The heaves debt, which is clearest in the chapter on Mode Il, is 10 Richard E: Neustadt T each ofthese individuals he is deeply grate- ful Finally Elssbeth K.. Alison wae companion, colleague td ‘counselor throughout the journey, om is origin tothe fin line Th preparing this revised edion, we have compled more debi. Richard Neusat and Eres May rernained source of ideas and insp- ration for thinking about the scope and character of possible revision ‘May and Zlkow tanseribed and edited the ape recordings Present Kennedy made of the deliberation a the White House: The Beller Centr for Selence and International Aire at Harvard’ John F Kennedy School of Government provided vital support for the research effort. We recived especialy valuable advice from Robert Blak, Devid King, Sean Lyn-Jones, and Svea Mile. Beyond the Kennedy School, este especially grateful for support from the Miller Center of Public Aires the Univers of Virginia and for Pepe ngs rom Miriam Avng Rian! tee Pl e Hn, sr Ror Aan ai hehe Pree ‘Maro im Natal Scott Sagan, Peer Singer, Diane Vaughan, and Richard Zeckhawser Final preparation of the manuscript was assisted by Harold Johnsous service both a typist and interpreter of hi yes At our publisher, Longin, we ae raul for encourage ft font Len Wigan, subanquet ctr esa Hayne and fenie [Erickson and Michele Hing, lm Stet Publishing Services. ‘We ar also thankful forthe work of those scholars who called attention to weskases i the orginal edition While we have surely ot staid thet, we are eur st we learned from them. That list includes Robert Ar, Jonathan Bendot, Thomas Hammond, Stephen Krasner, Milam Stine and David Welch, In addition we als wish to thank the following reviewers for their helpful comments on this now edition: Richard Bets, Columbia Univesity, Michael Corgan, Boston Univers Judith Gillespie, State University uf New York, ‘Albany, Patrick Morgan, University of California, Irvine; and Scot Sagan, Stanford University. Students in our clases, including a semi- rar where some of the new ideas were reviewed, also made many helpful suggestions. ‘Arai to Elisabeth Alison and now Paige Zelikow we express our thanks for more than we can sy Notes 1. fin ReaadyPren to Thode Sorensen, Dec Maing he (we oe Te ne Bch nde Aran (New Yr Cale ner re 193 LE TP paves se ee RIERA eC| . mma Introduction ain missin Cab tic, risky. =“al” Why did he Soviets remove the missiles eater than retaliate atother equally sensitiv ponts—Berlin, fo xample? ‘Whar are the "les of the mise erst What docs this event teach usabout nude confontations andthe ak of noc i? In theaftermath af the Cad Was, what docs imply about crisis man ‘agement and government coordination? I this 4 model of how © eal with adversaries? The tens of thousands of pages of rlwant evidence now finally ses to sent this rit psa serious hale the Selves Simply reading carta all the evidence team asians requiring many months. We two have made a bes eflot to ake fll, ‘svantge ofthe storehouse of declassified document memoirs oral Hise nterviews an evcn he for eet of nt the White House delberaos in ering an analyse ofthe mis ci Here the mise crisis serves as rst ina mote general investiga. tion But the central premise ofthis study is that stifctry answers to questions about the missles will equive more than adition slinformatin std analysis Rea improvement in our answers (0 (questions ofthis sort depend on greater awareness of what we Goth lEymen and profesional nays) bring othe anaes When awe ing questions ik" Wy did the Soviet Union pace missin Cubs ‘what we se and jadge to be important and accept as adequate Aepends nt only onthe evidence available but lo onthe “oncep= tual lenses through which we look atthe evidence. A primary p= ote ofthis study therefore, isto explore the fundamental yet often ‘Unnoticed choices among the categories and assomptions that chan ‘ha ur thinking abou problems ike the Cuban mise cri, “THE GENERAL ARGUMENT ‘When we are puse by a happeingin foreign afi the source of ‘our purlemntis ypc a partissr government action rst of Scions: Soviet emplscement of mises in Cube, American troops ieing sent tothe Pesan Gl Germany coding sovereign conte ‘overs currency by adopting the Euro, the alr to dfend the UN- ‘edlred "tafe havens n Bosnia, These occurences rane abviows ‘questions Why di the Soviet Union place mises in Cab? Why ‘ere 50,000 American soldiers inthe Persian Gulf Why dia “Geman gi up the Detach Male Why dd the United Nations do ‘olla dtd Serene nly 19997 n pursing the answers fo ‘Tee Genenl Aeneas 3 these questions the serious analyst seeks to discover why one specific “at of the word eame about—rather than some other searching for an explanation, one typically puts himself or her- sel inthe plae ofthe raion, of national yoverament, confront problem of foreign afar and wes o igure ot why one might have ‘hosen the action in qustion. Thus, analysts have explained the Soviet mises in Cuba aa way of defending Cab gaint American attack US. troops went fo Saud Arabia to undo and deter agresion- ema jine ie arpa Union partes comin CUED) to advance the cause of European integration. ‘The United Nations fled o act in Bosnia because member nations involved lacked the illo resist Serb aggreion. Inofering (or aeeping) hes explanations one sessing that igvernmcntal behavior cm be mot sislctrily understood by ana ‘gy with the purposive ats of individuals. In many cats thi sa ful assumption. Treating national governments a8 i they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals provides useful short hha for understanding policy choices and actions. Bat this simpli cation—like al simplieations—obscutes a well a reveals. In patty, t obscures the persistently nepected fact of government the" decsionmaterof national policy obviouly not one calulting vidual but i rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors. What this fact implies for anaes of events ike the ‘Caban mise crisis sno simple matter. ts implications challenge the ‘asic categories and asumptions with which we approsch evens. ‘More igoroush the argument developed inthe body ofthis study can be summarized in tte proposition: 1, Profesional analyst of ocgn afr and policymakers (as well asordinary cen) tk about problems of foregn and military eign terms of largely impli conceptual model that have Sigifiant consequences forthe content of thi thought In thinking about problems of foreign afirs, profesonal analysts aswell ordinary citizens proceed in a sesghtforwar, informa, aeametaaceat ee seatnhnene CEES et meena Spycam tas, Sete seems =a Speer MARAE RR ARR ues eené & MLD ontheoreticl fashion, Careful examination of explanations of events Ie the Soviet instalation of missin Cuba, however, eva a more ‘complex theoretical substructure. Explanations by particular analysts ‘Show real and predictable characterises that rect unrecognized ‘ssumptons about the character of puzales, the categories in which problems should be considered the types of evidence that are relevant, End the determinants of occurrences, Our fet proposition ir that bundles of such elated assumprions constitute base frames of refer ence or conceptual model in term of which analysts and ordinary laymen ask and answer the questions: What happened? Why did pent What wil happen? Asumption lie thee ae central tthe activites of explanation and prediction. In attempting to explain a artical event the analst cannot simply describe te fll state ofthe ‘word leding up to that event. Thelgic of explanation requires n= ling out the relevant, critial determinants ofthe occurrence, the junctures at which particular factors produced one tate ofthe world "ater tan another" Moreover as the lope of redicion underscore the analyst mat summarize the various factors ae they bear on the ‘ccarrence. Conceptual models not only fx the mesh ofthe nets that the analyst drage through the material in order o explain a partclar action; they also direct the analyst to cast nets in select ponds, ater tain depths inorder to catch the fish he sates. yt explain (and prec) behavior of national govern iments in terms of one baste conceptual model, here entitled Rational Actor Model (RAM or Mode) In spite of significant diferenes in interest and focus, most ana Ips and ordinary cizens attempt to understand happenings in for- ign afirs a the more of less purposive ace of unified national {governments Laymen personify sets and speak of thelr ams and holces. Theorists of international relations focus on problems between nations in accounting forthe choices of unitary rational actors, Sestege analyst concentrate on the loge f aeton without fefeenceo any partial ator For each of thee group, the pot of {sn explanation ito show how the nalon or government could have ‘hosn to at as Idd given the strategie problems it fed. For exam ple, in confonting the preblern posed by the Soviet ntallaton of| {Erstepe mises in Cuba, the Mosel analy frames the puzzle Why ‘id the Soviet Union detie to inatall missle n Cab He focus attention on certain concepts goals and objectives ofthe nation oF ernment Final he ay ives eran pte of infence {Poncnuton perfored an acon of isso emt heeds goal sttantpe Fhe analyst har expsne” hs cvent when cn show Soorpiing mses n Gib sa reworable ain, en Soviet tembe tlees Prediction sbout whats nation wid or would iv lone te geertd by esting the rata thing 0 doa Cevsn stun, gen specie objectives, |. Twoalematve conceptual models hr lle an Orgniatonl ‘Behavior Model (Medel I) and « Governmental Plies Model (Moda i), provide a base for improved explanations and pre- ions ‘Although the Rational Actor Mode has proved wsfl for many purpons there power evidence tha it mstbe supplemented by [ames of reference that fois onthe goverment machine—the Etsetins and pelt actor ered i he pole process RESET mptcaon tha important evens have important cute, Terthat movolths perform lrg actos for le erons, must be. balanced by the appreciation that (1) monoliths re lck bons co (Cingvaious ears and levers ina bighléiferentatddecisonmkng ‘Stueare and (@) lrg ats resi rom innumeribeand often com Tsing sales actions by individuals t various lel of organi. Hon in the sevice of a variety of only partially compatible Conceptions of national goals, organizational goal nd poi ‘bjectves: Model grasp of ational purposes and of the pressures reed by problems in ieratonal relations must confront the Sfranaional mechanisms rom which governmental actions mere. “Organization theory provide the foundation for the second mol, whscemphasics the distinctive loi capac culture and proce les of the large onganiations that constitute a government ‘ecording to this O al Behavior Model what Mode aa Ichi ict andi we houghtenead aon of Le rgnization ontonng sending ele paterns Cohan facd wih the fac of Sov mises ih Cubs, « Mode aun ames the purl: From what organizational cote, pre ‘hres and procedures did ths decision emerge! He focase tention erin gncrps exiting organization! eomaponet te ane ions and hte stndaed op rm tion (for example about A ‘Sefining ease options (or example, sending proven but medi6 recon ‘nage ballistic isto Cbs big new intecontnestaa tit) and implementation (rcp tal saline in Gaba witout being dco). The aay ives cet po tense inference epninsons produced onoupat of eran Wind at ers timetable eae fron ung orga tonal races, proceed repertoires A dal Ia as “pkines”thecent when horse ade te elevator oraenanton snd sepa he pters of ranzaona beh emi he ston emerge Pein ey eesti let ‘Sningorscaons st et procera progres “het model fearon he pls of erent Aorsng tothe mode etn foe feared ner su tp chs nora narod sate Rao wet pen Sermon a eal of aging ges son ler ne ‘atonal pverament In contig the problem pus by Sot asst Cabs Mod at fumes he pe Wie eas ‘rt icf arening amon lee ei ects ‘ico and sec i its enon on ct cog the verse terest ad cons imc he en ucrton he Eos tape player perp and ath etblsed ctu or co Sintering cept een farms pe ery re ine i overeat at ‘oan of Serpning song pay ne une A dal i aa. ‘phar cpin tev nb eo ar conred who id stato wm tele he ston ngs Fedctons ae pen ated by ientipng tegen which sn se wile tetera flyers td tt elie power ond Dp al “Kenta metaphor hlumintes the diféreces among thse smal orig poly hat ofan ben compared to motes ard tegen of mores inthe pe of chess Imapine «Ges pane ‘whch the ober cul stony sean upon whch mone the ‘Bnew roc ith no ormaton but how the pes came fo be moved Inialy mon cbserrs old ssune=-us Mod | drt a indices ler wr moving he ps whe crea pla and as tot th pa ot waning te ne ut pater of mons a be image ht woud ad some coer Hr wichig ser peo conie Mod Il upto he he er might ot bes sige veal bt ate oe ance of seminependet onion cach of whch move pss Sccrding andar opeting procedures Yor mpl morc of cpr at of ps mig clin, ech caring ot “eGo Argue 7 ‘outin, the king’ rook, bishop, and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according oa fixed plan. Iti conceivable, furthermore, that the pattern of play might suggest to an observer a Model Il assumption: a numberof distinct payers, with distinc objectives but shared power over the pecs, could be determining the moves a the resultant of colegial bargaining. For example, the black rooks move might eontibute tothe loss of «black knight with no comparable fis forthe black tearm, but with the black rook becoming the prin Spa guardian of the palace on that side ofthe board "Ainge caeecan dono more than sggeat the Kinds of difleences among explanations produced by the three models. But the Cuban ‘isi crisis especially appropriate forthe purposes ofthis study. In the contest of ultimate danger tothe nation, sal group of ten ‘weighed the options and decided. Such central high-level, css de! Sons would seem tobe ideal gist for Mode! I analysis. Moda It and Model Ill are foreed to compete on Model I's home ground. Dimensions and fetoes uncovered by Model I and Medel i hi ul therefore parila tractive 8nd illustration inthe chapters that Flow. "Fis our conta angment canbe applied broadly in arenas beyond {orcgn ofr Understanding tat ordinary explanations, predictions, tnd evalation ate ieseapably theory bated ie fundamental to sl Consciousness about knowiedge? This insight isespcialy important in profesional taining where individuals leagn to apply a theory or ‘pproach, for example, in law, economics, oF business. Salary the ‘ational Actor, Organizational Behavior, and Governmental Politis models can be applied beyond foreign policy to the domestic policy of| ‘ational governments sate and loal governments; nongovermen- {al organizations lke the United Nations or Red Cros schools, uni ‘versity, and hospitals; business enterprises; and other aggregate {core whom one encounters in normal every life “The proposition tht what you see doesnot necessarily qual what you gt ean be confsing, even disturbing, Nonetle, if we are ae- esl the chapters that follow wl persuade the reader that categories land assumptions he ha been using comfortably, unselfconscously matter more than he suspected. As economists consider why 3 Indonesian economy tat grew a rate of more than 10% per anu 32 FPP LS ighy seems ae eefoxtwo decades crated in 1958, desning at arate of more hen 1% ripe oie her an ty bce of Pesjnsor snes eae ses ivetment oppo wing re Tetra cluitons ech ineiahy proces wa he erm of tne sof eateprie spd sutton rer than other. The more