Neric 3

Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
IMPACTS
IMPACTS................................................................1
**TERMINAL IMPACTS**................................5
AIDS........................................................................6
Air Pollution............................................................7
Anthrax....................................................................8
Biodiversity..............................................................9
Bioterror.................................................................10
Bioterror.................................................................11
Bird Flu..................................................................12
Constitution............................................................13
Democracy.............................................................14
Dehumanization.....................................................15
Disease...................................................................16
Economy................................................................17
Freedom.................................................................18
Genocide................................................................19
Heg.........................................................................20
Human Rights Credibility......................................21
Oceans....................................................................22
Ozone.....................................................................23
Patriarchy...............................................................24
Poverty...................................................................25
Racism...................................................................26
SARS.....................................................................27
TB (1/4).................................................................28
TB (2/4).................................................................29
TB (3/4).................................................................30
TB (4/4).................................................................31
TB..........................................................................32
Terror.....................................................................33
Warming.................................................................34
**HEG**..............................................................35
Kagan.....................................................................36
Decline Inev...........................................................38
Econ T/...................................................................39
**WAR IMPACTS**...........................................40
Turns Everything...................................................41
AIDS......................................................................42
Animal Rights T/...................................................43
Biodiversity............................................................44
Cap.........................................................................45
Civil Liberties T/....................................................46
Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
Dehumanization T/................................................47
Democracy T/........................................................48
Disease T/..............................................................49
Disease T/..............................................................50
Domestic Violence T/............................................51
Econ T/...................................................................52
Edelman.................................................................53
Environment..........................................................54
Environment..........................................................55
Fascism..................................................................56
Gendered Violence T/............................................57
Health T/................................................................58
Heg T/....................................................................59
Homelessness.........................................................60
Homophobia..........................................................61
Inequality...............................................................62
Mental Health T/....................................................63
Poverty...................................................................64
Poverty...................................................................65
Woman Rights T/...................................................66
Racism...................................................................67
Rape.......................................................................68
Rights T/................................................................69
Rights T/................................................................70
Social Service T/....................................................71
Starvation...............................................................72
Terror.....................................................................73
**X TURNS CASE**..........................................74
AIDS T/ Readiness................................................75
AIDS T/ Readiness................................................76
Disesase T/ Readiness............................................77
Disease T/ Readiness.............................................78
Disease T/ War.......................................................79
Ecodestruction T/ Disease.....................................80
Ecodestruction T/ Disease.....................................81
Ecodestruction T/ War...........................................82
Ecodestruction T/ Agriculture................................83
**NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIOS**.................84
Central Asian Conflict...........................................85
China-US...............................................................86
Economic Collapse................................................87
India/Pakistan War.................................................88
Iraq Pullout............................................................89
Iran.........................................................................90
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
Japanese Relations (Spratly Islands).....................91

Japanese Relations (Middle Eastern Conflict).......92
Japanese Relations (China/Taiwan Conflict).........93
Japanese Relations (Korea)....................................94
Japanese Relations (Sino-Russian Ties)................95
North Korea...........................................................96
Pakistan Collapse...................................................97
Sino-Russian Conflict............................................98
Sunni/Shiite Conflict.............................................99
Russia-US............................................................100
Taiwan/China War...............................................101
Taiwan..................................................................102
Terrorism Nuclear Escalation.........................103
Terror = Extinction..............................................104
**NUKE WAR IMPACTS**............................105
Nuclear War Disease.......................................106
Nuclear War Extinction...................................107
Nuclear War Pollution.....................................108
Nuclear War Phytoplankton Scenario.............109
Nuclear War Ozone Scenario..........................110
Nuke War Oceans............................................111
Nuclear War Biodiversity Scenario (1/2)........112
Nuclear War Biodiversity Scenario (2/2)........113
**NUKE WAR PROBABILITY**...................114
Nuclear War Evaluated First................................115
Schell...................................................................116
Nuclear War Likely..............................................117
Nuclear War Likely Escalation.........................118
Nuclear War Likely Middle East Prolif............119
Great Power War Likely......................................120
Nuke War Not Likely...........................................121
Nuke War Not Likely US Russia......................122
Nuke War Not Likely Rising Costs..................123
Nuke War Not Likely Deterrence.....................124
Nuke War Not Likely International System......125
Nuke War Not Likely North Korea...................127
Nuke War Not Likely Pakistan.........................128
No Nuclear Terror................................................129
No Escalation - Nuclear Taboo Wont Be Broken (1/6)
130
131
132
133
134
135
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
AT: Schell.............................................................136
AT: Schell.............................................................137
AT: Schell.............................................................138
**IMPACT TAKEOUTS**...............................139
AT: Giligan...........................................................140
Extinction Impossible..........................................141
Nuclear War.........................................................142
Biological Attack Not Probable...........................143
Indo-Pak...............................................................144
Iran.......................................................................145
**IMPACT CALCULUS**..............................146
Impacts Exaggerated (1/2)...................................147
Impacts Exaggerated (2/2)...................................148
Prob. Evaluated First (1/2)...................................149
Prob. Evaluated First (2/2)...................................150
Prob Before Mag Ext...........................................151
Systemic Impacts First.........................................152
Probability Evaluation Key..................................153
AT: Rescher..........................................................154
Predictions Bad - Policymaking..........................155
Predictions Bad Background Beliefs................156
Predictions Bad Irresponsibility.......................157
Predictions Bad - Monkeys..................................159
Predictions Bad Decisionmaking Spillover......160
AT: Monkeys........................................................161
Predictions Good (1/3).........................................162
Mag. Evaluated First (1/3)...................................165
Role of Ballot = Magnitude.................................168
Extinction Evaluated First...................................170
**PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**...........171
Precautionary Principle Good- Risk Avoidance. .172
Precautionary Principle Good- Risk Fails...........173
Precautionary Principle Good Risk Fails..........174
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Innovation Stultification 175
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Zero Risk......176
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Cost...............177
Precautionary Principle Good- AT Bad Science. .178
**AT PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**.....179
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
Precautionary Principle Bad- Paralysis (1/3).......180

Precautionary Principle Bad- Innovation (1/3)....183
Precautionary Principle Bad- Pandemic..............186
Precautionary Principle Bad- Militarism.............187
**UTIL**............................................................188
Util O/W Rights...................................................189
Util Good K2 Policymaking.............................190
Util Good - K2 Determine Rights........................191
Util Good Best Interest.....................................192
Util Good Concrete Decisionmaking................193
Util Good Prevents Nuke War..........................194
Util Inevitable......................................................195
Survival Instinct Good Extinction....................197
Consequentialism Good.......................................198
Consequentialism Fails........................................199
Consequentialism Fails........................................200
**AT UTIL**.....................................................201
Util Bad No Equality/Justice............................202
Util Bad Mass Murder......................................203
Util Bad Annihilation........................................204
Util Bad VTL....................................................205
Util Excludes Rights............................................206
Survival Instinct Bad Destroys Humanity........207
**RIGHTS/DEONTOLOGY**........................208
Must Evaluate Human Rights (1/2).....................209
Must Evaluate Human Rights (2/2).....................210
Deontology O/W Util...........................................211
Deontology Good K2 Policy............................216
Deontology Good K2 VTL...............................217
Callahan (1/2)......................................................218
Callahan (2/2)......................................................219
Callahan Ext.........................................................220
Moral Justice First...............................................222
Moral Rationality First........................................223
Rights Absolute....................................................224
Rights/Liberty K2 Rationality.............................226
Moral Resolution O/W Util.................................227
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
Morals Compatible With Util..............................228

No Rights = Violent Backlash.............................229
Right To Health O/W...........................................230
Poverty Moral Obligation....................................231
Action Key End Result Irrelevant.....................232
**AT DEONTOLOGY/RIGHTS**.................233
Rights Violation Inev...........................................234
AT: Rights First....................................................235
AT: Rights First....................................................236
AT Rawls..............................................................237
AT Rawls..............................................................238
AT Rawls..............................................................239
AT: Liberty/Rights First.......................................240
AT: Morals First...................................................241
AT: Gewirth.........................................................242
AT: Gewirth.........................................................243
AT: Gewirth.........................................................244
AT: Gewirth.........................................................245
AT: Gewirth.........................................................246
AT: Gewirth.........................................................247
Ethics Bad............................................................248
Ethics Bad............................................................249
Ethics Bad............................................................250
Deontology Bad No Assume Nuke War...........251
Deontology Bad - Policy.....................................252
Deontology Bad - Policy.....................................253
Deontology Bad - Democracy.............................254
Deontology Bad -- Conflicts................................255
Deontology Bad Subjective Rights...................256
Extinction O/W Deontology................................257
Deontology Bad - Absolutist...............................258
Deontology Bad - Absolutist...............................259
Ethical Action/Legality Mutually Exclusive.......260
Ethical Action/Legality Mutually Exclusive.......261
**AT EGAL**....................................................262
Egalitarianism Frontline (1/2)..............................263
Egalitarianism Frontline (2/2)..............................264
Public Sphere Ext Arg Plurality........................265
Hierarchies Inevitable..........................................266
Egal = Envy.........................................................267
Egal = Infinite Redistribution..............................268
Egal Biased..........................................................269
Rejection of Egal K2 Check Abuse.....................270
AT: Moral Egal....................................................271
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
AT: Democratic Egal............................................272

AT: Radical Egal..................................................273
AT: Egal = Util.....................................................274
Inegal Solves........................................................275
Econ Turns Egal...................................................276
Sufficientarianism Good......................................277
Sufficientarianism Good......................................278
Sufficientarian Perm............................................279
**AGENCIES**................................................280
Generic Agencies Fail..........................................281
NGOs Key Federal Sucess.................................282
Administration for Children and Families...........283
Agriculture Department.......................................284
Department of Health and Human Services........285
Department of Education.....................................286
States Solve Education........................................287
Department of Interior.........................................288
Department of Interior (Natives Link).................289
Department of Interior (U.S. Territories DA)......290
Housing and Urban Development.......................291
Department of labor.............................................292
Department of Justice..........................................293
Environmental Protection Agency.......................294
Office of National Aids Policy.............................295
Office of National Aids Policy.............................295
Social Security Administration............................296
ICE.......................................................................297
Veterans Health Administration...........................298
Ineffective Agency Political Capital Link........299
**INTERNATIONAL LAW**..........................300
Intl Law Good....................................................301
Intl Law Good....................................................302
Intl Law Impact..................................................303
Intl Law K2 Rights.............................................304
Intl Law Bad.......................................................305
Intl Law K2 Democracy.....................................306
Intl Law Bad.......................................................307
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
**TERMINAL IMPACTS**
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
AIDS
The spread of AIDS causes mutations that risk extinction
Ehrlich and Erlich 90
Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, Professors of Population studies at Stanford University, THE POPULATION
EXPLOSION, 1990, p. 147-8
Whether or not AIDS can be contained will depend primarily on how rapidly the spread of HIV can be slowed through
public education and other measures, on when and if the medical community can find satisfactory preventatives or
treatments, and to a large extent on luck. The virus has already shown itself to be highly mutable, and
laboratory strains resistant to the one drug, AZT, that seems to slow its lethal course have already been reported." A
virus that infects many millions of novel hosts, in this case people, might evolve new transmission
characteristics. To do so, however, would almost certainly involve changes in its lethality. If, for instance, the virus
became more common in the blood (permitting insects to transmit it readily), the very process would almost certainly make
it more lethal. Unlike the current version of AIDS , which can take ten years or more to kill its victims , the new
strain might cause death in days or weeks . Infected individuals then would have less time to spread the virus to
others, and there would be strong selection in favor of less lethal strains (as happened in the case of myxopatomis). What
this would mean epidemiologically is not clear, but it could temporarily increase the transmission rate and
reduce life expectancy of infected persons until the system once again equilibrated. If the ability of the
AIDS virus to grow in the cells of the skin or the membranes of the mouth, the lungs, or the intestines
were increased, the virus might be spread by casual contact or through eating contaminated food . But it
is likely, as Temin points out, that acquiring those abilities would so change the virus that it no longer efficiently infected
the kinds of cells it now does and so would no longer cause AIDS. In effect it would produce an entirely different
disease. We hope Temin is correct but another Nobel laureate, Joshua Lederberg, is worried that a relatively minor
mutation could lead to the virus infecting a type of white blood cell commonly present in the lungs. If so, it might be
transmissible through coughs.

AIDS spread and mutations will cause extinction
Lederberg 91
(Joshua Lederberg, Molecular biologist and Nobel Prize winner in 1958, 1991
In Time of Plague: The History and Social Consequences of Lethal Epidemic Disease, p 35-6)
Will Aids mutate further ? Already known, a vexing feature of AIDS is its antigenic variability, further complicating the task of
developing a vaccine. So we know that HIV is still evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far more
HIV on earth today than ever before in history . What are the odds of its learning the tricks of airborne transmission? The
short is, No one can be sure. But we could make the same attribution about any virus; alternatively the
next influenza or chicken pox may mutate to an unprecedented lethality . As time passes, and HIV seems
settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. However, given its other ugly attributes, it is hard to
imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS. No rule of nature contradicts such a
possibility; the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia multiplies the odds of such a
mutant, as an analogue to the emergence of pneumonic plague.
Impact Generic
10
Dartmouth 2K9
Air Pollution
Air pollution will lead to extinction
Driesen 03
(David, Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School, 1989, Fall/Spring, 10
Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 25, p. 26-8)
Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and
harming the health of both future and present generations . The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that
are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs that is
worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. Between them, they aid
understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the center of concerns for sustainable
development." While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects
a concern about the natural environment. Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment,
air quality implicates both of these concerns. Lead, carbon monoxide, particulate, tropospheric ozone, sulfur dioxide, and
nitrogen oxides have historically threatened urban air quality in the United States. This review will focus upon tropospheric
ozone, particulate, and carbon monoxide, because these pollutants present the most widespread of the remaining urban air
problems, and did so at the time of the earth summit. 6 Tropospheric ozone refers to ozone fairly near to the ground, as
opposed to stratospheric ozone high in the atmosphere. The stratospheric ozone layer protects human health and the
environment from ultraviolet radiation, and its depletion causes problems. By contrast, tropospheric ozone damages
human health and the environment. 8 In the United States, the pollutants causing "urban" air quality problems also affect
human health and the environment well beyond urban boundaries. Yet, the health problems these pollutants present remain
most acute in urban and suburban areas. Ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate cause very serious public
health problems that have been well recognized for a long time. Ozone forms in the atmosphere from a reaction between
volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, and sunlight. Volatile organic compounds include a large number of hazardous
air pollutants. Nitrogen oxides, as discussed below, also play a role in acidifying ecosystems. Ozone damages lung tissue. It
plays a role in triggering asthma attacks, sending thousands to the hospital every summer. It effects young children and
people engaged in heavy exercise especially severely. Particulate pollution, or soot, consists of combinations of a wide
variety of pollutants. Nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide contribute to formation of fine particulate, which is associated with
the most serious health problems. 13 Studies link particulate to tens of thousands of annual premature deaths in the United
States. Like ozone it contributes to respiratory illness, but it also seems to play a [*29] role in triggering heart attacks
among the elderly. The data suggest that fine particulate, which EPA did not regulate explicitly until recently, plays a
major role in these problems. 16 Health researchers have associated carbon monoxide with various types of neurological
symptoms, such as visual impairment, reduced work capacity, reduced manual dexterity, poor learning ability, and difficulty
in performing complex tasks. The same pollution problems causing current urban health problems also contribute
to long lasting ecological problems. Ozone harms crops and trees. These harms affect ecosystems and future
generations. Similarly, particulate precursors, including nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide, contribute to acid rain, which is
not easily reversible. To address these problems, Agenda 21 recommends the adoption of national programs to reduce
health risks from air pollution, including urban air pollution. These programs are to include development of "appropriate
pollution control technology . . . for the introduction of environmentally sound production processes." It calls for this
development "on the basis of risk assessment and epidemiological research." It also recommends development of "air
pollution control capacities in large cities emphasizing enforcement programs using monitoring networks as appropriate."
A second principle, the precautionary principle, provides support for the first. As stated in the Rio Declaration, the
precautionary principle means that "lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation" when "there are threats of serious or irreversible damage." Thus,
lack of complete certainty about the adverse environmental and human health effects of air pollutants does not, by itself,
provide a reason for tolerating them. Put differently, governments need to address air pollution on a
precautionary basis to ensure that humans can life a healthy and productive life.
10
Impact Generic
11
Dartmouth 2K9
Anthrax
A small amount of anthrax could be effective in killing millions of people
Wake, 01
Ben Wake The Ottawa Citizen October 13, 2001 Saturday Final EDITION
http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?
docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7030650745&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=26&resultsUrlKey=29_T7030641352
&cisb=22_T7030650748&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8363&docNo=4
.The potential impact on a city can be estimated by looking at the effectiveness of an aerosol in producing downwind casualties. The
World Health Organization in 1970 modeled the results of a hypothetical dissemination of 50 kg of agent along a 2-km line upwind of
a large population center. Anthrax and tularemia are predicted to cause the highest number of dead and incapacitated, as well
as the greatest downwind spread. A government study estimated that about 200 pounds of anthrax released upwind of
Washington, D.C., could kill up to 3 million people. Here is a list of all of the recognized Biological Weapons.
11
Impact Generic
12
Dartmouth 2K9
Biodiversity
Biodiversity is key to preventing extinction
Madgoluis 96
(Richard Margoluis, Biodiversity Support Program, 1996,
http://www.bsponline.org/publications/showhtml.php3?10)
Biodiversity not only provides direct benefits like food, medicine, and energy; it also affords us a "life
support system." Biodiversity is required for the recycling of essential elements, such as carbon, oxygen, and
nitrogen. It is also responsible for mitigating pollution, protecting watersheds, and combating soil erosion.
Because biodiversity acts as a buffer against excessive variations in weather and climate, it protects us from catastrophic
events beyond human control. The importance of biodiversity to a healthy environment has become
increasingly clear. We have learned that the future well-being of all humanity depends on our stewardship
of the Earth. When we overexploit living resources, we threaten our own survival.
Biodiversity loss outweighs all impacts

Tobin 90
(Richard Tobin, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE, 1990, p. 22 )
Norman Meyers observes, no other form of environmental degradation is anywhere so significant as the fallout
of species. Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson is less modest in assessing the relative consequences of human-caused
extinctions. To Wilson, the worst thing that will happen to earth is not economic collapse, the depletion of energy
supplies, or even nuclear war. As frightful as these events might be, Wilson reasons that they can be repaired
within a few generations. The one process ongoingthat will take millions of years to correct is the loss of
genetic and species diversity by destruction of natural habitats.
12
Impact Generic
13
Dartmouth 2K9
Bioterror
Bioterror will cause extinction
Steinbrenner, Brookings Senior Fellow, 1997
[John D. , Foreign Policy, "Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses," Winter, InfoTrac]
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential
weapons of mass destruction, there is a n obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive,
weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not
independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things . That deceptively simple
observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs
immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable
manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent
damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military
planning. The use of a pathogen , by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be
precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or
decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and
therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction . A lethal
pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an
intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population . The 1918
influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.
Nobody really knows how serious a possibility this might be, since there is no way to measure it
reliably.
Bioterror is the only impact that risks extinction
Ochs 02
(Richard Ochs, Chemical Weapons Working Group Member, 2002 Biological Weapons must be
Abolished Immediately, June 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)
genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure
or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth . Any perceived military value or
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the
deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter,"
resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the
health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control
very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated . There is no way to guarantee the security of these
doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous
proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause.
Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in
the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser
effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical
extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements
last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered
agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could
persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no
known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW
POSSIBLE.
13
Impact Generic
14
Dartmouth 2K9
Bioterror
Biological terrorism caused extinction
Richard Ochs, Chemical Weapons Working Group Member, 2002
[Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately, June 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine,
are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to
the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange
of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are
easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has
demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or
accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small
in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while
they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or
more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural
environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the
killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever.
Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on
the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues
with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.
14
Impact Generic
15
Dartmouth 2K9
Bird Flu
Bird Flu goes global, killing billions
[Ethne Barnes, Research Assistant in Paleopathology, Wichita State, 2005, Diseases and human evolution, p. 427-8]
Human history is riddled with accounts of epidemics wreaking similar havoc among human populations around the world,
though not as severe as the rabbit myxomatosis introduced into Australia. Even the great influenza pandemic in the early
twentieth century did not come close to killing off a significant portion of the global population. However, a more
deadly influenza pandemic is all too likely. Influenza virus exemplifies the ideal predator for reducing
human populations. It is airborne and travels the globe easily and quickly, capable of infecting all age groups
in repeated waves within a short time span. Influenza type A viruses are unstable and continuously evolving .
Global movements of people and viruses at a rapid pace make gene swapping possible among
previously isolated strains. Hybrid virus produced by such gene swapping could result in a deadly strain that targets
the lower branches of the bronchial tubes and the lungs. Severe viral pneumonia and death within twenty-four hours would
follow. The new influenza virus could easily move around the globe within days and kill over half the
human population (Ryan, 1997). Crowded cities, especially megacities, could suffer up to 90 percent fatalities within
days or weeks.
15
Impact Generic
16
Dartmouth 2K9
Constitution
The Constitution is the most important thing to preserve
Eidmoe 92
(John A. Eidsmoe is a Constitutional Attorney, Professor of Law at Thomas Goode Jones School of Law and
Colonel with the USAF, 1992 3 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 35, p. 57-9)
Other misfortunes may be borne, or their effects overcome. If disastrous war should sweep our commerce
from the ocean, another generation may renew it; if it exhaust our treasury, future industry may replenish it; if
it desolate and lay waste our fields, still under a new cultivation, they will grow green again, and ripen to future harvests. It
were but a trifle even if the walls of yonder Capitol were to crumble , if its lofty pillars should fall, and its
gorgeous decorations be all covered by the dust of the valley. All these might be rebuilt. But who shall reconstruct
the fabric of demolished government? Who shall rear again the wellproportioned columns of
constitutional liberty? Who shall frame together the skilful architecture which united national sovereignty with State
rights, individual security, and public prosperity? No, if these columns fall, they will be raised not again . Like the
Coliseum and the Parthenon, they will be destined to a mournful, a melancholy immortality. Bitterer tears, however, will
flow over them, than were ever shed over the remnants of a more glorious edifice than Greece or Rome ever saw, the
edifice of constitutional American liberty. It is possible that a constitutional convention could take place and none of
these drastic consequences would come to pass. It is possible to play Russian roulette and emerge without a scratch;
in fact, with only one bullet in the chamber, the odds of being shot are only one in six. But when the stakes are as
high as one's life, or the constitutional system that has shaped this nation into what it is today, these
odds are too great to take the risk.
We have a moral obligation to prevent violations of the constitution whenever possible
Levinson 2k
Daryl Levinson, professor of law at University of Virginia, Spring 2000 UC Law Review
Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation, for we do not
usually think of violations of constitutional rights in terms of cost-benefit analysis and efficiency. Quite the opposite,
constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as deontological side-constraints that trump even
utility-maximizing government action. Alternatively, constitutional rights might be understood as
serving rule-utilitarian purposes. If the disutility to victims of constitutional violations often exceeds the social
benefits derived from the rights-violating activity, or if rights violations create long-term costs that outweigh
short-term social benefits, then constitutional rights can be justified as tending to maximize global utility, even
though this requires local utility-decreasing steps. Both the deontological and rule-utilitarian descriptions imply
that the optimal level of constitutional violations is zero; that is, society would be better off, by
whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never violated.
16
Impact Generic
17
Dartmouth 2K9
Democracy
Democracy preserves human life
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 95

(October, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990's," http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are
associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality,
accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The
experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic
fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves
or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are
much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do
not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more
reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for
investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who
organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties
since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach
agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,
property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of
international security and prosperity can be built.
17
Impact Generic
18
Dartmouth 2K9
Dehumanization
Dehumanization outweighs all other impacts
Berube, 1997
(Berube, David. Professor. English. University of South Carolina. Nanotechnological
Prolongevity: The Down Side. 1997.
http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm.)
Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire resultant
worldview smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial science. This would involve valuing people
as means. Moreover, there would always be a superhuman more super than the current
ones, humans would never be able to escape their treatment as means to an always
further and distant end. This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's
treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn: "its destructive toll is already greater than
that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life
and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul
might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the
holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and
dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man...
(Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact
dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of
humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the
actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater
than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war,
environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable.
When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be
inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.
18
Impact Generic
19
Dartmouth 2K9
Disease
Disease causes extinction
South China Morning Post 96
(Avi Mensa, 1-4-1996, Leading the way to a cure for AIDS, P. Lexis)
Despite the importance of the discovery of the "facilitating" cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There
is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a
virus deadlier than HIV. If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it.
AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now
affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg".
Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural
and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than
HIV. "An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or
from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain
reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen ."That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a
Hollywood film, but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory . Fifteen years ago, few
could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years
and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was
killed before it had a chance to spread . Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London,
New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow.The shock
of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of
a deadly viral outbreak is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent
conference. He added that the problem was "very serious and is getting worse". Dr Ben-Abraham said: "Nature isn't benign.
The survival of the human species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of
genetic variation exist for viruses to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system." He cites the 1968 Hong Kong
flu outbreak as an example of how viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new "mega-cities" are being
developed in the Third World and rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into
areas of human habitation. "This raises the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for
the first time, infect humanity at a large scale and imperil the survival of the human race," he said.
Drug resistant diseases threaten human extinction.

Discover 2000 (Twenty Ways the World Could End by Corey Powell in Discover Magazine, October 2000,
http://discovermagazine.com/2000/oct/featworld)
If Earth doesn't do us in, our fellow organisms might be up to the task. Germs and people have always
coexisted, but occasionally the balance gets out of whack . The Black Plague killed one European in four during
the 14th century; influenza took at least 20 million lives between 1918 and 1919; the AIDS epidemic has produced a similar
death toll and is still going strong. From 1980 to 1992, reports the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, mortality
from infectious disease in the United States rose 58 percent Old diseases such as cholera and measles have developed
new resistance to antibiotics. Intensive agriculture and land development is bringing humans closer to animal
pathogens. International travel means diseases can spread faster than ever Michael Osterholm, an infectious
disease expert who recently left the Minnesota Department of Health, described the situation as "like trying to
.
swim against the current of a raging river." The grimmest possibility would be the emergence of a
strain that spreads so fast we are caught off guard or that resists all chemical means of control perhaps as
,
a result of our stirring of the ecological pot. About 12,000 years ago, a sudden wave of mammal extinctions swept through
the Americas. Ross MacPhee of the American Museum of Natural History argues the culprit was extremely virulent disease,
which humans helped transport as they migrated into the New World.
19
Impact Generic
20
Dartmouth 2K9
Economy
Economic collapse causes a global nuclear exchange
Mead 92
(Walter Russell, Mead, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations, NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Summer,
1992, p. 30)
The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes
to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the
international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the
West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy
stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South
against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and
their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the
1930's.
Economic slowdown will cause WWIII

Bearden 2k
(Liutenant Colonel Bearden, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big-Medicine/message/642
Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy
in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on
the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat
Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the
stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts , to the point where the
arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As
an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea,
including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear
missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in
such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have
shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential
adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real
legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed . Without effective defense, the
only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to
take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD
exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great
Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many
decades.
20
Impact Generic
21
Dartmouth 2K9
Freedom
Violation of freedom negates the value of human existence and represents the greatest threat to human
survival
Rand 89
(Ayn Rand, Philosopher, July 1989, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, p. 145)
A society that robs and individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of his mind,
or compels him to act against his own rational judgment, a society that sets up a conflict between its ethics and the
requirements of mans nature is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule.
Such a society destroys all values of human coexistence, has no possible justification, and represents ,
not a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to mans survival. Life on desert island is safer than and
incomparably preferable than existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.
21
Impact Generic
22
Dartmouth 2K9
Genocide
Genocide threatens extinction
Diamond 92
(Diamond, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, 1992, p. 277)
While our first association to the world genocide is likely to be the killings in Nazi concentration camps, those were not
even the largest-scale genocide of this century. The Tasmanians and hundreds of other peoples were modern targets of
successful smaller extermination campaigns. Numerous peoples scattered throughout the world are potential
targets in the near future. Yet genocide is such a painful subject that either wed rather not think about
it at all, or else wed like to believe that nice people dont commit genocide only Nazis do. But our refusal to think
about it has consequences weve done little to halt the numerous episodes of genocide since World War
II, and were not alert to where it may happen next. Together with our destruction of our own
environmental resources, our genocidal tendencies coupled to nuclear weapons now constitute the two
most likely means by which the human species may reverse all its progress virtually overnight.
Genocide should always be weighed before other impacts
Rice 05
(Susan Rice, Brookings Institute, WHY DARFUR CANT BE LEFT TO AFRICA, August 7, 2005,
http://www.brookings.org/views/articles/rice/20050807.htm)
Never is the international responsibility to protect more compelling than in cases of genocide.
Genocide is not a regional issue. A government that commits or condones it is not on a par with one that, say, jails
dissidents, squanders economic resources or suppresses free speech, as dreadful as such policies may be. Genocide
makes a claim on the entire world and it should be a call to action whatever diplomatic feathers it
ruffles.
22
Impact Generic
23
Dartmouth 2K9
Heg
Heg prevents global nuclear wars
Khalilzad 95
(Zalmay
Khalilzad,
Rand
Corporation,
The
Washington
Quarterly
1995)
What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward ? Without the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of EastCentral Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either
in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are
likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development.
Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear
exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's
security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security
and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S.
protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant
Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese
technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously
With the
shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united
Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional
dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests.
become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces.
A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and
political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony
and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more
catastrophic
than
the
last.
In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both
sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their
independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran
controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country
that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the
United States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle
East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the
peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.
<continued> The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the
United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S.
standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports
and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of
The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such
as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles . That danger would only increase if the
United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which
many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly.
necessary adjustments might be high.
If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.<continued> Under the third
option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for
the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself,
but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment
would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would
have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional
hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another
hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant
dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a
bipolar
or
multipolar
balance
of
power
system.
23
Impact Generic
Dartmouth 2K9
24
Human Rights Credibility

Human Right Credibility solves extinction
Copelan 99
(Rhonda Copelan, law professor, NYU, NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW, 1999, p. 71-2)
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in the international arena.
The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and
crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy , and military and
environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It
is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the
Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of
individual and collective human survival and betterment . Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights,
encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of
accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include human-centered
sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given the poverty and inequality in
the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the human rights
framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.
24
Impact Generic
25
Dartmouth 2K9
Oceans
Oceans key to survival
Craig '03
(Robin Kundis Craig -- Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law McGeorge Law Rev Winter elipses in
original)
The world's oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable .
"Occupy[ing] more than [seventy percent] of the earth's surface and [ninety-five percent] of the biosphere," 17 oceans
provide food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes,
including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life , both
aesthetic and economic, for millions of people worldwide. 18 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the
importance of the ocean to humanity's well-being: "The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it
remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and
hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate." 19 Ocean and coastal ecosystem
services have been calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per year, worldwide. 20 In addition, many people
assign heritage and existence value to the ocean and its creatures, viewing the world's seas as a common legacy to be passed
on relatively intact to future generations.
25
Impact Generic
26
Dartmouth 2K9
Ozone
Ozone depletion causes extinction
Greenpeace, 1995
(Full of Homes: The Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer,
http://archive.greenpeace.org/ozone/holes/holebg.html .)
When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer
depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible
scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful
ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to
increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system
suppression in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems. This is why Rowland's and
Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.
Ozone destruction causes mass extinction
Palenotological Research Insitute, No Date
(Paleontological Research Institute, PERMIAN EXTINCTION, no date,
http://www.priweb.org/ed/ICTHOL/ICTHOLrp/82rp.htm)
Lastly, a new theory has been proposed- the Supernova explosion. A supernova occurring 30 light years away
from earth would release enough gamma radiation to destroy the ozone layer for several years. Subsequent
exposure to direct ultra-violet radiation would weaken or kill nearly all existing species. Only those living deep
in the ocean will be secured. Sediments contain records or short-term ozone destruction- large amounts of NOx
gasses and C14 plus global and atmospheric cooling. With sufficient destruction of the ozone layer, these
problems could cause widespread destruction of life.This was the biggest extinction event in the last 500 million
years, and researchers want a theory that is scientifically rigorous. Therefore, all these theories are possible but
also have many faults and create much controversy in determining if it is the one exact theory which will
explain this historic mass extinction.
26
Impact Generic
27
Dartmouth 2K9
Patriarchy
Patriarchy is the root cause of wars
Reardon 93
(Betty A. Reardon, Director of the Peace Education Program at Teachers College Columbia University, 1993, Women and Peace:
Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-2 (PDNSS6401))
In an article entitled Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War (1983), Charlene Spretnak focused on some
of the fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy
encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost
unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race
limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is badly needed . . . A clearly visible
element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal
ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to strut
their stuff as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns
that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance ones character
from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to
collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally
reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone
seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its
multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear
exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the
water. If we believe that war is a necessary evil, that patriarchal assumptions are simply human nature, then we are
locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of
recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of
thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used.
(Spretnak 1983)
Patriarchy is the root of all violence and war

Hooks 04
(hooks, professor of English at City College, 2004 (bell, The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity and Love. P 26-27))
Citizens in this nation fear challenging patriarchy even as they lack overt awareness that they are
fearful, so deeply embedded in our collective unconscious are the rules of patriarchy . I often tell audiences
that if we were to go door-todoor asking if we should end male violence against women, most people would give their
unequivocal support. Then if you told them we can only stop male violence against women by ending male domination, by
eradicating patriarchy, they would begin to hesitate, to change their position. Despite the many gains of
contemporary feminist movement-greater equality for women in the workforce, more tolerance for the
relinquishing of rigid gender roles- patriarchy as a system remains intact, and many people continue to
believe that it is needed if humans are to survive as a species. This belief seems ironic, given that patriarchal
methods of organizing nations, especially the insistence on violence as a means of social control , has actually led
to the slaughter of millions of people on the planet.
27
Impact Generic
28
Dartmouth 2K9
Poverty
Ongoing global poverty outweighs nuclear war- only our ev is comparative
Spina 2k
(Stephanie Urso, Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at the Graduate School of the City University
of New York, Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society, p. 201)
This sad fact is not limited to the United States. Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural
violence, compared to 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. That is , approximately every five years, as
many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million
deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world
as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an
ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and
the poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.
Poverty poses the greatest threat to the worldwe have a moral obligation to eradicate it
Vear 04
(Jesse Leah, Co-coordinates POWER--Portland Organizing to Win Economic Rights, "Abolishing Poverty: A
Declaration of Economic Human Rights," http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0407/040704.htm)
Locked in the cross-hairs of domestic and foreign policies which intentionally put our bodies in harm's
way, our terror is the terror of poverty - a terror boldly and callously proliferated by our own government. Surely
one doesn't need the surveillance powers of high-definition weapons-grade satellites to see the faces of the some 80 million
poor people struggling just to survive in America; to see the worried faces of homeless mothers waiting to be added to the
waiting list for non-existent public housing; to find the unemployment lines filled with parents who aren't eligible to see a
doctor and who can't afford to get sick; to see the children stricken with preventable diseases in the midst of the world's
best-equipped hospitals; to hear the rumble in the bellies of millions of hungry Americans whose only security is a bread
line once a week; or to detect the crumbling of our nation's under-funded, under-staffed schools. Meanwhile, billions are
spent waging wars and occupying countries that our school children can't even find on a map. Surely it doesn't take a
rocket scientist to detect the moral bankruptcy of a nation - by far the world's richest and most
powerful - which disregards the basic human needs of its own despairing people in favor of misguided
military adventures that protect no one, whether in nations half-way across the globe, or in the outer reaches of our
atmosphere. To see these things one needs neither a high-powered satellite nor a specialized degree. One needs only to open
one's eyes and dare to see the reality before them. Yet even as you look you still might not see the millions of
poor people in America. My face is only one of 80 million Americans who never get asked for in-depth television
interviews or for our expert commentary regarding the state of the economy or the impact of our nation's policies. In
addition to all the indignities suffered by poor people in America, we must suffer the further indignation of being
disappeared - kept discretely hidden away from the eyes, ears, and conscience of the rest of society and the world. The
existence of poverty in the richest country on earth cannot remain a secret for long. Americans, like the majority of the
world's peoples, are compassionate, fair-minded people. When exposed, the moral hypocrisy of poverty in
America cannot withstand the light of day any more than the moral hypocrisy of slavery or race or sex
discrimination could. That's where the Poor People's Economic Human Rights Campaign comes in. With this
campaign, we are reaching out to the international community as well as the rest of US society to help us secure what are
our most basic human rights, as outlined in International Law. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an
International Treaty signed in 1948 by all UN member nations, including the United States, all nations have a moral
and legal obligation to ensure the basic needs and well-being of all their citizens. Among the rights outlined
in the Declaration are the rights to food, housing, health care, jobs at living wages, and education. Over half a century after
signing this document, despite huge economic gains and a vast productive capacity, the United States has sorely
neglected its promise. In a land whose founding documents proclaim life, liberty, and justice for all, we must hold
this nation to its promises.
28
Impact Generic
29
Dartmouth 2K9
Racism
Racism is the root cause of violence
Foucault '76
[Michel, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, p. 254-257 Trans. David Macey]
What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under
power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum
of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast,
are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist
within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will
allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the
subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by
biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the
more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you
must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must
destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die" - function in a way that is completely new
and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand ,
racism makes it possible to establish a relationship

between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of
confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal
individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more Ias species rather than individual-can
live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the
sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is
something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological
relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political
sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or
the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the
improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society ,
race or racism is the

precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in
the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be
killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the
importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power
of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a
power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist.
When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death,
increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. I think that we are now in a position to
understand a number of things. We can understand, first of all, the link that was quickly-I almost said immediately-established between nineteenth-century
biological theory and the discourse of power. Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense-or in other words, not so much Darwin's theory itself
as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as: the hierarchy of species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence among species, the
selection that eliminates the less fit) naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth century not simply a way of transcribing a political
discourse into biological terms, and not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the
relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness, the history of societies with their
different classes, and so on. Whenever, in other words, there was a confrontation, a killing or the risk of death, the nineteenth century was quite literally
obliged to think about them in the form of evolutionism. And we can also understand why racism should have developed in modern societies that function
in the biopower mode; we can understand why racism broke out at a number of .privileged moments, and why they were precisely the moments when the
Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing

