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FORUM

Landscape: The Lowenthal Legacy

Kenneth Olwig
Department of Landscape Planning, Sveriges Luubmksuniversitet;Alnarp

The concept of landscape is enjoying a period of scholarly development in contemporary geography that has
spread to, and enriched, disciplines ranging from anthropology, archaeology, and sociology to history and philosophy.
This development is occurring despite the fact the concept of landscape was once effectively dismissed, by an
influential geographical theorist, as being of "little or no value as a technical or scientific term" in geography. This
article argues that the contemporary analytical power of landscape derives in important measure from the timely

ability of David Lowenthal to turn the critique oflandscape on end. He did this by transforming the very contradictions embodied

by landscape, which made it a liability as technical or scientific term, into a phenomenon for

epistemological inquiry. Key Words: Political landscape, environmental perception, David Lowenthal, Carl 0. Sauer,
George Perkins Marsh.

he foundational theoretical document for the

Department of Geography at the University
of California was Carl Sauer's benchmark 1925
paper, The M;rplwlogy of Landscape (Sauer 1969). From
the outset, landscape served as the key concept for what
became known as the Berkeley school of American
cultural geography. Fourteen years later, in another
benchmark text, The Nature of Geography, Richard
Hartshorne (1939, 149-74, 250-84) leveled a trenchant
criticism at the concept of landscape, which until then
had been "perhaps the single most important word in
the geographic language" (Hartshorne 1939, 149). Hartshorne (1939, 154), who spent the bulk of his career at the
University ofWisconsin, Madison, criticized the confusing
use of the term in both what he saw to be a specifically
German sense, where it meant "a definitely restricted
area," and in an English sense, where it referred to ''a more
or less definitely defined aspect of an unlimited extent of

the earth's surface."

It has been argued by Neil Smith that Hartshorne's

critique effectively "assassinated" the concept of landscape by branding it as being, in Hartshorne's words, of
'"little or no value as a technical or scientific term/"
leading it to be "largely excluded from theoretical
discourse almost to the present day" (Smith 1989, 107;
Hartshorne 1939, 158). The term "landscape," however,
was not entirely excluded from theoretical discourse. One
of the central figures who kept that discourse alive was
David Lowenthal. 1 His ability to do this, I will argue, lay in
his special position as a scholar whose formative years were

spent both at Sauer's Berkeley, where Lowenthal did

his initial graduate studies, and at Madison, where he
completed his doctorate in history while minoring in geography and where he worked with Hartshorne. Furthermore, Lowenthal was active as a scholar in both the
United States and Britain. This meant that he was put into
a position to build upon and rethink elements of both
the Sauer program and the Hartshornian critique, while
drawing upon both American and British landscape experience. In retrospect, it can be seen that Lowenthal's
work effectively prepared the way for new approaches to
landscape by transcending the differences between the
schools of geography defined by Sauer and Hartshorne.
Lowenthal was thus a key figure in paving the way for
the contemporary revival of geographical interest in landscape. The link between Lowenthal's work at Berkeley
and that at Wisconsin lay in his biography of influential
nineteenth . . century American conservationist George
Perkins Marsh.

Marsh and Nature

The topic of Lowenthal's dissertation in history, the
life and letters of George Peridns Marsh, was a long-term
interest of Carl Sauer's. The recognition of Marsh as a
formative figure in cultural geography took place largely
through Sauer's efforts in organizing the symposium, resulting in one of the classic works of modern geography,
William Thomas's 1956Man's Role in Changing the Face of
the Earth. In his 1941 presidential address, "Foreword to

AnnallofW Association of American Geogr(lphers, 93(4), 2003, pp. 871--877

2003 by Association of American Geographers
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 01148, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, U.K.

