EN BANC

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and in
payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated
petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a
check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983
in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was
dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
"CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the
salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being
sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify
the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the
theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as
basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987
by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 i.e., that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on
September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the

judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or

"bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee
or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not,
the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino
Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia
Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs.
Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981,
Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on
August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) almost one (1) year after Albino Co
had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15,
1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the
Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the
payment of an obligation," as follows: 4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency
having interpreting authority may reverse its administration
interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies
only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128
Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after
this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part
of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer
be considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction.
Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that
the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3,
1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this
Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided,"
declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been
applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30,
1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National
Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not
apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v.
Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended
by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a
saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and
10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no
retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person
cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged
violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette;
Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No.
316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending
the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court
of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal
cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive
effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could
not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding
that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v.
Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings
and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981,
108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission
on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as
to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment
had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which,
"although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by
the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7
reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole
question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the
basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this
Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law
thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant

Page1

September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration
under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office
of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December
13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal,
which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this
comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on
the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of
justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is

well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to
its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court
of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8

Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985
which declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which
declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance
on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." the Court said:

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the

subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was
acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June
18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past

this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374)
to wit:

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119

of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas
cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the
DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the
Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim
lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The
rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that
it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs.
Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of
the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those who have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of
a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only

prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we
emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects of the
invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued
Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the

Page1

was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he

was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an

unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a
municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot
be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any
official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it
should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any
legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of
simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not
admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and
had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience
and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to
be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to
its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period
of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be
to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there
be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot

County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374

[1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision
in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even
more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for
the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967,
21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v.
Military Commission No 34, 12 declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted
during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the
conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios,
190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer
should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases
and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of
final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by
military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by
the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or
the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be
declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer
doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be
released since judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the
military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of
martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders
issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers
is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those
proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic.
Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of

Page1

enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by

war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil.
68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the same
observations, to wit: 11

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154
SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of
an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated,
who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did
not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico,
14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the
intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry
being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially
different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official
issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the
special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the
defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could
not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the
defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but
upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government,
the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great
weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of
the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this,
particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the
authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos
vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is
crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no
administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the
Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications
as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional
Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the
accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between
Co, representing Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B.
Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for
refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and
Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively
contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 2021.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for
reconsideration, promulgated by the Special Former Second
Division of the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the
division by Paras, J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its
"stamp of approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding
inter alia that "It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely
in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."
4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the
textbook of retired Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws
remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after not
habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police
power : e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47
O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4)
curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first time unless
vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v.
Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving
prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms, and both holding
that appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial
Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential agent"

Page1

creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts

of the local government abolished. 13

"sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . .

who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license
to possess firearm.

17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA

47

7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.

8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et
al., and is reported in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited
Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA 593
[1984].
9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in
the text of the decision.
11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144
(1987) (Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533
where the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification of
an executive order creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of
the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686
(1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of
Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil
Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

14 SEE footnote 3, supra.

15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person
who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view .
. . any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those
in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Page1

13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of
February 26, 1991; and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378
[1991].

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed
from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the
registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and
substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado,
Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the
parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private
oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes
due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant
died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the
petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette
(Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered
view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant
application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which
in its pertinent portion provides: 8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD
1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision
of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette,
and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening
clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official
Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural.
Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court
would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land
registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,
as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition
on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is
appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his
petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9
The Issue

Page1

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

registration case mandatory or directory?

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of

discretion" 10 in holding

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring

publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No.
86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is
"necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper
of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
"procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot
be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in
the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its
disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of:
publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting
at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these
are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of
the application for registration.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While concededly such literal
mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately
depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case

Page1

The Court's Ruling

the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs.
Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section
23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication,
(2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of
the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per
Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants
of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the
law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement
of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it
would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly,
this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The
law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. 19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication
in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in

rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the
process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be
interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a
party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court
must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership
thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who
institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to
court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from
concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must
be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be

deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C.
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUALMARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

PARAS, J.:

Page1

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of
the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived
by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of
the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the
full blood of the deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of
the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a
Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of
her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition
to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to
the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood
brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by
the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise
agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes

Page1

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a)
the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. PascualBautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C.
Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in
effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14,
1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo,

p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual,
their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate
Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel
S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is
hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp.
515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
the

petition

is

DISMISSED.