genocide. If you are functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to
kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes of evolutionism, by appealing to a
racism. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens
to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the
nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme
of racism
right to take life was imperative.
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Impact Generic
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Dartmouth 2K9
SARS
A SARS bioweapon would kill 50 million people
Conant, 06
Paul, House Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack,July 2006
http://www.angelfire.com/ult/znewz1/bioterror.html
Concerned about this point, subcommittee Chairman John Linder, R-Ga., asked whether someone with a
"modicum of talent in this business" might genetically alter the SARS virus and "make it more virulent,
spread faster and make it more difficult to treat? The "short answer is yes," replied Brent, though the
recombinant virus might actually be weaker than the original Still, resynthesized SARS spread by
suicidal coughers is a real concern, said Brent.Anthrax, though not contagious in humans, is the more
serious threat, said witnesses, Callahan noting that "you don't have to store it, it lives forever, and
you don't have to feed it." The pathogen is also easy to obtain because the disease afflicts
animals in many places, he said.However, Callahan put avian influenza -- bird flu -- as a top concern
because of its extreme mortality in humans. If a mutated bird flu pathogen becomes contagious
among humans and remains extremely deadly, it could kill some 50 million people worldwide,
experts have said. http://www.angelfire.com/ult/znewz1/bioterror.html
30
Impact Generic
31
Dartmouth 2K9
TB (1/4)
TB collapses the economy
Fonkwo, International Consultant on Public Health, 2008 (Peter Ndeboc, International Consultant on Public
Health, EMBO reports 9, S1, S13S17 (2008),
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v9/n1s/full/embor2008110.html)
During the past couple of decades, however, microbes have shown a tenacious ability to adapt, re-adapt, survive and
challenge human ingenuity (Table 1). The impact of these diseases is immense and is felt across the world. In addition to
affecting the health of individuals directly, infectious diseases are also having an impact on whole societies, economies and
political systems. In the developing world in particular, crucial sectors for sustained development such as health and
education, have seen a marked loss of qualified personnel, most notably to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), tuberculosis (TB) and malaria. These and other infectious agents not only take
an enormous physical toll on humanity, but also cause significant economic losses both directly in the
developing world and less directly in the developed world. It is therefore a matter not only of public health, but
also of economic interest, to invest in and organize an internationally coordinated strategy to fight the
major infectious diseases, or at least to bring them under control Of course, one could simply think the
.
solution would be to try to eliminate the pathogens and/or their vectors from their natural reservoirs or hosts. After all, this
was successfully done with smallpox, for example. Cholera and malaria were similarly brought under control in the USA
and southern Europe. Unfortunately, it is not easy to predict where and when most infectious agents will strike or which
new diseases will emerge. The reasons for their persistence are manifold and include biological, social and political causes.
Pathogens constantly change their genetic make-up, which challenges the development of vaccines against infectious
diseases. This genetic flexibility allows many infectious agents to mutate or evolve into more deadly strains against which
humans have little or no resistance: the HIV and influenza viruses, for example, constantly mutate and recombine to find
their way through the host defence mechanisms. "From the evolutionary perspective, they [viruses and bacteria] are 'the
fittest' and the chances are slim that human ingenuity will ever get the better of them" (Stefansson, 2003). Mass migrations,
trade and travel are notoriously effective at spreading infectious diseases to even the most remote parts of the globe (Table
2). Mass migrations are often the result of emergency situations such as floods, wars, famines or earthquakes, and can
create precarious conditionssuch as poor hygiene and nutrition or risky sexual behaviourswhich hasten the spread of
infectious diseases. Global trade and travel introduce new pathogens into previously virgin regions , where the diseases
find a more vulnerable population and can develop into epidemics; this was the case
when West Nile virus arrived in New York City, from where it quickly spread throughout North
America. In the present-day global village, the next rabies or Ebola epidemic could occur anywhere in the world.
, for example, in the late 1990s,
Increasing urbanization and the growth of urban slums that lack sanitation and clean water, provide fertile ground for
infections. Many cities and townships in the developing world expands at the expense of pristine land, thereby disturbing
natural habitats and bringing humans into more intimate contact with unknown and possibly dangerous microorganisms.
Human forays into virgin areas of the African equatorial forests have brought us into contact with the Ebola virus, although
its real origin has not yet been identified. When humans live in close contact with animals, pathogens are sometimes able to
change hosts and infect humans (Parish et al, 2005). The new hostin this case, a humanis often not as adapted to these
zoonotic diseases as the original host. The past outbreaks of avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
hantavirus, Nipah virus and the HIV epidemic were all due to pathogens that were normally found in animals, but which
subsequently found a new, susceptible host in humans. Moreover, the misuse and overuse of antibiotics is eroding our
ability to control even common infections. Many bacteria have become resistant to even the most powerful antibiotics or
combinations of antibiotics; similarly, the once first-line drugs against malaria are now almost useless. Promiscuous sexual
behaviour and substance abuse remain the main means of transmission of blood-borne infectious diseases such as HIV and
hepatitis. In areas of extreme poverty, given the increased resort to the sex trade for survival, sexual transmission of these
diseases is accelerated. In many developing countries, commercial sex workers and long-distance truck drivers have
contributed greatly to the spread of such infectious diseases from one community to another. In addition, institutional
settingssuch as child-care centres, hospitals and homes for the elderlyprovide an ideal environment for the
transmission of infectious diseases because they bring susceptible individuals into close contact with one another. Wars,
natural disasters, economic collapse and other catastrophes, either individually or in combination, often cause a breakdown
in healthcare systems, which contributes further to the emergence, re-emergence and persistence of otherwise easily
controllable diseases. Yet these diseases do not necessarily require an emergency situation to be able to thrive.
31
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32
Dartmouth 2K9
TB (2/4)
Complacency within the population or health-service providers could be equally dangerous under
otherwise normal conditions. Cutbacks in prevention programmes
and a lack of earlydetection systems allow infectious diseases to gain a foothold in otherwise healthy populations. It is
often not the lack of tools, but the lack of an appropriate healthcare infrastructure and personnel that
handicaps the response to infectious diseases. More generally, there is not yet enough commitment to control
, a lack of trained staff
infectious diseases at the political level. The absence of a direct and obvious link between disease control and the benefits
for public health makes it difficult to sustain public-health policies. Programmes to prevent and treat infectious diseases in
developing countries depend largely on indigenous health workers, most of whom are unfortunately not motivated enough
to deliver the goods. Given the multiplicity and complexity of the reasons behind this general demotivation, only a strong
political will can improve the situation. Finally, public-health experts also worry that global climate change could
contribute further to the spread of both pathogens and their vectors such as mosquitoes or birds, as their migratory patterns
and normal habitats are likely to change. The burden of infectious disease is therefore likely to aggravate, and
in some cases even provoke
economic decay,
and political destabilization, especially in the
developing world and former communist countries. As of the year 2001, one billion people lived on less than US$1 per day.
Countries with a per capita income of less than US$500 per year spend, on average, US$12 per person per year on health.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), infectious diseases caused 32% of deaths worldwide, 68% of deaths
in Africa and 37% of deaths in Southeast Asia (WHO, 1999). These diseases account for 90% of the health problems
worldwide and kill about 14 million people annually, 90% of whom are from the developing world. They have killed more
people than famine, war, accidents and crimes together. AIDS, TB and malaria are increasingly being acknowledged as
important factors in the political and economic destabilization of the developing world. However, the developed world is
not spared either. As of the year 2000, the number of annual deaths owing to infectious diseases was estimated at roughly
170,000 in the USA (Gordon, 2000). HIV and pneumonia/influenza are among the 10 leading causes of death in the USA.
At present, approximately one million Americans are infected with HIV. The WHO estimates that 33.4 million people have
contracted HIV worldwide since the beginning of the epidemic in 1983 and about 2.3 million of these died in the year 1998
alone. In the USA and many other countries, AIDS is now the leading cause of death among young adults (Fauci et al,
1996). The United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS; Geneva Switzerland) estimates that another 115
million people will die by 2015 in the 60 countries most affected by AIDS (UNAIDS, 2006). The economic costs of
infectious diseases especially HIV/AIDS and malariaare significant. Their increasing toll on productivity
, further
social fragmentation
owing to deaths and chronic debilitating illnesses, reduced profitability and decreased foreign
investment has had a serious effect on the economic growth of some poor countries. According to the WHO, the
,
economic value of the loss-of-life owing to HIV/AIDS in 1999 was estimated at about 12% of the gross national product
(GNP) in sub-Saharan African countries, and the virus could reduce the gross domestic product of some by 20% or more by
2010. Some of the hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan Africaand possibly in South and Southeast Asiawill face severe
demographic changes as HIV/AIDS and associated diseases reduce human life-expectancy by as much as 30 years and kill
as many as 23% of their populations, thereby creating a huge orphan cohort. Nearly 42 million children in 27 countries will
lose one or both parents to AIDS by 2010, and 19 of the hardest-hit countries will be in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2003).
These demographic changes also affect economic growth, as endemic diseases deplete a country of its work force. A 10%
increase in life expectancy at birth (LEB) is associated with a rise in economic growth of 0.30.4% per year. The difference
in annual growth owing to LEB between a typical high-income country with a LEB of 77 years and a typical less-developed
country with a LEB of 49 years is roughly 1.6% per year, and is cumulative over time The relationship between
disease and political instability is indirect but real. A wide-ranging study on the causes of instability
indicates that TB prevalencea good indicator of overall quality of lifecorrelates strongly with political
instability, even in countries that have already achieved a measure of democracy (Van Helden, 2003). The
.
severe social and economic impact of infectious diseases is likely to intensify the struggle for the
political power to control scarce resources. Health must therefore be regarded as a major economic factor and
investments in health as a profitable business. According to the WHO, TB affects working hours in formal and
informal economies, as well as within households (WHO, 2008). Country studies document that each TB patient loses, on
average, 34 months of work time annually due to the disease, and lost earnings amount to 2030% of household income.
Families of people who die from the disease lose approximately 15 years of income. The global burden
32
Impact Generic
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Dartmouth 2K9
TB (3/4)
of TB in economic terms can therefore be easily calculated: given 8.4 million patients yearly according to the most
recent WHO estimates (Kim et al, 2008), the majority of whom are potential wage-earners, and assuming a 30% decline in
average productivity, the toll amounts to approximately US$1 billion each year. Annual deaths are estimated at two million
and, with an average loss of 15 years of income per death, there is an additional deficit of US$11 billion. Every 12 months
TB therefore causes roughly US$12 billion to disappear from the global economy. The social cost of the lost
productivity further increases the burden on society. By contrast, a 50% reduction in TB-related deaths would cost US$900
million per year, but the return on investment by 2010 would be 22 million people cured, 16 million deaths averted and
US$6 billion saved. Each year there are between 400 and 900 million febrile infections owing to malaria (0.72.7 million
deaths), more than 75% of which are among African children, and less than 20% of these malaria cases ever see a doctor for
treatment. Pregnant women have a higher risk of dying from the infection or of having children with low birth weight.
Children suffer cognitive damage and anaemia, and families spend up to 25% of their income on treatment. A study by
Gallup & Sachs (2000) showed that countries with endemic malaria had income levels in 1995 that were only 33% of those
in countries that do not suffer from malaria. Countries with a severe malaria burden grew 1.3% less per year, compared
with those without. Gallup & Sachs estimated the aggregate loss owing to the disease in some 25 countries at
approximately US$73 billion in 1987, which represented more than 15% of the GDP. AIDS/HIV also creates an enormous
burden for the global economy. In the year 2000, 36.1 million people were living with AIDS (25 million of whom were in
sub-Saharan Africa), 5.3 million people were infected (3.8 million in sub-Saharan Africa) and three million people died (2.4
million in sub-Saharan Africa), and AIDS has caused 21.8 million deaths to date. This has a heavy economic impact on
society. According to the WHO Macroeconomics Report, the economic burden of AIDS on sub-Saharan Africa is
approximately 72 million disability-adjusted life years (DALY), and each AIDS death is estimated to have resulted in 34.6
DALYs lost, on average, in 1999 (WHO, 2003). Assuming that each DALY is valued at the per capita income, the economic
value of lost life years in 1999 caused by AIDS represents 11.7% of the GNP. If each DALY is valued at three times the per
capita income, the losses represent 35.1% of the GNP. In addition, infectious diseases n general, especially those that
can cause an epidemic continue to make costly disruptions to trade and commerce in every region of the
world (Table 3). Emerging and re-emerging diseases, many of which are likely to appear in poorer countries first, can easily
spread to richer parts of the world. The burden of infectious disease already weakens the military capabilities of various
countries and international peace-keeping efforts. This will contribute further to political destabilization in the hardest-hit
parts of the world. In slowing down social and economic development, diseases challenge democratic developments and
transitions, and contribute to civil conflicts. Finally, trade embargoes or restrictions on travel and immigration
owing to outbreaks of infectious disease will cause more friction between developing and developed
countries, and hinder global commerce to the greater detriment of poor countries. The effects of infectious diseases
over the next decades depend on three variables: the relationship between increasing microbial resistance and scientific
efforts to develop new antibiotics and vaccines; the future of developing and transitional economies, especially with regard
to improving the basic quality of life for the poorest people; and the success of global and national efforts to create effective
systems of surveillance and response. Depending on these variables, the relationship between humans and infectious
diseases, and their impact on the human race, could take one of the following pathways. The optimistic scenario foresees
steady improvement whereby ageing populations and declining fertility, socioeconomic advances, and improvements in
health care and medical research will lead to a 'health transition' in which infectious diseases will be replaced by noninfectious diseases such as diabetes, heart disease and cancer, as major health challenges. By contrast, the pessimist
scenario of steady deterioration foresees little or no progress in countering infectious diseases in the future. According to
this scenario, a vicious spiral will develop between infectious diseases and poverty. Major diseases such as
HIV/AIDSwill reach catastrophic proportions as the viruses spread throughout populations as a result
of increased resistance to multi-drug treatments and the unavailability of expensive treatments in developing
countries, which face the majority of the problem. The third and most likely scenario foresees an initial deterioration
followed by limited improvement. Persistent poverty in the least-developed countries will create conditions that sustain
reservoirs of infectious diseases. Microbial resistance will continue to increase faster than the pace of drug and vaccine
development. The threat, in particular from HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria, will cause such massive socioeconomic and cultural upheaval that it will eventually affect a critical mass of humanity This will create
the necessary pressure for a movement towards better prevention and control efforts, with new and effective drugs and
vaccines made affordable. This will only later result in demographic changes such as reduced fertility and ageing
populations, and a gradual socioeconomic improvement in most countries. The good news is that infectious
33
Impact Generic
34
Dartmouth 2K9
TB (4/4)
diseases can be easily prevented through simple and inexpensive methods (Sidebar A). This requires correct education and
the spread of knowledge; however, even these simple measures will not be enough to bring infectious diseases under
control if there is no political and international commitment. Governments must be made to understand the
stakes involved in fighting infectious diseasesthis is the only way to guarantee that the necessary
resources will be allocated in sufficient quantities and on time . We need a global commitment to address the
most prominent infectious diseases and to complement local initiatives with special attention to the least-developed
countries (Alilio, 2001; Stop TB Partnership, 2006). This will require analytical and advisory services in order to help
countries generate and act on information about the status and dynamics of most infectious diseases, and to estimate their
social and economic impact. Such information is essential for advocacy, and for making appropriate and timely decisions.
In the face of limited resources, joint efforts will have to focus on the main killer diseasesincluding HIV/AIDS, TB and
malariain order to have the greatest impact. Medical treatment, psychosocial supportincluding palliative care for
debilitating diseasesand highly active anti-microbial therapy will be essential. In addition, the prevailing problem of the
physical and financial inaccessibility of most of these drugs will have to be addressed. Last, best practices will have to be
identified and scaled up. This will require special efforts to identify and overcome legal barriers, and to analyse, countryby-country, financial and non-financial resources with a view to mobilizing support internationally. In conclusion,
infectious diseases constitute a major problem for the world, but even more so for the developing world. No country can
afford to remain aloof in the battle against these diseases, especially given the potentially far-reaching and devastating
effects that they could have on the human race at large. Increasing globalization means that the big questions in relation to
epidemics will be those of where and whenand not whetherthe next epidemic emerges, as historical examples have
shown. Therefore, all stakeholdersresearchers, politicians, health professionals, the financial sector and the community at
largemust take the necessary bold steps forward Even from the purely economic point of view, the
investment in the fight against infectious diseases is evidently good business: the world economy and,
subsequently, individual family economiesstands to benefit from such investments. We already know a lot of
what we must do; we just need to do it. The future of the human race depends on our actions today.
.
34
Impact Generic
35
Dartmouth 2K9
TB
TB collapses the economy
Thomas, Writer for the WHO, 4/8/05 (Chris, Writer for the World Health Organization (WHO), 4/8/05
http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_apr05/pillars.htm )
TB tends to threaten the poorest and most marginalized groups of people. It disrupts the social fabric of
society and slows or undermines gains in economic development. An overwhelming 98 percent of the
2 million annual TB deathsand some 95 percent of all new casesoccur in developing countries.
On average, TB causes three to four months of lost work time and lost earnings for a household.
USAID has been a key player in the Stop TB Partnership, an effort of more than 350 partner governments and
organizations. Aside from funding, the Agency invests in the Stop TB Partnership and GDF by providing technical
support. This helps poor countries improve their drug management systems, trains local TB experts, and helps health
ministries draw up comprehensive TB strategies. USAID has been particularly involved in administering DOTS, a system
of observing people while they take the full course of medicine to prevent drug-resistant strains from developing.
The timeframe for TB is immediate

Lite, 4/1/09 (Jordan Lite, 4/1/09, Scientific American http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/60-secondscience/post.cfm?id=drug-resistant-tuberculosis-a-time-2009-04-01 )
The growing prevalence of drug-resistant tuberculosis is a "potentially explosive situation," the World
Health Organization's director general, Margaret Chan, said today at the opening of a three-day meeting on the
problem.Representatives from 27 countries affected by multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) and
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) are gathering in Beijing to discuss how to address the trend .
MDR-TB is resistant to first-line drugs; XDR-TB doesnt respond to those meds or second-line therapies .
More than 500,000 MDR-TB cases occur annuallyonly 3 percent of them treated according to WHO standardsand
XDR-TB exists in more than 50 countries, the agency says. People with HIV, whose immune systems are already
weakened by the AIDS-causing virus, are at increased risk of TB. "Call it what you maya time bomb or a
powder keg," Chan said today, according to the Associated Press. "Any way you look at it, this is a
potentially explosive situation."
35
Impact Generic
36
Dartmouth 2K9
Terror
A terrorist attack escalates to a global nuclear exchange
Speice 06
)Speice 06 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:
ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, William & Mary Law Review, February
2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427])
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or
fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era
nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods ,
including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by
[*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these
ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a
nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41
Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable
weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device
into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was
built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first
place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War
eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45
This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although
the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or
underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their
nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The
potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause
mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be
devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses . 49 Moreover, there would be immense political
pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the
number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists,
leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and
may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear
attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states , 52 as well as increase the
likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear
weapons. 53
A nuclear terrorist attack will trigger every single impact scenario
Zedillo 06
(Ernesto Zedillo, Former President of Mexico Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, FORBES, January 9, 2006,
p. 25)
Even if you agree with what's being done in the war on terror, you still could be upset about what's not happening: doing
the utmost to prevent a terrorist nuclear attack. We all should have a pretty clear idea of what would follow a
nuclear weapon's detonation in any of the world's major cities. Depending on the potency of the device the
loss of life could be in the hundreds of thousands (if not millions), the destruction of property in the
trillions of dollars, the escalation in conflicts and violence uncontrollable, the erosion of authority and
government unstoppable and the disruption of global trade and finance unprecedented. In short, we
could practically count on the beginning of another dark age.
36
Impact Generic
37
Dartmouth 2K9
Warming
Warming leads to nuclear war and famine that kills hundreds of millions of
people
Pfeiffer 2004
[Dale Allen, Geologist, Global Climate Change & Peak Oil, The Wilderness Publications, Online]
But the real importance of the report lies in the statement of probability and in the authors' recommendations to the
President and the National Security Council. While no statistical analysis of probability is given in the report as it has been
released (any such statistical analysis would most likely be classified), the authors state that the plausibility of severe
and rapid climate change is higher than most of the scientific community and perhaps all of the
political community is prepared for.6 They say that instead of asking whether this could happen, we
should be asking when this will happen . They conclude: It is quite plausible that within a decade the evidence of
an imminent abrupt climate shift may become clear and reliable.7 From such a shift , the report claims, utterly
appalling ecological consequences would follow. Europe and Eastern North America would plunge
into a mini-ice age, with weather patterns resembling present day Siberia. Violent storms could wreak
havoc around the globe. Coastal areas such as The Netherlands, New York, and the West coast of North
America could become uninhabitable, while most island nations could be completely submerged .
Lowlands like Bangladesh could be permanently swamped. While flooding would become the rule along coastlines,
mega-droughts could destroy the world's breadbaskets. The dust bowl could return to America's Midwest . Famine and
drought would result in a major drop in the planet's ability to sustain the present human population.
Access to water could become a major battleground hundreds of millions could die as a result of
famine and resource wars. More than 400 million people in subtropical regions will be put at grave risk. There would
be mass migrations of climate refugees, particularly to southern Europe and North America. Nuclear arms
proliferation in conjunction with resource wars could very well lead to nuclear wars. 8 And none of this
takes into account the effects of global peak oil and the North American natural gas cliff. Not pretty.
Runaway warming leads to extinction

Pfeiffer 2004
[Dale Allen, Geologist, Global Climate Change & Peak Oil, The Wilderness Publications, Online]
The possibility of runaway global warming is not as distant a threat as we may wish . It is a threat which
worries some of the greatest minds living among us today. Stephen Hawking, physicist, best selling author of A Brief
History of Time, and claimant of the Cambridge University post once occupied by Sir Isaac Newton (the Lucasian Chair of
Mathematics), has been quoted as saying, "I am afraid the atmosphere might get hotter and hotter until it
will be like Venus with boiling sulfuric acid."1 The renowned physicist was joined by other notables such as
former President Jimmy Carter, former news anchor Walter Cronkite, and former astronaut and Senator John Glenn in
drafting a letter to urge President Bush to develop a plan to reduce US emissions of greenhouse gases.2 Former British
Environmental Minister Michael Meacher is also worried about the survival of the human race due to
global warming.
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**HEG**
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Kagan
US hegemony key to check multiple scenarios for nuclear war.
Kagan 7 Senior Associate @ the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(End
of
Dreams,
Return
of
History,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html)
Policy
Review,
Hoover
Institution,
Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations,
Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East
Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its
goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and
continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe
and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power,
it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle
East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more
of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their
global place as No. 1 and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or
idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in
their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to
shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious
nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism
in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and
status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying its regional as well as its global predominance.
Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations
would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation
but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a
multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less
likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United
States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States
is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They
either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes,
of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to
play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would
compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve
struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts,
would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the
goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical
miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt
secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europes stability depends on
the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous
development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of
world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance
often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American
power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they
like would remain in place. But
thats not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of
power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and
especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were
Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms
reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an
improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment
liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no
guarantee against major conflict among the worlds great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts
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involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and
Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to
intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does
conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the
United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more
likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in
East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That
is certainly the view of most of Chinas neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as
the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious,
independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene even if it remained the
worlds most powerful nation could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially
forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance
of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for
a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without
Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe if it adopted what some call a strategy of offshore
balancing this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in
turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that
a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, offshore role would
lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access
open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the
best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more even-handed policy toward Israel, which some see as
the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israels aid if its
security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for
most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.
The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the
Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two
centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesnt change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to
the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American
withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is
further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would
not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and
Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly
Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that
could shift the balance of power in the
Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasnt changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq
will not return things to normal or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to
draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere
is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition
among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one
should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will
provide an easier path.
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Decline Inev
Rising asymmetric balancing, diplomatic countermovements, and overstretch
coupled with massive expenditure has rendered the decline of hegemony
imminent
Khanna 08 (Parag, America Strategy Program sr. fellow, 1/27, p. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the
ndependent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is
stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and,
from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and
has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy .
i
Americas standing in the world remains in steady decline. Why? Werent we supposed to reconnect with the United
Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can, and should, lead it to collective security and prosperity ? Indeed,
improvements to Americas image may or may not occur, but either way, they mean little. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no
permanent enemies, but it has no permanent friends either. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a
global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened Americas
armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and
asymmetric weapons like suicide bombers. Americas unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial
countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global
order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.
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Econ T/
US withdrawal would result in a new dark age and collapse the global economy
Ferguson, 4 (Niall. Prof of history @ Harvard. Hoover Digest, A World without Power July/August 4.
http://www.hooverdigest.org/044/ferguson.html)
So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark
Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark
Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous
roughly 20 times moremeaning that friction between the worlds disparate tribes is bound to be more frequent.
Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on fresh water and the harvest but also on
supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too; it is now possible not just to sack
a city but to obliterate it.
For more than two decades, globalizationthe integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capitalhas raised
living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or
civil war. The reversal of globalizationwhich a new Dark Age would producewould certainly lead to economic stagnation
and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or
Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business.
Meanwhile, as Europes Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists infiltration of the E.U. would become irreversible,
increasing transatlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the
communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors
would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home were preferable to the risks of default abroad.
The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the
global economyfrom New York to Rotterdam to Shanghaiwould become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease,
terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations
frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions,
beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America,
wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great
plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend
services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?
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**WAR IMPACTS**
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Turns Everything
War causes destroys health, human rights, the environment, and causes
domestic violence
Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and Public
Health, Edition 2, 2007)
War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys families, communities, and
sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from protection and promotion of health, medical care, and other
human services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It limits human rights and contributes to social injustice. It
leads many people to think that violence is the only way to resolve conflictsa mindset that contributes to domestic violence,
street crime, and other kinds of violence. And it contributes to the destruction of the environment and overuse of nonrenewable
resources. In sum. war threatens much of the fabric of our civilization.
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AIDS
War helps transmit HIV/AIDS
Unicef 96
(Unicef, 1996, Sexual violence as a weapon of war http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/sexviol.htm)
In addition to rape, girls and women are also subject to forced prostitution and trafficking during times
of war, sometimes with the complicity of governments and military authorities. During World War II,
women were abducted, imprisoned and forced to satisfy the sexual needs of occupying forces, and many Asian women
were also involved in prostitution during the Viet Nam war. The trend continues in today's conflicts. The State of
the World's Children 1996 report notes that the disintegration of families in times of war leaves women and girls especially
vulnerable to violence. Nearly 80 per cent of the 53 million people uprooted by wars today are women and children. When
fathers, husbands, brothers and sons are drawn away to fight, they leave women, the very young and the elderly to fend for
themselves. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Myanmar and Somalia, refugee families frequently cite rape or the fear of rape as a
key factor in their decisions to seek refuge. During Mozambique's conflict, young boys, who themselves had been
traumatized by violence, were reported to threaten to kill or starve girls if they resisted the boys' sexual advances. Sexual
assault presents a major problem in camps for refugees and the displaced, according to the report. The incidence of rape
was reported to be alarmingly high at camps for Somali refugees in Kenya in 1993. The camps were located in isolated
areas, and hundreds of women were raped in night raids or while foraging for firewood. UNHCR (the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees) has had to organize security patrols, fence camps with thorn bushes and relocate the
most vulnerable women to safer areas. Some rape victims who were ostracized were moved to other camps or given priority
for resettlement abroad. UNHCR has formal guidelines for preventing and responding to sexual violence in the camps, and
it trains field workers to be more sensitive to victims' needs. Refugee women are encouraged to form committees and
become involved in camp administration to make them less vulnerable to men who would steal their supplies or force them
to provide sex in return for provisions. The high risk of infection with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs),
including HIV/AIDS, accompanies all sexual violence against women and girls. The movement of
refugees and marauding military units and the breakdown of health services and public education
worsens the impact of diseases and chances for treatment. For example, one study has suggested that the
exchange of sex for protection during the civil war in Uganda in the 1980s was a contributing factor to
the country's high rate of AIDS.
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Animal Rights T/
War hurts animal rights
Ernst 09
(Stephanie Ernst, 5-29-09, Animals in War: You Don't Have to Be Human to Die by the Millions
http://animalrights.change.org/blog/view/animals_in_war_you_dont_have_to_be_human_to_die_by_the_millions)
The Animals in War Memorial in London, unveiled in 2004, bears the following as part of its inscription:
"They
had no choice." "They" refers to the literally millions of animals killed in twentieth-century wars- horses, mules, donkeys, pigeons, elephants, glow worms, and camels among them. Indeed, " eight million horses and
countless mules and donkeys died in the First World War . They were used to transport ammunition and supplies
to the front and many died, not only from the horrors of shellfire but also in terrible weather and appalling
conditions" (emphasis mine), a brief history on the monument's Web site explains--and that was only one war and only
one set of animals among many different animals.
A BBC article further explains, "The monument pays special tribute to the 60 animals awarded the PDSA Dickin Medal the animals' equivalent of the Victoria Cross - since 1943." Fifty-four of the 60, including 32 pigeons, were used in World
War II. And before anyone is inclined to say or think "just pigeons" or "just messages," consider what the birds were forced
to endure to get the messages back and forth. Examples: " Winkie, a pigeon that flew 129 miles with her wings
clogged with oil to save a downed bomber crew," and "Mary of Exeter, another pigeon, which flew back with her
neck and right breast ripped open, savaged by hawks kept by the Germans at Calais." (Note the BBC's irritating use of
"which" and "that" here instead of "who.") Sometimes people make remarks about such animals "giving" their lives. But
they didn't give their lives. They didn't choose to enlist. Their fate was decided for them . It was the ultimate,
no-recourse draft. For that reason, I am glad for that so-true inscription: "They had no choice." And animals certainly don't
have to be dragged to active battlefields to suffer and die because of humans' wars. The U.S. military shoots, injures, and
kills animals on our soil regularly, as part of training.
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Biodiversity
War destroys Forests and Biodiversity
Sierra Club, 2003
(No publish date, references 2003 in the past tense, http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/postings/war-and-environment.html)
Throughout history, war has invariably resulted in environmental destruction. However, advancements in military
technology used by combatants have resulted in increasingly severe environmental impacts. This is well illustrated by the
devastation to forests and biodiversity caused by modern warfare. Military machinery and explosives have caused
unprecedented levels of deforestation and habitat destruction. This has resulted in a serious disruption of ecosystem
services, including erosion control, water quality, and food production. A telling example is the destruction of 35% of
Cambodias intact forests due to two decades of civil conflict. In Vietnam, bombs alone destroyed over 2 million acres of
land.[13] These environmental catastrophes are aggravated by the fact that ecological protection and restoration become a
low priority during and after war. The threat to biodiversity from combat can also be illustrated by the Rwanda genocide of
1994. The risk to the already endangered population of mountain gorillas from the violence was of minimal concern to
combatants and victims during the 90-day massacre.[14] The threat to the gorillas increased after the war as thousands of
refugees, some displaced for decades, returned to the already overpopulated country. Faced with no space to live, they had
little option but to inhabit the forest reserves, home to the gorilla population. As a result of this human crisis, conservation
attempts were impeded. Currently, the International Gorilla Programme Group is working with authorities to protect the
gorillas and their habitats. This has proven to be a challenging task, given the complexities Rwandan leaders face, including
security, education, disease, epidemics, and famine.[15]
Chemical and Biological Warfare would destroy the environment-Vietnam proves

Sierra Club, 2003
One of the most striking examples of military disregard for environmental and human health is the use of chemical and
biological agents in warfare. The American militarys use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War is one of the most
widely known examples of using environmental destruction as a military tactic. Agent Orange is a herbicide that was
sprayed in millions of liters over approximately 10% of Vietnam between 1962 and 1971. It was used to defoliate tropical
forests to expose combatants, and destroy crops to deprive peasants of their food supply.[16] [17] The environmental
and health effects were devastating. The spraying destroyed 14% of South Vietnams forests, including 50% of the
mangrove forests. Few, if any, have recovered to their natural state. [18] A key ingredient of Agent Orange is dioxin, the
most potent carcinogen ever tested.[19] It is therefore not surprising that Agent Orange has been linked to an array of health
problems in Vietnam including birth defects, spontaneous abortions, chloracne, skin and lung cancers, lower IQ and
emotional problems for children (Forgotten Victims).[20] Similar to toxic chemical spills, Agent Orange continues to
threaten the health of Vietnamese. In 2001, scientists documented extremely high levels of dioxin in blood samples taken
from residents born years after the end of the Vietnam War. Studies attribute such high levels to food chain contamination:
Soil contaminated with dioxin becomes river sediment, which is then passed to fish, a staple of the Vietnamese diet.[21]
This is a clear reminder that poisoning our environments is akin to poisoning
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Cap
War has become privatized, fueling a stronger capitalism
Ferguson 08
Francis Ferguson, PhD Economist , 3-22-08, The Privatization of War
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_francis__080320_the_privatization_of.htm
Since 2000, there has been a huge increase in private contracts let by the US government. Spending on private
contractors has risen from $174.4 billion to $377.5 billion, an increase of 86%. Over this same period, private
contractors' collections for the Department of Defense increased from $133 billion to $279 billion annually, an increase
of 102.3%. These expenditures represent a unique new source of revenue and profit for American business, because
much of what it being purchased are services which would previously have been done by military personnel. (source
http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1071) With these tasks shifting to private contractors, workers can be hired in
low wage nations such and put to work doing menial labor for the troops. This is not to say these services come cheap.
They do not. Contractors such as Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) charge handsomely for the meals, laundry and
logistics provided. They just don't pay the workers who perform these tasks much. The difference, of course, is profit.
What was once a relatively minor expense to taxpayers in the form of Army pay for soldiers performing kitchen duties,
now becomes a major source of bottom line revenue for private companies who previously got nothing from these
services. In addition to new opportunities for profit in a war theater, there are new opportunities for corruption. Third
World contract workers have reported their employers withholding their passports, effectively making them indentured
servants. KBR and it's subsidiaries have been discovered charging premium prices for meals they never served and
with supplying contaminated drinking water to the troops. Government investigators report literally billions of dollars
have gone missing with no accounting for who received them or what was done with the money. The Center for Public
Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&fil=IQ) has a listing of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the value of the contracts they hold. Many of the contracts are awarded without competitive bidding, and billions of
dollars have literally gone missing. The Chicago Tribune reports ongoing investigations of Kellogg Brown and Root
and various of their sub-contractors for gross violations and fraud. www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-kbrwar-profiteers-feb21,1,5231766.story. All of this is symptomatic of deeper problems. We have privatized war, an in so
doing, we have reduced the populace's natural resistance to war and increased its profitability. With contracting, our
military can be smaller. This means the conflicts can be more easily handled with a voluntary, professional military.
Conscription can more easily be avoided along, as can the political backlash from potential draftees and their relatives.
With privatization, a greater portion of military spending flows as profit to American businesses. Spending on
contractor services can expand massively within the context of war. Wartime allows emergency measures and
expenditures which can proceed without customary bidding or oversight. The result is a river of profit with little
economic gain for the nation.
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Civil Liberties T/
In times of war nations ignore civil liberties to deal with threats Britain proves
Posner 92
HeinOnline -- 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1679 1993-1994, EXECUTIVE DETENTION IN TIME OF WAR , IN THE
HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN. By A. W. Brian
Simpson. Oxford: Clarendon, Press. 1992. Pp. x, 453. $62.
The absence of a comparative dimension is a closely related source of Simpson's disparagement of his country's
response to national emergency. Peacetime civil liberties are a luxury that nations engaged in wars of survival
do not believe they can afford. The question for the realistic civil libertarian is not whether Britain curtailed
civil liberties more than either seemed at the time or was in retrospect necessary, but whether it reacted more or
less temperately than other nations in comparable circumstances would do or have done. So far as I can judge,
the answer to this question is more temperately - than the United States, for example, which was far less
endangered.8 Of course there are perils in using a purely relative standard. The administration of Regulation
18B caused hardships and, in hindsight at least, seems not to have contributed materially to Britain's survival or
to have shortened the war. If there are lessons here that might enable Britain or the United States to deal more
effectively with the problem of internal security in wartime the next time the problem arises, they ought to be
drawn. But the only lesson Simpson draws is that Britain should not have destroyed "about 99 per cent of public
records dealing with detention, which is in line with general practice" (p. 422) and should not be refusing
access, half a century later, to most of the rest. I am sure this observation is right, but it makes for rather a tepid
ending to the book; the ending reads as if the British government's greatest sin with respect to the wartime
detention program was to make it difficult for academics to write the program's history.
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Dehumanization T/
Dehumanization is used as propaganda during wars
Vinulan-Arellano 03. [Katharine, March 22 yonip.com Stop Dehumanization of People to Stop Wars
http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/nomorewars.html ]
In war time, dehumanization is a key element in propaganda and brainwashing. By portraying the enemy as less than human, it
is much easier to motivate your troops to rape, torture or kill. Ethnic cleansing or genocide would always be perceived as a
crime against humanity if human beings belonging to another race or religion are not dehumanized.
Throughout history, groups or races of human beings have been dehumanized. Slaves, Negroes, Jews, and now, Muslims. Up
to now, women are dehumanized in many societies -- they are made sexual objects, treated as second-class human beings. The
proliferation of the sex trade are indications of the prevailing, successful dehumanization of women, worldwide. During wars,
mass rape of women is common.
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Democracy T/
Administrations use wartime to consolidate power and destroy democratic institutions
Forward Newspaper, 2008
L.L.C. Apr 11, 2008, The President in Wartime. (2008, April 11). Retrieved July 23, 2009, from Ethnic NewsWatch (ENW).
(Document ID: 1478699201). New York, N.Y.: Apr 11, 2008. Vol. 111, Iss. 31700; pg. 12, 1 pgs
The Bush administration recently declassified a secret Justice Department memo from 2003 that shows just how serious a
threat our democracy faces in the current war on terrorism. Unfortunately, the threat revealed in the memo is not from Al
Qaeda, but from us. The memo was addressed to the legal department of the Pentagon. It was meant to advise the military
on how far it may lawfully go in roughing up captured terrorism suspects during interrogation. The answer was, pretty far
indeed. It was the considered legal opinion of the chief legal office of the United States, the Department of Justice, that the
president of the United States is - well, above the law. "In wartime, it is for the President alone to decide what methods
to use to best prevail against the enemy," wrote the memo's author, John Yoo, then a Justice Department lawyer. In fact,
Yoo wrote, "Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate a criminal statute, the Justice Department could not
bring a prosecution because the statute would be unconstitutional as applied in this context." That is, the law would conflict
with the Constitution's designation of the president as commander in chief, charged with doing whatever necessary to
protect the nation during wartime. There's "original intent" for you. And who decides what constitutes "wartime"?
According to the Constitution, the Senate does. But that's old stuff. Nowadays, we're at war whenever the president says we
are. All he has to do is decide we're under attack - or threatened with attack - and order our troops to open fire. And when
does the war end? When the president says so. Right now, for example, we face an enemy so shadowy and ubiquitous terrorism - that the war could last, we're told, for a generation. Until then, according to the Bush Justice Department, the
president may do whatever he thinks necessary to protect us. In other words, anything he wants . The Yoo memo was
withdrawn a year after its drafting, following a revolt by government lawyers. But a similar Yoo memo, issued to the CIA,
remains.in force. Congress passed a law overriding it a few years ago, but the president vetoed the bill. It's hard to imagine
what terrorists could do that would threaten our democracy more than this president's notion of his power. Next time we
choose a president, we ought to find out how the contenders define the job.
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Disease T/
War increases the spread of fatal disease.
Boston Globe 07. [05-07, Spread of disease tied to U.S. combat deployments
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/05/07/spread_of_disease_tied_to_us_combat_deployments/]
A parasitic disease rarely seen in United States but common in the Middle East has infected an estimated 2,500
US troops in the last four years because of massive deployments to remote combat zones in Iraq and
Afghanistan, military officials said. Leishmaniasis , which is transmitted through the bite of the tiny sand fly,
usually shows up in the form of reddish skin ulcers on the face, hands, arms, or legs. But a more virulent form
of the disease also attacks organs and can be fatal if left untreated. In some US hospitals in Iraq, the disease has
become so commonplace that troops call it the "Baghdad boil." But in the United States, the appearance of it
among civilian contractors who went to Iraq or among tourists who were infected in other parts of the world has
caused great fear because family doctors have had difficulty figuring out the cause. The spread of leishmaniasis
(pronounced LEASH-ma-NYE-a-sis) is part of a trend of emerging infectious diseases in the United States in
recent years as a result of military deployments, as well as the pursuit of adventure travel and far-flung business
opportunities in the developing world, health officials say. Among those diseases appearing more frequently in
the United States are three transmitted by mosquitoes: malaria, which was contracted by 122 troops last year in
Afghanistan; dengue fever; and chikungunya fever.
War would increase immune system deficiency and create dangers of new and
deadly diseases
Sagan, former professor at Stanford and Harvard, 84
(Carl Sagan, former professor at Stanford and Harvard, Pulitzer prize winning author, 1984, Foreign Affairs, Nuclear War and
Climatic Catastrophe p. Lexis)
Each of these factors, taken separately, may carry serious consequences for the global ecosystem: their interactions may
be much more dire still. Extremely worrisome is the possibility of poorly underatood or as yet entirely uncontemplated
synergisms (where the net consequences of two or more assaults on the environment are much more than the sum of the
component parts). For example, more than 100 rads (and possibly more than 200 rads) of external and ingested
ionizing radiation is likely to be delivered in a very large nuclear war to all plants, animals and
unprotected humans in densely populated regions of northern mid-latitudes. After the soot and dust clear, there can, for
such wars, be a 200 to 400 percent increment in the solar ultraviolet flux that reaches the ground, with an increase of
many orders of magnitude in the more dangerous shorter-wavelength radiation. Together, these radiation assaults
are likely to suppress the immune systems of humans and other species, making them more vulnerable
to disease. At the same time, the high ambient-radiation fluxes are likely to produce, through mutation,
new varieties of microorganisms, some of which might become pathogenic. The preferential radiation
sensitivity of birds and other insect predators would enhance the proliferation of herbivorous and
pathogen-carrying insects. Carried by vectors with high radiation tolerance, it seems possible that epidemics and
global pandemics would propagate with no hope of effective mitigation by medical care, even with
reduced population sizes and greatly restricted human mobility. Plants, weakened by low temperatures and low light levels,
and other animals would likewise be vulnerable to preexisting and newly arisen pathogens.
52
Impact Generic
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Disease T/
War helps the spread of disease
VOA News, 05
(Voice of America News, 8-31-05, Poverty and Conflict Contribute the Spread of Infectious
Diseases, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-08/2005-08-31-voa23.cfm)
war also spreads disease because it often creates large populations of refugees. And
they're moving from one town to another, or one country to another (and) they may bring with them some
prevalence of disease that may not be a disease that is present in that other country.
Mr. Parkinson adds, It's also probably no coincidence that the great Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 was
associated with troop movements in Europe and especially afflicted the United States because that was the time of
Dr. Garcia says
the U.S. involvement in the war, and the troop movements back and forth created a great vector for infection.
The epidemic itself killed more people than died in the entire war -- an estimated 20 to 40 million people died from the
epidemic.
Where there are soldiers and conflict, there are also prostitutes and rape. This has led to a rapid spread
of AIDS in many war-torn African countries, say public health officials.
Conflict impacts disease in other ways, too, said Dr. Joseph Malone, director of the U.S. Navy's program to track emerging
global infections. Basic services such as clean water, availability of food, are threatened when there's
substantial conflict and generally the health care infrastructure and availability of medicines is
generally reduced whenever there's conflict and even any supplies that might be available can be
diverted to non-helpful uses.
Military conflicts spread fatal diseases globally
Boston Globe 07
[Boston Globe 05-07, Spread of disease tied to U.S. combat deployments
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/05/07/spread_of_disease_tied_to_us_combat_deployments/]
A parasitic disease rarely seen in United States but common in the Middle East has infected an estimated 2,500
US troops in the last four years because of massive deployments to remote combat zones in Iraq and
Afghanistan, military officials said. Leishmaniasis , which is transmitted through the bite of the tiny sand fly , usually
shows up in the form of reddish skin ulcers on the face, hands, arms, or legs. But a more virulent form of the
disease also attacks organs and can be fatal if left untreate d. In some US hospitals in Iraq, the disease has
become so commonplace that troops call it the "Baghdad boil." But in the United States, the appearance of it
among civilian contractors who went to Iraq or among tourists who were infected in other parts of the world has
caused great fear because family doctors have had difficulty figuring out the cause . The spread of
leishmaniasis (pronounced LEASH-ma-NYE-a-sis) is part of a trend of emerging infectious diseases in the
United States in recent years as a result of military deployments , as well as the pursuit of adventure travel and
far-flung business opportunities in the developing world, health officials say.
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Domestic Violence T/
War creates a cycle of violence that spills over to domestic violence
War often creates a cycle of violence, increasing domestic and community violence in the countries engaged in war. War
teaches people that violence is an acceptable method for settling conflicts. Children growing up in environments in which
violence is an established way of settling conflicts may choose violence to settle conflicts in their own lives. Teenage gangs
may mirror the activity of military forces Men, sometimes former military servicemen who have been trained to use violence,
commit acts of violence against women; there have been instances of men murdering their wives on return from battlefield.
War causes domestic violence and crime

