FINAL REPORT TO

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE:

"Career Patterns in the

Soviet Bureaucracy, 1917-1941"

AUTHOR:

J. Arch Getty
William Chase

CONTRACTOR:

University of California, Riverside

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:
COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER:
DATE:

J.

Arch

Getty

628-3

January 10, 1986

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided

by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH
Edward L. K e e n a n
Chairman, Board of Trustees
Vladimir I. Toumanoff
Executive Director

Suite 304
1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 387-0168

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
This paper is an interim progress report at the end of two
years of a three year project intended to:
(1)

assemble, test, and disseminate a computerized

data bank of biographical and career information
on approximately 30,000 Soviet Government and
Party officials over the period 1917-1941;

(2)

analyze the structure and operation of the Soviet

bureaucracy in that period.

Preliminary findings are presented here, and the authors hope

to present a Final Report analyzing changes in the bureaucracy
in late 1986. Thereafter the full data bank will be made available
to the scholarly community and general public by deposit with the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Science
Research (at the University of Michigan) and the State Data Bank
at the University of California, Berkeley.
The project is being funded jointly by the National Council, the
National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Fund for the Eighties

BOARD OF TRUSTEES: George Breslauer; Herbert J. Ellison; Sheila Fitzpatrick; Edward A. Hewett; David Joravsky; Edward L. Keenan (Chairman);
Andrzej Korbonski; Herbert S. Levine; Leon S. Lipson (Vice Chairman); Paul Marer; Daniel C. Matuszewski; Alfred G. Meyer; Marshall D. Shulman;
Vladimir I. Toumanoff; Richard S. Wortman

SUMMARY
Despite the significant number
Soviet

state

and

Communist

of

Party

studies

bureaucracies

period, few works employ aggregate analysis as a

and

understanding

internal
period.

of

aspects
in

of

the

the inter-war

means

of

examining

the overall patterns, behaviors, relationships and

structure

of

these

bureaucracies

during

this

formative

This study, which is based on a partially completed data bank

containing officeholding and biographical data of Soviet

bureaucrats,

applies

bureaucratic

aggregate

analysis

to

selected

aspects

practices and behavior from 1925 to 1931.

1929

and

The years 1925, 1927,

1931 were chosen for analysis and data were drawn primarily

from Vsia Mo3kva, the

methodological

Moscow

reasons,

city

directory.

of

For

substantive

and

this analysis is restricted to three issues:

(1) multiple officeholding and persistence

examples

of

(conversely

turnover)

as

aggregate behavior; (2) the extent and nature of "family

circles"; and (3) the structure of the Central Committee. Because

the

data base on which this analysis is based is only partially completed,

this is not a full-scale study of the state

and

party

bureaucracies

but rather a series of diagnostic probes and systematic observations.

Given

the

well-known

shortage

of

competent

and

politically

reliable administrators in the 1920s and early 1930s, one might expect
multiple officeholding to be
officeholding

by

national

common.
and

RSFSR

reveals that it was, in fact, quite

more

Yet

an

party

uncommon

analysis
and
less

of

multiple

state bureaucrats
than

20%

held

than one office. Although the exception among all officeholders,

multiple officeholding by the bureaucracies' top leaders

was

somewhat

more frequent. Nonetheless, more than 93% of the top leaders held only

Page 2

one or two offices simultaneously.

officeholding,

Despite

the

rarity

of

multiple

the proportion of officials and especially top leaders

who held more than one office grew steadily between 1925 and 1931.
One

of

bureaucracies

the

most

during

striking
this

features

period

is

of

the

the

USSR

startling

persistence and high rate of turnover among officials

officials

in

selected

USSR

personnel

the

low

RSFSR

level of

only

11%

of

state agencies and 5% in selected RSFSR

agencies held their position for

leading

and

six

years.

Among

those

agencies'

persistence rate was comparable 14% and 4%

respectively. Precisely why the persistence rate among RSFSR officials

was

so low is unclear, but one possible explanation can definitely be

eliminated

RSFSR

officials

were

not

moving

into

USSR-level

positions. The RSFSR commissariats were not a training ground for USSR
offices; on the contrary, the two were separate career tracks.
An examination of biannual turnover rates revealed that
was

high

(64%)

in

turnover

1925-1927, lower (43%) in 1927-1929, and highest

(77%) in 1929-1931. Although political purging (i.e. of Left and Right

Oppositionists) accounts for some of the turnover, it was considerably
less

significant

incontestable

than

structural

factors.

jobs.

The

fact

is

high rate of turnover meant that the vast majority of

bureaucrats, including top leaders, were new to and

their

One

result

was

inexperienced

in

undeniably confusion, inefficiency, and

dysfunctional behavior. One can not help but wonder how a

bureaucracy

in chaos managed to govern effectively.

To reduce the inefficiency which turnover bred, one

might

expect

that top bureaucratic leaders brought with them to their new positions
a coterie of experienced, competent

and

reliable

administrators,

Page 3

"family

circle".

But

the

evidence

clearly

indicates

circles were virtually unknown until 1929, and even

were

few

in

number

ones,

during

1929-1931

and usually very small. In some cases, personal

secretaries comprised the entire "family".

largest

that family

These

circles,

even

the

were especially small given the population at risk. In

those family circles which did exist, the members' experience suggests
that

the

circles

were primarily functional rather than political in

nature.
Our examination of the Central Committee reveals that, unlike the
low

rate

of

persistence

within

state

agencies, persistence among

Central Committee members was several orders of magnitude

fact,

the

Central

Committee

Demotions from or within the

related

to

from

remarkable
Central

Daniels'

finding

bureaucratic

structural

Committee

promotions

Central

factional/oppositional

changes. Robert
selected

during

during

Committee

the

constituencies

received

two

were

fairly stable.
nearly

Central

always

is

Committee

treatment

regional

was

correct. Despite it3

constituencies

preferential

period

was

In

membership rather than structural

that

consistency,

this

1925-1931

higher.

party

within

the

when it came to
secretaries

and

Vesenkha (Supreme Council of National Economy) presidium members.

The rise of the regional party secretaries during this period was
probably

related

to

collectivization. To ensure
policy,

the
the

process

and

successful

regional

needs

implementation

of

of
that

it was necessary to give regional secretaries more power. The

increased

importance

of

Vesenkha

presidium

members

undoubtedly

reflected

the Central Committee's increased concern with implementing

it3 newly adopted economic policies, especially industrialization. The

Page 4

promotion

of

both

Vesenkha

and regional party secretaries suggests

that the structural arrangements of the Central Committee depended

economic

goals

and

policies

others in selecting members.

rather

on

than on the whims of Stalin or

Introduction
Analyses of the Communist Party and

Soviet

state

bureaucracies

during the interwar years are common to Soviet studies. Historians and
political

scientists

readers

about

the

bureaucracies.
understand

published

formation,

While

all

evolution

such

structure

focus

political

totalitarianism,

group

theory,

narrative.

and

Irrespective

studies of necessity focus to

some

they

on

inform

of

these

bureaucracy

utilize

to

in

with interest

power,

and

which

approaches. Some seek to demonstrate the role of the bureaucracies

of

of

studies

works

of

formation

structure

numerous

variety

the

the

have

others come to the subject armed

still
of

others
the

extent

employ

traditional

approach used, all these

on

structure.

Yet

most

confine their analyses to content and behavior, usually the membership

and behavior of one or, at best, a few agencies.
Another approach is to
bureaucracy.

analyze

the

will

not

argue

it

emphasizes

structure

as

patterns,

that

the

research

analysis

deal

with

behaviors, relationships and internal structure of

the party and state bureaucracies during their

aggregate

the

which seeks to expose aggregate patterns. Aggregate analysis

is relatively new to Soviet studies. Few works exist which

overall

of

Party's or the Soviet state's bureaucracy was a determining

factor in anything. Rather

strategy

structure

One need not be a Straussian to recognize that structure

is important in its own right. This study

Communist

overall

of

formative

years.

Yet

selected aspects of officeholding can provide

some answers to longstanding questions and raise new

questions

about

these bureaucracies.
This paper confines itself

to

the

period

1925-1931

for

both

Page 2

substantive

and

methodological reasons. These years span a period of

profound political importance and major upheavals

associated

in

society

with the fall of a moderate political leadership, the rise

of Stalin, the collectivization of agriculture, the

Economic

Soviet

Policy

experiment

in

market

end

of

the

involved

in

composition

party
these

and

state

bureaucracies

events. Overall

New

socialism, the beginnings of

planned industrialization, and a cultural revolution. In

another,

the

changes

were

one

way

or

affected by and

in

the

structure,

and behavioralpatternswithin these bureaucracies provide

another vantage point from which to observe this important period.

Methodological and evidentiary
choice
were

of

issues

also

accounted

for

this period. The data needed to sustain aggregate analysis

available. Specifically,

bureaucratic

our

data

consist

of

listings

part

state

party

bureaucracies from 1917 to 1941. The data bank is still in

the process

of

completed.