872

Forum: The Lowenthal Papers

Historical Geography," Sauer (1969, 351-79) suggested

that an ideal way of educating onese If as a geographer
was to make a "full-length biographical inquiry" into
a historical figure such as Marsh. This, he argued, w0 uld
"provide a truly liberal geographic education, provided
each is taken as a whole, and not skimmed eclectically
in terms of prearranged views as to what is and is not geographic" (Sauer 1969, 355-56). Sauer saw himself as an
historical geographer and found inspiration in the historically oriented work of Marsh, and it was thus natural for
Sauer to wish to see Marsh himselfbecome the object of an
historical study. Lowenthal responded by making Marsh
the subject of his doctoral dissertation, which, though he
counted himself a student of Sauer, he chose to do under
historian Merle Curti at the University of Wisconsin,
Madison (Lowenthal 2000, xvi). The dissertation was
published by Columbia University Press and, a lifetime
.later, rewritten and republished, under the aegis of environmental historian William Cronan, by the University of
Washington Press (Lowenthal1958, 2000). Lowenthal also
edited the definitive edition of Marsh's Man and Nature
([1864] 1965), published by Harvard University Press.
Sauer's (1969, 351-79, 389--404) historically oriented
approach to geography as something one does as a form of
praxis or an intellectual calling contrasted deliberately
with Hartshorne's approach to the subject as a disciplined
field of academic endeavor, the theory and methodology of
which had been established by a succession of professorial authorities (autodidactic Marsh thus had no place in
Hartshorne's disciplinary pantheon). Lowenthal's historical approach led him to relativize and contextualize the
meaning of geographical concepts as products of their
time, rather than as timeless precepts. This occurred not
least because he was working with historians who were
exploring the changing meaning of complex concepts,
such as nature, that occurred in the course of a new
nation's confrontation with a new environment. This approach was particularly relevant to Marsh because Marsh
was concerned with the role of people's environmental perceptions and conceptions in shaping environmental
behavior, and because he actively sought to change their
perceptions and behavior. In other words, Marsh was concerned with nature not simply as an object of study, but
also as an individually and culturally perceived phenomenon that was historically constituted as much through
the arts as through the sciences.
The term

11

Anglo . . American'' assumes a necessary

alignment between the intellectual life of the United

States and Britain, but America was actually colonized by
people from all over Europe, and they helped create a
broader cosmopolitan educational culture than could
have been derived from Britain alone. In matters

geographical, German geographers such as Alexander

von Humboldt thus weighed more heavily in Marsh's
writings-as they did in the work of most cosmopolitan
thinkers-than in those of contemporary British geographers. Marsh was expert in languages ranging from Italian to the Nordic languages, in which he could claim
philological expertise, and his geographical reading was
often in the original language (Lowenthal1957). Sauer's
writings reveal a similar knowledge of the history of
European geographical thought in the broadest meaning; in addition, like Marsh, he was conversant with the
thought of poets as well as that of scientists. Thus, even
though Marsh was not a trained scientist, he fulfilled
Sauer's Germanic conception of science as Wissenschaft,
meaning an "organized process of acquiring knowledge"
(as opposed to the common restricted English meaning
"of a unified body of physical law"). This was in line with
what Sauer saw to be a 11 phenomenologic view of science"

as outlined in Hermann Graf Keyserling's 1910 Prolegomena zur Nawrphilosophie (Sauer 1969, 315-16).
The suffix "schaft" in Wissenschaft and Landschaft
(which, as Sauer pointed out, can be roughly translated as
"shape" in English) suggests a concern with both the shape
and constitution of the phenomenon in question-that is,
the phenomenon of knowledge-and the way in which it
is shaped. This approach lends itself to a concern with
epistemology, and hence-as Sauer notes, with reference
to johann Wolfgang von Goethe-with the "nature and
limits of cognition (1969, 326-27) ."It was his philosophic
position, with its concern for morphology--or shapethat led Goethe to argue that "[O]ne need not seek for
something beyond the phenomena; they themselves
are the lore [Lellfe]" (1902, p. 72; quoted in Sauer 1969,
326-27). It was against this background of thought that
Sauer (1969, 316) declared landscape to be a "naively
given, important section of reality, not a sophisticated
thesis." Sauer's morphologic approach to landscape has
been widely assumed by his critics (see Cosgrove and
Jackson 1987; Duncan 1990; Olwig 1991) to mean a
narrow, atheoretical focus on physical objects in the
material landscape. In fact, it refers to a concern with
phenomenological shape or form and with the way the
world is shaped as place. Though such an approach
initially seeks to comprehend the shape of "phenomena,"
it is not adverse, as Sauer (1969, 350. n. 56) argued in the
Morphology of Landscape, to appropr.ate forms of theoretical explanation, such as that offered by the discipline
of anthropology: "At present anthropology is the study of
culture per se. If our studies of man and of his work have
large success in synthesis, a gradual coalescence of social
anthropology and of geography may represent the first of a
series of fusions into a larger science of man."

