EDU v ERICTA

local governments may over local aairs

participate in its exercise.

FACTS:
1. May 20, 1970 - Respondent Galo and
other motorists led a suit for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction
assailing the constitutionality of the
Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of
the police power, for being violative of the
due process clause.
2. May 28, 1970 - As a remedy in case the
statute
be
declared
constitutional,
Respondent also assailed the validity of
AO No. 2 implementing such legislation
be nullied as an undue exercise of
legislative power.
- Same day, Judge ordered the
issuance of a preliminary injunction
directed against the enforcement of such
AO No. 2
- Day after, SolGen led a MR
representing Petitioner Edu but was later
on denied by respondent Judge.
3. June 30, 1970 - Judge Ericta led his
answer
why
he
restrained
the
enforcement of AO No. 2 and he said that
it's in excess of the authority conferred on
petitioner and therefore violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.
4. Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation
Commissioner led a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against respondent Judge
Ericta (CFI-Rizal,Quezon City), to annul
and set aside his order for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction directed
against the enforcement of Administrative
Order No. 2
ISSUE: W/N AO No. 2 went beyond its
authority and violates the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.
RULING: NO.
1. It is a fundamental principle owing from
the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative
power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that

2.

What cannot be delegated is the

authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the
test is the completeness of the statute in
all its term and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature.

3. To determine whether or not there is an

undue delegation of legislative power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and
deniteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of
his authority.
4. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the
laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to
its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection can be made.
5. The Constitution is thus not to be
regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of exibility and
practicability. To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy.
6. A standard thus denes legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and species the public agency to apply
it. The standard may be either express or
implied.
Thereafter, the executive or
administrative oce designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.
7. If the expressed, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out
specically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is
public safety.

contract to be adopted by both foreign and

domestic shipping companies in the hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas employment.)

8. It bears repeating that the Reector Law

construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No.
4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves
no doubt as to the stress and emphasis
on public safety which is the prime
consideration in statutes of this character.

4. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction

9. There is likewise a categorical armation

of the power of petitioner as Land
Transportation
Commissioner
to
promulgate rules and regulations to give
life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear.
There has been no abuse.

5. The petitioner immediately came to this

Court, prompting the SolGen to move for
dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

10. Thus from Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs.

Exconde: 46 "It is well established in this
jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a nondelegable activity that corresponds exclusively to
Congress,
nevertheless
the
latter
may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and eectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often nds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be met in carrying the law into eect. All
that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it;
but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes . . ."

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and

prohibition prayed for are granted
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v POEA
FACTS:
1. March 15, 1985 - Vitaliano Saco was Chief
Ocer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan.
2. His widow sued for damages under EO
No. 797 and MC No. 2 of the POEA (before
it the National Seamen Board)
3. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel,
argued that the complaint was cognizable
not by the POEA but by the Social Security
System as Saco is a domestic employee
not an overseas worker and should have
been led against the State Insurance
Fund.
Petitioner claims that it had never entered
into an employment contract as required
by MC No. 2 (This circular prescribed a standard

and after considering the position papers of

the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death
benets and P12,000.00 for burial expenses
pursuan to MC No. 2 (effective Feb. 1, 984).

6.

Petitioner questions the validity of MC No.

2 itself as violative of the principle of
nondelegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation;
and
even
with
such
authorization, the regulation represents
an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.

ISSUE: W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 is

valid and not violative of the principle of
non-delegation of Legislative Power.
RULING: YES
1. What can be delegated is the discretion
to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be.
2.

There are two accepted steps to

constitute valid delegation of Legislative
powers. Intented to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate The completeness test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it.
The sucient standard test, there must
be adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.

3. This principle is applicable to the 3 Depts

but esp. impt to Legislative as there were
frequent instances of delegation. The

reason is the increasing complexity of the

task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its
attention.
4.1 Particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. The Legislature has found it more
and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
In fact, The authority to issue the said regulation is
clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797, reading as follows:
". . . The governing Board of the Administration
(POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA)."
4.2 Two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at
the time of his death in 1985.
a. submission of its shipping articles to the POEA
for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas
employment under Executive Order No. 797.
b. payment of the contributions mandated by law
and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas
Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for
the purpose of providing social and welfare
services to Filipino overseas workers."

5.

Effected by their promulgation of what

are known as supplementary regulations.
These regulations have the force and
effect of law. Memorandum Circular
No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation.

6. The power of the POEA in requiring the

model contract is not unlimited as there is
a sucient standard guiding the delegate
in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive
order itself which, in creating the POEA,
mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."
7. Under MC No. 2, Series of 1984.