But

creation; as

of

and

this

writing,

it

is

about 40%

when it is finished, it will house officeholding data

on all bureaucrats listed in Vsia

RSFSR,

study

of a long-term project to construct a computerized data bank

of officeholding and biographical information on members of the

and

of

personnel in national and RSFSR level agencies from 1925

to 1931 taken from Vsia Moskva, the Moscow city directory. This
is

the

Moscow

Moskva

who

served

in

the

USSR,

province, city and raion-level bureaucracies. The

data base will also house biographical information on several thousand

of these bureaucrats.
The data analyzed in this paper are drawn from
listings

for

the

Vsia

Moskva

1925, 1927, 1929 and 1931.[1] (For a discussion of Vsia

Moskva, see Appendix A.) Although this represents but a portion of the

Page 3

data

in

several

the

data

reasons.

statistically

bank, we have confined ourselves to this data for

First,

verified.

the

data

While

is

complete

data

bank,

unverified

data

from

not

all

of

the

eentered. Therefore, we have limited the

Second,

the

ha3

been

large volume of officeholding data

drawn from other sources is in the

and

and

some

of

these

sources

it

remains

sources has ben

for

our

analysis.

data bank contains extensive biographical information on

many officeholers, but that data is either incomplete or has not

verified.

Hence

any

been

analysis of it would contain a significant bias

though of an undetermined nature.

Our analysis is divided into three
multiple

officeholding

and

sections

which

(1)

persistence (and conversely turnover) as

examples of aggregate behavior in the upper echelons of

and,

examine

the

national

in some cases, RSFSR bureaucracies; (2) the extent and nature of

"family circles"; and (3) the structure of the Central Committee. This
is

not

full-scale

structure and behavior

analysis

of

the

analysis of the party and state bureaucracies'

during

1925-1931,

nor

is

it

systematic

leading members' behavior. Rather it is a series of

diagnostic probes and systematic observations of some aspects of those

bureaucracies

and

data and study are

bureaucracies
patterns of

is

the aggregate behavior of their members. Much more

necessary
possible,

behavior

which

before

complete

picture

of

these

but hopefully the contours of change and

emerge

from

our

resemble the fundamental tendencies.

Multiple Officeholding

probe3

and

analysis

Page 4

One might expect that the well known shortage

of

competent

and

politically reliable administrators in the 1920s and early 1930s would

lead to a high incidence of
tried

to

fill

qualified and
leaders

as

multiple

officeholding,

as

the

regime

many positions as possible from a limited pool of

acceptable

personnel.

Indeed,

some

of

the

highest

held many positions simultaneously. M.I. Kalinin, chairman of

the soviet apparatus, held

industrial

commissar

ten

distinct

posts

in

1925.

Bolshevik

V.V. Kuibyshev must also have been busy in 1927

as he dashed to and from meetings of the twelve

diverse

departments,

agencies, and commissions in which he worked.

Yet when one looks at the leadership as a whole, the
patterns

of

individual

officeholding

suggest

officeholding was not the rule, and was common

statistical

that

only

at

multiple

the

highest

levels of the state and party bureaucratic apparatuses. Information on

multiple officeholding in this period is presented in Tables 3 and
Two

things

percent
while

the

stand

out.

First,

the

vast

majority

of officeholders held only one office at

M.

more

than 80

time.

Second,

proportions of individuals holding the same number of jobs

in these two years appear similar, there was a steady increase in

the

number

The

of

persons

who

held

two

positions

simultaneously.

proportion of persons with two positions doubled in the period. If

narrow

we

our focus to the higher echelons of the bureaucracy (Table 4),

we find the

same

bureaucrats

who

trend.
held

This

makes

sense:

we

would

not

expect

mid- or low-level management positions to have

more than one job; and if we expected multiple officeholding we

would

expect it among top level leaders.

Clearly, within the leadership as a whole, multiple officeholding

Page 5

was

uncommon

in

this

bureaucracy.

There

officeholders

to

period and was evident only at the top of the

was

tendency

over

time,

however,

occupy more than one post. Again, this tendency was

most pronounced at the top of the hierarchy. The points

that

for

multiple

officeholding

was

not

the

rule

to

note

are

and

that

the

possibilities of interlocking directorates were axiomatically

limited

to a small segment of the bureaucratic apparatus.

It seems reasonable to
related

to

the

availability

shortage of competent
talent

would

assume

(and/or

of

that

multiple

acceptable

politically

officeholding

is

personnel. A perceived

reliable)

administrative

predictably lead to a growth in multiple officeholding.

In the late twenties, this growth proceeded steadily.

One
increase

could
as

argue

its

that

the

regime's

political

control

would

individual members controlled more of the levers of

power and that multiple officeholding might seem politically desirable

to

the elite. Yet there is no reason to believe that the regime found

this practice attractive from a functional point of view. An

with
any

official

two or more jobs was probably unable to devote full attention to

one

of

them.

Party

pronouncements

in

the

1930s

on

making

administrators more responsible for successful task implementation, on

strengthening government staffs with "new men", and on
secretaries

freeing

party

from the details of economic administration show that the

leadership wa3 sensitive to such functional questions.

The growth of multiple

officeholding

at

the

end

of

the

New

Economic Policy may have been symptomatic of a shortage of experienced

personnel in times of industrial expansion and the implementation of a
planned

economy. The increase in the practice may therefore have been

Page 6

a response to particular problems as much

ensure

that

members

as

an

active

attempt

to

of the inner circle dominated key positions. To

further investigate the nature and parameters of officeholding in

Soviet

bureaucracy

and

to understand the administrative environment

which the Bolsheviks faced, it is necessary to look further

dynamics

and

in

into

the

patterns of the bureaucracy. For example, the length of

time one held an office is as important as the number of

held

the

understanding

the

offices

one

overall structure of the bureaucracy. To

study these patterns might help to explain the Bolsheviks' approach to

the problem of government.
Persistence
We are accustomed to thinking of the NEP as a period of
job

stability

and

of

long

relative

tenures in office. N.I. Bukharin edited

Pravda for twelve years until 1929. V.V. Shmidt was Commissar of Labor
for

a dozen years after the revolution, and A.V. Lunacharskii ran the

Commissariat of Enlightenment continuously in

the

same

period.

Our

conception has been that with the exception of occasional demotions of

Trotskyists from the Central Committee, job stability and tenure

were

relatively high until Stalin's revolution of 1929-1931 removed the NEP

political establishment.
Yet
incorrect.

our

data

The

clearly

state

demonstrate

bureaucracy,

that

especially

thi3
in

impression

is

the early Stalin

period, was a system through which large numbers of officials came and
went

with

great

frequency.

The

data

show,

likelihood of a given person persisting even in

for example, that the

the

upper-levels

of

the bureaucracy was low and that officeholders moved in and out of the
V3ia Moskva-defined leadership stratum from one year to the

next.

Of

Page 7

3,203 people in our sample whom we know held national office in either
1929 or 1931, 2,169 did so in 1929 and 1,470 in 1931.
individuals

(20.1%

Yet,

only

436

of all 1929 officeholders) held the same office in

both 1929 and 1931, suggesting a generally low level of persistence.

Of the 436 individuals whom we know held the same office in
1929

both

and 1931, 359 (82.3 percent) came from the upper echelon3. While

this means that persisters were more likely to be top level officials,
it

is

also

the

apparatus in 1931
positions.

Only

case

that

had
359

the

top-level

extraordinarily
of

little

that

the

clearly

in

their

at

the

upper

levels.

number of top-level positions did not increase

markedly from 1929 to 1931, the change in the

was

experience

903 top-staffers in 1931 (39.5 percent) had

more than two consecutive year3 of experience

Considering

management of the state

bureaucratic

apparatus

in personnel. Moreover, upper level persisters were more

likely to hold more than one office in both years than were members of
the

group as a whole. Thu3, men with experience were spread even more

thinly in 1931 than in 1929.

The lack of persistence among 1929
mobility

at

the

highest

levels

of

officals

suggests

startling

the Soviet bureaucracy in this

period. Tables 5-11 provide a detailed breakdown of personnel turnover

within

selected

state

agencies.

The tables show the percentages of

officeholders in a given agency who had worked in the same

agency

in

previous years.
Table 5 examines 1925-1931 persistence within selected
(USSR)agencies

for

persons of all ranks; Table 6 does the same for

agencies at the Russian Republic

astonishingly

high

all-union

personnel

(RSFSR)

level.

These

tables

show

turnover over the five year period. In

Page 8

USSR agencies, fewer than 11% of the 1931

worked

in

the

leaders

and

staffers

had

same agency five years before; in RSFSR agencies, the

average figure was less than 5%.

Where was turnover greatest? Did the administrative staff
the

same

remain

despite political changes at the very top of the agency? Or

was the reverse true? Was there stability in the top leadership
the

lower

staff

renewed itself? To find out (and to control for the

progressive underrepresentation of
editions

of

Vsia

while

Moskvasee

lower

Table

level

1 ) , we

officials
excluded

in

later

ranks below

department level in our calculations. Tables 7 and 8 evaluate the same

years,

levels, and agencies as Tables 5 and 5, but are limited to the

higher ranks. The turnover rates are quite similar to

ranks

and

tend

to

confirm

the

data

those

for

in Tables 5 and 6. It seems,

therefore, that high levels of personnel turnover were common

rank

levels

at

all

and that the reporting characteristics of Vsia Moskva do

not seem to bias measurements of

leadership

all

ranks

seem

to

this

have

kind.