Olwig: Landscape: The Lowenthal Legacy

Landscape Epistemology
.... Jqwenthal's experience working with Marsh, following
Sauer's recipe, appears to have helped open the way for his
"epistemological" approach to landscape perception. This
11pproach was able to effectively turn Hartshorne's critique
on 'end by making it into an avenue for fruitful research
while at the same time retaining important aspects of
Sauer's program. In his critique of the landscape concept,
Hartshorne (1939) pointed out that the appropriate
meaning of the term in English-language discourse would
refer to the "appearance of a land as we perceive it"
(150)-for example, "the section of the earth surface and
sky that lies in our field of vision as seen in perspective from
a particular point" (152). This sense, in turn, was related

. tO

'the "aesthetic" meanings

or the

term as used in.

disciplines such as art history. These contributed to the

term's unclear meaning, disqualifying it as a technical or
scientific term because it was capable of shifting "from the
landscape as sensation to the objects that produce that
sensation" (Hartshorne 1939, 152). Through his work
with Marsh, however, Lowenthal came into contact with a
very different evaluation of the potential contribution of
landscape aesthetics to human understanding. Marsh
([1864] 1965, 15) drew upon a contemporary Danish
poet, Frederik Paludan Muller, quoting him in both
Danish and English translation:
"In the material eye, you think, sight lodgeth!
The eye is but an organ. Seeing streameth

873

landscape as a thing-in-itself was uninteresting. What was

interesting was what these contradictions tell us about the
way environment is perceived and comprehended as landscape by individuals and societies, and the consequences
that this has for behavior toward that environment.
Lowenthal was fascinated by the multitude of ways
in which people and societies knew landscape, and how
this affected the way that they shaped the material environment. In his 1961 theoretical treatise, "Geography,
Experience and Imagination: Towards a Geographical
Epistemology" ([1961] 1972), Lowenthal revealed how
his approach to geography-including landscape-followed the Sauer/Marsh model as well as that of another
historian/geographer, John K. Wright. Though paying due
respect to Hartshorne (whom he thanked for his commentary on the paper), Lowenthal ([1961] 1972, 220,
n. 2) elucidated an alternative to Hartshorne's disciplinary focus:
Hartshorne's methodological treatises analyze and develop

logical principles of procedure for geography as a professional

science, 11 a form of knowing," as he writes, "that is different
from the ways in which we 'know' by instinct, intuition, a
priori deduction or revelation." My epistemological inquiry,
on the other hand, is concerned with all geographical
thought, scientific and other: how it is acquired, transmitted,
altered, and integrated into conceptual systems; and how the
horizon of geography varies among individuals and groups.

Specifically, it is a study in what Wright calls geosophy: "the

nature and expression of geographical ideas both past and
present ... the geographical ideas, both true and false, of

From the soul's inmost depths. The fine perceptive

all manner of people-not only geographers, but farmers

Nerve springeth from the brain's mysterious workshop."

and fishermen, business executives and poets, novelists and

painters, Bedouins and Hottentots." Because geographers
[as Wright writes] are 11 nowhere . .. more likely to be influ~
enced by the subjective than in their discussions of what
scientific geography ought to be," epistemology helps to

Marsh concluded:
To the natural philosopher, the descriptive poet, the painter,
and the sculptor, as well as to the common observer, the
power most important to cultivate, and, at the same time,

hardest to acquire, is that of seeing what is before him. Sight is

a faculty; seeing, an art. The eye is a physical, but not a self,
acting apparatus, and in general it sees only what it seeks.
Like a mirror, it reflects objects presented to it; but it may be
as insensible as a mirror, and it does not necessarily perceive
what it reflects.

