G.R. No.

179181, November 18, 2013

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Petitioners, v. CRESENCIA STA. TERESA
RAMOS, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, PONCIANO FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
challenge to the April 10 2007 decision 2 and the August 9, 2007 resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA decision affirmed, with modification, the January
17, 2005 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 of Pasig City (RTC), in LRC Case No. N5811 that denied the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM).
The Factual Antecedents
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land Lot 1 with an area
of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meters- covered by amended Plan
PSU-2239195 property), both located in what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On
September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 11, acting as a land registration court, an application for registration of
title6 (application) of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land
Act).7On October 4, 1974, the RCAM amended its application 8 by reducing Lot 2 to 760 square
meters (from 1,832 square meters).
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it acquired the
property during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in open, public, continuous
and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner. It added that to the best of its
knowledge and belief, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects the property, and that
no person has any claim, legal or equitable, on the property.
The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application: amended plan Psu223919; technical description of Lots 1 and 2; 9 surveyor s certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No.
9551 issued on September 6, 1966.11
On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Director of Lands, filed
an opposition12to the application. The Republic claimed that the property is part of the public
domain and cannot be subject to private appropriation.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her husband Ponciano
Francisco, filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application. She alleged that the property formed
part of the entire property that her family owns and has continuously possessed and occupied
from the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia
submitted the following documents,14 among others, to support her requested confirmation of
imperfect title:
1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta. Teresa and Eulogia Sta. Teresa Vda. de Ramos
(Cresencia's parents);

2.) her marriage certificate;

3.) their children's birth certificates;
4.) certificates of ownership covering two bancas;
5.) photographs of these two bane as with her youngest child while standing on the
property and showing the location of the RCAM' s church relative to the location of the
property;
6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand (allegedly for their gravel and sand business)
on the property;
7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni Maria standing on the property;
8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as sole
dealer of its gasoline products in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal;
9.) a photograph of their La Compania Refreshment Store standing on their titled lot
adjacent to the property;
10.) a photograph of the certificate of dealership given to Ponciano by a Tobacco
company for his dealership in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal; and
11.) the registration certificate for their family's sheet manufacturing business situated m
Bagumbayan, Taguig,15 Rizal.
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addition to those already on
record:16 tax declarations issued in its name in 1948, 1973, 1981, 1990, 1993, and 1999; 17 the
certified true copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia,
which adjoins the property on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming the RCAM's
ownership of the property.18 It likewise submitted several testimonial evidence to corroborate its
ownership and claim of possession of the property.
The ruling of the RTC
In its decision of January 17, 2005, 19 the RTC denied the RCAM's application for registration of
title. The RTC held that the RCAM failed to prove actual possession and ownership of the
property applied for. The RTC pointed out that the RCAM's only overt act on the property that
could be regarded as evidence of actual possession was its construction of the bahay ni Maria in
1991. Even this act, according to the RTC, did not sufficiently satisfy the actual possession
requirement of the law as the RCAM did not show how and in what manner it possessed the
property prior to 1991. The RCAM's tax declarations were also inconclusive since they failed to
prove actual possession.
In contrast, the numerous businesses allegedly conducted by Cresencia and her family on the
property, the various pieces of documentary evidence that she presented, and the testimony of
the RCAM' s own witnesses convinced the RTC that she and her family actually possessed the
property in the manner and for the period required by law.

This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to order the issuance of the title in Cresencia's name. The
RTC held that Cresencia failed to include in her opposition a prayer for issuance of title.
The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision before the CA.
The CA ruling
In its April 10, 2007 decision, 20 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's January 17, 2005
ruling. The CA confirmed Cresencia's incomplete and imperfect title to the property, subject to
her compliance with the requisites for registration of title.
The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality of the evidence on record unquestionably showed
that Cresencia was the actual possessor and occupant, in the concept of an owner, of the
disputed property. The CA held that Cresencia s use of the property since the Spanish time
(through her predecessors-in-interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s witnesses, clearly
demonstrated her dominion over the property. Thus, while she failed to register the property in
her name or declare it for taxation purposes as pointed out by the RCAM, the CA did not
consider this non-declaration significant to defeat her claim. To the CA, Cresencia merely
tolerated the RCAM s temporary use of the property for lack of any urgent need for it and only
acted to protect her right when the RCAM applied for registration in its name. Thus, the CA
declared that Cresencia correctly waited until her possession was disturbed before she took
action to vindicate her right.
The CA similarly disregarded the additional tax declarations that the RCAM presented in support
of its application. The CA pointed out that these documents hardly proved the RCAM s alleged
ownership of or right to possess the property as it failed to prove actual possession. Lastly, the
CA held that it was bound by the findings of facts and the conclusions arrived at by the RTC as
they were amply supported by the evidence.
The RCAM filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration. 21
Assignment of Errors
The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in: 22
1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect title of the oppositor when the magnitude of
the parties evidence shows that the oppositors merely had pretended possession that
could not ripen into ownership;
2. failing to consider that the RCAM had continuous, open and notorious possession of
the property in the concept of an owner for a period of thirty (30) years prior to the filing
of the application; and
3. confirming the oppositors incomplete and imperfect title despite her failure to comply
with the substantial and procedural requirements of the Public Land Act.
The Issue
In sum, the core issue for our resolution is who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to
the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title.

The Court s Ruling

Preliminary considerations: nature of he issues; factual-issue-bar rule
In her comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out that the present petition essentially questions
the CAs appreciation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who attested to her
actual, public and notorious possession of the property. She argues that these are questions of
fact that are not proper for a Rule 45 petition. In addition, the findings of the RTC were well
supported by the evidence, had been affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on this Court.
We are not entirely convinced of the merits of what Cresencia pointed out.
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari is
limited to the review of questions of law and not of fact. "A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence x x x as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation."24
An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed errors indeed primarily question
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that Cresencia, and not
the RCAM, had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by
law. When the presented question centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of
fact25 and is barred in a Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule. When the lower
courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly appreciated,
would warrant a different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made. 26 This,
in our view, is the exact situation in the case as our discussions below will show.
Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA s confirmation of Cresencia's title
over the property although she was not the applicant and was merely the oppositor in the
present confirmation and registration proceedings. Stated in question form -was the CA justified
under the law and jurisprudence in its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property?
This, in part, is a question of law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
recognized facts.
Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the petition on the merits.
Requirements for confirmation and registration of imperfect and incomplete title under C.A. No.
141 and P.D. No. 1529
C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Section 11
of C.A. No. 141 provides, as one of the modes of disposing public lands that are suitable for
agriculture, the "confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles." Section 48, on the other hand,
enumerates those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over
public lands and, therefore, entitled to confirmation and registration under the Land Registration
Act.

The RCAM did not specify the particular provision of C.A. No. 141 under which it anchored its
application for confirmation and registration of title. Nevertheless, the allegations in its
application and amended application readily show that it based its claim of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. As amended by P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, Section 48(b)
of C.A. No. 141 currently provides:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]
Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, then
operated under the Republic Act R.A.) No. 1942 (June 22, 1957) amendment which reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its amended application on
October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which then
required possession of thirty years), governs.
In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of Presidential Decree P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree specifies those who are qualified to register their incomplete title over an
alienable and disposable public land under the Torrens system. P.D. No. 1529, which was
approved on June 11, 1978, superseded and codified all laws relative to the registration of
property.
The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
[italics ours]
Under these legal parameters, applicants in a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may
register their titles upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, 27
since June 12, 1945, or earlier (or for at least 30 years in the case of the RCAM) immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. The burden of proof in these cases
rests on the applicants who must demonstrate clear, positive and convincing evidence that: (1)
the property subject of their application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and (2) their alleged possession and occupation of the property were of the length and of the
character required by law.28
On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled to the benefits of C A No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
Reiterating its position before the RTC and the CA, the RCAM now argues that it actually,
continuously, openly and notoriously possessed the property since time immemorial. It points
out that its tax declarations covering the property, while not conclusive evidence of ownership,
are proof of its claim of title and constitute as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
For her part, Cresencia counters that the RCAM failed to discharge its burden of proving
possession in the concept of an owner. She argues that the testimonies of the RCAM s witnesses
were replete with inconsistencies and betray the weakness of its claimed possession. Cresencia
adds that at most, the RCAM s possession was by her mere tolerance which, no matter how
long, can never ripen into ownership. She also points out that the RCAM s tax declarations are
insufficient proof of possession as they are not, by themselves, conclusive evidence of
ownership.
We do not see any merit in the RCAM s contentions.
The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC, dismissed the RCAM s application for its failure to
comply with the second requirement possession of the property in the manner and for the
period required by law.
We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the CA findings on this point. They had carefully
analyzed and weighed each piece of the RCAM s evidence to support its application and had
extensively explained in their respective decisions why they could not give weight to these
pieces of evidence. Hence, we affirm their denial of the RCAM' s application. For greater
certainty, we expound on the reasons below.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the period required
by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not fictional or
constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines, 29 the Court explained the character of the
required possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,

therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession requirement, the RCAM had
to show that it performed specific overt acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise
over his own property. Proof of actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of the
application is required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of
owner," the RCAM used to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law, 30 not an
allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when
[the possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood."31
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act characterizing its claimed
possession in the manner described above. The various documents that it submitted, as well as
the bare assertions it made and those of its witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. 32 We elaborate below on these points.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966, 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993
and 1999 did not in any way prove the character of its possession over the property. Note that
the settled rule is that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by any other evidence showing actual, public and adverse
possession.33 The declaration for taxation purposes of property in the names of applicants for
registration or of their predecessors-in-interest may constitute collaborating evidence only when
coupled with other acts of possession and ownership;34 standing alone, it is inconclusive.
This rule applies even more strongly in this case since the RCAM's payments of taxes due on the
property were inconsistent and random. Interestingly, while the RCAM asserts that it had been in
possession of the property since the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could
present was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and its amended
application in 197 4, the RCAM presented only two tax declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966)
covering the property. And since then, up to the issuance of the January 1 7, 2005 decision of
the R TC, the RCAM presented only five other tax declarations -those issued in 1977, 1984,
1990, 1993 and 1999. The case of Tan v. Republic 35 teaches us that this type of intermittent and
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis for inferring
possession, 36 the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession of the property for the required
duration. As already noted, the earliest tax declaration that it presented was for 1948. We are in
fact inclined to believe that the RCAM first declared the property in its name only in 1948 as this
tax declaration does not appear to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus,
when it filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property for only eighteen years,
counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the possession period from the filing of its
amended application in 1974, its alleged possession (which was only for twenty-six years

counted from 1948) would still be short of the thirty-year period required by Section 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942. The situation would be worse if we were to consider
the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) where, for the RCAM's claimed
possession of the property to give rise to an imperfect title, this possession should have
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and 2, and surveyor s
certificate only prove the identity of the property that the RCAM sought to register in its
name.37 While these documents plot the location, the area and the boundaries of the property,
they hardly prove that the RCAM actually possessed the property in the concept of an owner for
the required duration. In fact, the RCAM seemed to be uncertain of the exact area it allegedly
possesses and over which it claims ownership. The total area that the RCAM applied for, as
stated in its amended application and the amended survey plan, was 794 square meters (34
square meters for Lot 1 and 760 square meters for Lot 2). Yet, in its various tax declarations
issued even after it filed its amended application, the total area declared under its name was
still 1,832 square meters. Notably, the area stated in its 1948 tax declaration was only 132.30
square meters, while the area stated in the subsequently issued tax declaration (1966) was
1,832 square meters. Significantly, the RCAM did not account for or provide sufficient
explanation for this increase in the area; thus, it appeared uncertain on the specific area
claimed.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other improvement that clearly
announces its claim of ownership over the property. Neither did it account for any act of
occupation, development, maintenance or cultivation for the duration of time it was allegedly in
possession of it. The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiesta-related and Lenten
activities could hardly satisfy the possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the
CA, this structure was constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to, the filing of its
application in 1966.
Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly supplemented the inherent inadequacy of its
documentary evidence. While apparently confirming the RCAM s claim, the testimonies were
undoubtedly hearsay and were not based on personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the RCAMs claimed actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.
b. The RC M failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable land of he public
domain
Most importantly, we find the RCAM s evidence to be insufficient since it failed to comply with
the first and most basic requirement proof of the alienable and disposable character of the
property. Surprisingly, no finding or pronouncement referring to this requirement was ever made
in the decisions of the R TC and the CA.
To prove that the property is alienable and disposable, the RCAM was bound to establish "the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute."38 It could have also secured a certification from the
government that the property applied for was alienable and disposable. 39 Our review of the
records shows that this evidence is fatally absent and we are in fact disappointed to note that
both the RTC and the CA appeared to have simply assumed that the property was alienable and
disposable.

We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for two basic reasons. One, in this jurisdiction, all lands
belong to the State regardless of their classification. 40 This rule, more commonly known as the
Regalian doctrine, applies with equal force even to private unregistered lands, unless the
contrary is satisfactorily shown. Second, unless the date when the property became alienable
and disposable is specifically identified, any determination on the RCAM' s compliance with the
second requirement is rendered useless as any alleged period of possession prior to the date the
property became alienable and disposable can never be counted in its favor as any period of
possession and occupation of public lands in the concept of owner, no matter how long, can
never ripen into ownership.41
On this ground alone, the R TC could have outrightly denied the RCAM' s application.
On the CAs authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in land registration proceedings
The RCAM next argues that the CAs act of confirming Cresencia's title over the property is
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The RCAM points out that it filed the application for
registration of title under the provisions of C.A. No. 141 or alternatively under P.D. No. 1529;
both statutes dictate several substantive and procedural requirements that must first be
complied with before title to the property is confirmed and registered. In affirming Cresencia's
title without any evidence showing her compliance with these requirements, it claims that the
CA, in effect, made Cresencia the applicant entitled to the benefits of the land registration
proceedings that it initiated before the lower court.
We differ with this view.
Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court the authority to confirm the title of either the
applicant or the oppositor in a land registration proceeding depending on the conclusion that the
evidence calls for. Specifically, Section 29 provides that the court "x x x after considering the
evidence x x x finds that the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration,
judgment shall be rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land x x
x x." (emphases and italics ours)
Thus, contrary to
Cresencia, as the
satisfaction of the
support of her own

the RCAM's contention, the CA has the authority to confirm the title of
oppositor, over the property. This, of course, is subject to Cresencia's
evidentiary requirement of P D No. 1529, in relation with C.A. No. 141 in
claim of imperfect title over the property.

The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence belies Cresencia's claim of continuous, open and
notorious possession since the Spanish time. The RCAM points out that, first, Cresencia failed to
declare for taxation purposes the property in her name, thus effectively indicating that she did
not believe herself to be its owner. Second, Cresencia did not have the property surveyed in her
name so that she could assert her claim over it and show its metes and bounds. Third, Cresencia
did not register the property in her name although she previously registered the adjoining lot in
her name. Fourth, Cresencia did not construct any permanent structure on the property and no
traces of the businesses allegedly conducted by her and by her family on it could be seen at the
time it filed its application. And fifth, Cresencia did not perform any act of dominion that, by the
established jurisprudential definition, could be sufficiently considered as actual possession.
We agree with the RCAM on most of these points.