powerfl or comfortable the frameworks being applied, the more Final the recognition tat isnot te whole tt (Fr theo the Popeiion wt tha ces and rumen noted Concept “sat atx” perjury or"GNP" lary some dimen- sion ofthe bang confision one fs onthe on hand as they inesopably distort or limit on’ grasp of other dimensions ofthe ‘henoment onthe other Consider the le on which the book you lrenow reading i esting. Troxgh normal ents with 2-20 visto, itappears tobe sll eject This means tht placed onthe abe the bok wl et here aly it imagine examining the same able Under an eeton microscope. What would one sce! Masy empty, Inoceuped space—space through which neutrons can pas with gina ‘Second, becuse inpiftions are neces competing pia tins ae eae. When explaining predicting, evaluating o plan. ng. one sould in principe conser al ignficancausl actors ‘rt pins inte proces that leads the oecarence im que tin, Bat beense mat explanations or prediction seed ine {in where both ani of the question and atenton tthe ane {slime simpleton and shorthand se nesary. Concept and theories, especialy nes that dora wrk become septe, conven Anal and efficent for communicating answers Patcalri n planing and pedcng eons of government wen one fi of Slnplifstons becomes convenient and comping tr even more {Stata have at hand one or more simple but compete cons {Spiel rameworts op remind te quastoner and te answerer ‘thes omit, They open mind lit wider and exp tem open te longer Alem conceptual frarmori are nprtant nat nly for farther insights into neleted dimensions of te undying Pichomenon:Inyare nent emuner othe dortons an Eentaton of wiser eoncetalfemework.one employs Like the fit point this «general methodologia rath applicable in ll tres of cope slevant where roesonal uve leaned theory or langoge tha allows them to Sor analy and commun ‘ste ndings ray. ‘TeGennl Agent 9 “Third, while this book focuses principal on explanation, inferences that fom epi ar preci (Btn) te ee frguments have important mplitions for an array air tnt inelading: (1) evtuation or appraisal of acionsb individuals inaitions or sgrepates (2) prescrip of what ist be done nd {G) management ofa sequence of actions by oneself or by a group, 0 tschieve achoten objective. The basi loge of explanation requires ‘ne to identify both specific circumstance in the case in question ind generalizone from prior experince about instances ofthis ‘ind This allows one to understand why the event was (ors) tbe texpected given this combination of Sreamstanes and replat. Predictions or bets about tare events are, nee, the loi flipside of explanations, Purther assignments including evaluation and pre Scription require more than explanation. But each rests on a founda- ton ofjudgrnentssbout the causal proces involved —jdgmens that dlifer signiianty depending on which of the concepts! models Inform the sessment. "Rourth, the conceptual and istorialanalysis developed inthis book has importants implications for the caren foreign poi agenda. These begin with the Sundamental question of risks of clear wat In the ifermath ofthe Cold War, should Americans continue tobe con. ‘Erned about the sk of audear weapons exploding on American territory? On what grounds can individuals ike former Senator Sam Nunn and Senator fchand Logr eonclde that the rik of one FA ddoren nuclear weapons exploding on American sil snow higher. than daring the Cold War! Why do sates acquire nucle weapons {or example, India and Pakistan jn 1996, bat not South Kors or: ‘Swolen? What are the prospects of nclar war between new nucle States, for example, India and Pakistan or Isracl and » potential ‘puclese weapons neighbor like Ire, In, or a terrorist group? Fro [stony the president of the United Stats and the chairman ofthe. Soviet Union stl took in 1962, the css tds examine adozen pleuible sequences of events and sclions that end with nuclear ‘reapons exploding on American and Soviet cies. = ‘Beyond nuclear sue, sensitivity to aus fttors laminated by cach of the mel should infort a fundamental rethinking of Savona sear strategy foreign poli, and the vole ofthe United States (and other nation) in the post-Cold Wir envionment. An tr that continues tobe ale by what itcomessfer—the post-Cold, ‘War erarater tan what it, may best be cbsidered an “era. of| {onfision”® The rezone for confusion are not dificult to identi.For mostof the second half ofthe twentieth century, containment of ‘exgasioist Soviet or Chinese Communism provided the Gxed point forthe compas of American engagement in the word In 1950 the (Cold War ended in a stunning, almost unimaginable victory that cased this fled point from the gabe, an erasure sealed by the isin- tegration ofthe Soviet Union in 1981, Most ofthe coordinates by ‘which Americans got ther earings inthe world have now been con Signed to history dustin: the Brin Wala divided Germany, the Tron Cura, captive nations of the Wars Pat, Communism on the march and aly the Soviet Union ital Inthe afermath ofthis avalanche of evens, American foreign policy, as well tthe foreign poly of mos ofthe othe rat powers, mostly dis. In ways ery ‘analogous tothe years after Word War I the intermision between two word was, national policymaking in ll the major powers—the US, Great Bitsin, ance, Germany, Japan, China, Russias prin ipl preoecpied by afi at home, But when serious rethinking begat about American interes, American capa, and American oly hard question oul be ake nt only in Mindel terms bt om Modes I an Il perspectives aswel, Analyst must reexamine ‘ot only tends in international conditions, but also the approprite- ‘es of Cold War institutions (from the Department of Defense and eligence community othe IME). isnt ane fe tes eens which this book hasbeen we be wider aplication, Whe cone Ing abstract or theoretical dims or arguments, translate the ito ‘conor sense. Commoasenscal naloguesin one's own diet expei ‘ce wl never previ valence coos ‘St ele the gta tne ns many mia es ‘ths atemp to come to grips with abstractions or theories. ‘One stengh of Model is that when considering the Chinese ot Mexican choice about human sights or ade one can imagine being that goverment’ shoes and asking what one would do. Stents wh find Model I mysterious should think about thee own diet exper= enc, for example, in dealing wit the colege registrar, or the phone ompany—partclrly when one is frustrated by forms and proce ‘dre tht el sited to one own specifi cave Mod! IT boomer ‘more credible a one this about anslogous group decisionmaking Proce fom couple deidng hereto action hon one peere {he ocean andthe other the mountin) to dubs choices about the location, music, and rereshments for a party. Siar commonsense saloguts can help one apreite bth the insights an the limits of “Te Gen Agus th prone’ ena in gehen matinee, vibes climate arcs grnest ti. Cons a mundane canpl our audentsinve und we oa cpaing th ner senate tai at itn a tance whieh yal a ogee ‘aaltepet he mers of he op dei hy wanted etapa vt yay eng Sh pcr pup aot iu dnegbes psealae tei, clones Moll sas wih npn and tote TH yest arto ta edo he ‘Sloman ot snd eed cape we Eso tt he tovp ent othe Chine recat ney os of ere te Sonyabout te mel xp Mol fos Te a So state hacen fers whch te rare fe ‘tbl routnyicaing sper td ingens The le fod th they at abe or plas wal. yh ination {Sout pres bat pay ot a ry cout Mal iment om competing petaaes sd poss gros ting bn fr xref por ok ous ance ‘Ste con esau een te Ra he ens ‘cr mde tu cho, hen how tt eion secured teams Se Ope ten Cpe rors hy eet rit Soh a tes tae one se Chicken, then wa oreo chore be a Sp ring cpa oe ce te pp wl coterie cst seen a he Sey Sista hrs a he ny By pug ah of esate ‘asin tun heat held nme ssl othe ing te of eu qoctons each mod trent in the frou ‘Ry emthg slag Spay he pny eel, iy gape in understanding the psn a ining te rps sot hoes ta eo mo iyo shape eat NOTES Hempel rsceriton oft logo exugton season "mer he gus Why the ep phon cea by showing the phonon reed om cera pre drenet might have ha can intentions, to defend Cal Secs tion would be permanently secre =ow do they reach this conclusion? In Sherlock Holmes sy they cramine Iraq station, especially its indebtedness. They conclude that from the ine Saddam Hlsscin Heya mowing eps Nea eset aa siren hi ve ad ‘occupy the ene county, not js the bande oe olde tt were ‘nominal in dispute. Tey do this by magnifying several salient char. acters ofthe lrg mary preparations and highlighting some of Suddam Hussin's carl statements Tel explanation presents an How do analysts explain the coming of the First World Wer? ‘According to Hans Morgenthau, he First World War ad its origins “exclusively inthe fear of a disturbance ofthe European balance of| power” Before World Wa I, the Triple Entente (Britain, France, Rusia) was delicate counterweight to the Triple Aliance (Germany, ‘Austria-Hungary, Italy). If either bloc could have gained a decisive advantage inthe Balkans, i would have achieved a decisive advantage in the Balance of power. "twas this fea” Morgenthau ay "that ‘motivated Austin July 1914 sete is accounts with Serbia once and forall and tat indoced Germany o support Austria uncond ‘nally. 1 wa the same far that brought Rusia tothe support of Serbia and France to the support of Rusa" “How is Morgenthau able to resolve this problem so confident? ‘By imposing on the data “ational outline” The value of this method according to Morgenthau, i that it provides for rational in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign poliey which makes America, Bish, or Rusian foreign policy {Appear as an ili, rational cotinoum «regal of the Tuomas acknowedgs the amportance ot te structural la. tors employed by neorealits (anarchy and the distribution of power)» But instiutonalists insist that a further layer of system [evel factors, namely international institutions are necesary to ‘apa sate action Keohane recognizes exphicy that this int he Cal Mod ated 38 tional theory i incomplete and thus insulicent to provide ade ‘uate explanations snc teat the interests Sates pursue as beyond the theory or exogenous He concider therefore that nstutonal- iam (and neorelism as wel) must be supplemented bya further theory ofthe stata theory that adresses he origins of at inter ‘sts, specie objectives bell and perceptions “The smpleanalyis ofthe inetteionalit argument axe perhaps clcatest in Robert Axclfod and Keohane ate on “hehieving Cooperation under Anarchy™ Their question is In an anarchie International environment with no superior authority t enforce geement wen will ational vle-meximizing states onethless comer (when wil hey take cordate setion th promises higher payors o cach than ay ether option on which ey could agree!) Aalrod ear identified thre features of situates a which Fn find theres that affect thei propensity to coozerte: the mutuality of interests (that the extent to which each ator can achieve his ow interes by acting cooperatively rather than compet ively; the"shadow ofthe future that ithe extent o which actors ‘alue future payoifrom further interactions); and the number of payers (cooperation Becoming more dficulras the numberof ly Ersincrease) “Aghnst tis backdrop, Keohane and Axcrod show how the inst- tutional contet in which tates interact ca ler the payed to each state, lengthen the shadow of the future and enable mult-peson ‘3c tobe broken down int subordinate games with smaller num- bers of players. AS Lisa Martin's analysis of sanctions cuting the Falklands War of 1962 illustrates, Britains membership inthe European Community allowed it to secure the cooperation of i European panes in ewig sanctions against Argentina aking, this action to other isues, specially Bras contbutons tthe Community’ budget By inking these iss, Britain expe the intrest the partis share in the combined decision and alo esened concern about cherting (since farther ocasonson which «cheater ‘ould be punished proportionately were assured). The institutional Seting foliated bargaining aros disparate sues that would ot wie have been much more difficult o negotiate “Weak theory lads to ambiguous predictions at Keohane sys? ‘Nonetheless weak or contol prsitions ae beter than no Pre dictions and Keohane docs not shrink fom explicit recognition of the predictable consequences of his theory For example, rtitton= alin and ealss make radially diferent predictions abouthe tre ‘of arope, and in particular the prospects forthe Europan Union ; a ps wa aapetcgs ey(previously called the European Community) and NATO, John Mewaeimer els eit finial, wrote 1995, Cold War provided s hothouse environment in which the EC {european Communi could flours the Cold War ends nthe stable ode it produces collapses the EC is lely to grow weaker, to songe, wh ne™ In tha same ear, he also wrote“ the Soviet threat that Holds NATO together. Take away that oflensive tiget, andthe United Stats sly to abandon the Continent, whereupon the dfesive allance it etd for 40 yore may Ste Pine Addresing Mearsheimer» prdicions direct, Keane SS eat nsttnae theory wot lend “os the opponte™ Cxpecition nus 193 daca gt the promi of nto theory” he and Martin note that “both NATO and the European Community, now the Buopean Union (EU), are expanding their rember and are hardly in dedine™ Hi 1983 ste more Dreciss Tam wing to pred hat the BC wil be ager and hae {ester impact on is member polices inthe yar 2000 than it was ‘then the Btn Wal came down Nove 1969 Lberaiemt ‘Among the most significant developments in recent studies of inter ‘national relation i iberalis’sredcovery ofthe empirical peers lnation that democracies never (or very rarely) got war against ther democracies. Debates about definitions aside, thi is a powerfl snd significant finding. As one ofthe lading international ration schl- ans Jac Ler, has noted “the absence of war between democracies comes as cose as anything we have to an empirical law in interns Woral relations" Scholars who fave octsed on spel features of Hberal democracies and are thos often grouped under the lbel of "iberls" have Been atthe forefront of efoto explain why this regularity holds. “The placement of Her thetie within Mode may asi se prising Sine these theorists focus principally on liberal democrs. es, they clary recognize pluralism in domestic politi tater ‘objectives, belie and inclinations towards ston are shaped by thei pela ede, for exstle, whether they ore democrats or dice forshipe: The sate i then analyzed a4 unitary actor with this Fins i in decd en cme Amen ge rhea pram epost anne Heep ey adjacent ner indd pay a over crcetior oro na “ee Cl Mad inated 37 estipin Th tonal cto tt hoes tale ae thely pens eu not any sat but ater estate wh pete ‘hele Ao one bel oot Zev Mas angie ihe presumed ‘uel methanam that prevent democracies rom fighting exch ‘theron te rural conteinon the use force imposed ‘on democratic executives, emphasized by the stctral modelo the ‘Einocratie pene or the terdency of democracies to exeralie ‘orms of ptcfl conic realton, emphasized by the normative Siplantons of the democrat pence4 Mode Toe Ros Ace that impesition offal Soviet blackade in Jne ook the Americans oe bec he Soviet pve no waning f thee nent 10 imposes blockade, ba because repented warning sgn had gone Lnheeded since Api The Amerie chances to deter the Jone Uiackae ipod by in stages each Soviet move went snanavered {nd ech oportuny for deciive action passed" James Faron’ essy