The Chilla Review, Vol. 4, No.

2 (Fall 2004), 81-97

Lessons for Mainland China from

Anti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong
Melanie Manion

Abstract
Hong Kong, with its government ranked among the "cleanest" in the
world, presents an excellent example of successful anti-corruption

reform. Its experience offers four general lessons for ongoing anti
corruption effofts in mainland China. First, by creating a powerful
independent anti-corruption agency, the government clearly signalled its
commitment to anti-conuption enforcement. Second, the anti-comIption
agency achieved major enforcement successes quickly and publicized
them widely to consolidate irs reputation. Third, it accompanied
enforcement with broad public education, reaching out to the community
in innovative ways. Fourth, it studied government work procedures and
proposed measures to reduce incentives for corruption in institutional
design. Flaws in anti-corruption reform in mainland China are
illuminated by the contrast with the Hong Kong experience. First, leaders
in Beijing have responded to conuption with ambivalent signals, creating
two anti-corruption agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and an
unclear division of labour. Second, with routine enforcement
handicapped by agency design, leaders have launched intensive ami-

Melanie MANION is Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs at the

University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her previous work examines the nomenklatura
system. cadre retirement, and village electoral democratization. Work on anti
corruption reform includes Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in
Mainland China and Hong Kong (Harvard University Press, 2004). She is
currently studying reforms in local government formation, specifically in
communist party vetting of prospective leaders and people's congress delegate
nomination of candidates for deputy leadership pOSitions in indirect elections.

Melanie Manion

82

corruption campaigns that denigrate the law at the same time as they
empha<;ize "punishment according to law." Third. until recently, mainland
Chinese efforts have neglected institutional design and corruption
prevention. Essentially, they have yet (0 "tie their hands" [Q signal to

ordinary citizens a credible commitment to anti-corruption refonn.

Since the early 1980s, the abuse of public office for private gain in
mainland China has grown in both scope and severity. More than two
decades of anti-conuption reform measures have not brought the problem
under control or significantly changed public perceptions of conuption as
widespread. Leaders in Beijing have acknowledged that conuption is more
serious than at any time since the communists won power in 1949. The

contrast with Hong Kong, which experienced its own widespread

conuption in the 1960s, is striking. With its government ranked among the
"cleanest" in the world today, Hong Kong offers mainland China perhaps
the best example anywhere of successful anti-corruption reform. To be
sure, despite a shared Chinese language and culture, the contextual
differences between tiny Hong Kong and mainland China are huge. The
state in mainland China continues to playa major role in the economy, the
communist regime projects an instrumental orientation to rule of law, and

civil liberties on the mainland are notably absent. Can mainland China
learn anti-corruption reform lessons from Hong Kong? This article
concludes that the Hong Kong experience offers four useful lessons for
mainland China, despite fundamental differences in context, but that
mainland anti-corruption reformers are unlikely to embrace all of these
lessons.

I begin with a brief description contrasting corruption in mainland

China today with the relatively clean government of Hong Kong. [ then
review the anti-corruption experience of Hong Kong and summarize
lessons this experience has to offer mainland China. An examination of

anti-corruption efforts in mainland China follows. This illuminates

weaknesses in orientation as well as a rejection of policy instruments

integral

to

anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong. [ conclude by noting a

recent reorientation of tactics by mainland Chinese reformers, but argue

that contextual limitations will probably prevent a reorientation of strategy.

