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G.R.No.L44546

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.L44546January29,1988
RUSTICOADILLE,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS,EMETERIAASEJO,TEODORICAASEJO,DOMINGOASEJO,
JOSEFAASEJOandSANTIAGOASEJO,respondents.

SARMIENTO,J.:
Inissuehereinarepropertyandpropertyrights,afamiliarsubjectofcontroversyandawellspringofenormous
conflict that has led not only to protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like
strainedrelationshipsandeventheforfeitureoflives.Itisaquestionthatlikewisereflectsatragiccommentaryon
prevailingsocialandculturalvaluesandinstitutions,where,asoneobservernotes,wealthanditsaccumulation
are the basis of selffulfillment and where property is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his
property," says this modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody that
threatenshispossessionswillarousehismostpassionateenmity."1
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values the burden of reconstructing the social
orderisshoulderedbythepoliticalleadershipandthepeoplethemselves.
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief
pursuanttothedecreeoflaw.
Theantecedentfactsarequotedfromthedecision2appealedfrom:
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...[T]helandinquestionLot14694ofCadastralSurveyofAlbaylocatedinLegaspiCitywithanarea
of some 11,325 sq. m. originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property she
marriedtwiceinherlifetimethefirst,withoneBernabeAdille,withwhomshehadasanonlychild,
hereindefendantRusticoAdilleinhersecondmarriagewithoneProcopioAsejo,herchildrenwere
hereinplaintiffs,now,sometimein1939,saidFelisasoldthepropertyinpactoderetrotocertain
3rdpersons,periodofrepurchasebeing3years,butshediedin1942withoutbeingabletoredeem
andafterherdeath,butduringtheperiodofredemption,hereindefendantrepurchased,byhimself
alone,andafterthat,heexecutedadeedofextrajudicialpartitionrepresentinghimselftobetheonly
heirandchildofhismotherFelisawiththeconsequencethathewasabletosecuretitleinhisname
alonealso,sothatOCT.No.21137inthenameofhismotherwastransferredtohisname,thatwas
in 1955 that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his halfbrothers and sisters,
herein plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a
trusteeonanimpliedtrustwhenheredeemed,andthisistheevidence,butasitalsoturnedoutthat
oneofplaintiffs,EmeteriaAsejowasoccupyingaportion,defendantcounterclaimedforhertovacate
that,
Wellthen,afterhearingtheevidence,trialJudgesustaineddefendantinhispositionthathewasand
becameabsoluteowner,hewasnotatrustee,andtherefore,dismissedcaseandalsocondemned
plaintiffoccupant,Emeteriatovacateitisbecauseofthisthatplaintiffshavecomehereandcontend
thattrialcourterredin:
I....declaringthedefendantabsoluteowneroftheproperty
II....notorderingthepartitionofthepropertyand
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III....orderingoneoftheplaintiffswhoisinpossessionoftheportionofthepropertytovacatethe
land,p.1Appellant'sbrief.
whichcanbereducedtosimplequestionofwhetherornotonthebasisofevidenceandlaw,judgmentappealed
fromshouldbemaintained.3
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The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, 4 and ruled for the plaintiffsappellants, the private
respondentsherein.Thepetitionernowappeals,bywayofcertiorari,fromtheCourt'sdecision.

We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having given due course to the petition,
directed the parties to file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private respondents
havingfailedtofileone,wedeclaredthecasesubmittedfordecision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a coowner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in
common?
Essentially,itisthepetitioner'scontentionthatthepropertysubjectofdisputedevolveduponhimuponthefailure
ofhiscoheirstojoinhiminitsredemptionwithintheperiodrequiredbylaw.HereliesontheprovisionsofArticle
1515oftheoldCivilArticle1613ofthepresentCode,givingthevendeearetrotherighttodemandredemptionof
theentireproperty.
Thereisnomeritinthispetition.
Therightofrepurchasemaybeexercisedbyacoownerwithaspecttohissharealone. 5Whiletherecordsshow
thatthepetitionerredeemedthepropertyinitsentirety,shoulderingtheexpensestherefor,thatdidnotmakehimtheowner
ofallofit.Inotherwords,itdidnotputtoendtheexistingstateofcoownership.

Necessary expenses may be incurred by one coowner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the
remainingcoowners.6Thereisnodoubtthatredemptionofpropertyentailsanecessaryexpense.UndertheCivilCode:
ART. 488. Each coowner shall have a right to compel the other coowners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicialtothecoownership.
Theresultisthatthepropertyremainstobeinaconditionofcoownership.Whileavendeearetro,underArticle
1613oftheCode,"maynotbecompelledtoconsenttoapartialredemption,"theredemptionbyonecoheiror
coowner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co
ownerstoredeemitentitlesthevendeearetrotoretainthepropertyandconsolidatetitletheretoinhisname. 7
Buttheprovisiondoesnotgivetotheredeemingcoownertherighttotheentireproperty.Itdoesnotprovideforamodeof
terminatingacoownership.

