DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
a. The basic principles underlying the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
b.Manifestations of a republican state.
c. Define state
COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23
d. Elements of a state. Define each:
1. people
2. territory
3. sovereignty
4. government
e. Different meanings of the word people as used
in the constitution:
1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2);
2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7);
3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec. 4)
f. Presidential & parliamentary forms of government
Read:
1.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 757
The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is essentially presidential with
parliamentary features.
2. LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418
The form of government is essentially parliamentary with presidential features.
g. Two-fold function of the government
Read:
1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely directory] and Constituent
[Mandatory] Functions)
2) ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649
Due to complexities of the changing society, the two-fold function of the government as
classified by President Wilson is no longer relevant.
h. Parents Patriae
Read:
1) GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738
2) CABANAS VS. PILAPIO, 58 SCRA 94
i. De jure govt.? De facto govt.?
Read:
1. AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (on the de jure aspect)
2. In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160
A government formed as a result of a peoples revolution, is considered de jure if it is already
accepted by the family of nations or other countries like the United States, Great Britain,
Germany, Japan, and others.
3.
Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto, infra.
j. The three (3) kinds of de facto government?
Read: CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113
There are several kinds of de facto governments.
a.
The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful
legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government
of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.

b.
The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to
British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with
Mexico, by the troops of the United States.
c.
And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of
a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the
Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only
with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.
But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de
facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount
force. Its distinguishing characteristics are
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against
the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and
(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by
acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or
wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among
others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right
to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as
a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to
take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are
authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in
their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue
in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the
Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all
publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and
applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law
(Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of
a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror.
. . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure
either change the existing laws or make new ones.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are
not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle
of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the
fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its

legitimate government of sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the
effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence
to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his
control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction
of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would
be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be
scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should
be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon
criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government . (Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been
each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the
occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the
Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and
establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
l. Sovereignty:
1. legal
2. political
m. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation?
Read:
1. REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, 30 SCRA 968
By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The
Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such
ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make
use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases;
the second from the express provisions of the treaty. Nothing is better settled than that
the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
sovereignty. Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: It is to
be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct
language of Jellinek, is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction. A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. The opinion was at
pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional
rights, not its disappearance.
2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476
3. COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397
2. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national police, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity among all nations.

a. difference between aggressive & defensive war

b. Read:
1)
MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70
The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally
accepted principle of international law. As such, it should be applied to illegal aliens like the
petitioner so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an
unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him.
The meaning of reasonable time depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties
of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements
concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this
Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the peoples
expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the
highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral
argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On
the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the
last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him
abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the
pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation 3 or unless the Government admits that it can
not deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not
interfere.
2)
KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague
and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention,
Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines
was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule
and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce
the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes
against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of
Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
3)
SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121
4)
AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195
The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered part of the law of the
Philippines since the same is a generally accepted principle of international law in accordance
with the Incorporation clause of the Constitution.
5)
REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553
Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be

admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery
and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The
validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a
case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less
than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the
qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily
brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly
demands nothing less.
Without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly
invoked whenever its application would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such
as freedom of assembly and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the
chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or
demonstration.
3. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the military. The armed forces
of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the
sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
See also:
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2)
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4)
4. Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal and
military service.
Read:
1.
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13
The appellants argument that he does not want to join the armed forces because he does
not want to kill or be killed and that he has no military inclination is not acceptable
because it is his obligation to join the armed forces in connection with the defense of the
State provision of the Constitution.
2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721
3. PD1706, August 8, 1980
4. Exec. Order No. 264
5. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.
6. Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable.
Read:
1) PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413
2) GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514
(NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases)
3) Other provisions:
Other provisions on church & state:
1.
ART. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. NO RELIGIOUS
TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.