on Rtionalit Explanations for Wa” Begins rth ental pal it mot aod choke cout of wa nee and expected uy theories be fed fo ee tree or eae, Since Sighting aware conti, Fearon ak, why do onal state fight rather han dea According to ratonality theory, {Finer ext an aeratv that both partes prefer thy wil core it So wy nota negotiated bargain ential equlet tothe ost come ofthe wa bt without the expenditure of blond and treasure? Fearon conchdes that al fares of negotiations between compre- hensiely ational states (the “notional ate in out igure 1) an be traced to one of two typex Fit, Beatz there exits no superior tutor to enforce an spetment tates may forego bargain thats Drefenble to war Second, sats rationally misrepresent facts aout ther own resolve or even powe (Chey kep information boot thet mary ene po eet in eig cie mre rantageousbagun. In speciyingwaye in which wets may a= ffm raloal mialelaton of rete and power withou ay Ra {her misalelaton or misperception, Fearon makes an impetant ‘ontrbution. His model improves on eer atonal choice efforts ‘weeding out many of what he eal “hi sometimes nonrational ‘Ssumptions”"" However ah concider andy In fac. bter “undetanding of what he asmption of rationality ely implies or ‘planing wat may acti reo eine ofthe importance of parila irate ss actor orem, one the stntion i Finds len bound ritonality ay appears more important ease ‘ot disreementssbout itive power than promt information abot yeas ‘VARIANTS AND USES OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL As shown in Figure 1 early inthis chapter, the base Rational Actor ede omen res of a of tO in with astmption ofa comprehensive rationality and mores to ‘he limited perceptions and calculations of a particular agent A rian ad Uebel Medel second axis begins with any state and stretches to regime type ident Fed state and named leader. Diferences slong bot dimensions are ilastrated in recent theoretical approaches to international relations reviewed sbove ° In simplest form, the RAM links porpot and ation. IFT know an actor objective, Ihave a major due thsi action By obsery- ing behavior and considering what the actor's objective might be, ‘when entity an objective hat advanced fective bythe action, Tove song hypothe about why he did wheter he did. thie hypersimpie form, the danger of tautology is evident. Recall chile dren's explanations of behavior: he dit becase he wanted ta It the only evidence of what he wanted i what he diy the ew state- ‘mente are empirically equivalent i, “The fill RAM inclodes not only objectives but also calelations shout thestuton in which the actor nds himself This conte pe- Sents threats and opportunites thatthe agent pacages a options with pros and cons. The actor chooses the alternative that best ‘vances hi interes, Thus in explaining what an agent di, or in ‘aking bets about what hes key todo, an analyst mast consider ‘ot only the actor’ objectives but aso th option he identifies, the ‘Costs and the benefits he estimates to fl from each option and his Feadinet or reuctance to take eds. Ifthe reader thinks aboat 1 fiction he has taken-—for example, the cllge he cote to attend — How much of the fact that hea college X rather than calle Yi ‘explained by his objectivest In most cases the stents personal Sypris of options etimate ofthe corte and benefits and readiness to take sks were also important factors. [As Sceling has noted, one major advantage ofthe RAM is that “you can sitin your armchalt and ty to predict how people will thane by asking how you would behave iyou ad your wis about ous Yu te of charges fo of vaous, empirical behavior" This advantage comes wits mer sk, however Some analysts ind their armehair so comfortable that they rely on logic inferences alone, without any evidence about what the actors objectives, ‘pons and existe setully were. Ths proces lve them ve rae wo the ally ofthe conspiracy theo: Aelclen ma ‘ative analyst ean invent objectives at an actor “most have had” however implausby by weavings logical web fom consequence, however untatended or unrelated to some imagined intention, how- ‘ve farted Allow the analyst io make farther asumptons aboot‘options estimates, and risk orientation as wel, and the possible ibe fonisent RAM sos bcos inne Tn the thinnest version hon economics reappear 3s poli sae sco. Geoplital enditions, including the ditrbuton of pow ‘eograpi, balance of treat, existing hardware and sofware forthe ‘Sicof technology etc are coupled with asate's minimum ebjecves {odraw broad inferences Suchan analysis sufced in the ate 1930510 plain (or predict) that Germany, lated in the center of Europe wh pel areata he fn ad Ws acta Punitive peace in the aftermath of World War Tand ravaged Uepeatod end bpeataton woud eooey aere nd fo Slonist Moreover when Hier became Chanel of Germany, the Brlsh government copied that he wa ly to ah a tbe cpl ingot to the i. Ha 19 oe He fori the wold that Germany proposed to sole is imited trio die te wth Czcoslovki inorder to protec ethnic Germans living brs he Brith nt had tanner the questions wht doce ir really want Could his dsies be state pect? The Brsh Prive Minster, Nevile Chamber, believed that Germany ad reasonable grounds to fs aggrieved, inching legitimate eon cerns about the German-speaking population in Caechoslovaka He ound plus their clams thatthe peaceful tense of limited mounts of error oa Greater Germany ould help heal prychic ‘wounds inflict bythe Verses Treaty after the fst World War and {hus prevent a second European Wars Moreowes fom his fae to- face encounters with Hier, Chamberlin believed he had taken the ‘es fina nk of ar nd alee ought sain his fe, go he impression that here was a man ‘who could be reid upon when he had given is word" ‘But Chamberlin got wrong Byconciving of Hie sa normal stexreme, German atonal with el revanes but imied objec: thes, eed to examine finer dtas about Hers partial Syneraic goals and thus missed major cues. Hiller had writen tens bt wate aed ing caste te Fes of ethnicity, ebensnum (ving space) for German expansion, todthe Geman maser rac!” ms ‘Out of ofc daring his wilderness years, Winston Churcil ead carflly Hier book: Mein Karpf watched his maneuver on Bis Path to power and indeed as early a 1933 sounded an slarm about Fliers dope el intentions" When Germany uniatraly rel iar the Bhineand in violation ofthe Vrs Teaty in 1936 ai then absorbed Austra the anschuss,Chureil asigated the rans Uhe of eCac Mode 51 CChamberain goverment frit flue to understand its adversary” ‘Thus when Chamberlain returned from Munich with Hider’ igna~ freon am agreement and delared that he had brought back "peace ‘vith honor. blievet is peace nour time Chueh sid Wrong. ‘ashe wrote: "the paition of Czechoslovakia under pressure fom England and France amounts to the complete surrender af the ‘Western Democracies to the Nai treat of force. Such a collapse will Invi pees or scurty neither to England nr to France. On the con- Tearch wil place these we nations na everweaker and mow dan~ tevous situation, += The bei thatteurty can be obtained by fhrowing« smal att the wolves isa fatal delusion? ™ ooking back, Gerhard Weinberg concludes that Hitler's purposes were eomstent als practical une, "Whether any ater “Tcrmun fender wut end have taken the plage sure deb rarnings Hier received fom few of his advisors can ifored he belie in his personal role asthe one man Mind even coger io lead Germany snd drag the world “As Iraq massed large numbers of to0ps near the border with -Kawaitin the summer of 1990, Western leedes speculated about ‘nother dictator goals and plans. The challenge for American off Els wos to figure out "wat he legs hope to accomplish and where this intitve ely to lead" Thy Began with an identifi state, Teng taking account fis recent histor inthe specific crcumstances itconfonted. Iraq had recently conclude cosy, decade-long wat {gant Iran Lavish mlitar spending combined with major deste ‘nancial commitments lef Iraq feeling burdened by the weght of foreign debs In the wat with Ian, rag had lst Shatt-al-Anib and thus bad a pressing need for new port facies tat could bemet by fnnexing 2 smal slice of coast from Kuwait. Impartial observers fund some meri in Iegi aime in ts border dispute with Kuwait, ‘Specialy about underground ol fields that could be drilled fom ‘lh sides ofthe Borde President Bush could thus understand why Iraq might demand money, and even minor territorial ajusiment, from ite richer weaker neighbor, Kuat ‘Nerowing their fous to the personified state an particulrchar- aceite of Saddam Hisein, Wester leaders considered hisbchav- iocexpliabless actions ofthe ruthless rel tyrant they knewhim to be Moreover, neighbors who knew Iraq and Saddam mack better agreed, The Kuvaitis thought some concessions to Iraq mght be ‘eeded, but that Saddam wae just bargaining. Egypt shared this avait sessment of Saddam's goal: President Bush checked with 4 : ; a2 %22 Mode Te Ran Aa Vn and Ut ofthe Ca Model 5 ‘which aspects of reality the state wil care to observe dgments about ‘vale and reality re deply intertwined, for fact ae relevant only in|H. Md The Rao Ace Insitutions such asthe Buropean Union or IMF to international busi- nesses and nongovernmental organizations such asthe Red Cross, this paradigm is also predominant. Oe eas the model so per- ‘aie is that does have significant explanatory power. Both that [ower and sme of ie limits ae evident a8 we turn now tothe key ‘gestions about the Cuban mise eis NOTES 1s Lerner an iin Kh, Te Gl Ci 190-19 ‘Dias nd rth Nw War Grr Pn: rican Unieiy ran 9p a Hane Meet, Pirin an (Ne Yk Kp 970) p lt-te rp epson th iors They t-te “lun of te Rogan Nera pod of hero! ‘han one he whch cl Spr en 30) Fr ‘Maio 4c ton os Spmme ance! port ‘poem anges Morgen Spicion ee Grin ACs oe Teta Erg tnd ae Dipl of Ov Tit Sel ow Grd Ute ran 93. p. 3958 Te ‘Mee nae nnn ek i Wk sect rte Vr SndedWendn: Langu 199) othe ang pti epee he camadin Ste is San yn fos end Spl a rc ey Srl rg ee cnc Arcs cnn ay hun wn aa ‘Henan The maf ope he Maki of he Wa Vr (neu: Pict Unbersty Pre 98) 2 Martin, Pe oon Nn pS {ating i ey oni wht Dak ln er op rs 37 any 198) 21-94. (ener caon of Sterence Haw aera the ‘Sef ent snd ein quton? Derren wont “nnn thie hasnt party wi ake and oy Intuneiag pcos fw we lee ees caning whines br bring et ou bere le deemed ys ‘see Ta corgi than the pecs f the cnet hat ‘demand rican se ors Ft vt combination fae es (Sethetepartcpnte of he psn the aguge a ameter ‘ker cterent et ede Sond how dee he mata of ‘lc snd common merle peated sostin? wes | “Tint communion reed and wt eth mens of hein tence conan? oth hat kd fia ‘Sequel novels of ion lye a ly perce ‘rts anda ih prin nny age ‘mato Fh wat rte med ort or nent of oD Swath vc by bichon commis tse ‘there b wold be non si fom conden at if com Inet hethen cebleencugh tbe cece edt ecard ae Sheking The Sang of of 3), 5 Sth The Sag of Cafe 4 6 hen it sed int cng ion ene of Dc hi props on conte dcr at wes canted. Expion of hse or oecpied anc on hoa input ‘lel fre unopened clas ia ‘il ty nt re cto er vi eel ‘olin ani ee cnt sed by more sconaius ther, Thcter tnd nals be Sone Mode ef Se ‘out nel Mooata ayo Ratna! man Bei a Seal ng kg 95). 96 Forth Lge ation. alecn Ard a reat Ctont ee 50 4: lieth Sino ar Nate Polix The Diego tore cue ann ota ce on dct i ther Echt spo aay es may wae arc (age MIT Pes). 9, Hoi oma hartan dct wah rey Ca rich Mend ‘sor AE Thr of es Se Yor Maw, ‘ested Tt fran ‘et tr mot i pe ore sation ab ‘Srmunteton eve hc ajeens bat oe expec aoe ‘Somnon nar ues ina ine thet imine Ser rons moves yond ifn i ee pean ot {espe ons pil cna) toremind of oe Fecrotstap mencon Le, that one acres cosa ncn of "hes ar choke 2d) provi You or dein ch Incrctne Mo aes lie Ns gedit te emonethe:eSnon rend arth Peripe he mor onl me not pt cer barbeen io emonst hw farcand onset tata Se whee sneha steele ‘Smit th hp of ej compere anal nce” “Tm ttn Pp. 30 #2 paps PP Pere RAR ARR AAR wAY: J } / ‘" ears | Modal bThe Rao Ac oe Teeter cca ae eee era nner a aera are sat Eee ee 2 Se nanan Sopeheer re tigorneens ee eer Sire eter aemece Soest scuieneeumreneeoaeeed Seeoecke eater a Sitpenene cena 1S aceon ngs oman Settee iets ei ees Eatin aeaot neem Se ee Pla er apt ea Serie eeeeter tay Stereo ee Speen Simhat ereemeraren a! Sere oer Soraeesemamen ioe 1 soe 15, John Hara "Some Soc Sence Implication of New Approach Sheer, oo CE ow napeerte tomes See errt an 1, Sion Human Nur and Pap 23S of pliy ‘hear sel at set haw ifr peo pied ddonmaing enema hasten eden ‘outer copie sent rode tn cpld pine ‘Stour are by ies an eis eco Veer ‘Th rn Thr hls npr Praag Cpt oe orpon ‘nai aly Desa Suford Uae Pre 90, BIBT Manon cope peop hoedenontrnedin brary sting nein epee th adel of ‘Speer rol in nor! hone pelea om ‘Senierey nt fnetone nd preity ase dantine sin rat averion rnerom host fo cmp enon Forerummary fh mpl se Dan Raa, Pl Sl nd ‘ts Try le nent Und Ucn Herter ee {ene Cat Unt Pre Dao Rehr Nabe nd ae armen nore Sn nd Sern el pet (Gapenod Cite Preotee Hal), Simon Hen Nature in op. 27 Sno reson" an ‘ncn heey rmien nayhearyt perro xin ‘ealphramens fis he empl sumo et po an ‘et mae eperan sath won bch pope cher ele ‘Stan at cethom Tho pl nd harcerton do eo nme fpr ar nce ind pt an oh ean by op ng ip 0 Notssto apt inthe orinal cnfthe ook ade oe afar hatte poser epee ‘emnarotion ft cesses fra stay pre bh {Sn nr Toure for andes epi RC ‘Snguod itn Nature snd ima tar C90} in oliogred “he ef History non der Dane (Oxo On sie re 198 ph 24-5 The dere piss defn of is ‘nt onc Sutin boo arated bet nae ‘itt Wa ne On the iy sch earn nthe ‘Sete lita in eth cnc reno ne over, The Len of Hs (New Here: Une Pre 390 THcle Note the alps esmenfatoly anor epost ‘ingrowth ome fre icy scape, Thee mh oe el aw nar {epee fr Wao and os hice) sn impor ‘Byond hen sgicaer bens fe imps om heed ‘ony the words rope Warn opt ona ld ‘heal o 9b owes Won geste in Ninh Maer nd [Roonppth.swedopp Seatac so Artur Link, Wel‘Wie: Retin, Mad estilo Heights rn Dai, [Sonus Koc nt A Wr: Wan Wo nd he Qu fr ‘hv Or Po exon ives Ps, IR anor ‘ut aseamen of he ey of Wee peste rsd ‘Girne Coren wi over on Vr On fra Won ‘ages ewe Macs) The natn expr conics [ery aon Fras yee of aia Boi ay 95 reenter postion in Bol chnble iling he Us pain of engh nthe worl Bab ‘Wocbet Tie Che How Cnt Wo oro: Son ad Shas, Vo) 28 2s, Pes Rep nse tt “istrians oki back at uti wil Phe pent ent and pct testo af tc morc” TRS neo pe Cdom arcs pce oral ego ‘ech Patanent el he Ue Ko ine 18,2 epotedin The RETIE ines fre 06 Ina spent Untied Nas nied" {Vera Gene Depp tt der Bri 0 doth Seay er arial segs trend canyon” eg Buh pho Utd None Goel Ase, toe 1159, Sem mye ty rant rac pt reset cio eis ‘Seana nod cat regent and exer ‘Aint our eon crise bso elgg te serra nur demacnca” Wi Chaton a Nataly ‘Stay ngs on incre (ing. DEUS Sores Ming ae, to, ene ate See maton saul meetg 1996 cond on ‘Sind copter Keston Bruce em eve, Satins fog 11, Rhanhteion fh propaion2ec ab Pasar Exton Erp if cle nd i Mistry iyo iy 2.298) 2. Shing The Songof Ci. fanart th sc agents Thoms Shing ms yun er ce Ute re 0 rere cout deren ha goer see terion Se ‘Reo ef Wr ater (sma 99), Fr more eet aa ‘SoS ame ter snc heart ames Fa, ‘al expan or Wr train! Oat 0 ere ‘Sora Pv err Tow The Pe ety (canbe: Cay Unt Pr 1 dK aon gnc rad to Bn a ower” nro ae ic (oder poner): 40. Vague prs tow ‘Soc thoenterpton fhe shan mie a "Uncera, ‘SESS Lvming nd Bring inte Coen Mie Cs n dof ‘Sep hus Pa oer Ono Aon Abr Une en rae 90) p73. 