List of Documents

CREW v. CEQ 07cv365 (D.D.C)

11/30/09 CEQ Discretionary Release

11021-22 11779-80
12147 12503-05

11049-50 11781-82
12148 12507-10

11059 11804-07
12149 12512

11207 11836-38
12150 12514

11249-53 11840-45
12152-53 12520

11255 11865-67
12155-64 12522

11257-66 11869
12167-78 12523-25

11267-75 11870-71
12185 12527

11277 11886-89
12194 12529-34

11323 11891-93
12201-05 12536-38

11330-31 11895-11
12213 12540-44

13333 11913-15
12215 12547-51

11340-42 11942-44
12224 12553-67

11356-86 11946
12227-28 12569-75

11391-97 11952
12230-33 12577-78

11399 11954
12255-57 12580-85

11408-09 11956-57
12259-62 12587

11430-31 11959
12264 12594-99

11441-42 11963
12266 12608-10

11444-45 11965-66
12270-73 12615-17

11447-526 11967
12274-86 12622

11528-29 11968-80
12289 12624

11531 11983-85
12291-96 12665-67

11532 11986
12336-38 12669-71

11543-45 11987-88
12340-42 12685-86

11547-49 11991-92
12344-53 12724

11586-01 11994-09
12355-58 12726-30

11618-19 12011-16
12364-65 12737-38

11621-22 12018-22
12367 12740

11643-79 12034-36
12369 12742-44

11683 12043
12371-93 12749-50

11685 12045-46
12395 12764-70

11687 12081
12397 12777-81

11689 12084-85
12411 12782

11698 12086
12413-14 12784-86

11700-02 12087-91
12416-24 12791-98

11726-27 12096
12425-27 12808

11729-30 12097-08
12429-35 12810-14

11731-32 12110
12436-12441 12829-30

11739-43 12125
12444-46 12834-35

11762-63 12130-35
12455-61 12837-44

11765-66 12136-37
12463-12468 12859-60

11767-68 12139-42
12470-72 12862

11770-72 12143-45
12495-99 12864-66

11774-76 12146
12501 12878-81

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12904-07

12913

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12922-23

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12928

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12935

12936-42

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12952

12953-58

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12973

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12992-02

13005-12

13013-14

13018

13020-22

 u.s. Department of Justice

Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

Via First-Class Mail Via Overnight Delivery

P.O. Box 883, Rm. 7224 20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. 6116
Washington, DC 20044 Washington, DC 20001

Jean-Michel Voltaire Tel: 202/616-8211

Trial Attorney Fax: 202/616-8460

November 30, 2009

BYFEDEX

Scott A. Hodes, Esq.

1410 Aintree Drive
Rockville, MD 20850

Re: CREW v. CEQ, Civil Action No. 07-365 (D.D.C.) (RMU)

Dear Mr. Hodes:

Based on the CEQ's internal re-evaluation of the documents previously withheld under the
deliberative process privilege, the agency has exercised its discretion to release in full approximately
868 pages of documents that were previously withheld. The bates numbers for the attached documents
are not in sequence, and we are therefore attaching a list of the bates numbers for this production.

Please be advised that CEQ has not completed its re-evaluation process, and that more
documents might be released later if necessary.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-616-8211.

Thanks.

Jean-Michel Voltair
Trial Attorney

Ene.
cc: Dianne M. Shawley, CEQ
Elizabeth Moss, CEQ
 .
-- - -

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10 0 Task Name Duration Start Finish
1 Drafting 40 days?: Mon 9/9/02 Mon 11/4/02
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9 Integrale Document 6 days Fri 10/4/02 Fri 10/11/02

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11 Comments from WGs to IPO 1 day?" Fri 10/18/02 Fri 10/18/02

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13 High level Review 5 days Tue ; 0122102 Mon 10128/02 , . K"\-' i

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14 Final Revision 5 days Tue 10129/02 Mon 11/4/02
15 Draft Completed odays, Mon 11/4102 Mon 11/4/02 11/4
16 @:3\j:. ~ NOTE: IPo MOVE TO 1717 PA Ave rm 2 days, Thu 1013/02 Sat 10/5/02 [J
17 :Chapters 40 days? Tue 9/3102 Tue 10/29/02 • .i
18 In1JOduction (CCRt and USGCRP) 40 days' Tue 9/3/02 Tue 10/29/02 !4iJtt$~4'la;t)!{~$m""l Moss N
19 Observations and Data/Information 40 days Tue 913/02 Tue 10/29/02 !')\£i!J'§·"EW;J)t'ffii!li 'J1i!l'l!j!ij,$!1MW¥§.':,:%:O'J!'i3 ~OblinSkY[50%],Conkrl tqI
20 Scenarios 14 days?, Tue 9/3/02 Frl 9/20/02 • • I C\l
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26 Apt lied Modeling 40 days Tue 9/3102 Tue 10/29/02 W~;;"M~§.!i!ti\4:ym-¥*##i?im4:."R"'?%A1 Goodrich{33%],legler(
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27 Decision Support 40 days
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28 Atmospheric ComposiUon
29 ; Climate Variability and Change 40 days' Tue 913102, Tue 10129/02 1;"",#!§1</;~~~ Fein,Dole,legler
30 ,I Cartlon Cycle 40 days Tue 913/02 Tue 10/29/02 Mf~~!~'BilHfi orrego,Wlckland,Dahlman
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31 I Water Cycle 40 days, Tue 913/02 Tue 10129102
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33 Land Use/Cover Change 40 days Tue 913/02 Tue 10/29102 ~~~ F,adehlnd,Gutman,Jusl
34 Human Contributions and Responses 40 days, Tue 913102 Tue 10/29102 f¥MM#~W!41Ifi'$~ Gamble,Slmpson
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35 Grand Challenges in Modeling, Observatic ' 40 days: Tue 9/3/02 Tue 10129/02 1"f!'';*i;S*~9~'im Kobllnsky
36 Outreach and Public Information 40 days Tue 9/3/02 Tue 10129/02 1',K·it'\!3$i~i¢'!i*ijM§#iBii!i?WI?;:'{t;$f.q Sundt,Worresl
37 International Research Collaborations 40 days: Tue 9/3/02 Tue 10/29/02 f¥';;:;;1\~~'i'i§i'1m!&i29@;;;;;¥>;'-h¥N Arthur[50%],Brown[50%]

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Today, I make our investment in science even greater. My administration will establish
the U.S. Climate Change Research Initiative to study areas of uncertainty and identify
priority areas where investments can make a difference.

I'm directing my Secretary ofCommerce, working with other agencies. to set priorities
for additional investments in climate change research, review such investments, and to
improve coordination amongst federal agencies. We will fully fund high..priority areas
for climate change science over the next five years. We'll also provide resources to build
climate observation systems in developing countries and encourage other developed
nations to match our American commitment.
r---....----­
DRAFT - DEL/RERA TIVE - NOT ADMINISTRA T/ON POLICY - DO NOT C
Ck:Q
SCRIPT FOR INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH: DRAFT #3
5ri\ t­
1. Want to let you know that the President will deliver a major speech [WHEN]
I
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~ strategy for approaching the challenge of long-term global climate chant.
I
2 The President's plan will commit America to action to slow, stop and then reverse the growti of
greenhouse gas emissions. The first step in that process is to slow the growth in emissions.
We have already made progress in this effort; now, we will build upon that success.

3. The President will commit America to reducing the greenhouse gas "intensity" of our econo y
- that is, America will reduce our rate of greenhouse gas emissions relative to our level of
economic activity over the next decade. The President's goal is for America to improve the
"greenhouse gas intensity" of its economy over the next ten years.

4 This is a re~listic and effective approach to meeting the challenge of climate change. It ~
combines our need for environmental stewardship with the need to maintain strong econom c
growth. In the long run, only a growing economy "Yill be able to make significant investment in
cleaner energy generatior ~ II""~ c {{<..(~'1

5. [For developing countries, this approach recognizes their right to economic growth, and
provides a realistic and effective yardstick against which they might measure their progress
-7[~-Ioel<..c:~
6 The President's has proposed providing ver $22 iIIion for the Global Environmental Fa
and USAID to help developing countries in elr efforts to meet the challenge of climate
change. The funding for the GEF includes a one-third payment of America's arrears to this
important international institution, which accumulated in prior years.

7. We hope you will seriously consider the merits of the President's proposals. We hope you ill
find them thoughtful, credible, effective and attractive. If you do, we hope you'll be supporti e,
and we look forward to working with you.

8. Our new policy will be supported by an unprecedented level of federal funding for climate
change-related research and development. The President's recently released 2003 budget
proposes $4.5 billion in funding for climate change, a $700 million increase over this years
funding - even though this is awartime budget. No other country in the world comes close 0
that level of funding. The budget also includes $4.6 billion in tax credits over the next five y ars
for clean energy development, such as hybrid and fuel cell vehicles and renewable energy
supplies (solar, wind, geothermal).

9. America will undertake a broad range of !"ili~tives to help us meet that goal, including
significant improvements to our registry for recording reductions in emissions. [For every
jI

reduction recorded in the registry, we'll issue tradable credits, which will give companies a
incentive to act now to reduce emissions whenever possible.] I
[0R~~JI!.~J !

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Interagency Action on eEl Petitions on 'National Assessment on Climate Change

Background

• The Competitive Enterprise Institute (CED recently issued petitions under the Federal
Data Quality Act (FDQA) to three federal agencies requesting that the government cease
disseminating the National Assessment on Climate Ch.ange and the U.S. Climate Action
Report (because Chapter 6 of the CAR summarizes the National Assessment).

• The three petitions cite the provisions of the FDQA and each agency's information
quality guidelines under the Act. The FDQA compels OMB to issue government-wide
guidelines that provide guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring the quality, objectivity,
utility, and integrity of information disseminated by Federal agencies. Under the law,
each agency must issue its own information quality guidelirles that include
"administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of
information maintained and disseminated by the agency," if such infonnation does not
comply with the OMB guidelines.

• Agency responses to the petitions are due on different dates (either 90 or 60 days after
receipt of the request for correction). Note that these dates are goals and are not binding:

• EPA - received CEI petition on February 10,2003. EPA's goal under its guidelines
is to respond within 90 days (e.g., May IO'h l.
• NOAA- received CEl petition on February 19,2003. Under NOAA's guidelines, a
response would be due around April 19,2003.
• OSTP - received CEl petition on February 20,2003. Under OSTP's guidelines, a
response would be due around April 20,2003. .

• At yesterday'S EPW hearing, Senator Inhofe noted his lawsuit against the Administration
on the National Assessment (Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEl), Inhofe. et al. v. Bush
(DC DC CV 00-02383» and asked Governor Whitman if EPA would cease dissemination
of the Climate Action Report. She did not respond to his request directly but noted that
the National Assessment did not represent a product or policy ofthe US government and
that Chapter 6 cited multiple data sources in addition to the National Assessment (e.g.,
the NAS 2001 report, IPCC documents).

Action Needed

• Since'both the National Assessment and the Climate Action Report are multi-agency
products, nO'single agency should unilaterally respond to CEl's petition.

• A number of options are possible (e.g., accepting or denying the eEl request, or
requesting an extension of time to respond), all of which have substantive implications
for the Administration's climate change~policy.

• CEQ, as coordinator of Administration cl:~ange policy, should coordinate a

.....
consistent interagency response to the CEI petitions to'Ep..A, NOAA, and OSTP.

0021.1.4

CEQ bll207'
.TRANSFERREDIRECOMMEND DENIAL IN FULL
B5 u.s. SHOULD OPPOSE CANADA'S PROPOSAL FOR EXPORT CREDITS:
RECO~~~~~!I~~E.TOU.S.INTERESTS

At the SBSTA workshop on "Cleaner or Less Greenhouse Gas-Emitting Energy" (Wbistler,

British Columbia, Canada - May 7-8, 2002), Canada presented its paper "Cleaner Energy
Exports and Global Environmental Benefits: Canada's Position." The paper asserted that
Canada's exports ofnaturaJ gas and hydroelectricity to the United States will create an annual
"global environmental benefit," which, in 2010, will be 69 million metric tonnes ofCOrequiva­
lent greater in 2010 than it was in 1990. The paper concluded: "At SBSTA 16, Canada will be
bringing forward. a draft decision for consideration by COP 8, requesting an accommodation to
provide it with credit equivalent to the global environmental benefifcreated by its cleaner energy
. exports, i.e., 70 Mt C~.equivalentper year, for the first commitment period only."

The following comments are limited to identification of two precedents, neither ofwbich the
United States can afford, that would be established if the Canadian proposal were accepted.
Those grounds for U.S. objection to the Canadian proposal are in addition to the serious, sub­
stantive flaws that permeate the analysis Canada offers in support of its proposal.·

Defacto amendment of the Kyoto Protocol that rails to comply with the amendment
procedures of the Kyoto Protocol is an unacceptable precedent that must be opposed

Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol sets forth Canada's basic obligation under the Protocol: to
assure that its aggregate anthropogenic COz-equivaient emissions of greenhouse gases listed in
Annex A do not exceed its "assigned amount" calculated pursuant to its quantified emission­
reduction commitment in Annex B "and in accordance with the provisions of this Article.,,1 The
only adjustments to a Party's "assigned amount" required or allowed by Article 3 are those spe­
cified in Articles 3.3 through 3.8 and 3.10 through 3.13.

None of those provisions sanctions "credits" or any other form of adjustment to a Party's
"assigned amount" by reason ofits exports ofso-called "cleaner" energy (or any other exports.
claimed to result in a "global environmental benefit") to a country, such as the United States, that
is not a Party to the Kyoto Protoco1.2

Until Canada unveils its fonnal proposal, we cannot know exactly what it means by "a draft
decision for consideration by COP 8 ... to provide it with credit equivalent to ... 70 Mt COz­
equivalent per year, for the first commitment·period only." Plainly, a mere decision by the"COP,.
which purports to grant "credits" to Canada that are not provided for by Article 3, cannot modify
Canada's "assigned amount." This is because any such modification would constitute a de/acto

I Subject to adjustments required or permitted by Article 3, Canada's Kyoto Protocol commitment is to reduce its
COz-eqWvalent greenhouse gas emissions by 6 percent below their 1990 level.

z Since the Canadian·proposal is based on exports of so-<:alIed "cleaner energy" to a non-Party to the Protocol, we
need not be concerned with the hypothetical questions of whether such exports by an Annex B Party to another
Annex B Party could result in emission reduction units (ERUs) under the joint implementation provisions of Article
6, or whether such exports to a developing country Party could result in certified emission reductions (CERs) under
the Clean Development Mechanism of Article 12.

CEQ 011250

'. t

amendment of the Protocol; however, in the first instance, the authority to adopt such amend­
ment is vested exclusively in the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to the Protocol (COPlMoP), not the COP under the UNFCCC, and a Protocol amendment
adopted. by the COP/MoP must be "accepteQ." (commonly called "ratified") by three-fourths of
the Parties to the Protocol before it can enter into force. 3 .

The United States formally should object to any proposed decision Qf COP-8 that either ill pur­
ports to amend the Kyoto Protocol or {ill confers "credits" or similar benefits on Canada tbat. .@§
~ practical matter. enlarge Canada's "assigned amount" under the Kyoto Protocol and, therefore.
constitutes a de fQcto amendment of the Protocol. 4 This is because the United States ~
afford establishment of1! pr~ent in an international body Qfwbich i! is 1! member (the CQP)
that accomplishes de facto amendment of 1! treaty in disregard ofthe treaty's procedural safe­
guards ~nceming adoption Qftreatv amendments..

Granting Canada "credits" for its exports of "deaner or less greenhouse gas-emitting
energy" to the United States would establish a precedent that is contrary to U.S. interests
and, therefore, must be opposed.

Even though the United States will not be a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, a decision (by amend­
ment to the Protocol or otherwise) granting Canada "credits" for its exports of "cleaner or less
greenhouse gas~mitting energy" to the United States would establish a precedent that is very
contrary to V.S. interests.

3 Article 20.2 states that amendments to the Protocol "shall be adopted at an ordinaIy session ofthc Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol." The first meetiDg ofthe COPlMoP cannot occur
until after the Kyoto Protocol enters into force. Article 13.6. The "ratification" requirement is in Article 20.4.

• Canada may seek a COp·S decision which "recommends" that the COPlMoP, at its first session, amend the
Protocol to grant Canada the "credits" it seekll or otherwise to modify CanadA's "assigned amount." Although a
"recommendation" by the COP to the COPlMoP CllDDIJt legally bind tho COPlMoP, it would not be politically free
to reject the "recommendation" any more than it could reject any provision of the "Marrakech Accords," which
COP·7 adopted to implement the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, great care must be taken during consideration of a I
proposal for a "recommended" decision by COP-S:
·1
• A decisi~ of the COP, which "recommends" a decision to the COPlMoP, must be adopted by "consensus"

of the COP, even though it recommends adoption of an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, which, under

Protocol Article 20.3, may be adopted by a three-fourths majority Yote of the Parties to the Protocol present

and Yoting.

• Nothing in ~ proposed COP-S decision shouid be allowed to limit or waive strict adherence by the

COPlMoP to the requirements ofProtocol Article 20 concerning the procedure for adoption of an

amendment to the Protocol Among other requirements. Article 20.2 calls for the Secretariat to com­

municate the text of any proposed amendment to "the Parties" (meaning the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol)

at least six months before the meeting ~t which it is proposed for adoption.

CEQOl1251
· • l •

If Canada currently were grimted "credits" for its exports of "cleaner or less greenhouse gas­
emitting energy" to the United States, the precedent thereby established would be equally
applicable to any future climate-change treaty to which the United States ando Canada were
Parties, if that treaty, in one manner or another, established "targets and timetables" for reduc­
tions ofgreenhouse gas emissions either in absolute or percentage amounts compared to prior
emissions levels or relative to economic output ("carbon intensity"). In either situation, the
justification for the "credits" is that the exporter has created a "global en~nmentalbenefit"
because the exported energy displaces what otherwise would be the importer's use of more
carbon-intensive energy. ..

The problem for the United States arises from the fact that, insofar as treaty-relevant transactions
between developed countries are concerned, credits obtained. by one Party must be offset by
debits to the other Party. 11ris is necessary to "keep the books in balance." The principle is
'illustratc(i"by the provisions ofProtocol Articles 3.10 and 3.11, which require that, when emis­
sion reduction units or part of an assigned amoUnt are acquired pursuant to Articles 6 Goint
implementation) or 17 (emissions trading), they are added to the "assigned °amount" ofthe
acquiring party and an equal amount is subtracted from the "assigned amounf' ofthe transferring
Party.