While we uphold the CA' s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in a confirmation and
registration proceedings, we cannot agree, however, with the conclusion the CA reached on the
nature of Cresencia's possession of the property.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM' s application,
we also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession
of the property in the manner and for the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM,
Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the
requirements for confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of
proof; thus, the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and confirmed
Cresencias title over the property.
We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons outlined below.
First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia presented to support her own
claim of imperfect title hardly proved her alleged actual possession of the property. Specifically,
the certificates of marriage, birth and death did not particularly state that each of these certified
events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the claimed property; at best, the
certificates proved the occurrence of these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the
stated dates, respectively.
Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two bancas in the name of Ponciano, the registration
certificate for their family s sheet manufacturing business, the photograph of the certificate of
dealership in the name of Ponciano given by a tobacco company, and the photograph of the
plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products
did not prove that Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses on the disputed
property itself. Rather, they simply showed that at one point in time, Cresencia and her family
conducted these businesses in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. In fact, Cresencia s claim that they
conducted their gasoline dealership business on the property is belied by the testimony of a
witness who stated that the gas station was located north (or the other side) of Cresencia s
titled lot and not on the property.42
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s daughter, of the two
bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel and sand they allegedly used in their
gravel and sand business also hardly count as acts of occupation, development or maintenance
that could have been sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence of these objects and
of Cresencia s daughter on the property was obviously transient and impermanent; at most,
they proved that Cresencia and her family used the property for a certain period of time, albeit,
briefly and temporarily.
Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store business (that they allegedly
conducted on the property) actually stood on their titled lot adjoining the property.
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which they had been
occupying at the time the RCAM filed its application and where their La Compania Refreshment
Store stood), she never had the property registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her
predecessors-in-interest declare the property for taxation purposes nor had the property
surveyed in their names to properly identify it and to specifically determine its metes and
bounds. The declaration for taxation purposes of property in their names would have at least
served as proof that she or her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the property 43 that
could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of actual possession.

Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and Florencia Francisco Mariano (Cresencia's daughter) on
the nature and duration of their family's alleged possession of the property, other than being
self-serving, were mere general statements and could not have constituted the factual evidence
of possession that the law requires. They also failed to point out specific acts of dominion or
ownership that were performed on the property by the parents of Cresencia, their predecessorsin-interest. They likewise failed to present any evidence that could have corroborated their
alleged possession of the property from the time of their grandfather, Cipriano, who acquired
the property from its previous owner, Petrona Sta. Teresa. Interestingly, other than Ponciano and
Florencia, none of the witnesses on record seemed to have known that Cresencia owns or at
least claims ownership of the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient, which we do
not, confirmation and registration of title over the property in Cresencia' s name was still
improper in the absence of competent and persuasive evidence on record proving that the
property is alienable and disposable.
For all these reasons, we find that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC's ruling on this matter
and confirmed Cresencia's imperfect title to the property.WHEREFORE, in light of these
considerations, we hereby DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated
April 10, 2007 and the resolution dated August 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84646 to the extent described below:
1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals as it affirmed the January 17 2005
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, in LRC Case No. N-5811 that
DENIED the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila; and
2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the confirmation made by the Court of Appeals of the title
over the property in the name of respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos for lack of
sufficient evidentiary basis.

G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014

MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 11 , 2010 and
the Resolution2 dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN.
The CA had reversed and set aside the Judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMisamis
Oriental, Branch 20, in LRC No. 92-05 and dismissed the application for registration of title filed
by petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan.
The records bear out the following factual antecedents:
On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application 4 for original registration of title over a parcel of
land known as Lot 18793, Cad-237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an area of 1,061 square meters,
more or less, and particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City. Bounded on the North, by Lot 835, Cag.
Cad; on the East, by Lot No. 4342-A of Subd. Plan; on the South, by Lot 4342-K of Subd. Plan;
and on the West, by lot 4342-C of Subd. Plan with an area of ONE THOUSAND SIXTY ONE (1,061)
SQUARE METERS more or less (Lot 4342-B - Sketch Plan).5
In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the above-mentioned property from
Mamerta Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. 6 She
had the property declared for taxation purposes under her name and was issued Tax Declaration
Nos. 998937 and 05 83 51.8 Attached to the application are the following documents:
(a) Original Tracing Cloth Plan together with the three (3) Blue print copies; 9
(b) Technical Description of the parcel of land;10
(c) Surveyor's Report of Survey or Surveyor' s Certificate;11
(d) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land;12 and
(e) Tax Declaration No. 99893.13
After finding petitioner's application sufficient in form and substance, the trial court set the case
for initial hearing.
On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed an Opposition14 to petitioner's application for registration on the ground that (1)
neither petitioner nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) the
muniments of title and tax declarations attached to the petition do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject land; (3) the claim of ownership
based on Spanish title is no longer available for purposes of registration; and (4) the subject
land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not registrable.
During the hearing, petitioner testified that (1) she is the applicant for registration of a parcel of
land located at Buenavista Village, Carmen, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 18793,
Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing an area of 1,061 square meters; (2) that she acquired
said land through sale on November 28, 1989 from Mamerta Tan; (3) that after the sale, she
declared the property for taxation purposes under her name; (4) that she was issued Tax

Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351 ; (5) that she has been religiously paying taxes thereon
since 1989 up to 1991; and ( 6) that she took possession of the land and caused its survey. 15
Petitioner also presented Mamerta Tan who testified that she is the vendor of the land subject of
the present application and that she sold the land to petitioner in 1989. Mamerta averred that
she became the owner of the said property in 1975 after she bought the land from Teresita Tan.
She declared the property under her name for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
36942.16
Another witness, Mr. Honesto Velez, the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that he
issued certifications or certified copies of records on file in his office and he identified the
certified photocopy of the Land History Card 17 pertaining to Cadastral Lot 4342, Case No. 4
situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City under the name of cadastral claimant Potenciano
Abragan. The history card started with Tax Declaration No. 1645 in the name of Potenciano
Abragan. Later, another tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 37129 in the name of Presentacion
Eviofa, was issued. This tax declaration was subsequently replaced by Tax Declaration No.
37130. He stated that based on the records in their office, it appeared that petitioner is the
owner of Lot 4342. Another claimant is Presentacion Eviota and the remaining portion was in the
name of Potenciano Abragan. Presentacion Eviota was also issued a tax declaration, Tax
Declaration No. 124750 covering an area of 897 square meters, but not involving the same
parcel of land. Eviota's land was only a portion of Lot 4342. The original area of the land claimed
by Abragan is 12,293 square meters.18
City Assessor Velez further testified that their records showed that petitioner possessed a 1,061square meter portion of Lot 4342 covered by Tax Declaration No. 058351. All the transfers made
over portions of this parcel of land were all recorded in the land history card on file with their
office, thus paving the way for the issuance of corresponding tax declaration to its new owners. 19
Petitioner also presented and offered the following exhibits 20 to support her application for
registration of title, to wit:
1) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land,
2) Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351 ,
3) Tax Receipts,
4) Certified True Copy of Land History Card,
5) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano Abragan,
6) Tax Declaration in the name of Presentacion T. Eviota,
7) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano Abragan.
On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered Judgment 21 granting petitioner's application for
registration of title. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
There being no evidence presented by the oppositor, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding
applicant Minda S. Gaerlan as owner in fee simple of the land subject of this application and
hereby decreeing that Lot 18793, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing an area of One
Thousand Sixty One (1 ,061) square meters, more or less, be registered in her name [in]
accordance with the technical description attached to the application.
SO ORDERED.22