1. gol camp uel Ace oppo of hight tout ae intron ww tt Uo sd i aaa ere ‘Shinde ot cage Se Chia chen ‘nun Sees Rao Dares Try abd Compara Ce Sti” ‘on Poi nur 1909) 10-8. ‘Forres tht as thse Devin Hap The ‘Cus kr Pret Ls fm Sth Camb Nir B30. _o, Wh Scan a pling hie major works Gen Spd Deere nl ewe ins Pron Unies Pes) a fed ‘rec oman of heb mda a bes lc probe of seen sere robb of ay perc oak by he Suet ent feet fou tas ich an id? ‘Merten or mighbe terme eggs kas They ‘eC )bneltan offi ote (theca whic exec a {Si aol ofr pone heer) he poo ‘tr reopens cig ytd te pba wing, ‘Reasee wah porbe tpos (p12) Se Spders dort ‘Sino ofthe ameter motel inane wih Pa eee aeniy som: at este ness antes ‘tpn hen HS nd uD Cafis among Natio Sie nin cn iri ss $e Sting Nc Sg te el Ci 5 ay 9 i Sti noc Garman Dein eer UsTel, The ace ‘peel in Te Dorp neon Sra Tg I-16 ‘Ws nS, 961-190 eee Mae Then (evo Gran folihing 180), pp. 913 Teeter edactn 1s, an, Tat! the nto ors Hoon ‘sah 40, Hes hn Oe Eatin: Meta and euro NewYork: Paes vedas 3 Sen Sir en Corti 94 Aerts hs Ds Cai Suton aor Mir an Que St Mone RAND Corprtin,60, 15, Fail, Das Anais roca Lon Chit ee Uncen (ew Rd House 1968 Rae Metamora es tt Commence! sri Unive of Fp Ans Au ee 1962 Erde: nico burs saben hat arth eon een cane SRS OS CARS —s “igh aaa sotgiant ASS k| 72 Model The Rational Aor is publ ceo cer war“The mere ctht ation cou ‘to ke peng achat pnts a er vrcaa pc” 7, Sec a ec Wm ery eet Serer of Des th FPrsuontont he Cone (Wingo De: US. Gonrnment iting Offer 1981.9 Bi {9 Seam D Moro Gane Thy Pll Sess (Pinto: Prineton Une Pra 1990y edo Dre debe ad Be Man ne Folk Theremin Repeated Game with Darang nem Infra’ Enomea 5198. Thre maybe mail ah equa (Gorm ch eter neil det yon om) Inno um (perth gud once eh ye fovar th elvis inecengatenhe“Rle fhe St" Ione or thoapefal crite fatnalhie ppoaces 0 ‘tery diene Suphen Worm Teo Scery Ses? [ier ei 2 ig 7 van, Bc on de Menu dD ia, Renn Ne He: ‘Wes rem 992) Te eee mde pnt teh {pt nie tense sn eon, cpt Spe rtanbrAr emis Tata y 2932-3 empha ae. ena de Ment nd aim ices ‘cere erator a ‘See taconite. 8) 02. Resp Tas 20. 0 1A Acsring oar ei id nf they the ‘NorMtean e deepd ee vat! Dre Tes dv! Word Pac Canary 118, 108, Abe a dal inl Dorn Teory a8 Compre Cis Soe hte ee ao ea ra 10, fra -Raonal ea Theory an ent. 108 id. 90. pass abd On ron deere hor sump ‘Sout property ihr edahow en ne Gru “fon amen Teor: Think There | Deter ui (amar 18. 10, Tie wel Rober ele Gro Sn an Rcd Ne eo ‘hs Pipl ant Darlin obs Hepner Pro {tic Ned Lebo Bre Pe and The ae Intron! rs more os Hopi Users Pro ton, Ja Raa ence Ther and enc. 2 1 Se fr example, Alene George nd shad Ske, Deter ‘aera Fie oo or: amb Ue Pe, 19745 Ge Fol Ferme ory en Alera {ingen B60 ltt he P91 ong Te Cs Sorte Cope een Dion king Ber The Operon Cote Be Sen Pehl Na of eatin ‘eet Ure akowl (oa Wei 9 Rb ev ‘Thelin ternatina Rlow Pnec:Psceon Ucn fess 70) Reon nd pen eran ina 11, Geng nd Se, i Aen ep Pp. 18, Gees Soca tempo pyc oe Seren ‘tannin orp rt a0 pt ond {Po scone tort erence anton eed ‘Siig ssn pn nay i300. tna. Foro atom apna re 1s. Bide TIS Rac eter soniy atin age eae Chander nd ‘ees yo ni fi ee Tide woul te rs prs ua anil he Sdtindoo nnn meting with erin ecg cello nile Geri le Macon a a. ti, Sade sti ine sayin a be, ‘Sen yn ad Wer ee erm on Wed ‘iy ante Cam Uaeiy res. 99.5086 x Nowa oer Chelan nnn, 9D 51 12, Wc Chas he arin Sr a: Hn ii, ‘bhp th unheeded {Stuer bewen ne sarin sm mel ‘reyes mp atthe ine Mies epg py o ‘mos de chee an a cpl pare es eon ‘vou what ands pgis hopes Tac rine Maer peste ie tier ck aoe cor pain (ponte Cont Ep at marge sponte ‘ops aches oe he ct Comes ‘ine bse tht el ero wi bigot pre {Potala berwenGret sd Gean Me ‘Exetel uo edo ee ape e {ppeonenltedcottd Poesia pee Bt alr rare hope and opecaton Ave ta cy oisgious dpe propa osn song ap 29 80008 ve| 2 1 Seinen The Cuban Missile Crisis: A First Cut tempt to place ofenive sie ‘hoot to respond t he Soviet mise emplacement witha blockade ” ft €RO Sm SOO CoG OPAL LL | 6 fer9 wen aeons pHa HNN HHS a ‘or ssdoon aos pu ure 30 sumodsue {Beans our eg) 99 aUOKIK9 “79g Jo DUANE ore ap BNC 2VUND NI STTSSIBG BAISNISO ‘OV 1d OLaGIaG NOINA JATAOSTHL AIG AH, tN -suopso> prusuosar 0268804 omioss ade Seppe 5 suspuessusunpa Jo gee a eiruniog [Ponsa 2 capepin on ap wow HOS Am PAA IRD IO52 The Cabin Maile Creat Ot became an offensive base for the Soviet Union. If, however, Cuba became an “offensive military base of significant expacity for the Soviet Union, then this country wil do whatever must be done to protect its own eecrity and tha of ts alies"> ‘Khrushchev certainly heard the wering. He complained angrily shout it to Kennedy ina pevate eter sent on September 28,"T must tel you straightforward, Me President, tht your statement with threats against Cuba ie just an inconceivable step” Calling up feservise made “the atmoephere red-hot” and poured “il in the flame’ These threats aginst Cuba were ike the behavior of beigands in the Middle Ages, Khrushchev wrotes Rhctorie aside, hese moves and countermoves seem lke a text book ene of responsible diplomacy. The United States formulated a policy stating precisely “what strategic transformations we [vere] Drepaced tet? The Sov Union acknowledged te ile Errand announced uatrsegy Ut etaled vo bese conic. Tis ‘would alzo sem to be a mode ese of communication o signaling, between the superpowers: By private mesegs and publi statement, the United States commited Wilf to stion should the Soviets cross fn unambiguous line (deploying offensive mises in Cuba). Al ‘esponaee indented thal the Novlets understood the sia al Cepted the mestage* The policy followed the tenets of deterrence ‘Spouse by the best scholar ofthe subject, then and no? "The US. government nonetheless remained uneasy about Soviet intentions, The oppasition Republians, led by New York Senator Kenneth Keating, were making the Soviet buildup in Cuba the ‘umber one election sue in the upcoming congressional letons Keating repented voiced the fear that hort lear weapons were being placed off Ameriezs shores Inside the administration there war so gaily who suspected thatthe Soviets were ying about thei el plans He war the Director of CIA John MeCone. MeCane had no bard evidence, buts deep intuition stimulated by the ds- covery of antisirrat missles going into Cube. For MeCone, these ‘made snee only if Moscow intended ose them to shield a base for bullae mises aimed athe United States, lowing fom thse warnings promises andasurances, US. tation converged in an estimate prepared bythe Office of National Estimates, the organization that prepared national estimates coordi- ‘ating the views of inteligence anaes throughout the government For ten years, that Office had been directed by “perhaps the foremost ‘racitioner ofthe caf of anayals in American intelgence history" Sherman Kent® Kents analysts produced an estimate that was ds- Why Dith Soi Union Decide Pe ese Missin Gab teibutedto top officials throughout the goverment on September 19. Entied"The Military Buildup in Cuba the estimate condaded that, ye the Soviets could gain considerable militar advantage fom pla {nglongr rang ballistic missin Cubs or, riore ie establishing ‘ate for mise launching submarines there. “Buteither development ‘would be incompatible with Soviet pactie to dat and with Soviet policy as we presently estimateit” Why? Because sending mistilesto Cabs “would indiat afar greater wilingnes to increase the evel of riskin US. Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus a." In an analpais of the episode published in the CAF in-house jour alin 1964, Kent arged that the analysts ad red tse the matter ffom the unique perspective ofthe Soviet government In hundreds of ‘aes the method irelable, Kent explained because the“otber max" isimhis right mind because be cannot capriciousy make the decision by hil eae he ows the por of sao ein hi ‘antsy std gone aaepted inns of Ke itt, a Beene then wl nomed wen tia conan ot ‘ule that the el trouble begins Ken explained. “Its when the ‘man rigs len ou ofthe track of rma’ behavior that you are Mey lose hime ‘When October 15-16 Kenia and hit vse mere nformed thar the United States hed discovered Soviet bali mils fn ‘Caba the president and mos ofthe others wee shocked. “It seems 10 ‘me my pret statement was clear about how we woud do anything {tnd hese coniions aml under the conditions thet we woul. He rst know tht were going of out Soi sems to me he st." nd then Kennedy woes ald off" What Kennedy's announcercat ‘of the eis called “this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Comsanist mises” indeed posed troubling quetons. Jet why id ‘he Soviet Union undertake sucha elles movet Wat objective could the Sovets have had that would have justified coure’of action with ‘sch hgh probaly of mudear confontaton? These questions wee ‘mong the fist to be considered by Kennedy’ senior advisers when they convened at 1:50, on Tuesday, October 16 "We can have bean wrong about what hes tryng ro doin Coa? Kennedy adited. "There any doubt sbout that” Areas our spurte Goes uring that Birt day Kennedy wondered aloud why the Soviets had done i "Welle shrugged,"itv goddamn mystery tome" Discusion at that and subsequent meetings generated four hypotheses A careful examination of the deta of Soviet action ‘should allow us to distinguish among the hypothe more clesty ‘han the policy makers could inthe heat ofthe criss2 Tee Caen Mile Cri A Ft at the Soviet Union cept that it seu cy aha of ert ali Ci Teta yr ag stein ie gi tt he rowel county wold cometo tei ots weaken, One the Eitimemos the Cla produced afer the mises were dcovered in Cabs cxpne: "The Sov ede decision o deploy baste mis Sisto abate to thr determination to deter any sve US. irre wee nro te Ct eine ich ey Spirent reprd ately and imminent Though the 1961 effort Pied Cake wih fre of Ca-tined Cote ad aed issu the Soviet Union bd sabtantlreason bev that the Unted Sates might tempt todo the jo ight The Bayo igs td demonstte tht the United States could ‘Certainly Khrushcher and ater Soviet ofcils defended the deployment of Soviet rn to Cain 1962 nr these terms. Aer ennedy reveled the mise deplyment tthe word the Sv rep ‘ophased tht any Soviet id t Cabs “is exusvely dignd improve Cabs lesve capaci Tat emsined the Sov pion throughout hers Ins memoirs Krush ceed, "Whe was onan of vit to Bugis between May ¢-2, 1962,one ought petemmering ty bri: What wll happen we lose Cuba ™ From te Sve pat of vw Cuban defense wa cous mater Asal procimed socialist state Cbs sod othe Commons nly showase inthe Western world We ow know pec with the tid of ee boo by AlkundsPunscal and Tinoty Real, that Soviet. Coban reins were deeper and much more comple than Ameria reine, The Sovcs bad begun providing covert ax tance to te Casto goverment sey te pring of 1999 and ‘Suey ringed he res ofa ea of 95, wel eee Such aid was etc by a United Sates goverment et we sl ‘ing whether Casto wold bea fender oe inne 196), Canto thought his decion to nationalize American cil ener (wbih had refined to sefne Sot cade ol) wuld ‘Gute an inminent Ameria invasion (The Americana no seh Fan) Rhvaaehey gave s spect inating that the Soviet Union ‘right launch a nuda ack on America Washington chose Invade Cbs The spect had no effet ont nonexistent Ameren, "ans bt delighted the Caan lender wo thought the Rasans tn user uy Ca ere atc am Cuban eles beng ned by the CIA i Gata Such training asin ean post ‘ould be months bee the fee woul be ey fo evade Cube, The Sot sn Cabo goverment neve sy belived sic win net Mw as at ene es When {ne invasion di not come, the Cubuns agin bleed the Soviet threats had tered ln fact the CA the Dogan operon pla ing for thc invasion tht the Cabos thought they hn ast vee) ‘nearly November 1960, Casto gave a rate acess mong Cuban Gonmunis saying that he ba alvey been Maras abd pov ‘bouncing repeatedly that" Moscow sou brain and our get eee, Senos Cubans and Soviet were caught by surprise when the Cuban cals realy invaded tthe Bay of Piet Apel 1961, Khrushchev ifered al fhe support he could fo Cab end armed Kennedy thet any socal ‘ite wa can ouch ofa chain eatin in alparsof the lobe Again, the Soviets took some credit for deterring enn fem png the invasion he US mary suppet would have regi i order fo suceed. The Amerie bad ite ono gasp of wat tothe Soviets and Cubsns seed like «sng of Aeerent sess fr Soviet mis. Kirushcte and the Soviet government belived that more and smoreof ther own ats was ed 0 Css, Cub was the e SFP FRA. Pep POR RC84 The Cab Bie Ce A at at rime example of sizes in the newly announced global seatgy of Ldermining capitan though wat of atonal Toeaon ee is developed odd Cabs ate ws bsoming set of Soviet power dod gaa ere f Cuba was “ot cremated ‘ave it would hae been tere blow to Marie Leni It would geevey diminish our sature throughout the work bate lyin Latin Ameria" Kivushcher had sendy been eee he lenge bythe Chinese and by senor Suresh own goverment forreducng Soviet military prepared and not takng sf lenlyrevoltionary stance in foreign policy. Castro hitself had voice this crc n February 1968 whe he was ang for ees Inton droughout atin America ‘Soviet and Cuban beet about US. efor agunt Cuba often bore ony a ecincidental lationship to whet Ameria ws real doing Bt certainly Soviet and Cuban intligece would hve fad fzopt basis for snpcon. In Novener 19, the U.S. ewthornd Operaon Mongoneavorest Cle pl fe inert Tee Intion in Cab. Mongoose wa saperved by an ineragency ou erga chaired by Robert Kennedy Various forse sess Casto had been undertaken at leat since 1960, some with US knowiedge nd suppor some without “Mongoose see, hower om abasic problem characte of many sch cover operon Though tou dopa agen Ode 4nd mount some lav-erl sabotage operations mow offcals indingat CAthoughan internal rol would pee suse! on wn, Fe ees wuld have eal out bys Us ison, The Stary desoped contingency plans sch an on Ba ofthe sping of 1962, many of Kenedy advisers (espe a he Sate Department and the White Howse) mee not ony oppose oan invasion but wee a oppo to fmeny rere brent right foree the US to comer a invasion On tee te ihespring of 1962 when Kennedy puny exes his own i of the matter In alos hel Ap convertion wih te ender 0 he (ban ete, Kennedy id not ay what the ee lent ted ‘ear Echoing the view hnatlonl cry advise MeGeogs Hay, ted convoyed «moh ener ennedy pete sd he ould not Commit the Und Sts to bac ps et wih American Woops But meanwhile the covert Mongoote operation moved seed. is svcateshentenedby overt Ameren deruncnon of Case. clutionary fervor. ylog wo ntmae and Holt Cast, te U8 ied Tanuary 1962 fort to persuade other Western Hemiphere McGeorge Bundy. Soe Ura etme con inte Opinion con a i a de scant none api nye Sette es a fc nent ge ed a Seg ice ys en Ups Rela det an creo ine tener Er ienoty hl ahd so lon ewes Cab sn the error ch ee eee serdar oe cee ce Pita e tan anhet Wacceme eat scott tte eee eta ‘snus of ede arsenal Soporte reesei tes et Spm he pe pn oc a SEER eae atea cored eectThen inate Mach 1962 Soviet Cuban rations ented ri forests having eto do wih Washington sd ony nly under. ‘ood there For ternal eons Cast had tare o the amb tous lade ofthe Cuban Conununist party and oa servant of Moscow Anibal sate” Merwe Cato embatked on ne {Ws ieat png economies fom Chin In ry Ae be Sove govefmett contemplated ts opdon and dced