Contrasting Mainland China and Hong Kong Today

The distinction between corruption in mainland China and clean

Lessons jor Mainland Chinajrom Ami-corruption Rejonn in Hong Kong

83

government in Hong Kong cannot be summarized in a single number, but

it is nonetheless useful as a point of departure to note the huge differences
in perceived corruption reflected in scores compiled by the non
governmental watchdog organization Transparency International. On a
ten-point scale, with higher scores signifying perceptions of cleaner
government, Hong Kong has averaged 7.6 in the 1995-2002 period, about
the same as many established liberal democracies, including the United
States. In Asia, only Singapore ranks higher. Mainland China, by contrast,
has averaged 3.1 over the same period. I Corruption in mainland China
exploded in the early 1980s. Although its real magnitude is difficult to
quantify, its significant growth in volume is quite clear.' It appears to
extend to practically every sort of official activity in every sector. Common
forms include bribery and illegal commissions,' the use of public funds as
private capital,' and asset-stripping in state-owned enterprises.' Recent
years have seen a trend towards increased corruption in law enforcement
and the judiciary.' Much corruption in recent decades does appear,
however, to occur in enterprises and involves people who would not be
considered public officials in capitalist economies.' Corruption has
typically been associated with policies that unleashed rapid changes in the
political economy after 1978'
The relatively clean government in Hong Kong that Transparency
International has documented is the product of a significant and sustained
anti-corruption effort. Widespread corruption and the beliefs that
accompany it were characteristic of Hong Kong in the 1960s and probably
many decades before then. 9 Corruption was most serious in the police
force, taking the form of syndicated corruption W A major obstacle to a
credible anti-corruption effort was structural: the Anti-Corruption Office
(ACO), charged with fighting corruption, was a specialized unit of the
police force. In mid-1973, a wave of public protests erupted when a senior
expatriate police officer under investigation for corruption escaped to
England. His escape and the public outcry it ignited were the catalyst for a
major anti-corruption reform.

Anti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong

The crucial first step in a solution to the immediate crisis in mid-1973 and
the longer-term problem of widespread corruption was the creation of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), an anti-corruption
agency independent of the police force and civil service, accountable

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Melanie Manion

solely to the Governor, with its commissioner appointed by and reponing

directly to the Governor. In creating the ICAC, the Governor signalled his
recognition of the public confidence problem posed by an anti-corruption
agency based in the police force, the government department widely
perceived as the most corrupt in the territory. This argument is what Blair
Kerr characterized as the "political and psychological" rationale for an
independent agency." The structural change was aimed not only at better
enforcement but also at producing a shift in public perceptions, to
challenge the prevalent view about government complacency.
We have good evidence that this shift in perceptions did in fact occur.
A comparison of reported corruption in 1973 and 1974 reflects huge
differences in public confidence in the ACO and ICAe. These differences
show up before the (CAC began actually to engage in anti-corruption
work: In 1973 a total of 1,457 reports of corruption were registered with
the ACO, not much different from the previous few years, but reports of
corruption to the ICAC in 1974 were more than double that, totalling 3,189
reports. 12

A Three-Pronged Anti-corruption Strategy

To realize anti-corruption success, the ICAC developed a three-pronged
strategy, reflected in its internal structure." The Operations Depanment
carries out enforcement to discover and investigate corruption and
prmecute the corrupt. The Community Relations Department imple
ments education to inform the public of the role of the ICAC, spread
knowledge of anti-corruption laws, mobilize the public to report
corruption, and raise the moral costs of corrupt actions. The Corruption
Prevention Department works on institutional design to reduce
opportunities for corruption.

Enforcement
The top ICAC priority in the mid-1970s was enforcement. This reflected a
realistic assessment of the scope of corruption and the state of public
opinion. [CAe Commissioner Cater argued that the momentum of initial
community support for the ICAC, shown by the increase in reported
corruption, could best be maintained by prosecuting "a satisfactory
volume" of corrupt offenders. [~ Early success in enforcement was seen as
key to maintaining anti-corruption momentum because it was required to

Lessons for Mainland China from Anti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong

85

transform the view that widespread corruption was an unchangeable

feature in Hong Kong government and society.

The legal bases for ICAC action are represented in three laws: the
Corrupt and l1legal Practices Ordinance (10 June 1955)," the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance (14 May 1971),16 and the Independent Commission
Against Corruption Ordinance (15 February 1974)17 Most enforcement
powers of the ICAC derive from the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.
Corruption includes offering an advantage to a public servant, soliciting or
accepting (by a public servant) an advantage, and possession (by a public
servant) of unexplained income or propeny. The law is quite clear about
what constitutes an advantage. J8 The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance
gives the ICAC extraordinary powers. ICAC investigators can make arrests
without warrant for all offences described in the three laws. If, in the course
of investigating any offences under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
investigators discover any other criminal offence reasonably suspected of
being connected with the bribery offence, they have full powers of arrest
without warrant for this related offence too. ICAC investigators have
powers of search, seizure, and detention of anything believed to be
evidence of offences for which they have powers of arrest. They have
special powers of investigation - to examine bank accounts, to question
people under oath, and to restrict the disposal of property during an
investigation. They may carry firearms in situations considered dangerous.
The ICAC has its own detention facilities.
In the mid-1970s, the Operations Depanment scrambled to respond to
public repons of corruption and did not take the offensive. An exception
was the high priority attached to "big tigers." Godher, the corrupt
expatriate police officer whose escape had catalysed the creation of the
ICAC. was extradited and successfully prosecuted in a dramatic and highly
puhlicized trial."
At the end of 1975, with over 400 officers, many with significant
investigative experience, the Operations Department took the initiative
against syndicated police corruption. The syndicates were an obvious
target because they provoked public outrage, but also because large corrupt
syndicates are easier to investigate than the "satisfied customer" corruption
that involves only two panies, neither with any incentive to repon to the
authorities. The ICAC found the weak links in the chain and offered
reduced punishment in return for trial evidence against other members. By
mid-1977, the ICAC Commissioner reported that "no major syndicates
were known to exist. ,,20