Levy and Sidel, 7
(Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of Medicine, Victor Sidel- Professor of Social
Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and Public Health, Edition 2, 2007)
War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys families,
communities, and sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from protection and promotion of
health, medical care, and other human services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It limits human rights and
contributes to social injustice. It leads many people to think that violence is the only way to resolve conflicts
a mindset that contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and other kinds of violence. And it contributes
to the destruction of the environment and overuse of nonrenewable resources. In sum. war threatens much of the fabric
of our civilization.
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Econ T/
War leads to economic recession
Baumann, 08
(Nick Baumann, assistant editor, 2-29-08, Is the Economy a Casualty of War?
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/economy-casualty-war)
Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has blamed the Iraq war for sending the United States
into a recession. On Wednesday, he told a London think tank that t he war caused the credit crunch and the
housing crisis that are propelling the current economic downturn . Testifying before the Senate's Joint
Economic Committee the following day, he said our involvement in Iraq has long been "weakening the American
economy" and "a day of reckoning" has finally arrived. Stiglitz's contention that the war is causing the nation's
economic woes has become an increasingly popular meme in Democratic circles. (And a source of indignation
in Republican ones. Before Stiglitz's testimony, White House spokesman Tony Fratto said, "People like Joe Stiglitz lack the
courage to consider the cost of doing nothing and the cost of failure.") Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.), a leading anti-war voice
and cochair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, is among leading Democrats who echo Stiglitz's view. " The war is
the primary reason for this recession and we have to drum that home ," she told me. Meanwhile, a coalition of
progressive and anti-war groupsincluding MoveOn.org and Americans United for Changeannounced a $20 million
campaign to convince voters that the war is related to the nation's ongoing economic troubles, an effort that is headlined by
former Senator John Edwards and his wife Elizabeth. Polls show that voters trust the Democrats over the Republicans to
manage both the Iraq War and the economy, so pitching these two issues as interconnected could make political sense. The
war and the economy are undoubtedly linked, but there's a potential problem for anyone who claims the war led to a
recession: Many economists say this isn't so.
War creates economic slowdowns and hurts the dollar

Hart and Shapiro, 08
(Robert Shapiro is formerly the undersecretary of commerce in the Clinton administration and currently the head of Sonecon, LLC, an
economic consulting firm. Gary Hart is a former U.S. Senator from Colorado and currently a professor at the University of
Colorado.1-30-08, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/01/30/the-iraq-recession-debate_n_84060.html)
I think there is a sound case that the war policy has produced conditions that contribute in a fairly
modest way to the slow down. There are two main factors as I see it in regards to the slow down: the [crisis in the]
housing sector, which has reduced people's sense of their wealth... and the subprime mess, which is reducing business
investment and is doing so by screwing up the balance sheets of financial institutions.
Having said that, there is no doubt that the Iraq war is a significant factor in the current level of oil prices .
Not the most important factor but a significant factor... For American consumers whose consumption is being
squeezed, relatively more of their income has to go to energy, and that expense is just getting exported.
It's not stimulating the U.S. economy. The war is [also] a part of America' current account deficit. It
contributes to that and [that] is what's driving down the dollar.
Media and politicians rarely distinguish between government spending and government investments . War costs are
spending... When spent unnecessarily, that is without contributing to national security (i.e., Iraq), war costs are, in
effect, money down a rat hole. All spending over and above revenues creates deficits that must be
financed with borrowing, either from foreigners or future generations. So money spent on an
unnecessary war requires borrowing which drives down the value of the dollar and hurts our economy.
55
Impact Generic
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Edelman
Wars sacrifice soldiers to protect future generations, making the queer expendable to protect
conceptions of family norms
Donna Miles, Writer, Jan. 18, 2005
(Staff Writer for American Forces Press Service, Bush Begins Inaugural Celebration With Military 'Salute',
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24328)
The president credited the men and women in uniform for helping extend that same power to more than 50
million people in Afghanistan and Iraq during the past four years. He called the first free elections in Afghanistan's 5,000year history and the upcoming elections in Iraq "landmark events in the history of liberty." "And none of it would have been
possible without the courage and the determination of the United States armed forces," he said. Bush told the troops their
service and sacrifice in the war on terror is making America safer for today and the future. " Your sacrifice has made it
possible for our children and grandchildren to grow up in a safer world," he said. But this success has
come at a great cost and through tremendous sacrifice , the president noted. He acknowledged the long
separations families must endure, the wounds many service members will carry with them for the rest
of their lives, the heroes who gave their lives, and the families who grieve them . "We hold them in our
hearts," Bush said. "We lift them up in our prayers."
In times of war the life of the child is elevated above sacrificial adults, sacrificing the queer
Deen, @ Ipsnews.net, Jan 9 2004
(POLITICS: U.N. Must Protect Children in War NGOs, http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=21855)
A coalition of groups is urging U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to prepare

an annual list of governments and groups that recruit or use child soldiers or fail to protect children during military
conflicts. Such a regular list, it says, would keep such violators of international obligations constantly ''named and
shamed''. ''From Congo and Liberia to Iraq, Myanmar and Colombia, girls and boys are subject to appalling violence and
deprivation of their fundamental rights,'' said the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict in a 43-page report released
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 9 (IPS) -
Friday. The study, which estimates 300,000 children under the age of 18 are still directly involved in armed conflicts worldwide,
was released ahead of a Security Council meeting on child soldiers scheduled for Jan. 20. It says many countries do not
adequately protect children, a situation exacerbated by impeded access of civilians to much-needed humanitarian assistance in
times of conflict. As a result, says the study, ''more children die from malnutrition, diarrhoea and other preventable diseases in
conflict situations than die as a direct result of fighting.'' It wants Annan to expand existing lists of violators beyond
those countries and groups that use child soldiers, to include nations that do not adequately protect
children.
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Impact Generic
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Environment
Modern warfare devastates the environment- it destroys ecosystems
Worldwatch Institute, 2008
(January/February issue, Modern Warfare Causes Unprecedented Environmental Damage, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5544)
Washington, D.C. Modern warfare tactics, as seen in the American war in Vietnam, the Rwandan and Congolese civil wars, and the
current war in Iraq, have greatly increased our capacity to destroy the natural landscape and produce devastating environmental effects
on the planet, according to Sarah DeWeerdt, author of War and the Environment, featured in the January/February 2008 issue of
World Watch. Wartime destruction of the natural landscape is nothing new, but the scope of destruction seen in more recent conflicts
is unprecedented. For one thing, there is the sheer firepower of current weapons technology, especially its shock-and-awe deployment
by modern superpowers. The involvement of guerrilla groups in many recent wars draws that firepower toward the natural ecosystems
often circumscribed and endangered oneswhere those groups take cover, writes DeWeerdt. The deliberate destruction of the
environment as a military strategy, known as ecocide, is exemplified by the U.S. response to guerrilla warfare in Vietnam . In an
effort to deprive the communist Viet Cong guerrillas of the dense cover they found in the hardwood forests and mangroves that fringed
the Mekong Delta, the U.S. military sprayed 79 million liters of herbicides and defoliants (including Agent Orange) over about oneseventh of the land area of southern Vietnam. By some estimates, half of the mangroves and 14 percent of hardwood forests in
southern Vietnam were destroyed during Operation Trail Dust, threatening biodiversity and severely altering vegetation. Less
deliberate, but still devastating, were the environmental effects that stemmed from the mass migration of refugees during the Rwandan
genocide in 1994. Nearly 2 million Hutus fled Rwanda over the course of just a few weeks to refugee camps in Tanzania and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, making it the most massive population movement in history. Approximately 720,000 of these
refugees settled in refugee camps on the fringes of Virunga National Park, the first United Nations World Heritage site declared
endangered due to an armed conflict. The refugees stripped an estimated 35 square kilometers of forest for firewood and shelterbuilding materials. The dense forests also suffered as a result of the wide paths clear-cut by the Rwandan and Congolese armies
traveling through the park to reduce the threat of ambush by rebel groups. The longterm ecological effects of the current war in Iraq
remain to be seen. Looking to the effects of the recent Gulf War as a guide, scientists point to the physical damage of the desert,
particularly the millimeter-thin layer of microorganisms that forms a crust on the topsoil, protecting it from erosion. Analysis of the
area affected by the Gulf War has already shown an increase in sandstorms and dune formation in the region, and one study suggests
that desert crusts might take thousands of years to fully recover from the movement of heavy vehicles. Warfare is likely to have the
most severe, longest-lasting effects on protected areas that harbor endangered species, and slow-to-recover ecosystems such as deserts .
Even in the most fragile environments, sometimes natureand peoplecan surprise us, writes DeWeerdt. But turn and look in
another direction and you are likely to see warfares enduring scars.
War destroys infrastructure harming the environment

Sierra Club, 2003
The degradation of infrastructure and basic services brought on by war can wreak havoc on the local environment and public health.
Countries water supply systems, for example, can be contaminated or shut down by bomb blasts or bullet damage to pipes.[7] In
Afghanistan, destruction to water infrastructure combined with weakened public service during the war resulted in bacterial
contamination, water loss through leaks and illegal use.[8] The consequence was an overall decline in safe drinking water throughout
the country. Water shortages can also lead to inadequate irrigation of cropland. Agricultural production may also be impaired by
intensive bombing and heavy military vehicles traveling over farm soil.[9] The presence of landmines can also render vast areas of
productive land unusable.[10] Additional war-related problems which compound degradation of the natural and human environment
include shortages in cooking fuel and waste mismanagement during and after military conflicts. During the most recent warfare in
Iraq, individuals were forced to cut down city trees to use as cooking fuel.[11] In Afghanistan, the creation of poorly located, leaky
landfill sites resulted in contaminated rivers and groundwater.[12]
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Environment
War destroys the environment- both during and preparing for war
Finally, war and the preparation for war have profound impacts on the physical environment (see Chapter 5). The disastrous
consequences of war for the environment are often clear. Examples include bomb craters in Vietnam that have filled with
water and provide breeding sites for mosquitoes that spread malaria and other diseases; destruction of urban environments by
aerial carpet bombing of major cities in Europe and Japan during World War II; and the more than 600 oil-well fires in Kuwait
that were ignited by retreating Iraqi troops in 1991, which had a devastating effect on the ecology of the affected areas and
caused acute respiratory symptoms among those exposed. Less obvious are the environmental impacts of the preparation for
war, such as the huge amounts of nonrenewable fossil fuels used by the military before (and during and after) wars and the
environmental hazards of toxic and radioactive wastes, which can contaminate air, soil, and both surface water and
groundwater. For example, much of the area in and around Chelyabinsk, Russia, site of a major nuclear weapons production
facility, has been determined to be highly radioactive, leading to evacuation of local residents (see chapter 10).
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Fascism
War desensitizes culture and politics to fascist authoritarian structures
Kallis, 04
(Aristotle, DOI: 10.1177/0265691404040007 2004; 34; 9 European History Quarterly Aristotle A. Kallis Consensus
Ideological Production, Political Experience and the Quest for Studying Inter-War Fascism in Epochal and Diachronic
Terms)
A further revision of the early spirit of fascism came in the form of its idiosyncratic coexistence with traditional right-wing
authoritarian structures. In intellectual terms, fascism had very little to do with conservative notions of authoritarianism, in spite of its
oppositional convergence with radical forms of conservatism.67It advocated instead a more direct, transcendental type of
communication between nation and charismatic leader, as well as a collective representation and negotiation of sectional interests
within the framework of the party and its various societal extensions. However, the coopting of the fascist leaderships by powerful
traditional lite groups sealed the fate of fascisms relations to the mainstream Right by forcing the former to operate in a system
which perpetuated central elements of the conventional Rightist authoritarian tradition. Compared to this (more conventional) type of
rule, fascism offered a populist solution to the problem of generating social support and ensuring active societal unity through the
ritualization of controlled mass participation. Yet, this combination of novelty with an essentially traditional framework of politics was
hardly conducive to the pursuit of the mythical core of fascist nationalist utopianism. The result was a tension inside the regimes with
at least a fascist variant between fascism and authoritarianism a tension that was never fully resolved, but which affected the
evolution of inter-war fascism in two ways. First, it completed the ideologicalpolitical expropriation of fascism by the Right, in
contrast to its initially mixed (or at least not exclusively right-wing) intellectual roots and active revolutionary anti-system spirit.
Second, it compelled fascism to wage a constant struggle to defend its own political contours from the restrictive grip of its
conservative sponsors/partners and the authoritarian legacies of its political framework. In analytical terms, this means that a
categorical distinction between the regime-variant of fascism and conservative authoritarianism is meaningless, in so far as fascism
accepted an institutional, not violently revolutionary, approach to its own political emancipation from the mainstream Right and
thus could never fully eliminate continuities between new and old Right.68 By the time that even the most advanced fascist
systems of Germany and Italy had accelerated their rhythm of consolidation with their newfound self-confidence, they had absorbed
already crucial features of conventional authoritarianism (not least the leaders monopoly of power) into their general worldview.
Kallis, Studying Inter-war Fascism 31
Fascism requires social homogenization

Bataille et al. 79
(The Psychological Structure of Fascism Author(s): Georges Bataille and Carl R. Lovitt Source: New German Critique,
No. 16 (Winter, 1979), pp. 64-87 Published by: New German Critique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487877
Accessed: 22/07/2009 12:32)
XII.TheFundamentalConditionsofFascism.Ashasalreadybeenindicated,heterogeneousprocessesasawholecanonlyenterinto
playoncethefundamental homogeneityofsociety (theapparatus ofproduction) hasbecome dissociatedbecause ofitsinternal
contradictions.Further,itcanbestatedthat,eventhoughitgenerallyoccursintheblindestfashion,thedevelopmentofheterogeneous
forcesnecessarilycomestosignifyasolutiontotheproblemposedbythecontradictionsofhomogeneity.Onceinpower,developed
heterogeneous forces dispose of the means of coercion necessary toresolve the differences that had arisen between previously
irreconcilableelements.Butitgoeswithoutsayingthat,attheendofamovement thatexcludesallsubversion,thethrustofthese
resolutions will have been consistent with the general direction of the existing homogeneity, namely, with the interests of the
capitalists.
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60
Gendered Violence T/
War causes sexual violence and reifies the subjugation of women.
Eaton 04. [Shana JD Georgetown University Law Center 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 873 Summer lexis]
While sexual violence against women has always been considered a negative side effect of war, it is only in
recent years that it has been taken seriously as a violation of humanitarian law. In the "evolution" of war,
women themselves have become a battlefield on which conflicts are fought. Realizing that rape is often more
effective at achieving their aims than plain killing, aggressors have used shocking sexual violence against
women as a tool of conflict, allowing battling forces to flaunt their power, dominance, and masculinity over the
other side. The stigma of rape is used to effectuate genocide, destroy communities, and demoralize opponentsdecimating a woman's will to survive is often only a secondary side effect.
Sexual violence against women during wartime had to reach horrifying levels before the international
community was shocked enough to finally take these atrocities seriously. It took the extremely brutal
victimization of vast numbers of women, played out against a backdrop of genocide, to prove that rape is not
simply a natural side effect of war to be lightly brushed aside.
The conflicts in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia put women's rights directly in the spotlight, and the
international community could no longer avoid the glare. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ethnic cleansing was
central to the conflict. Raping women helped to achieve this aim in a number of ways, from forced
impregnation, where offspring would have different ethnicities than their mothers, to the use of sexual violence
to prevent women from wanting to have sex again (thus limiting their likelihood of bearing children in the
future). Additionally, rape was used as a means of destroying families and communities. Raping a woman
stigmatized her, making it unlikely that she would ever want to return home, and in many cases, ensuring that if
she did return home that she would be rejected. Civilians, particularly women, came to be used as tools to
achieve military ends, putting the human rights of these women at the heart of the conflict.
War conditions cause sexual violence
Women are especially vulnerable during war (see Chapter 12). Rape has been used as a weapon in many warsin Korea, Bangladesh, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda, the former Yugslavia, and
elsewhere. As acts of humiliation and revenge, soldiers have raped the female family members of their enemies.
For example, at least 10,000 women were raped by military personnel during the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The social chaos brought about by war also creates situations and conditions conductive to sexual
violence.
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Health T/
Funds are prioritized for war over health services
Many countries spend large amounts of money per capita for military purposes. The countries with the highest military
expenditures are shown in Table I -1. War and the preparation for war divert huge amounts of resources from health and
human services and other productive societal endeavors. This diversion of resources occurs in many countries. In some less
developed countries, national governments spend S10 to $20 per capita on military expenditures but only SI per capita on all
health-related expenditures. The same type of distorted priorities also exist in more developed countries. For example, the
United States ranks first among nations in military expenditures and arms exports, but 38th among nations in infant mortality
rate and 45th in life expectancy at birth. Since 2003. during a period when federal, state, and local governments in the United
States have been experiencing budgetary shortfalls and finding it difficult to maintain adequate health and human ser vices, the
U.S. government has spent almost $500 b i l l i o n for the Iraq War, and is spending (in 2007) more than $2 billion a week on the
war.
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Impact Generic
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Heg T/
One more military engagement would deplete US ground forces and utterly destroy US hegemony
Perry 06
(The U.S. Military: Under Strain and at Risk, The National Security Advisory Group, January 2006, William J. Perry, Chair)
In the meantime, the United States has only limited ground force capability ready to respond to other contingencies. The absence of a
credible strategic reserve in our ground forces increases the risk that potential adversaries will be tempted to challenge the United
States Since the end of World War II, a core element of U.S. strategy has been maintaining a military capable of deterring and, if
necessary, defeating aggression in more than one theater at a time. As a global power with global interests, the United States must be
able to deal with challenges to its interests in multiple regions of the world simultaneously. Today, however, the United States has only
limited ground force capability ready to respond outside the Afghan and Iraqi theaters of operations. If the Army were ordered to send
significant forces to another crisis today, its only option would be to deploy units at readiness levels far below what operational plans
would require increasing the risk to the men and women being sent into harms way and to the success of the mission. As stated
rather blandly in one DoD presentation, the Army continues to accept risk in its ability to respond to crises on the Korean Peninsula
and elsewhere. Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialized assets to deter or respond to
aggression, the visible overextension of our ground forces has the potential to significantly weaken our ability to deter and respond to
some contingencies.
War causes overstretch reducing hegemony- UK proves

Ferguson, 03
(Niall, Hegemony or Empire?, September/October 2003, Foreign Affairs)
Yet another, narrower definition is offered by Geoffrey Pigman, in his introduction to a useful and original chapter in Two
Hegemonies on agricultural trade liberalization in the 1990s. Pigman describes a hegemon's principal function as underwriting a
liberal international trading system that is beneficial to the hegemon but, paradoxically, even more beneficial to its potential rivals.
Pigman traces this now widely used definition of the word back to the economic historian Charles Kindleberger's seminal work on the
interwar economy, which describes a kind of "hegemonic interregnum." After 1918, Kindleberger suggested, the United Kingdom was
too weakened by war to remain an effective hegemon, but the United States was still too inhibited by protectionism and isolationism
to take over the role. This idea, which became known, somewhat inelegantly, as "hegemonic stability theory," was later applied to the
post-1945 period by authors such as Arthur Stein, Susan Strange, Henry Nau, and Joseph Nye. In this literature, the fundamental
question was how far and for how long the United States would remain committed to free trade once other economies -- benefiting
from precisely the liberal economic order made possible by U.S. hegemony -- began to catch up with it. Would Americans revert to
protectionist or mercantilist policies in an effort to perpetuate their hegemony, or stick with free trade at the risk of experiencing
relative decline? This is what Stein called "the hegemon's dilemma," and it appeared to him to be essentially the same problem faced
by the United Kingdom before 1914. Paul Kennedy drew a similar parallel in his influential The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
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Homelessness
Wars create homelessness
Markee 03
(Markee, Patrick,Senior Policy Analyst for Coalition for the Homeless, 3-27-03
http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/FileLib/PDFs/war_and_homelessness.pdf)
It is axiomatic that wars create homelessness in the territories where combat occurs. Every war that the
United States has been involved in, from the Revolutionary War to Desert Storm, has at least temporarily
displaced populations and destroyed the homes of civilians. Even the undeclared wars that the
United States has sponsored and supported, in Latin America and elsewhere , produced hundreds of thousands
of refugees and uprooted rural and urban populations. However, since the Civil War there have been no sustained
military battles fought on United States territory, so most Americans have no first-hand contact with the immediate impact
of homelessness resulting from war. In contrast, our armed forces veterans do have first-hand experience with
homelessness that is a direct consequence of American military and domestic policies . This briefing paper
provides an overview of the impact of homelessness on armed forces veterans, both historically and currently. Throughout
American history there has been high incidence of homelessness among veterans, primarily as a result of combat related
disabilities and trauma and the failure of government benefits to provide adequate housing assistance for low-income and
disabled veterans. The paper concludes that, absent a dramatic change in Federal policies, the war on Iraq will
create a new generation of homeless veterans.
War leaves veterans unemployed and homeless

Markee 03
(Markee, Patrick,Senior Policy Analyst for Coalition for the Homeless, 3-27-03
http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/FileLib/PDFs/war_and_homelessness.pdf)
The post-Civil War era witnessed a much more significant growth in homelessness nationwide . Indeed, asKusmer notes,
even the words tramp and bum, as applied to the homeless, can be traced to the Civil War era.3 One reason was the
enormous economic dislocation generated by the war and the succeeding economic recession, and by the 1870s vagrancy
was recognized as a national issue. Many of the new nomads riding the rails and congregating in cities were Civil War
veterans, and many had suffered physical injuries and trauma during the war. As the early 1870s recession deepened, many
cities responded by creating new antivagrancy legislation. In 1874 the number of reported vagrants in Boston was 98,263,
more than three times the number just two years earlier. From 1874 to 1878 the number of vagrancy arrests in New York
City rose by half.4 The homelessness crisis of the Great Depression, which affected many World War I veterans, was
dramatically abated in the early 1940s by the enlistment of tens of thousands of Americans in the armed forces and by the
wartime economic upswing. In New York City, according to Kusmer, In one two-month period in 1943, 100 Bowery
residents joined the armed forces, while another 200 acquired jobs in hospitals, restaurants, or on the railroads.5 With the
end of World War II, however, homelessness re-emerged as a significant problem in many cities. In New York City, demand
for emergency shelter rose in the late 1940s, with as many as 900 men bedding down in the Lodging House Annex (later the
Municipal Shelter) on East 3rd Street in the 1948-49 winter.6 Homelessness would have continued to affect many
thousands of World War II veterans were it not for the national economic upturn and the benefits provided by the G.I. Bill.
With the advent of the Vietnam War, however, the link between homelessness and military veterans finally came to the
attention of the general public. As Kusmer writes, Only a few years after the end of the waranew wave of homeless
persons, mostly in their 20s and 30s and disproportionately black or Hispanic, began to appear on city street corners. Many
were Vietnam veterans, unable to find work after being discharged.7 By the late 1970s, when modern homelessness fully
emerged, a significant portion of the homeless men seen sleeping outdoors in vast numbers in New York City and other
large cities were armed forces veterans. Many veterans suffered from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance
abuse disorders, and physical disabilities caused by their experiences in combat. The 1991 Gulf War, the last major
conventional war involving the United States military, also left many veterans recovering from physical and mental
disabilities and confronting homelessness. A 1997 survey of 1,200 homeless veterans nationwide who resided at mission
shelters found that 10 percent of them were Gulf War veterans.8 In New York City, homeless service providers also
reported assisting significant numbers of Desert Storm veterans.
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Homophobia
Wartime consensus favors inherently homophobic military culture
Dennis Sewell, 1993
(January 27, THE GUARDIAN FEATURES PAGE; Pg. 17, lexis)
If the public reasons why the armed forces are so set against admitting homosexuals bear such little scrutiny, is there an unspoken
reason? A homophobia that dare not speak its name? Certainly there is a profoundly ingrained distaste for homosexuals prevalent
among private soldiers and NCOs. This stems partly from a fear of becoming the object of unwanted homosexual attentions. Also
there is a knee-jerk association of the homosexual with the effeminate or effete. To men brought up in an exaggeratedly macho culture,
one of the most effective taunts within the group is that of being "queer". OFFICERS, of course, are keen to distance themselves from
this way of thinking or behaving. Such attitudes are, they say, part of ordinary working-class culture and not specific to the military.
They themselves, being middle class and having, doubtless, seen homosexual behaviour at their public schools, affect a personal
insoucience about the whole issue. But they insist "the lads won't have it". This, too, we have heard before. The slow progress made
by blacks in becoming senior NCOs or officers in the British Army owed much to the same kind of argument. Working-class culture
was inherently racist, officers would say. Once the lads were told they were jolly well going to have to lump it, of course they accepted
black officers. But in the case of homosexual servicemen, there is a complicating factor. Whereas officers did not, on the whole,
condone racist attitudes, they are often complicit in fostering homophobic attitudes. They make and enjoy the jokes just as much as the
men. Indeed, for the more insecure, a little queer baiting has been one way of proving their own masculinity. They will find it hard
now to tell the lads that they were wrong all along.
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Impact Generic
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Inequality
Wars are fought by the poor who are sacrificed for the upper classes turning case
Tyson, Wash Post, 05
(Ann Scott Youths in Rural U.S. Are Drawn To Military, Recruits' Job Worries Outweigh War Fears, Ann Scott Tyson, Washington
Post Staff Writer, Friday, November 4, 2005; Page A01)
As sustained combat in Iraq makes it harder than ever to fill the ranks of the all-volunteer force, newly released Pentagon demographic
data show that the military is leaning heavily for recruits on economically depressed, rural areas where youths' need for jobs may
outweigh the risks of going to war. More than 44 percent of U.S. military recruits come from rural areas, Pentagon figures show. In
contrast, 14 percent come from major cities. Youths living in the most sparsely populated Zip codes are 22 percent more likely to join
the Army, with an opposite trend in cities. Regionally, most enlistees come from the South (40 percent) and West (24 percent). Many
of today's recruits are financially strapped, with nearly half coming from lower-middle-class to poor households, according to new
Pentagon data based on Zip codes and census estimates of mean household income. Nearly two-thirds of Army recruits in 2004 came
from counties in which median household income is below the U.S. median. Such patterns are pronounced in such counties as
Martinsville, Va., that supply the greatest number of enlistees in proportion to their youth populations. All of the Army's top 20
counties for recruiting had lower-than-national median incomes, 12 had higher poverty rates, and 16 were non-metropolitan, according
to the National Priorities Project, a nonpartisan research group that analyzed 2004 recruiting data by Zip code.
The USFG recruits Hispanics to high fatality posts in the military

Hil, 2005
(Richard May Life lottery: US military targets poor Hispanics for frontline service in Iraq, New Internationalist)
They have been variously described as 'working class mercenaries', 'green card troops', 'non-citizen' armies, or desperate recruits of the
US Government's 'poverty draft'. They are the huge contingent of Hispanic personnel who--for personal and economic reasons--have
been recruited into the ranks of the US military. According to US journalist Jim Ross, by February 2005 there were 110,000 of them.
The biggest single contingent of such troops is made up of Mexicans and Mexican descendants. Many were in the marine units from
Camp Pendleton in San Diego that participated in the initial stages of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and later fought 'insurgents'
in Falluja. Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Central Americans and Ecuadorians are also well represented. Since the start of the war about a
third of the US forces stationed in Iraq--between 31,000 and 37,000 troops out of a total of about 130,000--were non-US citizens
serving in the navy, Marine Corps, army and air force. Following the widespread insurgency in early 2004 the US Government has
gone on a nationwide recruitment drive that has targeted young Hispanics with promises of green cards, scholarships, post-service
employment, and various medical and pension benefits. The US Government's interest in recruiting Latinos is hardly surprising since
they make up about 12.5 per cent of the US population: one in seven 18-year-olds are of Hispanic origin. Invariably poor and jobless,
they are prime candidates for US Military Occupational Specialists hungry for recruits. This recruitment campaign is driven by an
executive order signed in July 2002 by President Bush, which effectively allows recruits in active duty during the 'war on terror' to
apply for citizenship once they join up rather than having to wait years for the granting of a green card. Since 11 September 2001, the
Bush Administration has tightened immigration procedures and cut public spending in a number of areas such as housing and
education. This has meant that many young Latinos feel they have little choice but to pursue the inducements offered by the US
military. These non-citizen members of the military have a limited number of Military Occupational Specialties to choose from when
enlisting. As a consequence, noncitizens are over-represented in some of the most dangerous field operations . According to the Pew
Hispanic Center, Hispanic troops make up about 17.5 per cent of front-line forces. Not surprisingly, such troops die or are injured in
disproportionate numbers. US Department of Defense figures suggest a casualty rate for Latino military members of about 13 per
cent--almost two-and-a-half times the rate of other serving members and many times more than in previous conflicts in Korea,
Vietnam and the first Gulf War. Significantly, of the first 1,000 US deaths in Iraq, the overwhelming majority was among the lowestranked, poorest-paid, and worst-trained troops. Over 120 were Latinos--about 70 of them Mexican. With few prospects of gaining US
citizenship through the usual channels, and with little hope of employment, decent housing and education, the call to arms clearly
holds some attraction. Yet as the advocacy organization Latinos against the Iraq War has pointed out, the various promises made by the
Government frequently fail to materialize when Latino service personnel return home. Many of these troops--especially those who are
injured--find they are in worse circumstances than when they left for Iraq; themselves victims of the very 'war on terror' they were
recruited to vanquish.
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Mental Health T/
War creates many mental health issues
Given the brutality of war. many people survive wars only to be physically or mentally scarred for life (see Box 1-1). Millions of
survivors are chronically disabled from injuries sustained during war or the immediate aftermath of war. Approximately one-third
of Ihe soldiers who survived ihe civil war in Ethiopia, for example, were injured or disabled, and at least 40,000 individuals lost one
or more limbs during the war.' Antipersonnel landmines represent a serious threat to many people'' (see Chapter 7). For
example, in Cambodia, I in 236 people is an amputee as a result of a landmine explosion.'0
Millions more people are psychologically impaired from wars, during which they have been physically or sexually assaulted or have
physically or sexually assaulted others; have been tortured or have participated in the torture of others; have been forced to serve as soldiers
against their will; have witnessed the death of family members; or have experienced the destruction of their communities or entire nations
(sec Chapter4). Psychological trauma may be demonstrated in disturbed and antisocial behaviors, such as aggression toward family
members and others. Many soldiers, on returning from military action, suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). which also affects
many civilian survivors of war.
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Poverty
Wartime spending causes poverty
Henderson, 98
(Errol Anthony Henderson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2
(May, 1998), pp. 503-520, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647920)
ThisanalysisattemptedtoascertaintowhatextentarelationshipobtainedbetweenmilitaryspendingandpovertyintheUnitedStates.
Withthedecliningsignificanceofmacroeconomicforces,typesofgovernmentspendinghavebecomesalientininfluencingpoverty
ratechanges.Partialsupportwasfoundfortheviewthatincreasedmilitaryspending,intheaggregate,isassociatedwithincreased
povertythoughtheseeffectsaredifferentforpeacetimeandwartime.Peacetimemilitaryspendingincreasespoverty,morethanlikely
throughitsimpactonincreasinginequalityandunemployment,whilewartimespendinghasthereverseeffect.Whendisaggregated,
militarypersonnelspendingisshowntodecreasepovertywhileothercomponentsareassociatedwithincreasingpoverty.Although
military personnel spending reduces poverty, military buildups since the Korean War have increased the share of procurement
spendingattheexpenseofpersonnelexpenditures(Chan1995).Inaddition,totheextentthat increaseddefensespendingisfinanced
throughdeficitspending,theinflationaryimpactalsodisproportionatelyharmsthepoor.Whileincreasedaggregatemilitaryspending
fails as an antipoverty policy, focused spending on military personnel may decrease poverty, suggesting its potential as a
countercyclicalinstrument.However,argumentsinfavorofsuchmilitaryspendingincreasesaremostpersuasivelyputforthonthe
basisofnationalsecurityconcernswithinahostileinternationalenvironmentorinthepresenceofanarmsracewithamajorpower
rival.NeitherconditionobtainsinthepostColdWarclimate.Thefindingscomportwiththepresentdiscourseonmilitaryspending
dominated bydiscussionsof the"peace dividend" resulting from decreased defense budgets(Chan1995). While thesefindings
suggestthatreducedaggregatedefensespendingisassociatedwithdecreasedpoverty,defensereductionswillhavedifferentimpacts
acrossregions,occupations,andethnicgroups.Defensecutbackswillprobablyhavemoredeleteriousimpactsonstatesthatare
heavilyreliantupondirectandindirectmilitaryspending,suchasCalifornia,Texas,Virginia,NewYork,Florida,Pennsylvania,and
Ohio.Inaddition,economicconversioninitiativesaredominatedbyconcernsforrelieffordefensecontractorsandtheirusuallyhigh
skilledworkforce.Tobesure,skilledworkersinaffectedregionswillfacedifficultiesasoccupationssuchasaeronautics,industrial
andmechanicalengineering,andmetalworkingdecline;however,lowskilledlaborersaremorelikelycandidatesforpoverty.
Empirically war spending has disproportionately hurt the poor

Henderson, 98
(Errol Anthony Henderson, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2
(May, 1998), pp. 503-520, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647920)
ThisarticleexaminestheextenttowhichmilitaryspendingisassociatedwithpovertyintheUnitedStatesfortheperiod195992.The
relationshipiscomplicatedbymacroeconomicfactorssuchaseconomicgrowthandunemployment. Increasedmilitaryspendingis
associatedwithincreasingpoverty;however,thereisaninverserelationshipbetweenwartimemilitaryspendingandpovertyanda
directrelationshipbetweenpeacetimemilitaryspendingandpoverty.Also,militarypersonnelspendingisinverselycorrelatedwith
poverty while Operations and Maintenance (O&M), procurement, and Research and Development (R&D) spending are directly
correlatedwithpoverty.Thesefindingssuggest theantipovertypolicyalternatives ofincreasedsocial welfare spending,defense
conversion that is poverty sensitive, or increased spending on military personnel, which is usually only accompanied by war
mobilization.Thelastoptionisuntenableassocialpolicyandthefirstoptionisunlikelyinthepresentpoliticalclimate;therefore,
thepoormustrelyonmore"efficientlytargeted"conversioninitiatives.
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Poverty
Conflict causes chronic poverty
Goodhand 03
(Johnathan Goodhand, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2003 http://www.pikpotsdam.de/research/research-domains/transdisciplinary-concepts-and-methods/favaia/workspace/documents/world-developmentvolume-31-issue-3-special-issue-on-chronic-poverty-and-development-policy/pages629-646.pdf)
Research studies on the costs of conflict show that although the effects of war vary according to the
nature, duration and phase of the conflict, the background economic and social conditions and the level of compensatory
action by national governments or the international communityprotracted conflicts are likely to produce chronic
poverty. This particularly applies to collapsed state, warlord type conflicts characterized by the
systematic and deliberate violation of individual and group rights. In such conflicts the deliberate
impoverishment of the population may be used as a weapon of war. 9 Violent conflict is therefore likely
to be both a driver and maintainer of intergenerationally transmitted (IGT) poverty: Poor societies are at
risk of falling into no-exit cycles of conflict in which ineffective governance, societal warfare, humanitarian crises, and the
lack of development perpetually chase one another (Gurr et al., 2001, p. 13). (b) Macro effects of conflict
Conflict has direct and indirect costs. The direct impacts including battlefield deaths, disablement and
displacement have long-term costs for societies. Chronic poverty is likely to increase due to higher
dependency ratios caused by an increased proportion of the old, women and disabled in the population .
But the indirect costs are likely to have a more significant impact on IGT poverty. Many more people die
from wars as a result of lack of basic medical services, the destruction of rural life and transport and collapse of the state,
than from direct battlefield deaths. 10
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Impact Generic
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Woman Rights T/
War destroys womens rights
Marshall, founder of the feminist peace network, 04
(Lucinda Marshall Founder of the Feminist Peace Network, Feminist Writer and Activist, 12-18-04
Unacceptable: The Impact of War on Women and Children http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1219-26.htm)
Women and children account for almost 80% of the casualties of conflict and war as well as 80% of the 40
million people in world who are now refugees from their homes. It is one of the unspoken facts of militarism that women
often become the spoils of war, their deaths are considered collateral damage and their bodies are
frequently used as battlegrounds and as commodities that can be traded.
"Women and girls are not just killed, they are raped, sexually attacked, mutilated and humiliated.
Custom, culture and religion have built an image of women as bearing the 'honour' of their
communities. Disparaging a woman's sexuality and destroying her physical integrity have become a
means by which to terrorize, demean and 'defeat' entire communities , as well as to punish, intimidate
and humiliate women," according to Irene Khan of Amnesty International.
Sexual violence as a tool of war has left hundreds of thousands of women raped, brutalized, impregnated and infected with
HIV/AIDS. And hundreds of thousands of women are trafficked annually for forced labor and sexual slavery. Much of this
trafficking is to service western troops in brothels near military bases. Even women serving in the military are subjected to
sexual violence. U.S. servicewomen have reported hundreds of assaults in military academies and while serving on active
duty. The perpetrators of these assaults have rarely been prosecuted or punished.
The impact of war on children is also profound. In the last decade, two million of our children have
been killed in wars and conflicts. 4.5 million children have been disabled and 12 million have been left
homeless. Today there are 300,000 child soldiers, including many girls who are forced to 'service' the troops.
War restricts womens freedom and suppresses their basic human rights
Abeyesekera, director of a humans rights organization, 03
(Sunila Abeyesekera, director of Inform, a Sri Lankan human rights organization 02-03
http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/A-Women-s-Human-Rights-Perspective-on-War-and-Conflict)
At the same time, wars and conflicts have led to a host of negative consequences for unarmed women
civilians and dependent family members, children, the old and the infirm. Figures worldwide point to the fact that the
majority of refugees and internally displaced persons are female . The erosion of democratic space that often
accompanies conflict and war also propel women into a more active role in political and social life. In moments when men
and male-dominated traditional political and social formations, such as political parties and trade unions, are reluctant or
unable to come forward in defense of human rights and democratic principles, groups of women have had the courage to
stand up to the armed might of both state and non-state actors. War and conflict also push women into decision-making
positions in their families and communities, in particular in the role of head of household.
Most conflicts and wars emerge out of processes of identity formation in which competing identity groups and communities
resort to violence to affirm their equal status in society. Given this dynamic, conflict and war situations result in the
heightening of all forms of conservatism and extremism including religious fundamentalism, ultranationalism and ethnic and linguistic chauvinism. The hardening of identity-based roles ascribed to
men and women within the community that happen as a part of this process often has disastrous
consequences for women. It restricts their mobility and freedom, imposes dress codes, confines them
to the domestic sphere, brings them under the rigid control of male members of the family and the
community and, most critically, places them in the role of 'bearers of the community's honour' and
traditions. Thus, the rape and violation of the women of the 'enemy' community becomes a critical
military strategy in all identity-based wars and conflict.
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Racism
Wartime culture results in racism
Dieckmann et al., 97
(Bernhard Dieckmann, Christoph Wulf, Michael Wimmer, Violence--racism, nationalism, xenophobia, 134
War is as important as any other medium-term socio-economic or political factor in leading to a rise in racism.
In fact, anyone studying the history of race during the twentieth century cannot avoid the conclusiuon that the
worst persecution of minorities has occurred during wartime. Apart from genocide, illustrated by the Annenian
genocide in World War I and the Nazi Holocaust in World War Two, states such as Britain and Brazil
experienced some of their worst twentieth century outbreaks of violence during the First World War. The
explanations as to why war leads to an increase in intolerance are many, but revolve around the increase in
ostracisation of outgroups, facilitated by the seizure of control, directly or indirectly, by the military, as
members of the dominant society fell closer together to fight the external enemy.
War props up systems of racism and domination.