There is every reason to assume that, for the foreseeable future, the United States will be a large;
net importer of natural gas and hydroelectricity from Canada 5 Although granting Canada
"credits" for those exports does not result in "debits" to the United States as long as it is not a
Party to the Kyoto Protocol, any future treaty to which the United States and Canada were
Parties and which involved accounting for the Parties' emissions necessarily would result in the
United States having to absorb "debits" to match the "credits" Canada would gain under the pre­
cedent it now seeks to establish. Those "debits" have a cost to the UnitedoStates and U.S.
importers of the nat.ura1 gas and hydroelectricity (equal to the market price ofintemationally
traded "credits") that is incurred in addition to the commodity price ~harged by the Canadian
exporters.

The notion that exporters of "cleaner or less greenhouse gas-emitting energy" should receive
"credits" because the exports create a "global environmental benefit" knows no bounds. For
example, if Canada can gain "credits" for exports ofnatural gas and hydroelectricity, on what
basis could we resist claims for "credits" by exporters of more fuel-efficient or less-carbon-using
automobiles? At the recent Whistler workshop, which focused on Canada's proposal, !pore than
one country noted the logic of extending "credits" to others who could claim that their exports
resulted in "global environmental benefit."

A principal obj ective of any future climate-change treaty to which the United States might
become !! ~ in addition to those ofenvironmental effectiveness and equitable burden-sharing
among the nations of the world, is that the costs oru.s. compliance be held to acceptable levels.

~ U.s. natural gas imports from Canada rose nearly 22.5% from 2.89 trillion cubic feet in 1996 to 3.54 trillion cubic
feet in 2000. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Annual 2000, p. 20, Table 9. Canada projects
that U[n]atural gas exports to the United States are likely to increase significantly between now and 2010." Canada's
Third National Report 011 Cli;mate Change, p. 13.

CEQ 011252

!! would make that important objective even harder to obtain than before - and. therefore. would
be contraI)' to U.S. interests - ifg precedent were established for future negotiations. such ~ that
which ~ from Canada's claim for "credits" from "cleaner energy" exports to the United
States.

Conclusion:

The Administration has said it will not interfere with efforts ofother nations to pursue the Kyoto
Protocol. But there is a limit. As Under Secretary of State Dobriansky made clear in her
opening statement at COP-7 in Marrakech: "the United States has no intention of discouraging
. the work ofother nations on the Kyoto Protocol, but we willprotect legitimate u.s. interests. "

In her closing statement at COP-7, Under Secretary Dobriansky called to the Parties' attention
the "many areas in which the Kyoto Protocoi and the rules elaborating it contain elements that
would not be acceptable to· the United States ifproposed in another negotiating context in which
we participate." One of the three examples she properly cited was "[r]ules that purport to change
treaty commitments through decisions of the parties rather than through the proper amendment
procedure." Any effort to modify Canada's ~'assigned amoWlt," by means short of formal
amendment to the K,yoto Protocol, perpetuates that specific failing. Clearly, the United States
has a legitimate interest in opposing any such effort. .

SiIpilarly, there should be no question that the legitimate interests ofthe United States require it
to oppose in the COP proposals that, once adopted, would consti~te a precedent posing risk of
substantially adding to the economic costs the United States would have to bear in some other
international climate-change arrangement

Other nations are watching the United States. We are the target of the Canadian proposal. Ifwe
fail to speak up to protect our own economic and political interests, it is tantamount to telling
others that we either do not care or we have no guts. Acquiescence by silence to decisions that
are contrary to our national interests is not acceptable.

,"

-'­ CEQ 011253

·- ~
. TRANSFERREDIRECOMMEND DENIAL IN FULL
B5 Canadian Proposal for a High Level Bilateral Consultation Process

RECOMMEND AND TRANSFER - CEQ

October 2001 - Canadian Minister David Anderson first raised proposal in principle for high
level bilateral consultation process during meetings in Washington with CEQ's Connaughton,
EPA's Whitman, and DOS' Dobriansky. The GOC believed it received signals of interest from
_CEQ and EPA, and that DOS was neutral Also took home message that idea needed to wait to
be explored until after President's climate change announcement.

October - November 2001 - Issue raised informally at staff levels in Washington and Ottawa.

December 5,2001 - Canadians (Drake from Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade and­
Fateux from Environment Ministry raise issue of high level bilateral consultation at a luncheon
in Washington (with Harlan Watson and Dan Reifsnyder from State); U.S. asks Canada what
specifically it hopes to accomplish and what deliverables would be; Canada agrees to develop its
proposal further and get backto us.

January 2002 - Canadian Embassy's Minister for Political and Public Affairs Peter Boehm met
DOS' Dobriansky to discuss several issues including climate change. Dobriansky advised
Boehm that the USG would welcome such a consultation process when the time was right.

March 2002 - Boehm advised OES AlS Turner and OBS DASIE Burnam. that Minister
Anderson would pitch idea in detail during his March 6-7 yisit to Washington. The Embassy has
promised to preview Anderson's proposal, and advised it will be more substantive and less
process oriented than some agreements USG already signed (e.g., Japan). 'We understand GOC
scheduling meetings to pitch idea with NSC's Edson, CEA's Hubbard, EPA's Whitman, and
DOS' Dobriansky.

CEQ 011255

 TRANSFERREDIRECOMlvlEND DENIAL IN FULL E2.3~

B5 Introduction and Overview
RECOMMEND AND TRANSFER - CEQ
"The Earth's well-being is ... an issue important to America - and it's an issue that should
be imponant to every nation and in every part ofthe world. My Administration is committed 10 a
leadership role on the issue ofclimate change. We recognize our responsibility and we will meet
it. at home, in our hemisphere, and in the world. "
y e,.}~
With this June 2001 pledge, ~ Presidenveiterated the seriousness of climate change and .
ordered a Cabinet-level review or u.s. climate change policy. He requested working groups to
develop innovative approaches that would: (1) be consistent with the goal ofstabilizing
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmospbere; (2) be sufficiently flexible to allow for new
findings; (3) support continued economic growth and prosperity; (4) provide market-based
incentives; (5) incorporate technological advances; and (6) promote global participation.

The Pr~sident's decision to take' a deeper look at climate change policy arose from the
recognition that the dialogue begun in ]992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro lacked the
requisite piu1icipatory breadth for a global response to climate change. At this historic summit,
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted, with the ultimate
objective of providing a higher quality of life for future generations, Signatories pledged to:

"achieve ...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that

would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a
level should be achieved within a tiniefr'ame sufficienUo allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened. and to
enable"economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner:'

In Rio, ambitious plans were set in motion to address climate change. However. participation in
constructing adaptive and mitigative measures for addressing climate change feU short ofthe
breadth necessaIY to confront a problem that President Bush recently said has "the potential to
impact every comer of the world." A global problem demands a truly participatory global
response.