Both

upper

and

lower

suffered from the same high renewal

rates over the period.

However, turnover was somewhat greater
agencies

than

(6-10%

higher)

in

in those at the USSR level. It is difficult to account

for this difference. One might hypothesize that RSFSR agencies

as

training

grounds

for

officials

who

then

went

commissariats. Yet analyses of the previous positions

officials

RSFSR

suggest

that

earlier

of

on

served
to

USSR

USSR
state

service in RSFSR agencies was quite

rare. Similarly, there were almost no cases in

which

officials

held

USSR and RSFSR posts simultaneously (either in comparable or different

commissariats). Thus careers in the

republican

and

all-union

state

Page 9

agencies

seem

to

have

followed

one or the other path, and the two

levels represented separate and independent career tracks.

To refine our knowledge of turnover in the 1925-1931

period,

we

can break the span into three segments: 1925-27, 1927-29, and 1929-31.
Tables 9 10, and 11 respectively

show

the

levels

of

turnover

in

selected USSR agencies in this period. Of those in a particular agency

in 1927, an average of 64% had not worked there two years before.
"not

The

in agency previously" average falls to 43% for 1927-29, and then

rises again to 76% for 1929-1931.

We find, then, that
1927-29

(but

still

turnover
nearly

was

high

half),

and

three-fourths) between 1929 and 1931. Given

and

reorganizations

(expulsion of

related

rightists,

to

the

reassignment

in
then
the

Stalin
of

1925-27,
very

lower

high

(over

bureaucratic
revolution

personnel

to

in

purges

of 1929-31
cope

with

industrialization and collectivization, etc.) the high turnover in the

latter period is explainable. It is harder to account for the

varying

turnover levels in the 1925-27 and 1927-29 periods.

It may be that these three periods
political

purges.

The

relatively

of

high

change

were

related

1925-27 turnover might well

represent a purge of Trotskyists, the 1927-29 "low" turnover might

a

period

of

be

stable NEP personnel, and the 1929-31 change a purge of

rightists. This hypothesis

completed

to

data

bank

is

will

difficult

to

sustain.

Although

the

contain extensive records on oppositioanl

membership thereby allowing us to correlate it with personnel changes,

at

this

time

the

data is incomplete. Even if it were complete, the

hypothesis regarding the fluctuation in biannual turnover has

limitation.

While

many

Trotskyists

were

another

demoted or transferred in

Page 10

1925, others continued to hold their offices in Moscow until late 1927
when

they were expelled from the party and exiled to the hintherlands

of the USSR. If political purging were a primary factor

in

the

high

turnover rate, one would expect that the 1927-1929 turnover rate would
be higher given that Vsia Moskva was always
quarter

published

in

the

first

of the year and hence the removal of Trotskyists in late 1927

would appear in the 1927-1929 turnover figure.

But even if we assume
their

jobs

in

that

all

Trotskyist

officeholders

1925 (a dubious assumption as noted above), political

purging does not appear to explain the magnitude of the

we

assume

that

political

general

assume

administrative

"base

structural

line"

factors

level and

the

(1925-27,

about a quarter
political

around

levels

1929-31
of

instability

turnover

of

in

would
all

turnover.

bureaucratic

confusion,

was nearly half. Were we to

attributable

to

such

long-term

45%, then the difference between that

years

associated

with

political

purges

be about 20-30$. This would mean that only

turnover

would

appear

to

be

related

as

to

or factional issues. If these assumptions are accurate (and

there is ample reason to doubt them), then political purging was

half

If

purging was not on the agenda in 1927-29,

turnover resulting from personnel shortages,

and

lost

important

as

structural

personnel

only

problems in explaining

turnover. To the extent that 1925-27 and 1929-31 were tumultuous years
because

of

economic

factors, political considerations would be even

weaker in explaining turnover.

Top and middle-level management in those agencies in

our

sample

experienced considerable turnover. Three-quarters of the management in

these agencies had less than two years experience in

that

agency

at

Page 11

that

level;

96%

of

them

had less than five years experience. This

suggests that the bureaucratic apparatus chronically lacked experience

at the upper levels.[2]
One can only
stability

was

efficiently.
tumultuous

suspect
so

It

low

would

that
could

appear

administration

as

bureaucracy
not

have

difficult

in

which

functioned
to

personnel

smoothly

characterize

"totalitarian".

or

such

Constant

turnover,

purging, and reassignment of administrative cadres must certainly have

been the causes (or perhaps symptoms) of a bureaucracy in chaos.

"Family Circles" in the Bureaucracy

The numbers of leading officials who were nearly

always

new

to

their positions are staggering. It is difficult to understand how the

government continued to function effectively, if

indeed

it

did.

We

might suppose that the bureaucracy coped with such a chaotic situation
through the use of cohesive patronage networks in

the

absence

of

stable and effective personnel policy.

As in most political systems, patronage in the Soviet bureaucracy
allows

officials

to

create "family circles" of subordinate clients.

Family circles exist at all levels of Soviet society

units

within

enterprises

all

the

Without a large volume of "inside"

membership

from

way up to the Central Committee.

information

on

the

can

content

and

of family circles in the 1925-1931 period, it is difficult

to measure their size or importance. One type of family

we

individual

measure

is

composed

of

circle

which

the group of clients which a major

leader brings with him when he move3 to a different

agency.

We

have

Page 12

long

thought

that

Soviet

officials carry a khvost, or bureaucratic

tail, with them as they move from position to position. Theoretically,

we should see the official taking key members of his client group from
his old agency to his new one.[3]
But how common were family circles? Table 12 shows
of

all-union

the

movement

commissars and chairmen of state agencies and lists the

number of officials they carried with them in the 1925-31 period:

"Tail"

column

the

shows the number of officials which the leader brought

from his old agency to the new one.

In this period, there were 17 instances in which
chairman

or

commissar

moved

from

one

USSR

agency to a new a different

one.[4] Of the 17, 4 cannot be measured for lack of complete

this

stage

12

data

at

of the project. Of the remaining 13 moves, one took place

in 1925-27, two occurred in 1927-29,

Table

agency

and

ten

happened

in

1929-31.

shows that bureaucratic "tails" were uncommon and when they

did exist, were rather small.

Of the 13 instances of movement which we can measure, 4 involved
no apparent tail. Another five consisted of tails with only one or two
persons. All tails consisting of two
only five of these

or

more

persons

made

above

that

most

multiple

to

period:

the

years

of

the

of

1929-31

tails,

the

common even among top leaders.

place

the
least

in

the

Stalin revolution and the worst

period of bureaucratic turmoil. Notwithstanding the

number

support

officeholding,

persistence, and greatest turnover/reorganization took

1929-31

were

existed in the 1929-31 period, which included 10

of the 13 measurable groups. This distribution tends

observations

there

practice

relatively

large

does not seem to have been

Page 13

Among those leaders who did bring

groups

with

them,

common

practice was to bring along one's personal secretary. Between 1927 and
1929, N. Uglanov became Commissar of Labor

and

brought

one

of

his

administrative assistants (I.P. Itskov) along with him from the Moscow
Party Committee. In 1930, Ordzhonikidze brought his personal secretary
Semushkin

along

with him, and Kuibyshev brought M.F. Feldman. Ianson

could not do without A.M. Pintsel; Mikoian brought

Rukhimovich

Efimov;

and

took G.I. Trukhmanov. In some cases, the leaders promoted

their personal secretaries to key positions

Ianson

E.I.

made

Pintsel

in

their

new

agencies.

a Collegium Member of the Commissariat of Water

Transport; Rukhimovich made Trukhmanov his new Chief of Administration

in

the

Commissariat

of

Transportation;

and Kuibyshev made Feldman

Chief of Administration in Gosplan. Personal

secretaries,

therefore,

were powerful figures and frequent members of family circles.

Sometimes, key
clients

officials

apparently

large

groups

and

(The

Supreme

Council

of

the

Vesenkha

to

Transport

personal secretary and

Department.

The

other

two
six

a
key
were

the

with

him

total of nine persons, including his

members

of

his

Vesenkha

heads

or

deputy heads of various

Vesenkha departments. Rukhimovich installed his men in

in

National

head of the its Planning Department. In 1930, he became

Commissar of Means of Communication (Transport). He brought

from

of

with them to new agencies. In 1929, M.L. Rukhimovich had been

Deputy Chairman of Vesenkha

Economy)

brought

key

Planning

positions

Commissariat of Transport. His new Deputy Commissar, Chief of

Administration, and seven key department workers

had

come

with

him

from Vesenkha.[5]
One of the

major

personnel

changes

in

thi3

period

involved

Page 14

Vesenkha.

In

chief

Vesenkha;

of

certainly

1930,

Sergo

Ordzhonikidze

Kuibyshev

demotion.