redouble ‘sonmiment Caro For mons the Sorcha cael developed page of mi- spn ebay 180, afer foe Kaho on inl ihe governing Pei Gly aproved the con vpn stant pclae Ci Te Def Minish ‘este sda Seon to dls he Sai ee ‘ae malig te bi pata jm to diet to Cab i= Tent of te mses that had previa been proms to ay ‘Thr oun wt cmiered nthe aera of he Eales {doce ow 0S mila extcer ine Crean On Ape 2, ibe Protlum confmed the dein to deliver approximately 189 Sic meso Cab nab of Svs col eens ease ss ong with tamer and he deployment of regiment of teu ove oops Amar ion wad dtc Cuba ‘Stary atonal eel” i an dete we the Sov objet the emus apparent sutteded ha he me i ended Preset Kennedy peed {ti ca did ot threaten ihr would note invaded by the US or by anyother naon inthe Western Hemiapere. Tat edge iced oemowe he est the Soviet manent om Toate mane couilbe widen “Though persue temps to expan Sov acer mise in cabs wih te Can deere hypothesis il ot wind aed SSaminaton Festi dcteren: oan Arran stack on Cuba bad Feanibeprlmar Soviet ei he wer nc sal {SnMGE In Cin eqn sh Svs nee ng the Cuban ny crip an Areca tmp destroy Sin del) wuts mr atac If deere of 9 major Sieciadecr hectic emcee soccer stone ull ve tron bse sli, aw ger ‘Siico/Soi rope tn aby woud be oughly qu to that ‘inssan oop Second, the Govt could hve sgned pub dtese reat with ‘aba without deploying re A tse pct wa raed an fale by Sovist tne miner Rodin Malorky and Casts senior ade, Che Guevara, and was to be signed triumphantly by Khrshchey in Cuba in Noverber 1962, when the operational mis- _sleswere tobe unvlled tothe word. The signing ceremony never tok place, When Guevara and another top Cubsn official Emilio Aragones, Inent to Moscow a the end of August wo finalize the pact, they asked Khruthcher to publicize the preparation ofthe weaty and end the tempt hide the nuclear mises hoping the tety woud suc to ‘deter Ameria, The Cubans would then ns on thee ight 1 accept Soviet bse out inthe open just as America ales (lke Turkey) had done with thei nuclear deployments. But Khrusche sid 0." ‘A third objection tothe Cuban defense hypothesis centers onthe nuclear question If fr some reason the Soviets believed a nuclear Aetrrnt ws necessary, atl nuclear weapon (ie, weapons with § range of ls than 100 mies) were avalable that could have been tmplaced more quickly a less cos, and wit considerably les likel- hod of being dtcovered before they wee ready Indeed Khrushchev ‘ade jue uch a decision to rsh tactieal nuclear weapons to Cuba, but only in September 1962, when Kennedy's pubic statements revived Khrushchev’ rea fear ofa possible American invasion. Fourth, if for some reatonsratege-range misses were thought necessary, 2 much smaller number of medium-range ballistic mis fies (MOMS, with a range of sbout 1,100 mies) would have su ficed, with none of the more expensive and more detectable ltermediate-range ballistic mises (RBM, with a range of about 2200 miles). Nor would it have been necessary to turn Cuba into a bse for submarine launched balls mises too. "ith and most important what we now know about the timeline of Soviet dein finconsset withthe argument that Cuban defense xsi the deployment of Soviet ncleat misses. The Soviet govern ‘nent ad aleady analyzed the Amerian threat indie ers ad had “relly chosen frexpone,colnatingin the Presidium decison on ‘Apa 12 That a Meco ner to Culpa defense More than 2 ‘nth te Kl ha inte sete new process cule fag in set of dion taken on May 21 and 2410 send afr age ‘Group of Soviet Fores for deployment to Cuba, armed with many Insite Phe US il publi annonce tar execs a the Canty sing Apel a May (ales 62" Quick Ricky estab were nie by Soviet and Cuban ary imtligenceS one action might have tiggeeda response But there isn evidence thet the exer prompted relevant oficial in Moscow to react nor did Havana ask for radial reconsideration of the Presidiums Api 1 decison a therultary ad package for Cubs. TheSoviet military mision sentto Cuba did get new requests fom Castroon ‘May 18 formar costal dense mises and pos more Soviet oops (though on this pint Castro was bit eny). But nether Casto no the Soviet militar delegation expesed any interest in mlear weapons “Afterall at Castro himself putt Cuba had “tated repeatedly that ithas no intention to offer any part ofits teritory to any sate forthe ‘stablishment of military bases in part knowing that sucha move right bath proweke and legiimine an American attack. When ‘eiled to Moscow and asked his opinion daring the deliberations, the Soviet envoy to Castro was sure, for these reasons that Cast would not accept the misses™™ Th the end, Castro dd crept the mises, But he and his colleagues always sai that the dd this only because he elt obliged to help the ‘Soviet Union in its desire to change the global balance of power, OF ‘course, having acepted the dangerous deployments Casto and his collegues could also hope that Cuba would be protected from atack But Castro expected that the deployment would provoke an intense tis, He was fatalistie abou it, and sys that he“ignored how many nuclear weapons the North Americans had... We really trusted that they [the Soviets] were acting withthe knowledge ofthe ent sit ion’ 2*So a final problem with the Cuban defense hypothesis tht the move actualy made Cubs positon more, not les, perlous, Point hat was mae in Moscow by Khrushchev’ tp expert on Cubs. In support ofthe Cuban defense hypothesis lene tat Cuba ‘eas surely on Khrushchevs mind He might ve worried aboot the ‘American exercises, ven if his experts ad Casto had nol rise & reat fs and evn if he was not alarmed enough to wet to Kennedy ‘bout the matter Khrushchev’ impulsive nate is evident. Tere zo evidence that Khrushchev analyzed options for Cuban defense ‘aefllyo systematically Not had his military expert For the Soviet {General Stat Khrushchev plan "was ikea rll of thunder ina cleat sy” The only options they had examined were authorized in the ‘orginal, Apel decisions o defend Cuba with conventional arms.” Hypothesis 2 Cold War Politis ‘Weakness dented in probing the Gaban defense hypothesis can be addressed by locating this even in the contest ofa great power rivalry. The deftaing feature ofthe Cold War was the global compet ton Between the US, and the values and interests represented, on the one and, and the Soviet Union's Communist agenda, on the ether Whenere on prt ter gine and waren odo ‘oby othersaround the wold, Without knowing many deal sbovt Why Di he Sort ion Deco Phe Oe Mis in Cat 89 the United Stats andthe Soviet Union an ana would quilty understand hat they vere competing or bal powe Aria might ‘cae the opportunity to display the eet of ts wrdide power, ‘Speclly ance enemy’ shores Reacting to Def Secretary Rober MeNamat inl sement thatthe Sole misses n Cube bade mitra, Present Kennedy fl back on sich abroad hypothe of loa pols. He ‘a deme esl hy hed agra cred howinga general Acfance of US. power "Last mot Kenedy spect ‘rere going tallow) Last month shuld haves tht we dont ‘Ste But when we sd were nor ong and then they po ahead nd do, and then we do nothing then T woul think tha or sks ‘nee. Aer al hia polical stro se much as mit Inteligence experts round the government ined ew date netting tat,"A major Soviet objectve tee mlitery bald jn Cuba isto demonstrte tht the word ale of foes as hited £5 arin the favor that the US. can no longer prevent he adrane of Seviet ofesve power even ini i own hemphere” US seis. ence would mean sos of confidence in Ameria throughout atin ‘mre, and he world Secretary of State Dean Rk hoght "there Aicfeen git a dctre ging the Sve! Union boot the cours he pene coeitene theme therm ery fara hin the hemes lea now hat the hardline Eoy have moved nt the sscendancy. So one of the "Rigs we he ob concerto nt ja te ale ot the etre deveopmnet of vl plicy at fects ou tuton sod the gabe” Tn 1962, American lenders the Colé War a log erm stg he or lol peennence Kennedys deiion tet the Bay of Pgs {rvs of Ca fl was widely interpreted st showings lnc wl tnd Khrashehe hed red to puth the Ameren lene around st theiony face tofae meting in Vienna inane 196s general soe Keaned sie tnd stan tar sige we te, Khrushchev dapatch of nukes mises to Cab ovina epe: ented the supreme Soviet probe pf American Fatentions Gneraken in scree and sustained by Gopi, the sccess of Khrushchev pon sequied fat cea Conromed with oper tional mises the Une States might reset ndeciey.Dipiomatie protests woul just advertise Washingtons weaken the hllow nee of Kennedys own threats. By unmshinganreselute Americ, the Soviet Union would dasa reduc the eet of US. eo ‘iments to other nations After te alre acon Cabs, who cold90, The Cab Mine Cri A Ft Ca expect th United Sesto ac shower? Though obviously ya ‘lor would demons tthe ttn the Cld War had tuna iti fal today to reap um how pessimistic many Ameansveresbut they excome ofthe Ca War before enc toate Heny Kener rte a arent athe Unie Sts cont af ate destin ta Rar charactrd te ps etd sale More uch ae tation “woud indus reduced o Forges Ameria in word in ‘ich we ha beam gest Renny ch obs ates On October 21, when Sesnge asd ue wy be Sve fad pat mie in Cab Remy Pointe oh pont Sve pit gien (1) drwing Rusa Sn China dot pte sin henge sot ht ha been ‘ly widening sine 95 ort tegen the Sv pot ton the Conus word by towing that Moxcow wat cpa af Sold ston in support fs Crnmamnst revlon (2) radkely ‘ning th sign hich the Bern problem cold be reopen afer the Amen congreonal sections in November and ©) desing the Ute Sater emendnar pot ow Tn of he penser fs ararment hs hypothesis ignores vc key sper tution on a Robert MeNamarswondcred publicly on several oce sions why dd the Soviet Union need to probe the frnnes of ‘Ameria ntetons any frter afer the bg Americ stand 08 Beinn 961 Why anaes Sond, the end charac fhe Sve weapon deployment ver wel yond wat war ede or mes poll poke To {hangs Amercan intentions and mine, even ew RBM, {hrestening the emirerothcotern United Steer Cinlading Washington) sou set oud te THOM pos ao ‘heachvemen of hisobjetve othe plsnned depen of ‘acne iaunches balls mse “Tid the deploment of MRM, IRBMs, and plas for « sackman bse parte cca eget 8 ‘nal mon onthe Ctl War abo nancy thai fa Sconpl Asal toed mac ceploment tat eae oper Sond tle t ws Gc cold nde have gen te Set ition Can cave noes dele than the Wesel inten toe pce feo he epenem nr tigate Fourth yuh sch provocative probe of Americ inten- sign that omen inte stun of T96t Grands Amerca Wy Di he Sort Union Die ocr Oe Mies in Cust 91 Soviet $5-4 mediom range ballistic mises (MRBMS) being paraded trough Red Square These were theft type of mua ballistic mises {ployed aba cored Cua, Soe oe ‘might be humbled. But was there some purtcalar reson to try and hhumble the American at that particular me? What tangible gains could justify the isk? Finally thy choose Cuba asthe location ofthe probe? Atno point ‘onthe globe outside the continental United Stats were the Soviets so militarily disadvantaged vis-t-vis the United States asin the Caribbesn I the Soviet probe provoked a foreful American sipost, | vivid Soviet dent would make the whole venture counterproduic= {ive Moscow would then be the big loser, ot Washington. Hypothesis 3: Mise Power [Althe ist meeting with his advisers on the morning of October 16, the very fist speculation aout Sovict mvs came rom President Kenedy, He pointed othe strategie balance of Power."Must be some ajo reason forthe Russians to set this up he mused “Must be that theyre not satisfied with their ICBMs" The chairman ofthe Foint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell yor, thought Kennedy's es as tage ‘Knowing nothing about the government ofthe Soviet Union, or its leader an analyst could have gotten quite fr by examining objective foes maine strategic anal fomn Mars who could rad newspa #8 pistes. eC AERA tattle ah ener‘Tecan Mie os: A Fi Cat persand observe the military forces deployed and beng developed by the two sides. Starting only with the preumpton that the gal of cach tate induded survival and avoidance of xtreme coercion by he ‘ther and objective facts about current and projected strategic clear oes of exch, this analyst would have put higher odds. on the Soviet players moving mises to Cabs than did Sherman Kents Offic of National Esmates. Objective, the Soviet Union faced a ‘rious and wienin "window of Yuerbliy”—to row a phrase thatthe Commitee onthe Present Dange made vvd in describing the treat t the US. the American pots ofthe ate 1970s and ty 198, Specialy the Soviet Union fied reumstances in 1962 In'which the US. might have had, or might hae belleved tha, “Splendid frst strike" capability against the Soviet Union. As deseribed by Herman Kahn tn hs best-ling 1960 analysis On ‘Thermonucear Wr, a plendid frst seks capably exits when Sate ‘can, by skin st destroy State Bs capability to retaite against Sate Ae homeland rst, consider the brute fics, For a combination of echnical ad ‘budgetary reasons the Soviet government found ff in 1962 wih only 20 1CBMs (intercontinental alse miles with anges of more ‘han 5,000 mies) expabeof launching nuclear warheads that could ‘each American terry from bases ade the Soviet Union, Aboot ‘hese mises tenia elabty nd accra they had wel found Aoubas A sucesor generation of ICBMs would not become oper tonal before 1964, In addition, Soviet strategie forse nce only Shout six submarines with submarine aunched balls mist (StBMs)-The only rele nuclear submarine base for Soviet ub ‘marines was inthe nordern Kola Penisul, 7.000 mies from Us. Shores. Since the relatively erode early mises deployed by these sub: ‘matnes hada range ofl than 600 miles, Soviet SLBM fores could ‘not mint reeu patos in areas from which thir weapons could be launched against the U.S. Moreover the long route to the launch tea created igaicant vulnerable to detection and destruction by US. anti-submarine foes (os was demonstrated when submarines actually moved into the Adanie during the Cuban mise csi), The Sov Unio hex hope heating te US, eld wes its feet of approximately 200 lng range bombers. Though US. at ‘iets wer age een eco pate would ‘worry. Beas oftheir range, the absence of forward bases from ‘whic they could be launched and the lack of eapecty to refoeair- ‘raften route bombers launched agains the US. would be sent on ‘Wy Di ie Soviet ion Dec Pl Olle Marin ab? 98 mission with itd or no possibility of returning home, and could be plausibly intercepted by US. air defenses at various points along 2 7.000 mie route ‘The bulk ofthe Soviet nackar capability consisted not of long range micea thress othe US. but rather of the medium and inte imediate-ange ballistic missles (MRBMs and IRBMs), These mis- ‘Ses worked well and had been produced in the hundreds. rom the ‘Soviet homeland they could hit America ales, but not America (a fac that had framed strategie debates in Western Europe about te need for thee own nutes forces). There wee also shorter range ‘bombers carying clear bomis, bu again they could ony strike ‘Ameri allie. "With these assets in 1962, Soviet leader confronted a US strategic rela asenal of t Iss 180 ICBM, 12 Polaris submarines (ach ‘arying 12 mises), and 630 sutepe bombers stationed nt onlin {he US. but also in Burope anc Ast form which they coud attack Soviet targets fom all szmtht The bomber force was wel tained nd kept thigh readiness The Pola submarines could constantly patrol within range of thee Soviet targets, Moreover, the Kennedy ‘ministration had announced February 1961 that one of ts major Initiative would be to increase rapily American strategie nuclear {bree to tiple the ICM force and doe the SLBM fore by 1968, In adition, a a counter to Soviet shorter and itermediate range inudear threats to Europe and Asa the US. and NATO maintained hundreds of nuclear armed sircraft t bases in Europe and Asia and had deployed eal, now obseiscent, Thor and Jupiter IRBMS in {Great Britain aly and Turkey. The Jupiter deployment was sched- sled conetn nthe sig of 9 “Toa detached anaiyet—Amencan, Soviet or Martian—the conse- (quences of such a strategic balznce were calculable and ching, Satgie nuclear war planers distinguish betwee fis strike" and "Second trie scenarios in term of who stack st With thestat- sic nuclear eaptiites each had in 1952 and would have in 1963, {ational Soviet planners coud never have an incentive to strike ist, Bat wat satan US. paper Cul they hoe by «pre femptive stack to destroy and dsable altogether the Soviet capacity to fespond against the US? The Prsfic consequences of such an act. that willy destoyed tens of millions of Soviet izes as wel a lereducibleUncertites abou whether sch ist strike could prove 100 perent effective, made any such decision high nll even when one side had significant statgic superiority.