President Bush has pledged that the United States will act to address this global problem in a
serious. sensible and science-based manner, even though uncertainties may remain regarding the
precise magnitude, timing, and.regional patterns of climate change. But we need partners in this
endeavor fJaRBet'S who wiH lecogune dIat tbough t:ftc regieR'll impa~t& JRay t'6l)'J ldri:6!ate1)
the e£feets on auy OtIC WWib'j ~il1 resonate in cottutf'ies ~"Bbollt tJ>ewodd. All countries
must actively work together to achieve the long-tenn goal ofstabilizing greenhouse gas -1I-t­
concentrations at a level that will preventJnterference with the climate system, A.S rJ.e,..f,;'Lt! vJ-';:L~
~~~ ~~.
For our part, the United Stares intends to continue to be a constructive and activato the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. We are ~]tiRr; te' global .,-esu.tk to
understanding of the science of climate change, as called for under the Framework Convention. ~
We lead the world on climate SCienCrince 1990, the United States has provided over $ I 8 . ~ a,
billion for climate sYstem research-- are resources than any other country. In July 2001, .. I l
.:. ~ res.lA-t4
I 6I\! ~ ~~bA-S ~ 5puJ- ~l.b l:.·,4~.

-~.~-_~-. - - - - - - - - - - - . - . . . .
...... - -__ .. !5 j

CEQ 011257

 As envisioned by the Framework Convention. are helping to dev op ~echnologiesto

address climate change.The President has pledged rese h bUdgiO that fimds

will be available to.develop tb. . technologic . !' ~eas and monitor, • I

greenhouse gas ermssio ;;.;. 04AJ-<- fVlt~t\.3t! vJJJL -tL N~

~~UYf
We plan to increase bilateral support for climate observation systems and to finance even more ~-h~.,f..
. demonstration projects of advanced ~ergy technologies in.developing countries. President
Bush's Western Hemisphere Initiative •• created to enhance climate change cooperation with
developing countries in the Americas and elsewhere -- will also strengthen implementation of the
Framework Convention commitments. In line with our commitments under the Convention, we
have provided over $1 billion in climate change-related assistance to developing counnies over
the last five years. All of this is just the beginning: we intend to strengthen our cooperation on
climate SCienceJ:t~tte~orldwhenever;~hereverpossible.

We are also making progress in limiting emissions of ~eMOUsegases in the United States by

becoming more energy e~cient. In the last decade, wi'fo seen tremendous economic growth in

the United States':tjur level of emissions per unit of economic output has declined

significantly. We t 'ng substantive action to address climate chan~ and Y'e will continue to

do so. ~ ~w..f.,~r~

Climate change is a problem that requires 100% effort -- ours and the rest of the world's. ThSf IS 10>4 ~
problem, decades in the making, cannot be solved overnight. A real solution must be durable,
science~based, and economically sustainable. In particular, we seek an environmentally sound
approach that wiJl not harm the U.S. eco~omy, which remains a critically important engine of
global prosperity. We believe that economic development is key to protecting the global
environment. In the real world, no one will forego meeting basic family needs to protect the
global commons. Environmental protection is neither achievable nor sustainable without
opportunities for continued development and greater prosperity. Our objective is to ensure a
long-term solution that is enviroD.qlentally effective, economically sustainable, and fair.
Protecting the global environment is to? important a responsibility for anything less.

en this U.S. Climate Action Report, the United States' third fonnal communication under the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, we fulfill the commitments required under Articles
4 and 12 of the Convention. We meet the formal reporting requirements of the Climate'
Convention by providing a description ofour national circumstances. identifying existing and
planned policies and measures, indicating future trends in greenhouse gas emissions, outlining
expected impacts and adaptation measures, and providing infonnation on financial resources,
technology transfer, research, and systematic observations. The remainder of this chapter
provides a briefdescription of the climate system science that sets the context for U.S. action, as
well as an overview of the U.S. program that is the focus of this report.

The Science
2

CEQ 011258

 (the fol/owing section is adapted from Climate Change Science: An Analysis ofSome Key

Questions. NRC 2001 )

Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result ofhuman activities, causing

global mean surface air temperature and subsurface ocean temperature to rise. While the changes

observed over the last several decades are most likely primarily due to human activities, We

cannot rule out that some significant part is also a reflection of natural variability.

Reducing the wide range of uncertainty inherent in current model predictions will require major

advances in understanding and modeling of the factors that detennine atmospheric

concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols. and the feedback processes that determine the

sensitivity of the climate system. Specifically, this wilt involve reducing uncertainty regarding:

• future use of fossil fuels and future emissions of methane,

• the fraction of the fossil fuel carbon that will provide radiative forcing vs.

exchange with the oceans or net exchange with the land biosphere,

• the feedbacks in the climate system that determine both the magnitude of the

change and the rate of energy uptake by the oceans, .

• the details of regional and local climate change,

• the nature and causes of the natural Variability of climate and its interactions with
forced changes, and
• the direct and indirect effects of the changing distributions of aerosols. -flu- w.,~.

Knowledge of the climate system and of projections about the future c~i~v:: uJo~ from
fundamental physjc~ ~chemjstry 2flfeyga Medels and observations~owever.these model ~
projections are limited by the paucity of data available to evaluate the ability of coupled models
to simulate important aspects of ~limate. To overcome these limitations~ it is essential to ensure
the existence of a long-term observing system and to make more comprehensive regional
measurements of greenhouse gases. These data are critical to understanding local and regional
source strengths.

While current analyses are unable to predict with confidence the timing, magnitude, or regional

c\istribution of climate change, the best scien!ific infonnation indicates that if gre~nh~use gas

~once~t;ations continue to increase, changes are ¥'ClCY likely to occur.

~ 00 Cbi-~ ~ --n.#' "Ck 7 c;;J-.
'k /I ~. ~~~

-fkut-l t:o, ~~ ~.-""'r ......

~~''f }..QOI'I14~J1~~~~ --I. ~-I9e. ~ 0)
National Circumstances: Our Context ~.J;~~"~+:Ji~..JJ...r...fj
hi. ,.. ~-.:zoU! oS >4.4t~ ~~:/~
The perspective of the United States on climate change is infonned by our economic prosperity, t:r;;-.~
the rich div~r~ity of ~ur climate conditions and natural re~urce~, and ~e de.mographic.trends of ~~ A
over 275 rrulhon resIdents. Because of our country's vast dIVersIty of climatIc zones, chmate .~"<
change will not affect the U.S. unifonnly. This diversity will also enhance our economy's ~.
resilience totr.limate change. •
~~.
Higher greenhouse gas emissions are a consequence of robust economic growth: more wealth

generally promotes increased expenditures of energy. ~we\'er, 88 eeftsemB ftbotrt"'

'lllemplQyment and gmwtb s"bs.ide lvith CCQR9INie gf6 "1h, other :!Ioeielal eefleeRlS, Stleb 113 the-

CEQ 011259

 g the 19905, .atmvestments in technology led to' reases in energy efficiency,

whic tively offset increases in greenhouse gas emissio In addition, much ofthe
economic growth in the United States has occurred in less energy-intensive sectors (e.g.,
computer technologies). Consequently, in the 1990s thefel6&igasmp between economic growth
and greenhouse gas emissions was altered. L~l/l;J~tJJ:' -,-_
~Mo.t\T~
While the United States is the world's largest consumer of energy, it is also the world's largest

producer of energy, with vast'reserves of coal, natural gas, and crude oil. The President's new

National Energy Policy(NEPD Group 2001) includes recommendations that will reduce our

reliance on fossil fuel production, For example, tax incentives and other initiatives win be used

to promote the use of combined heat and power and the use of renewable resources. The

President has also proposed expanding our nuclear energy capacity~ but it is unclear whether

6:1rt4O'~ will sanction this endeavo.r . Even if alternative fonus of energy generation are slow to
. develop, the introduction of wholesale and retail competition in the electric power industry has
produced and wiIJ continue to produce significant changes in the energy sector.

The nation's response to climate change -- our VUlnerability and our ability to adapt - is also
influenced by U.S. govenunental, economic, and social structures, as well as by the concerns of
U.S. citizens. The political and institutional systems participating in the development and

protection of environmental and natural resources in the United States are as diverse as the

resources themselves. . _ 11

~tAJf'1~
President Bush said earlier this year that technology offers great promise to significantly,%oouce
emission Our national circumstances - our prosperity and our diversity -- may shape our
'1
response t climate change, but our commitment to invest in innovative technologies and
research '11 ensure the success ofour response. .

.i

CEQ 011260

 Greenhouse Gas Inventory

This report presents U.S. anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission trends from 1990 through 1999

and fulfIlls the U.S. commitment for 2001 for an annual inventory report to the UNFCCC. To

ensure that the U.S. emissions inventory is comparable to those ofother UNFCCC signatory

countries, the emission estimates were calculated using methodologies consistent with those

recommended in the Revised J996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories

(IPCCfUNEP/OECDIIEA 1997).

NaturaJly occurring greenhouse gases -- that is, gases that trap heat -- include water vapor,
carQon dioxide (C0 2), methane (C~), nitrous oxide (N20), and ozone (0). Several classes of
halogenated substances that contain fluorine, chlorine, or bromine are also greenhouse gases, but
they are, for the most part. solely a product of industrial activities. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and bromofluorocarbons (halons) are stratospheric ozone·
depleting substaIlces covered under the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer and, hence, are not included in national greenhouse gas inventories. Some other
halogenated substances-hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs). and sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6)-do not deplete stratospheric ozone but are potent greenhouse gases and are
accounted for iIi national greenhouse gas inventories.

Although C02, Cti4 and N20 occur naturally in the atmosphere, their atmospheric concentrations
have been affected by human activities. Since pre-industrial time (i.e., since about 1750),
concentrations of these greenhouse gases have increased by 31, 151 and 17 percent, respectively
(IPCC 2001). This increase has altered the chemical composition ofthe Earth's atmosphere and ~
~eeAseEtlJeBtlraffected the global climate system. . /
l

In 1999, total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions were about 12 percent above emissions in 1990. A
somewhat lower (0.9 percent) than average (1.2 percent) annual increase in emissions. especially
given the robust economic growth during this period, was primarily attributable to the following
factors: wanner than average summer and winter conditions, increased output from nuclear
power plants, reduced C1-I.4 emissions from coal mines. and reduced HFC-23 by-product
emissions from the chemical manqfacture of HCFC-22.

As the largest sourceoru.s. greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 accounted for 82 percent oftota!
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 1999. Carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion was the
dominant contributor -- emissions from this source category grew by 13 percent between 1990
and 1999. ~

Methane accounted faT 9 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 1999. Landfills,

enteric fermentation, and natural gas systems were the source of75 percent oftoW eRe

emissions. Nitrous oxide accounted for 6percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 1999,

and agricultural soil management represented 69 percent oftota! N20 emissions. The main

anthropogenic activities producing N 20 in the United States were agricultural soil management,

fuel combustion in motor vehicles, and adipic and nitric acid production processes. HFCs, PFCs,

and SF6 accounted for 2percent oftotal U.S. greenhouse'gas emissions in 1999. and substitutes

for ozone-depleting substances comprised 42 percent ofall lIFe. PFC, and SF6 emissions.~ ..,

5 tuf.d. a..... w..-u:v ~ .e" j ~ -n..d ~ $cro I­

Clo\-

u ~ !V·M.-),·Ud·~ ~ ~Wl·~
/'j":'f~ ~ orl. ~ -r.a:<Hc'~ ~ ,e-i.....4./.

CEQ 011261

 Policies and Measures

U.S. climate change programs reduced greenhouse gas emissions by an estimated 66 million

metric tons ofcarbon equivalent (MMTCE) in 2000. This reduction helped to significantly lower

(15 percent since 1990) carbon intensity (Le., greenhouse gases emitted per unit ofOOP), and

thus ranks as a tremendous step forward in addressing climate change.

However, the U.S. effort was given a potentially greater boost in June 200 Iwben President Bush
announced major new initiatives to advance climate change science and technology. These
initiatives came about after government consultation with industry leaders, the scientific
community, and environmental advocacy groups indicated that more could and should be done to
address scientific uncertainties and encourage technological innovation.

At the direction of the President. the Secretaries ofCommerce and Energy are developing

National Climate Change Technology and Research Initiatives. These initiatives are designed to

achieve real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and to use synergies among groups - e.g.,

public-private partnerships and interagency cooperation - (0 spearhead bold measures for ~~

oGgJRgaA~ GIim~, ~1:lllfig8. The President's National Energy Policy (NEPD Group 2001), a__ ..I l~

comprehensive strategy aimed at advancing enviromnentaUy friendly energy technologies and f~

energy effiCienC~Ywill provide a practical complement groWlded in market-based approaches to '"'" ~

the Technology d Research Initiatives. '. Jl.J~

~lL~V.S'hLAf1~~/ ~
Projections and the Total Effects of Policies and Measnres ~~

Impacts and Adaptation

One ofthe weakest links in our knowledge is the connection between global and regional
projections of climate change. Th~ National Research Council's response to the President's
request for a review of climate change policy specifically noted that fundamental scientific
questions remain regarding the specifics ofregiollal and local projections (NRC 2001). The
potential impacts of climate change will not be fully comprehended until these details are clear.
Predicting the potential impacts ofclimate change is limited eA!Tby the current inability to
accurately predict climate at local and regional scales. It is also limited by a lack of
understanding ofthe sens.itivity ofmany environmental systems and resources, both managed
and unmanaged, to climate change. .

This chapter provides an overview of potential negative and positive impacts and possible
response options; based primarily on the Climate Change ImpaclS on the United Stares: the
Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change completed earlier this year (NAST
2001). This assessment used historical records, model simulations, and sensitivity analyses to
explore our)'Ulnerability to climate change and highlighted gaps in our knowledge.
f~o.L .
6

. ,G

CEQ 011262
 Because the United States is large an.~Q direct effects ofclinutte change on our
economy as a \yhole are likely to be "mal. However, in considering vulnerability, we
recognize that the United States wil e affected by both, the positive and the negative
consequences affecting the rest of the world. Although tensions may exist among global,
national, and regional objectives, and though impacts will vary widely, we are part of a global
economy that shares resources, Therefore, what happens throughout the world has important
direct and indirect ronsequences, for the UI!ited States.

O1allenges associated with climate change will most rikely increase during the 21 tt century,1't1
the 8KteH( tAat fuWl'e eflQHge6 a£C lIeVl' agd their OI3Gi't abrupt, eeunolliJe lUSJ option wtrld occur,
I

~\lt •....m be Rl98eRlted by tHe magy ollgoiDB e1f.9rts te ifterease society's Icsilience. Although
changes in the environm~nt will surely occur, our nation's economy should continue to provide
the means for sucf::essful adaptation to cliinate changes.

Financial Resources and Transfer of Technology

To address climate change effectively, developed and developing counbies must meet
environmental and developmental challenges together. The United States is committed to helping
developing countries and cOlUltnes with economies in transition to meet these challenges in ways
that promote economic well-being and protect natural resources. This commitment has involved
many players, ranging from govemment to the priv!1te sector, who contribute significant .
resources to developing countries. As amplified in the UNFCCC guidelines, this assistance can
take the fonn of hard and/or soft technology transfer.

- ..

CEQ 011263

 Through the Tropical Forest Conservation Act.iUnited States, in cooperation with The
Nature Conservancy, sponsored a $6.8 million debt-for- ture swap with Belize. Under this
agreement, Jilelize's debt obligation to the United State ill be reduced by half- saving Belize
over $10 million in the next 26 years. In return, Belize will transfer 11,000 acres of crown land
into a local nongovermnent organization's (NOO's) stewardship and will provide for another
12,000 acres ofcritical forested land in the Maya Mountain Marine Conidor to be managed by
an NGO steward.

The Maya Mountain Marine Corridor is a steUar wildlife habitat bostingjaguar, ocelot,
marguay, tapir, West Indian manatee, Morelet's crocodile, and 350 species ofbirds, including the
rare scarlet macaw. It is also home to an offshore barrier reef that is second ohly to the Great
Barrier Reef ofAustralia. 'Through this debtpfor-nature swap, pine savannas, tropical rainforests,
16 miles of pristine Caribbean coastline, and more than 200 offshore caves will now be available
to delight and educate future generations. .

This example highlights ingredients for successful bilateral cooperation on climate

change: a project valued by both donor and host country that protects natural resources and

promotes economic well-being.

Research and Sy~tematic Observation

The Umted States leads the world in research on climate and other global environmental
changes, funding approximately half of the world's climate change research expenditures. We
intend to continue funding research in order to ensure vigorous, ongoing programs aimed at
narrowing the uncertainties in our knowledge of climate change. These research programs will
be crucial for advancing the llI1derstanding of climate change. However, an effective strategy for
furthering our understanding wil1 also require an observing system that can support long-term
climate monitoring and prediction. The United States has pledged to make significant
invesbnents to accelerate research and to build the infraStructure required to provide the
necessary information to support decisions on critical climate issues.

i
V.~
The President's major n initiatives directed at addressing climate change ~ informed by a
wealth of input aQd ar ~eetedto result in significant improvements in climate modeling,
observation and research efforts. The long-term vision embraced by the new initiatives is to help
government, the private sector, and conununitics make infonned management decisions
regarding climate change in light ofpersi~ent Wlcertainties. ­

Education, Training and PubJic Awareness

The U.s. National Assessment provided a vehicle for extending public awareness about c1imaiF_ .1
change. Regional and sectoral workshops in association with the Assessment proved to be -,,~ ~
~ venues for infonnation gathering and dissemination. Some activities generated during
the Assessment will continue to be supported as a way of strengthening the dialogue with the

,.~

CEQ 011264
 public. Nongovernmental organizations, the press, and industry have also played a very active
'role in the last few years in making issues regarding climate change visible to the public.

Educational initiatives sponsored by federal agencies have grown dramatically in the last three
years. These initiatives target a range of educational levels -- from K-12 through university'
faculty .- providing training and educational resources designed ·to enhance understanding of
climate change and the quality ofscientific and technical training. Some of these programs enlist
students and educators to participate in monitoring environmental parameters associated with
climate change. These programs give double· value, as they not only educate and train but also
expand our capacity to monitor changes in the environment. Most progrnms have web sites that
enable them to reach very large numbers ofpeopJe with information concerning climate change.

The goal of all of these endeavorS - education, training, and public awareness -. is to create an
infonned populace. The United States is committed to providing citizens with access to the
infonnation necessary to critically evaluate the consequences.efboth ee~6fl aftd jnseh61'l '
eeB6emtng climate Chang, . 'f 14 ~ -H ~
. t:>~~0l CtS/-~vl, t:lJlIJ~ ~-f ~ r;v-~~
a.J. ~ld.- ..A, I~e-' tu L.y ~ J~" f
1lL F~c.~c::.2 lM~'tz ~

·9

.4!

CEQ 011265

 TRANSFERREDIRECOMMEND DENIAL IN FUJtI:;- 2.({

B5 Introduction and Overview t=. 1~
RECOMMEND AND TRANSFER - CEQ
"The Earth's well·being is ... an issue important to America - and it's an issue that should

be important 10 every nation and in every part afthe world. My Administration is committed to a

leadership role on the issue ofclimate change. We recognize our responsibility and we will meet

it. at home. in our hemisphere. and in the w.or1d. "

With this June 2001 pledge, President Bush reiterated the seriousness of climate change and

ordered a Cabinet-level review oru.s. climate change policy. He requested working groups to

develop irmovative approaches that would: (l) be consistent with the goal of stabilizing

greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere; (2) be sufficiently flexible to allow for new

findings; (3) support continued economic growth and prosperity; (4) provide market-based

incentives; (5) incorporate technological advances; and (6) promote gJobal participation.

The President's decision to take a deeper look at climate change policy arose from the

recognition that the dialogue begun in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro lacked the

requisite participatory breadth for a global response to climate change. At this historic summit,

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted, with the ultimate

objective of providing a higher quality oflife for future generations. Signatories pledged to:

"achieve ...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that

would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a