In

became

head

of

Gosplan

almost

this game of bureaucratic musical chairs,

both leaders brought family

circles

Rabkrin

Workers'

(Commissariat

replaced V.V. Kuibyshev as

of

with

them:

and

Ordzhonikidze

Peasants'

from

Inspection)

to

Vesenkha and Kuibyshev from Vesenkha to Gosplan.

Ordzhonikidze brought ten functionaries with him from Rabkrin and
four from the Central Control Commission (Ts.K.K.) to Vesenkha. (Until
1934, Rabkrin and Ts.K.K., although charged with
were

united

under

one

distinct

commissar.) In his reorganized Vesenkha, the

Secretary to the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, and seven

the

Collegium

had

headed Vesenkha
Building,

been

Rabkrin

departments:

Labor,

functions,

members

of

veterans. Eight Rabkrin alumni now

The

Fuel,

Finance,

Supply,

Building

Planning,

and

Machine

Timber,

Organization/Rationalization of Production were headed by

and

Rabkrin

or

Ts.K.K. alumni.[6]
We should
Ordzhonikidze

also

note

brought

to

that

of

the

Vesenkha,

ten

Rabkrin

been

of

these

groups

in charge of inspecting a particular branch of the national

economy. It seems, therefore, that Ordzhonikidze took

who

whom

seven had been heads of Rabkrin

Operational-Inspection Groups in the twenties. Each

had

workers

specialized

administrators

in
of

certain
those

areas

of

sectors.

the

inspectors

production and made them the

The

watchdogs

became

the

administrators.
Kuibyshev brought seven of his former Vesenkha officials with him
to

Gosplan,

Vesenkha's

including

his

personal

Scientific-Technical

secretary,

Department,

and

four
the

members

of

heads

of

Page 15

Vesenkha's

Kustar

and

Chemical

Committees. Of the seven, one became

Gosplan's Chief of Administration, one became head of the Construction

Department,

and five became members of the Gosplan Standing Committee

on Cnemicals.[7]
The members of Kuibyshev's 1931
Chemicals

Gosplan

Standing

Committee

on

were an interesting group. Of the total of fifteen members,

six had come with Kuibyshev from Vesenkha. The fifteen members of
1931

Gosplan

least five

committee seem to have been divided into two groups. At

members

chemical

experts.

consisted

of

(including

the

of

the

Another

high-ranking

Rudzutak,

committee
group
party

latter group of eight party

within
and

Unshlikht,

(those

Vesenkha)

were

the

committee,

however,

Control

Commission

members

Zatonskii,

officials,

from

six

and Kuibyshev). Of this

were

Central

Committee

members or candidates. Presumably, their assignment was to keep an eye

on the chemical specialists. Thirteen of the fifteen had also been
the

Sovnarkom

Chemical

Committee

under Rykov. We might note

fifteen

in

this

on

back in 1929, and had thus worked

connection

that

by

1938,

all

except one (Krzhizhanovskii) had been shot or were in prison.

One, Rataichak, was a defendant at the 1937

Moscow

show

trial,

and

confessed to wrecking in the chemical industry.

There are other examples of 3uch family circles following leaders
through

the

bureaucracy. A.I. Mikoian had been Commissar of Trade in

1929, but in 1930 became head of

Supply.

the

newly-created

Commissariat

of

He brought with him his former Deputy Commissar, his personal

secretary, two
inspectors.

He

members
made

of
his

his
two

collegium,
former

and

one

of

his

chief

collegium members into Deputy

Commissars of Supply (M.A. Chernov and M.I. Khlopliankin), his

former

Page 16

Deputy

Commissar

into

his new commissariat's Chief of Planning, and

his former inspector into

the

Chief

Quality

Control

Inspector

in

Supply.[8]
While it might seem from these examples that
were

travelling

"tails"

common in upper and middle management during the 1929-31 period,

there are several aspects of our

First

of

all,

while

bearing

findings
in

which

suggest

mind that the figures in Table 12

represent only upper- and middle- management personnel,

that

these

otherwise.

we

can

note

family circles seem quite small; some officials have none

at all. The circles seem particularly small when we consider that

size3

of

1929 "old" agencies in each case were quite large. Thus the

"population at risk" to become part of a circle was enormous

to

the

actual

size

compared

of the circle drawn from it. While most leaders

took at least someone with them, they do

large

the

not

seem

to

have

brought

contingents to their new bailiwicks. Further research is needed

to evaluate the prevalence of family circles in other agencies and

lower

levels,

but

so

far

there

are

reasons

to

doubt

at

their

universality.
Second, it seems that
susceptible

to

the

some

migrations

agencies
caused

or
by

situations

were

less

family circles. The USSR

Council of Peoples' Commissars remained relatively stable,

despite

drastic change in its top leadership. Throughout the 1920s, A.I. Rykov
had

been

Minister.

Chairman

of

the

Sovnarkom

equivalent

of

Prime

With the fall of the "Right Opposition", Rykov was replaced

by V.M. Molotov and demoted to

Rykov

the

Commissar

of

Posts

and

Telegraphs.

brought no one with him from Sovnarkom to Posts and Telegraphs,

not even a personal

secretary.

While

we

might

suspect

that

such

Page 17

political

demotions

and

humiliations

precluded

the

bringing of a

circle, we should note that Molotov also brought no circle with him to
Sovnarkom.

There

are

no

known

veterans

of Molotov's Moscow party

organization working in his 1931 Sovnarkom.

Sovnarkom actually consisted of two parts: a
of

the

various

and

an

workers who handled the day to day work

of

the

upper

were

echelon

Peoples'

changed

Commissars,

as

Commissars

remained relatively stable in

thi3

Moscow

seems

party

officials.

It

period
then,

collegium

operational staff of
Council.

reassigned,
and
that

composed

included

While

the

the

staff

no

former

some agencies, like

Sovnarkom, were immune to the movement of family circles.

Therefore, large family circles were neither common nor large, at
least

at the highest levels. Paradoxically, their rarity may have led

to the conclusion that they were commonplace. If few leaders

actually

had visible family circles, then the ones who did must have stood out.
Ordzhonikidze's Rabkrin takeover of Vesenkha must
and

striking,

and

few

such

glaring

have

examples

been

obvious

could lead us to

conclude that the practice was universal. We can look at such examples
of

family

circles

and

suspect

that

they represent the tip of the

iceberg, but the evidence presented here makes us wonder if

there

is

anything below the waterline.

Finally, in those family circles which did
members

(excluding

personal

secretaries)

exist,

appear

the

circles'

to have possessed

valuable experience in their areas of responsibility. The most obvious

example

is

that

of

Kuibyshev's chemical experts. This leads one to

hypothesize that family circles were functional rather than

in

nature.

That

is,

political

commissars transferred to a new agency brought

Page 18

with

them

proven

trustworthiness)

administrators

whose

experience

(and

probably

would be of value to a commissar who now directed an

otherwise unproven staff.

Structural Changes in Central Committee Membership

An examination of the structure

Committee

should

bureaucracy
analyses

and

tell
the

us

and

something

priorities

of

personnel

about
the

the

of

the

Central

nature of the high

regime.

Prosopographical

of various Central Committees have told us a good deal about

the age

structure,

members

at

background,

and

careers

of

Central

Committee

certain times in Soviet history, but we still know little

about the structure of the Committee itself and the selection

process

that formed it during this period.[9]

Robert Daniels has
selected

from

suggested

particular

Accordingly, heads

of

that

the

Central

bureaucratic

various

key

agencies

Committee

was

"constituencies".[10]
and

departments

were

endowed with Central Committee membership to reflect their importance.

Similarly, were we
members

in

to

find

concentration

of

Central

Committee

certain agency, we might well suspect that this agency

enjoyed enhanced prestige and power. This approach does not deny
Stalin

personally

selected

suggest that members

Daniels

has

were

examined

Central
selected

Committee

composition.

elected

in

members, but it does

purposefully

and

functionally.

the constituency patterns for the 1925 Central

Committee. The following analysis extends this

Committees

that

1927

and

1930

work

to

the

Central

and evaluates the changes in

Page 19

The first thing one notices are the continuities. Of the 63

full

members elected in 1925, 51 (81 %) continue as full members in 1927. Of

the 42 candidate members in 1925, 38 (90%) either remained
or

were

promoted

candidates

to full member. Of the 71 full members in 1927, 63

(90i) had been members or candidates in 1925.

We

find

similar

high

levels of persistence between the 1927 and 1930 Central Committees. Of

the 71 full members in 1930, 55 (73%) had been members of the previous
Central

Committee, and another 12 had been candidates previously. So,

87 percent of the 1930 Central Committee had been

candidates

at

agencies,

the

Committee

the

time

is

members

rate

in

the

extremely

same

high.

agency

Between

for

1925

persistence in commissariats averaged only 36%, compared

the

or

of their election. In comparison with other

persistence

members

either

Central

and
to

1927,

81%

for

Central Committee; for the following period, the figures were 56%

compared to 78%. (See Tables 9 and 10)

Certain common patterns
throughout

the

period.