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the aforementioned decision asserting that the
trial court erred in ruling that the subject parcel of land is available for private appropriation. The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN.
On March 11, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision 23 reversing and setting aside the ruling of the
trial court and dismissing the application for registration of title filed by petitioner.
The CA found that petitioner failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land is
alienable and disposable. The CA stressed that the applicant for land registration must prove
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable and
that the land subject of the application falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO). In addition, the CA held that the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Moreover, the CA observed that there
is no evidence on record to establish that petitioner, by herself or through her predecessors-ininterest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land and that she possessed the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus,
the appellate court ruled that petitioner is not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.24
Hence, petitioner is now before us claiming that the CA erred in denying her application for
registration of title.
Petitioner asserts that her predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Abragan, possessed the subject
property as early as 1929. She claims Potenciano was the one who asked for the original survey
of Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 with an original land area of 12,293 square meters, situated in Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City. She averred that the property subject of the present application consisting
of an area of 1,061 square meters and known as Lot 18793, Cad-237, is a portion of Lot 4342,
Cad-237. In support of her claim, petitioner seeks to submit as additional evidence Bureau of
Lands (BL) Form No. 700-2A 25 of the Land Management Services which conducted a survey on
Lot 4342, Cad-237 on November 28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as the Cadastral Survey
Claimant.
Petitioner also maintains that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain and this land classification has long been approved by the DENR Secretary. She points
out that during the entire period of possession of Potenciano Abragan, the subject land had
already been classified as alienable and disposable land. To support her claim, petitioner
submits as additional evidence the Certification26 issued by the CENRO stating that a parcel of
land designated as Lot 4342, Cad-237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City containing a total
area of 12,293 square meters more or less falls within an area classified as Alienable and
Disposable under Project 8, Block I and Land Classification (LC) Map No. 5 85 certified and
approved on December 31, 1925. She prays that she be allowed with leave of, court to submit
the aforementioned document in support of her application for registration.
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she and her witnesses had testified on the issue of actual,
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land,
including the act of declaring the subject lot for tax purposes in their names and religiously
paying the taxes of the land to the government. Thus, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not
declaring that she is entitled to registration of the subject land.
Respondent, through the OSG, filed a Comment 27 asserting that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Respondent posits that in the present case, petitioner, for the first time and only in the present
appeal, seeks the admission to evidence of the following: (1) the Certification dated July 16,
2010 issued by the CENRO in Cagayan de Oro City to prove that Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 located in
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 8,

Block I and LC Map No. 585 which was certified and approved on December 31, 1925 and (2) BL
Form No. 700-2A which shows that Potenciano Abragan was the original claimant of the entire
land denominated as Lot 4342 since 1929, to prove her supposed acquisitive prescription of the
contested lot.
Respondent argues that petitioner's attempt to introduce additional evidence is impermissible as
its introduction would involve a review and assessment of the evidence on record. Respondent
adds that the determination of the probative value of evidence is a question of fact which is
beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner should have offered the
aforementioned documents before the land registration court and while the case was pending
appeal before the CA as it is an appellate court with authority to receive evidence.
Moreover, respondent points out that BL Form No. 700-2A submitted by petitioner named
Potenciano Abragan as the original claimant of the entire area known as Lot 4342 but the same
document does not show that petitioner is likewise a claimant of a part of Lot 4342 or that she
derived title to the lot in question from Potenciano Abragan. Petitioner's possession only started
in 1989 when she acquired the lot from Mamerta Tan who in turn acquired the lot from Teresita
Tan. But there is no clear evidence showing how, when and from whom Teresita Tan acquired the
subject lot.
Respondent cites the rule that the applicant for registration must be able to establish by
evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is respondent's contention
that even if said BL Form No. 700-2A were considered in this appeal, it would not help
petitioner's cause because the document is bereft of any information showing that petitioner has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lot since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Hence, respondent maintains that the CA properly reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling
granting petitioner's application for land registration since petitioner failed to offer in evidence
the necessary certification that the parcel of land applied for registration is alienable and
disposable in character during the proceedings below. Petitioner also did not present any
certification from the DENR or a certified copy of any land classification map in order to establish
irrefutably the fact that the subject parcel of land is, in fact, alienable and disposable.
Respondent claims that in the absence of such classification the land remains an unclassified
land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Also, respondent avers that petitioner failed to present specific acts that would show the nature
of her possession and that of her predecessors-in-interest. The trial court's decision merely
relied on the testimony of petitioner and her witnesses regarding the transfer of possession of
the subject property from one possessor to another without, however, adverting to the
particulars of their respective possession thereof. To prove adverse possession, it is not enough
to simply declare one's possession and that of the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest to have
been adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in the concept of owner for the required
number of years. The applicant should present specific acts that would show such nature of
possession. Thus, according to respondent, petitioner has failed to positively establish a
registrable title to the subject parcel of land.
Essentially, the main issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's
application for registration of title.
Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. Indeed, the principle is well established that this Court is
not a trier of facts . Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. 28
The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of

facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there
is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct
or not, is a question of law.29 In Republic v. Vega,30 the Court held that when petitioner asks for a
review of the decision made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving
into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made,
then a question of law is raised.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented
before us calls for a review of the CA's conclusion that the documents and evidence presented
by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence, the
petition is properly filed.
Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of her application has been declared
alienable and disposable in 1925 and that her possession through her predecessors-in-interest
started in 1929. However, after a careful examination of the evidence adduced by petitioner, we
find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title for
the failure of petitioner to prove satisfactorily the requirements for registration provided under
the law.
P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141,31 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 32 specifies those who are qualified to
apply for registration of land. Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended provide thus:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of title must establish and
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that his possession has
been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 33 Each element must

necessarily be proven by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence; otherwise the
application for registration should be denied.34
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. 35
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must
show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.36
To comply with the first requisite, petitioner submitted a CENRO Certification stating that Lot
4342, Cad-237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and disposable
area under Project No. 8, Block I. Petitioner also submitted LC Map No. 543 which was certified
and approved on December 31, 1925. We, however, find that the attached certification is
inadequate to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. We held in Republic v. TA .N
Properties, Inc.37 that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that
the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as
alienable and disposable. We ruled in Republic v. TA .N Properties, Inc. that:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.38
Thus, as it now stands, aside from the CENRO certification, an application for original
registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land is indeed alienable and
disposable.39
In Republic v. Medida,40 the Court explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The
CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication of the DENR Secretary s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.-Documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the
class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer," x x x. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications
are not even records of public documents. x x x 41
Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant
consideration since it was not presented during the proceedings before the trial court or while
the case was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner only presented the said certification
for the first time before this Court. The genuineness and due execution of the said document
had not been duly proven in the manner required by law. 42 Also, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. 43 In the
present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation why the CENRO certification was not
presented and submitted during the proceedings before the trial court to justify its belated
submission to this Court.
As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner failed to
establish that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land on or before June 12, 1945. Based
on the records, the earliest evidence of possession that petitioner and her predecessor-ininterest Mamerta Tan had over the subject property was only in 1975 when Mamerta Tan
purchased the subject lot from Teresita Tan. While Mamerta Tan testified that she purchased the
property from Teresita, the records are bereft of any evidence to show Teresita's mode of
acquisition of ownership over the subject lot or from whom she acquired the property and when
her possession of the subject lot had commenced.1wphi1
In addition, Honesto Velez, City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, merely testified on the tax
declarations issued to certain persons including petitioner and Mamerta Tan as enumerated in
the Land History Card of Cadastral Lot 4342 but his testimony did not prove their possession and
occupation over the subject property. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 44 Here, it is not shown by clear and satisfactory
evidence that petitioner by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied the land in an open, exclusive, continuous and notorious manner since June 12, 1945
or earlier.

Notably, petitioner attempted to convince this Court that Potenciano Abragan is her
predecessor-in-interest and was in possession of the subject property even before 1929.
However, there was absolutely no evidence proffered by petitioner that she derived her title to
the property from Potenciano Abragan. Moreover, BL Form No. 700-2A attached by petitioner to
her present petition and sought to be submitted as additional evidence, does not in any way
prove that Potenciano Abragan was in possession and occupation of the property before 1929.
At best, it merely shows that it was Potenciano who requested for an original survey of the lot.
More importantly, just like the CENRO certification, BL Form No. 700-2A could not be given any
evidentiary weight and value since it was not presented before the trial court and its
genuineness and due execution has not been duly proven. It must be emphasized that any
evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. 45
In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, her application for
registration of title of the subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated
May 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY (PRA), Petitioner, v. CITY OF PARAAQUE Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on
pure questions of law, assailing the January 8, 2010 Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
195, Parafiaque City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is
a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore, . not
exempt from payment of real property taxes. The pertinent portion of the said order reads:
In view of the finding of this court that petitioner is not exempt from payment of real property
taxes, respondent Paraaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo did not act xxx without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the warrants of levy on the subject properties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. The Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
Supplemental Petition is denied and the supplemental petition attached thereto is not admitted.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 (Creating the Public Estates Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes) which took effect on February 4,
1977 to provide a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the
administration and operation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the
government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development
consistent with public interest.
On February 14, 1979, by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating,
directing and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government.
On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming
PEA into PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to reclamation
activities.
By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay, including those located in Paraaque City, and was issued Original Certificates of
Title (OCT Nos. 180, 202, 206, 207, 289, 557, and 559) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT
Nos. 104628, 7312, 7309, 7311, 9685, and 9686) over the reclaimed lands.
On February 19, 2003, then Paraaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued
Warrants of Levy on PRAs reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San
Dionisio) located in Paraaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes
made by then Paraaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002.