level should be achieved within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened. and to
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."

In Rio. ambitious plans were set in motion to address climate change. However, participation in

construc~ng adaptive and mitigative measures {or addressing climate change fell short ofthe

breadth necessary to confront a problem that President Bush recently sai~ has "the potential to

imp.act every corner ofthe world." A global problem demands a truly participatory global

response.

President Bush has pledged that the United States will act to address this global problem in a

serious, sensible and science-based manner, even though uncertainties may remain regaroing the

precise magnitude, timing, and regional patterns of climate change. But we need partners in this

endeavor. All countries must actively work together to achieve the long-tenn goal of stabilizing

greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous interference ~th the climate

system.

.For our part, the United States intends to continue to be a constructive and active Party to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. We are leading global research
efforts to enhance the Wlderstanding of the science of climate change. as called for under the
Framework Convention. We lead the world on climate science and in recent years have spent

CEQ 011267

$1.6 billion on federal research annually. Since 1990, the United States has provided over $18
billion for climate system research-- more resources than any other country. In July 2001,
President Bush announced a new Climate Change Research Initiative to focus on key remaining
gaps in our understanding of anthropogenic climate change and its potential impacts.

As envisioned by the Framework Convention, we are helping to develop technologies to address

climate change. The President has pledged to reprioritize research budgets under the National
Climate Change Technology Initiative so that funds will be available to develop advanced energy
and sequestration technologies to measure and monitor greenhouse gas emissions accurately. '
. 4- "
We plan to increase bilateral support for climate observation systems and to finailce even more
demonstration projects of advanced energy technologies in developing countries. President
Bush's Western Hemisphere Initiative -- created to enhance climate change cooperation with
developing countries in the Americas and elsewhere':' will also strengthen implementation of the
Framework Convention comminnents. In line with our conunitrnents under the Convention. we
have provided over $1 billion in climate change-related assistance to developing countries over
the last five years. Ail of this is just the beginning: we intend to strengthen our cooperation on
climate science and advanced technologies around the world whenever and wherever possible.

We are also making progress in limiting emissions ofgreenhouse gases in the United States by
becoming more energy efficient In the last decade, we have seen tremendous economic growth
in the United States, and our level ofemissions per unit ofeconomic output has declined
significantly. We are taking substantive action to ad,dress climate change through voluntary
actions. and we will continue to do so.

Climate change is a problem that requires 100% effort - ours and the rest of the world's. This
long-term problem, decades in the making. cannot be solved overnight. A real solution must be
durable, science-based, and economically sustainable. In particular, we seek an environmentally
sound approach that will not hann the U.S. economy, which remains a critically important engine
ofglobal prosperity. We believe that economic development is key to protecting the global
environment In the real world, no'one will.forego meeting basic family needs to protect the
global commons. Environmental protection is neither achievable nor sustainable without
opportunities for continued development and greater prosperity. Our objective is to ensure a
long-term solution that is environmentally effective, economically sustainable, and fair.
Protecting the global environment is too important a responsibility for anything less.

In this U.S. Climate Action Report. the United States' third fonnal communication under the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, we fulfill the commitments required under Articles
4 and 12 of the Convention. We meet the formal reporting requirements of the Climate
Convention by providing a description ofour national circumstances, "identifying existing and
planned policies and measures, indicating future trends in greenhouse gas emissions, outlining
expected impacts and adaptation measures, and providing infonnation on financial resources,
technology transfer, research, and systematic observations. The rem~der of this chapter
provides a brief description of the climate system science that sets the context for U.S. action, as
2

. .-.
CEQ 011268
 well as an overview of the U.S. program that is the focus of this report.

TbeScience

(the following section is adapted from Climate Change Science: An Analysis ojSome Key

Questions, NRC 2001)

Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing

global mean surface air temperature and subsurface ocean temperature to rise. While the changes

observed over the last several decades are most likely primarily due to human activities, we

cannot role out that so.me significant part is also a reflection of natural variability.

Reducing the wide range of uncertainty iiilierent in current model predictions will require major
advances in understanding and modeling ofthe factors Ibat determine atlnospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, and the feedback processes that detcnnine the
sensitivity of the climate system. Specifically, this will involve reducing uncertainty regarding:

'. future use of fossil fuels and future emissions ofmethane,

• the fraction oCthe fossil fuel carbon that will provide radiative forcing vs. exchange
with the oceans Or net exchange with the land biosphere,
• tbe feedbacks in the climate system that determine both the magnitude of the change
and the rate of energy uptake by the oceans, '
• the details of regional and local climate change,
• the nature and causes of the natural variability of climate and its interactions with
forced changes, and
• the direct and indirect effects of the changing distributions of aerosols.

Knowledge of the climate system and ofprojections about the future climate is derived from
fundamental physics, chemistry and observations. Data are then incorporated in global
circulation models. Howev'er, model projections are limited by the paucity of data available to
evaluate the ability of coupled models to simulat~ important aspects ofclimate. To overcome
these limitations, it is ess<:ntial to ensure the existence of a long-term observing system and to
make more comprehensive regional measurements of greenhouse gases. These data are criticat'to
understanding local and regional source strengths.
#

While current analyses are unable to predict with confidence the timing, magnitude, or regional
distribution of climate change, the best scientific infonnation indicates that if greenhouse'gas
concentrations continue to increase, changes are likely to occur. The U.S. National Research
Council has cautioned, however, that "because there us considerable uncertainty in current
understanding of how the climate system varies naturally and reacts to emissions ofgreenhouse
gases and aerosols, current estimates of the magnitude of future wannings should be regarded as
tentative and subject to future adjustments (either upward or down":ard.)"

... _ .. _--~

CEQ 011269

 National Circumstances: Our Context

The perspective of the United States on climate change is infonned by our economic prosperity,
the rich diversity of our climate conditions and natural resources, and the demographic trends of
over 275 million residents. Because ofour co\ultry's vast diversity ofclimatic zones, climate
change will not affect the U.S. uniformly. This diversitY will also enhance our economy's
resilience to future climate change.

Higher greenhouse gas emissions are a consequence ofrobust economic growth: more wealth
generally promotes increased expenditures of energy. During the 19905, investments in
technology led to increaSes in energy efficiency, which effectively offset increases in greenhouse
gas emissions that would nonnally attend strong economic growth. In addition, much of the
economic growth in the United States has occtll"TCd in less energy-intensive sectors (e.g.,
computer technologies). Consequently, in the 1990s the direct and proportionate correlation
between economic growth and greenhous~ gas emissions was altered.

While the United States is the world's largest consumer of energy, it is also the world's largest
producer of energy, with vast reserves ofcoal, natural gas, and crude oiL The President's new
National Energy Policy (NEPD Group 2(01) includes recommendations that will reduce our
reliance on fossil fuel production. For example, tax incentives and otheiinitiatives will be used
to promote the use ofcombined heat and power and the use ofrenewable resources. The .
President has also proposed expanding our nuclear. energy capacity. but it is unclear whether
Congress will sanction this endeavor;Even ifaltemative forms ofenergy generation are slow to
develop, the introduction ofwholesaJe and retail competition in the electric power industry has
produced and will continue to produce significant changes in the energy sector.

The nation's response to climate change - our vulnerability and our ability to adapt -- is also
influ~nced by U.S. governmental, economic, and social structures, as well as by the concerns of
U.~. citizens. The political and institutional systems participating in the development and .
protection of environmental and natural resources in the United States are as diverse as the
resources themselves.

President Bush said earlier this' year that technology offers great promise to significantly and
cost-effectively reduce emissions in the long-term. Our national circumstances - OUT prosperity
and our diversity -- may shape our response to climate change, but our commitment to invest in
innovative technologies and research wj1J·ensure the success ofour response.

CEQ 011270

 Greenhouse Gas Inventory

This report presents U.S. anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission trends from 1990 through 1999
and fulfills the U.S. commitment for 2001 for an annual inventory report to the UNFCCC. To
ensure that the U.S. emissions inventory is comparable to those of other UNFCCC signatory
countries, the emission estimates were calculated using methodologies consistent with those
recommended in the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelinesfor National Greenhouse Gas Inventories
(IPCCIUNEP/OECDIIEA 1997).

. Naturally occurring greenhouse gases - that is, gases that trap heat - include water vapor,
carbon dioxide (C(h), methane (m), nitrous oxide (N20), and ozone (0,). Several classes of
halogenated substances that contain fluorine, chlorine, or bromine are also greenhouse gases, but
they are, for the most part, solely a product of industrial activities. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and bromotluorocaruons (halons) are stratospheric ozone­
depleting substances covered under the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer and, hence, are not included in national greenhouse gas inventories. Some other
halogenated substallces-hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6}-do not deplete stratospheric ozone but are potent greenhouse gases and are
accounted for in national greenhouse gas inventories.

Although CO 2, CH. and N 20 occur naturally in the atmosphere, their atmospheric concentrations
have been affected by human activities. Since pre-industrial time (i.e., since about 1750).
concentrations of these greenhouse gases have increased by 31, 151 and 17 percent, respectively
(!pCC 2001). This increase has altered the chemical composition of the Earth's atmosphere and
likely affected the global climate system.

In 1999, total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions were about 12 percent above emissions in 1990. A
somewhat lower (0.9 percent) than average (1.2 percent) annual increase in emissions, especially
given the robust economic growth during this period, was primarily attributable to the following
factors: warmer than average summer and winter conditions, increased output from nuclear
power plants, reduc~ ~ emissions from coal mines, and reduced HFC-23 by-product
emissions from the chemical manufacture ofHCFC-22.

As the largest source or U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 accounted for 82 percent of total
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 1999. Carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion was the
dominant contributor -- emissions from this source category grew by 13 percent between 1990
and 1999. .

Methane accounted for 9 percent oftotaI U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 1999. Landfills,
enteric fermentation, and natural gas systems were the source of75 percent oftotal ell.
emissions. Nitrous oxide accounted for 6 percent of total U.S. greenhouse g~ emissions in 1999,
and agricultural soil management represented 69 percent oftotal N 20 emissions. The main
anthropogenic activities producing N 20 in the United States were agricultural soil management,
fuel combustion in motor vehicles, and adipic and nitric acid production processes. HFCs, PFCs,
5

cs

CEQ 011271

 and SF6 accoWlted for 2 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 1999, and substitutes
for ozone-depleting substances comprised 42 percent ofall lIFC, PFC, and SF6 emissions.
Evidence is also emerging that black carbon aerosols (soot), which are formed by incomplete
combustion, may be a significant anthropogenic agent. These aerosols have significant negative
health impacts, particularly in developing countries. At least one million global deaths occur
annually as a result of particulate air pollution.

PoUcies aod Measures

U.S. climate change programs reduced greenhouse gas emissions by an estimated 66 million
metric tons ofcarbon equivalent (MMTCE) in 2000. This reduction helped to significantly lower
(15 percent since 1990) carbon intensity (Le., greenhouse gases emitted per unit of GDP). and
thus ranks as a tremendous step forward in addressing climate change.

However. the U.S. effort was given a potentially greater boost in June 2001 when President Bush
announced major" new initiatives to advance climate change science and technology. These
initiatives came about after government consultation with industry leaders, the scientific
community. and environmental advocacy groups indicated that more could and should be done to
address scientific uncertainties and encourage technological innovation.

At the direction ofthe President, the Secretaries of Commerce and Energy are developing
National Climate Change Technology and Research Initiatives. These initiatives are designed to
achieve real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and to use synergies among groups - e.g.,
public-private p~erships and interagency cooperation -- to spearhead bold measures for
reducing the projected growth rate in global greenhouse gas emissions. The President's National
. Energy Policy (NEPD Group 2001). a comprehensive strategy aimed at advancing
environmentally friendly energy technologies and energy efficiency, while enhancing U.S.
energy seeurily. will provide a practical complement grounded in market-based approaches to the
Technology and Research Initiatives.

Projections and the Total Effects of Policies and Measures

Impacts and Adaptation

One of the weakest links in our knowledge is the connection between global and regional
projections of climate change. The National Re~earch Council's response to the President's
request for a review ofclimate change policy specificaI1y noted that fundamental scientific
questions remain regarding the specifics ofregional and local projections (NRC 2001). The'
potential'impacts ofclimate change will not be fully comprehended until these details are clear.
. Predicting the potential impacts of climate change is limited only by the current inability to
accurately predict climate at local and regional scales. It is also limited by a lack of
6"

I"

CEQ 011272

 understanding of the sensitivity of many environmental systems and resources, both managed
and unmanaged, to climate change.

This chapter provides an overview of potential negative and positive impacts and possible
response options, based primarily on the Climate Change Impacts on the United States: the
Potential Consequences ofClimate Variability and Change completed earlier this year (NAST
2001). This assessment used historical records, model simulations, and sensitivity analyses to
explore our potential vulnerability to climate change and highlighted gaps in our knowledge.

Because the United States is large and diverse, any direct effects of climate change on our
economy as a whole are likely to be minimal. However, in considering vulnerability, we
recognize that the United States willlikeJy be affected by both the positive and the negative
consequences affecting the rest of the world. Although tensions may exist among global,
national, an~ regional objectives, and though impacts will vary widely, we are part of a global
economy that shares resources. Therefore, what happens throughout the world has important
direct and indirect consequences, for the United States.

Challenges associated with climate change will most likely increase during the 21 51 century.
Although changes in the environment will surely occur, our nation's economy should continue to
provide the means for successful adaptation to climate changes.

Fmancial Resources and Transfer of Technology

To address climate cnange effectively, developed and developing countries must meet
environmental challenges together. The United States is committed to helping developing
countries and countries with economies in transition meet these challenges in ways that promote
economic well-being and protect natural resources. This commitment bas involved many players,
ranging from government to the private sector, who have contributed significant resowees to
developing countries. As amplified in the UNFCCC guidelines, this assistance can take the fonn
of hard andlor soft technology trarrsfe~.

Projects targeting hard technology transfer, such as equipment to control emissions and increase
energy efficiency, can be particularly effective in reducing emissions. And projects that target the
transfer of soft technologies, such as capacity building and institution strengthening thO!}gh the
sharing of technical expertise can help countries reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of
climate change. But whether hard or soft, technology transfer programs are most effective when
they are approached in a collaborative manner and are congruent with the development
objectives and established legal framework of the target country.

To this end. the United States works closeJy with beneficiary countries to ensure a good fit
between the resources provided by the donor and the perceived needs of the developing country.
But even when the fit fulfills the goals of both countries, transparent democratic processes must
be in place for bilateral cooperation to succeed. Ingredients for successful bilateral cooperation

,
-

CEQ 011273

 on climate change: a project valued by both donor and host country that protects natural
resources and promotes economic weU-being.

From 1997 to 2000, the United States provi'ded over $15 billion in direct funding for climate­
related mitigation and adaptation activities and programs including carbon sequestration,
( tec~ology transfer and capacity-building in developing countries, and scientific research.
During that same period, the United States also provided $954.3 million in indirect funding for
mitigation activities in the energy sector. But merely focusing on the dollar value oftecbnology
transfer obscures the particularity of an individual project's worth as Chapter 7 illustrates with
numerous examples.

Research and Systematic Observation

The United States leads the world in research on climate and other global environmental
changes, funding approximately halfofthe world's climate change research expenditures. We
intend to continue funding research in order to ensure vigorous, ongoing programs aimed at
narrowing the uncertainties in our knowledge of climate change. These researcb programs will be
crucial for advancing the understanding of climate change. However, an effective strategy for
furthering our understanding will also require an observing system thafcan support long-term
climate monitoring and prediction. The United States has pledged to make significant
investments to accelerate research and to build dle infrastructure required to provide the
necessary infonnation to support decisions on critical climate issues.

The·President's major new initiatives directed at addressing climate change are informed by a
wealth of input and are intended to result in significant improvements in climate modeling,
observation and research efforts. The long-teon vision embraced by the new initiatives is to help
govenunent, the private sector, and communities make informed management decisio~s
regarding climate ch~ge in light ofpersistent uncertainties.

Education, Training and Public Awareness

The u.s. National Assessment provided a vehicle for extending public awareness about ~limate
change. Regional and sectoral workshops in association with the Assessment proved to be
effective venues for inf()rma~on gathering and dissemination. Some activities generated during
the Assessment will continue to be supported as a way of strengthening the dialogue with the
public. Nongovernmental organizations, the press, and industry have also played a very active
role in the last' few years in making issues regarding climate change visible to ~e public. .

Educational initiatives sponsored by federal agencies have grown dramatically in the last three
years. These initiatives target a range of educational levels -- from K-12 through university
faculty - providing training and educational resources designed to enhance'Wlderstanding of
8

...

CEQ 011274

· .

climate change and the quality of scientific and technical training. Some of these programs enlist
students and educators to participate in monitoring environmental parameters associated with
climate change. These programs give double value, as they not only educate and train but also
expand our capacity to monitor changes in the environment. Most programs have web sites that
enable them to reach very large numbers of people with information concerning climate change.

The goal orall of these endeavors - education, training, and public awareness - is to create an
infonned populace. The United States is committed to providing citizens with access to the
infonnation necessary to critically evaluate the consequences of policy options to address climate
change in a cost-effective manner that is sustainable and effective in achieving the long tenn
goals ofthe Framework Convention on Climate Change.

·1

CEQ 011275

I •

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTA
L QUALITY

00 1G 04

CE QO l12 77
 Sf cos 17

;--;--'~--_.

£.. Phil Cooney

10124/200206:01:54 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Phil CooneyICEOIEOP@EOP

cc: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
bcc: Roberta L. Conde/CEQ/EOP@EOP. Records Management@EOP
Subject: Re: Next Meeting on Voluntary Sectoral GHG Reduction Agreements: Wednesday, November 6,2·3:30
PM. CEQ· 730 Jackson Place ~