(Merely a
reiteration issued by the National Seamen Board on July
12, 1976)

"Section C. Compensation Benets"

"1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of

his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneciaries the amount of: "b. P180,000.00 for
other ocers, including radio operators and master
electricians
"2. It is understood and agreed that the benets
mentioned above shall be separate and distinct
from and will be in addition to whatever benets
which the seaman is entitled to under the PH law.
"c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the
Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneciaries
of the seaman an amount not exceeding
P18,000.00 for burial expenses."
8. Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the
rights of the parties in this case are resolved in
favor of the private respondent, in line with the
express mandate of the Labor Code and the
principle that those with less in life should have
more in law.
9. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. The temporary restraining
order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It
is so ordered.

GEROCHI v DOE
FACTS
1. Congress enacted the "Electric Power
Industry
Reform
Act
of
2001"
(EPIRA), June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001,
it took eect.
2. April 5, 2002 - NPC-SPUG led with ERC
availment of Universal Charge of its share
of Missionary Electrication (UC-ME).
May 7, 2002 - NPC led a petition with
ERC that the share of UC-ME be approved
for withdrawal from STF managed by
PSALM for
for the rehabilitation and
management of watershed area.
December 20, 2002 - ERC approved the
share of UC-ME of NPC and authorized
TRANSCO and Distribution Utilities to
collect the same from the end-users on a
monthly basis.
April 2, 2003 - ERC authorized NPC to
withraw up to 70M from PSALM for its
2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget
subject to the availability of funds.
June 26, 2003 - approved the withdrawal
of its share of UC-ME from STF managed
by PSALM.

3. On the basis of the said ERC decisions,

respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.
(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P.
Gerochi and all other end-users with
the Universal Charge as reected in their
respective electric bills starting from the
month of July 2003.
4. Petitioner Gerochi assailed the provision
of law and its IRR are unconstitutional on
the ff grounds:
a. The UC is a tax which is to be collected from all
electric end-users and self-generating entities. The
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as
such, the delegation of said power to any executive
or administrative agency like the ERC is
unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. UC as determined, xed and approved by
ERC gives it complete discretionary legislative
authority.
b. The ERC is also empowered to approve and
determine where the funds collected should be
used.
c. The imposition of the UC on all end-users is
oppressive and conscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation as the consumers
were not given a chance to be heard and
represented.
5. Respondent PSALM through OGCC contends that
unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for
public purposes, the assailed UC is levied for a
specic regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the
viability of the country's electric power industry,
the exercise of its inherent police power.
On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no
undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC
since the latter merely exercises a limited authority
or
discretion
as
to
the
execution
and
implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.
Respondents DOE, ERC, and NPC, through the
OSG share the same view as PSALM and deny that
there is undue delegation of legislative power to
the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sucient
determinable standards which would guide the ERC
in the exercise of the powers granted to it.
Respondents argue that the imposition of the UC is
not oppressive and conscatory since it is an
exercise of the police power of the State and it
complies with the requirements of due process.
Respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to
collect and remit the amount pursuant to Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC. Otherwise,
PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46 of the
EPIRA, which imposes nes and penalties for any
violation of its provisions or its IRR.
ISSUES:
W/N The Universal Charge imposed
under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax.

W/N
There is undue delegation of
legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.
RULING: NO to both.
1. Based on the purposes of which UC is imposed from
Sec. 34 of EPIRA, it can be gleaned that the
assailed UC is not a tax, but an exaction in the
exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare
is surely promoted. Also, the STF reasonably serves
and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the
purposes for which the UC is imposed, i.e., to
ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry.
2. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers,
as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata
non delagari potest (what has been delegated
cannot be delegated).
3. Requirements of the valid exercise of the power of
"subordiante legislation"; the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. "Regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law
and that the regulation be i n conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law.
4. The Court nds that the EPIRA, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sucient standards.
5. Sec 34 of EPIRA states that UC is to be determined,
xed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed
on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does
not state the specic amount to be paid as
Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in
the law itself.
6. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the ERC
does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of the UC. Sec. 51 (d) and (e) of the
EPIRA clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its
objective, have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and
stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis
for ERC in the determination of the UC ;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs,
utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property
contributed to it, including the proceeds from the UC.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the rst test for
valid delegation of legislative power.

7. As to the second test: Provisions of the EPIRA such

as, among others, "to ensure the total
electrication of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of
electric power" and "watershed rehabilitation and
management" meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the

ERC's power to formulate the IRR. These are

sucient standards.

recommend to the President the full deregulation of

the downstream oil industry or when the President
may consider it practicable to declare full
deregulation.

8. Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the

immensity of police power in relation to the
delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory
functions over electric power as a vital public utility.
" The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise
its police power with great exibility, when the
need arises."

9.

Also, the law does not provide any specic standard

to determine when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be declining nor
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US
dollar is considered stable.

This was reiterated in National Association of

Electricity Consumers For Reforms v. ERC where the
Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have
sucient power to respond in real time to changes
wrought by multifarious factors affecting public
utilities.