Conceived from this perspective, landscape ceases to be a

hindrance to comprehension and instead provides a door
to understanding how individuals and societies perceive
their environs and how they behave toward them. Hartshorne objected to the lack of clarity in the meaning
of landscape: was it scenery by nature, or was it essentially
an area? Hartshorne wanted to know what sort of thing
landscape was in and of itself. Lowenthal turned these
contradictions into a virtue by showing, in effect, that

explain why and how methodologies change.

By taking this epistemological approach, Lowenthal was
able to turn Hartshorne's critique on end by making it
foundational to his interest in environmental perception
and behavior. Lowenthal's work thus represents less a
break with Hartshorne than a creative rethinking of
the positive potentiality of Hartshorne's sharp critique
of landscape geography. Lowenthal was in the forefront of
the geographers who developed the study of landscape
perc< ption in which it was the relationship between
the perception of "landscape as sensation" and "the
objects that produce that sensation" that was in focus
(Lowenthal 1962; Lowenthal and Prince 1964, 1965;
Lowenthal and Riel1972).
As will be seen, however, Lowenthal did not limit
his approach to landscape to the pictorial definition

874

Forum: The Lowenthal Papers

featured in many studies of landscape perception (e.g.,

Bourassa 1991). Quoting john K. Wright, Lowenthal
emphasized that his epistemology was concerned with the
"'fascinating terrae incognitae'" that He 11 'within the minds
and hearts Of men"' (Wright 1947, 15). It was also
concerned with "'the relation between the world outside

. and the pictures in our heads'"-a phrase Lowenthal

([1961] 1972, 219) borrowed from American journalist
and author Walter Lippmann (Lippmann [1922] 1961;
Wright 194 7). In several key articles on English landscape
and. landscape tastes written with English geographer
H\1gh Prince, Lowenthal brought out the connection
between the pictures in the heads of leading segments of
English society and the shape and appearance of the
material landscape of England (Lowenthal and Prince
'1964, 1965). These articles were largely empirical exercises,' illustrating the relationship between certain
aesthetic ideals (such as the picturesque) and the material
landscape.
This approach raised issues that, in turn, opened the
, door for the vital theoretical contributions of such English
geographers as Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels
to the epistemological basis for the study of landscape
iconography, which were basically concerned with the
relationship between the pictures on our walls and in our
heads and the world outside (Cosgrove 1984; Cosgrove
and Daniels 1988a; Daniels 1993, 1999). The vitality
enjoyed today by the landscape concept in fields ranging
from anthropology and archaeology to sociology, philosophy, and history owes much to scholars inspired by the
work of Cosgrove and Daniels. 2 Their work, however,
is arguably indebted to Lowenthal's epistemological intervention at a time when Hartshorne's critique had
weakened the appeal of what had once been the
discipline's central concept. It was hardly a coincidence
that Daniels studied with both Lowenthal and Prince
at Universiry College, London, and that Cosgrove (1993)
dedicated the published version of his doctoral dissertation to Lowenthal.

The Landscape Inside and

Outside Our Heads
Different approaches to landscape raise different problems and possibilities for landscape research. The focus
on landscape as a form of pictorial representation opened
up new avenues of research, but it also created a narrow~
ing framework which, given the postmodern mindset,
could easily lead to a de-emphasis upon that which is
represented. ''A landscape," according to Cosgrove and
Daniels (1988b, I), "is a cultural image, a pictorial way

of representing or symbolising surroundings." In emphasizing the pictures in our heads, they are working in
Lowenthal's epistemological terrain. When taken to its
postmodern extreme, however, this approach appears
to deny the connectiviry to things in the world ol<lside.
From the postmodern position, according to Cosgrove and
Daniels ( 1988b, 8), landscape thus becomes "a flickering
text displayed on the word-processor screen whose meaning can be created, extended, altered, elaborated and
finally obliterated by the merest touch of a button." This
kind of argument (to which neither Daniels or Cosgrove
continues to subscribe), downplaying the importance of
the world outside, has led like-minded critics of American
cultural geography to perceive Berkeley geography as
being overly concerned with material things in the world
outside (Cosgrove and Jackson 1987; Duncan 1990;
Olwig 1991). The resulting emphasis on the landscape
within has, in turn, given rise to countercriticism, such as

that of anthropologist/archaeologist Tim Ingold.