Group. thanks to those of you who were able to participate in today's meeting. We will meet next on
November 6 at 2 PM. As we discussed for EPA and DOE, please plan to bring a "Public
affairs/communications" person with you to the next meeting (Sam Thernstrom, CEQ's Communications
Director, will coordinate this aspect of the effort). Also at the next meeting,'please plan to bring hard
copies (15 stapled) of the agreements or commitments that we have from industry sectors for distribution
to our larger group, Finally. DOE and EPA are checking calendars for their principals at different times on
Wednesday. December 11. Would you also check availability at those same times on Thurs and Fri of
that week, the 12 and 13th -- as J am trying to coordinate with Jim's schedule as well. Thanks to all -- we
have our work cut out for us, Phil

Message Copied To:

hogan.kathleen@epa.gov @ inet

seidel.stephen@epa.gov @ inet

larisa.dobriansky@hq.doe.gov @ inet

al.cobb@hq.doe.gov @ inet

reifsnyderda@state.gov @ inet

quintin.kendall@ost.dot.gov @ inet

chris_keamey@;os.doLgov@ inet

whohenst@mailoce.oce.usda.gov @ jnet

gibson.tom@epa.gov

kevin .kolevar@hq.doe,gov

bart.marcols@hq.doe.gov

Samuel A. Thernstrom/CEQ/EOP@EOP

"

002399

CEQ 011323

 draft

VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS

Goal. Demonstrate solid, tangible progress toward meeting the President's goal of an
18% reduction in GHG intensity by 2012.

Approach. Suggest the following:

• Evaluate and prioritize business sectors by factors of 1) relative scale of current

GHG emissions, 2) relative opportunity for emissions reductions, 3) relative ease

of achieving emissions reduction concurrence, and 4) ability to measure results.

Note that key issue is how to maximize inclusion of the fraction that is associated

with consumers.

• Determine what reductions performance we need or should expect from these

sectors to achieve the overall 18%

• Compare the targets with what we are likely to be able to encourage from the

industries

• Develop a marketing plan to achieve the targets

o Target organizations and outcomes (see above)

o Documentation describing the voluntary program benefits, goals,

organization, reqUirements, monitoring/verification, etc. designed to be
handed out to prospective participants. Note need to integrate with
Registry approach.

o Develop a draft conforming agreement

o Develop a draft WH press release announcing an agreement(s)

o Agree on lead agency and individual staff to implement the marketing

plan with each target entity (other's will support/encourage)

o Contact plan - individual executive meetings, addresses to groups, staffto

staff discussions, etc.

• Develop a process infrastructure (meetings, etc.) to report on progress and issues

Page 2 10/28/2002

CEQ 011330
 r. UU I

I _

AITACHMENT 1

PRELTMINARY PROPOSAL OF PRIORITY SECTORS AND AGENCY LEADS

Proposed Agency Lead

Key Business Sectors
Proposed Rationale/comments
Lead
Energy-Intensive Industries
- Primary Aluntinurn EPA Extend existing sector-wide program
- Cement EPA 13uild upon nnergy Star partnerships/tools
- Chemicals Manufacture DOE Build upon Industry for the Future relationship
- Food Processing EPA Build llpon Energy Star partnership/tools
- Glass Manufactl.lre DOE Build upon Industty for the Future relationship
- Iron and Steel DOE Build upon Industry for the Future relationship
- Metal Casting DOE Build upon Industry for the Future relationship
- Mining DOE Build upon Industry for the Future relationship
- Pelroleum Refining DOE Build upon Industry for the Future relationship
- Pulp anQ Paper ?'f? Build upon CHP Partnership as ClIP is major option
for cost-effective reductions in this industry?
Electricity Generation 'n?
Other Industrlo:i (EPA would pursue 5 of following in a 1'1 tranche)
- Automotive Illlsembly EPA BLJild upon Energy Star partnership
- Beer production EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
- Consumer electronics EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
- Natural gas production EPA Build upon Natural Gas Smr
and transmission
- Office eq\.lipment EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership ~

manufacture
- Pharmaceuticals
- Semiconductors
Service Industry (BUildings)
- Conunercit.ll Real Est&tc
'- Financial Services
- Healthcare
- Hospitality
- Retail
- Telecommunications
EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
EPA Build upon existing Elector-Wide program
(EPA would pursue 3 offallowing in a 1"1 tranche)
EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership
EPA Build upon Energy Sttlr partnership
EPA Build upon Energy Star partnership

CEQ 011331

 draft

VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS

Goal. Demonstrate solid, tangible progress toward meeting the President's goal of an
18% reduction in GHG intensity by 2012.

Approach. Suggest the following:

• Evaluate and prioritize business sectors by factors of 1) relative scale of current

GHG emissions, 2) relative opportunity for emissions reductions, 3) relative ease
of achieving emissions reduction c,oncurrence, and 4) ability to measure results.
Note that key issue is how to maximize inclusion of the fraction that is associated
with consumers.

• Determine what reductions performance we need or should expect from these

sectors to achieve the overall 18%

• Compare the targets with what we arc likely to be able to encourage from the
industries

• Develop a marketing plan to achieve the targets

o Target organizations and outcomes (see above)

o Documentation describing the voluntary program benefits, goals,

organization, requirements, monitoring/verification, etc. designed to be
handed out to prospective participants. Note need to integrate with
Registry approach.

o Develop a draft conforming agreement

o Develop a draft WH press release announcing an agreement(s)

o Agree on lead agency and individual staff to implement the marketing

plan with each target entity (other's will support/encourage)

o Contact plan - individual executive meetings, addresses to groups, staff to

staff discussions, etc.

.. Develop a process infrastructure (meetings, etc.) to report on progress and issues

Page 2 00350:1 10/3112002

CEQ 011340

 /!.f)c-? 8

(b) (:v
Jim Connaughton DRAFT REMARKS FOR zr '. ~NT

On behalfof President Bush. and the mem! #

afternoon - Secretary Abraham, Secretary Veneman, UUV'-U'v_
~ ,ined me this

~puty Secretary

Jackson -- I wannly welcome you. Today we are recognizing an important, broad and creative

array of initiatives from business and industry sectors across America to reduce their greenhouse

gas emissions in coming years. These initiatives, completed after many months of hard work

and collaborative engagement with four federal agencies, respond to President Bush's challenge

last year for collective engagement and effort - on industry wide and sector wide bases.

The initiatives that we are recognizing today will not only reduce the projected growth of

greenhouse gas emissions in these sectors in the next decade. With these initiatives, sectors are

committing themselves to greater energy efficiency in their operations, greater reliance on

emerging energy and carbon sequestration technologies, greater productivity and return on their

capital investments, and better stewardship of our environment. Of critical importance, these

sectors will be sustaining their tremendous efficiency gains of the last decade, while also

contributing their share toward achieving President Bush's stated goal for reduced "greenhouse'

gas intensity" -- by 18 percent -- in the next decade.

The President's focus on reducing greenhouse gas intensity reflects an underlying

philosophy that stands in stark contrast to proposals for near tenn controls on energy production

and consumption in this country - as the Kyoto Protocol would have imposed. One year ago, he

stated:

"Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort, over many generations.
My approach recognizes that sustained economic growth is the solution, not the problem
- because a nation that grows its economy is a nation that can afford investments in
efficiency, new technologies, and a cleaner environment."

Minutes ago, the White House press office released a Statement of the President

reinforcing that philosophy and commending the major industrial and business sectors that have

stepped forward today to prevent or sequester millions of tons of greenhouse gas emissions in the

coming decade.

Today we are extremely pleased to recognize the breadth and depth of this initial

response to President Bush's challenge to American businesses and industries to collectively

pursue cost-effective opportunities to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Even as we focus

our federal research to better understand the causes and consequences of global climate change

. and to develop ·'.v advanced energy and sequestration technologies that will deliver solutions to
this long term issue, we are actively pursuing near term initiatives to meaningfully reduce the
projected growth in America's greenhouse gas emissions in the next decade.

I also want to emphasize that in announcing these impressive initiatives today, we in the

Administration recognize that this is the beginning a process of engagement American business

and industry toward achieving the President's greenhouse gas mitigation goal. We plan to

engage many other industries in efforts to achieve our national goal, particularly in the

CEQ 011341
agriculture sector where cost-effective opportunities for carbon sequestration are significant. We
also envision a continuing dialogue with the sectors which have stepped forward today, to
actively explore opportunities for additional reductions that prove technologically viable and
cost-effective within this decade.

In turning our program back to Secretary Abraham, I would again express our thanks to
the industry sectors that have come forward with the initiatives that we are recognizing today.
This is a tremendous start to a heightened collaboration between the federal government and
American business and industry toward achieving our shared goals for our global environment.

CEQ 011342

 '1 ,.
ill
~
~
~ Global Issues

•-
fi
2 Ozone depletion and climate change have global consequences for human health and the environment.

3
In the first Instance, pollution damages a thin layer of beneficial ozone in the stratosphere, about 6 to 30
it 4 miles above the Earth, which protects living beings from harmful ultraviolet radiation (UV-a and UV-b)

~
,.
5 from the sun. UV radiation is a specific part of the sun's entire spectrum of wavelengths.

~ 6 Climate change is also a global issue. Energy from the sun heats the planet's surface, which in tum
7 radiates energy back into space at a longer wavelength. Any changes in the radiative balance of Earth
8 will alter weather patterns, regional temperatures, and precipitation. Variations in the sun's output and
iii> 9 volcanic activity are two natural factors that affect the radiative balance. In addition, certain atmospheric
~ 10 gases, such as CO 2 , methane, nitrous oxides (N 20), and other gases trap some of the outgoing energy,
11 retaining heat like the glass panels of a greenhouse. Other substances, such as black carbon (soot),

=
-
~
12
13

14
15
organic carbon, and sulfate aerosols, renect incoming solar radiation or absorb energy a~d affect climate
on regional and global scales.

Stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are separate environmental issues, but are related in
some ways. Specifically, some substances that deplete the ~tratospheric ozone layer also are potent and
jt 16 very long-lived gr.eenhouse gases (GHGs), absorbing outgoing radiation and warming the atmosphere.

~ 17 Ozone itself is a GHG, and its depletion in the stratosphere over the polar zones results in localized

it 18
19
cooling. Those substances have a small effect on global mean temperatures, and alter regional patterns
of climate.
lil
,..
j) 20

21 What is happening to the earth's ozone layer?

•
:t.
22 In recent decades, the earth's stratospheric ozone layer, which protects the planet from harmful UV
H8 23 radiation from the sun, has become SUbstantially thinner. The thinning has occurred principally over

•
-
24 Antarctica. and is referred to as the "ozone hole." The ozone layer over the Northern Hemisphere mid­
25 latitudes is about two percent below normal dUring summer and autumn. and about four percent below
26 normal in winter and spring. '5 UV levels at more than 10 sites in both hemispheres have increased by siX
1M 27 percent to 14 percent since the 19805. '6 EPA, in partnership with the National Weather Service, publishes

~ 28
29
a UV index (from ()"10+), indicating the amount of UV mdiation at noontime for communities across the
U.S.

"
~ 30 What is causing changes to the ozone layer?

.,.."'
~ 31 Stratospheric ozone depletion is associated with the use of chlorofluorocarbons, fire-fighting halons, and

·- 32 other chemicals used as solvents. Air conditioners, refrigemtors. insulating foams, and some industrial

33 processes all emit those products. Air currents cany chlv~:"'- 3nd bromine molecules into the
34 stratosphere, where they react to deplete ozone molecules.

~ 35 The U.S. virtually ceased production of most ozone-depleting substances in January 1996. While greatly

..
36 reduced, ozone-depleting substances are still being released into the environment, as reported in the
~
37 Toxics Release Inventory17. Even though scientists believe that recovery is underway. full restomtion of
Ii!t

~ WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapter 3-13 November 7.2002

.,
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... 002:175
• •
15 4
4
4
1 the stratospheric ozone layer will take decades, and will require continuing international cooperation in
l
2 phasing out ozone-depleting substances.
l
3 What are the human health and ecological effects of stratospheric \
4 ozone depletion?
5 Thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer allows more of the sun's UV radiation to reach Earth, possibly
6 contributing to increased incidences of human skin cancers. the most common of all cancers. Cataracts
7 and suppression of the human immune system may also result from increased exposure to UV radiation.
8 In addition. productivity of some marine phytoplankton, essential to the ocean's food chain, may be
9 unduly stressed by excessive UV radiation.

10 Is the earth's climate changing? Is there a trend?

11 The global mean surface temperature of the Earth has increased by 0.6 ± O.2°C (about 1° Fahrenheit)
12 since the late 19th century (Exhibit 3_6).18, The eight warmest years in the instrumental record occurred
13 between 1990 and 2001. While systematic measurement of temperatures by instruments such as
14 thermometers only began about 140 years ago, scientists have been able to extend our understanding of
15 climate change far beyond this period by examining "proxy" data. Proxy data include natural archives of
16 climate information such as tree rings, ice cores, corals, and sediments. In addition, historical documents
17 such as ship and farmers' logs, travelers' diaries, and newspaper accounts can provide insights Into past
18 weather and climate conditions. While proxy temperature reconstructions are more uncertain than direct
19 instrumental measurements, they suggest that the recent warming is unusual and that the 1990s are
20 likely to have been the warmest decade in the past 1,000 years for the Northern Hemisphere
21 (Exhibit 3-7).

22 Exhibit 3-6: Annual anomalies of combined land-surface air and sea surface temperatures ,e), 1861­
23 2001, relative to 1961-1990.

24 Exhibit 3-7: Reconstructions of average surface temperature of the Northern Hemisphere for the past
25 1000 years, including 95 percent confidence range in the data

26 But global averages mask great regional variations: some parts of the world are changing more. some
27 less. Many areas of the U.S. have warmed by more than 1°F, while the Southeast has cooled somewhat.
28 In some regions, particularly the Northeast, the Southwest, and the upper Midwest, the warming has been
29 greater. The increase in some places, such as the northern Great Plains, has reached as much as 3°F.
th th
30 In the 20 century, temperatures dropped below freezing two fewer days per year than they did in the 19
31 century. And observations indicate that total annual precipitation is increasing over the U.S. For the
th
32 conterminous U.S., the increase in precipitation during the 20 century is estimated to be 5 percent to 10
33 percent. Recent analyses suggest that heavier precIpitation events and more rain-days account for much
34 of the precipitation increase.

35 While the climate changes of the last several decades are most likely a result of human activities, we
36 cannot rule out natural variability as a significant cause. In any event, while the U.S. has a well-developed
37 climate monitoring system, the nation will need to combine data into meaningfUl and comprehensive
38 indicators of climate change.

WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapter 3-14 November 7.2002

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CEQ 6i uS /
 15

0.8 . - - - - - - - - - . : - - --:._--..,;~ .:...... __,

3
Temperatures expressed relative to 1961·1990 average.

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10

5oun;es: )on"", 1994 (I...d); Par1ceretal.. 1995 (Marine).

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18
19 Exhibit 3-6: Annual anomalies of combined land-surface air and
20 sea surface temperatures (oC), id61-2001, relative to 1961-1990.

WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapter 3·15 November 7,2002

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CEQ 011358

 Exhibit 3-x. Recons~rudi6ns of ~yerag~.s·urface te,mp.e~~r~ of th.!! Northem HemisphereJ~r the past 1000.,
2 " ." .,'. . .~; ·:"years', .
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10
1000 .1200 .1400 1600 1800 2000
iI, 11
Note: 'Proxy: <!au. (rom ~ 6ngs. corals, ke core':'r.d historical =~i.h·(bb>e lint') .~ cabbr.tt.d .g'I;,slthe~~~te<S (iKnPie.....)...~ 95" confidence lnteIVai (or the
\.. ....n••1data at'! pre..mtcd in gr.y, Proxy data are al"",1' less l:ertain.th~n instru"",ntal niadinG'- and inae.." in "",,,minty ill thew alStlnee I. time i~..e..
i 12
:. Source: Mann ct at. 1999

13

14

15

16

17

18
\.

1; 19 Exhibit 3~7: Reconstructions of average surface temperature of the Northern Hemisphere for the
20 past 1000 years, including 95 percent confidence range In the data
L
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WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapter 3-16 November 7. 2002

PRELIMINARY DRAFT" DO NOT DISTRIBUTE, QUOTE, OR CITE

 .

.....
;
I.,j
15

..
lit
What are the contributors to climate change? How are they

...,."
2 changing over time?
fit 3 Huma- activities emit GHGs and other substances that directly or indirectly affect the balance of incoming
4 and outgoing radiation, thereby affecting climate on regional and global scales. The best understood
5 GHGs are CO~, methane (CHJ, Np, and certain fluorinated compounds. Several additional emissions

•
~
~
6
7
8
indirectly affect the solar radiative balance, though,. including CO, NO" and nonmethane VOCs, as well as
substances that deplete the stratospheric 020ne layer. Aerosols, which are extremely small particles or
liquid droplets, such as those produced by emissions of S02 or elemental carbon, can also strongly affect

,.,.

9 the absorptive characteristics of the atmosphere.

~ 10 Carbon dioxide accounted for 84 percent of the nation's GHG emissions in 2000: it results primarily from
11 the combustion of fossil fuels necessary to produce electricity and fuel motor vehicles, as well as from a

..-
12 few industrial processes. Forestry and other land use activities in the U.S. remove more carbon from the
13 atmosphere than they emit, resulting in net sequestration, or carbon storage. Methane released by

.­M
r' ­ 14
15
landfills, coal mines, oil and gas systems, and agricultural activities accounted for nine percent of the total
U.S. GHG emissions in 2000. Nitrous oxide is emitted dUring agricultural and industrial activities, as well

..•-.
,. 16
17

18
as during combustion of solid waste and fossil fuels: in 2000, it accounted for six percent of the national

GHG emissions.

Emissions of m1Gs are driven mainly by economic activity and population (Exhibit 3-8)'v. Greenhouse

..•,.
19 gas emissions in the U.S. have grown at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent since 1990. The rate of
Ii)
20 GHGs emitted per unit of GDP however, is much slower, indicating a declining GHG emitting intensity.

21 Exhibit 3-8. U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, emissions per capita and emission per dollar of Gross
22 Domestic Product, 1990-2000

23 Over the past 150 years, CO2 concentrations have increased by 31 percent, CH4 by about 150 percent,

• and Np by 16 percent (Exhibit 3-9).20 Today's CO 2 concentration has not been exceeded during the past
r­ 24
25 420,000 years-and likely not dUring the past 20 million years. Concentrations of those GHGs continue to
~ 26 increase.

M
•...
27 Exhibit 3-9. Climate change indicators for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide
,'~"

~
tit
~
t.4

....•
..,..
~

114

~ WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapler 3-17 November 7,2002

r-t
•
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PRELIMINARY DRAFT - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE, QUOTE, OR CITE

.' CEQ 01 i36t

~
.­. 15

•. Exhibit 3-x. Chma,te.change, indicators for carbon

,dioxide, m~th'~e, ~d nitrous oXid~

•*'
2

3
Over the pm l,OOO).ears

•8 4

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~ 360
Carbon Dioxide
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18 , . Year,

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20
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27
1000 1200 1400
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1600 1800

Soun::e: EPA Office 01 JJ.r .nd Rad.. t,on. The U.S. Grunhou.. Cas 1.....101)< April
2002
2000

•-
28 Exhibit 3-9. Climate change indicators for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide

P)
~
D WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapter 3·19 November 7, 2002
I)
PRELIMINARY DRAFT - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE, QUOTE, OR CITE
~
~
­

...

1:

What are the human health and ecological effects associated with
2 climate change?
3 Certain adverse health outcomes are aS~'1ciz.ted with the prevailing environmental condition: illnesses
4 and deaths associated with temperature extremes; storms and other heavy precipitation events; air
5 pollution; water contamination; and diseases carried by mosquitoes, ticks, and rodents. Because most
6 human disease.s involve mUltiple factors, and because preventive measures can avoid or reduce adverse
7 health effects, it is not yet possible to quantify specific health effects related to climate change. But
8 statistics on mortality and hospital adm.issions show that death rates Increase during extremely hot or cold
9 days, particularly among very old and very young people living in cities.

10 Temperature changes over the past decades are corroborated by observed changes in ecosystems.
11 Satellite data indicate that snow cover has decreased about 10 percent globally since the late 1960s.
12 There is ample evidence of a major retreat of alpine and continental glaciers associated with wanning
lh
13 temperatures in the 20 century, although in a few maritime regions, glaciers have re-advanced due to
14 increases in precipitation. In Montana, Glacier National Park's largest remaining glaciers are now only a
15 third as large as they were in 1850,

16 Along w[th higher ocean heat content, global mean sea levels have risen between 10 and 20