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Melanie Manion

Education

The Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance charges the

ICAC commissioner to "educate the public against the evils of corruption"
and "enlist and foster public support" in fighting corruption. Anti
corruption education involves four closely related responsibilities: (I) to
publicize the ICAC and its reliability, (2) to educate ordinary citizens about
the legal notion of corruption, (3) to mobilize the community and public
officials to report corruption to the ICAC, and (4) to increase the
internalized moral costs and social disapproval of corrupt activities. The
responsibilities entailed in public education point to the interdependence of
enforcement, education, and institutional design.

Initially, the first responsibility was the most urgent, not only because
the ICAC was a completely new agency but also because of the public
perception of corruption in its predecessor agency. To maintain the
goodwill of the community, evidenced in the increase in reported
corruption in 1974, the ICAC had to prove it could meet the high
expectations of ordinary Chinese. The Operations Department worked to
achieve some impressive results swiftly. A top priority of the Community
Relations Department was to draw public attention to these enforcement
successes, with press releases, press briefings, and monitoring of media
coverage. Through early publicity that gave examples of the reliability of
the ICAC in anti-corruption enforcement, community relations officers

attempted to change ideas about what was possible. The Community

Relations Department also produced television dramas, radio call-in
shows, posters, and public announcements to educate people about the
ICAC. Community liaison officers established personal contact with the
mass public to explain ICAC aims in meetings with corrununity groups, in
door-ta-door visits, in visits to factories and schools, and in chats with

individual hawkers, taxi drivers, bus drivers, small shopkeepers, and

mainland immigrants.
The second aspect of anti-corruption education, educating ordinary
Chinese about what constitutes corruption, was as crucial as the first in the
mid-1970s. The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance was fairly new. Most
ordinary Chinese were unfamiliar with the nuances of the law, and
corruption in law enforcement meant knowledge of the law was not
practically relevant in any case. Also, no Chinese version of the relevant
laws existed. The Corrununity Relations Department quickly printed and
disseminated leaflets explaining the legal notion of bribery offences. The

Lessonsfor Mainland China from Anti-corruption Refoml in Hong Kong

87

department also produced short television programmes that described

features of anti-corruption law.
The third responsibility depended on success in the first two, but the
relationship between the three was complex and reciprocal. Mobilizing the
community to report corruption was especially important in the early years,
when the Operations Department depended on reports because it lacked the
resources and experience to take the offensive against corruption.
Obviously, unless ordinary Chinese believed the lCAC would in fact take
effective action, they would not be inclined to report corruption. Moreover,
unless they understood the legal basis for anti-corruption action, they
might fail to report activities not recognized as corruption. In sum,
mobilization of the community to report corruption in the early years was
largely a by-product of highly publicized enforcement success and gains in
public knowledge about the laws against corruption. The Community
Relations Department also engaged in direct mobilization efforts.
The most ambitious ICAC educational role is the fourth, which aims to
increase the moral costs and promote social disapproval of corrupt actions.
This entails moral education to change values and their social expression.
The Community Relations Department developed teaching kits that
quickly became the most widely used of all moral education materials in
the territory. It put in place a programme of liaison with schools. It served
on curriculum development committees and worked with instructors to
find areas where anti-corruption messages could be relevant in courses.
Institutional Design