The idea that landscape "is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing or symbolising surroundings"
Cosgrove and Daniels 1988b, 8) is explicitly rejected by
Ingold, who, in fact, rejects the very "distinction between
inner and outer worlds-respectively of mind and matter,
meaning and substance-upon which such distinction
rests." For him "as the familiar domain of our dwelling,"
landscape "is with us, not against us, just as we are part of it
[emphasis in original]" (Ingold 1993, 154; see also Ingold
2000, 191). Following this line of argument, Ingold has
promoted an approach that emphasizes the importance of
the earth under our nails and in our heads (metaphorically
speaking). Inspired by his interpretation of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and its particular approach to
phenomenology, Ingold sees the material landscape as a
field in which humans manifest their existence as living
beings by shaping physical things in their environment
through the praxis of dwelling. This approach has had
an impact on contemporary landscape study in geography
(Cloke and jones 2001).
The contradiction between the approach of Daniels
and Cosgrove, on the one hand, and Ingold, on the other,
can be illuminated by consulting a contemporary standard American dictionary's definition of landscape. 3 The
definitions "Ia: a picture representing a view of natural
inland scenery; b: the art of depicting such scenery" clearly underlie :he approach of Cosgrove and Daniels. The
second entry suggests that the strictly pictorial meaning
of the term is on the wane, because the meaning of
landscape as"vista, prospect" is now "obsolete" (Merriam . .
Webster 1995). Nonetheless, other meanings, such as
"2c: a particular area of activity: SCENE (political
landscape>," are not pictorial, and because of its emphasis

Olwig: Landscape: The Lowenthal Legacy

on activity, this definition would appear to be closer to
Ingold's idea of landscape. I would suggest, however, that
this last definition nevertheless suggests a third approach,
which does not, as with Ingold, deny the validity of the
distinction between the landscapes within and with. out our heads, but rather mediates between the two
by emphasizing the role of a third landscape-the political landscape.

The Political Landscape

. The apparent impasse between the postmodern landscape, as explicated by Cosgrove and Daniels, and Ingold's
premodern inspired landscape seems to leave the landscape researcher caught between a focus on the ephemeral
pictures in our heads and one on the tangible realm of
mearlingful material things constituted through down-toearth dwelling. Lowenthal, however, was not concerned
with one or the other, but with the relations between
them. He took the phrase "'the relation between the world
outside and the pictures in our heads"' from the title of the
introductory chapter of Lippmann's 1922 book, Public
Opinion (Lippmann [1922] 1961, 3-34). This book was
largely concerned with the polity as constituted through
the realm of discourse-public opinion-as it occurs both
through words and through visual means such as maps.
As'Lippmann ([1922]1961, 25) wrote,
We shall assume that what each man does is based not on
direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by

himself or given to him. If his atlas tells him that the world is
flat he will not sail near what he believes to be the edge of our
planet for fear of falling off. If his maps include a fountain of
eternal youth, a Ponce de Leon will go in quest of it. If
someone digs up yellow dirt that looks like gold, he will for a
time act exactly as if he had found gold. The way in which the
world is imagined determines at any particular moment what