Martin 90. [Brian, Associate Professor of Science, Technology, and Society at the University of Wollongong, ,
Uprooting War, Freedom Press, [http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/index.html]
Antagonism between ethnic groups can be used and reinforced by the state to sustain its own power. When one
ethnic group controls all the key positions in the state, this is readily used to keep other groups in subordinate
positions, and as a basis for economic exploitation. This was clearly a key process in apartheid in South Africa,
but is also at work in many other countries in which minority groups are oppressed. From this perspective, the
dominant ethnic group uses state power to maintain its ascendancy. But at the same time, the use of political and
economic power for racial oppression helps to sustain and legitimate state power itself. This is because the
maintenance of racial domination and exploitation comes to depend partly on the use of state power, which is
therefore supported and expanded by the dominant group. From this perspective it can be said that the state
mobilises racism to help maintain itself.
There are several other avenues used by the state to mobilise support. Several of these will be treated in the
following chapters, including bureaucracy and patriarchy. In each case, structured patterns of dominance and
submission are mobilised to support the state, and state in turn helps to sustain the social structure in question,
such as bureaucracy or patriarchy. To counter the state, it is necessary both to promote grassroots mobilisation
and to undermine the key structures from which the state draws its power and from which it mobilises support.
70
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Rape
War facilitates the rape of women to force unwanted pregnancies and to further ethnic cleansing
Robson 93
(Robson, has a Master's degree in African Literature and is an award winning writer, 06-93 http://www.newint.org/issue244/rape.htm)
No-one will ever know the exact number of women and girls raped during the conflict in former
Yugoslavia. But Heraks accounts of his forced participation in rapes of Bosnian Muslim women his commander
had told him it was good for morale accord with evidence recounted to human-rights observers and journalists
throughout the region. Though all figures must be treated with caution in a war so plagued by propaganda, these witnesses
tell of the organized and systematic rape of at least 20,000 women and girls by the Serbian military and the murder of many
of the victims. Muslim and Croatian as well as some Serbian women are being raped in their homes, in
schools, police stations and camps all over the country. The sexual abuse of women in war is nothing
new. Rape has long been tolerated as one of the spoils of war, an inevitable feature of military conflict
like pillage and looting. What is new about the situation in Bosnia is the attention it is receiving and the recognition
that it is being used as a deliberate military tactic to speed up the process of ethnic cleansing. According
to a recent report by European Community investigators, rapes are being committed in particularly sadistic
ways to inflict maximum humiliation on victims, their families, and on the whole community.1 In many cases the
intention is deliberately to make women pregnant and to detain them until pregnancy is far enough
advanced to make termination impossible. Women and girls aged anything between 6 and 70 are being held in
camps throughout the country and raped repeatedly by gangs of soldiers. Often brothers or fathers of these women are
forced to rape them as well. If they refuse, they are killed.
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Impact Generic
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Rights T/
Wars undermine human rights
Ganesan and Vines 04. [Arvind, Business and Human Rights Program Director @ HRW Alex, Senior
Researcher @ HRW, Head of Africa Programme Chatham House, Royal Institue of Intl Affairs, Engine of
War: Resources, Greed, and the Predatory State, Human Rights Watch World Report 2004
http://hrw.org/wr2k4/download/14.pdf]
Internal armed conflict in resource-rich countries is a major cause of human rights violations around the world.
An influential World Bank thesis states that the availability of portable, high-value resources is an important
reason that rebel groups form and civil wars break out, and that to end the abuses one needs to target rebel
group financing. The focus is on rebel groups, and the thesis is that greed, rather than grievance alone, impels
peoples toward internal armed conflict.
Although examination of the nexus between resources, revenues, and civil war is critically important, the
picture as presented in the just-described greed vs. grievance theory is distorted by an overemphasis on the
impact of resources on rebel group behavior and insufficient attention to how government mismanagement of
resources and revenues fuels conflict and human rights abuses. As argued here, if the international community
is serious about curbing conflict and related rights abuses in resource-rich countries, it should insist on greater
transparency in government revenues and expenditures and more rigorous enforcement of punitive measures
against governments that seek to profit from conflict.
Civil wars and conflict have taken a horrific toll on civilians throughout the world. Killings, maiming, forced
conscription, the use of child soldiers, sexual abuse, and other atrocities characterize numerous past and
ongoing conflicts. The level of violence has prompted increased scrutiny of the causes of such wars. In this
context, the financing of conflict through natural resource exploitation has received increased scrutiny over the
last few years.
When unaccountable, resource-rich governments go to war with rebels who often seek control over the same
resources, pervasive rights abuse is all but inevitable. Such abuse, in turn, can further destabilize conditions,
fueling continued conflict. Factoring the greed of governments and systemic rights abuse into the greed vs.
grievance equation does not minimize the need to hold rebel groups accountable, but it does highlight the need
to ensure that governments too are transparent and accountable. Fundamentally, proper management of revenues
is an economic problem, and that is why the role of IFIs is so important. But it is an economic problem that also
has political dimensions and requires political solutions. Political will and pressure, including targeted U.N.
sanctions where appropriate, can motivate opaque, corrupt governments to be more open and transparent.
Where such pressure is lacking, as in Liberia prior to enforcement of sanctions, continued conflict, rights abuse,
and extreme deprivation of civilians all too commonly are the result.
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Rights T/
Modern warfare involves crippling civilian infrastructure and violating human
rights
Modern military technology, especially the use of high-precision bombs, rockets, and missile warheads, has now made it
possible to attack civilian populations in industrialized societies indirectlybut with devastating resultsby targeting the
facilities on which life depends, while avoiding the stigma of direct attack on the bodies and habitats of noncombatants. The
technique has been termed "bomb now, die later."
U.S. military action against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Iraq War has included the specific and selective
destruction of key aspects of the infrastructure necessary to maintain ci vi l i an life and health (see Chapter 15). During the
bombing phase of the Persian Gulf War this deliberate effort almost totally destroyed Iraq's electrical-power generation and
transmission capacity and its civilian communications networks. In combination with the prolonged application of economic
sanctions and the disruption of highways, bridges, and facilities for refining and distributing fuel by conventional bombing,
these actions had severely damaging effects on the health and survival of the civilian population, especially infants and
children. Without electrical power, water purification and pumping ceased immediately in all major urban areas, as did sewage
pumping and treatment. The appearance and epidemic spread of infectious diarrheal disease in infants and of waterborne
diseases, such as typhoid fever and cholera, were rapid. At the same lime, medical care and public health measures were totally
disrupted. Modern multistory hospitals were left without clean water, sewage disposal, or any electricity beyond what could he
supplied by emergency generators designed to operate only a few hours per day. Operating rooms, x-ray equipment, and other
vital facilities were crippled. Supplies of anesthetics, antibiotics, and other essential medications were rapidly depleted.
Vaccines and medications requiring refrigeration were destroyed, and all immunization programs increased. Because almost no
civilian telephones, computers, or transmission lines were operable, the Ministry of Health was effectively immobilized. Fuel
shortages and the disruption of transportation limited civilian access to medical care.
Many reports provide clear and quantitative evidence of violations of the requirements of immunity for civilian populations,
proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering. They mock the concept of life integrity rights. In contrast to the
chaos and social disruption that routinely accompany armed conflicts, these deaths have been the consequence of and explicit
military policy, with clearly foreseeable consequences to human rights of civilians. The U.S. military has never conceded that
its policies violated human rights under the Geneva Conventions or the guidelines under which U.S. military personnel operate.
Yet the ongoing development of military technology suggests thatabsent the use of weapons of mass destruction violations
of civilians human rights will be the preferred method of warfare in the future.
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Social Service T/
Increased military spending from war would tradeoff with health care and other social services
Tasini , executive director of labor research association ran for senate in NY, 8-13 -7 (Jonathan , Guns Versus Butter -- Our Real
Economic Challenge , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-tasini/guns-versus-butter-our_b_60150.html)
Guns versus butter. It's the classic debate that really tells us a lot about our priorities that we set for the
kind of society we can expect to live in -- how much money a country spends on the military versus
how much money is expended on non-military, domestic needs. To perhaps explain the obvious, buying a
gun (or missile defense or a sophisticated bomber) means you don't have those dollars for butter (or a
national health care plan or free college education ). At some basic level, we all know that those tradeoffs
exist but, sometimes, numbers bring home the meaning of this equation in stunning fashion. What made me think of this is
a set of revealing numbers that jumped out at me the other day -- numbers that underscore why there is, in my opinion,
something lacking in the message of most of the Democratic presidential candidates and our party's leadership.
War spending trades off with Medicaid Bush and the Iraq war proves
Star Tribune 5 ("Social programs would bear brunt of deficit reduction", February 8, @Lexis)
President Bush sent Congress a $2.57 trillion budget Monday that would drastically cut or shut down 150
government programs and slash spending on Medicaid, farming and low-income housing, while boosting
money for defense and homeland security. In what Bush described as the most austere budget of his presidency,
discretionary spending would grow by 2.1 percent - less than the projected rate of inflation. Meanwhile, non-defense
spending would be cut by nearly 1 percent - the first such proposed cut since the Reagan administration . Hardest hit
is Medicaid, which could cost Minnesota as much as $712 million over the next decade.
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Starvation
War causes starvation
Messer 96
(Ellen Messer, University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1996, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu22we/uu22we0j.htm)
After the wars, communities decimated and depopulated by physical and human losses can
remain
underproductive and hungry for years, as food wars and the conditions leading up to them remain a
legacy of armed conflict that is not easily remedied without outside assistance. Individuals, households, and
communities must regain access to land, water, and other sources of livelihood, and human resources and social
infrastructure must somehow recover. Communities in many cases must be re-formed, especially where areas have
experienced complete or selective depopulation. Production and markets must be re-established, so that goods can flow and
livelihoods rebound. During prolonged warfare, whole generations may be conscripted into the military;
with no other schooling, they must later be socialized into peacetime occupations if they are not to
revert to violence and brigandage as a source of entitlements. In the African conflicts of Mozambique, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone, destruction of kinship units was a deliberate military strategy to remove intergenerational ties and
community bonds and create new loyalties to the military. These grown youths now need sustenance, and basic and
specialty education, if they are to contribute to a peacetime economy and society, and to general food security. After
decades of civil war, these countries also lack skilled agricultural, social, and health professionals to
speed recovery. They require agricultural, health, educational, and economic services to rebuild
societies, as well as physical infrastructure such as agricultural works, transport and communication lines, and marketplaces destroyed in the wars.
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Terror
Wars, like the Iraq war, have increased a chance of a terror attack
People Press 05
(Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 7-21-05, http://people-press.org/report/251/more-say-iraq-war-hurts-fightagainst-terrorism)
The public is growing more skeptical that the war in Iraq is helping in the effort to fight terrorism. A plurality
(47%) believes that the war in Iraq has hurt the war on terrorism , up from 41% in February of this year. Further, a
plurality (45%) now says that the war in Iraq has increased the chances of terrorist attacks at home , up from 36% in
October 2004, while fewer say that the war in Iraq has lessened the chances of terrorist attacks in the U.S. (22% now and 32% in
October). Another three-in-ten believe that the war in Iraq has no effect on the chances of a terrorist attack in the U.S. Older
Americans are more skeptical than younger people that the war in Iraq is helping the effort to fight terrorism. A 56% majority of
those age 50 and over say the war in Iraq has hurt the war on terrori sm, up from 39% in February. Those younger than
age 50 are divided on this issue, with 45% saying the war in Iraq has helped and 41% saying it hurt the war on terrorism; that pattern
has remained stable since February.
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**X TURNS CASE**
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AIDS T/ Readiness
AIDS kills readiness- it decreases troops and erodes govt control
Peterson, 3 (Susan- associate professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, Security Studies 12,
no. 2 (winter 2002/3), Epidemic Disease and National Security
http://people.wm.edu/~smpete/files/epidemic.pdf)
Still, IDs. impact in the contemporary international system may be somewhat different. Unlike other diseases, AIDS has an
incubation period of ten years or more, making it unlikely that it will produce significant casualties on the front lines of a war.
It will still, however, deplete force strength in many states. On average, 20.40 percent of armed forces in sub-Saharan countries
are HIV-positive, and in a few countries the rate is 60 percent or more. In Zimbabwe, it may be as high as 80 percent. 147 In high
incidence countries, AIDS significantly erodes military readiness, directly threatening national security. Lyndy Heinecken
chillingly describes the problem in sub-Saharan Africa: AIDS-related illnesses are now the leading cause of death in the army
and police forces of these countries, accounting for more than 50% of inservice and post-service mortalities. In badly infected
countries, AIDS patients occupy 75% of military hospital beds and the disease is responsible for more admissions than
battlefield injuries. The high rate of HIV infection has meant that some African armies have been unable to deploy a full
contingent, or even half of their troops, at short notice.. [In South Africa, because] participation in peace-support operations
outside the country is voluntary, the S[outh] A[frican] N[ational] D[efence] F[orce] is grappling with the problem of how to
ensure the availability of sufficiently suitable candidates for deployment at short notice. Even the use of members for internal
crime prevention and border control, which subjects them to adverse conditions or stationing in areas where local infrastructure is limited, presents certain problems. Ordinary ailments, such as diarrhoea and the common cold, can be serious
enough to require the hospitalization of an immune-compromised person, and, in some cases, can prove fatal if they are not
treated immediately.148 Armed forces in severely affected states will be unable to recruit and train soldiers quickly enough to
replace their sick and dying colleagues, the potential recruitment pool itself will dwindle, and officers corps will be decimated.
Military budgets will be sapped, military blood supplies tainted, and organizational structures strained to accommodate
unproductive soldiers. HIV-infected armed forces also threaten civilians at home and abroad. Increased levels of sexual activity
among military forces in wartime means that the military risk of becoming infected with HIV is as much as 100 times that of the
civilian risk. It also means that members of the armed forces comprise a key means of transmitting the virus to the general
population; with sex and transport workers, the military is considered one of the three core transmission groups in Africa. 149
For this reason, conflict-ridden states may become reluctant to accept peacekeepers from countries with high HIV rates. Rather
than contributing directly to military defeat in many countries, however, AIDS in the military is more likely to have longer term
implications for national security. First, IDs theoretically could deter military action and impede access to strategic resources or
areas. Tropical diseases erected a formidable, although obviously not insurmountable, obstacle to colonization in Africa, India,
and Southeast Asia. French and later American efforts to open the Panama Canal, similarly, were stymied until U.S. mosquito
control efforts effectively checked yellow fever and malaria. Second, in many countries AIDS already strains military medical
systems and their budgets, and it only promises to divert further spending away from defense toward both military and civilian
health. Third, AIDS in the military promises to have its greatest impact by eroding a government.s control over its armed forces
and further destabilizing the state. Terminally ill soldiers may have little incentive to defend their government, and their
government may be in more need of defending as AIDS siphons funds from housing, education, police, and administration.
Finally, high military HIV/AIDS rates could alter regional balances of power. Perhaps 40.50 percent of South Africa.s soldiers are
HIV-infected. Despite the disease.s negative impact on South Africa.s absolute power, Price-Smith notes, AIDS may increase that
nation.s power relative to its neighbors, Zimbabwe and Botswana, with potentially important regional consequences. 150 AIDS
poses obvious threats to the military forces of many countries, particularly in sub- Saharan Africa, but it does not present the
same immediate security problems for the United States. The authors of a Reagan-era report on the effects of economic and
demographic trends on security worried about the effects of the costs of AIDS research, education, and funding on the defense
budget,151 but a decade of relative prosperity generated budget surpluses instead. These surpluses have evaporated, but
concerns about AIDS spending have not reappeared and are unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future, given the relatively low
levels of HIV-infection in the United States. AIDS presents other challenges, including prevention education and measures to
limit infection of U.S. soldiers and peacekeepers stationed abroad, particularly in high risk settings, and HIV transmission by
these forces to the general population. These concerns could limit U.S. actions where American interests are at stake.152
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AIDS T/ Readiness
Aids kills military readiness
Upton, 4 ( Maureen- member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow of the 21st Century Trust, World
Policy Journal, Global Public Health Trumps the Nation-State Volume XXI, No 3, Fall 2004,
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj04-3/Upton.html)
The political economist Nicholas Eberstadt has demonstrated that the coming Eurasian AIDS pandemic has the potential to
derail the economic prospects of billions of peopleparticularly in Russia, China, and Indiaand to thereby alter the global
military balance.5 Eurasia (defined as Russia, plus Asia), is home to five-eighths of the worlds population, and its combined
GNP is larger than that of either the United States or Europe. Perhaps more importantly, the region includes four of the worlds
five militaries with over one million members and four declared nuclear states. Since HIV has a relatively long incubation
period, its effects on military readiness are unusually harsh. Officers who contract the disease early in their military careers do
not typically die until they have amassed significant training and expertise, so armed forces are faced with the loss of their most
senior, hardest-to-replace officers.
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Disesase T/ Readiness
Diseases kill military readiness- empirically proven
Military readiness. Even when disease is not deliberately used, it can alter the evolution and outcome of military conflict by
eroding military readiness and morale. As Jared Diamond notes, .All those military histories glorifying great generals
oversimplify the ego-deflating truth: the winners of past wars were not always the armies with the best generals and weapons,
but were often merely those bearing the nastiest germs to transmit to their enemies..142 During the European conquest of the
Americas, the conquistadors shared numerous lethal microbes with their native American foes, who had few or no deadly
diseases to pass on to their conquerors. When Hernando Cortez and his men first attacked the Aztecs in Mexico in 1520, they
left behind smallpox that wiped out half the Aztec population. Surviving Aztecs were further demoralized by their vulnerability
to a disease that appeared harmless to the Europeans, and on their next attempt the Spanish succeeded in conquering the Aztec
nation.143 Spanish conquest of the Incan empire in South America followed a similar pattern: In 1532 Francisco
Pizarro and his army of 168 Spaniards defeated the Incan army of 80,000. A devastating
smallpox epidemic had killed the Incan emperor and his heir, producing a civil war that split
the empire and allowed a handful of Europeans to defeat a large, but divided enemy. 144 In
modern times, too, pandemic infections have affected the ability of military forces to prosecute
and win a war. The German Army chief of staff in the First World War, General Erick Von
Ludendorf, blamed Germany.s loss of that war at least partly on the negative effects of the
1918 influenza epidemic on the morale of German troops. 145 In the Second World War, similarly,
malaria caused more U.S. casualties in certain areas than did military action. 146 Throughout
history, then, IDs have had a significant potential to decimate armies and alter military history.
Pandemics kill military readiness

Major Hesko, 6 (Gerald, Air Command And Staff College Pandemic Influenza: Military Operational
Readiness Implications April 2006)
There exists in the world today the possibility of a great influenza pandemic matching those of the past century with the
potential to far exceed the pain, suffering and deaths of past pandemics. Although global pandemics are difficult to accurately
predict, scientists theorize that another pandemic on a scale of the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is imminent.
If a pandemic influenza occurs, as predicted by many in the medical and scientific community, the number of Americans
affected could easily overwhelm our medical capability resulting in untold suffering and deaths. Although an influenza
pandemic, if it occurs, has the potential to devastate and threaten our society, an equally alarming consequence is the effects it
could have on the operational readiness of the United States military establishment. With our current engagements in
Afghanistan and Iraq, along with other smaller engagements world-wide, if an influenza pandemic were to strike the military,
our level of operational readiness, preparedness and ability to defend our vital national interests could be decreased or threaten.
As a result of the pending threat of an influenza pandemic, the United States military, must take decisive actions to mitigate the
potential devastation an influenza pandemic might have on operational readiness.
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Disease T/ Readiness
Disease turns military readiness
Suburban Emergency Management Project, 7 (Disease Outbreak Readiness Update, U.S. Department of
Defense
Biot Report #449: July 25, 2007, http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=449)
An infectious disease pandemic could impair the militarys readiness, jeopardize ongoing military operations abroad, and
threaten the day-to-day functioning of the Department of Defense (DOD) because of up to 40% of personnel reporting sick or
being absent during a pandemic, according to a recent GAO report (June 2007).
Congressman Tom Davis, ranking member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in the U.S. House of
Representatives, requested the GAO investigation. (1) The 40% number (above) comes from the Homeland Security Councils
estimate that 40% of the U.S. workforce might not be at work due to illness, the need to care for family members who are sick,
or fear of becoming infected. (2) DOD military and civilian personnel and contractors would face a similar absentee rate,
according to the GAO writers.
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Disease T/ War
Disease increases the likelihood of war and genocide
How might these political and economic effects produce violent conflict? Price-Smith offers two possible answers: Disease
.magnif[ies].both relative and absolute deprivation and.hasten[s] the erosion of state capacity in seriously affected societies.
Thus, infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intrastate violence, and in
extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure..83 Disease heightens competition among social groups
and elites for scarce resources. When the debilitating and deadly effects of IDs like AIDS are concentrated among a particular
socio-economic, ethnic, racial, or geographic group, the potential for conflict escalates. In many parts of Africa today, AIDS
strikes rural areas at higher rates than urban areas, or it hits certain provinces harder than others. If these trends persist in states
where tribes or ethnic groups are heavily concentrated in particular regions or in rural rather than urban areas, AIDS almost
certainly will interact with tribal, ethnic, or national differences and make political and military conflict more likely. PriceSmith argues, moreover, that .the potential for intra-elite violence is also increasingly probable and may carry grave political
consequences, such as coups, the collapse of governance, and planned genocides..84
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83
Ecodestruction T/ Disease
Worldwatch Institute, 96 (Infectious Diseases Surge: Environmental Destruction, Poverty To Blame
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1593)
Rates of infectious disease have risen rapidly in many countries during the past decade, according to a new study released by
the Worldwatch Institute. Illness and death from tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, and AIDS are up sharply; infectious
diseases killed 16.5 million people in 1993, one-third of all deaths worldwide, and slightly more than cancer and heart disease
combined.
The resurgence of diseases once thought to have been conquered stems from a deadly mix of exploding populations, rampant
poverty, inadequate health care, misuse of antibiotics, and severe environmental degradation, says the new report, Infecting
Ourselves: How Environmental and Social Disruptions Trigger Disease. Infectious diseases take their greatest toll in
developing countries, where cases of malaria and tuberculosis are soaring, but even in the United States, infectious disease
deaths rose 58 percent between 1980 and 1992.
Research Associate Anne Platt, author of the report, says, "Infectious diseases are a basic barometer of the environmental
sustainability of human activity. Recent outbreaks result from a sharp imbalance between a human population growing by 88
million each year and a natural resource base that is under increasing stress."
"Water pollution, shrinking forests, and rising temperatures are driving the upward surge in infections in many countries," the
report says. "Only by adopting a more sustainable path to economic development can we control them."
"Beyond the number of people who die, the social and economic cost of infectious diseases is hard to overestimate," Platt says.
"It can be a crushing burden for families, communities, and governments. Some 400 million people suffer from debilitating
malaria, about 200 million have schistosomiasis, and nine million have tuberculosis."
By the year 2000, AIDS will cost Asian countries over $50 billion a year just in lost productivity. "Such suffering and
economic loss is doubly tragic," says Platt, "because the cost of these diseases is astronomical, yet preventing them is not only
simple, but inexpensive."
The author notes, "The dramatic resurgence of infectious diseases is telling us that we are approaching disease and medicine, as
well as economic development, in the wrong way. Governments focus narrowly on individual cures and not on mass
prevention; and we fail to understand that lifestyle can promote infectious disease just as it can contribute to heart disease. It is
imperative that we bring health considerations into the equation when we plan for international development, global trade, and
population increases, to prevent disease from spreading and further undermining economic development."
The report notes that this global resurgence of infectious disease involves old, familiar diseases like tuberculosis and the plague
as well as new ones like Ebola and Lyme disease. Yet all show the often tragic consequences of human actions:
Population increases, leading to human crowding, poverty, and the growth of mega-cities, are prompting dramatic increases in
dengue fever, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS.
Lack of clean water is spreading diseases like cholera, typhoid, and dysentery. Eighty percent of all disease in developing
countries is related to unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation.
Poorly planned development disrupts ecosystems and provides breeding grounds for mosquitoes, rodents, and snails that spread
debilitating diseases.
Inadequate vaccinations have led to resurgences in measles and diphtheria.
Misuse of antibiotics has created drug-resistant strains of pneumonia and malaria.
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84
Ecodestruction T/ Disease
Environmental collapse threatens health and civilization collapse
WHO, 5 (Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Health Synthesis http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosys tems/ecosysq1.pdf)
In a fundamental sense, ecosystems are the planet's life-support systems - for the human species and all other forms of life (see
Figure 1.1). The needs of the human organism for food, water, clean air, shelter and relative climatic constancy are basic and
unalterable. That is, ecosystems are essential to human well-being and especially to human health defined by the World
Health Organization as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being. Those who live in materially comfortable,
urban environments commonly take for granted ecosystem services to health. They assume that good health derives from
prudent consumer choices and behaviours, with access to good health care services. But this ignores the role of the natural
environment: of the array of ecosystems that allow people to enjoy good health, social organization, economic activity, a built
environment and life itself. Historically, overexploitation of ecosystem services has led to the collapse of some societies
(SG3). There is an observable tendency for powerful and wealthy societies eventually to overexploit, damage and even destroy
their natural environmental support base. The agricultural-based civilizations of Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, the Mayans,
and (on a micro-scale) Easter Island all provide well documented examples. Industrial societies, although in many cases more
distant from the source of the ecosystem services on which they depend, may reach similar limits. Resource consumption in
one location can lead to degradation of ecosystem services and associated health effects in other parts of the world (SG3). At
its most fundamental level of analysis, the pressure on ecosystems can be conceptualized as a function of population,
technology and lifestyle. In turn, these factors depend on many social and cultural elements. For example, fertilizer use in
agricultural production increasingly is dependent on resources extracted from other regions and has led to eutrophication of
rivers, lakes and coastal ecosystems. Notwithstanding ecosystems' fundamental role as determinants of human health,
sociocultural factors play a similarly important role. These include infrastructural assets; income and wealth distribution;
technologies used; and level of knowledge. In many industrialized countries, changes in these social factors over the last few
centuries have both enhanced some ecosystem services (through more productive agriculture, for instance) and improved
health services and education, contributing to increases in life expectancy. The complex multifactorial causation of states of
health and disease complicates the attribution of human health impacts to ecosystem changes. A precautionary approach to
ecosystem management is appropriate.
Environmental destruction causes new diseases

WHO, 5 (Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Health Synthesis http://www.who.int/globalchange/ecosys tems/ecosysq1.pdf)
Disturbance or degradation of ecosystems can have biological effects that are highly relevant to infectious disease transmission
(C14). The reasons for the emergence or re-emergence of some diseases are unknown, but the following mechanisms have
been proposed: altered habitat leading to changes in the number of vector breeding sites or reservoir host distribution; niche
invasions or transfer of interspecies hosts; biodiversity change (including loss of predator species and changes in host
population density); human-induced genetic changes in disease vectors or pathogens (such as mosquito resistance to
pesticides or the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria); and environmental contamination by infectious disease agents
(such as faecal contamination of source waters).
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85
Ecodestruction T/ War
Environmental degradation increases war, instability, and hurts the economy
UN, 4 (United Nations News Center, Environmental destruction during war exacerbates instability November
5, 2004, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12460&Cr=conflict&Cr1=environment,
"These scars, threatening water supplies, the fertility of the land and the cleanliness of the air are recipes for instability between
communities and neighbouring countries," he added.
Citing a new UNEP report produced in collaboration with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Mr. Toepfer stressed that environmental degradation could undermine local and
international security by "reinforcing and increasing grievances within and between societies."
The study finds that a decrepit and declining environment can depress economic activity and diminish the authority of the state
in the eyes of its citizens. It also points out that the addressing environmental problems can foster trust among communities and
neighbouring countries.
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Ecodestruction T/ Agriculture
Environmental degradation destroys cropland
Homer-Dixon, 91 (Thomas- Professor of Political Science and Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the
University of Toronto, International Security On The Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict 199,
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/thresh/thresh2.htm)
Decreased agricultural production is often mentioned as potentially the most worrisome consequence of environmental
change,47 and Figure 2 presents some of the causal scenarios frequently proposed by researchers. This illustration is not
intended to be exhaustive: the systemic interaction of environmental and agricultural variables is far more complex than the
figure suggests.48 Moreover, no one region or country will exhibit all the indicated processes: while some are already clearly
evident in certain areas, others are not yet visible anywhere.
The Philippines provides a good illustration of deforestation's impact, which can be traced out in the figure. Since the Second
World War, logging and the encroachment of farms have reduced the virgin and second-growth forest from about sixteen
million hectares to 6.8-7.6 million hectares.49 Across the archipelago, logging and land-clearing have accelerated erosion,
changed regional hydrological cycles and precipitation patterns, and decreased the land's ability to retain water during rainy
periods. The resulting flash floods have damaged irrigation works while plugging reservoirs and irrigation channels with silt.
These factors may seriously affect crop production. For example, when the government of the Philippines and the European
Economic Community commissioned an Integrated Environmental Plan for the still relatively unspoiled island of Palawan, the
authors of the study found that only about half of the 36,000 hectares of irrigated farmland projected within the Plan for 2007
will actually be irrigable because of the hydrological effects of decreases in forest cover.50
Figure 2 also highlights the importance of the degradation and decreasing availability of good agricultural land, problems that
deserve much closer attention than they usually receive. Currently, total global cropland amounts to about 1.5 billion hectares.
Optimistic estimates of total arable land on the planet, which includes both current and potential cropland, range from 3.2 to
3.4 billion hectares, but nearly all the best land has already been exploited. What is left is either less fertile, not sufficiently
rainfed or easily irrigable, infested with pests, or harder to clear and work.51
For developing countries during the 1980s, cropland grew at just 0.26 percent a year, less than half the rate of the 1970s.
More importantly, in these countries arable land per capita dropped by 1.9 percent a year. 52 In the absence of a major
increase in arable land in developing countries, experts expect that the world average of 0.28 hectares of cropland per capita
will decline to 0.17 hectares by the year 2025, given the current rate of world population growth. 53 Large tracts are being
lost each year to urban encroachment, erosion, nutrient depletion, salinization, waterlogging, acidification, and compacting.
The geographer Vaclav Smil, who is generally very conservative in his assessments of environmental damage, estimates
that two to three million hectares of cropland are lost annually to erosion; perhaps twice as much land goes to urbanization,
and at least one million hectares are abandoned because of excessive salinity. In addition, about one-fifth of the world's
cropland is suffering from some degree of desertification. 54 Taken together, he concludes, the planet will lose about 100
million hectares of arable land between 1985 and 2000.55
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**NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIOS**
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Central Asian Conflict

Central Asia is the most likely scenario for global nuclear war
Blank, Research Professional of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US
Army War College, 2000
(Dr. Stephen J Blank, Research Professional of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College
June, pg. http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/Russia-2000-assessment-SSI.pdf)
Central Asias physical infrastructure might charitably be called Third World and the region is highly diverse
ethnically and politically. Thus we might quickly end up on the wrong side of a Central Asian ethnic
conflict. In such a case we would also quite likely be opposed by one or more of the key neighboring
states, China, Iran, or Russia, all of whom might find it easier to project and sustain power into the area
(or use proxies for that purpose) than we could.
Central Asia is the most likely scenario for a global nuclear war
Stephen Blank,, Director of Strategic Studies Institute at US Army War College, 1999 Central Asian Survey
(18; 2), [Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy
Wars]
many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene
now exist in the Transcaucasus. And similarly many conditions exist for internal domestic strife if the leadership of
any of these governments changes or if one of the many disaffected minority groups revolts. Many Third World conflicts
generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often
feel obliged to rescue their proxies and protgs . One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other
Thus
side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps
even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993
Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear
war in that case. This episode tends to confirm the notion that `future wars involving Europe and America as allies will be
fought either over resources in chaotic Third World locations or in ethnic upheavals on the southern fringe of Europe and
Russia . 95 Sadly, many such causes for conflict prevail across the Transcaspian. Precisely because Turkey is
a Nato members but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia or if it could, would
conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia s
declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost every-where else in the
CIS or the so-called arc of crisis from the Balkans to China.
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US China war goes nuclear
Hadar, adjunct scholar at Cato, 96
(Louis Hadar , The Sweet and Sour Sino-American Relationship, 1/23/96, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-248.html)
Some analysts, including Nicholas D. Kristof, former Beijing chief of the New York Times, have drawn a historical
parallel between the rise of Germany as a world economic and military power at the end of the 19th century
and China's rise in the last decade of the 20th century. They suggest that, given the similar authoritarian
and insecure nature of the regimes in post-Bismarck Germany the post-Deng China, China could
emerge as a leading anti-status quo player, challenging the dominant position of the United States, which
like Great Britain in the 19th century occupies the leading economic and military position in the world. "The risk is that
Deng's successor will be less talented and more aggressive--a Chinese version of Wilhelm II," writes Kristof. "Such a ruler
unfortunately may be tempted to promote Chinese nationalism as a unifying force and ideology, to replace the carcass of
communism." For all the differences between China and Wilhelmine Germany, "the latter's experience should remind us of
the difficulty that the world has had accommodating newly powerful nations," warns Kristof, recalling that Germany's
jockeying for a place in the front rank of nations resulted in World War I.(66) Charles Krauthammer echoes that point,
contending that China is "like late 19th-century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for
the continent it finds itself on."(67) Since Krauthammer and other analysts use the term "containment" to describe the
policy they urge Washington to adopt toward China, it is the Cold War with the Soviet Union that is apparently seen as the
model for the future Sino- American relationship. Strategist Graham Fuller predicts, for example, that China is
"predisposed to a role as leader of the dispossessed states" in a new cold war that would pit an
American-led West against an anti-status quo Third World bloc .(68) Although Krauthammer admits that
China lacks the ideological appeal that the Soviet Union possessed (at least in the early stages of the Cold
War), he assumes that, like the confrontation with the Soviet Union but unlike the British-German
rivalry, the contest between America and China will remain "cold" and not escalate into a "hot" war.
That optimism is crucial. Advocates of containment may be able to persuade a large number of
Americans to adopt an anti-China strategy if the model is the tense but manageable Soviet-American
rivalry. However, not many Americans are likely to embrace containment if the probable outcome is a
bloody rerun of World War I--only this time possibly with nuclear weapons.
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Economic Collapse
Economic decline leads to global nuclear war and totalitarian regimes
Cook, former analyst for the US Treasury Department, 2007
Richard Cook, Writer, Consultant, and Retired Federal Analyst U.S. Treasury Department, 6/14/2k7 "It's Official: The Crash of the
U.S. Economy has begun," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5964
Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than
face the economic music. The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to
World War II. Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if
the U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they
dont want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes? Maybe well finally have a
revolution either from the right or the center involving martial law, suspension of the Bill of Rights,
etc., combined with some kind of military or forced-labor dictatorship. Were halfway there anyway.
Forget about a revolution from the left. They wouldnt want to make anyone mad at them for being too radical.
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India/Pakistan War
India Pakistan War leads to extinction
Gertz, Staff Writer at the Washington Times, 2001
(Bill Gertz, Staff writer at the Washington Times 12/31/2001, India, Pakistan prepare nukes, troops for war, Lexis)
Pakistan and India are readying their military forces - including their ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons - for war, The Washington Times has learned. U.S. intelligence officials say Pakistani military moves include
large-scale troop movements, the dispersal of fighter aircraft and preparations for the transportation of nuclear weapons
from storage sites. India also is moving thousands of its troops near the border with Pakistan and has dispersed some
aircraft to safer sites away from border airfields, say officials familiar with intelligence reports of the war moves. Pakistan
is moving the equivalent of two armored brigades - several thousand troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles near the northern part of its border with India. Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged heavy mortar fire over their border in
southern Kashmir today, Agence France-Presse reported. Five Indian soldiers were seriously injured in the heaviest shelling
in four months, a senior Indian army official said. More than 1,000 villagers were evacuated from their homes overnight for
the operation, according to the report. Officials say the most alarming signs are preparations in both states for the use of
nuclear-tipped missiles. Intelligence agencies have learned of indications that India is getting its short-range Prithvi ballistic
missiles ready for use. The missiles are within range of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. Meanwhile, Pakistan is mobilizing
its Chinese-made mobile M-11 missiles, also known as the Shaheen, which have been readied for movement from a base
near Sargodha, Pakistan. Intelligence reports indicate that India will have all its forces ready to launch an attack as early as
this week, with Thursday or Friday as possible dates. Pakistan could launch its forces before those dates in a pre-emptive
strike. Disclosure of the war preparations comes as President Bush on Saturday telephoned leaders of both nations, urging
them to calm tensions, a sign of administration concern over the military moves in the region. The administration also fears
that a conflict between India and Pakistan would undermine U.S. efforts to find terrorists in
Afghanistan. U.S. military forces are heavily reliant on Pakistani government permission to conduct
overflights for bombing and other aircraft operations into Afghanistan, primarily from aircraft carriers
located in the Arabian Sea. With tensions growing between the states, U.S. intelligence officials are divided over the
ultimate meaning of the indicators of an impending conflict. The Pentagon's Joint Staff intelligence division, known as J-2,
late last week had assessed the danger of conflict at "critical" levels. Other joint intelligence centers outside the Pentagon,
including those supporting the U.S. military forces responsible for the Asia-Pacific region and for Southwest Asia, assess
the danger of an India-Pakistan war as less than critical but still "serious ." Intelligence officials are especially
worried about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal because control over the weapons is decentralized. Even
before the latest moves, regional commanders could order the use of the weapons, which are based on
missiles or fighter-bombers.
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Iraq Pullout
Iraq pullout causes Middle-Eastern nuclear war
Gerecht, resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007
(Reuel, The Consequences of Failure in Iraq, Jan 15, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25407,filter.all/pub_detail.asp)
If we leave Iraq any time soon, the battle for Baghdad will probably lead to a conflagration that
consumes all of Arab Iraq, and quite possibly Kurdistan, too. Once the Shia become both badly
bloodied and victorious, raw nationalist and religious passions will grow. A horrific fight with the
Sunni Arabs will inevitably draw in support from the ferociously anti-Shiite Sunni religious
establishments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and on the Shiite side from Iran . It will probably destroy
most of central Iraq and whet the appetite of Shiite Arab warlords, who will by then dominate their
community, for a conflict with the Kurds. If the Americans stabilize Arab Iraq, which means occupying the Sunni
triangle, this won't happen. A strong, aggressive American military presence in Iraq can probably halt the radicalization of
the Shiite community. Imagine an Iraq modeled on the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. The
worst elements in the Iranian regime are heavily concentrated in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Ministry
of Intelligence, the two organizations most active inside Iraq. The Lebanese Hezbollah is also present giving tutorials.
These forces need increasing strife to prosper. Imagine Iraqi Shiites, battle-hardened in a vicious war with Iraq's Arab
Sunnis, spiritually and operationally linking up with a revitalized and aggressive clerical dictatorship in Iran. Imagine the
Iraqi Sunni Islamic militants, driven from Iraq, joining up with groups like al Qaeda, living to die killing Americans.
Imagine the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arab refugees. The
Hashemites have been lucky and clever since World War II. They've escaped extinction several times. Does anyone want to
take bets that the monarchy can survive the implantation of an army of militant, angry Iraqi Sunni Arabs? For those who
believe that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the epicenter of the Middle East, the mass
migration of Iraq's Sunni Arabs into Jordan will bury what small chances remain that the Israelis and
Palestinians will find an accommodation. With Jordan in trouble, overflowing with viciously antiAmerican and anti-Israeli Iraqis, peaceful Palestinian evolution on the West Bank of the Jordan river is
about as likely as the discovery of the Holy Grail. The repercussions throughout the Middle East of the
Sunni-Shiite clash in Iraq are potentially so large it's difficult to digest. Sunni Arabs in Egypt, Jordan,
and Saudi Arabia will certainly view a hard-won and bloody Shiite triumph in Iraq as an enormous
Iranian victory. The Egyptians or the Saudis or both will go for their own nukes. What little chance
remains for the Americans and the Europeans to corral peacefully the clerical regime's nuclearweapons aspirations will end with a Shiite-Sunni death struggle in Mesopotamia, which the Shia will
inevitably win. The Israelis, who are increasingly likely to strike preemptively the major Iranian
nuclear sites before the end of George Bush's presidency, will feel even more threatened, especially
when the Iranian regime underscores its struggle against the Zionist enemy as a means of
compensating for its support to the bloody Shiite conquest in Iraq. With America in full retreat from Iraq, the
clerical regime, which has often viewed terrorism as a tool of statecraft, could well revert to the mentality and tactics that
produced the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996. If the Americans are retreating, hit them. That would not be just a radical
Shiite view; it was the learned estimation of Osama bin Laden and his kind before 9/11 . It's questionable to argue that
the war in Iraq has advanced the radical Sunni holy war against the United States. There should be no
question, however, that an American defeat in Mesopotamia would be the greatest psychological
triumph ever for anti-American jihadists. Al Qaeda and its militant Iraqi allies could dominate western
Iraq for years--it could take awhile for the Shiites to drive them out.
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Iran
Iran attack will cause a global nuclear war that leads to human extinction
Hirch Professor at the University og Califorina at San Diego 2008
(Seymour Hirsch, Professor of physics @ the University of California @ San Diego, 4/10/2k8
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=HIR20060422&articleId=2317)
Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in
Iraq and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, it is not clear whether
Iran would target Israel in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes
nuclear weapons use against Iranian facilities , as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring Iran it will cause
a much more violent response. Iranian military forces and militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq
and the US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and
inflaming the Muslim world. There could be popular uprisings in other countries in the region like
Pakistan, and of course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers . Finally I would like to discuss
the grave consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, the likelihood of
terrorist attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously enhanced
after these events. And terrorist's attempts to get hold of "loose nukes" and use them against Americans
will be enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran. , it will destroy
America's position as the leader of the free world. The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear
weapons are qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction
between small and large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those
targeting armies or civilians. It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression
against a non-nuclear country, and the US will become a pariah state. Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire
nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use
of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear
weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can
obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed.
In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed.
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Japanese Relations (Spratly Islands)

US-Japan alliance is key to prevent war over the Spratly Islands.
Okimoto President of Okamoto Associates and Special Adviser to the Cabinet and Chairman of the
Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations 2002
[Yukio, Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance, spring 2002, Vol. 25, No. 2,
http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf]
The Japan-U.S. alliance also probably serves as a deterrent against any one nation seizing control of the
Spratly Islands and, by extension, the sea lanes and resources of the South China Sea . Formally, the area is
outside the Far East region that the United States and Japan agree is covered by Article 6 of the security treaty. For the
countries vying for control of the sea, however, the proximity of two of the worlds great maritime forces must
at least urge them to use caution as they pursue their competition.