Executive

Central

Virtually

members as were the chairmen

Central

of

of

Committee

Committee

Secretary

Central

of

Committee

the

Trade

contained

hold

all Peoples' Commissars were full

Gosplan,
of

Vesenkha,

Soviets

Sovnarkom,

(Ts.I.K.),

GPU/OGPU.[11] Comintern Secretaries were often full

the

membership

the

and

the

as

was

members,

Union International (Profintern). Each

four

chiefs

of

Central

Committee

departments (as full or candidate members). Central Committees usually

had five to six Moscow party

leaders

and

three

to

four

Leningrad

officials as members or candidates.

One way to study upper bureaucratic change and priorities

is

to

examine the promotions and demotions within the Central Committee from

Page 20

1925

to

1930.

If

we

look

constituencies,

in

which

at

the

bureaucratic

agencies,

or

those demoted or promoted were working, we

see some interesting patterns.

At the time of the election of the 1927 Central Committee,
former

eight

members were dropped. Nearly all were prominent members of the

recently

defeated

Left

Opposition,

including

Trotsky,

Zinoviev,

Kamenev, Evdokimov, Piatakov, Rakovskii, and Smilga.

Nineteen Central Committee members or candidates in
to

failed

be elected to the 1930 Central Committee, and four full members in

1929 were demoted to candidates in

demotions.

(Of

the

posts on the Central

Committee

23,

two

Control

membership

1930 -- a

total

others

had

Transportation
widespread

Commission

It

23

apparent

which

precluded

Central

leaving 18 demotions in all.) Of the 18, the

represented

(1), Sovnarkom

Vesenkha
(1)

labor

officials.[12]

(1), Foreign

and

unknown

Affairs

posts

(6).

(1),
The

demotion of labor and union officials suggests the fall of

the Right Opposition and of the clients

unions.

of

had died and three were transferred to

largest single group (7) consisted of union and

The

1927

seems

clear

that

demotion

of

Mikhail
from

Tomskii

in

the

or within the Central

Committee was usually the result of ideological or

political

defeat.

These demotions, however, did not change the structural arrangement of

the

Central

Committee.

For

example,

the

1930

Central

Committee

contained eight "slots" for labor and union officials, as had the 1927
Committee.
If demotions fell heavily on union officials,
promotions

Central

Committee

benefitted other constituencies. There were three types of

promotion to and within the Central Committee. One could

be

promoted

Page 21

from

outside the Central Committee to either candidate or full member

status, or one could rise from candidate

patterns

for

individuals

elected

to

to

full

member.

the

1927

and

Promotion

1930

Central

Committees are given in Tables 15 and 16.

These tables clearly
Central

Committee

show

that

promotions

to

or

within

the

in this period were proportionally similar in 1927

and in 1930. The two constituencies most favored by Central

Committee

membership were regional party secretaries and members of the Vesenkha

presidium.[13] In this period, Vesenkha officials (many
backgrounds)

and

with

Rabkrin

provincial party leaders came to comprise a central

core of the Central Committee.

Of those promoted to or within the
31.9%

were

regional

secretaries

Central

and

at

Committee

in

1930,

least 10.6% were Vesenkha

presidium members- (No regional party secretary and only one member of
Vesenkha's

presidium

had

been demoted). The proportions of regional

secretaries and Vesenkha presidium members among those

far

higher

than

their

Central Committee,

so

promoted

were

numbers (at risk to be promoted) on the 1927

their

promotions

had

both

statistical

and

political significance.[14]
Looking first at the members of Vesenkha's presidium (Table
we

can

17),

see that from 1927 to 1930 Vesenkha's strength on the Central

Committee increased tremendously. One-third of Vesenkha's presidium in

1930

was

composed

of

Central

Committee

phenomenal growth in Vesenkha representation

from

members.

However,

did

result

not

this
solely

the promotion of Vesenkha presidium members to Central Committee

membership. Of the seven Vesenkha

presidium

Central

in

Committee

full

members

members

who

were

full

1930, six had already been full

Page 22

members

1927. [15]

in

Committee

Similarly,

candidates

six

the

six

installed

presidium

Vesenkha's

Rabkrin

veterans

in

the

1930

whom

1930-31,

Committee members or candidates in either year.

that

eight

Central

had already enjoyed that status on the previous

Central Committee. Of the

on

of

Ordzhonikidze

none

It

is

were Central
clear,

then,

main cause for Vesenkha's rise, at least with regard to its

representation on

the

Central

Committee,

was

the

appointment

of

already serving Central Committee members and candidates to Vesenkha's

expanded presidium. Whatever the
reflected

the

party's

cause

(and

one

suspects

of

the

it

increased concern with economics at a time of

profound change in economic policy), the result by 1931

enhancement

that

power

of

Vesenkha

and

was

its

major

leader,

Sergo

Ordzhonikidze.
While the rise of Vesenkha presidium
officials

who

benefitted

most

members

is

striking,

from Central Committee promotions in

this period were the regional party secretaries. In both years,

one-third

of

all

promotions

were

from

the

ranks

(non-Moscow) party secretaries. It is also clear that

regional

party

secretaries

were

working

years,

all

but

two

were

about

of

regional

these

promoted

their ways up the Central

Committee ladder. Of 30 instances of regional secretary

both

the

promotion

in

regular promotions up the line from

outside the committee to candidate member or from

candidate

to

full

member. Aside from the fact that they comprised about one-third of all
promotions, we can note that one half of those promoted from candidate
to

full

member

in

1927 were regional secretaries; between 1927 and

1930, this figure was two-thirds.

If we look only at full members

of

the

Central

Committee

and

Page 23

expand

our focus to include the entire decade of the 1930s, a clearer

pattern emerges. Table 18 shows the rise

party

secretaries

and

fall

of

the

regional

during the Stalin Revolution. The rise in power of

the regional secretaries was

reflected

(or

perhaps

based)

on

the

phenomenal growth in their local machines. If Smolensk is typical, the

patronage power of the oblast' secretary grew
1929

and

1936.

astronomically

between

In 1929, the Smolensk obkom's nomenklatura (right of

appointment) controlled 504 party and state appointments. By 1936, the

obkom disposed of slightly over 3,000 posts. In the economic and state
apparatus, the obkom's nomenklatura grew from 453 to 2,453

positions,

and in agriculture from 40 to 832 posts in this period.[16]

The

rise

explanations,

of

the

most

regional

secretaries

could

imperatives

of

collectivization

central/regional integration and balance of

that

the

several

of which remain hypothetical. It is hard to avoid

the impression that the rise of the secretaries was

the

have

and

somehow
to

power.

We

tied

problems
might

to
of

expect

implementation of collectivization on such an unprecedented

scale would involve the delegation of tremendous power to the regional

officials

who

carried

it

out.

Indeed,

the

recent

literature on

collectivization suggests that oblast' secretaries were key figures in

the

planning

and execution of the scheme.[17] It is also significant

that mo3t of the

Central

regional

secretaries

promoted

to

or

within

the

Committee between 1927 and 1930 were from grain-surplus areas

and/or areas of intensive collectivization.[18]

The

story

complicated

one

of

the

which

fall

of

involved

the
a

regional

secretaries

is

major power struggle between the

center and the provinces from 1934 to 1937 and which ended in a bloody

Page 24

victory

for

the

centralizing forces. Since this drama falls outside

the chronological limits of this paper, we need not

except

to

note

the

it

is

worth

observing

it

here

nature of the fall. Aside from the

precipitous

drastic decrease in representation

above,

discuss

on

the

Central

Committee

noted

that all regional secretaries on the

Central Committee in 1937 (save Khrushchev, Beria, and Zhdanov)

were

arrested in the Ezhovshchina.[19]

Summary

This paper has tried to show some

aggregate

analysis.

We

have

of

what

we

can

learn

perhaps raised as many questions as we

have answered. Yet, it seems as important to establish what we do

know

not

as it is to clarify what we do. The chief advantage of aggregate

analysis is that it can establish the central tendency.

is

from

normal

can

help

us

Knowing

what

better analyze and so better understand the

exceptional and unique. While our smorgasbord approach to the study of

bureaucratic

structure

precludes

any

final conclusions, we believe

that what our data suggest is worth future study.

The data on multiple

officeholding,

persistence,

and

turnover

strongly suggest bureaucratic upheaval and change of major proportions

which coincided with

the

social

and

economic

revolutions

of

the

period. Beyond wondering how the government functioned, we have to ask

ourselves how the system held together at all. How did the regime cope
with

this

administrative chaos and retain its hold on power? How did

it prevent centrifugal fragmentation? What held it together?

Unhappily, we do not have very

many

satisfactory

answers.

Our

Page 25

data suggest that organizationally multiple officeholding, job tenure,

and

patronage

functioned

networks

as

do

powerful

not

seem

cohesive

widespread
factor.

government may have partially coped with

significant

numbers

of

regional

the

enough

to

have

On the other hand, the

situation

officials

by

bringing

(including

party

secretaries) into the Moscow leadership circle. Given the diffusion of

power to the provinces, they had to.
On a different level, we might speculate on
emotional

factors

the

ideological

making for cohesion during these revolutions. Some

authors have mentioned the campaign mentality of the times. The

War

motif

of

military

powerful unifying

or

struggle

element.