875

and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures

which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals
acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with
capital letters." The political landscape, in this sense, was
the underlying subject of much that Lowenthal wrote
about Marsh, who was politically engaged, among other
things, as a diplomat and a politician. It is also, I would
argue, the underlying subtextofLowenthal's (1985, 1996)
later concern with landscape as a locus of environmental
concern and heritage identity!
In Lowenthal's work on heritage, which has helped
launch a new discipline of heritage studies, the morphology of landscape as a material phenomenon is understood
in the context oflandscape as an area of cultural activity, a
political landscape in its broadest meaning. The concern
here is not just with the pictures in our heads/' in the
narrow sense of graphic scenes and maps, but as world
pictures, or cosmologies, that are deeply implicated in the
ways that ethnic and national identities are generated, not
only by geographers but also "by farmers and fishermen,
business executives and poets, novelists and painters,
Bedouins and Hottentots" (Wright 1947, 12). Furthermore, by taking this approach, Lowenthal has managed to
appeal to a public that goes far beyond disciplinary bounds
within and outside geography,' and even beyond academia
itsel A seminar with Lowenthal may thus attract not only
archaeologists, anthropologists, and geographers, but also
architects and planners, tribal representatives and West
Indian statesmen, as well as the odd farmer and fisherman, not to mention poets, novelists, and painters. Such
seminars, in turn, tend to become the site of a form of
anthropological research in which the participants become partners in the ongoing discourse that makes up the
stuff of Lowenthal's scholarship. 8
11

Conclusion

men will do.

Marsh's book Man and Nature ([1864] 1965) was
similarly concerned with the connection between
the political landscape as shaped by discourse and the
shaping-and misshaping-of the environment. 4 This
emphasis on the role of public opinion within a polity fits
the dictionary definition of the landscape as "a particular area of activity," such as "the political landscape"
(Merriam-Webster 1995). 5 The landscape, in this sense,
is neither the intangible pictures within our heads nor
the material thing outside the mind, but the social and
political realm of discourse-public opinion-that informs both. As Lippman ([1922] 1961, 29) put it, "The
pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes,

Hartshorne sought to define geography in terms of

a scientific discipline in the Anglo-American sense
of science. This led him to reject concepts such as
"landscape" that could not be given a clearly fixed and
defined meaning. For Lowenthal, however, the historically
oriented tradition of Sauer, Marsh, and Wright led him
to a concern with "all geographical thought, scientific
and other: how it is acquired, transmitted, altered, and
integrated into conceptual systems; and how the horizon
of geography varies among individuals and groups"
(Lowenthal [1961] 1972, 220, n. 2). It was this change
in emphasis that allowed Lowenthal to take Hartshorne's
perceptive but trenchant critique of landscape and work
to transform it into a major new focus of scholarship and
avenue of research. In this way, he helped bring landscape

876

Forum: The Lowenthal Papers

geography beyond the restrictions imposed by Sauer's

morphological approach, and helped geography to begin
to realize Sauer's dream of generating a synthesis of
landscape geography and cultural understanding.

Notes
1. Lowenthal, of course, was not alone. For other contributions to

this discourse, see, for example,Tuan (1974), Mcinig (1979),

jackson (1984), and Wagner (1972).
2. Recent works in the fields of anthropology, archaeology,
sociology, philosophy, and history that derive, I would argue,

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

from the epistemological approach to landscape pioneered

by Lowenthal include Hirsch and O'Hanlon (1995), Bender
(1993), Urry (1990), Casey (2002), and Schama (1995).
For a more detailed analysis of landscape's etymological
.meaning, see Olwig ( !996, 2002).
Marsh, it should be noted, did not just contribute to discourse
on the environment through his effort to shape public opinion;
he also took a professional philological interest in language and
text as the stuff of discourse (Lehtinen !99!).
The term 11 politicallandscape" specifically refers to the mean~
ing of 11 area of activity" as being synonymous with the word
"scene.". The word "scene," in this context, means, "sphere
of activity" (Merriam-Webster 1995).
It is this concern with the political landscape that has inspired my
own work on the subject (Oiwig 1980, 1996, 2002) and that, in
tum, has also helped inspire a younger generation of scholars,
such as Don Mitchell (2000) and Tom Mels (!999, 2002).
This could be seen, for example, in the multidisciplinary
contributions to the three sessions dedicated to Lowenthal at
the 2002 meetings of the AAG in Los Angeles.
These observations are based on personal experience as a
participant observer in a number of seminars held with
Lowenthal in Scandinavia.

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