Costs

against

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14,
1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article
992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are
within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in
Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra,
where this Court ruled that:

the

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and
of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of
a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that
it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the

Page1

WHEREFORE,
petitioners.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual,
full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles
902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio
Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers
the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation
is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as
done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article
982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate
child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation
which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982
is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article
992 the exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article
902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C.
Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427;
pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not
susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110
Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or
not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Page1

law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further

grounds of resentment.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed
charging now the crime of murder, to wit:

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 116719

January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation
and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby
inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the
consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of

FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation
and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting
injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND
LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY,
DIAPHRAGM
STOMACH,
DUODENUM,
PANCREAS
AND
MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and
able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.
(p. 1, Rollo.)

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the accused is
hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the
medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to
death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of
P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was
committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office
of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at
their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City,
Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the
back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his
daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year
old son, who were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year

Page1

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information

reading as follows:

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada,
Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada,
suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao
City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction.
This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at
the comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31,
1992, pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's
vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also
seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on
collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight
damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat
and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle.
(TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not
looking," to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you". (TSN, April 29, 1991,
p. 16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who
was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the
Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to
leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the
former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the
accident. (ibid. p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You
are Chinese, is it you?" With a ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I am a
Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for
a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but

after a lapsed of about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly
approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are a Chinese, is it
not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese,"
and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously
stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried
to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the
Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the
injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking
the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times,
the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera,
pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it
was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid. p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to
heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several
people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation
nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only
after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on
the left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said
vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father
bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from
his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he fled.
(Ibid. p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran
faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead
decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the
Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro
Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition,
due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu.
After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed
there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)

Page1

old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29,
1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the
promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and
hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder
committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying
circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when
the stabbing and killing happened, the computation of the penalty should
be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty.
Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down
to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no
modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty
should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which
is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs.
Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua," thereby
eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without
categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. MelencioHerrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods,
the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs.
Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the

minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium;

and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein
does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III,
Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be
sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in
fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of
the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should
be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision
in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to
the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should
now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade
scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article
III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced
the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still
plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the
language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, for its interpretation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish

the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the
intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also
meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a
result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all
expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated
therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been

Page1

In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival,
Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese
General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired.
CAUSE OF DEATH SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that
the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp.
6-7)

One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The
writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be
still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another
or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere did not say
enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was
then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court
today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which
we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition
of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after
reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well
it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The
decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced
but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told
that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a
fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of
continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our)
tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine
providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by
the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold
that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as
it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains
unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities
that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death
penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of
any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same
medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the
latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the
Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some
relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid
the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer
than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he

complained because he felt unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the

court over the person. An appearance may be madt agree with me for a
penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them
and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined
exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative
of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to
the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua.
This is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of
the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The
award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but
the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the
present policy.
(at pp. 120-125.)
The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991])
and in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too
cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to
plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their
feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is
elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Page1

so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly,

leaving no doubts as to its meaning.

G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.
Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court
is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent
to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution
for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does
not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information
dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA
Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as
further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about
the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary
to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at
the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the
accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has
neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same
on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from
the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits,
the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for
decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret
agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that
he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does
the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in
the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant,
answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a
statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms
that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then
Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the
accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect
that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then
stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit
the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of
having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the
costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of
the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The
decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6

Page1

EN BANC

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such
he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of
courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 7
The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro
Afternoon M'am.

D.

Ramirez

(Chuchi)

The

Good

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent

was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused
as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to
set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent
therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang

nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka
kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong

binalikan, sabing ganoon

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung

(sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in
a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity
and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable
at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon icocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union
kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na
kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon
ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka
pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko

Page1

SOCORRO
D.
RAMIREZ,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang

nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako

makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong
ka. 3

CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:

CHUCHI Eh, di sana

INFORMATION

ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi

wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung
hindi ako.

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez

of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa
loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok,
okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in

Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation
with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of
the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.

ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong

kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi
kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged
do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished
by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. 4

Page1

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga

Union.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed

Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding
that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on
the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the
provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent
was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where
a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an
injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,"
provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by

all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A.
4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the
element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose,
Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by
some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases
or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily
by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be
indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording,
would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within
the purview of this bill or outside?

Page1

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your

Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the
prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or
special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape
recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the
parties.

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under

Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a
public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the
speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by
the bill. It is the communication between one person and another
person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting

to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then
using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should know that the observations are
being recorded.

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the
above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes
no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons,
we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be
used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if
you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks
of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.

The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT
before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section
1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols
(as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on

Page1

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings
of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is
no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the
people whose remarks and observations are being made should
know that the observations are being recorded.

February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the
usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most,
if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do
not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression
of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here,
the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of
conversations between individuals and the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have
known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be
found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication
between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue
of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant
case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with
the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Page1

SO ORDERED.