{yo Suro oy a Ho poyEY4N 01 aS uogdap un BEIUEAPE ‘Geng dae aos tow pynon mals 24h ey Pokaag 208 Ng fuotpolqo any atom 29M “manody $9002 yl 292% 20 ‘ip sours agp s1gR0 pue Vin 18 ssieue (eUOEszIONd EK ecsiBs5u0 [2] wo) panos 4 -Asvano> pu poaydan> ase asad se 240 A popes 2401 7M seu, 960 ‘andi ay eqn m pou Seg AP “Rpm sur osng yo somes po xs mW to pF Sqm pense om pong pun, Py 2H OF {ripe ung) ap wo yam pu asleep apse ) _Siajosonp sucoaye ego snap dr poo 8 esos 2 ug 29 pot 3005 20) ‘ burzag pus se peur get beans sands pauyep suodeon pry ey suopao} of Suadeas Jpn: 23 pe "1967 PEE 96K “2961 HP 1 po opm sengO mM FOC HOH oat VHD I RA LH96 The Cn Mle Cri A Fat ot site would double the known mise strength to reach this country ‘But there was a second objection. The estimate by Sherman Kent and his interagency panel of inteligence anaes had conceded the ‘sensible Soviet government would accep the extraordinary risk such 4 venture entalled.Specically, the initiative’ succese depended on ffectng afr accompli without discovery. ‘Third, MeCone’s hunch didnot give adequate ‘Why Di he Sori Din Dace Pee Mis in Cabs 97 banning farther et explo- ‘Sons of nuclear weapons. The talks filed The US. then proceeded ‘with eres of tex blasts in the Pacific The Soviets aw the renewedGi q fS Se fess 9 mod poueyaa snomape a yo 200s of + yp ‘ean ou vdeo ute Age >a Ai yD BS 01 poe pp poe You se APIUUDY TODAS fea] 20 9pea), “eIM— MIDE PsTEMHOMH Snuauiap spn Jo sues%p SUEY, “Sept ran se} bo agp el etos 0 ey SIAOS 2 PP Jone sn mown ou pp sano 2, psn a> 2503 [SED ep 20 poptaoad 2g pan suodeaw Zep Sapssus STsteg 3 {oy spesiaea sent ap oF UORPpe uy Speapes EMU Pork GOL Fs ure amo anja an on umd porn Ae AAEM 9 PoE Te lspe ao so 0 is wey go pu my a rE, Feet Sang) spew yo Bean Ae 0} at Bano ary UNG OFF PRON BGR pa PF aot dan» FH eGR) OSE nog xh pate APNEA ADEA“Tiephoio wa taken in one of theaw-leereconssance fights tht began ‘on Oca 25,162; U2 photos, taken om 70000 fet rather han 30, ee ‘uch arder interpret Soo Esty ary indeed change the stratepc balance Kennedy was stil nt convinced ‘Why was Khrushchey taking this isk Surely the misses were not so valuable ust for their ow sake? His advises moved on to another Subject, but Kennedy was preoecpied with this question e burt ‘ut withthe eomament tat "we never ely ever had case where is been quite this...” Kennedy stl didnot get an answer" For Kennedy atleast, « more plausible answer dawned on him shorty afterward mst be Brin Khrushchev would us the miss to ole the Berlin problem —on his own terme Al the rs meting Rusk had voiced the suspicion that “Belin is very much involved in this For the fst time, Ym beginning to wonder whether maybe Mr, Khrahchev tera sou Brin, Weve ay ed abot is obesion with th In 1945, Bela had been divided into zone of eccpation anon the Americans, British, Preach, and Soviets. As occupied Germany ‘became a divided Germany, the Wenern sectors of Berlin became & democrats aptait metropolis unfortunately located inthe heat of the communist ast German stat. The Eat Gerrans considered West ‘Berna mortal threat to thei fragile eetion, For thi and ther re sons, Khrushchev had decided in 1958 to make West Berlin the pivotal “The ein Wille UPVC me ‘ated in the Cold War He dlvre n ultimatum demanding, in ‘cs tha the West throw fom Btn, Aer» period of intense “onfrntation withthe Ekenhower administration, Khrashehe had ‘greed to it the ultimatum in antipaton of 21960 summit with ‘enhower. The planned summit was hen canceled ater an Aperian U-Greconnatance sical worst deen over the Soviet Union Khrushchev nd renewed the lmaum to Kennedy when they met in Vien inne 161, Western troops be anaounced, mst be ot of [erin by the end ofthe year Kennedy responded witha mj buldop ‘of Ameren forces but he knew tha wae not enough in mitary {erm the facie were cle ‘The US. te NATO ale could not, ‘etend Berlin with conventional foes. Kennedy thought he could ‘eter a Soviet move only by posing creer exalt acontict, ‘nuclear wat Ia August, the Communist authorities Built a wall Tretwcon ast and Wee Deri. As yearend aprosehed ip November och, hvac gin stepped bak om eb alow the cor pletion of intense egotations that culminated in tals bree bis foreign minster, Andre Gromyo, and he American secretary of state, Dean Rusk, during Mach and April of 196. Yeti ting the nepoi= tions tke thir course, Khrushchev made est he wat not yin © “py better the next al-back positions diplomats cal He warmed that the US. and its als had to give up their postion in Btn. TheEide CE ‘hag pt sos ayy arene sem exstnars)a0Pq Ing Ut sa 2 0 pouza}pey pouty S948) Bf H9geI 804 tau pee Zaqang ur sets pas ay oF pojaen Opes ETA UBjotog wsia0g yaw aie stoner imo spods yoqyN poate, oeet 104 The Osten Mlle Citic A Fit Cat July why Khrushchev seemed tobe staking even more ofhispresige on 4 policy that would meet unaltered American resistance. Now ‘Thompson understood "{Khrushehev'} nots fol—L was aways cr ‘us as to why he side would defer this confontation on Bertin] unt after the election I seems to met all rated to this move of mises into Cabal” Kennedy agreed. Khrushchev “played a double ‘une? Kennedy explained few day ter tothe Bish prime minster ‘ou remember that he kept saying he wae coming over here afte he (US.congresionl] ection and would do nothing to distur the site ‘on unt afer the election. He sd thatthe wespons were defensive, that they were moving any miles there anda the ret And obvi= ‘ously he hasbeen building this up in order to fce ur with bd sta ‘on in November atthe time he was going to squceze us on Berlin” Thus for Kennedy, Khrushchev manewer made sens or itor in Btn ithe Americans did nothing Khrahcher wold force the Wet ‘ut of Berlin confident thatthe ties in Chin wot deter the “Americas from staring a war Ifthe America tried to berg he terms would bea wade of Cuba and Berlin, Since Berlin ws i srably more important than Cub, that rade would ls be a win for Khrushchev the Americans blockaded or attcked Ca, Kisco could then usc ths asthe exes fran equlent blockade o ata on Betin.“So that whatever we doin regard to Cuba Kennedy si, "it ‘ies im the chance to do the same with regard to Berlin Worse yt, Kennedy thought, Amerie’ European alles woud then blame the oss ‘of Bedin on the United States, since they would not understand why “America fl the need tata Cubs. The Alince would be spit by « Sv het nd aps Moscow woud betes wine ‘As Kennedy sw it his choice in responding to Soviet mises in CCaba was not one betveen provoking a mila rss over Cuba, o no nuclear ris, He could ether havea clear cis ver Cuba now, whe the onus of staring nila war woud be on Khrisicheot he could havea ucla eis the next month in Belin, when the US. strategic Postion would be much worse an th burden of nating a malar ‘war would be on Kennedy. This formulation ofthese was ultimately the essence of Kennedys analysis of his predicament to the Joint Chie of Staff on October 18. “Our problem isnot merely Cuba hes, "itis also etn. And when we recognize the importance of Bein to Borope, and recognize the importance of ur ali ota’ what hs made thisthing bea dilemma for tre days. Otherwise, ou answer would be uit czy” He went on:“On the other and, we've got todo something Because if we do nothing we're going ta have the problem of Berks mya. That was ade dea ls ight [oy Grom. Were poing to Wy Did he Soi Union Decide Mae fete Minin Ca? 18, have this knife stuck right in our guts" when the missin Cub ‘become operational. In bargaining terms, one had to admire Khrushche's move. “The advantage i, fram Khrushchev’ poit of view be takes reat chance but there sre gut some rerards tot" “Examining the evidence abou Soviet decsonmakingin retrospect we can finds good dal of evidence to suppor the Bedin hypothe Recalling th spring of 1962, Dobrynin notes that “Germany and Betinoyershadowed everthing” The previous yen in September 196, afer the Belin Wall had been erected, Khrathche had estab FIGURE Khrushchev-Kennedy Correspondence (September 1961-October 1962) confides Sentty Date “Subjects (oer mentioned) Krasicher 92061 ‘erin Laon Kennedy 101661 Bedi Las Khrahchev 115161. bruce 1/61 Ton Vin Kennedy W/W Lae Vit Kennedy innel_Bein Khrhchey 12/361 ——_Betin Kirhehey 1162! Btn 2 Kennedy 21812 Berlin Krahchey S102 ‘eri mica tetng? Q Kennedy 562 Bern Khrashcher 75/62 Belin Kenedy 71712 etl Khrasicher 9142 Neelea teting Kennedy 9/1842 Nadear sing t Khrasichey 972812 Nader teing Betin,Cabasuree Jane of Soviet hig, U2 itasion {nt ove space, Bern again Kennedy [0862 ‘Nada esing “Apri. Rancher ee ing te te nie Reber Renta Se PL a eter ag ih del int106 “The Cn Mlae Ci rt at se rt onde ang ing Ke abe a ere ae he wage the leaders tought eo ner Karst cs ele Fe a ae None forage, emi cs enc eh thn sti oe orci “ ne Sr et ety Kreps heal ea oe api Kheatches a cof impr Fs yh a ecllpalo” Te rere a ar ought enentw sat Ss ary npn a nT ae Wate sei eatin ee ig 2 nen ot fom he meena yg, as Kesh lg bi 1 ag i eo es cansgan norms ean adie desde 5 ena bl eal ton The premise SE certs deade pom pin wih anal Hea yh endo Math nen Rsk dd ceva yin At wes a he ea no re as Se ewe lng ancoing pre Beng pub eee ee ced oophe Sot tag ceten? ce Fe spt ia Ksichereecind te Ce the Sov ear bad an eppotanity—the srg nef Kemesy Whe owe Fs cio te kee et pedi ut ea a in wh eed len perineal foe a ye on hich he hd so Nemeth US might cdo a rade weapons Btn oro Stealer ssegteanar a ee i wa mh oe Kees pes aig foo wants to ight over West Brin The ‘Why Die Sov Uo Dec Pe Ooi Mie in ate! 107 United Sates nocd Belin “ike a dog needs five legs” Khrushchev ssid the hey ii te hands of President Kennedy, becsse he ll [hive w fe he fist sho." The Soviet Union, he added forelly, was “endy to moet ths tl" ethaps Khrushchev was not so confident. ‘The nextday he lf for the rip to Bulgaria during which, by his own accu he Madu he id taste itr Cla, Ne aye ice the Kremlin ene Coun ratified the don. ‘What were Kshs options te rsolving is rin problems? {khrushchev could walk away fom the sue But he had ostestatiously sstanagenda and past deadline to which e ad filly committed hit Sean prestige He could seep am snc salle, moro ee the statue quo: Kennedy had ofeed sucha setement (furaing “est German Chancellor Konrad Adenauet) but Khrushchev had already rejected it. Or Khrushchev could choose to renew the con Frontaton,hopeflly under mote advantageous crcumstancze. The Soviet eer had already rejected he fst te choles. The Americans ‘ood by what he called their°poiy of strength on Bedlin”™ ‘Tn March 1962, sis new ambasiador was leaving for Washington, -hrushchev told Dabryi tat the Benin question was the principal {sue in Soviet-Amercanreltions, The American ble in thei sup posed nuclear superiority was making them acts Khrushchev putt, aticulaly avogant” Khrushchev concluded, "ts high time thet long ams were cut shore” He liked Kennedy and thought of im asa ‘man of character Ye, Dobrynin ells Khrushchev" not conceal his bli tat parting pressure on Kennedy might ring us some success" [Khrushchev erainly needed a suctass As Janes Richter observe, “xKhrushchev's domes position set the stage for his foreign policy behavior. He needed a foreign policy success more than vet. The ‘mounting difficulties in his domestic programs discredited his argu- ments that he could lead the Soviet Union tos rapid victory ovr the United States inthe economic competition, even a the inressed strain on capital investment reinforced his inceative to sa¥e on ‘efene spending ‘Against this backdrop, which conditioned Khrashche'seraluaton ofall his options, the missle power and Belin hypotheses afer the ‘ost saistctory explanation ofthe thinking behind the Soviet more to send miler missle to Cubs. Khrushchev would gun a quiere atively cheap boost to Soviet mise power. The Berlin eri, he appa ently reasoned, might be presed tos successful conclusion Foreign poly tmp fa hand Rheascher oul no fle Ren tie aa” improvement ia superpower rations hat he ad promised He could return, too, to his hopes for Soviet domestic renewal, now better able to move resnorcs fom defense and heavy industy tothe aoe FS ees acne uamamenmaamaass shania SOO .