Spratly Conflict goes nuclear
Nikkei 1995
[The Nikkei weekly, Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being
subjected to trade liberalization demands, says Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, July 3, 1995, lexis]
Developing Asian nations should be allowed a grace period to allow their economies to grow before being subjected to
trade liberalization demands, says Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad . He dismisses an argument put
forward by some industrialized countries that fair trade can be realized when trading conditions are the same for all
countries. It is not fair when small developing countries are obliged to compete with Japan and the U.S. under the same
conditions, the outspoken champion of Asian interests insists. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum
originated as a loose discussion platform. But it has become an institution, and agendas are prepared ahead of meetings.
However, Mahathir is dissatisfied with its management, because, he says, group policy is decided by a handful of leading
nations. He is also resentful of some countries' opposition to the Malaysian-proposed East-Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC), aimed at promoting economic cooperation in the region. The EAEC, which the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) defines as a part of APEC, doesn't stand in opposition to APEC, he says. "The EAEC and APEC can
coexist," he says. The EAEC is just a conference, not a trade bloc like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), he adds. Mahathir has gone to some lengths to bring Japan on board. Without the world's No. 2 economy, the EAEC
will not be taken seriously by the international community, he says. Some have suggested also sending out invitations to
Australia and New Zealand. But in order to join the EAEC, those two nations should not only just call themselves Asian
countries, he says. They should also share values and culture with their Asian partners, he stresses, because the caucus is a
group of Asian countries. Mahathir strongly opposes the use of weapons to settle international disputes. The prime minister
hails the ASEAN Regional Forum as a means for civilized nations of achieving negotiated settlement of disputes. Many
members of the forum, including Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Thailand, have problems with their neighbors, but
they are trying to solve them through continued dialogue, he adds. Three scenarios Mahathir sees Asia developing in three
possible ways in future. In his worst-case scenario, Asian countries would go to war against each other,
possibly over disputes such as their conflicting claims on the Spratly Islands. China might then declare
war on the U.S., leading to full-scale, even nuclear, war.
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Japanese Relations (Middle Eastern Conflict)

US-Japan alliance is key to preventing war in the Middle East
Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States and Islamic
countries, which, with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested that Japan can become a potential
intermediary between the United States and the Muslim world because of Japans close relations with
Arab governments, Muslim oil-producing states, and the nations of Central Asia ; its relatively more flexible
stance on human rights policies; and the absence of a strong tie to Israel . Japan can contribute to a U.S.Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and an inconsistent U.S.
commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of stemming the rise of terrorism in the
Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the
industrialized world that extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States also
needs to explain its reluctance to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights
standards as those applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia.
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Japanese Relations (China/Taiwan Conflict)

US-Japan alliance is key to preventing China Taiwan war
Regardless of whether Chinas development takes the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason
for concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks
of life have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. The
U.S.-Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem . Both
Japan and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force . When China
conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups
into nearby waters as a sign of its disapproval of Chinas belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese
minds the possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities . Even though
intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests
guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an
unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs up Japans basic stance that the two sides need to
come to a negotiated solution.
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Japanese Relations (Korea)

US-Japan alliance is key to preventing North Korean War
the
the
people, the North Korean military maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of
artillerysome of which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheadsawaiting the
signal to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRKs immense stock of weapons includes large numbers of Nodong missiles
Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its choking, inhumane society,
DPRK government still refuses to retreat to its place on the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of
capable of striking Japans western coastal regions and probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major
Japanese city. The United States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some 30,000
U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul. Most military experts admit that the army troops serve a largely
symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment could
pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces at the incipient stage. The firepower the USFJ
can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance
the Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and
manipulation, but they know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a
strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan.
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Japanese Relations (Sino-Russian Ties)

A. Strengthening the US-Japan alliance is critical to loosen Sino-Russian ties and checking agression
Brookes, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 5
(Peter Brooks, Senior Fellow at the heritage foundation, 8/15/05 An Alarming Alliance: Sino Russian ties tightening The Heritage
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081505a.cfm
The first- ever joint Chinese-Russian military exercises kick off Thursday in Northeast Asia. The exercises are small
in scale but huge in implication. They indicate a further warming of the "strategic partnership" that Moscow and Beijing
struck back in 1996. More importantly, they signal the first real post-Cold War steps, beyond inflammatory rhetoric,
by Russia and China to balance and, ultimately, diminish U.S. power across Asia. If America doesn't
take strategic steps to counter these efforts, it will lose influence to Russia and China in an increasingly
important part of the world. Unimaginable just a few years ago, the weeklong military exercises dubbed "Peace
Mission 2005" will involve 10,000 troops on China and Russia's eastern coasts and in adjacent seas. This unmistakable
example of Sino-Russian military muscle-flexing will also include Russia's advanced SU-27 fighters, strategic TU-95 and
TU-22 bombers, submarines, amphibious and anti-submarine ships. The exercise's putative purpose is to "strengthen the
capability of the two armed forces in jointly striking international terrorism, extremism and separatism," says China's
Defense Ministry. But the Chinese defense minister was more frank in comments earlier this year. Gen. Cao Gangchuan
said: "The exercise will exert both immediate and far-reaching impacts." This raised lots of eyebrows especially in the
United States, Taiwan and Japan. For instance, although Russia nixed the idea, the Chinese demanded the exercises
be held 500 miles to the south a move plainly aimed at intimidating Taiwan. Beijing clearly wanted
to send a warning to Washington (and, perhaps, Tokyo) about its support for Taipei, and hint at the
possibility that if there were a Taiwan Strait dust-up, Russia might stand with China. The exercise also
gives Russia an opportunity to strut its military wares before its best customers Chinese generals. Moscow is Beijing's
largest arms supplier, to the tune of more than $2 billion a year for purchases that include subs, ships, missiles and fighters.
Rumors abound that Moscow may finally be ready to sell strategic, cruise-missile-capable bombers such as the long-range
TU-95 and supersonic TU-22 to Beijing strengthening China's military hand against America and U.S. friends and allies
in Asia. Russia and China are working together to oppose American influence all around their periphery.
Both are upset by U.S. support for freedom in the region notably in the recent Orange (Ukraine), Rose
(Georgia) and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) revolutions all of which fell in what Moscow or Beijing deems its sphere of influence.
In fact, at a recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (i.e., Russia, China and the four 'Stans'), Moscow and
Beijing conspired to get Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to close U.S. airbases. As a result, Uzbekistan gave America 180 days
to get out, despite the base's continued use in Afghanistan operations. (Quick diplomacy by Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld saved the Kyrgyz base, but it remains on the ropes.) Moreover, it shouldn't be overlooked that the "Shanghai Six"
have invited Iran, India and Pakistan to join the group as observers, expanding China and Russia's influence into South Asia
and parts of the Middle East. What to do? First, the Pentagon must make sure the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review
balances U.S. forces to address both the unconventional terrorist threat and the big-power challenge represented by a
Russia-China strategic partnership. Second, the United States must continue to strengthen its relationship with
its ally Japan to ensure a balance of power in Northeast Asia and also encourage Tokyo to improve
relations with Moscow in an effort to loosen Sino-Russian ties. Third, Washington must persevere in advancing
its new relationship with (New) Delhi in order to balance Beijing's growing power in Asia and take advantage of India's
longstanding, positive relationship with Russia. And be ready to deal. Russia has historically been wary of China. America
must not ignore the possibilities of developing a long-term, favorable relationship with Russia despite the challenges
posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's heavy-handed rule. These unprecedented military exercises don't make a
formal Beijing-Moscow alliance inevitable. But they represent a new, more intimate phase in the Sino-Russian
relationship. And China's growing political/economic clout mated with Russia's military would make
for a potentially potent anti-American bloc. For the moment, Beijing and Moscow are committed to
building a political order in Asia that doesn't include America atop the power pyramid. With issues
from Islamic terrorism to North Korean nukes to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the stakes in Asia are
huge. Washington and its friends must not waste any time in addressing the burgeoning Sino-Russian
entente.
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North Korea
North Korean War goes nuclear
CNN 2003
[CNN, N K. Warns of nuclear conflict, 2/26/2003 ,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/25/nkorea.missile/index.html]
Pyongyang cites upcoming U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises scheduled to begin on March 4, as "reckless war
moves" designed to "unleash a total war on the Korean peninsula with a pre-emptive nuclear strike". " The situation of
the Korean Peninsula is reaching the brink of a nuclear war," the statement, issued by the official
Korean Central News Agency, says . The North also called on South Koreans to "wage a nationwide anti-U.S. and
anti-war struggle to frustrate the U.S. moves for a nuclear war." The United States denies it has any plans to attack North
Korea, consistently saying it is seeking a diplomatic and political solution to the increasing tensions sparked by
Pyongyang's decision to reactivate its nuclear program. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on Tuesday wrapped up a
four-day tour of Japan, China and South Korea during which he lobbied Asian leaders to support a multi-lateral approach to
pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Powell repeated the U.S. position that it had no intention of
invading North Korea and had no plans to impose fresh economic sanctions on the impoverished communist nation. While
Japan and South Korea indicated they might support a regional initiative to sway Pyongyang, China -- a key ally and aid
donor to the North -- appeared to remain unconvinced. China says the United States must deal with Pyongyang equally on a
one-to-one basis. "We believe diplomatic, political pressure still has a role to play. And there are countries who have
considerable influence with the North Koreans who will continue to apply pressure," Powell said Tuesday. "We also made it
clear that if they begin reprocessing (nuclear material), it changes the entire political landscape. And we're making sure that
is communicated to them in a number of channels." Powell would not be drawn on how would Washington react if
Pyongyang did begin reprocessing but did say that the U.S. had "no intention of invading" North Korea. Tensions on the
peninsula have been ratcheting up over the past few weeks with North Korea becoming increasingly
provocative. On Monday, the North fired a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan, or East Sea, an act many believe
was designed to upstage the inauguration of new South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. ( Roh sworn in) Last week, a
North Korean MiG-19 fighter briefly flew into South Korean air space. (MiG incursion) The North has also
threatened to abandon the 1953 armistice that ended the fighting of the Korean War.
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Pakistan Collapse
Pakistan Collapse leads to nuclear war and nuclear terrorism
Brooks, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 2007
Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 7/2/2007 (Peter, BARACK'S BLUNDER
INVADE A NUCLEAR POWER?
http://www.nypost.com/seven/08022007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/baracks_blunder_opedcolumnists_peter_brookes.htm?page=2)
The fall of Musharraf's government might well lead to a takeover by pro-U.S. elements of the Pakistani military but other possible outcomes are extremely unpleasant, including the ascendance of Islamist factions. The last
thing we need is for Islamabad to fall to the extremists. That would exacerbate the problem of those
terrorist safe havens that Obama apparently thinks he could invade. And it would also put Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal into the wrong hands. That could lead to a number of nightmarish scenarios - a nuclear
war with India over Kashmir, say, or the use of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group against any number
of targets, including the United States.
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101
Sino-Russian Conflict
Sino Russian War leads to Extinction
Sharavin Head of the Institute for Political and military analysis 2001,
(Alexander Sharavin, head of the institute for political and military analysis, 10/1/2001 The Third Threat
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5470.html)
Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is
called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even
tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive
to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more
horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization
and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single
direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either).
Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out,
what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic
missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In
the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our
country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and
even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.
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102
Sunni/Shiite Conflict
A war between Sunnis and Shiites would spill over resulting in extinction
Hutson Correspondent for Renew America 2007
(Warner Todd Huston, Correspondent for Renew America, recently appeared 1/24/2007, Media: Bushs flawed portrayal of the
enemy in the State of the Union http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/huston/070124)
Once again, a National U.S. paper "arguably" chooses sides with Europe's interests over that of
America. Under Bush's rubric, a country such as Iran which enjoys diplomatic representation and
billions of dollars in trade wit major European countries is lumped together with al-Qaeda, the
terrorist group responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. "The Shia and Sunni extremists are different
faces of the same totalitarian threat," Bush said, referring to the different branches of the Muslim religion. Trade?
How is trade an assurance of the benevolence of any nation? Nations didn't stop trading with Nazi Germany even as Hitler
was Blitzkrieging through Europe, for instance. Even the USA was still trading with the Confederacy after the Civil War
had already begun. The fact that Europe is still trading with Iran as if everything is hunkeydorie does NOT say one word as
to the Iranian regime's status as a bunch of nice guys. Trade is one of the last things that is affected by war.
Business is business, after all. Further Bush did not "lump together" al-Qaeda and Iran as if they were
indistinguishable, as the Post seems to be claiming. Here is what Bush actually said: In recent times, it has also become
clear that we face an escalating danger from Shia extremists who are just as hostile to America, and are also determined to
dominate the Middle East. Many are known to take direction from the regime in Iran, which is funding and arming
terrorists like Hezbollah a group second only to al Qaeda in the American lives it has taken. The president said that the
Shia extremists in Iran are "second only to al Qaeda" among the enemies we face. He did not, however, say they were one
and the same. The Post's simple-minded efforts to make Bush himself look simple minded only makes the Post out to be
practicing partisan political demagogy. Bush's saying that Shia and Sunni extremism are only "different faces of the same
totalitarian threat" is not to say they are wholly the same, only that they share a similar end game: total domination over the
Middle East in the near term and the world in the long term. Using WWII as an example again, it would like
saying that the Nazis and the Japanese were indistinguishable merely because they both wanted to rule
the world. No one would make such an absurd claim. Yet both threatened our extinction. Just as both
Shia and Sunni extremism today threatens our interests and our way of life. Unfortunately, the Post seems to
see no threat from Iran in particular and Shia extremism in general. Perhaps no one let the Washington Post in on the badly
kept secret that Iran has been sending weapons, manpower, advisors and thousands of IEDs into Iraq to
attack us since the first day Saddam's hold over the country ended. Not to mention the constant threat
and rhetoric against us emanating from the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
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Russia-US
Russia-US conflict guarantees nuclear Armageddon nuclear stockpiles
Bostrom Professor of philosophy at Yale, 2002
(Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Yale. Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,
2002, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR.
An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that
might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal . There was a real worry among those best
acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might
annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization .[4] Russia and the US retain large
nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation , either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a
risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however tha t a smaller nuclear exchange,
between India and Pakistan for instance , is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankinds potential permanently.
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Taiwan/China War
China Taiwan War would draw in the US and lead to extinction
Straits Times 2000
[The Straits Times, No One Gains in War over Taiwan, 6/25/00, Lexis]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and
China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a fullscale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror
of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it
considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent
parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent,
Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as
opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia
may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly
upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear
arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to
General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the
US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War,
a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway
said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons.
If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope
of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses
about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the
nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non
first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for
Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the
government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders
considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign
intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.
There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem
inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
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Taiwan
Taiwan is the most probable scenario for nuclear war
Johnson President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, 2001
(Chalmers Johnson, President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, The Nation, 5/14/2k1 http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?
i=20010514&c=1&s=Johnson)
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US
militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the
overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US
warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains
the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a
war that no one wanted , a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a
conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and
probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be
defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear
holocaust. Since any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally would be viewed as a challenge to China's
sovereignty, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect. The United States uses
satellites to observe changes in China's basic military capabilities. But the coastal surveillance flights by our twelve (now
eleven) EP-3E Aries II spy planes, like the one that was forced down off Hainan Island, seek information that is useful only
in an imminent battle. They are inherently provocative and inappropriate when used to monitor a country with which we are
at peace. The United States itself maintains a 200-mile area off its coasts in which it intercepts any aircraft attempting
similar reconnaissance. America's provocative military posture in East Asia makes war with China more
likely because it legitimizes military strategies in both Beijing and Taipei as well as in Washington and
Tokyo.
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Terrorism Nuclear Escalation

Nuclear Terrorism leads to global nuclear war
Chesney, JD candidate at Harvard Law, 1997
(Robert, Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal, November)
The horrible truth is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, in light of the potential existence of a black
market in fissile material. Nuclear terrorists might issue demands, but then again, they might not. Their target could be
anything: a U.S. military base in a foreign land, a crowded U.S. city, or an empty stretch of desert
highway. In one fell swoop, nuclear terrorists could decapitate the U.S. government or destroy its
financial system. The human suffering resulting from a detonation would be beyond calculation, and in
the aftermath, the remains of the nation would demand both revenge and protection. Constitutional
liberties and values might never recover. When terrorists strike against societies already separated by fundamental
social fault lines, such as in Northern Ireland or Israel, conventional weapons can exploit those fault lines to achieve
significant gains. n1 In societies that lack such pre-existing fundamental divisions, however, conventional weapon attacks do
not pose a top priority threat to national security, even though the pain and suffering inflicted can be substantial. The
bedrock institutions of the United States will survive despite the destruction of federal offices; the vast majority of people
will continue to support the Constitution despite the mass murder of innocent persons. The consequences of terrorists
employing weapons of mass destruction, however, would be several orders of magnitude worse than a
conventional weapons attack. Although this threat includes chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapon's
devastating [*32] potential is in a class by itself. n2 Nuclear terrorism thus poses a unique danger to the
United States: through its sheer power to slay, destroy, and terrorize, a nuclear weapon would give
terrorists the otherwise-unavailable ability to bring the United States to its knees. Therefore, preventing
terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons should be considered an unparalleled national security
priority dominating other policy considerations.
Nuclear terrorism will cause global nuclear war, leading to extinction
Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian political analyst for the Al-Ahram newspaper, 2004:
(Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian political analyst for the Al-Ahram newspaper, Al-Ahram online, August 26,
2004,http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from
certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear
technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs
dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated.
This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the
course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of
a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD,
proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would
further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living.
Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human
rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It
would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is
imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This
could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war
which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When
nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
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Terror = Extinction
Terrorist attack risks extinction.
Alexander Prof and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies 3
(Yonah, Terrorism Myths and Realities, Washington Times, Prof and Director of Inter-University
For Terrorism Studies)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that
the
international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the
terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades
tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national
security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented
tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers.
Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism
triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of
intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements
(hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of
modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the
manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the
religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by
terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists
have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and
impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have
entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its
serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
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**NUKE WAR IMPACTS**
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Nuclear War Disease

Nuclear war collapses global infrastructure and causes mass disease pandemics
Sagan, Former Professor of Astronomy at Harvard University, 1985,
(Carl, The Nuclear Winter, http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/sagan_nuclear_winter.html)
In addition, the amount of radioactive fallout is much more than expected. Many previous calculations simply
ignored the intermediate time-scale fallout. That is, calculations were made for the prompt fallout -- the plumes of
radioactive debris blown downwind from each target-and for the long-term fallout, the fine radioactive particles lofted into
the stratosphere that would descend about a year later, after most of the radioactivity had decayed. However, the
radioactivity carried into the upper atmosphere (but not as high as the stratosphere) seems to have been largely forgotten.
We found for the baseline case that roughly 30 percent of the land at northern midlatitudes could receive a radioactive dose
greater than 250 rads, and that about 50 percent of northern midlatitudes could receive a dose greater than 100 rads. A 100rad dose is the equivalent of about 1000 medical X-rays. A 400-rad dose will, more likely than not, kill you. The cold,
the dark and the intense radioactivity, together lasting for months, represent a severe assault on our civilization
and our species. Civil and sanitary services would be wiped out. Medical facilities, drugs , the most
rudimentary means for relieving the vast human suffering, would be unavailable. Any but the most elaborate
shelters would be useless, quite apart from the question of what good it might be to emerge a few months later.
Synthetics burned in the destruction of the cities would produce a wide variety of toxic gases, including carbon
monoxide, cyanides, dioxins and furans. After the dust and soot settled out, the solar ultraviolet flux would
be much larger than its present value. Immunity to disease would decline. Epidemics and pandemics
would be rampant, especially after the billion or so unburied bodies began to thaw . Moreover, the
combined influence of these severe and simultaneous stresses on life are likely to produce even more
adverse consequences -- biologists call them synergisms -- that we are not yet wise enough to foresee.
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Nuclear War Extinction

Nuke war is the highest risk for human extinction
Kateb 1992
(George, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture, Thinking About Human Extinction (1): Nuclear Weapons and Individual Rights, p. 111-112)
Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous, an acknowledgment
hat the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational
or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in
a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of
extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility-a genuine possibility-as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that
contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's
perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if
we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse
must vividly register that distinctiveness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one
can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of
nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss
signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly
put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several . Most obviously, a
sizable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to the earth's uninhabitability, to
"nuclear winter," or to Schell's "republic of insects and grass." But the consideration of extinction cannot rest with the
possibility of a sizable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizable exchange must not
take place. A so-called tactical or "theater" use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the
possibility of immediate escalation into a sizable exchange or because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the
possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than
one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect on nonnuclear powers who may feel
compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by
increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not
acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counted on to seek expression later. Other than full strategic uses are
not confined, no matter how small the explosive power: each would be a cancerous transformation of the world. All nuclear
roads lead to the possibility of extinction. It is true by definition, but let us make it explicit: the doctrine of no-use excludes
any first or retaliatory or later use, whether sizable or not. No-use is the imperative derived from the possibility of
extinction. By containing the possibility of extinction, any use is tantamount to a declaration of war against humanity. It is
not merely a war crime or a single crime against humanity. Such a war is waged by the user of nuclear weapons against
every human individual as individual (present and future), not as citizen of this or that country. It is not only a war against
the country that is the target. To respond with nuclear weapons, where possible, only increases the chances of extinction and
can never, therefore, be allowed. The use of nuclear weapons establishes the right of any person or group, acting officially
or not, violently or not, to try to punish those responsible for the use. The aim of the punishment is to deter later uses and
thus to try to reduce the possibility of extinction, if, by chance, the particular use in question did not directly lead to
extinction. The form of the punishment cannot be specified. Of course the chaos ensuing from a sizable exchange could
make punishment irrelevant. The important point, however, is to see that those who use nuclear weapons are qualitatively
worse than criminals, and at the least forfeit their offices. John Locke, a principal individualist political theorist, says that
in a state of nature every individual retains the right to punish transgressors or assist in the effort to punish them, whether or
not one is a direct victim. Transgressors convert an otherwise tolerable condition into a state of nature which is a state of
war in which all are threatened. Analogously, the use of nuclear weapons, by containing in an immediate or delayed manner
the possibility of extinction, is in Locke's phrase "a trespass against the whole species" and places the users in a state of war
with all people. And people, the accumulation of individuals, must be understood as of course always indefeasibly retaining
the right of selfpreservation, and hence as morally allowed, perhaps enjoined, to take the appropriate preserving steps.
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Nuclear War Pollution

Nuclear arms race would cause pollution and destroy the environment
Sierra Club, 2003
The looting of Iraqi nuclear facilities in 2003, which occurred after U.S. led forces entered the country, has offered another
blow to social and environmental security in the region. The most troubling of cases concerns the Tuwaitha nuclear plant,
located 48 kilometres south of Baghdad, where an estimated two hundred blue plastic barrels containing uranium oxide
were stolen. After dumping the radioactive contents and rinsing out the barrels in the rivers, poverty-stricken residents used
the containers for storing basic amenities like water, cooking oil and tomatoes. Extra barrels were sold to other villages or
used to transport milk to distanced regions, thus making the critical problem increasingly widespread.[22] The mishandling
of the radioactive material has profound effects on the environment and on the people and animals that depend on it. Toxic
substances seep into the ground (rendering the soil unsafe), disperse through the air (spreading wide-scale pollution), and
taint water and food supplies. Iraqs national nuclear inspector has forecasted that over a thousand people could die of
leukemia.[23] In addition to stolen radiological materials, computers and important documents have also gone missing.[24]
Given the right mix of technology and materials, radiological weapons such as dirty bombs and possibly even weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) could be produced. It is worth noting that uranium oxide can be refined with the proper
machinery and expertise in order to produce enriched uranium, a key ingredient in a nuclear bomb.[25] There is concern
that such materials could end up in the hands of the very terrorist groups the US and UK military are trying to disable. [26]
Unfortunately the coalition forces inability to effectively secure nuclear sites in Iraq may well have exacerbated the
situation the war was supposed to avoid: the unlawful proliferation and use of WMD weapons.
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Nuclear War Phytoplankton Scenario

A.) Nuclear war produces aerosol spikes killing phytoplankton
Crutzen and Birks 83
(Paul, Director of the Air Chemistry Division of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry, and John, Associate Professor of Chemistry and Fellow of the Cooperative
Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, in The Aftermath: The Human and Ecological Consequences of Nuclear War, ed. Peterson, p.84)
If the production of aerosol by fires is large enough to cause reductions in the penetration of sunlight to
ground level by a factor of a hundred, which would be quite possible in the event of an all-out nuclear war, most of
the phytoplankton and herbivorous zooplankton in more than half of the Northern Hemisphere oceans would
die (36). This effect is due to the fast consumption rate of phytoplankton by zooplankton in the oceans. The
effects of a darkening of such a magnitude have been discussed recently in connection with the probable
occurrence of such an event as a result of the impact of a large extraterrestrial body with the earth (37). This
event is believed by many to have caused the widespread and massive extinctions which took place at the
Cretacious-Tertiary boundary about 65 million years ago.
B.) Phytoplankton depletion collapses the global carbon cycle causing extinction
Bryant 03
(Donald, Professor of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at Penn State, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, The beauty in small things revealed,
Volume 100, Number 17, August 19, http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/100/17/9647)
Oxygenic photosynthesis accounts for nearly all the primary biochemical production of organic matter on
Earth. The byproduct of this process, oxygen, facilitated the evolution of complex eukaryotes and supports
their/our continuing existence. Because macroscopic plants are responsible for most terrestrial photosynthesis, it is
relatively easy to appreciate the importance of photosynthesis on land when one views the lush green diversity of
grasslands or forests. However, Earth is the "blue planet," and oceans cover nearly 75% of its surface. All
life on Earth equally depends on the photosynthesis that occurs in Earth's oceans. A rich diversity of
marine phytoplankton, found in the upper 100 m of oceans, accounts only for 1% of the total photosynthetic
biomass, but this virtually invisible forest accounts for nearly 50% of the net primary productivity of
the biosphere (1). Moreover, the importance of these organisms in the biological pump, which traps CO2 from the
atmosphere and stores it in the deep sea, is increasingly recognized as a major component of the global
geochemical carbon cycle (2). It seems obvious that it is as important to understand marine photosynthesis as
terrestrial photosynthesis, but the contribution of marine photosynthesis to the global carbon cycle was
grossly underestimated until recently. Satellite-based remote sensing (e.g., NASA sea-wide field sensor) has allowed
more reliable determinations of oceanic photosynthetic productivity to be made (refs. 1 and 2; see Fig. 1).
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Nuclear War Ozone Scenario

A). Nuclear war causes massive ozone depletion
Sagan and Turco 90
(Carl, David Duncan Professor of Astronomy and Space Sciences at Cornell, and Richard, Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at UCLA, A Path Where No Man
Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race, p. 57)
But in a nuclear war, the atmosphere would be so perturbed that our normal way of thinking about the ozone
layer needs to be modified. To help refocus our understanding, several research groups have constructed models
that describe the ozone layer following nuclear war . The principal work has been carried out by research teams at
the National Center for Atmospheric Research and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (ref. 4.9). Both find that there is
an additional mechanism by which nuclear war threatens the ozone layer. With massive quantities of smoke injected
into the lower atmosphere by the fires of nuclear war, nuclear winter would grip not only the Earth's surface, but the
high ozone layer as well. The severely disturbed wind currents caused by solar heating of smoke would, in
a matter of weeks, sweep most of the ozone layer from the northern midlatitudes deep into the Southern Hemisphere.
The reduction in the ozone layer content in the North could reach a devastating 50% or more during this phase.
As time progressed, the ozone depletion would be made still worse by several effects: injection of large
quantities of nitrogen oxides and chlorine-bearing molecules along with the smoke clouds; heating of the
ozone layer caused by intermingling of hot smoky air (as air is heated, the amount of ozone declines); and
decomposition of ozone directly on smoke particles (carbon particles are sometimes used down here near the ground
to cleanse air of ozone).
B). Ozone depletion causes extinction

Greenpeace 95
(Full of Homes: The Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer, http://archive.greenpeace.org/ozone/holes/holebg.html)
When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer
depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of
credible scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all
from harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist.
Exposure to increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system
suppression in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems . This is why Rowland's and
Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.
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Nuke War Oceans

Nuclear war would result in the death of the entire ocean ecosystem
Perkins, professor of effects of nuclear war, 01
(Simon Perkins, professor in the effects of nuclear war, May 22, 2001, Climate Conditions
http://www.compsoc.man.ac.uk/~samp/nuclearage/lonterm.html )
Assuming that you have been lucky enough to survive the initial hazards of a nuclear explosion what would happen next?
Above ground zero the huge clouds of dust and debris will rise to 10 miles into the atmosphere. When merged
together these clouds will effectively block out all sunlight plunging the sky into darkness for at least
several weeks after. During this period the temperature will fall dramatically. Along the continent this could be as
much as a 40c drop. For counties along the Northern Hemisphere this is enough produce an Arctic winter. Fortunately for
us small islands like the UK will have a less dramatic temperature decrease due tot he warming effect of the oceans.
Looking at some past examples of volcanic eruptions can give us some idea of biological effects; the severe cold would
destroy most crops, rivers would freeze over and many animals would die of cold and hunger. The effect on
tropical plants and creatures would be even more profound and biologists have concluded that many species will
become extinct. Surely most of the plants and animals in the deep oceans would have a better chance? The average drop
in the world's oceans would be only about 1 C 3 and as most species are acclimatised to the cold conditions anyway. This
would be the case in the Artic regions were species are used to long dark periods but for those in tropical waters most
would die from lack of nutrients and light. The lack of light would disrupt the food chain of microscopic
creatures dependent of photoplankton (algae). Within a few months all the fish would die off , the
population decline for many species would be irreversible.
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Nuclear War Biodiversity Scenario (1/2)

A). Nuclear winter following exchange kills all plant and animal life
SGR 03
(Scientists for Global Responsibility, Newsletter, Does anybody remember the Nuclear Winter? July 27, http://www.sgr.org.uk/climate/NuclearWinter_NL27.htm)
Obviously, when a nuclear bomb hits a target, it causes a massive amount of devastation, with the heat, blast and
radiation killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people instantly and causing huge damage to
infrastructure. But in addition to this, a nuclear explosion throws up massive amounts of dust and smoke. For
example, a large nuclear bomb bursting at ground level would throw up about a million tonnes of dust. As a consequence of
a nuclear war, then, the dust and the smoke produced would block out a large fraction of the sunlight and the
sun's heat from the earth's surface, so it would quickly become be dark and cold - temperatures would drop
by something in the region of 10-20C - many places would feel like they were in an arctic winter. It would take months
for the sunlight to get back to near normal. The drop in light and temperature would quickly kill crops and other
plant and animal life while humans, already suffering from the direct effects of the war, would be vulnerable
to malnutrition and disease on a massive scale.
B). We have high probability degree changes devastate entire ecosystems risking extinction
Sagan and Turco, 1990
(Carl and Richard, astrophysicist and astronomer at Cornell University, and founding director of UCLA's Institute of the Environment, A Path Where No Man
Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race, pg 22)
Life on Earth is exquisitely dependent on the climate (see Appendix A). The average surface temperature of the
Earth averaged, that is, over day and night, over the seasons, over latitude, over land and ocean, over coastline and
continental interior, over mountain range and desertis about 13C, 13 Centigrade degrees above the temperature at which
fresh water freezes. (The corresponding temperature on the Fahrenheit scale is 55F.) It's harder to change the temperature
of the oceans than of the continents, which is why ocean temperatures are much more steadfast over the diurnal and
seasonal cycles than are the temperatures in the middle of large continents. Any global temperature change implies
much larger local temperature changes, if you don't live near the ocean. A prolonged global temperature drop of a
few degrees C would be a disaster for agriculture; by 10C, whole ecosystems would be imperiled; and
by 20C, almost all life on Earth would be at risk. The margin of safety is thin.
C) Nuclear war collapses ecosystems and kills all biodiversity
Ehrlich et al, 1983
(Paul R. Ehrlich, Stanford University; Mark A. Harwell, Cornell University; Carl Sagan, Cornell University; Anne H. Ehrlich, Stanford University; Stephen J. Gould,
Harvard University; biologists on the Long-Term Worldwide Biological Consequences of Nuclear War (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 25 and 26 April 1983)., Science,
New Series, Vol. 22, No. 4630, Dec. 23, 1983, pg 1293-1300, jstor)
The 2 billion to 3 billion survivors of the immediate effects of the war would be forced to turn to natural ecosystems
as organized agriculture failed. Just at the time when these natural ecosystems would be asked to support a human
population well beyond their carrying capacities, the normal functioning of the ecosystems themselves would be
severely curtailed by the effects of nuclear war. Subjecting these ecosystems to low temperature, fire, radiation,
storm, and other physical stresses (many occurring simultaneously) would result in their increased vulnerability to disease
and pest outbreaks, which might be prolonged. Primary productivity would be dramatically reduced at the prevailing low
light levels; and, because of UV-B, smog, insects, radiation, and other damage to plants, it is unlikely that it would recover
quickly to normal levels, even after light and temperature values had recovered. At the same time that their plant foods were
being limited severely, most, if not all, of the vertebrates not killed outright by blast and ionizing radiation would either
freeze or face a dark world where they would starve or die of thirst because surface waters would be frozen and thus
unavailable. Many of the survivors would be widely scattered and often sick, leading to the slightly delayed extinction of
many additional species. Natural ecosystems provide civilization with a variety of crucial services in addition to food and
shelter. These include regulation of atmospheric composition, moderation of climate and weather, regulation of the
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Nuclear War Biodiversity Scenario (2/2)

hydrologic cycle, generation and preservation of soils, degradation of wastes, and recycling of nutrients. From the human
perspective, among the most important roles of ecosystems are their direct role in providing food and their maintenance of a
vast library of species from which Homo sapiens has already drawn the basis of civilization (27). Accelerated loss of these
genetic resources through extinction would be one of the most serious potential consequences of nuclear war. Wildfires
would be an important effect in north temperate ecosystems, their scale and distribution depending on such factors as the
nuclear war scenario and the season. Another major uncertainty is the extent of fire storms, which might heat the lower
levels of the soil enough to damage or destroy seed banks, especially in vegetation types not adapted to periodic fires.
Multiple airbursts over seasonally dry areas such as California in the late summer or early fall could burn off much of the
state's forest and brush areas, leading to catastrophic flooding and erosion during the next rainy season. Silting, toxic
runoff, and rainout of radio- nuclides could kill much of the fauna of fresh and coastal waters, and
concentrated radioactivity levels in surviving filter-feeding shellfish populations could make them dangerous to consume
for long periods of time. Other major consequences for terrestrial ecosystems resulting from nuclear war would include: (i)
slower detoxification of air and water as a secondary result of damage to plants that now are important metabolic sinks for
toxins; (ii) reduced evapotranspiration by plants contributing to a lower rate of entry of water into the atmosphere,
especially over continental regions, and therefore a more sluggish hydrologic cycle; and (iii) great disturbance of the soil
surface, leading to accelerated erosion and, probably, major dust storms (28). Revegetation might superficially resemble
that which follows local fires. Stresses from radiation, smog, erosion, fugitive dust, and toxic rains, however,
would be superimposed on those of cold and darkness, thus delaying and modifying postwar succession in ways that would
retard the restoration of ecosystem services (29). It is likely that most ecosystem changes would be short term. Some
structural and functional changes, however, could be longer term, and perhaps irreversible, as ecosystems undergo
qualitative changes to alternative stable states (30). Soil losses from erosion would be serious in areas experiencing
widespread fires, plant death, and extremes of climate. Much would depend on the wind and precipitation patterns that
would develop during the first postwar year (4, 5). The diversity of many natural communities would almost certainly
be substantially reduced, and numerous species of plants, animals, and microorganisms would become
extinct.
D). Biodiversity collapse causes extinction
Diner Judge Advocate Generals Corps-1994
[Major David N., United States Army Military Law Review Winter, p. lexis]
By causing widespread extinctions,
humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases,

so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are
relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction , with all its dimly
perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases
the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, n80 mankind
may be edging closer to the abyss.
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**NUKE WAR PROBABILITY**
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Nuclear War Evaluated First

Nuclear war precedes all ethics
Nye, Harvard Professor, 86
Joseph Nye, prof. of IR at Harvard University, 1986 Nuclear Ethics, p. 24
This leads us to the last and most difficult problem with nuclear weapons: that they risk nuclear holocaust. This holocaust
is a case of extreme (excessive?) violence, since it may very well entail the end of all human civilization as well as the
destruction of numerous other forms of life (probably everything except cockroaches). It is difficult to see how such a war
can be viewed as following St. Augustine's just war standard of creating peace. Even outside the precepts of just war, it is
hard to see the utilitarian aspects of such a war. It is extremely hard to defend as a step towards ultimate good, unless
you believe that the world needs to be completely destroyed and started anew.
Since nuclear holocaust is a
combination of massive destruction and residual effects, possibly including the remaking of all life on the planet through
genetic mutations and nuclear winter, it is essentially just an extension, albeit extreme, of the combination of excessive
violence and residual effects. Since our earlier analysis of these two areas failed to provide an ethical framework for either
of them even in isolation, we shall not even begin to try to defend their combination, nuclear holocaust, as ethically
acceptable.
Nuclear war is the end of all ethics

Nye, Harvard Professor, 86
Joseph Nye, prof. of IR at Harvard University, 1986 Nuclear Ethics, p. 24
The first of these ethical points is rather simple: if the intent of the overall war is ethically unsound, then the use of any
weapons in such a cause is wrong, be they clubs or nuclear missiles. This fact does not let us differentiate ethically between nuclear
and non-nuclear arms, but merely returns us to a basis for our original assumption that war can be just. This point does bear on the
ethicality of all- out nuclear war, however, since although the announced intent of the war may be to save the earth from the yoke of
Communism or Imperialism, the actual end of the war would probably be a silent, smoking planet. Each of us must draw our own
conclusions as to the ethicality of such an action, based on our own cultural, religious, political, and ethical backgrounds. But it is an
old ethical axiom that no right action aims at greater evil in the results, and my personal feelings on all out war is that there is no
provocation that can ethically support such devastation.9 In the eloquent words of John Bennett, "How can a nation live with its
conscience and . . . kill twenty million children in another nation . . .?"10
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Schell
Extinction from nuclear war dwarfs all other impact calculus you must treat the RISK of extinction as
morally equivalent to its certainty
Schell, 82
Jonathan Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96 1982
To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation just as it would be a
misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If
one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the
ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient
enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that
mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to
calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a
holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet
unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished.
We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our
species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be
jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the
species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known,
thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human
species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international
agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end
for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass of "the basic power of the universe" and of a means by which man
could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this
power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction
has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for
the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species
crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually
having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with
some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have
entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a
significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we
make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within
the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss
in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless,
eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular
transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of
extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other
words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the
game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically
speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about
extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of
nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the
fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a
mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our
humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to
withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.
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Nuclear War Likely

