Police Power

Roxas and Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals

GR 127876
December 17, 1999
Facts: This case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu Batangas
owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these by
the government under RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 9188. Petitioner Roxas and Co. is a domestic
corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely
Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. The events of this case
occurred during the incumbency of then President Aquino, in the
exercise of legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987,
Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms
necessary to initially implement the program. Congress passed
Republic Act No. 6657; the Act was signed by the President on June
10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the laws
effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to
sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of EO No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in
Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate acquisition and
distribution by the government under the CARL. Meanwhile in a
letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for
conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to nonagricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite
petitioners application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded
with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The Land Bank of the
Philippines trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were
replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October
22, 1993, from the title of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered
Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 6654. On October 30,
1993, CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On December
18, 1991, the LBP certified certain amounts in cash and LBP bonds
had been earmarked as compensation for petitioners land in
Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion
of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. Hacienda Caylaway was
voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before
the effectivity of the CARL. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992,
petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, sent a letter to the
Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed

respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda

Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. Respondent DAR Secretary
informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not
exempt it from agrarian reform.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with respondent
DAR Adjudication Board praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs
issued by respondent DAR in the name of the farmers. Petitioner
alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are
located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not
suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan
of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural. Respondent
DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of
whether the property was subject to agrarian reform; hence, this
question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for determination.
Petitioner filed a petition with the CA. It questioned the
expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due
process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the
petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied.
Petitioners petition was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the
haciendas were valid and in accordance with the law.
Held: No, for a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two
notices are required first the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties and second, the Notice of Acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the first
notice, the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the
States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the
extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners,
there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under
the power of eminent domain. In this case, respondent DAR claims
that it sent a letter of invitation to petitioner corporation, through
Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico but he was not
authorized as such by the corporation. The SC stressed that the
failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due
process in the acquisition proceedings does not give the SC the
power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer
beneficiaries. The Court said, to assume the power is to short-circuit
the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular

course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its

procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico
alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since
then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their
lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and
equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the
land they till. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent
DAR's failure to observe due process.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform

Council (PARC), et al.,G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011,
VELASCO, JR.,
J
.
I.
Facts
In 1958, Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), assisted by the
Central Bank of the Philippines,purchased Hacienda Luisita and the
Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, from the
Spanishowners of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
(Tabacalera). Tadeco was then owned and controlled by theJose
Cojuangco Sr. Group. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million
loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the pesoprice component of the sale,
with the condition that
the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the
applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there
be any, and whenever conditions should exist
warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure
Act.
Tadeco however did not comply with thiscondition.On May 7, 1980,
the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC
against Tadeco, et al., forthem to surrender Hacienda Luisita to
the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be
distributedto farmers at cost. Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita is
not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations for itdoes not
have tenants. The argument did not convince the Manila RTC, thus
rendered judgment ordering Tadeco tosurrender Hacienda Luisita to
the MAR. Tadeco appealed the case to the CA.
On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved
to withdraw the governments case
against Tadeco, et al. By Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA
dismissed the case the Marcos government initiallyinstituted and

won against Tadeco, et al. The dismissal action was, however, made
subject to the obtention by
Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that
must initially be implemented after such
approval shall have been secured. On August 23, 1988, Tadeco
organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitionerHLI, as vehicle to
facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose,
Tadeco conveyed to HLI theagricultural land portion (4,915.75
hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in
exchange forHLI shares of stock.On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the
then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda
Luisita
signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed
HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP).
On May 11,1989, the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI,
and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then
DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and
mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually
approved by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by
the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117FWBs, out of 5,315 who
participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.On August 15, 1995, HLI
applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda
from agriculturalto industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657.
The DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to
payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs
and to HLIs continued compliance with its
undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions. On December
13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of12,000,000 shares of
stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded
300 hectares of the converted area to
the latter. Consequently, HLIs Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
287910
was canceled and TCT No.292091 was issued in the name of
Centennary. HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares covered by
TCT No.287909 to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate
transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly involving100
hectares for PhP 250 million each. Subsequently, Centennary sold
the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 millionto Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial
complex. Later, LIPCOtransferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
in payment of LIPCOs
PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC.
LIPCOs titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC.
Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later
detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the
government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX)
complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained ofthe original 4,915

hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.Such, was the state of things when