Neitherdoesthefactthatthepetitionerhadsucceededinsecuringtitleovertheparcelinhisnameterminatethe
existingcoownership.Whilehishalfbrothersandsistersare,aswesaid,liabletohimforreimbursementasand
for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Registrationofpropertyisnotameansofacquiringownership.Itoperatesasamerenoticeofexistingtitle,that
is,ifthereisone.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. The Civil
Codestates:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. The
petitioner'spretensionthathewasthesoleheirtothelandintheaffidavitofextrajudicialsettlementheexecuted
preliminarytotheregistrationthereofbetraysacleareffortonhisparttodefraudhisbrothersandsistersandto
exercisesoledominionovertheproperty.Theaforequotedprovisionthereforeapplies.
ItistheviewoftherespondentCourtthatthepetitioner,intakingovertheproperty,didsoeitheronbehalfofhis
coheirs,inwhichevent,hehadconstitutedhimselfanegotiorumgestorunderArticle2144oftheCivilCode,or
for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents
being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the
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petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co
heirs.Hecannotthereforebesaidtohaveassumethemeremanagementofthepropertyabandonedbyhisco
heirs,thesituationArticle2144oftheCodecontemplates.Inanycase,astherespondentCourtitselfaffirms,the
result would be the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private
respondents,hiscoheirs.
ThisCourtisnotunawareofthewellestablishedprinciplethatprescriptionbarsanydemandonproperty(owned
in common) held by another (coowner) following the required number of years. In that event, the party in
possessionacquirestitletothepropertyandthestateofcoownershipisended. 8Inthecaseatbar,theproperty
was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents was presented in
1974.Hasprescriptionthen,setin?

We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership, must have been
precededbyrepudiation(ofthecoownership).Theactofrepudiation,inturnissubjecttocertainconditions:(1)a
coowner repudiates the coownership (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co
owners (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionofthepropertyfortheperiodrequiredbylaw.9
Theinstantcaseshowsthatthepetitionerhadnotcompliedwiththeserequisites.Wearenotconvincedthathe
hadrepudiatedthecoownershiponthecontrary,hehaddeliberatelykepttheprivaterespondentsinthedarkby
feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his
efforts to deny the coownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a
portionofthelanduptothepresent,yet,thepetitionerhasnottakenpainstoejecthertherefrom.Asamatterof
fact,hesoughttorecoverpossessionofthatportionEmeteriaisoccupyingonlyasacounterclaim,andonlyafter
theprivaterespondentshadfirstsoughtjudicialrelief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, 10 but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. 11 It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the longstanding rule that
registrationoperatesasauniversalnoticeoftitle.

For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974 over the estate
registeredin1955.Whileactionstoenforceaconstructivetrustprescribesintenyears, 12reckonedfromthedate
oftheregistrationoftheproperty, 13we,aswesaid,arenotpreparedtocounttheperiodfromsuchadateinthiscase.We
note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentationinhisunilateralaffidavitofextrajudicialsettlementthatheis"theonlyheirandchildofhismotherFeliza
withtheconsequencethathewasabletosecuretitleinhisnamealso." 14Accordingly,weholdthattherightoftheprivate
respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioner's act of defraudation. 15 According to the
respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the litigation." 16 Hence,
prescriptionisnotabar.

Moreover,andasarule,prescriptionisanaffirmativedefensethatmustbepleadedeitherinamotiontodismiss
or in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived, 17 and here, the petitioner never raised that defense. 18 There are
recognizedexceptionstothisrule,butthepetitionerhasnotshownwhytheyapply.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is
DENIED.TheDecisionsoughttobereviewedisherebyAFFIRMEDintoto.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED,
Yap(Chairman),MelencioHerrera,ParasandPadilla,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1GREENE,FELIX,THEENEMY234(1971).
2Gatmaitan,Magno,ActingPres.J.Domondon,SixtoandReyes,Samuel,JJ.,Concurring.
3Rollo,1415.
4Solidum,Arsenic,PresidingJudge,CourtofFirstInstanceofAlbayCivilCaseno,5029.
5CIVILCODE,art.1612CIVILCODE(1889),art.1514.

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6Supra,art.489.
7Supra,art.1607.
8Themodesofterminatingacoownershipotherthanbyprescriptionarepartition(CIVILCODE,
arts.4941079,1082),mergerorconsolidation,andlossofthething(3Manresa486).
9Santosv.HeirsofCrisostomo,41Phil.3342(1921)Bargayov.Camumot,40Phil.857(1920).
10Pres.DecreeNo.1529,sec.31.
11Amerolv.Bagumbaran,G.R.No.33261,September30,1987.
12Supra.
13Geronav.DeGuzman,No.L19060,May29,1964,11SCRA153(1964).
14Rollo,id.,14,
15Geronav.DeGuzman,supra.
16Rollo,id.,18.
17RULESOFCOURT,Rule9,sec.2.Apartyneednotpleadthestatuteoflimitationsina
responsivepleading(ormotiontodismiss)wherethecomplaintitselfshowsthattheclaimshave
prescribed[Ferrerv.Ericta,No.L41767,August23,1978,84SCRA705(1978)].Likewise,ithas
beenheldthatwherethedefendanthadnowayofknowingthattheclaimadvancedbytheplaintiff
hadprescribed,hisfailuretoinvokethestatute(inhisanswerormotiontodismiss)doesnot
constituteawaiverofsuchadefense[Guanzov.Ramirez,32Phil.492(1914)].Inanothercase,we
saidthatprescriptionneednotbepleadedspecificallyinananswerwheretheevidenceitselfshows
thatprescriptionbarstheplaintiff'sclaims[PhilippineNationalBankv.Perez,No.L20412,February
28,1966,16SCRA270(1966)seealsoChuaLankov.Dioso,97[Phil.821(1955)Philippine
NationalBankv.PacificCommissionHouse,No.L22675,March28,1969,27SCRA766(1969)].
18Rollo,id.,18.
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