<*108 The Cutan Mle Ci A Ft Cot eds of his role. “The Cuban mie venture” ices concaded, "ott him the prospec however sm, that he oul merge om, {Misstuaton and age is sendy dining suthorine= “The defese of Cube was constant conienton inthe back: ground. Butts nouble tht, during hs October 18 meting with Sromyio, Kennedy twice sid hs government di not intend to Iva Cuba and ety ofred to peg tat there wou bee inv sion of Ca, herby efapes by U.S. forces Knowing what was happening and what mattered to Khrashehew,Gromyko fnored ennedys fer and did not even consider It portant enaugh 10 tention ins cable o Khrushchev reporting onthe meng ™ Bur it must be acknowledged thatthe mise power and Belin ype a wees thoes conidcred above false for ‘nyo estes of what the Soviet stay di isteach of he {bur hypotheses asames hat he Sov decison tempos mises lediou pan or implementing that cess byiaaligt dts first to protect the bases and deter photographic econaissanc, and then endngin macarons Bu Soviet cons ape incon ‘tet wi hs eeonstructed plan. Itappesed othe Anereos at the MEM: were installed bere the cover of sree mises ‘wsin place Kenai's adviser and spexcwrter, Theodore Sorensen, ‘xprested forcefully the bederment ofthe White House oer his face Why the Soviets ale coordinate ths ing ‘ene cover on time before the miss were pun plc node fo Shield the mises rom beng dicovered, Wi, the, dd the Soviet ores in Gaba pert the U2 0 By over Cabs and spot the mises? Rirusichev' rand plan for unveling his fait atop presents 9 second ifcly He planed to vit the US. and snnounc te true Situation inthe second hal of November. resmabiy by then the insaltion oft misaes would be emp But even onthe round the-lock construction schedule adopted air the Us. announce: fret ta the nae hal en dered ory te MR wd ten place The IREM composes would not have achieved opera ‘ional readiness ut Deemer This forte are of coon iediielto understand ‘third peste rae sbot the Soviet omision of cmos tthe snl rd Boring the cng Thompson thoughts ane pa tat ‘BeSovies had waned he Arica to dove te mls dri ‘onto. “sao et to camouflage these thing or hie tem the wood Why didnt they do inthe fie pce! They sur ex ‘eed ter hem tame age How ee One Cp ‘Why Die US Respond th Mie Deplarat wi a ocade 109 fact thatthe mine sts were constructed in the configuration that twas standard the Soviet Union? A the White House meeting on the ‘rening of October 16, the intligence biter explained tha they ‘ould spot the launcher, in part, Because "Whey have a fourin-line ‘ployment pattern «which Sental «representative of the ‘deployments that we ote in the Soviet Union fr sia missles"? Bata Soviet dese tobe found oot hardly squares wit the exeasie effective camouage and deception that characterized transport of the mises to Gabe and from the docs tothe tes, ‘inally why did the Soviet Union pers inthe face of Kennedy's repeted warnings! Alexander George and Richard Smoke eek to ‘plain the fare of deterrence inthis case as an example ofa fait ‘accompli In such stuaons the inittor ofthe action being deterred. (hrahchey) believes that no commitment ext against his intended fetion and that the action canbe accomplished befor the defnder as the time o opportunity to srtabish comment and make eed ible Are George and Smoke right? Wa the American signal too faint, for nat heard? Was the warning not creibe? How cou the Soviets Inve belived that Kennedy would not react to their move! ‘Khrushchev didnot akhiambasada in Washington or any other ‘known experts on the United Stats for a considered analysis of his judgement, The foreign minster, Gromyko, ter wrote that he had ‘warned Khrushcher privately that “putting our mises in Caba would ‘az poll explosion i he United States. Lam absolutely certain ‘ofthat and this shouldbe aken into account” When orig this ‘sesment he feared Khrushchev might "Aint a age but thee was ‘no estion, According to Grompks acount Khrushchev was simpy mee thse sams Doran copied thot Rhvuscher rosy misunderstood the peehology f his oppo ‘nents, Had he athe the embassy beforehand, we could have predicted the violent American rection this adventure onceit became known [ee worth noting that Casto understood thi, But Khrushchev tran iy spre on Wea wn wh ot hes Drs in the end when his sere plan was uncovered WHY DID THE UNFTED STATES RESPOND TO THE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT WITH A BLOCKADE? “The US. reponse to the Soviet Unions emplacement of mises in aa canbe nerd in strategie terme ae simple vale-masimiing ‘Saati, American mcs superiority cul be counted on fo parasmo ae _ sfuysous woo x puaye ou rp ing uounzeda] 215 8 at "ou suet ppt pe dpatay ape ead ae UOmEY aC Cana so] "no Uoqo A395 SRF UE PP a emer nn a Pn ‘ “pees eo ean cml & am Bun § Seon ape « re if i =) ‘evan Aon 9 (Dy auodin i suodemrence. The lager danger was that the United States might this Soviet move and prompt an explosive countermave in. The Soviet ection would be anounced by the United in sch a calm, casual manner that ft could deflate whatever ‘one among Kennedys advisers made the Ing, except Bundy. Bundy only made the argument fay, he had changed his mind ‘But on October ren the Western Hemisphere which would weaken out whole position it Wy Dike US Respond athe Mie Deployment wh Boda 113 fsKennedy echoed that “Wall | think I would have been impeached “onthe grounds that {sid they would’ do it [put missiles in Gisshand cs" He lf therentence unfinished Bren allowing fr the iyperak of the nnmments the consents aneracre the sense that doing nothing was ot ous alternative Fru present Alternative 2: Diplomatic Pressures “wo baie forms of diplomatic pressure were considered. Former “ambasiador tothe Soviet Union Charles Bohlen and Thompson ro poral esectet ultimatum to Khrushchev demanding a removal of the misses and giving im an opportunity to comply without & Public confonaton or military action. “Another version of diplomacy, suggested by Adlai Stevenson, would be an appeal tothe United Nations or Orgusization of American Stats for inspection of Cuba and an effort to negotiate ‘he removal ofthe mises with bargaining on both ides, possibly at ‘Trummit meting The final setlement might include neutralization of Cube, with US: withdsaval fom the Guantanamo base or with- Arawal ofthe US. jupiter mises from Turkey ot Iai or both. ‘Both diplomatic approaches had particular drawbacks. To send secret emisary to Khrushcher demanding withéraval ofthe mises ‘would pose unacepable results On the one hand, this woud invite Khrushchev to seize the diplomatic initiative, perhaps commiting him to statgie retalistion in response roan attack on tiny Cuba, ‘wl wating for opinion in the United States and overseas 0 force a “Conference lke that of Chambedain and Hite at Munich, On the ster hand, the US, would be tendering an uldmatur hard for any (great power to acest without making @counterproposl To con- Font Khrushchev at a summit would guarentee demands for US. onccsions andthe seria similaty between US, mises in ‘Tuey and Russian mines in Cuba could not be ignored. The Soviet, ‘no could vet any seoltion inthe UN. Sceuty Counc While the diplomat argued the miler would beeome operational Tt why not ofr to trade the Jupiter in Tckey and aly for the mises in Cuba? Few thought the ses had any vale. The US. Fad sted the Turks to forgo the deployment in the spring of 1961, fot the Turks had osm ping ead spd the US. hal seq ‘Sex il plan bad been developed for replacing the Jupiter, a {east symbolic, with the promise that U.S. nuclear mise sub- marines would be placed ofsore, commited to Turkeys defense. Kennedy fhe ht oe rat ne fo cones Ta en Ali hy cote ap say that we would serie thee security to protect dur interests in an are ‘of no concern to them. Instead of being onthe diplomatic defensive, ‘re shoul be lading the Sovce Union fort pty adits threat {wrk peace” Kempe heievel thal uel mower a this ns; wo soy to the wd tht wed boo ghee ito aban sloning ove poston’ The US. might acknowledge is wilingness te ‘withdraw these nse tsome point, bt only in the future Alternative 3A Secret Approach o Castro ‘The ei provided an opportunity to divorce Cuba from Soviet Communism by offering Casto the alternatives: "split ofall” Introducing the ies, Rusk thought there might be “one chance in « ‘hundred but perhaps Cato might break with Moscow “fhe knew that were deadly jopand:™ The group, however did nat think ‘Castro would be tempted by the offer. Such an ofr might also give ‘sdvance warning of American intentions while inviting some of the ‘ame diplomatic entanglement that bedevled the ide of an ulti tum to Khrushchev. Finally, of coute, these were Soviet missles firmly under Soviet control. Alternative: Invasion ‘The United Sater could take this occasion not only to remove the rises but ale od itself of Castro. Contingency plans for an inva fon bad been made and practiced. Daring the Bist day of ers deli- rations, Kennedy remarked thatthe revelation of misses in Cube "Sows the Bay of Pigs atack wth Cuban exes against Cuba in 1961] var relly right Wed go trig, That was [achoce between betes tnd better and worse and worse” General Taylor replied"Tm a pes tims, Mr. President We havea wae plan ovr therefor you [1] call fora quarter ofa milion American older, Marines, nd armen te {skean and we laonched 10 Cubans against a eat anda al ago ‘We've changed our evaluations. Well. he walled off "An inwion wae considered ala resort twas 8 ase, cot ‘operation bogging America into what Tylor called "that deep mud of Cia. Tt would foree American troops fo confront Soviet troops it the Cold War's irs caso direct combat between ground forces af the perpen Sch brinksship kad dear dar, including at ‘Suva Sovict owe guna Beri, Alternative: Ai Strke Farclemer than a vst would he the removal of he mets by Jno oneutonal sate Heat iti tie soneRobert MeNamara aves apres conference sing the height ofthe (Caban Mise Cris. Ser Uri ee, the tempted deception deserve A strike woud remove the mises ‘efoe they became operational and eould launch nuclear warheads ‘aginst American Done immediatly t would limit the rik that ‘he Soviets would eae the America dscovery and at fis, conceal the mises and making an ear arte imposible, a well os tating Aiplomaticand military countermoves. Thetis would preserve he milter advantages of surprise Kennedy would make a pbc ates ‘mento the nation and tothe Soviets asthe plane approached thi ta ‘ts, dserbing his esons and warning Moscow aptnstrealiation, ‘ennedy lened toward ths option atthe outiet and remained ‘eraped by it. Four dificulties however, blunted is ntl appl. it, could the rhe be ke sel a iy ce Bc the aisle sites could be desuoyed the Soviet MIG-2ls snd the IL-28 ‘bombers might attack the southeastern United States. Taylor repeat ceiy called Kennedy's tention to this problem nd the fact that the Joint Chie of Stat had jst concluded that sir defenses of ths pot ofthe country were lamentaly wes. Armerians would be fro it les in Florida were Domed andthe military had not even ted 0 Aestro the MiGs and the -28e and thir aids Adding these ta ‘rt would significant enlarge the sie ofthe strike. Nor could any Wy dhe US Reed oth Mie Depot wih dad! 117 ‘Variants ofthis sp were widely itebuted by the media during the (Cen Mise Crise Suet eet Li responsible Ac Force ofcer endorse large-scale strike tat id not tryst th same tim, a ciminate the ener a defenses that would bw iiling his pilot. By Ocaber 16,» en-consensus developed tong Kennedys adie, The adviser were persade tht he oly feeble ise would have to indde thet dense ses and the ‘ombers, requiring attacks by hundreds ofsrerat on targets ‘Boog Cas This intr might edt hos nd plea ‘elapt ofthe Cas regime, hing America ito a vain "To countr this argent Bundy and Acheson eld ov fort rower more surgi ke, On Octet 2 the key dy ofthe dec Son to go with he blockade there were actly two sr se options ‘etre the president, the sal version and the are Kenedy eppar- ny anal nowt the ster eson, other beta spplidwocither ind of sek. ‘econd a surprise ir tack would kl Ronan tthe mise stesand door the atackovere more mai Antik on he tlt troop snd izes ofa gest power soul. not be repded Ty. Kenney word tothe ser mipt be anced pnt the United Stes and ordered enprecedented emergency cil dfense Planning to protect and evacate sor cles Premures on he Soviet would be ao strong tht am atackom Bein ot“Tukey seemed highly probable. Kennedy payed out the senaio If they went into Berlin US, troops would be overrun. Then someone asked, what do we do? Ball answered, "Go to general war” Bundy greedy “Its then general war” Kennedy: “You mean a nuclear The oer agreed A minute ter Kennedy underscored that "the question realli to what action we take which lessens the ‘ances ofa auclear exchange which obvious isthe prime faiture— thats obvious to rand athe same time maintain some degree of ‘elidarity with ou aie” “Third there was the question of advance warning A surprise sitac, Ball told the group, was “lke Pearl Harbor. It che kind of “Conduct that one might expec ofthe Soviet Union. Its not conduct that oe expects ofthe United States” No way could be found to tole the problem of advance warning, To atack without warning, Seemed epee Rusk called "his busines of earrying the mark of ‘Giinon your bow forthe ret of your hife=™ Four theatack might ot ellthe misses and would not pu ante against future Soviet deployments. From the start the Joint ‘hc of Stfodvocted an nin, ts part to doe jb thoroughly ‘Gyor gteed. Buta ntligencs showed the nstallation of RBM. launch te a well a the MRBMG, he joined his Join Chief of Sat Callesguesin apresing that both nsirsrkeand an invasion woul be ‘Suet deal defintely with he Soviet spre hi asus ‘hechain ofexcalation Bohlen ad singled out in is invent ‘ment ainstano-waroingai sik. Bohlen thought“itwll immedi ‘sls to wer with Cuba and would otbe the neat quick disposal of ‘het aes wo set Fart atm ressonabl eran Ut the Aled rent woul! be dead seat us esx Whe Soviet retaitd local (in Torky oll or in erin). 1el very Strongly that any belie ina limited quick action i anision and ‘woul ead us into full wor with Cubs om step-by-step bass which ‘ould get incrse the probability of general wat" Alternative 6 Blockade Tadivect military sction inthe form of some type of blockade, an ‘option fist raised for consideration by MeNemara on October 1, leame mor aracive a the president spd his advises dissected the ster ateratves An embargo on mata shipments to Cuba enforced banaval blockade however, was not without its own problems seven the term presented a formidable dificult Most adviers ‘made the pint tata blockade was a hose act that they thought he. Ropondte th Me Deployment with cade 1 would have be accompanied by a declaration of wa guns bs. By October 1, however the Ste and Justice Department legal ‘pers iad oncdd thatch a elaraton might be avoided, bt ‘tothe justin bed onthe Ro Treaty or dee of the ‘Wester Hentoper, could be obtained ony with a esaation tat ‘Commanded two-thirds vote of the member ofthe Organization of ‘Xeric Sete Second, ould the United States blockade Cabs without nvitig Soviet repre in Bein aint blodades might ret inte ingot ‘eth bringing the United States ack wo whee itsasted and allowing, the Sov lditiona time to complet the mise. : “Tir th posible consequences of the blockade eembled those that counted asin the a te If Soviet ship dno stop the Usted State eu be cdi th fr sbi reno Moreover astro might stack American ships lackading island {Ths posta and that of Soviet teat, led Kenedy fot ogrestinl ders on Ocober 23 that ech with he Bocce, Sino hive the wart nex 24 hour? Tanti how ous ochade be rlsted to the problem ofthe existence of sie seady 0 the sand of Cab and approaching peatinaleadinese daily blockade ofred the Svat a spec vf dling tcc wth whic fy tinea compte the i= ‘ie inuaftene cea very stow death hobert Kennedy “omplained "it bis op, and foes ove a period of month nd Sing he tad yocegoralthe polling and sceaning Trent Kena nm toch on thi aor pb wai dee opin ar Thon ge he es a the We Tiooe om Grohe twat: Kenedy kd, "do we do with he ‘spon sed there” “FRompsc's anwer was equally conc: “Demand theyre dis mailed al sy tat nee gong maintain constant survelance, {Ent thy se armed, we would then take them out And then maybe {doi Hetwet om hn we shoud be under no Masons that probaly in end going ols othe sue hing ark Dut we [akin etl dierent posture and backround and much es ‘anger of gating Up ino the bg was “Fhompear sneer bighlightel the existence of vo major vat snteof the Hockade option, which corresponded othe wo kinds of Glomat pprsses ng diced. Fhompon sn rer ‘asry Setar Doug Dion were the to propose ing the BEES SEE eS aha ap ea = wR1 I t ‘ f L ji t 120 ‘The Cabn Mie Cri Ai Cat blockade with Bohlen “uimatum" approach. This aprosch so ‘supported by John McCone and Rober Kennedy, would open with the blockade, refuse detailed negotiations, demand remorl of the threaten further military ation." proponents ofthe blockade a itas an opening to nego: approach, supported by McNamara, Stevenson, and jupiter ‘mises in Trkey and Tay. The two diferent blockade options were presented to Kennedyon October 20. ‘be eoupled with demand for ‘withdraval ofthe mises. No