2.
ART. VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches, mosques, non-profit
cemeteriesactually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
3.
ART. VI, Sec. 29 .(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, for the benefit, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination or religion, except when such priest, minister.. is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
4.
ART. IX, C, 2(5). Religious denominations and sects shall not be registeredas
political parties. (NOTE: Religious organizations are also prohibited ion connection with
sectoral representatives under Art. VI)
5.
ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option in writing by parents, religion shall be allowed to
be taught to their children in elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by
instructors designated or approved by religious authorities to which said children belong,
without additional cost to the government.
7.
Sections 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with
other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination,
8.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues
a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
1.
meaning of nuclear-free Philippines;
2.
Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25
9.
Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living, and an improved quality of life for all..
10.
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
11.
The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII
12.
9. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support the support of the government.
NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand on divorce. As such, a
Divorce Law to be passed by Congress may or may not be unconstitutional. But definitely, a
law allowing abortion , other than therapeutic, is unconstitutional.
1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV.
2. Read:
a)
GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969)
A law prohibiting the sale of girlie magazines [bold?) is constitutional and does not violate
the above provision. This is so because parents could buy said magazines for their children if
they believe the same is already suitable to the understanding of their child. This is in
accordance with this provision which states that the parents have the natural and primary
right in rearing their child for civic efficiency
b) MEYER VS. NEBRASKA, 260 US 260 (1922)
c) PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925)
A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional since it
interferes with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the right to choose

which school is best suited for the development of their children without interference from
the State.
d) PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806
e) CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94
10. Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Read:
1) PD 684
2) PD 935
3) PD 1102
4) PD 603; see the objectives of the law
11.
Sections 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of men and women.
12.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
13.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
14.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote human liberation and development.
1) Read together with Article XIV
Read :
VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993;
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of intergenerational responsibility and inter-generational justice. Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals with the timber
licensing agreements entered into by the government which if not stopped would be
prejudicial to their future. This is so because the DENR holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations the natural resources of the country. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil
case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development

and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless
to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also
for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.
13.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
1) Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.
2) Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution.
3) Read:
a. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS UNION, 59 SCRA 54
The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an Iglesia Ni Kristo
member may refuse to join a Union and despite the fact that there is a closed shop agreement
in the establishment where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated
for his non-membership in the majority union therein.

13. Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
See Art. XII
14.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
a. Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it the welfare state
concept? Distinguish the two.
b. Read: ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the separate opinion of former Chief
Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only)
The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-state concept
which is being followed as shown by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing,
protection to labor (NOTE, however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions which
provide for free enterprise)
PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286 SCRA 109
Mendoza, J.
The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE REPUDIATED laissez
faire (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an economic principle, and although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.
As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for the
benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very
clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote
the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.
15. Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
reform.
a. Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution
b. Read PD 27 as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS regime
c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended THE CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORMS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Read the policy of the state on this matter)
d .Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law
by the President on June 7, 1988.
e. Read:
Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, July 14, 1989
16. Sections 22. The State recognizes and promotes the right of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.
To be discussed later with Art. X, Secs. 1521.
Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities:
1. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)
2. Art. X, Secs. 15 21
3. Art. XII, Sec. 5
4. Art. XIII, Sec. 6
5. Art. XIV, Sec. 17
6. Art. XVI, Sec. 12
17. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
17-a. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in
nation-building.
18. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
a. Define autonomy
b. See Art. X

Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its provisions evidencing
autonomy to local government units.
19. Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
20. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
To be discussed under Article XI.
a. Please see RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by RA 3047, PD
77 and BP 195..
b. PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other
gifts and to their accomplices in bribery other than graft cases against public officers.
c. RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have been illegally acquired
by a public officer or employee.
21.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Public disclosure of government
transactions
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[1][4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the
PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous years mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months,
over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given
to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive
committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan
to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given,
subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in
aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J.
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. [2][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. [3][7] At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,[4][8] approved by
Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo

Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified
in Senate Res. No. 455. All were disregarded by the petitioners.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman
Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the
Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGGs nominees
Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent
Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the
absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;
and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues
raised in the petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction;
second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate
Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth, Senates Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated
any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right
against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into
justiciable controversies.
I S S U E:
Is Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its implementation
wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in investigations involving their
transactions violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution?
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1, which limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it
reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[5][15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[6][16] In
those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power
to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that
the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function,
thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process
to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information

respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,
Section 1 of the Constitution
stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain
powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to
the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the
government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words,
public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers. [7][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress
and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same
provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Pea,[8][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as
obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of
E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He
eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is
important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as
valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If
Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof
from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by
this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most
serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and nonaccountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x x
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members
were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which mandates that
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Read together with Section 7, Article III and Sec. 20, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Reference:
Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City