17 centimeters-about four to eight inches-over the past hundred years. which is about 10 times the
18 average rate of increase of the last 3,000 years. That rise in sea level has contributed to the loss of
19 wetlands. For example, since 1938, one-third of the marsh-more than 5,000 acres-at the Blackwater
20 National Wildlife Refuge on the Ch'esapeake Bay has disappeared due to 8' combination of sea-level rise
21 and overgrazing by nutria.

22 It is very likely that there has been a reduction of about two weeks in the annual duration of lake and river
23 ice in the mid-to high latitudes of the Northem Hemisphere. Several types of birds that fly north to
24 Michigan in the spring now arrive two or three weeks eartier than they did in 1960, for example. And the
25 range of some Edith's checkerspot butterflies has shifted northward by about 92 kilometer~and 124
26 meters upward in alpine regions-over the last century.

27 While current analyses are unable to predict with confidence the timing, magnitude, or regional
28 distribution of climate change, the best scientific infonnation indicates that if GHG concentrations continue
29 to increase, changes are likely to occur, Projected climate change will have both beneficial and adverse
30 effects, but the larger the changes and rate of change in climate, the more the adverse effects are likely
31 to predominate. Effects of climate change will vary widely across the U.S, and the world. with some
32 regions benefiting from modest change, and others experiencing losses.

WORKING DRAFT SOER Cleaner Air Chapter 3-20 November 7, 2002

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 I

1 4.4.4 What are the ecological effects associated with depleted ozone levels? 1:

­I

2
3 Physiological and developmental processes of plants are affected by UVB radiation, even by the amount
4 ofUVB in present-day sunlight. Despite mechanisms to reduce or repair these effects and a limited
5 ability to adapt to increased levels ofUV-B, plant growth can be directly affected by UV-B radiation.
6 Indirect changes causea by UV-B (such as changes in plant form, how nutrients are distributed within
7 the plant, timing of developmental phases and secondary metabolism) may be equally or more important
8 than damaging effects ofUV-B. These changes can have important implications for plant competitive
9 balance, herbivory, plant diseases, and biogeochemical cycles.
10
11 Exposure to solar UV-B radiation affects both orien~tion mechanisms and motility in phytoplankton,
12 resulting in reduced survival rates for these organisms. Scientists have demonstrated a direct reduction
13 in phytoplankton production as a result of ozone depletion-related increases in UV-B.
14
15 Solar UV-B radiation has been found to cause damage to early developmental stages offish, shrimp,
16 crab, amphibians and other animals. The most severe effects are decreased reproductive capacity and
17 impaired larval development. Even at current levels, solar UV-B radiation is a limiting factor, and small
18 increases in UV'..B exposure could result in significant reduction in the numbers of animals that eat these
19 smaller creatures.
20
21 Increases in solar UV radiation could affect terrestrial and aquatic biogeochemical cycles, thus altering
22 both sources and sinks of greenhouse and chemically important trace gases e.g., carbon dioxide (C02),
23 carbon monoxide (CO), carbonyl sulfide (COS) and possibly other gases, including ozone. These
24
25
potential changes would contribute to biosphere-atmosphere feedbacks that attenuate or reinforce
atmospheric buildup of these gases.
.,

26
27 Synthetic polymers, naturally occurring biopolymers and some other materials of commercial interest
28
29
also are adversely affected by solar UV radiation, but special additives somewhat protect some modern
materials from UV-B. Increases in solar UVB levels nonetheless will likely accelerate their breakdown.
.1
30 limiting how long they are useful outdoors.
31
32 1
33 4.5 Climate Change
34
35 Energy from the Sun drives the Earth'~ weather and climate and heats the Earth's surface. In tum, the
l
36 Earth radiates energy back into space. Atmospheric greenhouse gases (water vapor, carbon dioxide, and
37
38
other gases) trap some of that outgoing energy, retaining heat somewhat like the glass panels of a
greenhouse. I
39
40
41
Without this natural "greenhouse effect," temperatures on Earth would be much lower than they are ,

now, and life as known today would be impossible. Instead, Earth's average temperature is a more
42 hospitable 60°F. However, scientists are concerned that problems may arise because the atmospheric
43 concentration of greenhouse gases increases such as carbon dioxide has been increasing and is certain to
44 continue increasing at least over coming decades.
45
46 Human activities lead to emissions of greenhouse gases, but are also adding small particles and droplets

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

October 2 J. 2002 4-62
 I called aerosols that reflect light back into space, tending to cause some areas to cool. Black carbon
2 (soot) aerosol can absorb solar radiation, which tends to warm the climate system. In addition, changes
3 in aerosol concentrations can alter the amount of cloud coverage and reflectivity by changing cloud
4 properties and lifetimes. However, because atmospheric aerosols have a lifetime of day!> or weeks ­
5 contrasted to the decades or years for most greenhouse gases - aerosols tend to be concentrated
6 immediately downwind of major industrial areas
7
8 Natural forces outside the climate system, such as volcanoes, changes in solar activity, and changes in
9 the Earth's orbit, also can affect climate. For example, scientists recently discovered an I,800-year cycle
l O i n global warming and cooling driven by periodic changes in the strength of ocean tides. The changes
11 in the tides are caused by gradual shifts in the relative astronomical positions of the Sun, Moon, and
12 Earth. When tides are strong, cool water from the ocean depths is brought to the surface where it cools
13 the climate. When tides are weaker, as currently is the case, the climate warms.
14
: 15 The climate system, consisting of the atmosphere, the oceans, sea ice, ecosystems, clouds, and other
16 components, has its own natural random variability. This variability can lead to short-tenn changes in
17 climate, such as El Nino events, or longer-term changes such as those brought on by shifts in ocean
18 circulation. Climate change from human activities occurs in the context of the climate's natural
19 variability, challenging climate scientists both to detect whether climate is changing and to detennine
20 how much of!he change is attributable to human activities.
21
22 Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the lntergovernmenml Panel on Climate Change in 2001
23 determined that "There is new and stronger evidence that most of the wanning observed over the last 50
24 years is attributable to human activities. " tJ~ (J.\.1
25 I
26 Stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are separate environmental issues, but they are related
27 in some ways. Specifically, some substances that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer act also like
28 potent and very long-lived greenhouse gases, absorbing outgoing radiation and warming the atmosphere.
29 Ozone itself is a greenhouse gas and its depletion in the Arctic zone results in localized cooling. These
30 changes have a small effect on global mean temperatures but rather can alter regional patterns of
31 climate.

32

33

34 4.5.1 Is Earth's climate changing? Is there a trend?

35
36 Over the years, a number of methods and data sources have been used to study Earth's climate. These
37 include data from instruments such as thermometers, rain gauges, barometers, and satellite-born
38 microwave sounding units. Instrumental data have been used to measure:
39
40 Surface Temperatures; Most of the records on ground temperature come from thousands of
41 weather monitoring stations around the world. AllJng with surface temperature, these stations
42 also track things like barometric pressure, wind :>peed, and precipitation.
43 Sea-Surface Temperatures: Like the ground-based temperature network, ships and specially
44 designed ocean buoys provide information on temperature, and other weather factors such as
45 relative humidity, and precipitation at sea.
46 Atmospheric temperatures (troposphere and stratosphere): Studies of temperature changes in

DRAFf 3 SOER Technical Support Documf!/lt

October 2/. 2002 4-63
 .~

1 -

I the troposphere, or lower atmosphere (from the surface to about 9 miles above the Earth), were
I 2 begun in the late 1940s using instrument packages carried aloft by weather balloons. Starting in
;, i
~
; I
.. 3
4
1979, satellites began to provide more complete coverage.

,i, :1; 5 In ',:ldition to data collected by instruments, many natural phenomena are climate-dependent, such as the
I . 6 growth rate of a tree, and they therefore provide natural 'archives' of climate infonnation. These natural
:I 7 recorders of climate are called "proxy" climate data (i.e., they substitute for thennometers, rain gauges,
!l !.
• I 8 and other modem instruments used to record climate). By analyzing records taken from these proxy
, I
9 sources, scientists can extend our understanding of climate change far beyond the 140-year instrumental
,: I

i 10 record provided by thermometers and rain gauges. Some useful proxy data can be found in sources as
1 11 diverse as:
,l 12
I I3 lee Cores: Scientists drill into massive ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica to create "ice
! 14
15
cores," or samples of ice. These cores contain dust, air bubbles, or isotopes of oxygen, that can
be used to interpret the past climate of that area.
16 Tree Rings: Changes in tree rings' width are related to alUlUal variations in temperature and
17 precipitation.
18 Corals: Corals build their hard skeletons from calcium carbonate, a mineral extracted from sea
19 water. The carbonate contains oxygen and the isotopes of oxygen, and also trace metals that can
20 be used to determine the temperature of the water in which the coral grew. ,J
21 Sediments: Ocean and lake sediments consist of materials produced in the lake/ocean or washed
:
h 22 in frOTI1 nearby land. These materials (preserved tiny fossils and chemicals in the sediments) can
1
, 23 be used to interpret past climate.
24
25 Evidence from this diverse array of data points to a warming ofglobal surface air temperatures.
26 Instrumental records from land stations and ships indicate that global mean surface temperature warmed
27 by about O.6°e +/- O.2°e during the 20th century. The warming trend is spatially widespread and is
28 consistent with the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring
29 melting of ice on rivers and lakes, and increases in sea-surface temperatures and ocean heat content (see
30 Exhibit 4-37).
31
32 There has been little or no change in upper troposphere temperature since 1979, the period for which
"

33 Satellite Microwave Sounding Unit data exist. For the mid- alld lower troposphere, there are small
34 unresolved differences between radiosonde (weather balloons) and satellite observations of tropospheric
35
36
37
temperatures, but both data sources show slight warming trends. If one calculates trends from the
beginning of radiosonde data in the 19505, there is a slightly greater warming in the record as a result of
increases in the 1970s. An enhanced greenhouse effect is expected to cause cooling in higher parts of the

I
38
39
40
atmosphere because the increased "blanketing" effect in the lower atmosphere holds in more heat,

allowing less to reach the upper atmosphere. Both Satellite Microwave Sounding Unit and radiosonde
I
data show cooling of the lower stracosplrere since 1979.

,I
,
41
42 Changes have been observed also in other important aspects of climate. Overall, precipitation over land

43 has increased by about 2 percent globally since 1900, but these precipitation changes vary spatially and

44 temporally. For example, instrumental records show a 5 to 10 percent increase in precipitation over land

45 in northern mid-high latitudes, except over eastern Asia, and there have been increases in the frequency

46 of heavy precipitation events. In contrast, over the sub-tropics, land-surface precipitation overall has

47 decreased about 3 percent during the 20th century, a trend that has weakened in recent decades.

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

I
October 21,2002 4-64
Ji
CEQOf~6l
 1 Atmospheric water vapor has increased over many regions of the Northern Hemisphere over the past

2 few decades. In addition, there have been increases in cloud cover over mid- to high latitude land areas

3 during the 20'h century. (see Exhibit 4-38)

5 Importantly, aspects of climate appear unchanged. A few areas of Earth have not warmed in recent

6 decades. Since 1978, no significant trends in Antarctic sea-ice extent are apparent. Neither have

7 systematic large-scale changes in the frequency of tornadoes, thunder days, or hail events been observed.

8 And there have been no significant global trends over the 20th century in the intensity and frequency of

9 tropical and extra-tropical storms.

10
11 Many areas of the US have warmed by more than 1°F, elCeept for the southeastern US, where there has
12 been some cooling. In some regions, particularly the Northeast, Southwest, and the upper Midwest, the
13 warming has been greater. The increased temperature in some places, such as the northern Great Plains,
14 has reached as much as 3°F. Over the 20th century, there has been a decrease of about two days per
15 year when temperatures drop below freezing.
16
17 Observations indicate that total annual precipitation is increasing over the US. For the contenninous
18 US, the increase in precipitation during the 20th century is estimated to be 5 to 10 percent Recent
19 analyses suggest that much of this increase in precipitation is in heavier precipitation events and in an
20 increase 'in the number ofrain-days.
21
22 Although the climate changes observed over the past several decades are likely primarily the result of
23 human activities, we cannot rule out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of
24 natural variability.
25
26 A number of considerations lead to the selection of the global mean surface air temperature (includes

:3
27 both land and sea surface temperatures) as an indicator. First, instrumental records represent direct
28 samples at exact points in space and time, and they have been collected at tens of thousands of locations
29 in the pas~ two centuries. In addition, the data is regularly collected, analyzed, and subjected to
30 extensive quality control. While satellite measurements can provide global coverage, that data has been r/
31 collected only since 1979, perhaps too short a time for analyzing trends in atmospheric temperature.
32
33 Indicator
34
35 Combined Annual Land-Surface Air and Sea Surface Temperature Anomalies 1861 to 200 I, Relative to
36 1961-1990 - Type I Indicator.
37
38 Exhibit 4-32: Combined Annual Land-Surface Air and Sea Surface Temperature Anomalies 1861 to
39 2001, Relative to 1961-1990
40
41 Global average surface temperature has increased s!rr.~ 1861 and over the past century by O.6°C (+1­
42 o.2°C). This value is larger than previously estimated tor the period up to 1994, because of relatively
43 high temperatures from 1995 to 2001 and improved methods for processing the data. There are
44 uncertainties in the annual data because of data gaps, random instrumental errors and uncertainties,
45 uncertainties in bias corrections in ocean surface temperature data, and adjustments for urbanization.
46

DRAfT 3 SO£R Technical Support Document

October 2 J, 2002 4-65
 1
2
The observed wanning has not proceeded at a uniform rate. Virtually all the 20th century wanning in
global surface air temperature occurred during two periods, 1910 to 1945 and 1976 to 2000. The causes -.•

3 ofthese irregularities and the disparities in the timing are not completely understood.
4
5 Further, regional patterns ofwanning have varied over time. The 1916 to 2000 period ofwanning has
6
7
8
9
been almost global, with the largest increases over the mid- and high latitudes of the Northern
Hemisphere continents. The 1910 to 1945 wanning, on the other hand, was initially concentrated in the
north Atlantic. By contrast, the 1946 to 1975 period showed significant cooling in the North Atlantic
and the northern Hemisphere and warming in much of the Southern Hemisphere. •
j

,I

:1

f
l

~ 1

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

October 2/, 2002 4-66

CEQ 011367
 1

7 Temperatures e><pressed relative to 1951-1990 average.

8 0.6' I----~-- --------------"rl.' :
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25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43 Exhibit 4-32: Combined Annual Land-Surface Air and Sea Surface Temperature Anomalies 1861

44 to 2001, Relative to 1961-1990

DRAFT J SO£R Technical Support Document

October 2/. 2002 4-67

 1
2 Surface temperatures also are not rising uniformly. Average night-time low temperatures are rising
3 about twice as rapidly as daytime highs. The winters in areas between 50 and 70° North Latitude (the
4 latitude of Canada and Alaska) are wanning relatively fast, but summer temperatures show little trend.
5 Urban areas are warming somewhat more rapidly than rural areas, because of both changes in land
6 cover and consumption of energy in densely developed areas (a feature known as the "urban heat island"
7 effect).
8
9 Using proxy climate data, several researchers have developed temperature "reconstrUctions" for the
10 Northern Hemisphere going back 1,000 years (see Figure 4-33). For the Northern Hemisphere summer
11 .temperature, the 1990s appear to be the warmest decade of the millennium. Also, the rate and duration
12 of wanning since the late 19th century is unprecedented over the past 1,000 years. Older data are
13 insufficient to provide reliable hemispheric temperature estimates. Ice core data suggest that the 20th
14 century has been warm in many parts of the globe, but also that the significance of the warming varies
15 geographically when viewed in the context of climate variations of the last millennium.
16
17 Exhibit 4-33: ReconslrnctiorlS ofaverage surface temperature a/the Northern Hemispherefor the
18 past 1000 years, including 95 percent confidence range in the data
19
20 While global average surface temperature captures only one aspect of climate change, it is probably the
21 best-known andmost widely-used indicator of climate change.
22
23 Exhibit 4-34: Observed variations ojthe lemperature indicators and hydrological and storm related
24 indicators
25
26 Indicator Gaps and Limitations
27
28 Global mean surface temperature, the most commonly used number for measuring global climate
29 change, is not the only possible measure, and hardly a perfect one. But if a single measurement must be
30 picked, it is arguably the best one. Climate change consists of many things in addition to global mean
31 surface temperature - changes in amount of precipitation, in timing of seasons, in day-night differences,
32 in weather extremes, in the vertical distribution of temperatures in the atmosphere, and other things.
33 Global mean surface temperature measures the main phenomenon scientists expect to find as a result of
34 greenhouse gases - warming. And it has been measured directly by instruments over a longer period of
35 time, more extensively, and more accurately than almost any other climate parameter.
36
37 The global temperature record consists of thermometer measurements from more than 6,000 stations
38 worldwide, dating back to before 1861. These data usually were collected by various nations' \\feather
39 agencies and by ships at sea. The number of stations and extent of spatial coverage has increased, and
40 the work is usually done under protocols established by multinational scientific bodies such as tbe
41 World Meteorological Organization. Climate scientists use various different analytic methods to
42 maximize reliability and estimate possible errors.
43 I

.j

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

October 2/, 2002 4-68
 1
2 "Exhibit ,4·x. Reconstructions ~r average surface temperatu~e of the Northern HemisphereJor'u,e past lobo' '
3
. ' years. indudirig 9~% confid~'n~e range f~lhe....,data:" ' ,
4 . . ". . . ., ~

5 Oau (rom thermometm (red) and from tree rio&<, c;'rols. ice cor.~ and histo\i",,' =ords (blue) " •.

6 Departu~s In temperature (eC) from the 1961·1990 average'

7
8
9
10
IJ , ....
12 : . ','. '

13
,<
14 ( "

15
16
17 ,.. ,

'.,

18

19 . ';

20
21
22 1000 . 1200 ' , 1400 i' 1606· " ' ;" isoo' 2000
23
24
.
, N~te: ·Pro.~ WI~ from I':" rin!:s,coral~ c~$, a~d
ice hiStorical:~;~~l ~~~1f ~,; ~~ ~';;~~ei~ta~ I~~m~: (~! ~~;): ;~:~si ~~e.tnttrYal fo:" ill< : j,'
,rinu,ldota are pre>ented in g..y. Prory d.l. .,. ...... ys less cert'in than instrumental re.et..g.;....KI inm;'.. In 'uncertainly '$ theirdistanceln time increases. ~

25 • • • _. '. : • • I " .. ~ "

26 , Soo",e: Mann 01 al. 1999 / ~ ..

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44 Exhibit 4-33: Reconstructions of average surface temperature of the Northern Hemisphere for the
45 past 1000 years, including 9S percent confidence range in the data

DRAFT 3 SO£R Technical Support Documell1

October 11.2002 4-69
 ·0
: ..:

.',

1 ~ . "; ...
2
3
,: ...,
4
5 ." ", '1
.~ -,
6
7 ld<,lohooct
••• V....lly art... (probob<hl)'

8 > 99")

9 Verylol<ly (prob>bil~y" 90'J,

but ~ ~9'J,)
10 li<ly (pnlbabil,ty> 68" but

<90'J,)

11
12 _... __ ..._. . _._----­
i998 W,"l1e,tyearforot 1..'1 the N.H.
I "',Il;"", 1,1,hlload (probob~,ty

> H'J,butS 66"')

'. 13 "M,rine air tempenlUre: 0.4 to O.7"C incre...

:. 14 . :'., ~.~ .~.. '" ";.'
,ince late 19th century.
. "~ ~.; : " . .. "
15 ., " .... ",
..
-'. ," ._:.
16 \.
:~ ,

17
18 ,
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,
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19
20
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:'~~." :':-~ '::,(';. ".,'. ;, . :\:":., ,.; ~

.. b. Hydrologi~l"andSt~~rel~te'd indicatc"rs";' ';~</::,;:~:,:\ '\\),::) :':}';;' ':',,:,~ }''-' 'J:'

,- '; '\

23 .
,, ., 24
:
: ': . . ~: . ~OCEAN ';,,~, :,",: ~..: .;..- ~ ..~,~: ~~:~~.~ ·'/~~~~;\·:?'~tAW1'~J~~~{z5¥~·i;~jZ:; \~~'.If.. ~ .~. ~~ oCEAN,':r;."..'~'" .' ~
25
26 ~ .... ~:.. ;" '~'. : '.
27 llulihood:
. ••• v.w.ny wb;n (probobol,ty
28 • > ~~")
29 Verynelr (probibility" 901(,

but S 9~")

30 lIkely (prob~hty > 6&"1. btJlt

<90'J,)
31 I M.dlum I,lelrood (proboba'ly
32 >n"'butS661o)

33 ."
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
.. ,', .' t I
,.'".- ".' .."
41
42
43 Exhibit 4-34: Observed variations of tbe temperature indicators and hydrological

44 and storm related indicators

DRAFT 3 SUER Technical Support Documellt

October 21, 2002 4-70
· ,

I Extensive efforts, for example, have been made to eliminate duplicate data. Other efforts seek to
2 identify, analyze, and adjust for possible changes in the measurements - e.g., a change in the type or
3 location of the thermometer at a particular station. A number of other. data quality control procedures
4 have been used, leading to the exclusion of some suspect data. Because weather stations are not evenly
5 distributed across the globe, various statistical ulethods have been used to estimate both spatial averages
6 and their possible error. Temperature recorded at sea were actually sea surface water temperatures, and
7 extensive analytic procedures have used to make these comparable with air temperatures over land.
8
9 This indicator is simply an estimate of global annual average surface temperatures and an'