On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC.
On April 3, 2003, after due hearing, the RTC issued an order denying PRAs petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
On April 4, 2003, PRA sent a letter to Carabeo requesting the latter not to proceed with the
public auction of the subject reclaimed properties on April 7, 2003. In response, Carabeo sent a
letter stating that the public auction could not be deferred because the RTC had already denied
PRAs TRO application.
On April 25, 2003, the RTC denied PRAs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction for being moot and academic considering that the auction sale of the subject
properties on April 7, 2003 had already been consummated.
On August 3, 2009, after an exchange of several pleadings and the failure of both parties to
arrive at a compromise agreement, PRA filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
Supplemental Petition which sought to declare as null and void the assessment for real property
taxes, the levy based on the said assessment, the public auction sale conducted on April 7,
2003, and the Certificates of Sale issued pursuant to the auction sale.
On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRAs petition. In ruling that PRA
was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC
under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an
authorized capital stock divided into no par value shares. In fact, PRA admitted its corporate
personality and that said properties were registered in its name as shown by the certificates of
title. Therefore, as a GOCC, local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 Local Government Code (LGC) which was the prevailing law in 2001
and 2002 with respect to real property taxation. The RTC also ruled that the tax exemption
claimed by PRA under E.O. No. 654 had already been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and
that PRA failed to comply with the procedural requirements in Section 206 thereof.
Not in conformity, PRA filed this petition for certiorari assailing the January 8, 2010 RTC Order
based on the following GROUNDS
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY REAL
PROPERTY TAX ON THE SUBJECT RECLAIMED LANDS CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER IS AN INCORPORATED INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
AND IS, THEREFORE, EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAX UNDER SECTIONS 234(A)
AND 133(O) OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE VIS--VIS MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF APPEALS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RECLAIMED LANDS ARE PART
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND, HENCE, EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX.

PRA asserts that it is not a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. Neither is it a GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because it is not required to meet the test of economic viability. Instead, PRA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service
pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Although it
has a capital stock divided into shares, it is not authorized to distribute dividends and allotment
of surplus and profits to its stockholders. Therefore, it may not be classified as a stock
corporation because it lacks the second requisite of a stock corporation which is the distribution
of dividends and allotment of surplus and profits to the stockholders.
It insists that it may not be classified as a non-stock corporation because it has no members and
it is not organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational,
fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry,
agriculture and like chambers as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code.
Moreover, PRA points out that it was not created to compete in the market place as there was no
competing reclamation company operated by the private sector. Also, while PRA is vested with
corporate powers under P.D. No. 1084, such circumstance does not make it a corporation but
merely an incorporated instrumentality and that the mere fact that an incorporated
instrumentality of the National Government holds title to real property does not make said
instrumentality a GOCC. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
recognizes a scenario where a piece of land owned by the Republic is titled in the name of a
department, agency or instrumentality.
Thus, PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of the National Government, it is
exempt from payment of real property tax except when the beneficial use of the real property is
granted to a taxable person. PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local
governments cannot tax the national government which delegate to local governments the
power to tax.
It explains that reclaimed lands are part of the public domain, owned by the State, thus, exempt
from the payment of real estate taxes. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas
for public use or public service. While the subject reclaimed lands are still in its hands, these
lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain. Hence, the assessment of real
property taxes made on said lands, as well as the levy thereon, and the public sale thereof on
April 7, 2003, including the issuance of the certificates of sale in favor of the respondent
Paraaque City, are invalid and of no force and effect.
On the other hand, the City of Paraaque (respondent) argues that PRA since its creation
consistently represented itself to be a GOCC. PRAs very own charter (P.D. No. 1084) declared it
to be a GOCC and that it has entered into several thousands of contracts where it represented
itself to be a GOCC. In fact, PRA admitted in its original and amended petitions and pre-trial brief
filed with the RTC of Paraaque City that it was a GOCC.
Respondent further argues that PRA is a stock corporation with an authorized capital stock
divided into 3 million no par value shares, out of which 2 million shares have been subscribed
and fully paid up. Section 193 of the LGC of 1991 has withdrawn tax exemption privileges
granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.
Hence, since PRA is a GOCC, it is not exempt from the payment of real property tax.
THE COURTS RULING

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC
as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
On the other hand, Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
defines a government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. x x x
From the above definitions, it is clear that a GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation" while an instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when
the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality
remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the
department framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become
stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or
instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the
Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All
these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as
stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called
government corporate entities. They are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense as understood
under the Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and
status of government entities.2
Correlatively, Section 3 of the Corporation Code defines a stock corporation as one whose
"capital stock is divided into shares and x x x authorized to distribute to the holders of such
shares dividends x x x." Section 87 thereof defines a non-stock corporation as "one where no
part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers." Further,

Section 88 provides that non-stock corporations are "organized for charitable, religious,
educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service,
or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers."
Two requisites must concur before one may be classified as a stock corporation, namely: (1) that
it has capital stock divided into shares; and (2) that it is authorized to distribute dividends and
allotments of surplus and profits to its stockholders. If only one requisite is present, it cannot be
properly classified as a stock corporation. As for non-stock corporations, they must have
members and must not distribute any part of their income to said members. 3
In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock
corporation. It cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital
stock divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not
authorized to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no
provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances
pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525,5 E.O. No. 6546 and EO No. 7987 that authorizes PRA
to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A
non-stock corporation must have members.8 Moreover, it was not organized for any of the
purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to
manage all government reclamation projects.
Furthermore, there is another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common
good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters
on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC
must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of
common good but failed the second one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind
the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to
compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing reclamation
companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created
essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands
belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their
development consistent with the public interest. Sections 2 and 4 of P.D. No. 1084 reads, as
follows:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide for a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands
belonging to, managed and/or operated by the government, with the object of maximizing their
utilization and hastening their development consistent with the public interest.
Section 4. Purposes. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:

(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other
means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government.
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such services as may be necessary for the
efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
The twin requirement of common good and economic viability was lengthily discussed in the
case of Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 9 the pertinent portion of which
reads:
Third, the government-owned or controlled corporations created through special charters are
those that meet the two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution.
The first condition is that the government-owned or controlled corporation must be established
for the common good. The second condition is that the government-owned or controlled
corporation must meet the test of economic viability. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,
or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be
created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the
test of economic viability.
The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to create "government-owned or controlled
corporations" through special charters only if these entities are required to meet the twin
conditions of common good and economic viability. In other words, Congress has no power to
create government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters unless they are made
to comply with the two conditions of common good and economic viability. The test of economic
viability applies only to government-owned or controlled corporations that perform economic or
commercial activities and need to compete in the market place. Being essentially economic
vehicles of the State for the common good meaning for economic development purposes
these government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters are usually organized
as stock corporations just like ordinary private corporations.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing
governmental or public functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These
instrumentalities perform essential public services for the common good, services that every
modern State must provide its citizens. These instrumentalities need not be economically viable
since the government may even subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities are
not the "government-owned or controlled corporations" referred to in Section 16, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the Constitution imposes no limitation when the legislature creates government
instrumentalities vested with corporate powers but performing essential governmental or public
functions. Congress has plenary authority to create government instrumentalities vested with
corporate powers provided these instrumentalities perform essential government functions or
public services. However, when the legislature creates through special charters corporations

that perform economic or commercial activities, such entities known as "government-owned