two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003.
Thefirst was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory
Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, inthe
alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for the
revocation and nullification of the SDOA and thedistribution of the
lands in the hacienda, was filed by
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng HaciendaLuisita
(AMBALA). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to
attend to issues relating to the SDP ofHLI. After investigation and
evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its
obligations under RA 6657despite the implementation of the SDP.
On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No.
2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further
resolved that the subject lands be forthwith placedunder the
compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the
CARP.From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its
motion notwithstanding, HLI also filed apetiti
on before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the
DARs hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita underCARP even before
PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARC
would eventually deny HLIs
motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May
3, 2006.
II.
Issues
(1) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of
outright land transfer, unconstitutional?(2) Did PARC gravely abuse
its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the
hacienda under CARPs
compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme?(3) Did the
PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included LIPCOs and
RCBCs respective properties that once
formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory
acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice ofCoverage
?
III.
Ruling
(1)
NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional.
The Court actually refused to pass upon theconstitutional question
because it was
not raised at the earliest opportunity
and because the resolution thereofis

not the lis mota

of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered
moot and academic
since SDO is no longerone of the modes of acquisition under RA
9700.While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, it took
FARM some eighteen (18) years from November21, 1989 before it
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite
too late already. The FARMmembers slept on their rights and even
accepted benefits from the SDP without even a complaint on the
allegedunconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were
derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolvinga
constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a
long period of time and the occurrence ofnumerous events and
activities which resulted from the application of an alleged
unconstitutional legal provision.Furthermore, the lis mota is whether
or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
recall of theSDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP,
as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutionaland
statutory provisions. Any of these key issues may be resolved
without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec.31 of RA 6657.By
virtue of Sec. 5 of RA 9700, the stock distribution scheme under Sec.
31 of RA 6657 is no longer anavailable option under existing law;
thus the question of unconstitutionality should be a moot issue.

(2)
NO, the PARC did not gravely abuse its discretion in revoking
the subject SDP and placing the
hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition and
distribution scheme
.
The revocation of the approval of the
SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLIs stock
distribution
violate DAO 10 because the minimumindividual allocation of each
original farm worker-beneficiaries (FWBs) of 18,804.32 shares was
diluted as a result of
the use of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2)
the 30
-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stocktransfer is contrary to what
Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at le
ast 37 days in a fiscal year before he or shebecomes entitled to HLI
shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not
get any share at yearend. The number of HLI shares distributed
varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to
workin one year. Worse, HLI hired farm workers in addition to the

original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in theCompliance dated

August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of
farm workers of HLI as of saiddate stood at 10,502. All these farm
workers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares
out of the118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of
the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the
minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32
shares was diluted as a result of the use of mandays and the
hiring of additional
farm workers.Par. 3 of the SDOA expressly provides for a 30-year
timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is anarrangement contrary
to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the
implementation of theapproved stock distribution plan within three
(3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval
ofthe plan by PARC. Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are
given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost ofthe land thus
awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the
government.DAO 10, having the force and effect of law, must be
duly complied with; therefore, PARC is correct inrevoking the SDP.
(3) YES, those portions of the converted land within
Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCOacquired by purchase
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution.
It can rightfullybe said that both LIPCO and RCBC, adduced from
their foregoing actions, are purchasers in good faith for value,
soentitled to the benefits arising from such status.First, at the time
LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of
industrial land, there was nonotice of any supposed defect in the
title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other person has a
right to orinterest in such property. The same is true with respect to
RCBC. To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew thatthe lots they
bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a stock
distribution plan, as the DAR conversionorder was annotated at the
back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the
honest belief that thesubject lots were validly converted to
commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken
out of theCARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and
hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec.
65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition
of agricultural lands previously covered by
CARP land acquisition after the lapse of five (5
) years from its award when the land ceases to be
economicallyfeasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.
And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchasedportions of Hacienda
Luisita for value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land
from Centennary for theamount of PhP 750 million pursuant to a
Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a Deed of

Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed po

rtions of Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by wayof dacion en
pago to pay for a loan of PhP 431,695,732.10.Both RCBC and LIPCO
cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of
Hacienda Luisitaare industrial/commercial lands and are, thus,
outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and consequently DAR,
gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCOs and RCBCs
property which once formed part of Hacienda
Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme.
Alita v. CA
-petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring Presidential
Decree No. 27 inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law; 2)
Declaring that the 4 registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the
farmholding themselves as owners; & 3) Ejecting tenants, namely; Gabino Alita,
Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando
Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.
-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur acquired by
respondents Reyes through homestead patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141
- Reyes wants to personally cultivate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate,
relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and regulations of MAR/DAR
-June 18, 1981: Respondents Reyes (Plaintiff) instituted a complaint against
Minister of Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX P.D.
Macarambon, and Alita et.al for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees,
Letters of Instructions and General Orders inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants Alita filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses.
-July 19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring
the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land
transfer certificates
-November 5, 1982: Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV,
Pagadian City (Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its
decision dismissing complaint and the motion to enjoin
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which
defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
RTC: issued decision prompting defendants Alita et al to move for reconsideration
but was denied
CA: the same was sustained
ISSUE: whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by
the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.--NO
We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However,
such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the purpose of the enactment of the
Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 to protect ones right to life itself
by give a needy citizen a land wherein they could build a house and plant for
necessary subsistence.
Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders'
rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardshipin
the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public
domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to
their ancestral lands.

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise
supports the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like
those of the property in question,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court

of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR
GR No 103302
August 12, 1993
Facts:
Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of
120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of
125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas
to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated
within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Since private
landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing
subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner EDIC as developer of Natalia
applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location clearances
by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia
thereafter became Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657
went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped
portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately
registered its objection to the notice of coverage and requested the
cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural
lands when they were included in the areas reserved by Presidential
Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR then contended that the
permits granted were not valid and binding since they did not comply with
the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), and that there
was no valid conversion of the properties.
Issue:
Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15,
1988 covered by RA 6657.
Ruling:
No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as land devoted to
agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands for

this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural
land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.

Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR

FACTS:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made
to apply to it:
(a)

Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of

"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.

(b)

Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to

commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c)

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)

Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to

summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e)

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

HELD:
Said provisions are unconstitutional.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the

meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers
of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin

inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Milestone Farms vs Office of the President

FACTS:

Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the
raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import
cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs,
and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect

In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare

property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.

Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting
forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock,
poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.

Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.

DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an

ocular inspection on petitioners property and recommended the exemption of petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.

DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation

The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the
said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with
DAR Secretary

Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the MCTC.

MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone

RTC reversed the decision of MCTC

CA ruled in favor of Milestone

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776
hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring
75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but
when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the
decision of Director Garilao.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the
coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the
parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion
order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property
from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total
area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the
controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas
Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would
now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that
the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373
hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP

HELD:
No.

When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its
discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full
force and effect.

As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is
not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the
said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

215 SCRA 86 (1992)

Facts:

On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving
for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its
future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap"
wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the
terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups through
the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn,
they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided
that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its
resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land
for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's
determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not
"actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public
use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used
and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?

Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer
the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also
chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's
present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to
be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in
carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and
academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in
the years to come.
DAR v. DECS

Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied

petitioners motion for reconsideration
-Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462
hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen.
Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands
were donated by Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in
the name of respondent DECS.
-DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop
years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The
contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop
years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.
-June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Escalante.
-After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of Coverage to
respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its
representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piosa
submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the
DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.
-August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation
and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and
distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.
-DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Director.
-Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set
aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)NO
2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for
agriculture as possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of
CARP. The program shall: cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.
Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a)

All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological,

developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by

law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b)

All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as

determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c)

All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or

suitable for agriculture; and

(d)

All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture

regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
thereon.

Section 3(c): agricultural land- land devoted to agricultural activity as

defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
agriculture or agricultural activity- means the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
by persons whether natural or juridical.
The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly
private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated
to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane,
albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government. There is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under
the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture.
-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the
same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses,
as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt
from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived that must be
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
HELD: I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their
exemption:

c)
Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by

public or private schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage
of this Act.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly,
and exclusively used and found to be necessary; and 2) the purpose is for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes.
The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used
and found to be necessary cannot be understated. The words of the law are clear
and unambiguous. The plain meaning rule or verba legis is applicable. Where
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, wherein we declared the land
subject exempt from CARP coverage. However, DECS reliance is misplaced
because the factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.
1st, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land
of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P.
Garcia under Proc. No. 476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now
CMU). In this case, however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
2nd, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it was
being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.)
under a Management and Development Agreement, the undertaking was that
the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as part of the CMU
research program, with direct participation of faculty and students. The retention
of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational
needs. On
the
other
hand,
the
lands
in
this
case
were
not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses. They were
leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational but business
purposes. Also, it was the income and not the lands that was directly used for the
repairs and renovations of the schools.