10 accompanying estimate of the uncertainty of that estimate. It simply tells what the temperature was in a
11 given year. It does not by itself tell the significance of those temperatures, although it may seem highly
12 suggestive. It tells us there has been a 140-year warming trend, but it does not indicate whether that
13 wanning trend is unusual or whether it was caused by human activity.
14
15 Data Source
16
17 One of the two principal data sources for.this indicator is the HadCRUT dataset
18 (http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk!cruldataltemperaturel and Jones (1999», a merging of the University of East
19 Anglia's Climatic Research Unit's CRUTEMI dataset and the dataset on sea surface temperature
20 anomalies of thp Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research in the United Kingdom (Parker
21 et al., 1995). See also and Peterson and Vose (1997), for the Global Historical Climatology Network
22 (GHCN Ver. 2) temperature database, another approach to the same underlying data, a collaborative
23 effort focused at NOAA's National Climatic Data Center and DOE's Carbon Dioxide Information
24 Analysis Center (CDIAC), which refines and accumulates previous efforts. Peterson and Vose (1997)
25 extensively reference literature on quality of component data sets.
26
27 4.5.2 What arc the contributors to climate change? How are tbey changing over time?
28
29 Earth's temperature depends mainly on (1) the amount of sunlight received, (2) the amount of sunlight
30 reflected back into space, and (3) the extent to which the atmosphere retains heal.
31 Factors affecting any of these three parameters cause "radiative forcing," measured in watts per square
32 meter (Wm2). Scientists use that tenn to describe changes in the amount of energy available to the
33 Earth-atmosphere system as a result of different natural and human-induced causes.
34
35 Different agents of radiative forcing have distinct forms, magnitudes, spatial distributions and durations.
36 For example, some agents can have positive radiative forcing (i.e. a tendency to warm Earth's surface),
37 and some negative (i.e. a cooling tendency). These differences among the fOl"Cings of different agents
38 increasingly allow scientists to "fingerprint"changes in the climate and attribute those changes to
39 different agents.
40
41 Over the past two million years, changes in the timing and art'!l'.mt of sunlight striking Earth has been
42 responsible for inducing ice ages, during which periods temperatures were about 5°C (9°F) colder than
43 they are today. In the intervening inter-glacial wann periods, temperatures have approximated current
44 temperature. Solar irradiance has been measured directly for only about two decades.
45

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

October 2/. 2002 4-7/
I
I

CEQ OII3J

• I

I
During the 20th and 21st century, however, two other factors -. reflection of radiation back to space and
2
absorbtion of heat by the atmosphere -- have become increasingly important. Water vapor, carbon
3
dioxide and other "greenhouse gases" found naturally in the atmosphere keep Earth warmer than it
4
otherwise would be. Earth's clear atmosphere allows sunlight to penetrate to its surface and warm it.
5
The surface releases this energy as infrared radiation, which is absorbed by greenhouse gases in the
6
atmosphere. Without this "greenhouse effect," Earth would be about 33°C (60°F) colder than it is
7
currently.
8

9
Human activities' have altered the chemical composition of the atmosphere through the buildup of
10
greenhouse gases - primarily carbon dioxide; methane, nitrous oxide, and substances such as black
II
carbon (soot). That these gases and particles trap heat in the atmosphere is undisputed, although
12
uncertainties exist about exactly how Earth's climate responds to them. Reflection of solar radiation
13
because of other substances, such as aerosols, and because of clouds and land cover also has been
14
altered by human activities and also has uncertain effects on Earth's climate
15

16
Indicators
17

18
US Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gas, 1990 to 2000 - Type I Indicator
19
US Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Capita and Per Dollar of Gross Domestic Product, 1990 to 2000 ­
20
Type I Indiqator
21

22
Exhibit 4-36: US Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gas. 1990 to 2000

23

24
Exhibit 4-37: US Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Capita and Per Dollars ofGross Domestic Product,

25
1990 to 2000

26

27
The changes observed in the global climate over the past several decades are likely due mostly to human
28
activities, but some significant part may also be the result of natural variation. Since the Industrial
29
Revolution, emissions from energy consumption, industrial activities, land clearing and other activities
30
have changed the composition of the atmosphere, increasing concentrations of heat-trapping greenhouse
31

32

gases.
I

33
With the world's largest economy, the United States emits the most greenhouse gases. Emissions of
34

35

greenhouse gases in 2000 (Exhibit 4- 36) were approximately 7,001 teragrams (Tg, or million metric
tonnes) of carbon dioxide equivalent (see discussion below on global warming potentials), about 14
I

36
percent above 1990 emissions. The average annual rate of increase for 1990 through 2000 was J.3

37

38

39

percent.

Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion for electricity generation, motor vehicles and
40

41

42

industry comprise the dominant part of the U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory. Those emissions have
remained at about 79 percent of the C02-equivalent inventory through the 1990s. Emissions from this
category grew by 18 percent from 1990 through 2000, and were responsible for most ofthe increase in

43

44

45

US emissions through this period. Greenhouse gas emissions were partly offset by removal and

sequestration (storage) of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by forests, other vegetation, soils and

land- filled carbon. These were estimated to be 13 percent of C02 equivalent emissions in 2000.
I

46

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

I

October 2/,2002 4-72

I

_--------LEQlTITI13

 I
-1
.~
2

5
.~
, 8 6.8?O I-------------=------j . ,
.l~
'< 11 6.40q t-----~fI"==----------_l
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14 6.ori~ci't_---------------1. "
.15 .. : .....
~16
, 17
J 5,6'00' ,
18 :, 1990 ': .. t992,: -,1994' :'" 199'6~ ',~',1'99·8. "',2000,'., ',,'

19 '. ". ~ '':'\ .",.;:':':.:' :\~~;{:.: . , :-.:, .;~~~:~~1" .': .~ H;'~, ,"', .. >~:_", : '.... :;.~ _'

20 , Somte; Th. us, G~nMusi!,91' '"""nt<lly. u.s. EPA Off<a.,of 10< ;;nd Rod-..\ion. EPA
43~f.,02:008;W.ihIn&tOODC.APfiI2D02.: --:" ',,;1:',: " , " ,': ,

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29
30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

4041
39

42

43

44 Exhibit 4-36: US Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gas, 1990 to 2000

45

46

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

Octnbcr 2/. 2002

4-73

=================~=::::============~=~C~E~Q
011314
·.,
lUI2
Methane accounted for 9 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2000, released by landfills,
coal mines, oil and gas systems, and agricultural activities, and methane emissions have decreased by
3 5.6 percent since 1990. Nitrous oxides are emitted during agricultural and industrial activities and also
4 durin;, combustion of solid waste and fossil fuels, and are 6 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in
5 100G. N20 emissions come mainly from agricultural soils and industrial processes, and have increased
6 by 9.0 percent since 1990. The synthetic gases HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 comprise less than 2 percent of
7 the 2000 inventory, but have risen by 29.6 percent since 1990, largely as substitutes for the CFCs and
8 other substances now controlled by the Montreal Protocol Oil Substances That Deplete the Ozone
9 Laye~ ,
10
11 Emissions of greenhouse gases are driven mainly by the scale of conswnption, determined by economic
12 activity and population (Exhibit 4-40). Greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. have grown at an average
13 annual rate of 1.3 percent since 1990. During that period, however, the rate of greenhouse gases
14 emitted per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased, indicating a declining greenhouse gas
15 emitting intensity. Contributing to the economy's declining emissions intensity are growth in the
16 services sectors and in other low-emitting sectors, technological advances, and regulatory or economic
17 incentives that directly or indirectly reduce emissions. In the United States, approximately 6.6 tons
18 (almost 15,000 pounds carbon equivalent) of greenhouse gases are emitted per person every year.
19 Emissions per person have increased about 3.4 percent between 1990 and 2000.
20
21
.
Indicator Gaps and Limitations
22
23 The U.S. Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emission and Sinks (EPA, 2002) is the official annual report of
24 the United States Government under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
,25 Change.
26
27 To ensure that the U.S. emissions inventory is comparable to those of other UN FCCC signatory
28 countries, the emission estimates were calculated using methodologies consistent with those
29 recommended in the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories
30 (IPCClUNEP/OECDIIEA, 1997). These guidelines were produced and peer reviewed through a
31 collaboration of hundreds of scientists and national experts. The United States Environmental
32 Protection Agency is responsible for developing the annual U.S. inventory through one of the most
33 rigorous management systems in the world for estimating, documenting, and evaluating emissions and
34 sinks for all source categories. The EPA works directly with industries and other government agencies
35 to develop high-quality emissions data. The inventory goes through extensive peer, inter-agency and
36 public review before publication.
37
38 The GHG inventory addresses the principle greenhouse gases covered by the UN FCCC. It does not
39 include estimates for several man-made substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol 011
40 Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. Some of those gases, besides causing thinning of
41 stratospheric ozone, are also greenhouse gases, most notably chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
42 hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and bromofluorocarbons (balons). Sulfate and black carbon
43 aerosols (soot), among others, are also implicated in climate change, but are likewise not covered
44 currently at this time in the U.S. GHG inventory. Nor does the inventory include "indirect" greenhouse
45 gases. Emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) and
46 carbon monoxide (CO) do not themselves trap heat but indirectly affect concentrations of GHG in the

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document

OC.fober 21, 1002

4-75

--------------------------~~~5

~
i
I
{ I .. '
..
!
i 1 atmosphere, through photochemical production of tropospheric ozone and oxidation products. Although
2 these gases are not included in the inventory, EPA does estimate their emissions (see Section 4. ?? and
3 Exhibits 4-16, 4-17 and 4-18 of this Chapter).
4
5 Exhibits 4-36 and 4-37 estimate of emissions of greenhouse gases by weighting the emissions
6 calculated as molecular mass by "Global Warming Potentials" (GWP). The GWP of a gas is the ratio
7 of the rndiative forcing of one kilogram of that gas or aerosol to that of one kilogram of carbon dioxide
8 over a specified time horizon, for instance 100 years. Calculations of GWP are based on the lifetime of
9 the gas in the atmosphere and how efficiently it traps heat in the atmosphere. These emission estimates
10 use the 100-year GWPs from the 1996 report of the lPec (lPCC 1996), although they were updated in
11 the 200 I [PCC assessment,.to comply with the lPCC guidelines for producing national GHG
12 inventories. Multiplying the emissions in mass of a GHG by its GWP produces its "C02-equivalent
13 emissions," which are added to calculate the net C02 equivalent emissions across gases and sources.
14
15 Data Sources
16
17 Greenhouse gas emissions come from the U.S. Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emission and Sinks, 2002.
18 http://www.epa.gov/globalwarminglpublicationslemissionslus2002
19
20 The data on GDP use real, chained weighted 1996 dollars as published by Bureau of Economic Affairs.
21 Populati?n data come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
22
23 Indicators
24 Concentrations in the Atmosphere of Carbon Dioxide over the Past 1000 Years - Type [
25 Concentrations in the Atmosphere of Methane over the Past 1000 Years - Type I
26 Concentrations in the Atmosphere of Nitrous Oxide over'the Past 1000 Years - Type I
27
28 Exhibit 4-38: Concentrations in the Atmosphere afCarbon Dioxide over the Past 1000 Years
29
30 Exhibit 4-39: Concentrations in the Atmosphere ofMethane over the Past }OOO Years
31
32 Exhibit 4-40: Concentrations in Ihe Atmosphere ofNitrous Oxide over the Past 1000 Years
33
34 Although C02, CH4, and N20 occur naturally in the atmosphere, their atmospheric concentrations
35 have increased as a result of human activities. For most of the past 1,000 years, the atmospheric
36 concentrations of"greenhouse gases" remained roughly constant. However, since pre-industrial time
37 (i.e., since about 1750), concentrations of these greenhouse gases have increased by about 31,151 and
38 17 percent, respectively (lPCC 200 I). This increase has altered the chemical composition of the
39 atmosphere and has very likely affected the global climate system.
40
41

i
I
DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document
October 2 I. 2001 4-76
I
s
 I

:i,~it\~'<t~f~J.~~~:IT~f0?:;'··.
2
3
4

5
Attriospheri~ concet'lb31iQ~ ~fC02,{P~~): :tRadi~ fo~ (\vm-2~"
6
7 1.5
Carbon Dioxide
560
8

9 340

1.0
10 320
11

12 5Q(?

13

14

'21l0 '-& '\': ~yAV'I'\.~1~

15
260

16

17 ,~qo~, ""~2~\,, ,,1,40,0 ,:~a; 1~?~"" i:', :18~0 '" 2~00

18 Source: The U5. G...~nhouSe Gas Inventory, U.S. EPA blfo<;< ofAir iri<!'Radi.1t1on, ,

EPA 430,r-02-008. W.shi,;gtOn ~ APf:;t 2ooi.. " :" . '. " , . " ," ' ,

19 , • ., • , ~ .-.. '. '. .~ .. ' # # • •~. ~ :. <

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43 Exhibit 4-38: Concentrations in the Atmosphere of Carbon Dioxide over the Past 1000 Years

DRAFT 3 SOER Teclmica/ Support Document

October:! I. 2002 4-77
-'

1
2

4
5

Methane
9 1750 0.5
10
11 0:4

12 0.3
13
14
15

16

17 o· .
'~ •
~: .
'I.'.

18 lp:'='p'::"O-':~'''''''':.1~20!:-:O''--.,""'::~"""',1,..,J~=-:O""'.-~"'.~.':-·.''''''1-d:60::-::0'''.'i-''·....~---:-::.18:-!::O':"O-;. ...

:.· .....""',20c::-:!,09.'·~ ,
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.
19 .; .:.... '4 .; ~. 4; ',,~, - •• :.- .'"~. .t; ;7,' ';:~ ~~r>:, ~:.~ :~','...';; ~..':', ~:;;"', : ~ ~~ ,f. /;:": 2: ~ '..

20 SOiiree: The us. CreonhQUse GU Inveiltoty;U.s: £1>1, O~e1lfAir Uld.Radiati<1n, :'.('

.£I>A430.f7,02.008, ~shi~~'!9~.Ap!iJ7~O.Z.;,
• •• '"~' ~
",.: ':'< '; ',:
• < ~.
~.,. ,;"':'.
21
• '. •••••••• '.' ." I "":' ... J

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31
32

33

34

35

36

37
I
38
39 J
40
41
42 j
43
Exhibit 4-39: Concentrations in the Atmosphere of Methane over tbe Past 1000 Years

J
DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Support Document I.
October 21.2002
4-78
J
J. :.:
•
Il
"

1 . : -.. ~" :':r..., . ,: . '

2 Exhibit 4.~x': Nit~ous ,,;Ode concent~tion ....
3 ,( 1 • ',: .,:'. " : .\.~.. _:., ."4.'.:;:.', .... ~ . . • ' '::":'~ r.

4 , '.: ", Over ~~ P:-1~~' ~;ooo ye~.. .... . . .: '.

5 ..'. .'. .. '., '..:>.' ~dioa~ve ~~~g (Wni-2)

6 _ 0.15
7 3101- Nitrous Oxide
8
9 . 300 I- j ?:10

10 , 2901- ~'"

_"'- 0.05

1I -
, ,2801- ;/­
... -.- .
"
12 ""t&" # .", .

13
14
.: 270 •• .. .. . . .. . ... ~.
, •• _ . , "
- 0.0

260
15
250
­
16 . 1000. 1200, '1400 .' 1600 ': '1800" . 2000" .
17 . . ' . . ' ..'. :' : ,Year.~ :,':. ' : ' " ,-:..:' .

Souru: . The U5•.Grren!'<!use ~1.h!"~"tllty. U~. ~pA pflice.:o(Air .~ J!.adi.Jtion.

18 EPA 430,F-02-008, w.Sh'igwn bc;"pril 2002, ·': .. '. '.

.

.... , ". ':.

.~. . ' ,:'.~'-'H ,;"'. ~
19 '.

20

21

22

23

24

... ·25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32
33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43 Exhibi t 440: Concentrations in tbe Ahnosp bere of Nitrous Oxide over

the Past 1000 Years

DRAFT 3 SOER Tephnical Support Document

October 2J, 2002 4-79

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ -----~---,.fI
J

CEQ 011379
 1 The combustion of oil, coal, gas, or wood releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Approximately

"

Pi 2 half of the C02 released is soon absorbed by the oceans or by increased plant photosynthesis. The other
1• ,I 3 half remains in the atmosphere for many decades to hundreds of years (its "atmospheric lifetime"). As a
1
jj 4 re5ult, the atmospheric concentration of C02 is increasing. The average concentration of carbon dioxide
, ~ 5 has increased from around 275 parts per million before the Industrial Revolution, to 315 ppm when
£ 6 precise monitoring stations were set up in 1958, to 368 ppm in 1999. This change has increased the
'L 7 amount of energy trapped at the Earth's surface by about 1.5 watts for every square meter (Wm2). This
/~ Ii
'f'
8 increased energy is equal to about 1 percent of the energy in the sunlight that reaches the Earth's
is 9 surface.
I, ''1:.':";
J II
1
( 10
I ·1 11 Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, atmospheric concentrations of methane concentrations
in
I ~; ( 12 have more than doubled. Evidence indicates that the rate of methane increase in the atmosphere has
11: I
J .'
13 slowed in the past decade, although it is not clear why.
"i 14
h,
Iii,
15 Nitrous oxide concentrations have risen by about 15 percent since the beginning of the industrial
r 16 revolution.

Iq·Ii
:l
17

18 Indicator Gaps and Limitations

il;
J,:

19
20
.
There is comparatively little scientific controversy over the magnitude of growth in atmospheric
I'
l·i'
21 concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide during the industrial era.. The

22 contemporary data are based on direct sampling. The record of direct sampling of C02 concentrations
23 (at Mauna Loa, Hawaii, and at the South Pole) since 1957 is one of the longest and most consistent time
:1: 24 series that atmospheric science has produced. Because all three gases are relatively well-mixed globally
j'
25 over the time-scales of concern, spatial sampling error can be eliminated as a significant uncertainty.
f,' 26 Contemporary measurements from direct sampling of the atmosphere are combined with measurements
.i:
.'. 27 ofgas concentrations in air bubbles trapped in ice sheets to provide a longer time series. The overall
I­
I,.
28 trend of post-industrial increase in concentrations overwhelms the relatively small local, daily, seasonal,

i'
! 29 and inter-annual variability.
,,' 30
31 For direct sampling (Mauna Loa and South Pole), sites were chosen partly to be as far as possible from
32 anthropogenic sources and sinks (e.g. industry, agriculture), in order to sample well-mixed air without
33 local influences. lee core sites were chosen primarily to provide thick ice sheets suitable for coring -­
34 and also based on the availability of research station logistical support. Deep cores provide longer time
35 series. Fixed station air sampling was at least hourly. Temporal sampling of ice cores varied as
36 appropriate to timescale of concern to separate research projects. Technical sampling methods,
37 extraction methods, and instrumentation are described further for each data set in references below.
38
39 Data Sources
40
41 For CO2, the indicator consists of two data sets. The first is contemporary direct instrument
42 measurements of atmospheric C02 concentrations at fixed-site observatories at Mauna Loa, Hawaii,
43 and the South Pole. The other is a set of five longer-tenn time series of measurements orC02
44 concentrations in air bubbles from datable ice cores, published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
45 [Referenced in IPCC WGI TAR (2001), Fig. 3.2.]
46

DRAFT J SOER Technical Support Documelit

October 2 J. 2002
4-80

CEQ 61 1do

 I
~I The methane indicator also consists of a marriage of two data sets. The first is contemporary direct

I; 4
~nstrument measurements of atmospheric CH4 concentrations via the NOAA Climate Monitoring and
Diagnostics air sampling network. The other is a set of four longer-term time series of measurements of
CH4 concentrations in air bubbles from datable ice cores, published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
5 [Referenced in £PCC WGI TAR (2001).]

16 7 Similarly, the nitrous oxide indicator consists of two data sets. The first is contemporary direct
8 instrument measurements of atmospheric N20 concentrations via the NOAA Climate Monitoring and

Il~ Diagnostics air sampling network. The other is a set of five longer-term time series of measurements of
N20 concentrations in air bubbles from datable ice cores, published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
1I [Referenced in IPCC WGI TAR (2001), Fig. 4.2.J
r:l12
1113
14 4.5.3 What are the human health and ecological effects associated with climate change?

11 15

16
17
No single indicator supports general national conclusions about impacts of climate change on human
health and on the nation's ecosystems. Numerous indicators each address a small portion ofthe potential

1120 18
19
health impacts of climate change, and several studies offer insights into human health effects. Beyond
human health, climate change is expected to have impacts on economic and human welfare. These

.22
_21

23
impacts are not included in this report.

Rising global temperatures are partly responsible for the current rise in sea level (mainly because water
expands as it is heated), and they change precipitation and other local climate conditions. Changing
1liiif24 regional climate could affect human health, animals, and many types of ecosystems in various ways.
-'25 Some changes will be beneficial and others adverse, but the larger the changes and the more rapid the
26 rate of change in climate, the more likely that adverse effects would predominate.
111i127
_28 In addition, positive and negative effects likely will vary widely across the U.s. and globally. However,
29 quantifying the exact magnitude of these effects is highly uncertain because ofthc lack ofreliable local
30 detail in climate change scenarios, especially in the projection of extremes, limited knowledge of some
• 31 processes, and the lack of relevant data on these effect.
32
33 Some examples ofpotential ecological and health effects are described below. These are meant to be
• 34 illustrative and not a comprehensive catalog of potential climate change effects.
35
36 Coastal Areas. Sea level is rising more rapidly along the U.S. coast than worldwide. Studies by EPA
37 and others have estimated that along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, a one foot (30 cm) rise in sea level is
38 likely by 2050 and perhaps as soon as 2025. In the next century, a two-foot rise is most likely, but a
39 four -foot rise is possible, and sea level will probably continue to rise for several centuries, even if
40 global temperatures were to stop rising a few decades hence.
41
42 Rising sea level inundates wetlands and other low-lying lands, erodes beaches, intensifies flooding, and
43 increases the salinity of rivers, bays, and groundwater tables. Some of these effects may be further
44 compounded by human reactions 10 a changing climate. For example, measures people take to protect