or controlled corporations" must meet the test of economic viability because they compete in
the market place.
This is the situation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the
Philippines and similar government-owned or controlled corporations, which derive their
incometo meet operating expenses solely from commercial transactions in competition with the
private sector. The intent of the Constitution is to prevent the creation of government-owned or
controlled corporations that cannot survive on their own in the market place and thus merely
drain the public coffers.
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, proponent of the test of economic viability, explained to the
Constitutional Commission the purpose of this test, as follows:
MR. OPLE: Madam President, the reason for this concern is really that when the government
creates a corporation, there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt from the test
of economic performance. We know what happened in the past. If a government corporation
loses, then it makes its claim upon the taxpayers' money through new equity infusions from the
government and what is always invoked is the common good. That is the reason why this year,
out of a budget of P115 billion for the entire government, about P28 billion of this will go into
equity infusions to support a few government financial institutions. And this is all taxpayers'
money which could have been relocated to agrarian reform, to social services like health and
education, to augment the salaries of grossly underpaid public employees. And yet this is all
going down the drain.
Therefore, when we insert the phrase "ECONOMIC VIABILITY" together with the "common good,"
this becomes a restraint on future enthusiasts for state capitalism to excuse themselves from
the responsibility of meeting the market test so that they become viable. And so, Madam
President, I reiterate, for the committee's consideration and I am glad that I am joined in this
proposal by Commissioner Foz, the insertion of the standard of "ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR THE
ECONOMIC TEST," together with the common good.1wphi1
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, explains in his
textbook The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary:
The second sentence was added by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The significant
addition, however, is the phrase "in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability." The addition includes the ideas that they must show capacity to function
efficiently in business and that they should not go into activities which the private sector can do
better. Moreover, economic viability is more than financial viability but also includes capability to
make profit and generate benefits not quantifiable in financial terms.
Clearly, the test of economic viability does not apply to government entities vested with
corporate powers and performing essential public services. The State is obligated to render
essential public services regardless of the economic viability of providing such service. The noneconomic viability of rendering such essential public service does not excuse the State from
withholding such essential services from the public.
However, government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters, organized
essentially for economic or commercial objectives, must meet the test of economic viability.
These are the government-owned or controlled corporations that are usually organized under
their special charters as stock corporations, like the Land Bank of the Philippines and the

Development Bank of the Philippines. These are the government-owned or controlled

corporations, along with government-owned or controlled corporations organized under the
Corporation Code, that fall under the definition of "government-owned or controlled
corporations" in Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code. [Emphases supplied]
This Court is convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under Section 2(3) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The facts, the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA
was not organized either as a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by
Congress to operate commercially and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public
service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code.
Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property
tax.
Clearly, respondent has no valid or legal basis in taxing the subject reclaimed lands managed by
PRA. On the other hand, Section 234(a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o), exempts PRA
from paying realty taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local government units.
Sections 234(a) and 133(o) of the LGC provide, as follows:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person.
xxxx
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units. [Emphasis supplied]
It is clear from Section 234 that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines (the
Republic) is exempt from real property tax unless the beneficial use thereof has been granted to
a taxable person. In this case, there is no proof that PRA granted the beneficial use of the
subject reclaimed lands to a taxable entity. There is no showing on record either that PRA leased
the subject reclaimed properties to a private taxable entity.
This exemption should be read in relation to Section 133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits
local governments from imposing "taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities x x x." The Administrative Code allows real
property owned by the Republic to be titled in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the
national government. Such real properties remain owned by the Republic and continue to be
exempt from real estate tax.

Indeed, the Republic grants the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or
instrumentality of the national government. This happens when the title of the real property is
transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as the Republic remains the owner of the real
property. Such arrangement does not result in the loss of the tax exemption, unless "the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." 10
The rationale behind Section 133(o) has also been explained in the case of the Manila
International Airport Authority,11 to wit:
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While
the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local
governments may only exercise such power "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide."
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities,
such power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a
person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater
force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the
exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national
government instrumentality. As this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.:
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the
government itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to
reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by government in the course of its
operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be
construed liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of such agencies.
There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each other, unless a
sound and compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket
to another.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for
rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is
when the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express
language in the law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.
Thus, Section 133 of the Local Government Code states that "unless otherwise provided" in the
Code, local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities. As this Court held in
Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation:
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner
control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments.
"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of
power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of
the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political
subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment
of them." (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what
local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax
as "a tool for regulation." (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42)
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (McCulloch v.
Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it. [Emphases supplied]
The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain,
owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part, as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
Similarly, Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates properties belonging to the State:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. [Emphases supplied]
Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of the public
domain. In the case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development
Corporation,12 the Court held that foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the

public domain and were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to
disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service. The fact that alienable
lands of the public domain were transferred to the PEA (now PRA) and issued land patents or
certificates of title in PEAs name did not automatically make such lands private. This Court also
held therein that reclaimed lands retained their inherent potential as areas for public use or
public service.
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain.
Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In
the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable
lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as
well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private
lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not
automatically make such lands private.13
Likewise, it is worthy to mention Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the Administrative
Code of 1987, thus:
SEC 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Dominion of the Government.(1)The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific
public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.
Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for public use. They are
properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they
are withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources"
and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as
alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or
foreclosure sale.14 Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed
lands by respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are
without basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 8, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 195, Paraaque City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All reclaimed properties owned by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority are hereby declared EXEMPT from real estate taxes. All real
estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by
the City of Paraaque on the subject reclaimed properties; the assailed auction sale, dated April
7, 2003; and the Certificates of Sale subsequently issued by the Paraaque City Treasurer in
favor of the City of Paraaque, are all declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163767, March 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, Petitioner, v.ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof by the applicant in proceedings for the
registration of land under Section 14 (1) and (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
The Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated on January 30, 2004, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 10, 1981 by the erstwhile
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan (now the Regional Trial Court) in Registration Case No.
3446-M granting the application of the respondent for the registration of her title covering a
parcel of land situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan. 2
The respondent filed her application for land registration in the CFI in Bulacan. 3 The jurisdictional
requirements were met when the notice of initial hearing was published in the Official Gazette
for two successive weeks,4 as evidenced by a certification of publication. 5 The notice of initial
hearing was also posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building of Paombong, Bulacan as well as on the property itself. 6On June 2, 1977, at
the initial hearing of the application, Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes interposed an opposition in behalf
of the Director of Lands and the Bureau of Public Works. Upon motion by the respondent and
without objection from Fiscal Reyes, the CFI commissioned the Acting Deputy Clerk of Court to
receive evidence in the presence of Fiscal Reyes.7
The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland with an area of 12,342
square meters known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan, and covered by plan Ap-03001603;8 that the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto Dionisio
since 1907;9 that on May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale, 10 had sold the land to
Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of
the respondent) had inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963, the
respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly, publicly,
uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then; that
the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the taxes due thereon
had been paid, as shown in Official Receipt No. H-7100234. 11
In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes, 12 the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest
Development averred that whatever legal and possessory rights the respondent had acquired by
reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure to
occupy and possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application;13 and that the land applied for, being actually a portion of the Labangan Channel
operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land
registration.14
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed in behalf of the Government an opposition to
the application,15insisting that the land was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan,
as indicated in BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; that areas within the unclassified region
were denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction, control and

authority of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD); 16 and that the CFI did not acquire
jurisdiction over the application considering that: (1) the land was beyond the commerce of
man; (2) the payment of taxes vested no title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer. 17
Ruling of the CFI
On August 10, 1981, the CFI rendered its decision, 18 ordering the registration of the land in favor
of the respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently established her open, public,
continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, to wit:
Since it has been established that the applicants and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
the open, public, continuous, and adverse possession of the said parcel of land in the concept of
an owner for more than thirty (30) years, that it, since 1926 up to the present time, applicant
therefore is entitled to the registration thereof under the provisions od Act No. 496, in relation to
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws.
WHEREFORE, confirming the order of general default issued in this case, the Court hereby orders
the registration of this parcel of land Lot 2633, Cad 297. Case 5, Paombong Cadastre[)]
described in plan Ap-03-001603 (Exhibit D, page 7 of records) and in the technical description
(Exhibit F, page 5 of records) in favor of Rosario de Guzman Vda de Joson, of legal age, Filipino,
widow and resident of Malolos, Bulacan.
After the decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree be issued,
SO ORDERED19.
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court had erred in
granting the application for registration despite the land not being the subject of land
registration due to its being part of the unclassified region denominated as forest land of
Paombong, Bulacan.20
Judgment of the CA
On January 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment, 21 affirming the decision of the
trial court upon the following ratiocination:
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by
the oppositor-appellant and they should serve as proof of the paucity of the claim of the
applicant-appellee over the subject property.
Upon the other hand, oppositor-appellant, in a lackluster fashion, advanced pro forma theories
and arguments in its Opposition which naturally failed to merit any consideration from the court
a quo and also from this Court. The indorsement from the Bureau of Forest Development, San
Fernando, Pampanga to the effect that the subject area is within the unclassified region of
Paombong, Bulacan does not warrant any evidentiary weight since the same had never been
formally offered as evidence by the oppositor-appellant. All the other allegations in the
Opposition field (sic) by the oppositor-appellant failed to persuade this Court as to the veracity
thereof considering that no evidence was ever presented to prove the said allegations.