The idea of corruption prevention developed from "an assessment that it

was the working environment of many civil servants which not only
provided the opportunity for malpractice, but virtually encouraged the
weak and greedy to be corrupt."21 The Corruption Prevention Department
examines government work practices and methods to discover corrupt
practices and the procedures conducive to corruption. The purpose is to
propose a new design for the organization of work that reduces incentives
to corruption.
Corruption prevention work was unique in concept at the time the
lCAC was established. A standard practice was developed for
"conventional studies" of design flaws in the organization of work in
government departments. After studying the situation, corruption
prevention analysts prepared a report describing opportunities for

Melanie Maniun

88

corruption and recommending remedial measures. The report wa.s

discussed in some detail with the client department, so as to gain agreement
to implement recommendations. If agreement was reached and the
recommendations put in place, corruption prevention analysts returned to

the client department after a short time to monitor implementation and

assess effectiveness. At the same time, they checked that the changes had
not produced new opportunities for corruption. By 1985, the ICAC had
completed one thousand such studies.
Corruption prevention analysts also offered external training in
corruption prevention, organizing sessions in government departments
at the managerial level to teach supervisory accountability in the context of

countering corruption and at lower levels to help junior officials recognize

specific corruption-related problems in their work, to teach them how to
avoid and discourage offers of bribes, and to inform them about actions to
take if bribes are offered.
Perhaps the most interesting and effective aspect of corruption
prevention is consultation at the stage of policy formulation or legislative
drafting. Under this arrangement, the government department that
originates legislation seeks the advice of the Corruption Prevention
Department so that analysts there can advise, especially on whether there
has been an adequate assessment of enforcement capability in terms of
resources in the agencies responsible for implementing the proposed
legislation. This work aims to pre-empt the creation of corruption
opportunities. It is institutional design in the most fundamental sense:
Corruption prevention analysts participate in initial design of procedures,
policies, and legislation. They bring to this a specialized knowledge and a
single concern -

implications for corruption.

Generalizable Lessons from Hong Kong

Four broadly generalizable anti-corruption reform lessons are suggested by

the experience of Hong Kong. First, the Governor of Hong Kong sent a
clear signal about a major government shift: He explicitly acknowledged
corruption as a serious problem and he created a powerful new anti

corruption agency, outside the police force and answerable solely to him,
to resolve the fundamental structural obstacle to reliable anti-corruption
enforcement. The mass public cooperated with the ICAC by reporting
corruption. responding to it even before it had earned its reputation for

reliability. Second, of course, the ICAC used its draconian powers to

Lessons/or Mainland China/rom Anti-corruption Re/orm in Hong Kong

89

consolidate its reputation with early well-publicized enforcement successes

-- catching and prosecuting "big tigers" and targeting syndicated
corruption in the police force. Corrupt officials quickly revised
expectations about corrupt pay-offs and changed their behaviours
accordingly. In turn, ordinary citizens revised expectations about the
volume and severity of corruption. In time, they no longer viewed
corruption as routine. 22 Third, enforcement was accompanied by a broad

anti-corruption public education effort that reached out to the community

in innovative ways: teaching the mass public the legal connotation of
corruption, publicizing enforcement successes and thereby strengthening
ICAC credibility, and advertising the ease with which corrupt acts can be
reported. Education also included an effort, targeted at youth, to transfonn
public morality. Fourth, the ICAC studied the organization of work
procedures in government and recommended specific measures to reduce
incentives for corruption inherent in institutional design. It also vetted
arrangements proposed in new legislation to consider their implications for
corruption.

The first three lessons in this broad strategy of enforcement, education,

and institutional design point directly to the importance of transforming
mass public perceptions and mobilizing community cooperation to reduce
corruption. The fourth lesson is the least well appreciated component of
anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong. Yet, reducing the underlying
incentives for corrupt acts is essential to the goal of controlling corruption
for the long term."

Anti-corruption Reform in Mainland China

Since the late 1970s. mainland Chinese leaders have adopted policies
designed to unleash the potential for significant and sustained economic
growth. At the same time, they have acknowledged the less desirable by
products of a rapidly changing political economy, including the growth of
corruption. The broad struggle against corruption in mainland China has
been characterized by routine enforcement by party and government
agencies. but dominated by the communist party, and intermittent anti
corruption campaigns.

Two Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdictions

In the late I970s, mainland Chinese leaders reinstated two organizations.