With all the problems that the status quo presents a nuclear war will defiantly happen but with so many
nuclear countries we cannot find out where it will start.
Hirsch 05 [Jorge, Ph.D. @ Univ. of Chicago, professor of physics at Cal, member of the American Physical Society, a society of
physicists opposed to the use of nuclear weapons, Dec. 16, 2005, Nuclear Deployment for an Attack on Iran
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8263]
The nuclear hitmen: Stephen Hadley, Stephen Cambone, Robert Joseph, William Schneider Jr., J.D. Crouch II, Linton
Brooks, and John Bolton are nuclear-weapons enthusiasts who advocate aggressive policies and occupy key positions in the
top echelons of the Bush administration. A nuclear doctrine that advocates nuclear strikes against non-nuclear
countries that precisely fit the Iran profile: the "Nuclear Posture Review" and the "Doctrine for Joint
Nuclear Operations." The doctrine of preemptive attack adopted by the Bush administration and
already put into practice in Iraq, and the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
(NSPD 17), which promises to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons. 150,000 American
soldiers in Iraq, whose lives are at risk if a military confrontation with Iran erupts, and who thus
provide the administration with a strong argument for the use of nuclear weapons to defend them.
Americans' heightened state of fear of terrorist attacks and their apparent willingness to support any
course of action that could potentially protect them from real or imagined terrorist threats. The allegations
of involvement of Iran in terrorist activities around the world [1], [2], including acts against America [1], [2], and its alleged
possession of weapons of mass destruction. The determination of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission that Iran has
connections with al-Qaeda. Senate Joint Resolution 23, "Authorization for Use of Military Force,"
which allows the president "to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United
States" without consulting Congress, and the War Powers Resolution [.pdf], which "allows" the
president to attack anybody in the "global war on terror." The Bush administration's willingness to use military
power based on unconfirmed intelligence and defectors' fairy tales. The fact that Iran has been declared in noncompliance
[.pdf] with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which makes it "legal" for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against Iran.
The course of action followed by the Bush administration with respect to Iran's drive for nuclear technology, which can
only lead to a diplomatic impasse. The Israel factor [1], [2] .
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Nuclear War Likely Escalation

Mutually assured destruction insures a quick escalation of a nuclear war hence leading to all out
destruction.
Nuclear Files 2009, Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Project.
(Mutually Assured Destruction, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategymutual-assured-destruction.htm)
When the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United States, the Cold War had entered a new phase. The cold war
became a conflict more dangerous and unmanageable than anything Americans had faced before. In the old cold war
Americans had enjoyed superior nuclear force, an unchallenged economy, strong alliances, and a trusted Imperial President
to direct his incredible power against the Soviets. In the new cold war, however, Russian forces achieved nuclear equality.
Each side could destroy the other many times. This fact was officially accepted in a military doctrine known as
Mutual Assured Destruction, a.k.a. MAD. Mutual Assured Destruction began to emerge at the end of
the Kennedy administration. MAD reflects the idea that one's population could best be protected by
leaving it vulnerable so long as the other side faced comparable vulnerabilities. In short: Whoever
shoots first, dies second.
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Nuclear War Likely Middle East Prolif

The Arms Race in the Middle East is creating a breeding ground for a chance of a nuclear war. Nuclear
war is guaranteed if the status quo continues.
Cirincione, 8/21/2007
[Joseph, "The Middle East Nuclear Surge," http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/nuclear_surge.html]
Iran is still probably five to 10 years away from gaining the ability to make nuclear fuel or nuclear bombs. But its
program is already sending nuclear ripples through the Middle East. The race to match Iran's capabilities has begun.
Almost a dozen Muslim nations have declared their interest in nuclear energy programs in the past year. This
unprecedented demand for nuclear programs is all the more disturbing paired with the unseemly rush of nuclear salesman eager to
supply the coveted technology. While U.S. officials were reaching a new nuclear agreement with India last month, President Nicolas
Sarkozy of France signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Libya and agreed to help the United Arab Emirates
launch its own civilian nuclear program. Indicating that this could be just the beginning of a major sale and
supply effort, Sarkozy declared that the West should trust Arab states with nuclear technology. Sarkozy has a point:
No one can deny Arab states access to nuclear technology, especially as they are acquiring it under existing international rules and
agreeing to the inspection of International Atomic Energy Agency officials. But is this really about meeting demands for electric
power and desalinization plants? There is only one nuclear power reactor in the entire Middle Eastthe one under construction in
Busher, Iran. In all of Africa there are only two, both in South Africa. (Israel has a research reactor near Dimona, as do several other
states.) Suddenly, after multiple energy crises over the 60 years of the nuclear age, these countries that control
over one-fourth of the world's oil supplies are investing in nuclear power programs. This is not about energy; it
is a nuclear hedge against Iran. King Adbdullah of Jordan admitted as much in a January 2007 interview when he said: "The
rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region. . . . After this summer everybody's going for nuclear
programs." He was referring to the war in Lebanon last year between Israel and Hezbollah, perceived in the
region as evidence of Iran's growing clout. Other leaders are not as frank in public, but confide similar sentiments in private
conversations. Here is where the nuclear surge currently stands. Egypt and Turkey, two of Iran's main rivals, are in
the lead. Both have flirted with nuclear weapons programs in the past and both have announced ambitious plans
for the construction of new power reactors. Gamal Mubarak, son of the current Egyptian president and his likely
successor, says the country will build four power reactors, with the first to be completed within the next 10
years. Turkey will build three new reactors, with the first beginning later this year. Not to be outdone, Saudi Arabia and the five other
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) at the end of 2006
"commissioned a joint study on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." Algeria and Russia quickly signed an agreement
on nuclear development in January 2007, with France, South Korea, China, and the United States also jockeying for nuclear sales to
this oil state. Jordan announced that it, too, wants nuclear power. King Abdullah met Canada's prime minister in July and discussed the
purchase of heavy water Candu reactors. Morocco wants assistance from the atomic energy agency to acquire nuclear
technology and in March sponsored an international conference on Physics and Technology of Nuclear
Reactors. Finally, the Arab League has provided an overall umbrella for these initiatives when, at the end of its
summit meeting in March, it "called on the Arab states to expand the use of peaceful nuclear technology in all
domains serving continuous development." Perhaps these states are truly motivated to join the "nuclear
renaissance" promoted by the nuclear power industry and a desire to counter global warming. But the main message
to the West from these moderate Arab and Muslim leaders is political, not industrial. "We can't trust you," they are saying, "You are
failing to contain Iran and we need to prepare." It is not too late to prove them wrong. Instead of seeing this nuclear surge as a new
market, the countries with nuclear technology to sell have a moral and strategic obligation to ensure that their business does not result
in the Middle East going from a region with one nuclear weapon state - Israel - to one with three, four, or five nuclear nations. If the
existing territorial, ethnic, and political disputes continue unresolved, this is a recipe for nuclear war.
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Great Power War Likely

Great power wars are not obsolete and are still on the table
Professor John J. Mearsheimer (1998-99 Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; R. Wendell Harrison
Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago) CFR February 25, 1999
http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/index.html
Now I think the central claim thats on the table is wrong-headed, and let me tell you why. First of all, there are a number of good
reasons why great powers in the system will think seriously about going to war in the future, and Ill give you three of them and
try and illustrate some cases. First, states oftentimes compete for economic resources. Is it hard to imagine a situation where a
reconstituted Russia gets into a war with the United States and the Persian Gulf over Gulf oil? I dont think thats implausible. Is it
hard to imagine Japan and China getting into a war in the South China Sea over economic resources? I dont find that hard to imagine.
A second reason that states go to war which, of course, is dear to the heart of realists like me, and thats to enhance their security.
Take the United States out of Europe, put the Germans on their own; you got the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other,
and in between a huge buffer zone called eastern or central Europe. Call it what you want. Is it impossible to imagine the Russians and
the Germans getting into a fight over control of that vacuum? Highly likely, no, but feasible, for sure. Is it hard to imagine Japan and
China getting into a war over the South China Sea, not for resource reasons but because Japanese sea-lines of communication run
through there and a huge Chinese navy may threaten it? I dont think its impossible to imagine that.
What about nationalism, a third reason? China, fighting in the United States over Taiwan? You think thats impossible? I dont
think thats impossible. Thats a scenario that makes me very nervous. I can figure out all sorts of ways, none of which are highly
likely, that the Chinese and the Americans end up shooting at each other. It doesnt necessarily have to be World War III, but it is
great-power war. Chinese and Russians fighting each other over Siberia? As many of you know, there are huge numbers of Chinese
going into Siberia. You start mixing ethnic populations in most areas of the world outside the United States and its usually a
prescription for big trouble. Again, not highly likely, but possible. I could go on and on, positing a lot of scenarios where great
powers have good reasons to go to war against other great powers.
Mandlebaum flows neg he concedes that great power war is still likely with
Russia and China
Michael Mandelbaum, American foreign policy professor at the Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 1999 Is Major War Obsolete?, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/
Now having made the case for the obsolescence of modern war, I must note that there are two major question marks hanging
over it: Russia and China. These are great powers capable of initiating and waging major wars, and in these two countries, the
forces of warlessness that I have identified are far less powerful and pervasive than they are in the industrial West and in Japan. These
are countries, in political terms, in transition, and the political forms and political culture they eventually will have is unclear.
Moreover, each harbors within its politics a potential cause of war that goes with the grain of the post-Cold War period-with it, not
against it-a cause of war that enjoys a certain legitimacy even now; namely, irredentism.
War to reclaim lost or stolen territory has not been rendered obsolete in the way that the more traditional causes have. China
believes that Taiwan properly belongs to it. Russia could come to believe this about Ukraine, which means that the Taiwan Strait and
the Russian-Ukrainian border are the most dangerous spots on the planet, the places where World War III could begin.
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Nuke War Not Likely

Nuclear war wont escalate; the US could disarm any nuclear opponent before they could retaliate
Liber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Press Associate
Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania 2006
(Keir Liber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Press Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Spring 2006, International Security, The End of Mad The Nuclear dimension of US
Primacy http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.7)
For nearly half a century, the worlds most powerful nuclear-armed countries have been locked in a
military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet
Union possessed such large, welldispersed nuclear arsenals that neither state could entirely destroy the others nuclear
forces in a rst strike. Whether the scenario was a preemptive strike during a crisis, or a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack,
the victim would always be able to retaliate and destroy the aggressor. Nuclear war was therefore tantamount to mutual
suicide. Many scholars believe that the nuclear stalemate helped prevent conict between the superpowers during the Cold
War, and that it remains a powerful force for great power peace today.1 The age of MAD, however, is waning.
Today the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy vis--vis its plausible great
power adversaries. For the frst time in decades, it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear
arsenals of Russia or China with a nuclear first strike . A preemptive strike on an alerted Russian arsenal would
still likely fail, but a surprise attack at peacetime alert levels would have a reasonable chance of success.
Furthermore, the Chinese nuclear force is so vulnerable that it could be destroyed even if it were
alerted during a crisis.
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Nuke War Not Likely US Russia

A US first strike would cripple Russia, retaliation would be impossible
Liber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Press Associate
Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania 2006
(Keir Liber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Press Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Spring 2006, International Security, The End of Mad The Nuclear dimension of US
Primacy http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.7)
A critical issue for the outcome of a U.S. attack is the ability of Russia to launch on warning (i.e., quickly
launch a retaliatory strike before its forces are destroyed ). It is unlikely that Russia could do this. Russian
commanders would need 713 minutes to carry out the technical steps involved in identifying a U.S.
attack and launching their retaliatory forces. They would have to (1) confirm the sensor indications that an attack
was under way; (2) convey the news to political leaders; (3) communicate launch authorization and launch codes to the
nuclear forces; (4) execute launch sequences; and (5) allow the missiles to fly a safe distance from the silos. 38 This timeline
does not include the time required by Russian leaders to absorb the news that a nuclear attack is The End of MAD? 21
under way and decide to authorize retaliation. Given that both Russian and U.S. early warning systems have
had false alarms in the past, even a minimally prudent leader would need to think hard and ask tough
questions before authorizing a catastrophic nuclear response.39 Because the technical steps require 713
minutes, it is hard to imagine that Russia could detect an attack, decide to retaliate, and launch missiles
in less than 1015 minutes. The Russian early warning system would probably not give Russias
leaders the time they need to retaliate; in fact it is questionable whether it would give them any
warning at all. Stealthy B-2 bombers could likely penetrate Russian air defenses without detection .
Furthermore, low-flying B-52 bombers could fire stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles from outside
Russian airspace; these missilessmall, radar-absorbing, and flying at very low altitude would
likely provide no warning before detonation. Finally, Russias vulnerability is compounded by the poor
state of its early warning system. Russian satellites cannot reliably detect the launch of SLBM s; Russia
relies on groundbased radar to detect those warheads. 40 But there is a large east-facing hole in Russias radar
network; Russian leaders might have no warning of an SLBM attack from the Pacific.41 Even if Russia
plugged the east-facing hole in its radar network, its leaders would still have less than 10 minutes
warning of a U.S. submarine attack from the Atlantic, and perhaps no time if the U.S. attack began
with hundreds of stealthy cruise missiles and stealth bombers.
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Nuke War Not Likely Rising Costs
Major war is obsolete nuclear weapons and rising cost check aggression
Michael Mandelbaum, American foreign policy professor at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 1999 Is Major War Obsolete?, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons
to think that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I mean war waged by the most
powerful members of the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary
geopolitical consequences. There have been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I,
World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been,their consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most
influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So
if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, this
kind of war, is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on
which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, Major war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress
are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major war is
obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful,
even desirable, but that now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a
practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have
made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst. Why is this so? Most simply, the costs have risen and the benefits of major
war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this century of
nuclear weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom . As for the benefits, these now seem, at
least from the point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare are in retreat, if not
extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, as a paying
proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the
collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has
reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But the ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own, liberalism, tends to be pacific.
Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One
of these is the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this
eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldnt
go that far. I dont believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do
believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now its true that one important cause of
war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to
whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in
this country and the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to
have to prepare to defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that a post-Cold War
innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, common
security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably
produces by transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through
the principle of defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them more suitable for
defense and less for attack. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. Its not universal. It exists only
in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a
consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have
already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international
system that seems to me to lend itself to warlessness is the novel distinction between the periphery and the core, between the powerful
states and the less powerful ones. This was previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article
again, While for much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War,
with the industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there is no great-power conflict
into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be absorbed.
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Nuke War Not Likely Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence prevents great power
G John Ikenberry Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University The Rise of China and
the Future of the West Foreign Affairs January/February 2008 http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87102/g-johnikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west.html
The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate
rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing
the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising
power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism
of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.
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Nuke War Not Likely International System

The international system prevents wareconomic, military, and ideological
trends have changed.
Christopher Fettweiss, April prof security studies naval war college, Comparative Strategy 22.2 April 2003 p 109-129
Mackinder can be forgiven for failing to anticipate the titanic changes in the fundamental nature of the international system much
more readily than can his successors. Indeed, Mackinder and his contemporaries a century ago would hardly recognize the rules by
which the world is run todaymost significantly, unlike their era, ours is one in which the danger of major war has been
removed, where World War III is, in Michael Mandelbaums words, somewhere between impossible and unlikely.25 Geopolitical
and geo-strategic analysis has not yet come to terms with what may be the central, most significant trend of international politics:
great power war, major war of the kind that pit the strongest states against each other, is now obsolete.26 John Mueller has been
the most visible, but by no means the only, analyst arguing that the chances of a World War III emerging in the next century are next to
nil.27 Mueller and his contemporaries cite three major arguments supporting this revolutionary, and clearly controversial, claim.
First, and most obviously, modern military technology has made major war too expensive to contemplate. As John Keegan has
argued, it is hard to see how nuclear war could be considered an extension of politics by other meansat the very least, nuclear
weapons remove the possibility of victory from the calculations of the would-be aggressor.28 Their value as leverage in diplomacy has
not been dramatic, at least in the last few decades, because nuclear threats are not credible in the kind of disagreements that arise
between modern great powers. It is unlikely that a game of nuclear chicken would lead to the outbreak of a major war. Others
have argued that, while nuclear weapons surely make war an irrational exercise, the destructive power of modern conventional
weapons make todays great powers shy away from direct conflict.29 The world wars dramatically reinforced Angells warnings, and
today no one is eager to repeat those experiences, especially now that the casualty levels among both soldiers and civilians would be
even higher. Second, the shift from the industrial to the information age that seems to be gradually occurring in many
advanced societies has been accompanied by a new definition of power, and a new system of incentives which all but remove
the possibility that major war could ever be a cost-efficient exercise. The rapid economic evolution that is sweeping much of the
world, encapsulated in the globalization metaphor so fashionable in the media and business communities, has been accompanied by
an evolution in the way national wealth is accumulated.30 For millennia, territory was the main object of war because it was directly
related to national prestige and power. As early as 1986 Richard Rosecrance recognized that two worlds of international relations
were emerging, divided over the question of the utility of territorial conquest.31 The intervening years have served only to strengthen
the argument that the major industrial powers, quite unlike their less-developed neighbors, seem to have reached the revolutionary
conclusion that territory is not directly related to their national wealth and prestige. For these states, wealth and power are more likely
to derive from an increase in economic, rather than military, reach. National wealth and prestige, and therefore power, are no longer
directly related to territorial control.32 The economic incentives for war are therefore not as clear as they once may have been.
Increasingly, it seems that the most powerful states pursue prosperity rather than power. In Edward Luttwaks terminology, geopolitics
is slowly being replaced by geoeconomics, where the methods of commerce are displacing military methodswith disposable
capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of militarytechnical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons
and bases.33 Just as advances in weaponry have increased the
cost of fighting, a socioeconomic evolution has reduced the rewards that a major war could possibly bring. Angells major error was
one that has been repeated over and over again in the social sciences ever sincehe overestimated the rationality of humanity.
Angell recognized earlier than most that the industrialization of military technology and economic interdependence assured that the
costs of a European war would certainly outweigh any potential benefits, but he was not able to convince his contemporaries who
were not ready to give up the institution of war. The idea of war was still appealingthe normativecost/benefit analysis still tilted in
the favor of fighting, and that proved to be the more important factor. Today, there is reason to believe that this normative calculation
may have changed. After the war, Angell noted that the only things that could have prevented the war were surrendering of certain
dominations, a recasting of patriotic ideals, a revolution of ideas.34 The third and final argument of Angells successors is that today
such a revolution of ideas has occurred, that a normative evolution has caused a shift in the rules that govern state interaction. The
revolutionary potential of ideas should not be underestimated. Beliefs, ideologies, and ideas are often, as Dahl notes, a major
independent variable, which we ignore at our peril.35 Ideas, added John Mueller, are very often forces themselves, not flotsam on
the tide of broader social or economic patterns . . . it does not seem wise in this area to ignore phenomena that cannot be easily
measured, treated with crisp precision, or probed with deductive panache.36 The heart of this argument is the moral progress that
has brought a change in attitudes about international war among the great powers of the world,37 creating for the first time,
an almost universal sense that the deliberate launching of a war can no longer be justified.38 At times leaders of the past were
compelled by the masses to defend the national honor, but today popular pressures push for peaceful resolutions to disputes between
industrialized states. This normative shift has rendered war between great powers subrationally unthinkable, removed from
the set of options for policy makers, just as dueling is no longer a part of the set of options for the same classes for which it was once
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central to the concept of masculinity and honor. As Mueller explained, Dueling, a form of violence famed and fabled for centuries, is
avoided not merely because it has ceased to seem necessary, but because it has sunk from thought as a viable, conscious possibility.
You cant fight a duel if the idea of doing so never occurs to you or your opponent.39 By extension, states cannot fight wars if doing
so does not occur to them or to their opponent. As Angell discovered, the fact that major war was futile was not enough to bring about
its endpeople had to believe that it was futile. Angells successors suggest that such a belief now exists in the industrial (and
postindustrial) states of the world, and this autonomous power of ideas, to borrow Francis Fukuyamas term, has brought about the
end of major, great power war.40
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Nuke War Not Likely North Korea

North Korea wouldnt Use a nuclear weapon, to many complications
Quester, Professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, 2005
(George Quester, Professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, Spring 2005, Naval War College Review, If the
Nuclear Taboo gets broken, https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%20War%20College%20Review/2005/Article%20by%20Quester
%20Spring%202005.pdf)
history of successful nuclear deterrence suggests that nations have indeed

been in awe of nuclear weapons, have been deterred by the prospect of their use, even while they were
intent on deterring their adversaries as well. Would the nations that have been so successfully deterred
(sinceNagasaki) fromusing nuclear weapons not then be stopped in their tracks once deterrence had
failed, once the anticipated horror of the nuclear destruction of even a single city had been realized ?2
Another of the more probable scenarios has been a use of such weapons by North Korea , a state perhaps
Yet on the more positive note, the
not quite as undeterrable as the suicidal pilots of 11 September 2001 but given to rational calculations that are often very
difficult to sort out. This use could come in the form of a North Korean nuclear attack against Japan, South Korea, or even
the United States.3 The nearest targets for a North Korean nuclearweaponwould be South Korea and
Japan, but therewould be many complications should Pyongyang use such weapons against either.
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Nuke War Not Likely Pakistan

Nuclear Power plants have excellent security
CTC Sentinel, The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution
based in the Department of Social Sciences at the West Point, 2009
(CTC Sentinel, The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of
Social Sciences at the West Point, July 2009 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf)
Pakistan has established a robust set of measures to assure the security of its nuclear weapons. These
have been based on copying U.S. practices, procedures and technologies, and comprise : a) physical
security; b) personnel reliability programs; c) technical and procedural safeguards; and d) deception and
secrecy. These measures provide the Pakistan Armys Strategic Plans Division (SPD)which oversees nuclear weapons
operationsa high degree of confidence in the safety and security of the countrys nuclear weapons .2 In
terms of physical security, Pakistan operates a layered concept of concentric tiers of armed forces
personnel to guard nuclear weapons facilities, the use of physical barriers and intrusion detectors to
secure nuclear weapons facilities, the physical separation of warhead cores from their detonation
components, and the storage of the components in protected underground sites. With respect to personnel
reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers
from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from
which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support. Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. Personnel Reliability Program
(PRP) that screens individuals for Islamist sympathies, personality problems, drug use, inappropriate external affiliations, and sexual deviancy. 3
The army uses staff rotation and also operates a two-person rule under which no action, decision, or
activity involving a nuclear weapon can be undertaken by fewer than two persons .4 The purpose of this
policy is to reduce the risk of collusion with terrorists and to prevent nuclear weapons technology
getting transferred to the black market. In total, between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from the SPDs security division and from
Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence and Intelligence Bureau agencies are involved in the security
clearance and monitoring of those with nuclear weapons duties. 5 Despite formal command authority structures that cede a role to Pakistans
It imposes its executive

authority over the weapons through the use of an authenticating code system down through the
command chains that is intended to ensure that only authorized nuclear weapons activities and
operations occur. It operates a tightly controlled identification system to assure the identity of those involved in the nuclear chain of
command, and it also uses a rudimentary Permissive Action Link (PAL) type system to electronically lock its nuclear weapons. This system
uses technology similar to the banking industrys chip and pin to ensure that even if weapons fall
into terrorist hands they cannot be detonated .6 Finally, Pakistan makes extensive use of secrecy and
deception. Significant elements of Pakistans nuclear weapons infrastructure are kept a closely guarded
secret. This includes the precise location of some of the storage facilities for nuclear core and
detonation components, the location of preconfigured nuclear weapons crisis deployment sites, aspects
of the nuclear command and control arrangements ,7 and many aspects of the arrangements for nuclear safety and security
civilian leadership, in practice the Pakistan Army has complete control over the countrys nuclear weapons.
(such as the numbers of those removed under personnel reliability programs, the reasons for their removal, and how often authenticating and
enabling (PAL-type) codes are changed). In addition, Pakistan uses deceptionsuch as dummy missilesto complicate the calculus of
Taken together, these measures

provide confidence that the Pakistan Army can fully protect its nuclear weapons against the internal
terrorist threat, against its main adversary India, and against the suggestion that its nuclear weapons
could be either spirited out of the country by a third party (posited to be the United States) or destroyed in the
event of a deteriorating situation or a state collapse in Pakistan.
adversaries and is likely to have extended this practice to its nuclear weapons infrastructure.
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No Nuclear Terror
Nuclear Power plants have excellent security
Heaberlin Head of the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, managed by Battelle 2004,
(Scott W. Heaberlin Head of the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, managed by Battelle, A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity,, Battelle Press, 2004)
But, of course, airline crashes are not the only way for a terrorist to attack a nuclear power plant.
Truck bombs and armed attacks are certainly something to consider . It turns out that nuclear power plants
are one of the few facilities in our national infrastructure that does consider these things. Every U.S.
nuclear power plant has a trained armed security force who is authorized to use deadly force to protect the
plant. Not wanting to give any terrorists alternative ideas, but if I had a choice of going after a facility either totally
unprotected or protected with only a night watchman versus a facility with a team of military capable troopers armed with
automatic weapons, it would not be a tough choice. That is not to say these wackos are afraid to die. Clearly, they have
demonstrated that they are not. However, one would assume that they do want to have a reasonable chance of
successfully completing their vile mission. In that regard, a nuclear power plant would be a tough nut
to crack.
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The Nuclear Taboo is to strong to break, the longer we wait for a nuclear war the less likely it becomes
One often hears references to a taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, but people usually have
difficulty putting their finger on exactly what that means. A taboo surely is more than simply
something we want to avoid, something we disapprove of, for we do not hear of taboos on bank
robberies or on murder. A taboo, then, refers to something that we are not willing even to think about
doing, something about which we do not weigh benefits and costs but that we simply reject. The best
example in ordinary life is the taboo on incest. If a six-year-old girl asks whether she could marry her brother when they
grow up, her parents typically do not reason with her, perhaps suggesting, Your brother and you are always squabbling
about your toys; surely you can find someone else more compatible to marry.We instead respond simply,No one marries
their brother or sister! The child quickly enough picks up the signal that this is something that is simply not done. Another
such taboo is, of course, cannibalism. Air Force crews are briefed on hundreds of measures they can take to survive after a
crash, but one subject never touched upon is that of avoiding starvation by consuming the body of a dead comrade. The
entire question is just not thinkable . The taboo on nuclear weapons use that seems to have settled into place
over the nearly sixty years sinceNagasaki may indeed have taken this form.We do not hear many
discussions of the costs and benefits of a nuclear escalation, but a somewhat unthinking and
unchallenged conclusion that such escalation is simply out of the question . Related, though hardly identical,
is speculation as to whether a customary international law on the use of nuclear weapons may be said to have emerged,
by which the battlefield application of such weapons has become illegal without any international treaties being signed or
ratified, simply because they have gone so long unused.16 How such a custom or taboo is developed and what
happens to it when violated will play an important part in our assessment of what the world would be
like after a new nuclear attack. The fact that the nuclear taboo is not violated decade after decade, that
nuclear weapons are not used again in anger, arguably strengthens the taboo, but there are also a few ways in
which that state of affairs may endanger it. The reinforcement comes simply from the general sense that such an act must be
unthinkable because no one has initiated one for so long; it is in this sense that customary international lawis held to be
settling into place by which the abstinence of other states presses our own state to abstain. People did not begin speaking
about a nuclear taboo for a number of years after Nagasaki. It was only in the late 1950s, after more than a decade had
passed without repetition of the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the feeling arose that a barrier now existed to
treating nuclear weapons as just another weapon.17 But in time there will be hardly anyone alive who was a victim of the
1945 attacks, hardly anyone who remembers seeing the first photographs of their victims or who recalls the nuclear testing
programs of the 1950s and 1960s. Further, an unwelcome result of the bans on nuclear testing, intended to shield the
environment and discourage horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation, is that some of the perceived horror of such
weapons may be fading, so that ordinary human beings will be a little less primed to reject automatically the idea of such
weapons being used again. The only fair test of the long-term viability of the nuclear taboo would, of
course, be for the world to manage to keep that taboo observed and intact. The net trend, the net result,
of a prolongation of non-use is most probably that such non-use will be strengthened and renewed
thereby, just as it seems to have been over the decades of the Cold War and its aftermath. There have
been parallel taboos in other areas of warfare, taboos that have indeed been violated in the last
several decades. The world for many years sensed the development of such a taboo on chemical warfare; the effective
prohibition was reinforced by the Geneva Protocol but observed even by states that had not yet ratified the protocol (the
best example being the United States at its entry intoWorld War II). A similar taboolike aversion was thought to apply to
biological warfare.18 The long period since naval forces have confronted each other on the high seas (broken only by the
Argentine-British war over the Falklands) may have had some similar characteristics. The longer one goes without
engaging in some form of warfare, the stranger and less manageable that kind of conflict will seem,
and the more the public and others will regard it as simply not to be contemplated.
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Similarly, the worlds resistance to the proliferation of nuclear weapons has at times seemed to be
mobilizing a widespread popular feeling that a taboo or customary international lawwas developing
on proliferation as well. Ordinary people and even military professionals in many countries were
coming to assume that nuclear weapons were so horrible, and so different, that it simply made no sense
to think of even acquiring them..
If a nuclear weapon was use countries would rally against the nation preventing retaliation
This entire question might seem the more interesting at first to those who are pessimistic about future
risks and who might thus regard speculation about an end to the nuclear taboo as overdue . Yet, to repeat,
pessimism may not be necessary, since analysis of the likely consequences of nuclear escalation might
stimulate governments and publics to head it off. The chances are as good as three out of five that no
nuclear event will occur in the period up to the year 2045 that there is a better than even chance that the
world will be commemorating a full century, since Nagasaki, of the non-use of such weapons. But
analysts and ordinary citizens around the world to whom the author has put these odds typically dismiss themas too
optimistic. Indeed, the response has often been a bit bizarre, essentially that we have not been thinking
at all about the next use of nuclear weapons, but we think that you are too optimistic about such use being
avoided. Such responses in Israel, Sweden, Japan, or the United States might support the worry that people around the
world have simply been repressing an unpleasant reality, refusing to think about a very real danger. Yet the possibility
remains that the relative inattention is not simply a repression of reality but rather a manifestation of the unthinkableness of
nuclear weapons use One could also introduce another wedge of hope, that any such use of nuclear weapons
between now and 2045 would be followed by reactions and consequences that reinforced rather than
eroded the taboo. That would be the case if the world did not retreat in the face of such use but rallied
to punish it, and as a result the perpetrator did not advance its interests by such an escalation but
actually lost the battles and territories that were at issue.
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Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Programs at Brown Unviersity, 2005
(Nina Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Programs at Brown Unviersity, 2005, Stigmatizing the Bomb, International
Security 29.4 (2005) 5-49, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v029/29.4tannenwald.html#authbio)
The nuclear taboo, however, also has an intersubjective or a phenomenological aspect: it is a taboo
because people believe it to be. Political and military leaders themselves began using the term to refer to
this normative perception starting in the early 1950s, even when, objectively, a tradition of nonuse hardly existed. If actors
see the use of nuclear weapons as if it were a taboo, as their rhetoric suggests, then this could affect
their choices and behavior. In the words of sociologists William and Dorothy Thomas, "If men define situations
as real, they are real in their consequences ."18 This subjective (and intersubjective) sense of "taboo-ness" is
one of the factors that makes the tradition of nuclear nonuse a taboo rather than simply a norm .
Although one might be skeptical that this is just empty rhetoric, this belief is not entirely detached from
reality. Evidence for the taboo lies in discourse, institutions, and behavior. The most obvious evidence lies in
discoursethe way people talk and think about nuclear weaponsand how this has changed since 1945. This includes
public opinion, the diplomatic statements of governments and leaders, the resolutions of international
organizations, and the private moral concerns of individual decisionmakers. The discourse evidence is
supplemented both by international law and agreements that restrict freedomof action with respect to
nuclear weapons, and by the changing policies of states that downgrade the role of nuclear weapons
(e.g., shifts in NATO policy, he denuclearization of the army and marines, and the buildup of conventional alternatives). As
the inhibition on use has developed over time, it has taken on more taboo-like qualitiesunthinkingness and taken-forgrantedness. As a systemic phenomenon, the taboo exists at the collective level of the international
community (represented especially by the United Nations), but this need not mean that all countries have
internalized it to the same degree. As noted earlier, the taboo is a de facto, not a legal, norm. There is
no explicit international legal prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons such as exists for, say,
chemical weapons. Although resolutions passed in the UN General Assembly and other international
forums have repeatedly proclaimed the use of nuclear weapons as illegal, the United States and other
nuclear powers have consistently voted against these. U.S. legal analyses have repeatedly defended the legality
of use of nuclear weapons as long as it was for defensive and not aggressive purposes, as required by the UN charter. 19 As
the 1996 World Court advisory opinion on the issue confirmed, although increasing agreement exists that many, if not most,
uses of nuclear weapons are illegal under the traditional laws of armed conflict, there is by no means agreement that all uses
of nuclear weapons are illegal.20 Nevertheless, legal use has been gradually chipped away through incremental
restrictionsan array of treaties and regimes that together circumscribe the realm of legitimate nuclear
use and restrict freedom of action with respect to nuclear weapons. These agreements include nuclear
weapons-free zones, bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, and negative security
assurances (i.e., political declarations by the nuclear powers that they will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear
states that are members of the NPT). Together, these agreements enhance the normative presumption against
nuclear use. By multiplying the number of forums where a decision to use nuclear weapons would
have to be defended, they substantially increase the burden of proof for any such decisio n.21 Many of
these legal constraints have been incorporated into U.S. domestic practice, where they are reflected in constraints on
deployments and targeting, proliferation, arms control, and use. 22 Thus, while the legality of nuclear weapons
remains in dispute, the trend line of decreasing legitimacy and circumscribed legality is clear.
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Nuclear weapons wont be used even if its in their best interest
Paul, Professor of international relations at McGill University and Director of University of MontrealMcGill Research Group in International Security, 1995
(T.V. Paul, Professor of international relations at McGill University and Director of University of Montreal-McGill Research Group in
International Security, December 1995, Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, Vol. 39 No. 4)
These stringent definitions of social taboos may not be fully applicable in the nuclear context. However, the tradition of
nonuse has been characterized by many scholars as equivalent to a taboo (e.g., Hoffmann 1966,99; Schelling
1980, 260). In this context, the term taboo is used in its figurative and loose sense-as an unwritten and uncodified
prohibitionary norm against nuclear use. It is also used to the extent that both social and nuclear taboos are
based on the fear of consequences of a given course of action. The latter arose as a response to a
realization of the danger or the unforeseeable consequences involved in nuclear war. The analysis in this
article elaborates on the moral, normative, legal, and rational constraints involved in the use of nuclear weapons and their
possible role in the formation and evolution of the taboo U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially used the term
taboo to describe the prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons. On October 7, 1953, he was reported to have said:
"Somehow or other we must manage to remove the taboo from the use of these weapons" (quoted in Bundy 1988, 249).
Dulles was in favor of developing usable nuclear weapons to obtain the battlefield military objectives of the United States.
Schelling popularized the concept of a tradition of nonuse in his writings in the 1960s. In his words,
what makes atomic weapons different is a powerful tradition for their nonuse, "a jointly recognized
expectation that they may not be used in spite of declarations of readiness to use them, even in spite of
tactical advantages in their use" (Schelling 1980, 260). A tradition in this respect is based on a habit or
disposition that prevents the use of nuclear weapons as a serious option for consideration by decision
makers.3 As Schelling (1994, 110) argued, the main reason for the uniqueness of nuclear weapons is the
perception that they are unique and that once introduced into combat, they could not be "contained,
restrained, confined, or limited." Although prolonged conventional war can also cause somewhat
similar levels of destruction, the difference is in the perception of the impact. The swiftness with which
destruction can take place is the distinguishing point in this respect.4 Clearly, the nuclear taboo has developed
largely as a function of the awesome destructive power of atomic weapons. The potential for total
destruction gives nuclear weapons an all-or-nothing characteristic unlike any other weapon invented so
far, which, in turn, makes it imperative that the possessor will not use them against another state except
as a last-resort weapon. This means a nuclear state may not use its ultimate capability unless a threshold is crossed
(e.g., unless the survival of the state itself is threatened). Decision makers and the public at large in most nuclear-weapon
states believe that great danger is involved in the use of nuclear weapons with respect to casualties and aftereffects, in both
psychological and physical terms. Breaking the taboo could bring the revulsion of generations to come unless it were for an
issue of extremely vital importance-a situation that thus far has failed to materialize . Not surprisingly, nuclear states,
even when they could have received major tactical and strategic gains by using nuclear weapons, have
desisted from their use.
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Super Powers recognize the importance of not breaking the nuclear taboo, even the cold war wasnt
enough to prompt their use
The taboo has been observed by all nuclear and opaque-nuclear states thus far. Nations with different
ideological and political systems and military traditions-the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, China, India, and Israel-have found no occasion to use them, pointing toward the
emergence of a global "recognition that nuclear weapons are unusable across much of the range of
traditional military and political interests" (Russett 1989, 185). The American unwillingness to use them in
Korea and Vietnam to obtain military victory and the Soviet refrain from using them to avert defeat in
Afghanistan suggest the entrenchment of the taboo among the superpowers even during the peak of the
cold war period.5 The Chinese aversion to using them against the Vietnamese to obtain victory in the
1979 war also point out that other nuclear powers have observed the taboo . In the United States, the taboo
or the tradition of nonuse became well entrenched despite many urgings by military and political
leaders to break it during times of intense crises. It was observed in the 1950s and 1960s when the
United States could have gained major tactical and strategic objectives against its adversaries. Possibly, it
began with the revulsion and the fear that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks engendered in the consciousness of the
public and political leadership. Although the fear of nuclear weapons had been somewhat removed by the
end of the 1940s, with the Soviet attainment of nuclear and missile capability in the early 1960s, a
sense of renewed vulnerability began to creep into the American public perception (Malcolm- son 1990, 8,
35; Weart 1988). This sense of vulnerability, arising from the awareness that effective defenses against a
nuclear attack do not exist, may have contributed to the development of the nuclear taboo. The
Vietnam War saw the entrenchment of the tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons . In 1969, President
Nixon "could not make the nuclear threat in Vietnam that he believed he had seen Eisenhower use successfully in Korea"
(Bundy 1988, 587-8). Since then, each passing decade saw the strengthening of this tradition, and the
experience of over four decades "has more firmly established a de facto norm of non-use" (Russett 1989,
185). The Cuban missile crisis further showed the perils of a crisis spilling over to a possible nuclear war. The crisis
underlined the dangers of atomic posturing to the point of permanently discrediting this kind of atomic diplomacy (Bundy
1984, 50).6
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A nuclear victory would have to many consequences for their use
The taboo was also likely to have been strengthened by a rational calculation that military victory
following a nuclear attack may not be materially, politically, or psychologically worth obtaining if it
involves the destruction of all or a sizable segment of an enemy's population and results in the
contamination of a large portion of the territory with radio-active debris . Thus the tradition must have
emerged largely from the realization by nuclear states that there are severe limits to what a state can
accomplish by actually using a nuclear weapon (Gaddis 1992, 21). It also implies that after a certain point,
the capacity to destroy may not be useful, as the relation between the power to harm and the power to
modify the behavior of others is not linear (Jervis 1984, 23). Additionally, the effects of nuclear attack may
be beyond the local area of attack but could have wider effects, spatially and temporally (Lee 1993, 18).
There exists no guarantee that aftereffects such as the spread of radioactive debris could be confined to
the target state's territory. Neighboring states that may be neutral or aligned with the nuclear state could
be the victims of a nuclear attack as well. The fear that, once unleashed, nuclear terror could escape
meaningful political and military control and physical limitation may have influenced decision makers'
choices in this regard.
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AT: Schell
Schells views on policy are flawed and impossible to achieve
Review: Freeze: The Literature of the Nuclear Weapons Debate
Author(s): Peter deLeon he Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 181-189
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/173847.pdf
Lastly, one turns to Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, probably the most pretentious (witness its
title) and flawed of these books. But it is also the most important, for in many ways, it has served as the catalyst of
the antinuclear movement. His examples of a thermonuclear holocaust are no more graphic- although better written-than
are those of other authors, nor is his litany of secondary effects (e.g., the effects on the food chain and the possible
depletion of the earth's ozone layer) any more convincing. But these are just preliminary groundwork to Schell's main
thesis-that mankind's major obligation is to its future and the "fact" that nuclear war literally destroys whatever future may
exist. No cause, he argues, can relieve us of that burden. Some (e.g., Kinsley, 1982) have claimed that Schell has no right
to impose his set of values on the body politic. Perhaps, but few should contest Schell's sincerity in explicitly raising the
profoundly moral issues that have too long been neglected in the ethically sterile discussions that have characterized
mainstream nuclear doctrine. Whether Schell is right or wrong in assuming his high moral ground is the normative
prerogative and judgment of the individual reader; at the very worst, however, Schell forces the reader to confront these
issues directly. And this,
in spite of his grandiose style of writing, is why this book warrants careful attention. Schell probably does not expect to
have his thesis accepted uncritically; he admits his data are open to wide variation and interpretation. But, given his
"evidence" and logic, Schell has the courage of his conviction to realize where his positions will take him. He admits that
the nuclear weapons demon cannot be put back in the bottle, that even with a nuclear disarmament treaty, the extant
scientific knowledge would always allow a nation to reconstruct this ultimate weapon. Similarly, to rely on conventional
weapons to preserve national sovereignty is to invite a nation to cheat, to build clandestine nuclear weapons and thus begin
the nuclear arms race towards extinction once again. The fundamental culprit to Schell's way of thinking is not
Zuckerman's dedicated nuclear engineer nor Ivan the Targeteer, but the nation-state itself. He openly
acknowledges that "the task we face is to find a means of political action that will permit human beings
to pursue any end for the rest of time. We are asked to replace the mechanism by which the political
decisions, whatever they may be, are reached. In sum, the task is nothing less than to reinvent politics"
(p. 226). Schell's proposal, past an immediate nuclear freeze, is some form of functioning world
government, that is, the abandonment of national sovereignty and perhaps individual liberties as a
means of retreating from the nuclear precipice, for any life, he avers, is better than no life. Schell does
not actually say "better red than dead," but he surely could not disavow such a position.
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AT: Schell
Schells rationality argument contradicts with human nature
Nevin, University of New Hampshire, 82
JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR ON RESISTING EXTINCTION: A REVIEW OF
JONATHAN SCHELL'S THE FATE OF THE EARTH' JOHN A. NEVIN
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE1982, 38, 349-353 NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER)
Schell relies primarily on rational argument. A rational calculus suggests that although the probability of nuclear
extinction may be small, its value-the termination of life -is minus infinity, and the product of any non- zero probability
and minus infinity is minus infinity. In terms of relative expected utility, then, the choice is clear (Schell, p. 95). The
choice correctly posed and evaluated by Schell is structurally identical to Pascal's wager on the existence of God, which
has an expected utility of plus infinity despite the possibly infinitesimal probability that belief in God is
necessary and sufficient for eternal life. But Pascal's rational argument never made converts-faith appears to derive from
certain immediate experiences, even in his own case. Likewise, I fear that Schell's calculus will not make
converts to disarmament-choice behavior depends not on rational calculation but on experienced

