MALABANAN v REPUBLIC

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather and upon his death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. Part of this property was later
sold to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject
property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification. The RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. The CA reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
HELD: The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious

possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
REPUBLIC v ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP
FACTS: Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for
original registration of land. Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its
predecessor in interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession
and occupation of land since June 12, 1945. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.
On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time
when the land became alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether
Zuburan acquired the land by prescription.
ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of
land?
HELD: The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed.
The following are the bases for application:
1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:
a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain (Example of
non-alienable lands are forests, lakeshores, etc)
b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership; and
c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier
Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It
is sufficient that property is alienable and disposable at the time of application (Malaban)

2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:

a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property
b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title
OR 30 years regardless of good faith or bad faith.
c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the
beginning of 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. Property of public
dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial
property of State.
Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation
commenced (no allegation that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the
duration. So the application is based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing
that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the
patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth.

REPUBLIC v JOSON
FACTS: The Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated CA which affirmed the
judgment by the CFI of granting the application of the respondent for the registration of
her title.
The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland in Paombong,
Bulacan. That the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto
Dionisio since 1907; that on May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale, had sold the
land to Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto
(mother of the respondent) had inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in
1963, the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly,
publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner
since then; that the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the
taxes due thereon had been paid.
The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development averred that whatever legal
and possessory rights the respondent had acquired by reason of any Spanish government
grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure to occupy and possess the land for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land
applied for, being actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga
River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land registration.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRIVATE ACQUISITION
No it is not. Hence, The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in her name by alleging that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial. However,

the Republic counters that the land was public land; and that it could not be acquired by
prescription. The determination of the issue hinges on whether or not the land was public;
The respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite by virtue of her having
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. She testified on how the land had been passed on to her
from her predecessors-in-interest; and tendered documentary evidence like, the Deed of
Sale, Tax Declarations and receipts of payments of such. The CFI found her possession of
the land and that of her predecessors-in-interest to have been open, public, continuous, and
adverse in the concept of an owner since 1926 until the present time, or for more than 30
years, entitling her to the registration.
Respondent thoguh did not discharge her burden to prove the classification of the land as
demanded by the first requisite. She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public,
having been declared alienable and disposable by the State.
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the subject of
appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR. The mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO, submitted
by respondent did not suffice because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original
classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification alone would have sufficed, the
respondents application would still be denied considering that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in 1976.
The certification itself indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable
only on October 15, 1980
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired through
prescription may be registered in the owners name. Did the respondent then acquire the
land through prescription considering that her possession and occupation of the land by
her and her predecessors-in-interest could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that
the nature of their possession and occupation was that of a bona fide claim of ownership
for over 30 years? Clearly, the respondent did not.
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of
the possessor.

CITY MAYOR v EBIO

FACTS: Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land which was
an accretion of Cut-cut creek, and that the original occupant and possessor of the said
parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the
land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied
and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and
occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name.
Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said
property. Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida.
On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the
entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under
Pedros name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebios name.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution
No. 08, series of 1999 seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the
construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay and would
be traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all
the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto. Threatened of being evicted, respondents applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners. The RTC denied the petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved. The CA issued a decision in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the character of respondents possession and occupation of the
subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.
HELD: The petition is without merit.
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local
government of Paraaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road
that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary
of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along
its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. Such
contention is untenable.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that
have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that
governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers,

and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners
of such lands
Which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks
of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter
how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against
the State regarding property of public domain. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a
property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear
provision of law.
It was also held that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over
the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
In the case at bar, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years,
neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or
private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title
over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the
acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed
over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A
decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

REPUBLIC v CA and TANCINO

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and
Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by a Transfer
Certificate situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three
lots adjacent to their fishpond property. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vicente, in
representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner
appointed by the Court. Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2. The lower court rendered a decision granting
the application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
The petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which rendered a
decision affirming the decision of the lower court.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New
Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if
there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the
gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents submit that the fact of accretion happened
without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion
was complete.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is registrable as an accretion.
HELD: We agree with the petitioner. Article 457 of the New Civil Code requires the
concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is
said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by

human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
There is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not
the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged
alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers
but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The
land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the
river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of
the location of his land.
The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to
their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD v UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood. It renewed its timber license, which was granted by the government and shall be
valid for 25 years, in early 1960. Said license authorizes the company to cut, collect and
remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain municipalities of Laguna,
including Paete.
In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an experiment station for UP.
The said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete, occupied by IHVCP
so UP, who claims ownership of said portion of timberland, demanded the latter to pay the
forest charges to it, instead of the BIR. IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against
UP, claiming that R.A. 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure and seal the timber cut
by it within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest
charges prescribed by the BIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete.
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP
the area, which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the
public domain. In respect to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP, the said Act
removed and segregated it from being a public forest.

The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
The provision of the Act is clear that UP, being the owner of the land, has the right to collect
forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP
within it is concerned.
REPUBLIC rep. By MINDANAO MEDICAL v CA
The trial court ordered the registration of a lot situated in Davao city, which was reserved
by a Presidential proclamation for medical for medical site purposes in 1956, in favor of
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center.
Respondent de Jesus questioned the registration on the ground that his father had acquired
a vested right over the subject lot by virtue of a sales award earlier issued to him by the
Director of Lands. On appeal, the SC ruled in favor of petitioner.
It held that Proclamation No. 250 legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical
Center validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such grant
is constitutive of a fee simple title or absolute title in favor of petitioners.
Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving
public lands, provides that Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to
the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall
become registered lands.
The claims of person who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public and
which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving
certain lands, and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights
previously acquired in such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a
preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted,
reserved from sale, or appropriated, are void.