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Melanie Manion

abolished during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, that became the
main specialized anti-corruption agencies of the party and government. At
the top of the hierarchy of communist party discipline inspection
committees is the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (COle) in
Beijing, under the Central Committee. Below the CDIC are discipline
inspection committees under the dual leadership of party committees at the
provincial, municipal, and county levels respectively and discipline
inspection committees one level up. Grassroots discipline inspection
committees operate in rural villages, urban neighbourhoods, and basic
level workplaces. Ad hoc discipline inspection groups can be dispatched
by the COIC to party or government departments at the centre, as needed.
Discipline inspection committees were reinstated to combat problems of
inappropriate workstyle, in the broadest sense. In 1982, leaders in Beijing
put the struggle against economic crime at the top of priorities for the party,
and discipline inspection committees soon assumed a role that grew
throughout the next two decades: as the party anti-corruption agency."
Procuratorates extend from Beijing down three levels of government
but do not exist at the grassroots. At the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy,
the Supreme People's Procuratorate is accountable to the National
People's Congress. At lower levels, procuratorates are accountable to local
people's congresses at the same level and the procuratorate one level up.
The 1979 Criminal Procedure Law and regulations issued in the two
decades after 1979 give procurators exclusive authority to investigate and
prosecute more than two dozen specific crimes involving officials,
including major economic crimes such as bribery, embezzlement of public
assets, misuse of public funds, possession of unexplained assets, and tax
evasion. 25 Although investigation and prosecution of criminal corruption is

not the only function of procuratorates, it has been the main focus of their
work since the early 1980s.
In principle, there is a division of labour between party discipline
inspection committees and government procuratorates. The party agencies
investigate violations of party discipline, most of which are not so serious
as to constitute crimes. The government agencies investigate crimes
involving officials, most of whom are party members. In practice,
however, the division of labour is not clear because investigatory
jurisdictions overlap. To begin with. the criminal nature of economic
transgressions is not always readily apparent at the beginning of party
agency investigations. Also, economic crimes are at the same time
violations of party discipline. This means that party agencies have a

Lessons for Mainland China from Anti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong

91

legitimate professional interest in economic offences, including economic

crimes, committed by communist party members. Insofar as corruption is
concerned, the investigatory jurisdiction of procuratorates is practically a

subset of that of discipline inspection committees."

The party has its own set of punishments for violations of party
discipline. These range from warning, serious warning, dismissal from
party positions, probation within the party. and expulsion from the party.
Expulsion. the harshest punishment. is nonetheless mild compared to the
chief criminal punishments for corruption: imprisonment and the death
penalty.
As party discipline inspection committees are located at the grassroots
and have a broader investigatory jurisdiction, sequencing gives party
agencies the advantage of initiative in investigations and punishments. 27
Despite numerous documents promoting joint investigations, discipline
inspection committees routinely pursue investigations to completion
before turning cases over to procuratorates. This delay can be detrimental
to criminal investigation and prosecution. More serious is the failure of
party agencies to define violations as crimes. This results in the
punishment of crimes of corruption with milder penalties for violations of
party discipline. Party committee generalist leaders, who exercise main
leadership in the dual leadership arrangement over party discipline
inspectors, have the specific and general powers to make or break
investigations of official misconduct, including crimes. A driving force
behind the substitution of party penalties for criminal punishments appears
to be the role of local party committee generalists."
Anti-corruption Campaigns and "Punishment According to Law"
With routine anti-corruption enforcement hampered by problems of
agency design, top Chinese leaders have turned to short bursts of intensive
enforcement to produce results. Three anti-corruption campaigns were
launched in the 1980s (in 1982, 1986, and 1989) and two in the 1990s
(1993 and 1995). Each anti-corruption campaign featured an evident
escalation in anti-corruption publicity, including publicity encouraging
ordinary Chinese to report corruption and urging corrupt officials to
confess their crimes, and new demands by top generalist leaders on local
party agencies to greatly increase the role of the criminal justice system in
anti-corruption enforcement. Anti-corruption campaigns were conducted
for only about 10 per cent of the 1980s and 1990s, but they accounted for