events.One significant event that can be experienced by any reader is exposure to Schell's book itself. As a warning of
imminent disaster and a motivator of action, it is supremely
effective in arousing concern and activating behavior.
The problem now is to identify events and contingencies that will foster sustained commitment, by the
species, to the second alternative-survival. Laboratory work on commitment and self-control suggests
that humans and animals will usually choose the smaller but more immediate of two rewards, or the
larger but more delayed of two punishers, to their own long-term detriment . Our current choice, as a
species, of the first alternative-continuation of the arms race-is therefore entirely consistent with
laboratory data. Can knowledge from the laboratory help us switch over to the second alternative? One way in which
animals can be trained to choose the larger, more delayed reward (or the lesser but more immediate punisher) is to adjust
the delay values gradually, while giving repeated exposure to both outcomes; but of course this method is ruled out by the
nature of the nuclear dilemma. Another method is to train the subjects to make an early "commitment" response that
precludes access to one of the choices later. However, as Schell points out, we can never really preclude access to nuclear
weapons, because the methods for making them are well known and cannot be unlearned; the commitment response must
be continuous.
Perhaps the problem is best approached by invoking more immediate, smaller-scale, molecular events. For example, we
can try to get a large audience for Schell's book, which (as noted above) is a strikingly potent stimulus.
We can also expose all people, everywhere, to stimuli correlated with nuclear warfare such as pictures
of the burned and dying and dead at Hiroshima, and films showing the awesome power of nuclear test
explosions, which bring at least some of the future aspects of the first alternative into the present. But
this is not sufficient, because it might merely serve to generate numb passivity or avoidance of the
entire issue. We need, in addition, to instigate and maintain behavior that is compatible with the second alternative,
including open discussion, nonviolent protest, and political action that opposes the momentum of the arms race and leads
to disarmament. Clearly, we have witnessed some of the requisite behavior during this year, as hundreds of thousands of
people in many countries have rallied to demonstrate their opposition to the threat of nuclear war. Political support for
disarmament is on the rise. However, such behavior must be reinforced if it is to be maintained through the protracted
negotiations and rearrangements of international politics that will be required; and it cannot be reinforced by the
nonoccurrence of a nuclear holocaust, because that nonevent will always be equally well correlated
with pursuit of the arms race until the holocaust occurs. Much more immediate and local reinforcers such as
societal approval, access to political office, and economic well-being will be necessary. of humankind
is thereby placed in doubt. The entire system of sovereign nation-states is therefore a dangerous relic of
pre-nuclear times and must be abandoned.
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AT: Schell
Society wont react to warning about nuclear war, disproving Schells argument
Nevin 82
JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR ON RESISTING EXTINCTION: A REVIEW OF
JONATHAN SCHELL'S THE FATE OF THE EARTH' JOHN A. NEVIN UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE1982, 38, 349-353
NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER)
It is impossible not to acknowledge the power of Schell's presentation, but its very power may lead to two
further problems. First, his account of Armageddon generates strong aversive emotional reactions, and
we know from the study of negative reinforcement that such stimuli strengthen behavior that removes
them. The orienting-response literature also suggests that organisms will orient away from cues that
signal aversive events. We are, therefore, likely to turn away from warnings of nuclear warfare and
engage in other activities. Second, the ultimate horror that Schell portrays is widely regarded as
inevitable. The arms race is often said to possess a sort of impersonal momentum, like a massive object
that rolls on inexorably, regardless of our actions; and certainly the recent history of negotiations to
control the arms race, conducted by people who are well aware of its potential ultimate outcome, does
nothing to reassure us. In the laboratory, uncontrollable aversive events have been shown to produce a state of
inactivity termed helplessness. Taken together, the history of uncontrollability of the arms race, the
aversiveness of our reactions to warnings of nuclear warfare, and the lack of correlation of such
warnings with experienced events would seem to explain the absence of effective privateaction
(thinking) to analyze the problem or overt behavior to effect disarmament. This combination of factors may
be responsible for what Robert Jay Lifton has termed "psychic numbing," a refusal to confront the threat of universal
death that hangs over our heads like an executioner's sword.
How can we approach the absence of relevant action-the refusal to look up at the sword and do something to blunt it or
prevent it from falling-from a behavioral perspective? Consider an analogy. If we saw a person afflicted with a potentially
fatal disease, taking daily doses of an addictive drug that gave temporary relief from distress but in addition
exacerbated the disease, we would diagnose the behavior as maladaptive. Appealing to this person to exercise "selfcontrol" would not be likely to have much effect. If this person became our client, we would immediately regulate
access to the drug and take steps to eliminate its use, while at the same time arranging a program of behavioral therapy
to maintain abstinence when treatment ended. Schell suggests that human society, living as it does under the
constant threat of self-imposed termination while using its economic resources to build more
instruments of universal death in the name of security, is like this client-"insane," in Schell's words.
Immediate therapy is essential. However, our society is both client and therapist. Consequently, we are
enmeshed in a problem, at the level of society and species, that parallels the problem of "self-control"
at the level of the individual. Schell poses the choice facing humanity in terms very close to the
laboratory study of selfcontrol:
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**IMPACT TAKEOUTS**
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AT: Giligan
Violence is too deeply entrenched into our society to end poverty, even Gilligan concedes
Alvarez, Professor in the department of criminal justice at Northern Arizona University and Bachman,
Professor and Chair of the Sociology and Criminal Justice Department at the University of Delware 2007
(Alex Alvarez, Professor in the department of criminal justice at Northern Arizona University and Ronet Bachman, Professor and
Chair of the Sociology and Criminal Justice Department at the University of Delware, 2007 Violence: the enduring problem Chapter
1 ,Pg. 19-20, http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/17422_Chapter_1.pdf
We also worry about violence constantly, and change our behavior in response to perceived threats of violence. We avoid
certain parts of town, add security features to our homes, and vote for get tough laws in order to protect ourselves from
violent offenders. At the time this chapter was written, Americans were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and news reports
were full of fallen soldiers, car bombings, torture of prisoners, and beheadings of hostages. In short, whether domestically
or internationally, violence is part and parcel of American life. In fact, the sociologists Peter Iadicola and Anson Shupe
assert that violence is the overarching problem of our age and suggest that every social problem is influenced by the
problem of violence.47 James Gilligan, a medical doctor who directed the Center for the Study of Violence at Harvard
Medical School, put it this way: The more I learn about other peoples lives, the more I realize that I have yet to hear the
history of any family in which there has not been at least one family member who has been overtaken by fatal or life
threatening violence, as the perpetrator or the victimwhether the violence takes the form of suicide or homicide, death in
combat, death from a drunken or reckless driver, or any other of the many nonnatural forms of death.48 So its safe to say
that violence is not foreign to us, but rather is something with which we rub shoulders constantly.We know violence
through our own lived experiences and the experiences of our family, friends, and neighbors, as well as through the media
images we view. At a deeper level, this means that our identities as citizens, parents, children, spouses, lovers, friends,
teammates, and colleagues are often shaped by violence, at least in part. Who we are as individuals and as human beings is
shaped by the culture within which we live.How we define ourselves, the ways in which we relate to others, and our notions
of what we stand for and what we believe in, are all determined in large part by the influences and experiences of our lives
or, as the great English Poet Alfred Lord Tennyson once wrote, I am a part of all that I have met.49 In a similar vein,
although a bit less poetically, the sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann suggest, Identity is a phenomenon that
emerges from the dialectic between individual and society.50 In short, our life experiences shape who we are. Therefore, if
violence is a part of our reality, then it plays a role in shaping us as human beings and influences how we understand the
world around us. To acknowledge this is to understand that violence is part of who we are and central to knowing ourselves
and the lives we lead. Because of this prevalence and its impact on our lives, some have suggested that Americans have
created and embraced a culture of violence. Culture is a nebulous concept that includes values, beliefs, and rules for
behavior. These qualities detail what is expected, what is valued, and what is prohibited.51 Essentially, then, this argument
contends that our history and experiences have resulted in a system of values and beliefs that, to a greater extent than in
some other cultures, condones, tolerates, and even expects a violent response to various and specific situations.52 Other
scholars have further developed this theme by arguing that, instead of a culture of violence in the United States, there are
subcultures of violence specific to particular regions or groups. First articulated by the criminologists Wolfgang
and Ferracuti, this viewpoint suggests that members of some groups are more likely to rely on violence. As they suggest
Quick resort to physical combat as a measure of daring, courage, or defense of status appears to be a cultural
expectation . . . When such a cultural response is elicited from an individual engaged in social interplay with others who
harbor the same response mechanism, physical assaults, altercations, and violent domestic quarrels that result in homicide
are likely to be relatively common.53 This argument has been applied to various subcultural groups such as Southerners,
young African American males, and others.54 The South historically has had much higher rates of violence than other
regions of the country and many have suggested that it is a consequence of Southern notions of honor that demand a violent
response to certain provocations. The argument suggests that Southern culture, in other words, is more violence prone than
other regional cultures. Violence, then, is something that appears to be embedded in our values and attitudes, which is why
some have suggested that violence is as American as apple pie.55
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Extinction Impossible
It is impossible to kill all humans.
Schilling 00
But others have pointed out that the human animal (as opposed to human civilization) would be almost impossible
to kill off at this point . People have become too widespread and too capable, a few pockets of
individuals would find ways to survive almost any conceivable nuclear war or ecological collapse.
These survivors would be enough to fully repopulate the Earth in a few thousand years and another
technological civilization would be a precedent. Maybe this will happen many times
A nuclear war would only kill hundreds of thousands of people. It is defiantly survivable and the impact
is not huge.
Brian Martin Formal training in physics, with a PhD from Sydney University, 2002
(Activism after nuclear war, http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2002/Martin_ActivismNuclearWar.html)
In the event of nuclear war, as well as death and destruction there will be serious political consequences. Social activists should be
prepared. The confrontation between Indian and Pakistani governments earlier this year showed that military use of nuclear weapons
is quite possible. There are other plausible scenarios. A US military attack against Iraq could lead Saddam Hussein to
release chemical or biological weapons, providing a trigger for a US nuclear strike. Israeli nuclear weapons
might also be unleashed. Another possibility is accidental nuclear war. Paul Rogers in his book Losing Control
says that the risk of nuclear war has increased due to proliferation, increased emphasis on nuclear war-fighting,
reduced commitment to arms control (especially by the US government) and Russian reliance on nuclear arms
as its conventional forces disintegrate. A major nuclear war could kill hundreds of millions of people. But less
catastrophic outcomes are possible. A limited exchange might kill "only" tens or hundreds of thousands of
people. Use of nuclear "bunker-busters" might lead to an immediate death toll in the thousands or less.
Humanity is resilient: extinction is highly unlikely.

Bruce Tonn, Futures Studies Department, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2005, Human Extinction
Scenarios, www.budapestfutures.org/ downloads/abstracts/Bruce% 20Tonn%20-%20Abstract.pdf)
The human species faces numerous threats to its existence. These include global climate change, collisions with near-earth
objects, nuclear war, and pandemics. While these threats are indeed serious, taken separately they fail to describe exactly how
humans could become extinct. For example, nuclear war by itself would most likely fail to kill everyone on the planet, as strikes
would probably be concentrated in the northern hemisphere and the Middle East, leaving populations in South America, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand some hope of survival. It is highly unlikely that any uncontrollable nanotechnology could ever be
produced but even it if were, it is likely that humans could develop effective, if costly, countermeasures, such as producing the
technologies in space or destroying sites of runaway nanotechnologies with nuclear weapons. Viruses could indeed kill many people
but effective quarantine of a healthy people could be accomplished to save large numbers of people. Humans appear to be
resilient to extinction with respect to single events.
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Nuclear War
The chance of a nuclear war is just as likely as it was a half century ago.
Daily Newscaster November 15, 2008
(World conflict brewing but nuclear war unlikely, http://74.125.47.132/search?
q=cache:SLntzFWp_iEJ:www.dailynewscaster.com/2008/11/15/world-conflict-brewing-but-nuclear-war-unlikely/
+"World+conflict+brewing+but+nuclear+war+unlikely"&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
In August, oilgeopolitical expert F.W. Engdahl wrote, The signing on August 14th of an agreement between the
governments of the United States and Poland to deploy on Polish soil US interceptor missiles is the most dangerous move
towards nuclear war the world has seen since the 1962 Cuba Missile crisis. Now, I dont like being in a position
where I have to contradict the leading analyst of the New World Order, but there is no chance we are
any closer to a nuclear war than we were in the 1950s, 1962, or any time in the last 58 years . I cant
speak for Mr. Engdahl but most NWO conspiracy theorists expect a depopulation event to rid the planet of 5 billion useless
eaters. The Illuminati, they say, need only 500 million of us for slaves when they take over the world. Dont get me wrong,
I am not saying there couldnt be a depopulation event before 2012 but a nuclear war is not in the cards. Nuclear World
War III would make too much of the planet uninhabitable and that would include the One World
governors as well as the 500 million humans they need for slaves. Think about it: why havent we had
a nuclear accident since the 50s? Where is Dr. Strangelove or some insane Air Force General Jack D. Ripper who
orders a first strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or how about just a plain f up? If things can go wrong, they
will go wrong and the U.S. government or any nuclear power are not exactly the sharpest tools in the
shed.
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Biological Attack Not Probable

Biological Warfare wouldnt cause widespread death
Ropeik & Gray, Writers, 02
David Ropeik, George M. Gray, A Practical Guide for Deciding Whats Really Safe and Whats Really Dangerous in the World
Around You, 2002, Pg. 186, Books.Google.com
Fortunately, carrying out an attack with biological agents which kills large numbers of people is difficult. Distributing these
pathogens in a way that exposes large numbers of people is not simple. You dont just brew up some deadly germs in a lab and
go somewhere and shake them out of a jar. For most biological weapons to reach more than just a few people, they have to be
dispersed in the air. To accomplish that, the agent has to be dried, then ground up or milled into tiny particles that can remain
airborne for days, and in some cases further treated to control clumping. These steps take time, money, special equipment, and
expertise. They also require sophisticated protective clothing, filters, and containment equipment if the people who want to use them
as weapons dont want to become their own first victims. The Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo, before its Tokyo subway
attack with the nerve gas sarin, attempted several attacks with botulinum toxin, anthrax, and other agents but couldnt manage
to cause a single death. And the 2001 mailborne anthrax attacks in the United States demonstrated how difficult it is to use even
potent weaponized agents to kill more than a small number of people.
.
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Indo-Pak
Indo-Pak nuclear conflict unlikely.
The Michigan Daily 02
(Experts say nuclear war still unlikely, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely)
University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit
in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the
U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and
Pakistan than would be warranted." The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking
fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. " The decision makers are aware of what
nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said. "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think
they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said. Varshney
added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is
committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike,
because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous." Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special
assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the
position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal
said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "American intervention is another reason not to expect
nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control
system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands." But the low probability of nuclear war
does not mean tensions between the two countries who have fought three wars since they were created
in 1947 will not erupt. "The possibility of conventional war between the two is higher. Both sides are looking for ways
out of the current tension," Lieberthal said.
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Iran
The US wont have a have a nuclear war with Iran, too risky.
Defense experts say a military strike on Iran would be risky and complicated . U.S. forces already are
preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, and an attack against Iran could inflame U.S. problems in the Muslim
world. The U.N. Security Council has demanded Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program. But
Iran has so far refused to halt its nuclear activity, saying the small-scale enrichment project was strictly
for research and not for development of nuclear weapons . Bush has said Iran may pose the greatest challenge to
the United States of any other country in the world. And while he has stressed that diplomacy is always preferable, he has
defended his administration's strike-first policy against terrorists and other enemies. "The threat from Iran is, of course,
their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel," the president said last month in Cleveland.
"That's a threat, a serious threat. It's a threat to world peace; it's a threat, in essence, to a strong alliance .
I made it clear, I'll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally.'' Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col.
Mark Ballesteros would not comment Sunday on reports of military planning for Iran. "The U.S. military never comments
on contingency planning," he said. Stephen Cimbala, a Pennsylvania State University professor who studies U.S. foreign
policy, said it would be no surprise that the Pentagon has contingency plans for a strike on Iran. But he suggested the hint of
military strikes is more of a public show to Iran and the public than a feasible option. "If you look at the military options, all
of them are unattractive," Cimbala said. "Either because they won't work or because they have side effects where the cure is
worse than the disease.''
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**IMPACT CALCULUS**
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150
Impacts Exaggerated (1/2)

The threat of huge impacts is often exaggerated
Rescher, Prof. of Philosophy, 83
Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk
Evaluation and Management 1983
But while there is room for (perfectly legitimate) differences from person to person, it is clear that when these go too far
there also arises a significant prospect of impropriety and exaggeration. People frequently tend to inflate extreme
outcomes -- exaggerating the badness of the bad and the goodness of the good. The tendency to overestimate the
dramatic comes into play with outcome-evaluation. Our psychological capacity for imagination may run riot. We
tend to overrate the positivity of imagination-projected boons and negativity of imagination-projected hazards:
anticipated tragedies often do not prove to be all that awful. And such psychological tendencies as are involved with
familiarity, understanding, dread, etc. can all foster unrealism in appraising negativities.
The perceived value of an outcome may prove to be widely off the mark of any realistic estimate of its actual value. Our
perception of the magnitude of risks tends to be distorted by the structure of our anxieties. Hazards involving
threats that are particularly striking or dramatic -- leading to death, say, rather than mere debility, or likely to take more
rather then fewer lives -- tend to be overestimated, while risks of a commonplace, undramatic nature whose
eventuations are no less serious tend to be underestimated. ~
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Impacts Exaggerated (2/2)

Low probability scenarios are often exaggerated as important high probability scenarios are forgotten
In risk assessment one is often inclined -- or even constrained to resort to subjective probabilities. These can sometimes
be checked against the objectively measurable facts, and when this is done, certain common fallacies come to light. 38 In
particular, people tend to overestimate systematically the relative probability of certain sorts of eventuations -- as for
example:
-- striking or dramatic or particularly dreaded outcomes (large gains or losses)
-- relatively rare events -- particularly those that have actually occurred in past experience in some memorable way
(the once bitten, twice shy syndrome'').39
-- probabilistically multiplicative events (i.e., those whose eventuation involves the complex concatenation of many
circumstances)
-- chance events that have failed to occur for a long time (the MQnte Carlo Fallacy)
The first of these phenomena is particularly significant. Even in the best of circumstances, it is difficult to convince
oneself that a particularly feared disaster may be extremely unlikely. Then too there is the tendency to exaggerate the
likelihood of wished-for consummations, mocked by Adam Smith when he spoke of that majority activated by the absurd
presumption in their own good fortunes.''4
The other side of the coin is that people tend to underestimate systematically the relative probability of
-- humdrum, undramatic (though often inherently important events)
-- relatively frequent or familiar events
-probabilistically additive events (i.e., those whose eventuation can be realized along various different routes)
The operation of such principles means, among other things, that people incline to underestimate the eventuation of
high-probability events, and to overestimate the eventuation of low-probability events.4'
Interesting misjudgments come to light through these data. For example, accidents were judged to cause as many deaths as
diseases, whereas diseases actually take about fifteen times as many lives. Homicides were incorrectly thought to be more
frequent than diabetes and stomach cancer. Homicides were also judged to be about as frequent as stroke, although the
latter actually claims about 11 times as many lives. The incidence of death from botulism, tornadoes, and pregnancy
(including childbirth and abortion) was also greatly over-estimated. Indeed a systematic bias emerges -- to overestimate the
more unusual and dramatic low-frequency causes of death and to underestimate the more commonplace. Any discussion or
consideration of possible disasters -- even reassuring statements by technical experts designed to establish their
improbability -- appears to have the effect of increasing their preceived likelihood by enchancing the apprehension of
their reality. This unrealism greatly hampers profitable discussion of low-probability hazards.
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Prob. Evaluated First (1/2)

Probability should be evaluated before magnitude
Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the
Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management 1983
A probability is a number between zero and one. Now numbers between zero and one can get to be very small indeed: As N gets bigger, 1/N will grow very,
very small. What, then, is one to do about extremely small probabilities in the rational management of risks? On this issue there is a systemic
disagreement between probabilists working in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on issues relating to human affairs. The former
take the line that small numbers are small numbers and must be taken into account as such. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities
represent extremely remote prospects and can be written off. (De minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: there is no need to
bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as it is that a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times will all come up sixes, then, so it
is held, we can pretty well forget about it as worthy of concern.
The "worst possible case fixation" is one of the most damaging modes of unrealism in deliberations about risk in real-life situations.
Preoccupation about what might happen "if worst comes to worst" is counterproductive whenever we proceed without recognizing that, often as not, these
worst possible outcomes are wildly improbable (and sometimes do not deserve to be viewed as real possibilities at all). The
crux in risk deliberations is not the issue of loss "if worst comes to worst" but the potential acceptability of this prospect within the wider framework of the risk
situation, where we may well be prepared "to take our chances," considering the possible advantages that beckon along this route. The worst threat is certainly
something to be borne in mind and taken into account, but it is emphatically not a satisfactory index of the overall seriousness or gravity of a situation of
hazard.
Any action could potentially have devastating impacts, but we dont evaluate
them because of the low probability
Stern, Fellow at CFR, 99
Jessica Stern, Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former National Security Council Member The
Ultimate Terrorists 1999 http://www.hup.harvard.edu/features/steult/excerpt.html
Poisons have always been seen as unacceptably cruel. Livy called poisonings of enemies "secret crimes." Cicero referred to
poisoning as "an atrocity." But why do poisons evoke such dread? This question has long puzzled political scientists and
historians. One answer is that people's perceptions of risk often do not match reality: that what we dread most is often not
what actually threatens us most. When you got up this morning, you were exposed to serious risks at nearly every stage of
your progression from bed to the office. Even lying in bed exposed you to serious hazards: 1 in 400 Americans is injured
each year while doing nothing but lying in bed or sitting in a chair--because the headboard collapses, the frame gives way,
or another such failure occurs. Your risk of suffering a lethal accident in your bathtub or shower was one in a million. Your
breakfast increased your risk of cancer, heart attack, obesity, or malnutrition, depending on what you ate. Although both
margarine and butter appear to contribute to heart disease, a new theory suggests that low-fat diets make you fat. If you
breakfasted on grains (even organic ones), you exposed yourself to dangerous toxins: plants produce their own natural
pesticides to fight off fungi and herbivores, and many of these are more harmful than synthetic pesticide residues. Your
cereal with milk may have been contaminated by mold toxins, including the deadly aflatoxin found in peanuts, corn, and
milk. And your eggs may have contained benzene, another known carcinogen. Your cup of coffee included twenty-six
compounds known to be mutagenic: if coffee were synthesized in the laboratory, the FDA would probably ban it as a
cancer-causing substance. Most people are more worried about the risks of nuclear power plants than the risks of driving to
work, and more alarmed by the prospect of terrorists with chemical weapons than by swimming in a pool. Experts tend to
focus on probabilities and outcomes, but public perception of risk seems to depend on other variables: there is little
correlation between objective risk and public dread. Examining possible reasons for this discrepancy will help us
understand why the thought of terrorists with access to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons fills us with dread.
People tend to exaggerate the likelihood of events that are easy to imagine or recall. Disasters and catastrophes stay
disproportionately rooted in the public consciousness, and evoke disproportionate fear. A picture of a mushroom cloud
probably stays long in viewers' consciousness as an image of fear.
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Prob. Evaluated First (2/2)

Catering to minute risks based on higher magnitude creates policy paralysis,
making their impacts inevitable
Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the
Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management 1983
The stakes are high, the potential benefits enormous. (And so are the costs - for instance cancer research and, in particular, the
multi-million dollar gamble on interferon.) But there is no turning back the clock. The processes at issue are irreversible. Only
through the shrewd deployment of science and technology can we resolve the problems that science and technology themselves
have brought upon us. America seems to have backed off from its traditional entrepreneurial spirit and become a risk-aversive,
slow investing economy whose (real-resource) support for technological and scientific innovation has been declining for some
time. In our yearning for the risk-free society we may well create a social system that makes risk-taking innovation next
to impossible. The critical thing is to have a policy that strikes a proper balance between malfunctions and missed
opportunities - a balance whose "propriety" must be geared to a realistic appraisal of the hazards and opportunities at issue.
Man is a creature condemned to live in a twilight zone of risk and opportunity. And so we are led back to Aaron Wildavski's
thesis that flight from risk is the greatest risk of all, "because a total avoidance of risks means that society will become
paralyzed, depleting its resources in preventive action, and denying future generations opportunities and technologies needed
for improving the quality of life. By all means let us calculate our risks with painstaking care, and by all means let us manage
them with prudent conservatism. But in life as in warfare there is truth in H. H. Frost's maxim that "every mistake in war is
excusable except inactivity and refusal to take risks" (though, obviously, it is needful to discriminate between a good risk and a
bad one). The price of absolute security is absolute stultification.
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Prob Before Mag Ext

Probability of a scenario is evaluated before all else, regardless of the impact
The rational management of risk calls for adherence to three cardinal rules: (I) Maximize Expected Values! (II) Avoid
Catastrophes! (III) Dismiss Extremely Remote (''Unrealistic'') Possibilities! The first of these is a matter of using the
expected-value of the various alternative choices -- computed in the stardard way -- as index of their relative preferability.
In particular, that alternative whose expected value is maximal is thereby to be viewed as maxipreferable. Rule (II) is to be
applied subject to an insofar as possible condition. It can ordinarily be implemented by setting the value of a catastrophe
at -- in the context of expected-value calculation. This, of course, will fail to resolve the matter if it should happen
that every alternative leads to possible catastrophe, in which case-- that of a dilemma -- special precautions will be
necessary. (They are described on pp. 87-88.) Rule (III) calls on us to implement the idea of ''effectively zero
probabilities by setting the probability of ''extremely remote possibilities at zero. It calls on us to dismiss highly
improbable possibilities as ''unrealistic.'' Note that rules (II) and (III) enjoin us to view the choice-situation in a guise different from the actual
facts. An element of as if is involved in both cases. With (II) we are to identify a certain level of catastrophe and take the stance that a negativity
whose magnitude exceeds this level is to be seen as having value -- ~. Again, with (III) we are to identify a certain level of effective zerohood for
probabilities, treating as zero whatever probabilities fall short of this threshold value. Thus in assessing risks by way of expected-value appraisals, we are
in each case not to view the situation as it actually stands, but to replace the actual situation by its policy transform through a change of the form V--~- orp~0. The application of all three of these rules calls for essentially judgmental, subjective inputs. With (I) we are involved in negativity-eval~uation.
With (II) we must fix on a threshold of ''catastrophe .'' With (III) we must decide at what level of improbability effective zerohood
sets in and possibilities cease to be real. None of these evaluative resolutions at issue is dictated by the objective circumstances and imprinted
in the nature of things. They are instruments of human devising contrived for human purpose in the effective management of affairs. To begin with, note
that rules (I) and (II) can clash, as per Figure 1. Here the top alternative enjoys the greater expected value. Nevertheless, it is intuitively clear that the
bottom alter native is far preferable (and would continue to be so even if the 60C loss were increased to some other ordinary negativity.) The clear
lesson is that rule (II) takes priority over (I) in such cases where catastrophes loom. We are to ignore the ruling of a straightforward calculation of expected
values and insist on valuing catastrophes at --~, so as to avoid them at any (ordinary) cost. (Recall the discussion of the rationale of insurance on pp. 79-80
above.) Moreover rules (I) and (III) can also clash. This is shown by those cases where an expected-value calculation rules in favor of an alternative whose
probability is too small to qualify it as a real possibility. (Recall the Vacationer's Dilemma of p. 40.) Unless we are prepared to
dismiss extremely remote possibilities as having a probability of effectively zero -- and thus not counting
as real possibilities at all -- we shall find our actions systematically stultified to a degree which we are unwilling to
accept in ''real life situations. It is thus clear that rule (III) takes priority over (I). Finally, it is clear that rules (II) and
(III) can also conflict. For consider the situation of Figure 2. Note that a refusal to see the situation in terms of a = 0 keeps
the catastrophe in the picture, so As these deliberations indicate, the three cardinal principles of risk management stand
in a relation of preferential rank-order so that: (Ill) takes precedence over (II), which in turn takes precedence over (I).
We have here a sequential priority-ordering of the several principles, which fixes an automatic process for one's
overriding another in those cases where their rulings conflict. This precedence ordering entails certain limitations to the
reach of classical decision theory, which proceeds on the basis of the unmodified and unadulterated use of expected-value
appraisals. A deployment of the concepts of catastrophe-avoidance and of effectively zero'' probabilities modifies
this policy in two directions. First, catastrophe is seen to represent an unacceptable risk, when ''the game's not worth
the candle'' because the potential negative outcomes, unlikely though their realization may be, are simply too massive for
the stakes otherwise at issue. But, secondly, this principle itself needs to be curtailed, when it becomes too conservative
in its operation and leads to a stultification of action. Just this rationale motivates the recourse to ''effectively zero''
probabilities.
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Systemic Impacts First

Err on the side of systemic impacts its the biggest consequence in the long
term
Machan, Professor of Philosophy, 03
Tibor Machan, prof. emeritus of philosophy at Auburn University, 2003 Passion for Liberty
honesty is the best policy, even if at times it does not achieve the desired
good results; so is respect for every individual's rights to life, liberty, and property. All in all, this is what will ensure the
best consequencesin the long run and as a rule. Therefore, one need not be very concerned about the most recent
estimate of the consequences of banning or not banning guns, breaking up or not breaking up Microsoft, or any other public
policy, for that matter. It is enough to know that violating the rights of individuals to bear arms is a bad idea, and that history
and analysis support our understanding of principle. To violate rights has always produced greater damage than good, so
let's not do it, even when we are terribly tempted to do so, Let's not do it precisely because to do so would violate the
fundamental requirements of human nature. It is those requirements that should be our guide, not some recent empirical data that have no staying power (according to their very own
All in all, then, I support the principled or rights-based approach. In normal contexts,
theoretical terms). Finally, you will ask, isn't this being dogmatic? Haven't we learned not to bank too much on what we've learned so far, when we also know that learning can always be improved, modified, even
We must go with what

we know but be open to change provided that the change is warranted. Simply because some additional gun controls or
regulations might save lives (some lives, perhaps at the expense of other lives) and simply because breaking up Microsoft
might improve the satisfaction of consumers (some consumers, perhaps at the expense of the satisfaction of other consumers)
are no reasons to violate basic rights. Only if and when there are solid, demonstrable reasons to do so should we throw out the old principles and bring on the new principles. Any
such reasons would have to speak to the same level of fundamentally and relevance as that incor porated by the theory
of individual rights itself. Those defending consequentialism, like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, have argued the opposite thesis: Unless one can prove, beyond a doubt, that violating rights in
revised? Isn't progress in the sciences and technology proof that past knowledge always gets overthrown a bit later? As in science and engineering, so in morality and politics:
a particular instance is necessarily wrong in the eyes of a "rational and fair man," the state may go ahead and "accept the natural outcome of dominant opinion" and violate those rights.1 Such is now the leading
jurisprudence
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Probability Evaluation Key

The probability of each element of an argument chain must be evaluated
Alemi, Professor of Risk Analysis, 06
Farrokh Alemi, Ph.D in Decision Analysis, Professor of Risk at George Mason University, Lecture on the Probability of
Rare Events, October 4, 2006 http://gunston.gmu.edu/healthscience/riskanalysis/ProbabilityRareEvent.asp
The concept of fault trees and reliability trees has a long history in space and nuclear industry. Several books (Krouwer, 2004)
and papers describe this tool (Marx and Slonim, 2003). The first step in conducting fault trees is to identify the sentinel adverse
event that should be analyzed. Then all possible ways in which the sentinel event may occur is listed. It is possible that several
events must co-occur before the sentinel event may occur. For example, in assessing the probability of an employee providing
information to outsiders, several events must co-occur. First the employee must be disgruntled. Second, information must be
available to the employee. Third, outsiders must have contact with the employee. Fourth, the employee must have a method of
transferring the data. All of these events must co-occur before hospital data is sold to an outside party. None of these events are
sufficient to cause the sentinel event. In a fault tree, when several events must co-occur, we use an "And" gate to show it. Each of
these events can, in part, depend on other factors. For example, there may be several ways to transfer the data: on paper,
electronically by email, or electronically on disk. Any one of these events can lead to transfer of data. In fault tree when any one of a
series of events may be sufficient by themselves to cause the next event to occur, we show this by an "Or" gate. Fault tree is a
collection of events connected to each other by "and" and "Or" gates. Each event depends on a series of other related events,
providing for a complex web of relationships. A fault tree suggests a robust work process when several events must co-occur before
the catastrophic failure occurs. The more "And" gates are in the tree structure, the more robust the work process modeled. In contrast,
it is also possible for several events by themselves to lead to catastrophic failure. The more "Or" gates in the path to failure, the less
robust the work process. The second step is to estimate probabilities for the fault tree. Since the catastrophic failure is rare, it is
difficult to asses this probability directly. Instead, the probability of various events leading to this failure are assessed. For
example, the probability of a finding a disgruntled employee can be assessed. The probability of an employee having access to large
data sets can be assessed by counting employees who have such access during the course of their work. The probability of an
employee being approached by someone to sell data can be assessed by providing an expert data on frequency of reported crimes and
asking him/her to estimate the additional unreported rate. In short, through objective data or subjective opinions of experts various
probabilities in the fault tree can be assessed. The fault tree can then be used to assess the probability of the catastrophic and
rare event using the following formula:
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Reschers theories are flawed- using predictions for data is key
Eggleston 02
Ben Eggleston January 12, 2002 Department of Philosophy University of Kansa
Practical Equilibrium: A New Approach to Moral Theory Selection
http://web.ku.edu/~utile/unpub/pe.pdf
The language of data to be accounted for recurs even more frequently in papers published in the wake of Rawlss book.
Singer writes that The reflective equilibrium conception of moral philosophy . . . lead[s] us to think of our particular moral
judgmentsas data against which moral theories are to be tested (1974, p. 517; cf. 1998, p. vi), and Nicholas Rescher
writes that our intuitions are the data . . . which the theoretician must weave into a smooth fabric and that The
process is closely analogous with the systematization of the data of various levels in natural science (1979, p. 155).
Others have offered similar characterizations. 13 So the notion of accounting for the data is often regarded as providing
support for reflective equilibrium. I wish to argue, though, that the notion of accounting for the data can be seen to
provide such support only when clouded by a pair of misunderstandings, and that when these two
misunderstandings are removed, the notion of accounting for the data actually lends support to practical
equilibrium. The two misunderstandings concern what the data to be accounted for actually are, and how a moral
theory accounts for whatever data it accounts for.
First, consider what the data actually are. When it comes to our moral intuitions, we might think that our data are that acts
of certain kinds, such as acts of punishing the innocent, are never justified. But actually this overstates our data: in fact our
data are just our observations of our own intuitions, such as our observation that it seems to us that punishing the
innocent is never justified. It is a further claim, not among the data to be accounted for, that these intuitions that we are
aware of having are correct. The data do not include that certain acts are wrong; the data include only our regarding certain
acts as wrongfor this latter phenomenon, our own judgment of the matter, is all that we can really detect in any instance
of moral appraisal.14 So the first error in reflective equilibriums use of the notion of accounting for the data lies in its
holding theories responsible for accounting for things that are not actually among the data. It says that a moral theory must
explain the truth of the intuitions that we have, when actually the only data there are are that we have those intuitions.
Now at this point it may appear that I am arguing that what the notion of accounting for the data means in the case of a
moral theory is not that the theory explains the truth of the intuitions that we have, but that the theory explains the fact that
we have those intuitions. For this interpretation of accounting for the data would accommodate the interpretation of what
the data actually are that I have just been arguing for. But Imaintain that we need to make a second adjustment in order to
arrive at a sound interpretation of the notion of accounting for the data in the case of a moral theory.
Whereas the first adjustment had to do with what the data are, this one has to do with
what it means for a moral theory to account for data. What I have in mind is that we need
to say that what a moral theory is supposed to do, as far as its accounting for anything is concerned, is not to explain
our having certain intuitions, but to endorse our having those intuitions.
The reason for this adjustment is simple: moral theories differ from scientific ones in that they are not in the
business of predicting or explaining anything: they are in the
business of prescribing, or giving instructions. Normally, the instructions were interested in are those that concern
specific situations in which we might engage in some conduct or regard to the intuitions we should have
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Predictions Bad - Policymaking

Ejecting low probability internal link chains is key to rational policymaking - accumulated experience
proves that appeals to the possibility of catastrophic causal chains should not influence decision-making
Hansson, Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, 05
Sven Ove Hansson ["The Epistemology of Technological Risk," Techne: research in philosophy and
Technology, Volume 9, Number 2, Winter 2005 http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ ejournals/SPT/v9n2/hansson. html]
However, it would not be feasible to take such possibilities into account in all decisions that we make. In a sense, any
decision may have catastrophic unforeseen consequences. If far-reaching indirect effects are taken into account, then
given the unpredictable nature of actual causation almost any decision may lead to a disaster. In order to be able to decide
and act, we therefore have to disregard many of the more remote possibilities. Cases can also easily be found in which it
was an advantage that far-fetched dangers were not taken seriously. One case in point is the false alarm on so-called
polywater, an alleged polymeric form of water. In 1969, the prestigious scientific journal Nature printed a letter that warned
against producing polywater. The substance might "grow at the expense of normal water under any conditions found in the
environment," thus replacing all natural water on earth and destroying all life on this planet. (Donahoe 1969 ) Soon
afterwards, it was shown that polywater is a non-existent entity. If the warning had been heeded, then no attempts would
had been made to replicate the polywater experiments, and we might still not have known that polywater does not exist. In
cases like this, appeals to the possibility of unknown dangers may stop investigations and thus prevent scientific and
technological progress.We therefore need criteria to determine when the possibility of unknown dangers should be taken
seriously and when it can be neglected. This problem cannot be solved with probability calculus or other exact
mathematical methods. The best that we can hope for is a set of informal criteria that can be used to support intuitive
judgement. The following list of four criteria has been proposed for this purpose. (Hansson 1996) Asymmetry of
uncertainty: Possibly, a decision to build a second bridge between Sweden and Denmark will lead through some
unforeseeable causal chain to a nuclear war. Possibly, it is the other way around so that a decision not to build such a bridge
will lead to a nuclear war. We have no reason why one or the other of these two causal chains should be more probable, or
otherwise more worthy of our attention, than the other. On the other hand, the introduction of a new species of earthworm is
connected with much more uncertainty than the option not to introduce the new species. Such asymmetry is a necessary but
insufficient condition for taking the issue of unknown dangers into serious consideration. 2. Novelty: Unknown dangers
come mainly from new and untested phenomena. The emission of a new substance into the stratosphere constitutes a
qualitative novelty, whereas the construction of a new bridge does not. An interesting example of the novelty factor can be
found in particle physics. Before new and more powerful particle accelerators have been built, physicists have sometimes
feared that the new levels of energy might generate a new phase of matter that accretes every atom of the earth. The
decision to regard these and similar fears as groundless has been based on observations showing that the earth is already
under constant bombardment from outer space of particles with the same or higher energies. (Ruthen 1993) 3. Spatial and
temporal limitations: If the effects of a proposed measure are known to be limited in space or time, then these limitations
reduce the urgency of the possible unknown effects associated with the measure. The absence of such limitations
contributes to the severity of many ecological problems, such as global emissions and the spread of chemically stable
pesticides. 4. Interference with complex systems in balance: Complex systems such as ecosystems and the atmospheric
system are known to have reached some type of balance, which may be impossible to restore after a major disturbance. Due
to this irreversibility, uncontrolled interference with such systems is connected with a high degree of uncertainty. (Arguably,
the same can be said of uncontrolled interference with economic systems; this is an argument for piecemeal rather than
drastic economic reforms.) It might be argued that we do not know that these systems can resist even minor perturbations.
If causation is chaotic, then for all that we know, a minor modification of the liturgy of the Church of England may trigger a
major ecological disaster in Africa. If we assume that all cause-effect relationships are chaotic, then the very idea of
planning and taking precautions seems to lose its meaning. However, such a world-view would leave us entirely without
guidance, even in situations when we consider ourselves well-informed. Fortunately, experience does not bear out this
pessimistic worldview. Accumulated experience and theoretical reflection strongly indicate that certain types of influences
on ecological systems can be withstood, whereas others cannot. The same applies to technological, economic, social, and
political systems, although our knowledge about their resilience towards various disturbances has not been sufficiently
systematized.
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Predictions Bad Background Beliefs