ISSUE: W/N Section 15 of RA No. 8180

constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretary of
Energy

So it is clear that there is no undue

delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

1. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in

R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the
end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
nal date of full deregulation. The discretion given
to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997.

10. WHEREFORE, the instant

DISMISSED for lack of merit

case

is

hereby

TATAD v SECRETARY OF DOE

FACTS
1. RA No. 8180, or the Downstream Oil Industry
Regulation Act of 1996, was enacted by
Congress for the purpose of deregulating the
downstream oil industry.
"Under the deregulated environment, "any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil
and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate reneries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use
the same for his own requirement," subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy."

2. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency

regulating the oil industry other than those dealing
with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were
free to enter and exit the market without any
government interference.
3. Two phases of deregulation process; the transition
phase(Aug. 12, 1996) and the full deregulation
phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 392)
4. The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of
various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No.
392.
5. One of the issues is the substantive issue regarding
Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392.
First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide (sufficient
standard test) the Executive Branch in
determining
when
to
implement
the
full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Petitioners contend that the law does not dene
when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to

RULING: NO.

2. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the

judgment of the President he is to time it "as far
as practicable" when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioner's contention that the words "as far as
practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have
been dened in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set
determinate or determinable standards deserves
scant considerations as dictionary meanings of
these words are well settled and cannot confuse
men of reasonable intelligence.
3.

Petitioners further posit the thesis that the

Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a
factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil
industry in February 1997.
A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily
reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the DOE and the Oce of the
President, viz .: (1) the time when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining, and (2) the time when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable.Section 15 did not mention the
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given
weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation.
In the cases at bar, the Executive comingled the
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors
of decline of the price of crude oil in the world
market and the stability of the peso to the US
dollar.

The ruling of the Court was that the early

deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a
misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
4. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A.
No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No.
372 void.

SEMA v. COMELEC
FACTS
1.

The Ordinance appended to the 1987

Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao.
The rst legislative district consists of
Cotabato City and eight municipalities.

2. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM,

created under its Organic Act, R.A. 6734,
as amended by R.A. 9054. Although
Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but
of Region XII, having voted against its
inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite
held in November 1989.
3. August 28, 2006 - the ARMM's legislature,
the
ARMM
Regional
Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec. 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054,
enacted MMA Act 201 creating the
Province
of
Shari
Kabunsuan
composed of the eight municipalities in
the rst district of Maguindanao, later
added 3 municipalities. Thus, what was
left
of
Maguindanao
were
the
municipalities constituting its second
legislative district.
4.

October 29, 2006 - voters of

Maguindanao ratied Shariff Kabunsuan's
creation in a plebiscite
Feb. 6, 2007 - Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the
status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province"
under MMA Act 201.

of Cotabato City because

enactment of MMA Act 201.

of

the

May 10, 2007 - COMELEC issued a

Resolution no. 7902, renaming the
legislative district in question as "Shari
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City
(formerly
First
District
of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."
5. Sema, who was a candidate in the May
2007 elections for Representative of
"Shari Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City", prayed for the nullication of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the
exclusion from canvassing of the votes
cast in Cotabato City for that oce.
Contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is
entitled to one representative in Congress
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance.
Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902.

Sema further claimed that in issuing

Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC
usurped Congress' power to create or
reapportion legislative districts.
ISSUES: W/N Section 19, Article VI of R.A.
9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional.
W/N a province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 is
entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of
a national law creating a legislative
district for such province.
RULING: NO to both.
1. The creation of local government units is
governed by Sec. 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

Mar. 6, 2007 - COMELEC answered that

"maintaining the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
First Legislative District of Maguindanao"

2. Thus, the creation of any of the four local

government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions.

Mar. 29, 2007 - In preparation for May

2007 elections, states that Maguindanao's
rst legislative district is composed only

1. The creation of a local government unit must

follow the criteria xed in the Local Government
Code.

2. Such creation must not conict with any

provision of the Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
3.

Under the Local Government Code,

"only . . . an Act of Congress" can
create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress
delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power
to
create
provinces,
cities,
municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM.

5. For Congress to delegate validly the power to

create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create
a legislative district.

6. Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.

9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
the power to create provinces and cities
for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI
and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution,
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.

The question here is if the delegation is in

conict with the Constitution.

Thus, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.

201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan
was
declared
VOID.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

4. No conict arises as to the delegation of the

power to create municipalities and barangays,
however in the creation of provinces and cities
there exist conict with the Constitution.
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, "Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fty thousand, or each
province,
shall
have
at
least
one
representative"
in
the
House
of
Representatives as similary stated by Sec 3 of
the Ordinance.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without
a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. Thus, the power to
create a province or city inherently
involves the power to create a legislative
district.

TOBIAS v ABALOS
FACTS
1.