We

Civil

for the revolution may have been a

might

note

further

that

this

was

precisely the time that Stalin's "cult of personality" became loud and
pervasive. The more chaotic
realities

became,

the

the

louder

social,

economic,

and bureaucratic

the worship of Stalin intruded itself

into Soviet life. We might speculate that the Stalin cult may have had
practical uses over and above the gratification of the dictator's ego.
Deification and adulation are powerful unifiers.
It may well be that such
empirical

evidence,

speculations

are

weakly

grounded

in

but it is difficult to resist suggesting answers

to these nagging questions. We may

know

little

more

happened, but we are 3till in the dark about why and how.

about

what

Page 25

Appendix A
Vsia Moskva and its Limitations
To appreciate the nature of the
based,

data

on

which

this

study

is

it is worth examining briefly the contents of Vsia Moskva. For

the modern historian,

analyzing

social

archives

remain

of

often

disparate

force

scholars

sources.

irregularly in the 1920s and 1930s, Vsia

albeit

sources

of

choice

for

and political phenomena. But for the Soviet period,

problems of access and availability

variety

the

to

Published

Moskva,

use

wide

frequently

which

is

but

but

one

the most extensive of Soviet city directories, contains a wide

range of detailed information about urban and bureaucratic life. It is

a

combination

government, service and telephone directory and a city

guide with sections on the city's

architecture,

districts,

history,

neighborhoods

economy,

and

transportation,

suburbs.

Although only

available for 1923, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931 and 1936,
Vsia

Moskva

constitutes

resource

of

unparalleled

value

to

researchers.
The sections of Vsia Moskva on which
those

which

list

the

party

organizations

raion levels
located

in

at

for

is

based

are

agencies,

commissariats,

the USSR, RSFSR, and Moscow province, city and

in short, the organizational arms of

Moscow.[20]

competencies,

the

bureaucracy

typical listing for a commissariat, party

committee or institute might begin with a

agency's

study

and state bureaucratic apparatuses. In

general, Vsia Moskva contains listings

and

this

short

responsibilities,

and

description
relation

of
to

the
other

agencies, plus its address and hours of operation. Next would come the
names,

titles,

business

addresses,

and

telephone

numbers

of the

Page 27

agency's personnel from the chairman or commissar, through departments

and

sub-departments,

sometimes

even

to clerical levels. Like their

counterparts dealing with social services

bureaucratic

listings

seem

(such

as

hospitals),

the

designed to provide detailed information

for Muscovites. For the historian and political scientist, V3la Moskva
is a good guide to the Soviet bureaucratic hierarchy.
Although Vsia Moskva appears to provide a complete
the

party

and

state

bureaucracies,

it

bureaucratic organs. The police, Central

military

(with

certain

Committee

types

departments,

of
of
the

the exception of some scanty listings) and other such

sensitive organs are

Moskva

omits

breakdown

missing

from

the

directory's

listings.

Vsia

also omits the entire national (USSR) party apparatus from the

listings; only that of the

Logically

enough,

local,

Moscow

city

party

is

included.

the provincial bureaucracy, except for that housed

in Moscow, is afforded little space.

Our data, therefore, provide a
echelons

of

the

state

solid

apparatus:

view

what

we

bureaucracy's top and middle-level managerial

chairman
little

to

only

might

corps.

the

upper

consider
Personnel

the
from

technicians appear in Vsia Moskva listings, but there is

doubt

represented.

of

that
The

only

the

highest

levels

are

systematically

same is true of party officeholding. Simple numbers

make the point. One of the only accounts that tries to assess the size
of

the

Central Committee Secretariat in 1926 fixes it at 767-[21] In

contrast, the total number

national

party

agencies

of

top

staff

positions

listed

Vsia

Moskva

all

in Vsia Moskva for 1926 was 301. Obviously,

our listings do not reflect the complete bureaucracy, only

echelons.

in

its

upper

listings are also not comparable from year to

Page 23

year. The 1929 directory, for example, lists

while
The

the

1931 edition contains only 1,439

discrepancy

stems

from

under-represents

low

of

contains

Vsia

2,270

Moskva

sub-department
secretaries);

fact

that

positions,

over 37 percent fewer.

the

latter

edition

level positions. (See Table 1) The 1929 edition

level
the

the

state

entries

for

1,050

(sub-department

1931

listings

positions

chiefs,

contain

deputy

only

468

at

the

chiefs
fewer

and
than

half.[22]
Most problems can be resolved by limiting
staff,

presidium

and

department

level

analysis

three

the

top

positions, which seem to be

fully reported. Table 2 displays the average number

the

to

of

positions

of

highest levels in the state agencies for the four editions

of Vsia Moskva utilized here. The

most

notable

change

was

in

the

average number of presidium level jobs, which rose from between 14 and
15 to 20 in 1931. It is impossible at this time to fully
growth

of

the

presidium slots relative to other positions of leadership,

but it seems worth noting

segments

explain

of

the

upper

that

presidium

positions

were

the

only

levels of the state apparatus which expanded

between 1929 and 1931, suggesting that these may have been

easier

create than either top staff or functional department level slots.

to

Page 29

Table 1
USSR State Positions Listed in Vsia Moskva: 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931

Rank

Year
1925

1927

1929

1931

41

86

67

80

Presidium

200

181

192

282

Dept. Head

167

127

123

207

Dept. Member

298

457

281

218

Sub-Dept. Head

500

575

614

370

Sub-Dept. Member

1013

913

436

98

Tech. Specialist

253

170

192

68

22

44

50

27

2925

2970

2270

1439

Commissar/Chairman

Personal Secretary

Total State Posts

Sources and notes: see text,

Page 30

Table 2
Average Number of Positions in State Agencies,
By Level, 1925-1931

Level

1925

1927

1929

1931

Top Staff

2.9

6.1

5.6

5.4

Presidium

14.2

14.5

17.2

19.8

Department

33.4

45.0

33.9

30.1

Total

50.5

65.5

56.7

55.3

13

13

12

14

(N)

Sources and notes: see text.

Page 31

Table 3
Profile of National, State and Party
Officeholding, 1925-1931: Multiple Officeholding

Individuals
(All Levels)

Number of
Positions

1925
Percent

1927
Percent

1929
Percent

1931
Percent

88.0

86.2

83.2

90.4

8.1

9.2

12.5

6.7

2.4

2.7

2.9

1.8
.8

.7

1.0

.8

.9

.5

.3

2673

2127

1419

2220

Held
1
2
3

5+

Sources and notes: see text.

.9

Page 32

Table 4
Profile of National State and Party
Officeholding, 1925-1931: Multiple Officeholding of Top Leaders

Individuals
(Top Staff, Presidium, Department Members)
1925
Percent

1927
Percent

1929
Percent

1931
Percent

85.5

82.7

82.4

76.3

11.2

11.0

11.5

17.3

2.7

4.9

4.7

4.9

.4

1.2

.9

1.2

5+

.2

.2

.5

.3

552

848

788

832

Positions
Held

Sources and notes: see text.

Page 33

Table 5
Turnover of Officials in Selected USSR
State Agencies, 1925-1931

Number of
Staffers
in 1931

Agency

In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

Not
In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

127

22

17.3

105

82.7

Sovnarkom

81

18

22.2

63

77.8

Gosplan

54

1.9

53

98.1

Comm. of Foreign Affairs

94

29

30.9

65

69.1

Comm. of Transportation

143

4.2

137

95.8

47

6.4

44

93.6

101

2.0

99

98.0

43

4.7

41

95.3

205

15

7.3

190

92.7

Ts.I.K.

Comm. of Posts and Telegraphs

Comm. of Labor
Comm. of Finance
Vesenkha

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

Moskva.

10.8

given

is

the

number

reported

39.2

in

Vsia

Page 34

Table 6
Turnover of Officials in Selected RSFSR
State Agencies, 1925-1931

In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

Not
In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

112

14

12.5

98

87.5

Sovnarkom

94

0.0

94

100.0

Comm. of Agriculture

46

0.0

46

100.0

Comm. of Enlightenment (Education)

n) 68

4.4

65

95.6

Comm. of Labor

33

0.0

33

100.0

Comm. of Finance

37

0.0

37

100.0

Comm. of Justice

75

13

17.3

62

82.7

Vesenkha

80

2.5

78

97.5

Number of
Staffers
in 1931

Agency

Ts.I.K.

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

4.6

given

is

the

number

reported

95.4

in

Vsia

Moskva. The Commissariat of Agriculture existed only at republic level

until 1930 when the USSR Commissariat was formed. For the purposes
this

table,

it

is

treated

as

evaluate continuity of personnel.

one

of

agency, 1925-1931, in order to

Page 35

Table 7
Turnover of Upper Level Officials in Selected USSR
State Agencies, 1925-1931

Number of
Top Staffers
in 1931

Agency

In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

Not
In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

Ts.I.K.