II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not
qualified beneficiaries.
The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:

SECTION 15.
Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all
agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the
CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall
provide the following data:

(a)
(b)

names and members of their immediate farm household;

owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of
tenurial relationship;

(c)

location and area of the land they work;

(d)

crops planted; and

(e)

their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.

A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be
posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall
be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP
beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under
CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the
courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative
agency. In this case, there was none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social

justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the
underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from
oppressive tenancy. The objective of the State is that: landless farmers and
farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to
move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No.
64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is
REINSTATED.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

May 17, 1993
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129
authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish a
pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for
the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2
cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).
RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San
Joaquins.

CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void,
b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give
comment.
SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of
the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first
be secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural lands).
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised.
The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the
expropriation is for a public use).
Issues:
1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the
expropriation is for a public use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is
restricted by the CAR Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground
of inadequacy of the compensation offered?
Held/ratio:
1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is
authorized and valid.
SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the
new concept of public purpose:. Old concept is that the property
must actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on
the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity
of the whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot development center would
inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps.
(How?) invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage
industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.
2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the
Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the
power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first
secure approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to
non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting
expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is
applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform
program. This is limited only to applications for reclassification
submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of
the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded.
It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation
cases based on the value given either by the owners or the
assessor. Rules for determining just compensation are those laid
down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what
they consider is the just compensation.

Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR

FACTS:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27,
1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15,
1988. Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and
Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On
August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent a letter to theSecretary of DAR
withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas
allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to nonagricultural As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of
Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON
AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A
TOURISTZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application
for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the
issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to nonagricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas
including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the
subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and
of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994
3 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the
effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone
to non-agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
RULING:
PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE
MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism
zone, reclassified all landstherein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural
purposes.The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising
the [three Municipalities that] havepotential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary
studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" toachieve its purpose. Which is why the PP
directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourismareas are. If all
the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there would have
been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those "specific geographic areas" are.In the
above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, 9 the Court made it clear that the "power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage
of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies withthe [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this
Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, byOrder, the application for
CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in
theaffected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time,
identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism
development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning
and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.11Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,12came up with
clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed thatB. Proclamations declaring general areas such as whole
provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas astourist zones that merely:(1) recognize
certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or
peninsulasto be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to
identify/delineate specificgeographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and
to coordinate said areas development; or (2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located
within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority
to coordinate said areas development;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification
of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist zone. This is sobecause "reclassification of lands"
denotes their allocation into some specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilizationand
disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land

use plan." A proclamation that merelyrecognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the
general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend the entirety of the land
area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct thatotherwise
CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural.Moreover, to
view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces,
municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic
and sweeping exemption from CARP in thename of tourism development. The same would
also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local governmentunits in conjunction with
pertinent agencies of government.C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said
proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for
exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coverageD. The DARs reading
into these general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially in
thepresent petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely
recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism
zones
. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does
not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion
before one is permitted to use it for other purposes

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD and JOSE R.
CAGUIAT G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for
their agricultural lands, which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. The RTC ordered
Land Bank and DAR to pay respondents' land for P30 per square meters.
Land Bank was not able to file its motion for reconsideration on time because the motion filed by its
counsel lacked a notice of hearing. Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel is due to intense
work-pressure and constitutes excusable negligence, so the trial court should have heard the relief in
accordance with Sec 1 of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Land Bank also argues that respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a
petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court because they should
have first sought reconsideration of the DAR's valuation of their properties.
Issues:
1. Whether or not counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land
Bank to a relief from judgment.
2. WON respondents should have sought reconsideration from DAR.

Answer: The petition is unmeritorious.

Reasoning: Land Bank's argument that its counsel committed an excusable negligence when he was
not able to file the motion on time is untenable. Primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine
in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program,
but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is
a function addressed to the courts of justice.

G.R. No. 170220

November 20, 2006

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C.

SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
Petitioners, vs.LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:

Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee 2 of Federico C. Suntay over

certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares,
was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 27 (1972)4 and Executive Order No. 228 (1987). 5 The land was
thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the
land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in
favor of Lubrica.
Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico
Suntay a parcel of agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1
with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571
hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the
coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP
and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary
administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based on
the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment.
HELD: Yes.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just
compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property
can be taken away from its owners. 27 The transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of
the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with
the landowner.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then,
title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date,
they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be
inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to
determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and
not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial,
full and ample.

G.R. No. 118712 | October 6, 1995 | LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents. | FRANCISCO,
R., J.:
FACTS
The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the Court of
Appeals decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development
Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land,
private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite
the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of
their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively
"earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow
them to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper
determination and disposition.
The CA found the following facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR,
the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that
before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in
bonds.
On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its
rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. The issuance of the "Certificate of
Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution
of the cases it has filed for just compensation.

1.

RULING:
NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative
agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a
grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. The function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the
law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law
or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law
and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in
their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's
valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use
of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is unnecessary to
distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation
under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same; the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.

Estribillo v DAR
Facts:
Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its
landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In
1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to
1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs (Emancipation Patents) covering the entire
527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December
1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage

under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings.

HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was
untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision
declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered
was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy
relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which
affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed.
Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one
year from their registration.
Issue:
Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance
Held:
After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is
required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenantfarmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to
petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs.
The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration
of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.
Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.

Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.

G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By
virtue of a Municipal Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as industrial
lands. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject lands
as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and
appropriate government certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for
industrial use and directed the petitioners to cease and desist from further
developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction. However, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has
jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the CA.
However, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the
case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though
reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over
which is vested in the DAR.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to approve
or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses, pursuant to Section 4(i) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize
under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural
lands.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in
the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial
and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against
the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus
shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.

CREBA V SEC
Ponente: Perez

Nature: This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO
No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88, for having been issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and
unconstitutional.

Facts:
:Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses
: said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced and all untitled agri lands and agri lands reclassified by LGU into
non-agri uses after 15 June 1988
: March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of Agri Lands
to Non Agri Uses, it covers the following:
(1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other
non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity
such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted
to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
: The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to
non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
: The AO was amended again in 2007 t include provisions particularly addressing land
conversion in time of exigencies and calamities
: To address the conversion to lands to non agri, Sec of DAR suspended processing and
approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88
: Creba claims that there is a slowdown of housing projects because of such stoppage

Issues: WON DAR AO is unconstitutional

CREBA: SEC DAR gravely abused his discretion

: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agri lands as lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person
whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land

: However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as

residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988
: In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or
other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for
purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise
: This is violation of RA 6657 bec there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or
in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require
that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority
: It also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein
that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or
that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.
: The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the
constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section
2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
: There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly,
arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of
administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is
patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.

SC: DISMISSED
JURISCIDTION / PROCEDURAL
: Although RTC, CA and SC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writes of certiorari and
prohibition etc but such concurrence doesnt give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum
: Heirs of Hinog v Melicor and People v Cuaresma THERE IS HIERARCHY OF COURTS. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition
: petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to
justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due course to this
petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts
: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board,
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. He was exercising quasi-legislative
functions; there was no adjudication of rights
: It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
unconstitutional and illegal becausecertiorari is confined only to the determination of the
existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

AUTHORITY OF DAR SEC

: Section 5(c) of executive order 129-A authorized the DAR to establish and
promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian
reform implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or
disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands
into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has
given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as
may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides
that the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the
discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
: DAR AO As amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the
subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to
agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act
No. 6657
Doj Opiniion recognizes that DAR has been given the authority to approve land
conversion
: The authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988
in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of
Agrarian Reform, this Court has enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No.
6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands,
which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15
June 1988, are exempted from conversion
: Alarcon v. Court of Appeals ruled that reclassification of lands does not suffice.
Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of changing
the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
DARwhile reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized
for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in
the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In
view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a
landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is
permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes
: Effectivity of RA 6657 is the cut off period for automatic classification
: Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian
Reform, reclassification of lands denotes their allocation into some specific use and
providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. For reclassified agricultural lands,
therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are intended there is still a need to
change the current use thereof through the process of conversion. The authority to do so
is vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with
increased productivity. Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to
non-agricultural uses, they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for
other purposes.
: Republic v. Estonilo, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or
reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of
public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such
use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly
and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved,
otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP

: power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the
DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to nonagricultural uses has been validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160
by explicitly providing therein that, nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing
or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657
: DAR AO does not also violate the due process clause, as well as the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. In providing administrative and criminal penalties in the said
administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions
of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Prohibited acts and omissions) and
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435 (Penalty for agricultural inactivity and Premature
conversion)
: The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of
the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis, therefore it is
constitutional.

