PAAT v CA

G.R. No. 111107

January 10, 1997
FACTS
On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while
on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in
Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents
for the forest products found concealed in the truck.

LOWER COURTS: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which
to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private
respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation.
RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of
DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the
forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive
Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12,
1989.ii[2] * DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution) * RTC (action for replevin):
denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED) * CA (review): denied, has legal
questions involved
ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable
property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture
proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court's judicial power can be sought.

The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies.
so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and to dispose of the case
Suit for replevin:
Founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property
sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are
unlawfully detained.
To detain:
To hold or keep in custody
Has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense
of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.
Rules of Court:
it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is
wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the
same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value
of the property.
Replevin:
It originated in common law as a remedy against the wrongful exercise of the right
of distress for rent and, according to some authorities, could only be maintained in
such a case.
But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases
of wrongful distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a
proper remedy for any unlawful taking.
Replevied, used in its technical sense, means delivered to the owner, while the
words to replevy means to recover possession by an action of replevin.
Replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of provisional relief. It may refer
either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that
would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and to
hold it pendente lite.
Primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the
right of possession

(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to

confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government?
YES.

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly

Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of
the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act
of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it
should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter.
it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners
for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.

Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the

confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of
forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA

[G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991]
Facts
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and
dyeing textiles with untreated wastewater which were being discharged directly into
a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte
Order based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant,
directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater
pollution source installations as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of

Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution
Adjudication Board for a temporary operation.
However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the
Board but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of
dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority
to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there
is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the other hand, contends that
under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that
Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat
ISSUE
Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the
Order and Writ of Execution against SolarTextile Finishing Corporation.
Held
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and
desist orders under the following circumstances:
(a)Public Hearing . . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable
standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order
directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation
of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes
without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be
immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person
prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or
nullified by a competent court.
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board
were entirely within its lawful authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are
permitted by law and regulations in situations like in this case.
Police Power:
Pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests.

Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It
follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the
Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without
prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's
Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.