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Melanie Manion

clear "reporting peaks" by ordinary citizens, "confession peaks" by corrupt

officials, and "enforcement peaks" of corruption cases investigated by
procuratorates over these two decades. 29 At the same time. this apparent
success of anti-corruption campaigns has produced its own problems for
the anti-corruption effort over the longer term.
First, anti-corruption campaigns featured an increase in official rhetoric
about "punishment according to law'- and a corresponding rise in numbers of
cases processed through the criminal justice system by procuratorates. Put
another way, top Chinese authorities most strongly expressed their
commitment to the role of law in controlling corruption in the most highly
politicized times. Campaigns are political disruptions. These disruptions to
routine anti-corruption enforcement were required to urge party committees to
permit the law to work. Giving "punishment according to law" full play
during campaigns almost certainly has impeded the development of
expectations of a role for law in usual, non-campaign times.
Second, campaigns increased pressures on procuratorial resources.
During campaigns, procurators had many more criminal corruption cases
to investigate and prosecute because ordinary citizens were directly
reporting more to procuratorates, more corrupt officials were giving
themselves up to procuratorates to gain leniency, and party agencies were
transferring more cases to procuratorates. Campaigns increased demands
to produce measurable enforcement results, without comparable increases
in resources for procuratorates. This contributed to a distortion of
"punishment according to law" during campaigns. On the one hand, the
authorities established highly arbitrary clemency periods during the 1982
and 1989 campaigns. On the other. procuratorates overwhelmed with a
sudden huge increase in cases more often resorted to exemptions from
prosecution to complete cases quickly.)D

Mainland China's Efforts in Light of Lessons from Hong Kong

Mindful of the four lessons suggested by successful anti-corruption reform
in Hong Kong, how might mainland China's efforts be characterized?
First, leaders in Beijing have responded to the explosion of corruption
with, at best, ambivalent signals. Two different agencies are responsibJe
for investigating and punishing corruption. These agencies have
overlapping jurisdictions and an unclear division of labour. which has
hampered success in routine anti-corruption enforcement. The privileged
organizational position of party discipline inspection committees and the

Lessons for Mainland China from Anti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong

93

leadership exercised by local party committee generalists practically

ensures that mild party disciplinary actions will substitute for criminal
punishment for corrupt acts. If agency design signals anything in mainland
China, it signals that communist party politics remains in command and
that ordinary citizens cannot rely on anti-corruption agencies for impartial
discovery and prosecution of corrupt officials. Second, with routine
enforcement handicapped by agency design, mainland Chinese leaders
have resorted to infrequent intensive anti-corruption campaigns that
denigrate the law at the same time as they emphasize "punishment
according to law." This is particularly a problem in mainland China, where
party and government regulations have had to fill gaps as revision of the
criminal code introduced in 1978 catches up to a rapidly changing political
economy. Third, until recently, despite obvious structural incentives for
corruption in many new policies, mainland Chinese leaders have shown a
neglect of institutional design and corruption prevention. In sum, despite
an anti-corruption effort spanning two decades, it is not surprising that
mass public perceptions continue to place corruption at the top of the list of
mainland China's grave problems and that ordinary Chinese continue to
exercise discretion in reporting corruption to the authorities.

Conclusion
The review above of Hong Kong's experience is not meant to imply that
only one strategy offers generalizable lessons for success in anti-corruption
reform. At the same time, it is evident that anti-corruption efforts in
mainland China are seriously flawed and that these flaws are illuminated
by the contrast with the Hong Kong experience. In particular. two lessons
of institutional design have yet to be fully absorbed in mainland China.
First, nowhere has corruption prevention through institutional design
been articulated and practised as thoroughly as in Hong Kong. By contrast,
this is the element of anti-corruption reform most neglected in mainland
China. The many prohibitions issued in Beijing are not the same as changes
in the underlying incentives that foster corruption. Only in recent years
have mainland Chinese leaders begun to introduce institutional design
measures that may help prevent corruption. Examples include the
reduction in the number of required penuits and licences, the substitution
of an agricultural tax for fees levied by lower authorities, a judicial recusal
system, competitive bidding in government procurement, and the rotation
of posts in the civil service.

Melanie Manion

94

Second, the independence of the ICAC is often touted as the

component of institutional design for anti-corruption reformers
everywhere to emulate. There are advantages in having an agency with an
exclusive organizational mission, unconstrained by multiple goals. Yet,

there is nothing inherently credible about an independent agency design.