Such being the case, this Court is not inclined to have the positive proofs of her registrable
rights over the subject property adduced by the applicant-appellee be defeated by the bare and
unsubstantiated allegations of the oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence, the Republic appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS
SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRIVATE ACQUISITION; and
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE COURT OF APPEALS, ERRED IN
GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.23
Ruling
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree state:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court]
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
xxxx
Section 14(1) deals with possession and occupation in the concept of an owner while Section
14(2) involves prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,24 the Court set the guidelines concerning land registration proceedings brought under
these provisions of the Property Registration Decree in order provide clarity to the application
and scope of said provisions.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in her name by alleging that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse
possession of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial. However, the Republic
counters that the land was public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The
determination of the issue hinges on whether or not the land was public; if so, whether the
respondent satisfactorily proved that the land had already been declared as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in

open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of
owner since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic vs. Tsai,25 the Court summarizes the amendments that have shaped the current
phraseology of Section 14(1), to wit:
Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended several times. The Court of
Appeals failed to consider the amendment introduced by PD 1073. In Republic v. Doldol, the
Court provided a summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown
that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity
with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.26
Under Section 14(1), therefore, the respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945, or
earlier.27 It is the applicant who carries the burden of proving that the two requisites have been
met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the application.
The respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite by virtue of her having been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier. She testified on how the land had been passed on to her from her
predecessors-in-interest; and tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale
evidencing the transfer of the property from Mamerto Dionisio to Romualda Jacinto in 1926; 28 (2)
Tax Declaration No. 4547 showing that she had declared the property for taxation purposes in
1976;29 and (3) Official Receipt No. H-7100234 indicating that she had been paying taxes on the
land since 1977.30 The CFI found her possession of the land and that of her predecessors-ininterest to have been open, public, continuous, and adverse in the concept of an owner since
1926 until the present time, or for more than 30 years, entitling her to the registration under the
provisions of Act No. 496, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6236 and other existing laws. 31 On its part, the CA ruled that the documentary and
testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the Republic. 32

Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not discharge her burden to
prove the classification of the land as demanded by the first requisite. She did not present
evidence of the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and disposable by the State.
During trial, she testified that the land was not within any military or naval reservation, and
Frisco Domingo, her other witness, corroborated her. Although the Republic countered that the
verification made by the Bureau of Forest Development showed that the land was within the
unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan as per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927, 33 such
showing was based on the 1st Indorsement dated July 22, 1977 issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development,34which the CA did not accord any evidentiary weight to for failure of the Republic
to formally offer it in evidence. Still, Fiscal Reyes, in the opposition he filed in behalf of the
Government, argued that the land was a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the
Pampanga River Control System, and could not be the subject of appropriation or land
registration. Thus, the respondent as the applicant remained burdened with proving her
compliance with the first requisite.
Belatedly realizing her failure to prove the alienable and disposable classification of the land, the
petitioner attached as Annex A to her appellees brief 35 the certification dated March 8, 2000
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesCommunity Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),36viz:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the parcel of land described on lot 2633 located at San Isidro,
Paombong, Bulacan as shown in the sketch plan surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Carlos G. Reyes
falls within the Alienable or Disposable Land Project No. 19 of Paombong, Bulacan per Land
Classification Map No. 2934 certified on October 15, 1980.
However, in its resolution of July 31, 2000, 37 the CA denied her motion to admit the appellees
brief, and expunged the appellees brief from the records. Seeing another opportunity to make
the certification a part of the records, she attached it as Annex A of her comment here. 38 Yet,
that attempt to insert would not do her any good because only evidence that was offered at the
trial could be considered by the Court.
Even had the respondents effort to insert the certification been successful, the same would
nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito v. Republic, 39 the Court pronounced that a
survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land
still formed part of the inalienable public domain, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable
and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such

presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence,
the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying
solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable.40
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the subject of
appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 41 we explicitly ruled:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.42
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did
not suffice to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a
copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. As the
Court said in Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation: 43
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership
by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that
the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as
alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1)
a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application.
Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration. 44
Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification alone would have sufficed, the
respondents application would still be denied considering that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in 1976. The
certification itself indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on
October 15, 1980. The consequence of this is fittingly discussed in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, to wit:

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals since in
the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable
or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet
two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned
the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, which involved a claim of possession that extended back to
1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza
cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the
attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by
Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots
involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification
Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to
show the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which
is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land...."
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not
err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927.
As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them."
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that
in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been
declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in
Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to
belittle.45(citations omitted)
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired through
prescription may be registered in the owners name. Did the respondent then acquire the land
through prescription considering that her possession and occupation of the land by her and her
predecessors-in-interest could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the nature of their
possession and occupation was that of a bona fide claim of ownership for over 30 years?

Clearly, the respondent did not. Again, Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic is enlightening, to
wit:
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the
State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands
of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public
dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain.
Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from
property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113
provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the
same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth".1wphi1
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter.1wphi1 The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change
the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to
amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. 46

The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessor. As pointedly clarified also in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic: 47
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to
the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive
period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession
before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application
for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as
public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and
justify registration.48
In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land, no matter how
long, was irrelevant because prescription did not operate against the State before then.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on January 30, 2004; DISMISSES the application for land registration of respondent
Rosario de Guzman Vda. De Joson respecting Lot 2633, Cad-297 with a total area of 12,342
square meters, more or less, situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan; and DIRECTS the
respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184371, March 05, 2014

SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the April 30, 2007 decision 2 and
August 22, 2008 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84620. The CA
reversed and set aside the December 29, 2004 decision 4 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Bauang, La Union in LRC Case No. 80-MTC, BgLU, which approved the application of registration
of title of Lot No. 3876, Cad-474-D, Case 17, Bauang Cadastre, filed by the spouses Mario and
Julia Campos (petitioners).
Facts
On November 17, 2003, the petitioners applied for the registration of a 6,904 square meterparcel of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union, particularly described as Lot No. 3876, Cad474-D, Case 17, Bauang Cadastre. The petitioners bought the subject land from Roberto Laigo,
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties on July 26, 1990.
In support of their application, the petitioners presented, among others, the following evidence:
(1) testimony of petitioner Mario Campos; (2) testimony of adjoining lot-owner, Leopoldo
Subang; (3) Linen cloth of Lot 3876 of AP-1-002221, Cad-474-D; (4) Original technical
description of the lot; (5) Certificate of Assessment; (6) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 26,
1990; (7) Certified true copies of Tax declarations for the years 1948 and 1953 in the name of
Margarita Laigo, the mother of Roberto Laigo; (8) Certified true copies of Tax declarations for the
years 1970, 1974, 1980, 1985 and 1987 in the name of Roberto Laigo; (9) Certified true copies
of Tax declarations for the years 1990, 1994, 1995 and 1998 in the names of the petitioners;
(10) Tax receipts for the years 1991-1994, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003 and 2004; and (11)
Certification from the DENR-CENRO that Lot 3876 falls within the alienable or disposable land of
the public domain.5
Only the Republic filed a formal opposition to the petitioners application, which the MTC later
dismissed due to the Republics failure to present testimonial or documentary evidence to
substantiate its grounds for objection.6
On December 29, 2004, the MTC rendered a decision granting the petitioners application for
registration, stating that:
Based on the evidences presented, it is appearing that the applicants have established a
satisfactory proof that they have a registrable title over the property subject of these
proceedings, they, being qualified to own that land being Filipino citizens, it being established
also that their possession and that of their predecessor-in-interest of the parcel of land subject
of this application have been open, continuous, exclusive and adverse against the whole world
for more than fifty-six (56) years since the oldest documentary evidence, Tax Declaration No.
235 series of 1948 and in the name of Margarita Laigo shows that Margarita Laigo, mother of
Roberto Laigo from whom the applicants bought this land subject of this case, has owned it
since 1948. Besides, witness Leopoldo Subang, the owner of the land adjacent to this land
subject of this case, confirmed that their possession was probably before 1948 because he