summit meeting or other channel of det negotiation would be offered to delay o obfuseate elton of ‘the central issue, The military move of a blockade would convey urgency anda sense of imminent confrontation. ‘WD he Sok nin Withdraw te Mis 12 TE WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION WITHDRAW THE MISSILES? Cn Sunday morning, October 28, the Soviets broadcast the mesage that ended the eral phase ofthe crisis, Khrushchev announced the sf ing the miles on terms edy Perhaps the most sustained strateple analysis was provided by Albert and Wohlsterer : ouriget ai On (ec tte wold he ee many ings sy eon pt Wich ‘Send chon been ting her Fong down The Usedsuena iano wo ie Se ine epi he ‘lS copii by i te Sov ion wie te mins “Charny lotic spp dt ae acs omental oe ithe wal eT seth ev of ton he would ve ha espns oc ery much her eves" Se mae problem wth th explanation of Soviet wihdeaval the mses foc onthe ekade athe sunt mnt of US. termini the lke work Or intend al in just the way that any of is opponents bad dete! Fr afl wht th blockade are fo do wth the sie aleay onthe lan of Cubs and rapidly aproaching meal rexdnes? The loko exhibited US. wlingcs (0 ets abo the point of isang cl nonmetal unter he owl loa amiestions of sch onn It faced Karcher to choose tong the ae ree avid show by keping Sov vss cut of the shade she loca by pernting hips 0 be stopped sd sarehdr and (3) provoke the United State to sft use of re by dying te blockade But fhe chose heist, why could ot ase edt compe the 24 MROM eh Sites with ese and sng en 42a ht wee ey rca in Ca hdd Sa is nox pic what append? The Sv tanker utero wich ebvousy could ot be carping oulawed ont vented toc he boca fier ening hel An ancman sg ipa lie proel 9 Sorc ced Ls ithe Mary wich cred on i, ifr and spare parts submited to bong stopped and seatched Bots Sovigccharsred Swedish ship defied the Dockade and me oan he Sco ot. Sone yr cuit re es gue posing ape orange mis abe athe ver Sitar completion and hey were re fr aeian by Ober > ace msc ics hth ome thew re mal mee he sade lone ‘rent Kenedy announcement ofthe lskade emphasized nts anil sp Noserpt was ade ogc heme dsp mre han 2000 ison open Fra, Hard Stade Spe mondo sports wis xy ing dance of tugtin Cuba. On Saturday night, October 27, MeNamar calle to ‘tve duty 25 roop-arierausdrons ofthe Ais Fore Reserve Spon 14.00 yen, Ths the akade webu test ep 2iitesof moveita teen ast ion, “The Kremlin deberatons began wih neva ofthe impending Kennedy specch. Not yt knowing what Kenedy wetle sap Ehrushehe fared the wor, He thought the Americans git dear blockade and then do thing but was vey worried ea they woul js attack Cuba, Khruthche speculated gut ho he Sovlt government would rato sich a atc, might turn the ila weapons overt Caban contol det hem eond ut he {shred hi eleages be would not kt Gast ten eric Wa {heMRBN nso ce of courneon American site would have ben fictely uncomesed "Mr the wore deliberations about what Kennedy might do news of his srech andthe announced ocade was rec not with fear but wth relic. Fom Washington, Dobrynin reported the ‘American move ua general rte eveue ede woe pve ‘vy from the US. ecing fers about Bet He weed Ue fae Americans wee pepting fra ral teat of strengthen em tended tat Moto theta move apn! Bearing wh 9 {oud locade and -lving out fore tine bein roses fot ta pe pounds for pls confomon? tet Debepam edad {hachscoW shuld nor ery todos an exrereaggrve- tin of the situation it goes without sying, would not be out eres" The Soviet Weep was herd ta he Arran aad a ny mee the Dae et rena ht eh rats for plead cates Soap ised at unyielding response to Kennedy's demande ” Henney ad his avers expe he Soc did considera countermnove agaist Beri: Note the teterence to th les {Giepunn cane ent Weatigant a uceiyIegkeretieee et Ava the Ke coring he bcd wit rsa pea inst etn Khruhcer however apene orale he ws ale in wey deepwater Ont of those presen ele tha he ea of Heri countrmere prove asin aad ntl sy wl {ion Richelet be ou out ch ace a nnn oa at othe conf a thn sche Woh may ave bcos singling ou the importance af Ameren sree and ace supe er te ta het Sova re ay wo coners move opin Belin CeeNMOL POOL OAL LLL President Kennedy address the nation. Soe bn met LSore eee ne tn sound, Others apparently were let to probe Amerie sont nner a iecceiaeene ene ew entree ie eremnem nosie cea Soc peaeere neers eee hcaemeeree ct page eorron eames Si nosenvesho inne oars Seana By Sy se prepa entae that Ames had awe he Bucharest pas oo Ob, iterate ia ‘Why Dish Soi Union Widow he Misa 128 rumor, warning of imminent American military ation against ‘Guo! Khrushchev promptly made sever moves He sent instruc tions to acept UN Secretary General U Thants proposal for avoiding ‘tconftontation atthe quarantine ine, thereby promising to keep ‘Soviet ships sy from this ine He alo dictated along personal eter to Kennedy suggesting a pescfl resolution ofthe criss. Inthe leer, he stated that ifthe US. promised not to invade Cub, the necsty forthe presence of out miliary specials in Cuba would disappear" * ‘Kennedy and his colleagues hypotheied that these various hs shout posible trade ofthe mises for a noninvsion pledge of ‘Ca indicated that Khrushchev had made the fundamental econ tot to ska malitary confrontation inorder to keep the mises in Ci, On the other and, Khrushchev ha given Kennedy aint of a eas nota concrete fe. Also by keeping the corespondence priate, hhehad hidden fis tentative move ftom Casto. Therefore he might be ‘Continuing the delaying tactics he hed menoned tothe Breidum on ‘October 35, while Soviet military activity in Cubs rushed to com- plete the mises nd ready them fraction. for reasons that ae stl obscure, Khrushehey came toa judgment bythe next mornin, October 7, thatthe Americans could be pshed Ihrder Pesheps ne misjudged U.S, resolve due tothe way the ‘Americans were enforcing, and fling to enforce, the quarantine. KRhroshche's so mld heather fet blige to seod at easton ship through (the Buchare) and was plssenly surprised when the ‘Ameritas lett through, Sovet ambassador to Cuba, Alexa ‘Commented thatthe Americans had really just established «paper ‘lockade since clenrly some ships were crossing te ine without foc.” American offical were quite worried about wheter thelr ‘Plc enforcement ofthe quarantine was sending mized or weak ‘messages to Moscow, How Khrushchev or any of his advisers actly Deteed mates athe times unclear ‘Khrushchev convened the Presidium and explained that he ‘thought the Americans would no longer dare to tack Cob "tis ezery to tae into consideration thatthe United States didnot ‘Mack Cub Five days posed since Kennedys speech and noth ing ned happencs, “To suy ind they are nt ceay to doit now “There was no guarantee agains an American attack oo Khrushchev wroulé make anothen more coneete oferta actualy acknowledged the presence of miles in Cuba But he would ad mises in Turkey to thebargain Wit that “we would win hesuid."® Just as teri itl evidence to eplnin why Khrushchev reversed his assessment of American intentions, hee also lit evdence 0oan NF SOS im Sunes woSesag 2 sos yoUEOUNOWET HOO fan 2oj pam seg ye) vl ao sss fare oy ur tuo pe yan sous 93 Ag pou gw us9 fm SH. 2p Jo enaprooys 2 inoge pesos aun Aqpauod>s en anoxia “uo omy o eausees saad wi eodond yond [puopesun> og ob pt hs HOW ee SL Fn pu poojand Sandve (quip peg tous SH SUES po sodand gopysany, emg peal oN128 The Cuban Mie Cc A Fi Cat lance of Cuba would continue despite the stacks on American ai- caf (4)a short mesoge tothe UN secretary general giving a negative snswer 1 Khrushchev’ proposed trae; (3) Kennedy’ publi etter Seat to Khrushchev late in the afternoon (Washington time) giving in ‘ff a postive reply to Khrushchev’ private suggestion ofthe day before, offering a pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange for removal ofthe miles (6) MeNamass pres conference cling up reserve sit ‘squadrons to farther ready an invasion; and (7) planned warning to the United Nations about the approach ofa Soviet ship toward the ‘American blockade line "Khrushchev opened the Presidium sesion on Sundsy morning of (October 28 with yet another about-face in his assessment ofthe ‘American danget. This ime he told his Presidium colleagues that they were “face to face with the danger of war and of nuclear eats- ‘trope, with the posse rent of destroying the human race” He ‘went on:"Tn order to save the word, we must retea"™ "In sum, the blockade did not change Khrashchevs mind. Only when coupled with the treat of farther acion—action inthe frm (Of alternatives rejected during the fist week fr reasons that have sleeady been dietsed—al ft secrd in forelgSeviet withlrtal ofthe misiles, Without the threat of al trike invasion the blockade alone would not have forced the removal ofthe missles se “Tuat ted exlaaton according to which Khrushchev yelddtot sasickand or capot In dleing Kemnay Babryin on the tight of Ocber 27, Robe Kenney made the ‘American rest of ter son gle emit and sl le ime se oti kr te ig ci snpied oy uppsion ber Kenedy sd thre could Foto ded on tis porn sneitimelved NATO. Bu he said he could ritely eure the Soviet tbe upers wee gong to be wih {wn four or eons Te ee tet 6 Rsk es the sof ved ny bout fe reciprocal cope o timetable rade we pting the oper sof he bean taee for delay hd bees the br of Karshche ofr at hod Seno peridous moe tan the sobtance™The gency in Robert ennatfs warning abut tna tary ection was Robert Fennel wuld not have tered sch te fhe tought hsbrother ould mute ims ac Peet Kenedy mse lec on Oceber Dawe had decd Saray pt Occber to bop te ‘rk on Tuesday [Ocaber 30, andi ay hve been one fhe ee Sons why the Rasa nay i tiga" tn any case apparent Khrushche’ decision to Bik was nat ‘based on ews of ihe the sie othe cat a Robert Kennedys omesaton with Dobrynin. Acording fo Franko and Nataly ‘taony fer Khrhch made hs dedarason othe oir that ewscase nf the cable fom Dabenin in Washington reperngen the discussion with Robert Kennedy i blesk ominous terms. The econ the Jupiter sch tw caused 90 ret That inal was erelmed athe general one threat nd urgency which jst ‘infor and acted the deionKivshcevbed cay mae ‘Thesaer who eed surary of the cable tthe Presidium emer tered how the-ete tenor ofthe words bythe Presidents reiees they werercoyedby Anstely Dobrynin prompted the concn hat thetineof reckoning hd come” Khroshheatr ld sto thats ‘rmingofan iinet American atackhadbenconfimedby ober Durer and hat heb redo preven ‘Ehrushey withdrew the Soviet miles not Because’ of the Docade but beau ofthe tent of farther seth The mide {oud tat yh load nay hae proved tine Sores ‘ajo the facto Ameria deeriain fo withdrew the mi asc slant nam forthe Sovr Unon tng the mie {o operational readiness. What narrowed that room wes Vaal that fed leary uget tres tht Aria tea about fo move up the ladder of exeltion In this lade, ‘meri benefited fom ie sdvantnges fm bth mle ef ‘[Shetlnal res Arbachomara eed ser the cits ene ‘Raver ind of hcten-andhe-epy date glng on svt ‘thick wis precminen To me hati tying fo argue about {Uhh lad ofthe cor ey et he paper ™ NoTES 1. Misc pents Mol aan ft cnr in ‘hers ce Te pup soins ong are das {atom med ranged ngage ies ue Sov Ue ‘edn import inciting the can a open dene ‘Ry the hn up Se oe Soret aay ew ok persone eS 7167. ‘On Bote iting Any Dobe taf Ne Random Has) py 8 On Dobe caret wit abet ead ih pd Raber ean Tier ay A190 TheCaben Mae ii Ft at emi ofthe le is ok WH. Net 9. et em ncn ef ey hor Dobra sting SNC, an 2S arn wih Aci Dn 6 seen nen en ery eater PR Set Se cance [cue teint erro eee ‘Sfmt cf teen ‘sorrento ste can be oie Nain acca Come Te gottin ince Sa ‘Sea Nr tres «Shreya 28 Speer 190 le Bs antares Crops, 8 Reto gerade 3a ie a ara knowns Ameria fia ng wap hom ning Te See fC Sts a ere a fe ‘aro nL Cons Read Sock, Deere er ay: Thay snd racic (New ok: Clana Ureit ce Comptia a 24 ge and Willen in gan a eh 2 pg rt mae nd in ng Cal Teen st inane ncn on ot de Ketan i rb a Seay NGO eins hee : rene ety Benin pila SS en pene nn ie Sa ‘i Cs (nang, DCC HDS te oy publihd = gene Sp 9% olbetin Sears “td of Non xine p16, FE cra ono Kt sucess svg Nee "Perigo te ‘aug: ge Ale? asap 19901293. Fetch Cc Ete Rled p18 The gunet soa waa (sation on pp. 8-82 met May snd Pl. Zw, The eal Tpes Di he Wie se Dos Calas Mie Crs (Coie: Harvard User Pres ton emmting a 00a on Ober) A quo tr enor ae) ri he adn eon of bok. The ‘Sond begun, rng conn a umber of eal erections and ‘Sitdipna sett May and Zw weber los feet ine trig ‘ache it Cl Marys elle (aso, eI erS80 (wate Sunt by th Sort Government, 23 Ober 1962, David Laon, Mette Fan ha of a ev cen hina een smc tal it pond hw wee amp othe Wen Ts einen be ben pba = ‘Shomer Nass Khuen oe Reman ran and Se ‘ah ts: ats bw 7 a Rhee Ke Renin: Ye Lnmane mio Se ab etn ie Sn, Na Kare vache Rene The ltt “pesos eel Scr wh Vc Eco (Bn: itl 90) The ute tom Rah Kosher omens 7, pa ‘nds ent aod Tnthy Nal, "One ofa Gane’: ‘hes or ant Rey 1958-156 (ew Yo VW. Nero, 197), ee) Rapp sts Tip she menage to end. 1 Ape 1961 ia Department of ae, Fp ation te Ue Sse 16-196 [eater FRUS [eID] ol Renny Rahs Echange (washington DC oven ining Of, 190.8 irc Rie Ronen 970 p93. Rate Qu Pied Ca (NewYork VEW. Norton, 199). 7. 40-1 “Teh of Opertn Menge dcumened in FRUS 8136 vo. TR sno res Caso ics a Eder tebe eno heh amer Bae etl” 16 May 19S ip. bor ands not by be lo) ent Select Commi Sty Content Opin ith Rpt onli Acie ao nn th Cc Cec fers sian Str Pk se, i et is SAIN CRA CRRA: § & a Alig Aasinaton os hing Fog Leder, th Cong at 8, Novenbe 175 and anh Te gn The i and De te (ttre toe Sinan nd Str 97h 9p. 39-4 3959 Sie Sor adil de eset mach into, inSeymour eh, The Der of Come (Bast Lit Bow 197) pt? 22, 26-5 Cee afer 161 here det ee of We Heep thong er forte rt IA ‘ears aber nye eee eA open ‘ed Cares od hub svt fader andthe coey {Suefhy day email conta tt ole tlio (Gate: Taste sty ar slew CIA deter ab one eptin then but what ping too ht here aa te ‘deers nk any el Cpe cn wth know Soot ite tigen pr tht oth sentinel eer, the i of ny epost and pros. 26, Set or Gabon nena ey peered Coby en grein Sele by Seo bar ed Sansa ag: ‘mcs bcen upg wth Amercan oe er Cao fd ‘ero Sat Theor of Cte ove Will oro, {Sep tk On tach 2h end he Caan een, [ores mete Wt He in Sears Bay The (ties pel rena poi Cab nd verre Ctra, ‘Bendy whom ht if US wo appr acho act hd be ‘eta compete Tat coal ot hppn itn oe len ‘FU armed flan wold mea pn a apn ih he US jadent was ot evita te presenter ston” Caran dnt I his ner Menon of eng been Cardo an Bind 29 Mech 92 RUS 9-196) ol 10, cab 1961-82 (Watington DC Gomme: rt fi 97) p. 78 Catan ten ht wth Kenedy on pl 10 Kn. the Bandy. spel wb Garon pe oc conus tn ron Pye Rt iscased rig Merino De. Mio Cardone wit te Pen" 25 Ape 19st and Grodno Peden Kennedy thin JP, NSE Bo ae Subjects Mi Cardona Mater Sento am Dench Te Ste Deparment ‘tar resign ek wae on ip 9 "eps Frsraton snd inpatenethe Cab ceo what (der anny rpting te ero of te Cats pe? The ele leen"have ecome abe of ence citcan rh aed ‘avincethe nied Stet cnaon mit operton pops” don was den hee ei. 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Elo ‘ogee este ve monn were Ct Bal ara Che ‘Gr Oval Dorado) nd om th ee Cao ‘Sta ore Rn ac te rit pp 31,26 Ths ‘stent ithe of Co bil athe ar cof 2 (Glew Binkp. oahu of ey ee whe Bp {S152 On Galen tes ay Si Calc 3-40 eo gh, land Wel doin of Cao ea mei iocaceping he en Gon nthe Bp 35-0