An independent agency answerable solely to a chief executive is as
credible as the chief executive, unless he or she is constrained by some
mechanism to respond responsibly." This explains the panic that
developed among Hong Kong democrats as 1997 approached and they
contemplated an independent ICAC under a chief executive effectively
selected in Beijing. Why was an independent ICAC in 1973 a strong
credible signal of government anti-corruption commitment? The answer

has much

to

do with a context, which included basic limitations on the

exercise of political power. Free and fair elections are a broadly

acknowledged general mechanism imposing accountability On rulers to

ordinary citizens, but elections offer no answer to the puzzle here. Rather,
the 1973 commitment was credible because of constraints imposed by the
government's overall orientation to rule of law, basic respect for civil

liberties, and genuine fear of sustained protests exposing "good

governance" as a sham.

What lesson of institutional design, then, is implied for mainland

China? Surely, a Leninist political design rules out an anti-corruption

agency independent of the party. An independent anti-corruption agency

answerable to the communist party general secretary is not necessarily a
blueprint for anti-corruption credibility, however. If mainland Chinese
leaders put anti-corruption enforcement in the hands of an independent

agency or the government procuracy, they would still require other

mechanisms signalling to ordinary citizens the impossibility of reneging on
their anti-corruption commitment. Despite a considerably more
enlightened perspective on government accountability on issues ranging
from SARS to rural taxes, current leaders in Beijing have yet to "tie their
hands" effectively with meaningful elections, rule of law, civil liberties, or
other knots that signal to ordinary citizens their credible commitment to
anti-corruption reform.

Notes
J. The rankings and related material, including background papers and
rramework documents that discuss data sources, aggregation methodology,

Lessonsfor Mainland ChinafromAnti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong

95

and measuremenl preeision can be accessed at the Internet Center for

Corruption Research at hltp://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/icr.htm.
2. Melanie Manion. "Issues in Corruption Control in Post-Mao China," Issues
and SlUdies, Vol. 34, No.9 (1998), pp. 1-21; and Corruption by D,'sign:
Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
3. Andrew Wedeman, "Politics and Corruption," in China Review 1996. edited
by Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shu-ki (Hong Kong: The
Chinese Universi(y Press, 1996), pp. 61-94; Ting Gong, "Forms and
Characteristics of China's Corrup(ion in the 1990s: Change with Continuity,"
Communist and Post-Communist SWdies, Vol. 30. No.3 (1997), pp. 277
88; Zhiyue Bo, "Economic Development and Corrup(ion: Beijing beyond
'Beijing,'" Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9, No. 25 (2000), pp. 467
87; Zengke He, "Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Reform China,"
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, No.2 (2000), pp. 243--70.
4. Gong (Note 3); Yan Sun, "Reform, State, and Corruption: Is Corruption Less
Destructive in China Than in Russia?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No.1
(1999). pp. 1-20; X. L. Ding, "informal Privatization throogh inter
nationalization: The Rise of Nomenklatura Capitalism in China's Offshore
Businesses," British Jounwl of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. I (2000), pp.
121-46; and "Systemic Irregularity and Spontaneous Property Transformation
in the Chinese Financial System," The China Quarterly, No. 163 (2000), pp.
655-76.
5. Sun (Note 4); X. L. Ding, "Who Gets What, How? When Chinese State
Owned Enterprises Become Shareholding Companies," Problems of PoSf~
Communism, Vol. 46. No.3 (1999), pp. 32-41; "The Illicit Asset Stripping of
Chinese State Firms," China Journal, No. 43 (2000), pp. 1-28; and Ding,
"Informal Privatization .. ." (Note 4).
6. Jiwen Zhong, "Guard Against the Growth and Spread of Corruption," Dang
jian yanj;u neican, No.4 (1997), pp. 12, 8 (in Chinese); Randall Peerenboom,
China's Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2(02); Shengtang Wen, "New Progress in the Anti-comIption Struggle
in 2002," in Bille Book of Chinese Society 2003: Analysis of the Situation and
Forecast, edited by Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin (Beijing: Shehui ke,.;,ue
wen xi an chubanshe, 2003), pp. 99-110 (in Chinese).
7. See the analysis in Manion, Corruption by Design (Note 2).
8. See, for example, Alan P. L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's
Republic of China," American Political Science RelJiew, Vol. 77, No.3 (1983),
pp. 602-23; Clemens Stubhe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political
Corruption," Corruption and Reform, Vol. 1, No. I (1986), pp. 209-33;
Wojtek Zafanolli, "A Brief Outline of China's Second Economy," in
TransfiJmling China's Economy;n the Eighties: Vol. 2, Mdnagement, Industry