Fortich vs. Corona (AJG)

G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao, Bukidnon), NQSR
Management and Development Corporation
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao
Summary: The subject of the controversy is an agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon, measuring 144
hectares. The municipality of Sumilao wanted to convert this into an agro-industrial land. In its Order
dated March 29, 1996, Office of the President acceded to this conversion, and converted the whole 144
hectares to agro-industrial land in order to attract investors. This order became final and executory.
Feeling aggrieve, farmers commenced a hunger-strike in protest of this ruling. The OP wanted to
appease the farmers, hence, they issued a new resolution. They said that only 44 hectares will be
converted into agro-industrial land and that the remaining 100 hectares will be distributed to the
farmers. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but there was no result because the
justices voted 2-2 in resolving such MR. Now, the respondents wanted to refer the case to the Supreme
Court en banc. The Supreme Court said that the resolution of the MR cannot be referred to the Court
en banc. It based its reasoning on Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the Constitution. From that certain paragraph,
the Court differentiated CASES from MATTERS. CASES are to be DECIDED, while MATTERS are
to be RESOLVED. An example of a MATTER is a motion for reconsideration, such as the one in this
case. Only CASES which do not obtain the required number of votes are required to be elevated en
banc. On the other hand, as regards MATTERS, the failure of the division to resolve the motion
because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a tie in resolving a matter,
the earlier decision of the Court is upheld.
RESOLUTION
(We will learn the difference between Decision and Resolution in this case. This case is a
Resolution, just in case sir asks :D )
Facts:
Background facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the
decision of the Office of the President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved the
conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. Note
that this decision already became final and executory.

The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC

(Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a
pineapple plantation to Del Monte.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the property,
and enacted an ordinance converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a
view to attract investors in order to achieve economic vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The DAR rejected the land conversion and instead opted to put the same
under CARP and ordered the distribution of the property to the farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decision reversing the DAR and
converting the land to agro-indusrial area, which became the subject of the strike of
the farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded nationwide
attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene
for their cause.
These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the so-called WinWin Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29,
1996) after it had already become final and executory.
o It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100)
hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and company and
declared that the Win-Win Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect considering that the
March 29, 1996 resolution of the OP already became final and executory.
ALERT This is where the issue relevant to our topic arose: Aggrieved, respondents Corona
and Garilao filed [separate] motions for reconsideration for the said ruling (separate MRs
pero rinesolve ng Court through one resolution).
o The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-TWO on the
separate MRs filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998 Decision.
Hence, this motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the Court en banc. They
contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April
24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e.,
three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court
en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the resolution addressing the
MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be referred to the Court en banc NO.
o

Ratio:

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the
framers to draw a distinction between CASES and MATTERS.
o CASES are decided.
o MATTERS, which include motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must
refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the
Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not
obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the
aforequoted provision speaks only of case and not matter.

The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still
the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division
to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The
assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was
the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their separate motions for
reconsideration are of first impression. They are arguing that the local government unit
concerned still needs to obtain the approval of DAR when converting land. However, this was
rebutted in the resolution dated November 17, wherein it was expressed that:
o Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. In the case of
Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
o The Court voted uninamously in that case, hence, the argument of the petitioners that
their MRs are motions involving first impression is flawed.
Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited, unless there is a
showing of extraordinary persuasive reasons and a leave of court is filed. In this case, there
was none.
Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the OP
because it was already final and executory thus the Win-Win resolution cannot be
implemented anymore? Well, because of this, there was a litany of protestations on the part of
respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The
sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was
disposed of on a mere technicality.
o The Court however said that it was not a mere technicality because the finality of
the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in
dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the
country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property.
Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have standing to intervene
in this case. The Court said there was none, because the source of their standing to file is
the Win-Win Resolution (note that in that resolution, pinamigay nga yung lupa sa mga
farmers, ngayon, meron silang Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil dun, nag
intervene sila).
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who derived their
rights from the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the CLOA to them does not
grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution.
No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.