79

16

20.3

63

79.7

Sovnarkom

34

20.6

27

79.4

Gosplan

27

0.0

27

100.0

Comm. of Foreign Affairs

35

14

40.0

21

60.0

Comm. of Transportation

54

7.4

50

92.6

Comm. of Posts and Telegraphs

16

18.8

13

81.2

Comm. of Labor

23

0.0

23

100.0

Comm. of Finance

42

4.8

40

95.2

105

13

12.4

92

87.6

Vesenkha

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

13.8

given

is

the

number

reported

86.2

in

Vsia

Moskva. The top staff positions considered include chairman/commissar,

deputy

chairman/commissar,

all

presidium/

department heads, and department members.

collegium

members,

Page 36
Table 8
Turnover of Upper Level Officials in Selected RSFSR
State Agencies, 1925-1931

Number of
Top Staffers
Agency

In Agency

Not
In Agency

in 1925

in 1925

in 1931

No.

Pct.

No. Pct.

Ts.I.K.
Sovnarkom

52
49

7
0

13.5
0.0

45
49

86.5
100.0

Comm. of Agriculture

46

0.0

46

100.0

Comm. of Enlightenment (Education) 40

7.5

37

92.5

Comm. of Labor

28

0.0

28

100.0

Comm. of Finance

3t

0.0

31

100.0

Comm. of Justice

16

6.3

15

93.7

Vesenkha

40

2.5

39

97.5

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

3.7

given

is

the

number

reported

96.3

in

Vsia

Moskva. The top staff positions considered include chairman/commissar,

deputy

chairman/commissar,

department

heads,

and

all

department

presidium/

collegium

members. The

Agriculture existed only at republic level until 1930

members,

Commissariat
when

the

of

USSR

Commissariat was formed. For the purposes of this table, it is treated

as one agency, 1925-1931.

Page 37

Table 9
Turnover of Upper Level Officials in Selected USSR
State Agencies, 1925-1927

Number of
Top Staffers
in 1927

Agency

In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

Not
In Agency
in 1925
No. Pct.

Ts.I.K.

65

31

47.7

34

52.3

Sovnarkom

49

18

36.7

31

63.3

Gosplan

35

18

51.4

17

48.6

Comm. of Foreign Affairs

47

24

51.1

23

48.9

Comm. of Transportation

139

21

15.1

118

84.9

Comm. of Posts and Telegraphs

25

8.0

23

92.0

Comm. of Labor

23

11

47.8

21

52.2

Comm. of Finance

46

15

32.6

31

68.4

Vesenkha

99

34

34.3

65

65.7

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

36.0

given

is

the

number

reported

64.0

in

Vsia

Moskva. The top staff positions considered include chairman/commissar,

deputy

chairman/commissar,

all

presidium/

department heads, and department members.

collegium

members,

Page 33

Table 10
Turnover of Upper Level Officials in Selected USSR
State Agencies, 1927-1929

Number of
Top Staffers
in 1929

Agency

In Agency
in 1927
No. Pct.

Not
In Agency
in 1927
No. Pct.

Ts.I.K.

68

43

63.2

25

36.8

Sovnarkom

31

23

74.2

25.8

Gosplan

29

20

69.0

31.0

Comm. of Foreign Affairs

28

18

64.3

10

35.7

Comm. of Transportation

52

20

33.5

32

61.5

Comm. of Posts and Telegraphs

23

12

52.2

11

47.8

Comm. of Labor

25

14

56.0

11

44.0

Comm. of Finance

48

23

47.9

25

52.1

Vesenkha

76

34

44.7

42

55.3

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

56.7

given

is

the

number

reported

43.3

in

Vsia

Moskva. The top staff positions considered include chairman/commissar,

deputy

chairman/commissar,

all

presidium/

department heads, and department members.

collegium

members,

Page 39

Table 11
Turnover of Upper Level Officials in Selected USSR
State Agencies, 1929-1931

Top
Level Staffers
in 1931

Agency

In Agency
in 1929
No. Pct.

Not
In Agency
in 1929
No. Pct.

Ts.I.K.

82

33

40.2

49

59.8

Sovnarkom

36

11

30.6

25

69.4

Gosplan

28

14.3

24

85.7

Comm. of Foreign Affairs

35

20

57.1

15

42.9

Comm. of Transportation

55

16.4

46

83.6

Comm. of Posts and Telegraphs

17

23.5

13

76.5

Comm. of Labor

30

3.3

29

96.7

Comm. of Finance

42

14.3

36

85.7

105

12

11.4

93

88.6

Vesenkha

Mean

Notes: Number of positions

23.5

given

is

the

number

reported

76.5

in

Vsia

Moskva. The top staff positions considered include chairman/commissar,

deputy

chairman/commissar,

all

presidium/

department heads, and department members.

collegium

members,

Page 40

Table 12
Size of Bureaucratic "Tails"
of All-Union Commissars and Chairmen, 1925-1931

New
Agency

Old
Agency

Size of
"Tail"

Ordzhonikidze, G.K.

Rabkrin

Transcaucasus Party

Kuibyshev, V.V

Vesenkha

Rabkrin

Smirnov, I.N.

Comm. of Posts/Teleg.

Comm. of Finance

Miliutin, V.P

Cen. Statistical Adm.

Rabkrin

Uglanov, N.

Comm. of Labor

Moscow Party

Vesenkha

Rabkrin/Ts.K.K.

Rukhimovich, M .L

Comm. Transport

Vesenkha

Kuibyshev, V.V

Gosplan

Vesenkha

Mikoian, A.I.

Comm. Supply

Comm. Trade

Iakovlev, Ia.A

Comm. Agriculture

Rabkrin

Grin'ko, G.F.

Comm. Finance

Gosplan

Ianson, N.M.

Comm. Water Trans.

RSFSR Justice

Rozengol'ts, A .P.

Comm. Foreign Trade

Rabkrin

Molotov V.M.

Sovnarkom

Moscow Party

Rykov, A.I.

Comm. Posts & Teleg.

Sovnarkom

Andreev, A.A.

Rabkrin

N. Caucasus Party

Tsikhon, A.M

Comm. Labor

Unknown

1925-1927:

1927-1929:

1929-1931:
Ordzhonikidze,

G.K.

,4

Page 41
Table 13
Changes in Central Committee Size, 1925-1927

Full Members

63 Size in 1925
8
2
0
2

C 12.7%) Removed
(3.1%) Died
(0.0%) Demoted to Candidate Status
(3.1%) Transferred to Control Commission

51

(80.9%) 1925 Members who Persist as 1927 Members

12
8

Promoted 1925 Candidate Members

New Members not in 1925 Committee

71

Size in 1927
Candidate Members

42 Size in 1925

4
12

(9.5$) Removed
(28.5$) Promoted to Full Status

26

1925 Candidates who Persist as 1927 Candidates

24

New Candidates

50 Size in 1931
Sources and notes: see text.

Page 42

Table 14
Changes in Central Committee Size, 1927-1930

Full Members

+
+

71

Size in 1927

10
2
4

(14.12) Removed
(2.8%) Died
(5.6%) Demoted to Candidate Status

55

(77.5%) 1927 Members who Persist as 1930 Members

12
4
71

Promoted 1927 Candidate Members

New Members not in 1927 Committee
Size in 1930

Candidate Members

+
+

50

Size in 1927

7
12

(20.1$) Removed
(24.0$) Promoted to Full Status

31

1927 Candidates who Persist as 1930 Candidates

4
31

1927 Members Demoted to Candidates

New Candidates

66

Size in 1930

Sources and notes: see text.

Page 43

Table 15
Positions of Individuals Promoted to the
Central Committee in 1927

Brand
New
Candidates

Brand Candidates
New
Made
Members
Members

Totals

Regional Party Secretaries

15

Vesenkha Presidium Members

Peoples' Commissars

Moscow Party Officials

Military

Union

14

Deputy Commissars

Komsomol
GPU/OGPU

C.C. Department Workers

Central Control Commission

Provincial Industry

Other

17

12

37

Known Positions
Unknown Positions

Total Promotions

Sources and notes: see text.

12

Page

Table 16
Positions of Individuals in 1927 Promoted to the
Central Committee in 1930

Brand
New
Candidates

Regional Party Secretaries

Vesenkha Presidium Members

Brand Candidates
New
Made
Members
Members

Totals

15

Peoples' Commissars

Deputy Commissars

Moscow Party Officials

Military

Union

Komsomol

GPU/OGPU

C.C. Department Workers

Known Positions

21

11

36

Unknown Positions

10

11

Total Promotions

31

12

Sources and notes: see text.

Page 45

Table 17
Central Committee and Vesenkha Presidium
Membership, 1929-1931

1929

1931

Proportional
Change

Size:
Vesenkha Presidium
Central Committee
Membership:
Vesenkha Presidium Members
Sitting on Central Committee
Vesenkha Share of all
Central Committee Positions
Central Committee Share of all
Vesenkha Presidium Positions

Sources and notes: see text.