96

Melanie Manion

and the Urban Economy, edited by Stephan Feuchtwang, Athae Hussain, and
Thierry Pairauh (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). pp. 138-55; Stephen K.
Mat "Reform Corruption: A Discussion on China's Current Development,"
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 62, No.1 (1989). pp. 40-52; Andrew J. Nathan, China's
Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1990); Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its
Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China
Quarterly, No. 130 (1992), pp. 402-16: Ting Gong, The Politics aj'Corruption
in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1994); He (Note 3); Gordon White, "Corruption and the Transilion
from Socialism in China," Journal afLaw and Society. Vol. 23, No. I (1996),
pp. 149--69.
9. See Leo Goodstadt, "Squeeze Me Please," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25
June 1970, pp. 7-8; and "The Fix.ers," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July
1970, pp. 21-23; H. J. Lethbridge, 'The Emergence of Bureaucratic
Corruption as a Social Problem in Hong Kong." Journal of Oriental Studies,
Vol. 12, Nos. 1-2 (1974), pp_ 17-29; and Hard Grqft in Hong Kong: ScandaL.
Corruption, the ICAC (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1985); David
Faure, "Paying for Convenience: An Aspect of Corruption That Arises from
Revenue Spending:' in Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, edited by
Rance P. L. Lee (HonE Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981), pp. 133
65; Alastair Blair-Kerr, Second Report of the Commission of Inquiry under Sir
Alastair Blair~Kerr (Hong Kong: Government Printer. September 1973).
]0. Tak-sing Cheung and Chong-chor Lau. "A Profile of Syndicate Corruption in
the Police Force," in Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, pp. 199-221;
Peter N. S. Lee, "The Causes and Effects of Police Corruption: A Case in
Political Modernization." in Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, pp.
167-98.
II. Alastair Blair-Kerr. First Report of the Commission of Inquiry under Sir
Alastair Blair-Kerr (Hong Kong: Government Printer, JUly 1973).
12. Royal Hong Kong Police Force, Annual Departmental Report, 1972-73 (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1973); Independent Commission Against Corrup
tion ([CAC), Annual Report by the Commissioner of the Independent Com
mission Against Corruption, 1975 (Hong Kong: Governmenr Printer, 1975).
13. Anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong and its outcomes are described and
analysed in great detail in Manion, Corruption by Design (Note 2).
14. [CAC (Note 12), p. 22.
15. Corrupt and lIlegai Practices Ordinance (Chapter 288).10 June 1955. Hong
Kong.
16. Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Chapter 201). ]4 May 1971. Hong Kong.
17. Independem Commission Against Corruption Ordinance (Chapter 204). 15
February 1974. Hong Kong.

Lessons for Mainland China from Anti-corruption Reform in Hong Kong

97

18. In Hong Kong. the legal definition of cOffilption also includes transactions in
the private sector, but these are not included in the discussion here.
19. See Lethbridge (Note 9).
20. ICAC, AnnuaL Report by the Commissioner of the Independent Commission
Against Corruption, /978 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1978), p. 1.
21. ICAC, Annual Reporf b.v the Commissioner of the Independent Commission
Against Corruption, /980 (Hong Kong: Government Primer, t 980), p. 40.
22. This is seen in the surveys conducted regularly by the ICAC from 1977 through
thc present (see Manion, Corruption by Design [Note 2]).
23. See especially Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes,
Conseql4ences, and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
24. Graham Young, "Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions Since
the 11th Congress," The China Quarrerly, No. 97 (19841. pp. 24--52.
25. He Jiahong (with Jon R. Waltz), Criminal Prosecution in the People's
Republic of China and the United States of America: A Comparative Study
(Beijing: China Procuratorial Press, 1995).
26. Sce especially Manion. Corruption by Design (Note 2).
27. See Manion, Corruption by Design (Note 2).
28. Sec ibid.
29. See ibid.
30. See ihid.: and "Issues in Corruption" (Note 2).
31. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conjlict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Universi\y Press, 1960); Hilton Root, "Tying the King's Hands; Credible
Commirmems and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime," Rationality
and Soc;,'ry, Vol. 1, No.2 (1989), pp. 240-58; Douglass C. Nortb and Barry R.
Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: Thc Evolution of Institutions
Governing Puhlic Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 49, No.4 (1989), pp. 803-32.