45 private property from rising sea level - such as building bulkheads and dikes - may impair coastal
46 wetlands and restrict public uses of beaches and waterways.

DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Supporl Docllmcl1I

October 2/.2001 4-81
I 'j'
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,I I Coastal marshes and swamps are particularly vulnerable to rising sea level simply because of proximity.
2 As the sea rises, the outer boundary of these wetlands will erode, and new wetlands will form inland as
I 3 previously dry areas are flooded by the higher water levels. The amount of newly created wetlands,
"

,
..,
I
4 however, will be much smaller than the area ofv:etlands lost. The amount of dry land within a few feet
:.1·! 5 above the wetlands is much less than the area of wetlands that would be lost if sea level rises a few feet.
6 Moreover, developed areas will often be protected with bulkheads, dikes, and other structures that keep
7 new wetlands from forming inland.
8
'.: . 9 Nationwide, a two-foot rise in sea level could eliminate 17-43 percent orus wetlands, even if no
10 additional bulkheads or dikes are erected, with more than half of the loss taking place in Louisiana
11 alone. Nationwide, about 5,000 square miles of dry land - 4,000 currently undeveloped - are within
12 two feet of high tide. This land would be inundated by rising sea level unless additional dikes and
13 bulkheads are constructed. Including both the wetlands and dry land lost to the sea, a two-foot rise in
14 sea level would eliminate approximately 10,000 square miles ofland, an area equal to the combined size
..,, 15 of Massachusetts and Delaware.
;, ,I·
" 16
17 The loss of estuarine beaches caused by rising sea level would decrease available habitat for the least
18 tern, an endangered species. Loss of these beaches also would decrease feeding areas for shore birds that
19 rely on horseshoe crabs and other organisms found in inter-tidal areas. By decreasing estuarine fish and
20 shellfish pop\llations, the loss of coastal wetlands would decrease available food supplies; and the loss
21 of wetlands would also decrease available habitat. The loss of Louisiana's wetlands could have a
22 particularly adverse impact on international migratory birds that travel along the Mississippi flyway.
,i
23
;\;
24 Finally, rising sea level tends to increase the salinity of both surface water and groundwater. Higher
25 estuarine salinity has also been cited as a cause of declining oyster harvests in the Chesapeake and
26 Delaware Bays, and as a cause for wetland loss in Louisiana, Florida, and Maryland.
27
28 Chesapeake Bay Case Study (Exhibit 4-41): EPA estimates that with additional global warming and
,'. 29 continued subsidence, sea level in the Chesapeake Bay area probably will rise another eight inches by
30 2025, 13 inches by 2050, and 27 inches by 2100, compared with the level in 1990. Such a rate of sea
31 level rise would be approximately double that of the preceding century. The Eastern Shore of
32 Maryland contains one of the nation's largest areas of very low land, which includes both marshes and
33 dry land that would become wetland if sea level rises about two feet. Rising sea level and other factors
34 nre converting the wide expanses of the coastal marshes there into open water, eliminating feeding areas
35 for birds and juvenile fish species. Along bay beaches and muddy shores, the hard shore-protection
36 structures that people erect to protect property from the rising waters are eliminating habitat for
37
38
temlpins, sea turtles, kingfisher, and horseshoe crabs.
I

39 Exhibit 4-41.' Areas for selected coastlines that would be affected by sea-level rise
40
41
42
For the past 5,000 years, the average rate of sea level rise in the Chesa.: ·::.;~e Bay was approximately 3
feet per 1,000 years. During the 21 51 century, global warming could cause the bay's level to rise at a rate
i

43
44
45
closer to 3 feet per 100 years

Rapid sea level rise could be devastating for most Chesapeake Bay islands, marshes, and beaches. The
J

46 loss of these habitats in tum would affect birds, fish, terrapins, and other wildlife. The future

DRAFT3 SOER Techllical Suppo,.' Dowment

I

O~tober 2 J. 2002 4-82

I

I.

 Chesapeake Bay might lose some of its charm for residents, tourists, kayakers. boaters, anglers.

1
windsurfers. and birders who spend time on and around the bay each year.

I)

•
•
ti

•
• DRAfT 3 SOER Technical Support Document
4-83

October 21, 2002

"

CEQ OIi§b
 -
I
Exhibit 4·x. Lands close to sea le~el alon~'the
. .
U.S.·mid.Atlantic·
.. and.Gulf
' . coasts
.

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1

2
I
3
4
5

8 I
9 .~ .

10
11 .',:' ·1
12
13
14 I
15
16 c..
17 J
18
19
20 I
21
22
23
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24
25
26 t
27
28
29 '>·1
30
31
32
33
I
34
35
36
·1
GufCout
37
38 .J
39
40 Sautee: TItus.I.G. ~nd C. Richm.n. 2001. °M.ps of Lands Vulnerable to Se. level Rise: ~od".d Elevations along the U.s. Atlantic .nd Gulf Coasts.· CJj"",~
Resean:h. 18:20S·228. .
41 J
42 in progress
43 Exhibit 4-41: Areas for selected coastlines that would be affected by sea-level rise
1

J
DRAFT 3 SOER Technical Suppor' Document
October 2/. 2002 4-84
J

J
 I
11 2
Salt marshes can keep up with moderate increases in sea level but may be drowned if the sea rises faster
than sediments and peat can build up the marsh. In low-lying areas like the Eastern Shore or Virginia's

I~
Back Sa: National Wildlife Refuge, new marsh develops naturally as rising seas flood the land.
Similarly, beaches are able to migrate inland. But many Eastern Shore residents are armoring their
5 property against the sea by building sea walls, bulkheads (retaining walls), and revetments (rocks piled

I~
along the shore). These structures prevent marshes and beaches from moving inland as the sea rises.
Since 1980, Chesapeake Bay residents have built bulkheads and revetments along 350 miles of
8 shoreline. If this trend continues, many of the bay's beaches and marshes will be lost, squeezed between

Il~
the rising tide and the armored shore.

11
HWf-..
Since 1938, one-third of the marsh at Blackwate~as disappeared as a result of a combination of sea
ffll2 level rise and overgrazing by nutria, large non-native beaver-like rodents that dig canals through the
I;t4 13 marsh and eat the vegetation.. More than 5,000 acres of marsh have been lost, and most of the remaining
14 wetlands are projected to disappear within 30 years.
15
1 16
17
Wintering populations of many ducks have declined in recent decades, some quite dramatically.
Overwintering Northern pintails, for example, declined from an average of about 40,400 birds from
18 1950-1959 to only 2,600 birds in 1985-1999. Other species, such as the Canada goose, snow goose, and
1 19
20
Brant, have beconle more abundant.

21 Researchers believe that the population changes are related to impacts on food resources in and around
1 22
23
Chesapeake Bay. In particular, degradation of bay water quality caused by heavy nutrient and sediment
runoff has reduced submerged aquatic vegetation, a prime waterfowl food, throughout much of the bay.
24 Geese and swans respond by switching to other foods, such as waste com in agricultural fields. But
1 26
·25 species that rely on submerged aquatic vegetation, such as the Northern pintail, redhead, and American
widgeon, have practically disappeared from the bay.
27
1 2928 Forests. Climate and soil are strong factors in the establishment and growth of plants, and climate
influences the composition, structure, and function of forest ecosystems. A warmer climate is expected
30 to shift northward the ideal range for many North American forest species. If the climate warms slowly
1 31
32
enough, trees may be able to colonize north into areas now too cold; they may be able to do so at about
the same rate as southern areas became too hot and dry for species there to survive. More rapid
33 warming, however - for instance 2°C (3.6°F) over 100 years - may mean species would have to
1 34
3S
migrate about two miles every year, a rate considered infeasible.

lit 36 Several other impacts associated with changing climate further complicate the picture. On the positive
~ 37 side, C02 has a beneficial fertilization effect on plants, and increased C02 would enable some plantS
38 and crops to use water more efficiently. These effects might enable some species to resist adverse effects
39 of wanner temperatures or drier soils. On the negative side, forest fires may become more frequent and

fl 40 severe if soils become drier.

I.
41
42 Changes in pest populations also could pose risks to forests. For example. some Alaskan forests have

I 43
44
experienced a sustained infestation of spruce bark beetles since 1992. The outbreaks, fonnerly limited
by the cold, have caused the death of2.3 million acres of trees on the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska, the
I- 45 largest (ass of trees to insects ever recorded in North America. Managed forests may tend to be less

I 46 vulnerable than unmanaged forests, because managers may shift to tree species appropriate for the

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Octoher 2/, 2002 4-85

1~4
I
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I I
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2
warmer climate. Finally, a key complicating factor is uncertainty over whether particular regions will
become wetter or drier
I
3
4 Mountains. There is ample evidence of a major retreat of alpine and continental glaciers associated with
5 wanning temperatures in the 20th century, although in a few maritime regions, glaciers have re­
6 advanced as a result of increased precipitation. Glacier National Park's largest glaciers are only about
7
8
one-third the size they were in 1850, and many small mountain glaciers have disappeared completely
during the past 150 years. The area of the park covered by glaciers
I
9 declined by 73 percent from 1850-1993. Researchers estimate that even if average temperatures remain
10
11
at their current level, all the glaciers would disappear within the next 100 years. Mollntain glaciers in
the Alps, south-central Alaska, and the Pacific Northwest also have retreated over the past century.
I
\2

.i 13 Changes in the depth of mountain snowpacks and glaciers, and changes in their seasonal melting, are of

d 14 particular concern to areas that rely on freshwater runoff from mountains. Rising temperatures may

J
j
15 cause snow to melt earlier and faster in the spring, shifting the timing and distribution of runoff. These

16 changes could affect the availability of freshwater for natural systems and human uses such as

17 agriculture.

f
18

19 If freshwater runoff is reduced in the summer months because of earlier melting, soils and vegetation

20 may become drier. increasing the risk and intensity of wildfires. Changes in stream flow and higher

21 water temperatures also could affect insects and other invertebrates that live in streams and rivers, with

p
," 22 repercussions up the food chain for fish, amphibians, and waterfowl. More directly, some bodies of
i!
ii'j'
23
24
water may become too warm for the fish that currently inhabit those areas; but warmer temperatures
may also enable fish in cold ocean waters to grow more rapidly.
25
"
1.' 26 At Olympic National Park, changes are occurring at the tree line: Forest species are beginning to crowd
27 the edge of meadows and fill the gaps of open grassland.
28
29 Birds. As temperatures warm, birds will tend to inhabit more northerly areas (in the Northern
30 Hemisphere). Data collected by the National Audubon Society's annual Christmas Bird Count show
3\ that during years with wanner temperatures, th~ majority of bird species do not have to fly as far south
32 for the winter. Several types of birds that fly north to Michigan during spring now arrive two or three
33 weeks earlier than they did in 1960. Scientists at the British Trust for Ornithology have found that 20 of
34 65 species of birds are laying their eggs an average of nine days earlier than they did in 1971.
35
36 Human Health. Certain health outcomes are recognized to be associated with the prevailing
37 environmental conditions. These adverse outcomes include illnesses and deaths associated with
38 temperature extremes; storms and other heavy precipitation events; air pollution; water contamination;
39 and diseases carried by mosquitoes, ticks, and rodents. Because the causes of most human diseases
40 involve many factors and preventive measures can be Wldcrtaken to avoid or reduce adverse health
41 effects, one cannot quantify exactly which health effects may be caused by c1iTl'ate change. However,
42 statistics on mortality and hospital admissions show that death rates increase ouring extremely hot days,
43 particularly among very old and very young people living in cities.
44
45
46

DRAFr 3 SOER Technical SUPPOI'/ Documem

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- - - - - - - - - -..........-L""6

u.s. Climate Change Science Program Workshop

Media Plan
November 8,2002

Overview
This media plan is designed to promote the U.S. Climate Change Science Program
Workshop and highlight the role of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program as a
critical vehicle for coordinating and integrating U.S. climate and global climate change
research programs. The media plan will leverage upcoming events, speaking
opportunities, interviews and op-eds to deliver key messages to targeted audiences.

Media Outreach
Our contact with media will be targeted to scientific and environmental reporters with
specific knowledge and interest in climate change science and the governmental
management structure overseeing it.

Op-Ed
• Objective: Write and place an op-ed from Secretary Evans which states the progress
made in the area of advancing the President's initiative on climate change research
and science. The news peg is the Climate Change Science Program Workshop, Dec.
3-5 in Washington, D.C.
• Key Messages:
• President Bush's climate initiative is starting to yield real results that will be

meaningful for national and global decision-makers

• The importance of scientific information that is objective and well documented

• The need for observing and monitoring systems to provide comprehensive global

data

• New direction toward developing decision-support tools for policy-makers.

• Target publications: Washington Post (Outlook section), Los Angeles Times,
Houston Chronicle, San Francisco Chronicle, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Miami
Herald, Boston Globe
• Timing: Mid-November, 2002

New York Times Interview-GFDL Visit, Princeton

• Objective: Leverage visit to New York area to provide key reporter with update on
climate science progress and provide background information on upcoming Climate
Change Science Program Workshop
• Tactics: During visit to NOAA's Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory in
Princeton, NJ invite New York Times science writer Atl~·, ltevkin on tour of facility
andjTOvide background briefon climate science progress to include deployment of
500 ARGO float, VADM Australia trip, new climate science management
framework and upcoming climate science workshop.
• Participants: GFDL Director Ants Leetma, Assistant Secretary James Mahoney,
Ph.D., Vice Admiral Comad Lautenbacher, Dr. John Marburger
• Timing: November 14,2002

002294

CEQ 011392
Climate Science Media Roundtable
• Objective: Hold media roundtable with select science and environmental writers to
build awareness for and provide background information on Climate Science
Program Workshop
• Message: Climate workshop is an important step in realizing the Administration's
goals of having a comprehensive climate science management framework to aid
future policy decisions.
• Participants: Deputy Secretary Bodman, Under Secretary of Energy Robert Card,
Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacner, Dr. James Mahoney, Sean O'Keefe­
• Timing: Mid-late November, 2002

Climate Change Science Program Media Roundtable

• Objective: The primary objective is to give reporters close access to decision makers
and to educate them about the Climate Change Science Program. The CCSP media
roundtable will serve this purpose by inviting national reporters who cover climate
change issues to meet with key players in the Science Program. By allowing these
reporters access before the workshop in December we can accomplish several goals.

The targeted reporters are the most knowledgeable in this field and have the largest
and usually most educated audiences. Because of this reach, it is important to fully
communicate the targeted goals of the workshop and CCSP in general. With better
knowledge of the structure of the program, they will be able to generate more
informed and germane coverage prior to and during the workshop.

• Goals
• explain to the media the process by which the CCSP Strategy will be derived
• inform media and the public of the objectives of the workshop
• encourage media participation in the workshop
• develop coverage before the workshop to build public interest
• establish a sense of trust between reporters and the U.S. climate science officials
• announce key speakers/panelists and outline goals of the workshop

• Principle Participants
• Commerce Secretary Don Evans or Deputy Secretary Sam Bodman
• Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, NOAA Administrator
• Assistant Secretary James Mahoney, Ph.D.
• Sean O'Keefe, NASA Administrator
• Energy Under Secretary Robert Card
• James Connaughton, Director, Council on Environmental Quality
• Media (list below)

Media Outlet Writer

AGU Eos Rand Showstack

CEQ 011393
AP Randy Schmid
Baltimore Sun Sara Engram
Kniqht-Ridder Robert Boyd
Knight-Ridder Seth Bernstein
National Joumal Bara Vaida
National Joumal Cyril laneski
New York Times Andy Reykin
Newsweek George Hackett
Reuters Chris Baltimore
Reuters Tom Doggett
Science Magazine Dayid Malakoff
Science Maqazine Jeffrey Mervis
Science News Sid Perkins
Time Maaazine Eric Roston
U.S. News Tomas Hayden
USA Today Chris Vacarro
Wall Street Joumal John Fialka
Washington Post Eric Planin
Washington Post Rob Stein
Washington Times Allen Bradford

• Themes and Messages

• Significant scientific uncertainties remain. These uncertainties must be resolved

or at least better understood before defining policy strategies.

• CCSP will address if/then scenarios of possible actions and their probable

outcomes that include: Earth system impacts, economic impacts and energy

supply impacts. These scenarios range from no action to extreme action and

several levels between.

• CCSP does not recommend specific strategies, and is completely independent of

policy analysis.

• During the past 13 years, the United States has made the world's largest scientific

investment in global change research a total investment of almost $20 billion

Resources
• Tools and Deliverables Provide to Participants:
• Talking Points for panelists
• Qs and As for panelists
• Invitation letter/advisory to media
• Background materials to media
• Press Packs:
• Bios of key players
• Joint Evans/Abraham letter to the White House
• OpEds written recently
• Dr. Mahoney's Congressional testimony
• Releases
• Workshop program
3

CEQ 011394
 Planning
• Stage I ( - Nov. 8)
• Determine CCSPO panelists
• Schedule location for roundtable
• Finalize media list
• Stage II (Nov. 8 - 15)
• Invite media
• Invite CCSPO panelists and confirm attendance
• Collect talking points and distribute to panelists
• Prepare backround materials for press packs
• Stage III (Nov. 15 - 25)
• Confirm media attendance
• Assemble press packs

. Climate Change Science Program Workshop Press Conference

• Principals: Bruce Alberts, Robert Card, Rita Colwell, James Connaughton, Vice

Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, John Marburger, Dr. James Mahoney, Sean O'Keefe

• Timing: December 3,2002

• Location: Mamot Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, DC
• Supporting Documents:
• Press Release - Draft completed Nov. 8, NOAA approval Nov. IS, DOC approval

Nov. 22, all departmental reviews completed Nov. 29

• Media Advisory released November 29,2002

• Climate Change Workshop Program and Fact Sheet
• Messages:
• This workshop is an important step to realizing a climate science framework that

provides operational tools for decision making.

• An operational system that can be shared worldwide and is universally recognized

as scientifically sound will act as an important vehicle for establishing momentum

and clarity in climate science.

• It is through partnerships and collaboration with other governmental

organizations, states, academia, NGOs, industry, IGOs and other nations that we

will be able to make progress necessary to better understand and mitigate the

pressing problem of global climate change

Ptupose: The Workshop Press Conference will be an opportunity for general media to

hear remarks from and question key officials oftbe agencies involved in the Climate

Change Science Program. All administrators joined together will display an impressive

unity within the science agencies and a strong commitment from the administration to

pursue greater knowledge of the global climate systems.

Goals:
• inform media and the public of the objectives of the workshop

CEQ 011395
• explain the structure of the CCSP to illustrate the function of the program and shed
more light on GCRP/CCRI
• encourage media participation in the workshop

Themes & Messages:

• This workshop is an important step to realizing a climate science framework that

provides operational tools for decision making.

• An operational system that can be shared worldwide and is universally recognized

as scientifically sound will act as an important vehicle for establishing momentum

and clarity in climate science.

• It is through partnerships and collaboration with other governmental

organizations, states, academia, NGOs, industry, IGOs and other nations that we

will be able to make progress necessary to better understand and mitigate the

pressing problem of global climate change

• The CCSP Workshop will solicit input from stakeholders and interested

organizations from across the political spectrum to derive the optimal strategy in

undertaking climate science research.

• CCSP does not recommend specific strategies, and is completely independent of

policy analysis.

• CCSP will address it7then scenarios of possible actions and their probable

outcomes that include: Earth system impacts, economic impacts and energy

supply impacts. These scenarios range from no action to extreme action and

several levels between.

• During the past 13 years, the United States has made the world's largest scientific

investment in global change research - a total investment of almost $20 billion.

• Significant scientific uncertainties remain. These uncertainties must be resolved

or at least better understood before defining policy strategies.

• The United States is taking positive action in better understanding global climate

and climate change.

Resources

Tools and Deliverables Provide to Participants:

• Talking Points for panelists

• Qs and As for panelists
• Media advisory
• Background materials to media

Press Packs:
Bios of key players
Joint Evans!Abraham letter to the White House
OpEds written recently
Dr. Mahoney's Congressional testimony
Releases
Workshop program
Workshop announcement

CEQ 011396
Provisional agenda

Planning:

Stage I ( - Nov. 20)

Finalize CCSP panelists

Schedule location for press conference

Stage II (Nov. 20 - 27)

Send out media advisory

Invite CCSP panelists and confinn attendance

Collect talking points and distribute to panelists

Prepare backround materials for press packs

Stage III (Nov. 27 - Dec. 3)

Confirm panelist attendance

Assemble press packs

CEQ 011397