knows Roberto Laigo as the present owner of the land when he sold it to the applicants; and that
this property was originally owned by Margarita Laigo, mother of Roberto Laigo. Hence, this
Court conclusively presumes that Margarita Laigo was the original owner even before the
Second World War.7
The Republic appealed to the CA on the ground that the MTC erred in granting the petitioners
application for registration because of discrepancies in the area of the subject land as applied
for and indicated in the tax declarations and the parties deed of sale. Also, discrepancies in the
description of the subject land appeared in the tax declarations, as the land was sometimes
described as "swampy" and, in others, "sandy."
The CA, in its assailed April 30, 2007 decision, reversed and set aside the MTCs decision and
dismissed the petitioners application for registration of title. It ruled that, contrary to the MTCs
findings, the evidence failed to prove the nature and duration of the petitioners possession and
that of their predecessors-in-interest; that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse
possession of Lot 3876 since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The CA further held that the petitioners failed to establish when the subject land became
alienable; that while the DENR-CENRO La Union certified that "Lot 3876 falls within the Alienable
and Disposable land of the Public Domain as per Project No. 9, L.C. Map No. 3330 of Bauang
Cadastre as certified on January 21, 1987," such certification (as annotated in the lots Advance
Plan) was inadequate to prove that the subject land was classified as alienable and disposable
on said date.
Lastly, the CA noted the discrepancies in the area of the subject land indicated in the tax
declarations and deed of sale presented by the petitioners, which put in doubt the lots identity.
It held that:
xxx, insufficient identification of the land claimed in absolute ownership by the applicant cannot
ripen into ownership. Lot 3876 consists of 6,904 square meters, as shown in the tax declarations
for 1994 and 1996, whereas the tax declarations for 1948, 1953 and 1970 cover a parcel of land
consisting of 4,502 square meters. Besides, the Deed of Absolute Sale and tax declarations
covering the years 1980 until 1987, inclusive, pertain to a land with an area of 4,512 square
meters.8 (Citation omitted)
The petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision but the CA denied their motion in a
resolution dated August 22, 2008, hence, the filing of the present petition for review for
certiorari with this Court.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners argue that the CA erred in ruling on non-issues and on
established and undisputed facts that were not raised by the Republic as errors in its appeal;
that the sole issue raised by the Republic was merely on the discrepancies on the area and
description of the subject land as indicated in the documents and evidence presented, which
issue the petitioners already addressed in their appeal brief before the CA.
The petitioners maintain that they have presented sufficient evidence to show the nature and
duration of their possession and the fact that they had possessed and cultivated the land sought
to be registered.

Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as the CA committed no reversible error in dismissing the
petitioners application for registration of title.
First, we address the procedural issue raised by the petitioners. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.1avvphi1
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those
errors assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances.
As exceptions to the rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in
instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors
within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to
serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely related to the assigned error/s; and
(6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose determination is necessary to rule on the
question/s properly assigned as errors.9 The present case falls into the exceptions.
We find no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the petitioners
possession and on the alienable character of the subject land. These issues were apparently not
raised by the Republic in its appeal before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the
petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. In Mendoza v. Bautista, 10 the Court held
that the appellate court reserves the right, resting on its public duty, to take cognizance of
palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, and to notice errors that are obvious
upon inspection and are of a controlling character, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice
due to oversight.1wphi1
In deciding on the merits of the present petition, we affirm the CA in dismissing the petitioners'
application for registration of title.
Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14( 1) of Presidential Decree No.
152911 must prove: (1) that the land sought to be registered forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.12
As the CA did, we find that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The
oldest documentary evidence presented by the petitioners was a 1948 tax declaration over the
subject land in the name of Margarita Laigo. The petitioners failed to present evidence of their
possession prior to 1948. In fact, the petitioners, in their application for registration, base their

possession of the subject land only from 1948, and not "since June 12, 1945, or earlier" as
required by law.
We emphasize that since the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 13 on January 25, 1977, it must be shown
that possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, which totally conforms
to the requirement under Section 14(1) of P.D. No 1529. A mere showing of possession and
occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer sufficient. 14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM the April 30, 2007
decision and August 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84620.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF
FISHERIES (ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF
SUPERINTENDENT,Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, NAMELY: SALVACION L.
SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN,
JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New
Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National
College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R.
Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful
heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
containing an approximate area of FIFTY[]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square
meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the
North by Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and
on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L.
Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against
Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent),
for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages.
Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231square meterportion of the property they inherited had
been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel
of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was
the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551
hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private respondents alleged
property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent
furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible
of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio
Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by
Ricardo Andres, then the designated OfficerinCharge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of firstlevel courts. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of
land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now
Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit B),
and then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa
palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.

In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by
ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin
asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an
owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF.
To prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was
in the year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and
possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of
the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under
Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for
the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in
question when the same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount
of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the
possession of the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of
Php10,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs of this suit. 3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. LL)
shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified
as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh. 4D). The MCTC observed that the phrase
Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415 was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF
established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. 6), indicating that the disputed land is an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals4where it was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public
land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving
certain lands, and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously
acquired in such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right
of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or
appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from
the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there
are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their
and their predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo
Andres from the payment of damages and attorneys fees. All other details of the appealed
decision are affirmed in toto.5

The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private
individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the
court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings.
The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no
showing on record that he acted with malice or in bad faith in the implementation of
Proclamation No. 2074.6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the
new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition
for Review. The petition was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack
of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands
adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have
been issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the
subject land was agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in
1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject
property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15,
1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960.
Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over
the disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property
had been privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a timberland. This
being the case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the State, albeit an
imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come under the
meaning of private rights under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from
the mass of civil reservation granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING
RESPONDENTS CLAIM TO SUPPOSED PRIVATE RIGHTS OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE
DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation
No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of
Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College
of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate
area of 24.0551 hectares, situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan,
Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR203, x x x [.] 9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private
rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation
thereon. Theprivate right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly
acquired by possession of the subject property, through their predecessorsininterest, for 30
years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree.

Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated respondents complaint for recovery of
possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded
to determine if respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessorsininterest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessorsininterest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was
alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to show competent evidence
that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said
year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly
recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the
same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as
tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 382 was issued to implement Proclamation No.
1801. The respondentsclaimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 382 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes. The respondents claim that through their predecessorsininterest, they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this
Court, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twentyeight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). Petitionerclaimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging
that it infringed on their prior vested right over portions of Boracay which they allege to have
possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition for review
concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 382.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine visvis the right of the claimants to lands they
claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8
of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim)
is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,
or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that,
prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such wellnigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or

reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 14 (Emphases in the original; citations
omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence
that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960
does not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date.
On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such
was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea
Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the
same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied,
citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in disagreement
as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be
a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the
alleged possession by them and by their predecessorsininterest is inconsequential and could
never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the
courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390)
for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions
of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from
the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by
respondents isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.