19

47

147%

121

138

14%

15

400%

2 .4%

10.9%

354%

15.8%

31 .9%

102%

Page 46

Table 18
Full Central Committee Membership of
Regional Party Secretaries, 1927-1939

Full Central Committee Membership

1927
No. Pct.

1930
1934
1939
No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct.

Obkom and Kraikom

Secretaries

4.2

11

15.5

12

16.9

4.2

National Party
Secretaries

2.8

2.8

9.9

5.6

All Regional
Secretaries

7.0

13

18.3

19

26.8

9.8

Size of Full
Central Committee
(71)
Sources and notes: see text and note 1.

(71)

(71)

(71)

Page 47

Notes

1.

Data on state

officeholding

is

drawn

largely

from

Vsia

Moskva.

Adresnaia i spravochnaia kniga na 1925g. (Moscow, 1925); Vsia

Moskva.

Adresnaia

Adresnaia

kniga

na

spravochnaia

1927g.

kniga

(Moscow,

na

1927);

Vsia

1929g. (Moscow, 1929); and Vsia

Moskva. Adresnaia i spravochnaia kniga na 1931g. (Moscow,

on

party

officeholding

is

taken

Moskva.

1931).

Data

mainly from E.L. Crowley, et.al.,

eds., Party and Government Officials of the

Soviet

Union

1917-1967,

(Metuchen, N.J., 1969).

2.

This, in turn, provides a

explanation

for

the

plausible,

though

hypothetical,

increase in presidium level slots in 1931 noted

above. Proportionally, few top staffers with any top-staff

experience

survived

place.

the

general

reorganization

that

compensate for the lack of general experience

larger

presidiums,

containing

experienced

created in an attempt to manage by

while

relatively

few

in

were

taking

in

managing

To

agencies,

personnel, may have been

committee.

number,

was

Persisting

experienced

officials,

not

only

upper-level management, but at holding more than one office, and

at
thus

could provide needed expertise.

3.
leader's

In a static situation, it is difficult to tell how many of a

subordinates

actually

belong

to

his

circle, how many he

inherited from the previous chief, how many were forced upon him, etc.
Only when a leader moves can we identify his "tail".
4.
positions

This

total

does

not

count

those

officials

whose

new

resulted from renaming, etc. Thus, Menzhenskii "moved" from

GPU to OGPU, and Rozengol'tz "moved" from the Commissariat of

Foreign

Page 48

Trade to the Commissariat of Trade due to bureaucratic reorganization.

5.
V.N.

Rukhimovich's nine followers were: P.B. Bilik, B.G.

Ksandrov,

A.I.

Lokshin,

I.S.

Morozov,

F.I.

Kaplun,

Portenko,

A.M.

Postinkov, M.S. Raskin, G.I. Trukhmanov.

6.

Ordzhonikidze's

tail consisted of A.M. Fushman, S.I.

Ignat,

M.M. Kaganovich, I.P. Pavlunovskii, A.D. Semushkin, Z.G. Zangvil, V.I.

Grossman,

A.I.

Gurevich,

Veinberg,

Iu.P.

Figatner,

K.F.
A.E.

Martinovich,

S.Z.

Ginzberg,

G.D.

Bliznichenko, and F.G. Ego. Because

these bureaucratic changes took place in 1930,

the

1930

edition

of

Vsia Moskva provided supplementary information in this case.

7.
A.N.

Kuibyshev's circle and their

Bakh,

E.V.

new

Gosplan

positions

were:

Britske, N.P. Gorbunov, A.I. Iulin, S.S. Lobov (all

members of the Standing Committee on Chemicals), M.F. Fel'dman

(Chief

of Administration), and D.N. Shapiro (Chief of Construction Dept.).

8.

In addition to Chernov

and

Khlopliankin,

Mikoian's

group

included N.B. Eismont (the new chief of planning) and B.P. Nekrasov.
9.

Examples of such group studies include:

Yaroslav

Bilinsky,

Changes in the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

(Denver, 1957); M.P.
Committee:

Gehlen

and

M.

McBride,

"The

Soviet

Central

An Elite Analysis", American Political Science Review, 62,

(1968).
10.
Central

Robert V. Daniels, "Evolution of Leadership Selection in the

Committee,

1917-1927",

in

Rowney, eds., Russian Officialdom, The

Society

from

Walter

M.

Pintner and Don Karl

Bureaucratization

of

Russian

the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, (Chapel Hill,

1930).
11.

There were two exceptions. (1)In 1930, G.F. Grin'ko was USSR

Page 4 9

Commissar

of

Finance,

but was neither a member nor candidate of the

Central Committee. (2) Also in 1930, M.M. Litvinov was

Foreign

Commissar

for

Affairs, but was only a candidate member. His predecessor, G.

Chicherin, had been a full member.

12.

The

demoted

Trade

Union

Council),

Council), V.A.

Kotov

(Dept.

(Moscow

labor/union

officials

A.I.

were:

V.M.

Mikhailov

Dogadov (All-Union Trade Union

Chief,

Commissariat

of

Labor),

N.A.

(USSR Commissar of Labor), R.O. Ugarov (Leningrad Trade Union

Uglanov

Council), A.T.

Markov

(Member,

Council

of

Textile

Unions),

G.N.

Mel'nichanskii (All-Union Trade Union Council).

13.
obkom,

Regional party secretaries

and

republic

party

are

here

secretaries.

defined

as

kraikom,

Moscow and Leningrad party

secretaries are excluded from these calculations.

14.
Committee

Regional secretaries accounted for only 13% of 1929

members

and

candidates,

promotions. Vesenkha presidium

Committee

members

and

but

members

candidates

Central

comprised nearly 32% of all

were

but

2.4%

of

1929

constituted

10.6%

Central
of

all

promotions.
15.

The six previous Central Committee

Krzhizhanovskii,

members

were

Bukharin,

Shvernik, Tolokontsev, Moskvin, and Zhukov. Piatakov

was the newly promoted Central Committee member.

16.
1-8,

and

The 1929 figures are from Smolensk Archive file WKP 33, pp..
WKP

42, passim. The 1936 figures are from Smolensk Archive

file RS 924, protocol no. 156. Our thanks to Peter Gooderham

1929

reference.

Much

of

the

. resulted from the creation of

staff) in 1930-31.

increase
raions

for

the

in local nomenklatura power

(each

requiring

an

appointed

Page 50

17.

See

R.W.

Collectivization

Davies,

The

Socialist

Offensive:

The

of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930, (Cambridge, Mass.,

1980), esp. chaps. 3-7.

18.
the

The obkom and kraikom secretaries who were full

1931

Central

Committee

were

from

Voronezh*,

Stalingrad*,

of

the following regions: West

Siberia*, East Siberia*, The Urals, Central Volga*,

Smolensk,

members

Ivanov,

North

Caucasus*,

Ivanovo-Voznessensk, and

Gorkii*. An asterisk (*) indicates a promotion to full membership.

19.
"Party

For the fall of the regional secretaries see J. Arch

and

Purge

in

Smolensk,

1933-1937",

Slavic

(Spring, 1933), 60-93. A fuller treatment will be

Getty,

Origins

of

Reconsidered,

the

1933-1933

Great

Purges:

(forthcoming,

the
1985,

Review,

found

Soviet

Getty,

in

42, 1

J.

Arch

Communist Party

Cambridge

University

Press).
20.

For a systematic treatment

arrangements

of

the

of

bureaucracy,

Gosudarstvennykh Uchrezhdenii

SSSR,

the

see

changing

A.

institutional

A.

Nelidov,

Istoriia

1917-1936gg:

uchebnoe

posobie,

(Moscow, 1962).
21.

Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the

Soviet

Union

is

Governed, (Cabridge, Mass., 1979), 127.

22.

Our categorization of rank levels is as follows:

Top Staff: The executive leadership

(or

Chairman),

Deputy

Commissar

Member of Gosplan), First Secretary

of

the

agency

Commissar

(or Deputy Chairman), Member (i.e.

(party

only),

Secretary

(party

only), Deputy Secretary (party only), Second Secretary (party only).

Presidium: The members and
presidium or collegium.

candidate

members

of

the

agency's

Page 51

Department: The first

variously

called

otdel,

subdivision
Upravlenie,

of
or

the

agency's

hierarchy;

less

commonly

sektor

sektsii. Ranks at this level include Department Chief,

or

Deputy

Chief,

usually

called

Assistant, Secretary, Member, Instructor and Consultant.

Sub-department: A subdivision of

department;

sektor, chast', grupp, and less commonly otdel.

Standing Committee: Department-level

body

usually

composed

of

members of the presidium or other leading officials of the agency.

Technicals:

Ranks

such

as

engineer,

referrent,

specialist,

controller, bookkeeper, inspector.

Personal Secretaries: Clerical officials attached explicitly to a
leading official.
The 1931 edition of Vsia Moskva sometimes omits detailed listings
for

personnel at the sub-department level and below. For example, the

personnel listing for a lower level committee might include

chairman,

deputy

chairman

only

the

and secretary. Careful testing can detect

most of the flaws and the researcher must take them into account.