Risk assessment irrationally exaggerates low probability impacts. Objective risk analysis is impossible
because our decisions are always tainted by our background beliefs- vote affirmative in the face of the
undeniable impact of detention
Teuber, Professor of Philosophyat Brandeis University, 1990,
Andreas Teuber"JUSTIFYING RISK," Daedalus, Volume 119 Number 4, Fall, 1990
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/paperrisk.html
Even if the practical difficulties of obtaining people's consent could be overcome, it is widely reported that people are
notoriously poor judges of risks. People's perceptions frequently fail to match up with the actual dangers risks pose and few
people have a "feel" for what a chance of dying, say a chance of one in a million, really means. Research by psychologists
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman has shown that we are regularly led astray in our assessments of probabilities by rules
of thumb. Faced with a judgment that requires even a minimal familiarity with statistics, we frequently avoid the statistical
information and rely instead on a description or heuristic which feels less strange. 8 We tend to overemphasize low
probabilities and underestimate large ones. We have to struggle to resist the gambler's fallacy: the belief that after a series of
losses the odds must favor a win. We are also poor judges of outcomes. We appear to be more concerned to avoid a loss
than to receive an equivalent gain, and this asymmetry can be exploited in the way choices are presented.9 Retailers, for
example, know enough about our suceptibility to the way options are framed to represent a surcharge for credit card
customers as a discount to those who are willing to pay cash.10 The influence of framing on judgments about risk is
systematic and pervasive, and shows up at all levels of education. Health care professionals are no less susceptible to the
effects of framing than their patients who have less experience and lack their expertise. The following hypothetical case
was put to a group of physicians: Imagine that you have operable lung cancer and must choose between two treatments:
surgery and radiation therapy. Of 100 people having surgery, 10 die during the operation, 32 are dead after one year, and 66
after five years. Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during treatment, 23 are deadafter one year, and 78 after
five years. Which treatment do you prefer?11 Given these options, fifty percent of the physicians said they preferred
radiation treatment. However when the same options were presented in terms of survival rates rather than mortality rates,
84% said they would prefer surgery. It is perhaps not completely surprising to learn that people are poor judges of
probabilities, but "we want to give [people] credit for at least knowing their own minds," as one report puts it, "when it
comes to assigning values to the outcomes of their choices."12 Apparently, very little credit is due, as experiment after
experiment reveals: Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual flu epidemic which is
expected to kill 600 people, unless action is taken. Two alternative programs to combat the disease are proposed If program
A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved and a 2/3
probability that no one will be saved When the alternatives were posed in these terms in a test survey, 72 percent of the
respondents opted for program A, only 28 percent for program B. A second group was given the same options, but redescribed (re-framed) in this way: If program A is adopted, 400 people will die; if program B is adopted, there is a 1/3
probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die This time only 22 percent opted for the first
program, while 78 percent opted for the second.13 It is generally believed that consistency in judgments is a minimal
condition of rationality. Since our judgments about risk are apparently inconsistent, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that
our attitudes towards risk are also irrational. These findings have disturbing implications for public policy, especially in a
society like our own which relies on a democratic process. If we are irrational in our judgments about risk, the policies we
enact will reflect a similar bias. Given our untrustworthy attitudes, a consent-based approach to legitimating risk-imposing
activities can only lead to irrational public policies.
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Predictions Bad Irresponsibility

The production of risk enacts a system of organized irresponsibility that relies on obsolete political
ideologies. The aff challenges the current epistemology of risk- its not sufficient to respond to risk as a
purely material event.
Elliott, Foundation Director of the Centre for Critical Theory at the University of the West of England,
2002
Anthony Elliot Becks sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment, Sociology, Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2002
It is the autonomous, compulsive dynamic of advanced or reexive modernization that, according to Beck, propels modern
men and women into self-confrontation with the consequences of risk that cannot adequately be addressed, measured,
controlled or overcome, at least according to the standards of industrial society. Modernitys blindness to the risks and
dangers produced by modernization all of which happens automatically and unreectingly, according to
Beck leads to societal self-confrontation: that is, the questioning of division between centres of political activity and the
decision-making capacity of society itself. Society, in effect, seeks to reclaim the political from its modernist relegation to
the institutional sphere, and this, says Beck, is achieved primarily through sub-political means that is, locating the politics
of risk at the heart of forms of social and cultural life. Within the horizon of the opposition between old routine and new
awareness of consequences and dangers, writes Beck, society becomes self-critical (1999b: 81). The prospects for
arresting the dark sides of industrial progress and advanced modernization through reexivity are routinely short-circuited,
according to Beck, by the insidious inuence of organized irresponsibility. Irresponsibility, as Beck uses the term, refers
to a political contradiction of the self-jeopardization and self-endangerment of risk society. This is a contradiction between
an emerging public awareness of risks produced by and within the
social-institutional system on the one hand, and the lack of attribution of systemic risks to this system on the other. There is,
in Becks reckoning, a constant denial of the suicidal tendency of risk society the system of organized irresponsibility
which manifests itself in, say, technically orientated legal procedures designed to satisfy rigorous causal proof of individual
liability and guilt.
This self-created dead end, in which culpability is passed off on to individuals and thus collectively denied, is maintained
through political ideologies of industrial fatalism: faith in progress, dependence on rationality and the rule of expert
opinion.
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Predictions Bad - Monkeys

Expert predictions are less accurate than dart throwing monkeys
Menand, Harvard Professor, 05
Louis Menand 2005 PhD Colombia and Robert M. and Anne T. Bass Professor of English and American
Literature and Language at Harvard University., The New Yorker, 12-052005, http://www.newyorker.com/critics/con...205crbo_books1
It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlocks new book, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We
Know? (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their businesspeople who appear as experts on television, get
quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtablesare no better than
the rest of us. When theyre wrong, theyre rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they
were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the
same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs
about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your
gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more
frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an experts
predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of
knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to
happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it
rewards bad judgments over good ones.
Expert Political Judgment is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologisthe teaches at Berkeleyand his
conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people
who made their living commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends, and he started asking them to assess
the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized
and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would
Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many
experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in
2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their
judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not
support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.
Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a three possible futures form. The
respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of
something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on
two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of
happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were
unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal
probability to all three outcomesif they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human
beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing
monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.
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Predictions Bad Decisionmaking Spillover

Refusing their method is critical to move away from this bad form of risk - rejection within the
laboratory of debate spills over to policy making
Herbeck, Prof at Boston College, 92
Dale A. Herbeck, Professor of Communication and Director of the Fulton Debating Society at Boston College, and John P. Katsulas,
Debate Coach at Boston College, "The Use and Abuse of Risk Analysis in Polcy Debate," Paper Presented at the 78th Annual meeting
of the Speech Communication Association (Chicago, IL), October 29th-November 1st 1992, Available Online via ERIC Number
ED354559, p. 10-12
It is sometimes argued that debate is a laboratory for testing argumentation. Critics of the laboratory metaphor have argued
that we have failed as scientists, for we have produced little of consequence in our lab. Perhaps our experience with
risk analysis in debate can inform our understanding of the crisis rhetoric which we confront on an
almost daily basis. The best check on such preposterous claims, it seems to us, is an appreciation of
nature of risk analysis and how it functions in argumentation. If we understand this tool, we will be
well-armed in our battle with the bogeyman of our age
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Menand bases his claims off flawed principals in Expert Political Judgement
Davies, staff for STMI Consulting, 07
Adrian Davies, 15 July 2007. St Andrews Management Institute, Book Review: Expert Politial
Judgement. http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk/4bookrev26.html
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt in your philosophy. This was Hamlets admission that
he was confused by complexity and had difficulty in coming to judgment. Hamlets solution was inexpert and created a new
set of political problems.
Expert Political Judgment is an attempt to identify the characteristics of individuals who have the
ability to analyse situations in depth and with accurate foresight so that their decisions are informed by
expert political judgment. The author is a psychologist but has worked for many years with a range of specialists in
different disciplines in order to distil the quintessence of expert political judgment, not only for the immediate need but
sustainable into the longer term. The main focus of the book is on forecasting outcomes of particular situations and on
identifying the specific techniques and mental attitudes which do so most successfully. Luck is recognised as a factor but is
set aside as exogenous. The quest is for the mindset and toolkit which will optimise forecasting by quantifying the
unquantifiable. For the mindset contrasts are drawn between radical sceptics, who expect nothing and meliorists who
are open to seeking improved outcomes. Another facet of mindset is Isiah Berlins contrast between hedgehogs who
know one big thing and foxes who know many little things. In the context of the book hedgehogs emerge as having
fixed views, seeing issues as black or white and supremely self-confident. By contrast foxes are open-minded, flexible
and self-critical. One key finding of the book is that foxes emerge as winners of most of the tests, yet hedgehogs are
more focussed and willing to make tough decisions. In times of increasing uncertainty it would seem that fox-like
characteristics are at a premium over those of hedgehogs in evaluation, though hedgehog confidence is needed to take
action.
The book draws to a conclusion with a challenge: Are we open-minded enough to acknowledge the limits of openmindedness? This chapter is a critique of scenario planning which the author sees as advising only that
anything is possible. Too often those involved are over absorbed in inward looking details to build
their stories, while an outside view is needed to provide a reality check. Tetlock fails to realise that
scenario planning should be used as a means of guiding action not engendering endless debate.
Judgment seems to involve a metacognitive trade off between theory driven and imagination driven
modes of thinking. Theory offers certainty and imagination helps to cope with uncertainty. The author
sees the best long term predictor of good judgment to be a Socratic commitment by protagonists to
thinking about how they think.
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We should make predictions even if they arent perfect
Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University, 4 (Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4)
When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism
about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even
harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models,
history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be
predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance.
Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of
history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all
predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latters total opacity and indeterminacy.
Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to
understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the
principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for
responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a
normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely
on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to
pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible
and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.
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Their Menand evidence doesnt apply it doesnt say that all predictions are bad, just that predictions
without evidence are bad
Menand, Harvard Professor, 05
Louis Menand 2005 PhD Colombia and Robert M. and Anne T. Bass Professor of English and American
Literature and Language at Harvard University The New Yorker, 10/5/2005, lexis
It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about why some people make better
forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin's metaphor from Archilochus,
from his essay on Tolstoy, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," to illustrate the difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who "know one
big thing," aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who "do not get it," and express
considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term . High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many
small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible "ad
hocery" that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. A hedgehog is a person who sees
international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the
spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald
Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the "actor-dispensability thesis," according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the big idea,
and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only "off on timing," or are "almost right," derailed by
an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out. Foxes, on the other hand, don't see a single determining
explanation in history. They tend, Tetlock says, "to see the world as a shifting mixture of self-fulfilling and self-negating prophecies: self-fulfilling ones in which
success breeds success, and failure, failure but only up to a point, and then self-negating prophecies kick in as people recognize that things have gone too far." Tetlock
did not find, in his sample, any significant correlation between how experts think and what their politics are. His hedgehogs were liberal as well as conservative, and the
same with his foxes. (Hedgehogs were, of course, more likely to be extreme politically, whether rightist or leftist.) He also did not find that his foxes scored higher
because they were more cautious-that their appreciation of complexity made them less likely to offer firm predictions. Unlike hedgehogs, who actually performed worse
in areas in which they specialized, foxes enjoyed a modest benefit from expertise. Hedgehogs routinely over-predicted: twenty per cent of the outcomes that
hedgehogs claimed were impossible or nearly impossible came to pass, versus ten per cent for the foxes. More than thirty per cent of the outcomes that hedgehogs
thought were sure or near-sure did not, against twenty per cent for foxes. The upside of being a hedgehog, though, is that when you're right you can be really and
spectacularly right. Great scientists, for example, are often hedgehogs. They value parsimony, the simpler solution over the more complex. In world affairs, parsimony
may be a liability-but, even there, there can be traps in the kind of highly integrative thinking that is characteristic of foxes. Elsewhere, Tetlock has published an
analysis of the political reasoning of Winston Churchill. Churchill was not a man who let contradictory information interfere with his idees fixes. This led him to make
the wrong prediction about Indian independence, which he opposed. But it led him to be right about Hitler. He was never distracted by the contingencies that might
combine to make the elimination of Hitler unnecessary. Tetlock also has an unscientific point to make, which is that "we as a society would be
better off if participants in policy debates stated their beliefs in testable forms"-that is, as probabilities-"monitored their forecasting
performance, and honored their reputational bets." He thinks that we're suffering from our primitive attraction to deterministic, overconfident hedgehogs. It's true
that the only thing the electronic media like better than a hedgehog is two hedgehogs who don't agree. Tetlock notes, sadly, a point that Richard Posner has made
about these kinds of public intellectuals, which is that most of them are dealing in "solidarity" goods, not "credence" goods. Their analyses and
predictions are tailored to make their ideological brethren feel good-more white swans for the white-swan camp. A prediction, in this context, is just an
exclamation point added to an analysis. Liberals want to hear that whatever conservatives are up to is bound to go badly; when the argument gets more nuanced, they
change the channel. On radio and television and the editorial page, the line between expertise and advocacy is very blurry, and pundits behave exactly the way Tetlock
says they will. Bush Administration loyalists say that their predictions about postwar Iraq were correct, just a little off on timing; pro-invasion liberals who are now
trying to dissociate themselves from an adventure gone bad insist that though they may have sounded a false alarm, they erred "in the right direction"-not really a
mistake at all.
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The study Menand cites is out of context it just says that we need to examine the evidence behind
predictions.
Tetlock, psychologist, 05
Philip Tetlock (psychologist) 2005 Expert Political Judgement, http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/s7959.html)
Chapters 2 and 3 explore correspondence indicators. Drawing on the literature on judgmental accuracy, I divide the guiding hypotheses into two categories: those
rooted in radical skepticism, which equates good political judgment with good luck, and those rooted in meliorism, which maintains that the quest for predictors of good
judgment, and ways to improve ourselves, is not quixotic and there are better and worse ways of thinking that translate into better and worse judgments. Chapter 2
introduces us to the radical skeptics and their varied reasons for embracing their counterintuitive creed. Their guiding precept is that, although we often talk ourselves
into believing we live in a predictable world, we delude ourselves: history is ultimately one damned thing after another, a random walk with upward and downward
blips but devoid of thematic continuity. Politics is no more predictable than other games of chance. On any given spin of the roulette wheel of history, crackpots will
claim vindication for superstitious schemes that posit patterns in randomness. But these schemes will fail in cross-validation. What works today will disappoint
tomorrow.34 Here is a doctrine that runs against the grain of human nature, our shared need to believe that we live in a comprehensible world that we can master if we
apply ourselves.35 Undiluted radical skepticism requires us to believe, really believe, that when the time comes to choose among
controversial policy options--to support Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization or to bomb Baghdad or Belgrade or to build
a ballistic missile defense--we could do as well by tossing coins as by consulting expert s.36 Chapter 2 presents evidence from regional
forecasting exercises consistent with this debunking perspective. It tracks the accuracy of hundreds of experts for dozens of countries on topics as disparate as
transitions to democracy and capitalism, economic growth, interstate violence, and nuclear proliferation. When we pit experts against minimalist performance
benchmarks--dilettantes, dart-throwing chimps, and assorted extrapolation algorithms--we find few signs that expertise translates into greater ability to make either
"well-calibrated" or "discriminating" forecasts. Radical skeptics welcomed these results, but they start squirming when we start finding patterns
of consistency in who got what right. Radical skepticism tells us to expect nothing (with the caveat that if we toss enough coins, expect some streakiness). But
the data revealed more consistency in forecasters' track records than could be ascribed to chance. Meliorists seize on these findings to argue that crude humanversus-chimp comparisons mask systematic individual differences in good judgment. Although meliorists agree that skeptics go too far in
portraying good judgment as illusory, they agree on little else. Cognitive-content meliorists identify good judgment with a particular outlook but squabble over which
points of view represent movement toward or away from the truth. Cognitive-style meliorists identify good judgment not with what one thinks, but with how one thinks.
But they squabble over which styles of reasoning--quick and decisive versus balanced and thoughtful--enhance or degrade judgment. Chapter 3 tests a multitude of
meliorist hypotheses--most of which bite the dust. Who experts were--professional background, status, and so on--made scarcely an iota of difference to accuracy. Nor
did what experts thought--whether they were liberals or conservatives, realists or institutionalists, optimists or pessimists. But the search bore fruit. How experts
thought--their style of reasoning--did matter. Chapter 3 demonstrates the usefulness of classifying experts along a rough cognitivestyle continuum anchored at one end by Isaiah Berlin's prototypical hedgehog and at the other by his prototypical fox.37 The
intellectually aggressive hedgehogs knew one big thing and sought, under the banner of parsimony, to expand the explanatory power
of that big thing to "cover" new cases ; the more eclectic foxes knew many little things and were content to improvise ad hoc solutions to keep pace with a
rapidly changing world. Treating the regional forecasting studies as a decathlon between rival strategies of making sense of the world, the foxes consistently
edge out the hedgehogs but enjoy their most decisive victories in long-term exercises inside their domains of expertise. Analysis of
explanations for their predictions sheds light on how foxes pulled off this cognitive-stylistic coup. The foxes' self-critical, point-counterpoint style of
thinking prevented them from building up the sorts of excessive enthusiasm for their predictions that hedgehogs , especially well-informed
ones, displayed for theirs. Foxes were more sensitive to how contradictory forces can yield stable equilibria and, as a result, "overpredicted" fewer departures,
good or bad, from the status quo. But foxes did not mindlessly predict the past. They recognized the precariousness of many equilibria and hedged their bets by rarely
ruling out anything as "impossible." These results favor meliorism over skepticism--and they favor the pro-complexity branch of meliorism, which proclaims the
adaptive superiority of the tentative, balanced modes of thinking favored by foxes,38 over the pro-simplicity branch, which proclaims the superiority of the confident,
decisive modes of thinking favored by hedgehogs.39 These results also domesticate radical skepticism, with its wild-eyed implication that experts have nothing useful
to tell us about the future beyond what we could have learned from tossing coins or inspecting goat entrails . This tamer brand of skepticism--skeptical
meliorism--still warns of the dangers of hubris, but it allows for how a self-critical, dialectical style of reasoning can spare experts the
big mistakes that hammer down the accuracy of their more intellectually exuberant colleagues.
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Nuclear war and extinction outweighs all impacts a fraction of infinity is still infinity
Schell, Visiting Fellow at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 82
Jonathan Schell, Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96 1982
On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in
danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the
world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of
extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They
knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass of "the basic power of the
universe" and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the
earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of
human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no
need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed,
or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at
hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of
nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to
say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and
immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into
account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not
the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place
the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our
particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction
may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we
learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and
neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in
the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same,
and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put
an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with
the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make
us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay
to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.
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National leaders dont have the Luxury of ignoring large impacts
Zeihan, IR expert for Stratfor, 08
Peter Zeihan, expert on international relations and Asian Politics, Vice President of global analysis for Stratfor
April 23, 2008
Fear is a powerful motivator, even getting results when the threat is exceedingly remote. It makes us cross at crosswalks even
when traffic is thin, pay more over time for fire insurance than our homes are worth, and shy away from snakes even when signs
clearly inform us they are not poisonous. Humans instinctively take steps to prevent negative outcomes, oftentimes regardless of how
likely or more to the point, unlikely those unpleasant outcomes are.
As with individuals, the same is true for countries. Anyone can blithely say Cuba or Serbia would not dare
ignore the will of their more powerful neighbors,or that Brazils or Egypts nuclear programs are so inconsequential as not to
impact the international balance of power. But such opinions even if they truly are near-certainties cannot
form the foundation of state power. National leaders do not have the
luxury of ignoring the plethora of coulds, mights and maybes that pepper their radar screens every day. An analyst can dismiss
a dark possibility as dubious, but a national leader cannot gamble with the lives of his countrymen and the existence of his state.
They must evaluate even improbable threats against the potential damage to their respective national interests.
Many of the standing policies we take for granted have grown from such evaluations. While the likelihood of Israel
bombing the Aswan High Dam is rather remote, Egypt cannot afford to risk the possibility, which contributed to Cairos burying-ofthe-hatchet with Israel. Worrying about continental European countries sublimating their national differences, uniting into a federated
super state and invading the United Kingdom may seem to flirt with lunacy, but within that lingering concern lies the root
of the Anglo-American alliance. Similarly, worrying about China using the archipelagos of Southeast Asia as a staging point for an
invasion of Australia may seem ludicrous, but that fear dominates military planning in Canberra.
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Some impacts warrant extra attention.
Nicholas Rescher (Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh) 1983 Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the
theory of risk evaluation, p. 67
Certain hazards are simply unacceptable because they involve a
relatively unacceptable threatthings may go wrong so badly that, relative to the alternatives, its just not worthwhile to run the risk,
even in the face of a favorable balance of probabilities. The rational man is not willing to trade off against one another by juggling probabilities such
In such situations we are dealing with hazards that are just not in the same league.
outcomes as the loss of one hair and the loss of his health or his freedom. The imbalance or disparity between risks is just too great to be restored by probablistic
readjustments. They are (probablistically) incommersuable: confronted with such incomparable hazards, we do not bother to weigh this
balance of probabilities at all, but simply dismiss one alternative as involving risks that are, in the circumstances, unacceptable.
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Role of Ballot = Magnitude

The ballot should prefer the advocacy that avoids the fastest and most probable internal link to
extinction
Bostrom Prof at Oxford, 02

Nick Bostrom, PhD and Professor at Oxford University, March, 2002 [Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol
9] http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html
Previous sections have argued that the combined probability of the existential risks is very substantial .
Although there is still a fairly broad range of differing estimates that responsible thinkers could make, it is nonetheless
arguable that because the negative utility of an existential disaster is so enormous, the objective of
reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration when acting out of concern for
humankind as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for moral action; we can call it Maxipok:
Maximize the probability of an okay outcome, where an okay outcome is any outcome that avoids existential disaster. At
best, this is a rule of thumb, a prima facie suggestion, rather than a principle of absolute validity, since there
clearly are other moral objectives than preventing terminal global disaster. Its usefulness consists in helping us to
get our priorities straight. Moral action is always at risk to diffuse its efficacy on feel-good
projects[24] rather on serious work that has the best chance of fixing the worst ills. The cleft between
the feel-good projects and what really has the greatest potential for good is likely to be especially great
in regard to existential risk. Since the goal is somewhat abstract and since existential risks dont currently cause
suffering in any living creature[25], there is less of a feel-good dividend to be derived from efforts that seek to reduce
them. This suggests an offshoot moral project, namely to reshape the popular moral perception so as to
give more credit and social approbation to those who devote their time and resources to benefiting
humankind via global safety compared to other philanthropies. Maxipok, a kind of satisficing rule, is different
from Maximin (Choose the action that has the best worst-case outcome.)[26]. Since we cannot completely eliminate
existential risks (at any moment we could be sent into the dustbin of cosmic history by the advancing front of a vacuum
phase transition triggered in a remote galaxy a billion years ago) using maximin in the present context has the consequence
that we should choose the act that has the greatest benefits under the assumption of impending extinction. In other words,
maximin implies that we should all start partying as if there were no tomorrow. While that option is indisputably attractive,
it seems best to acknowledge that there just might be a tomorrow, especially if we play our cards right.
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Extinction Evaluated First

Even a regional nuclear war would destroy all life on Earth ozone loss and UV
rays prove
Gache, Science News Editor, 08
Gabriel Gache, Science News Editor for Softpedia, an online science and technology news resource 8th of April 20 08
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Regional-Nuclear-War-Would-Destroy-the-World-82760.shtml
Global or not, a nuclear war would kill us all. And if nuclear weapons didn't do the job, then the Sun would. According to recent
studies, a regional global war would cause the ozone layer of the Earth to be destroyed in as little as a decade, all living beings being
at the mercy of the Sun's ultraviolet rays. Ultraviolet light has the ability to alter the human DNA, but other organisms may be at risk
as well. 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs would be enough to determine substantial changes in Earth's atmosphere. Take India and Pakistan
for example; both have a nuclear arsenal of about 50 nuclear warheads bearing 15 kilotons of explosive material. In case the disagreements between
the two countries reach very high levels as to make use of their entire nuclear arsenal, global disaster is soon to follow.
"The figure of 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs compares pretty accurately to the approximately 110 warheads that both states reportedly possess between
them," says professor of non-proliferation and international security in the War Studies Group at King's College, Wyn Bowen.
Michael Mills of the University of Colorado at Boulder, US, and colleagues used computer models to study how 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs would
affect the atmosphere. Michael Mills from the University of Colorado reckons that such a nuclear war in South Asia would decay about
40 percent of the ozone layer in the middle latitudes and 70 percent in the high latitudes of the northern hemisphere.
"The models show this magnitude of ozone loss would persist for five years, and we would see substantial losses continuing for at
least another five years," says Mills.
Mills extracted his results from computer models. Previous models were created during the 1980s, however those investigations revealed that impact
of the nuclear detonations would be much more moderate. This might be because the old models do not take into consideration the columns of soot
rising at altitudes of 80 kilometers into Earth's atmosphere, as Mills considers.
Once the soot is released into the upper atmosphere, it would block and absorb most of the solar energy, thus determining a heating of the
surrounding atmosphere, process that facilitates the reaction between nitrogen oxides and ozone. Ultraviolet rays influx, caused by the decay of
the ozone layer, would increase by 213 percent, causing DNA damage, skin cancers and cataract in most - if not all - living beings.
Alternatively, plants would suffer damage twice, as the current due to ultraviolet light.
"By adopting the Montreal Protocol in 1987, society demonstrated it was unwilling to tolerate a small percentage of ozone loss
because of serious health risks. But ozone loss from a limited nuclear exchange would be more than an order of magnitude larger than
ozone loss from the release of gases like CFCs," says co-author of the study Brian Toon. "This study is very conservative in its
estimates. It should ring alarm bells to remind us all that nuclear war can destroy our world far faster than carbon dioxide emissions,"
says Dan Plesch, of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at theSchool of Oriental and African Studies, UK, although he
notes that no one knows how likely a nuclear exchange is.
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**PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**
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Precautionary Principle Good- Risk Avoidance

Precautionary Principle essential to avoid unquantifiable risks
Myers, director of science and health, 04
Nancy Myers is communications director for the Science and Environmental Health Network. multinational monitor September
2004, http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2004/09012004/september04corp1.html
But serious, evident effects such as these can seldom be linked decisively to a single cause. Scientific standards of certainty (or
"proof") about cause and effect are high. These standards may never be satisfied when many different factors are working together,
producing many different results. Sometimes the period of time between particular causes and particular results is so long, with
so many intervening factors, that it is impossible to make a definitive link. Sometimes the timing of exposure is crucial -- a trace
of the wrong chemical at the wrong time in pregnancy, for example, may trigger problems in the child's brain or endocrine system, but
the child's mother might never know she was exposed.
In the real world, there is no way of knowing for sure how much healthier people might be if they did not live in the modern
chemical stew, because the chemicals are everywhere -- in babies' first bowel movement, in the blood of U.S. teenagers and in the
breastmilk of Inuit mothers. No unexposed "control" population exists. But clearly, significant numbers of birth defects, cancers and
learning disabilities are preventable.
Scientific uncertainty is a fact of life even when it comes to the most obvious environmental problems, such as the disappearance
of species, and the most potentially devastating trends, such as climate change. Scientists seldom know for sure what will
happen until it happens, and seldom have all the answers about causes until well after the fact, if ever. Nevertheless, scientific
knowledge, as incomplete as it may be, provides important clues to all of these conditions and what to do about them.
The essence of the Precautionary Principle is that when lives and the future of the planet are at stake, people must act on these
clues and prevent as much harm as possible, despite imperfect knowledge and even ignorance.
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Precautionary Principle Good- Risk Fails

Risk Assessment paradigms fail
Ironically, one tool that has proved highly effective in the battle against environmental regulations was one that was meant to
strengthen the enforcement of such laws: quantitative risk assessment. Risk assessment was developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a
systematic way to evaluate the degree and likelihood of harmful side effects from products and technologies. With precise,
quantitative risk assessments in hand, regulators could more convincingly demonstrate the need for action. Risk assessments would
stand up in court. Risk assessments could "prove" that a product was dangerous, would cause a certain number of deaths per million,
and should be taken off the market.
Or not. Quantitative risk assessment, which became standard practice in the United States in the mid-1980s and was
institutionalized in the global trade agreements of the 1990s, turned out to be most useful in "proving" that a product or
technology was not inordinately dangerous. More precisely, risk assessments presented sets of numbers that purported to state
definitively how much harm might occur. The next question for policymakers then became: How much harm is acceptable?
Quantitative risk assessment not only provided the answers; it dictated the questions.
As quantitative risk assessment became the norm, commercial and industrial interests were increasingly able to insist that
harm must be proven "scientifically" -- in the form of a quantitative risk assessment demonstrating harm in excess of acceptable
limits -- before action was taken to stop a process or product. These exercises were often linked with cost-benefit assessments that
heavily weighted the immediate monetary costs of regulations and gave little, if any, weight to costs to the environment or future
generations.
Although risk assessments tried to account for uncertainties, those projections were necessarily subject to assumptions and
simplifications. Quantitative risk assessments usually addressed a limited number of potential harms, often missing social,
cultural or broader environmental factors. These risk assessments have consumed enormous resources in strapped regulatory
agencies and have slowed the regulatory process. They have diverted attention from questions that could be answered: Do better
alternatives exist? Can harm be prevented?
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Precautionary Principle Good Risk Fails

Precautionary Principle preferable to Risk assessment
Risk assessment is the prevalent tool used to justify decisions about technologies and products. Its proponents argue
that because conservative assumptions are built into these assessments, they are sufficiently precautionary.
Too often, however, risk assessment has been used to delay precautionary action: decision-makers wait to get enough
information and then attempt to "manage" rather than prevent risks. Risk assessment is not necessarily inconsistent
with the Precautionary Principle, but because it omits certain basic requirements of the decision-making process, the
current type of risk assessment is only helpful at a narrow stage of the process, when the product, technology or
activity and alternatives have been well developed and tested and a great deal of information has already been gathered
about them. Standard risk assessment, in other words, is only useful in conditions of relatively high certainty, and
generally only to help evaluate alternatives to damaging technologies.
Under the Precautionary Principle, uncertainty is also given due weight. The Precautionary Principle calls for the
examination of a wider range of harms -- including social and economic ones -- than traditional risk analysis provides. It
points to the need to examine not only single, linear risks but also complex interactions among multiple factors, and the
broadest possible range of harmful effects.
This broad, probing consideration of harm -- including the identification of uncertainty -- should begin as early as possible
in the conception of a technology and should continue through its release and use. That is, a precautionary approach should
begin before the regulatory phase of decision-making and should be built into the research agenda.
What is not consistent with the Precautionary Principle is the misleading certainty often implied by quantitative risk
assessments -- that precise numbers can be assigned to the possibility of harm or level of safety, that these numbers are
usually a sufficient basis for deciding whether the substance or technology is "safe," and that lack of numbers means there
is no reason to take action. The assumptions behind risk assessments -- what "risks" are evaluated and how comparisons
are made -- are easily manipulated by those with a stake in their outcome.
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Precautionary Principle Good- AT Innovation Stultification

The Precautionary Principle improves innovation
Precautionary action usually means adopting safer alternatives. A broad precautionary approach will encourage the development of
better technologies. Using this approach, society will say "yes" to some technologies while it says "no" to others. Making uncertainty
explicit, considering alternatives, and increasing transparency and the responsibility of proponents and manufacturers to demonstrate
safety should lead to cleaner products and production methods. It can also mean imposing a moratorium while further research is
conducted, calling for monitoring of technologies and products already in use, and so forth
The Precautionary Principle encourages better technologies

This is not true. Precaution suggests two approaches to new technology:
Greater vigilance about possible harmful side effects of all innovations. Alternatives to harmful technologies (such as
genetic modification to reduce pesticide use) must be scrutinized as carefully as the technologies they replace. It does not
make sense to replace one set of harms with another. Brand-new technologies must receive much greater scrutiny than
they have in the past.
Redirection of research and ingenuity toward inherently safer, more harmonious, more sustainable technologies,
products, and processes.
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Precautionary Principle Good- AT Zero Risk

Precautionary Principle doesnt demand zero risk, just an attempt to reduce harm
Any debate over the possibility of "zero risk" is pointless. Our real goal must be to impose far less risk and harm on the
environment and on human health than we have in the past. We must harness human ingenuity to reduce the harmful effects of
our activities.
The real question is who or what gets the benefit of the doubt. The Precautionary Principle is based on the assumption that people
have the right to know as much as possible about risks they are taking on, in exchange for what benefits, and to make choices
accordingly. With food and other products, such choices are often played out in the marketplace. Increasingly, manufacturers are
choosing to reduce risk themselves by substituting safer alternatives in response to consumer uneasiness, the threat of liability and
market pressures.
A key to making those choices is transparency -- about what products contain, and about the testing and monitoring of those
ingredients. Another is support, by government and industry, for the exploration of -- and rigorous research on -- alternatives.
Market and voluntary action is not enough, especially on issues that go beyond individual and corporate choice. It is the responsibility
of communities, governments, and international bodies to make far-reaching decisions that greatly reduce the risks we now impose on
the earth and all its inhabitants.
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Precautionary Principle Good- AT Cost

A2 very expensive
If a cost-benefit analysis indicates that a precautionary approach is too expensive, that analysis is probably incomplete.
Does it consider long-term costs? The costs to society? The costs of harmful side effects -- monetary and nonmonetary? The
costs spread over a product's entire lifecycle -- including disposal? The pricetags of most products and developments do not
reflect their real costs. Like precautionary science, precautionary economics operates in the real world, in which
connections, costs and benefits are complex and surrounded by uncertainty -- but they cannot be ignored. Tallying the
"cost" of precaution requires making true value judgments, which can only partially be expressed by money. But in the 21st
Century, precaution is essential to a healthy, sustainable economy.
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Precautionary Principle Good- AT Bad Science

The Precautionary Principle encourages scientific evaluation in addition to societal action
On the contrary, the Precautionary Principle calls for more and better science, especially investigations of complex interactions
over longer periods of time and development of more harmonious technologies. It calls for scientific monitoring after the
approval of products. The assertion that the principle is "anti-science" is based on any or all of the following faulty
assumptions:
1) Those who advocate precaution urge action on the basis of vague fears, regardless of whether there is scientific evidence to support
their fears.
Most statements of the Precautionary Principle say it applies when there is reason to believe serious or irreversible harm may occur.
Those reasons are based on scientific evidence of various kinds: studies, observations, precedents, experience, professional judgment.
They are based on what we know about how processes work and might be affected by a technology.
However, precautionary decisions also take into account what we know we do not know. The more we know, scientifically, the
greater will be our ability to prevent disasters based on ignorance. But we must be much more cautious than we have been in the
past about moving forward in ignorance.
2) Taking action in advance of scientific certainty undermines science.
Scientific standards of certainty are high in experimental science or for accepting or refuting a hypothesis, and well they should be.
Waiting to take action before a substance or technology is proven harmful, or even until plausible cause-and-effect
relationships can be established, may mean allowing irreversible harm to occur -- deaths, extinctions, poisoning, and the like.
Humans and the environment become the unwitting testing grounds for these technologies. This is no longer acceptable. Moreover,
science should serve society, not vice versa. Any decision to take action -- before or after scientific proof -- is a decision of society,
not science.
3) Quantitative risk assessment is more scientific than other kinds of evaluation.
Risk assessment is only one evaluation method and provides only partial answers. It does not take into account many unknowns and
seldom accounts for complex interactions -- nor does it raise our sights to better alternatives.
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**AT PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE**
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Precautionary Principle Bad- Paralysis (1/3)

The precautionary principle is paralyzing and destroys the possibility for any action
Sunstein professor at the University of Chicago Law School 2005,
Cass R Sunstein. prominent law professor at the University of Chicago Law School. Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary
Principle p3-4 2005
My larger point, the central claim of this chapter, is conceptual. The real problem with the Precautionary Principle in its strongest
forms is that it is incoherent; it purports to give guidance, but it fails to do so, because it condemns the very steps that it
requires. The regulation that the principle requires always gives rise to risks of its own and hence the principle bans what it
simultaneously mandates. I therefore aim to challenge the Precautionary Principle not because it leads in bad directions, but because
read for all its worth, it leads in no direction at all. The principle threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction, and
every step in between. It provides help only if we blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a
narrow subset of what is at stake. That kind of self-blinding is what makes the principle seem to give guidance; and I shall have a
fair bit to say about why people and societies are selective in their fears.
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The precautionary principle is flawed it totalizes risk assessment to the point of nihilism and stifles
calculated risk-taking that solves extinction
Scruton professor of philosophy 2004,
Roger Scruton former professor of philosophy at Birkbeck College in London, founder of the Claridge Press and author of more than
20 published books on philosophy and theory, Summer 2004[National Interest]
The Precautionary Principle clearly presents an obstacle to innovation and experiment. But there are deeper reasons for being
troubled by it, reasons that bear on the very essence of human life and on our ability to solve practical problems. First, there is the
tendency of the principle to disaggregate risks in ways that defeat the possibility of reasonable solutions. Risks are never
single, nor do they come to us only from one direction or from one point in time. By not taking the risk of angering my child, I
take the risk of dealing, at some later stage, with a spoiled and self-centered adolescent. All practical reasoning involves weighing
risks against one another, calculating probabilities, ring-fencing uncertainties, taking account of relative benefits and
costs. This mode of reasoning is instinctive to us and has ensured our extraordinary success as a species. There is a branch of
mathematics-decision theory-devoted to formalizing it, and there is nothing in decision theory that looks like the Precautionary
Principle. For the effect of this principle is to isolate each risk as though it were entirely independent of every other. Risks,
according to the principle, come single-wrapped, and each demands the same response-namely-Don't! If, in obeying this
command, you find yourself taking another risk, then the answer again is "Don't!" The principle is therefore logically on a par with
the command given by an American president to his senior civil servant: "Don't just do something, stand there!" But, as the
president realized, standing there is not something that civil servants are very good at. Bureaucrats have an inveterate need to be seen
to be doing something. The effect of the principle therefore is to forbid the one identified risk, while removing all others from
the equation. What this means can be vividly seen from a recent instance. A European directive, responding to the slight risk that
diseased animals might enter the human food chain, insists that all slaughter should now take place in the presence of a
qualified vet, who must inspect each animal as it arrives at the abattoir. There is no evidence that veterinary examination in these
circumstances is either necessary or (in the rare cases when infected animals come to the abattoir) effective. Nevertheless, the
Precautionary Principle delivered its usual result, and the edict was imposed. Small abattoirs all over Britain were forced to
close down, since their profit margins are as narrow as those of the farmers whom they serve, and qualified vets require fees that
reflect their qualifications. The effect of this on husbandry,on the social and economic life of farming communities, and on the
viability of small pasture farms has been devastating, the effect on animal welfare equally so. Instead of travelling a quarter of an hour to
the local abattoir, our herds must now travel three or four hours to one of the great processing plants that enjoy the presence of a permanent vet. Farmers who have
taken pride in their animals and cared for them through two or more winters are distressed to part with them on such terms, and the animals themselves suffer
greatly. This damage done to the relation be-tween farmer and herd has further adverse effects on the landscape. Unable to take
full responsibility for the life and the death of his animals, a farmer ceases to see the pointof his unprofitable trade. The small
pasture farms that created the landscape of England are now rapidly disappearing, to be replaced by faceless agro-businesses or
equestrian leisure centers. This damages our landscape, and in doing so damages our sense of nationhood, of which the landscape
has been the most potent symbol. As if those long-term costs were not bad enough, we have also had to endure the short-term cost of hoof-and-mouth disease, which
in the past would usually be contained in the locality where it broke out. In its latest occurrence, the disease was immediately carried all over the country by animals
on their way to some distant abattoir. The result was the temporary, but total, ruination of our livestock farming. Now, a responsible politician would
have taken into account, not only the small risk addressed by the directive, but also the huge risks posed to the farming
community by the destruction of local abattoirs, the risks posed to animals by long journeys, the benefits of localized food
production and local markets for meat, and so on. And he would have a motive for considering all those things, namely, his desire to
be re-elected, when the consequences of his decision had been felt. As a rational being, he [or she] would recognize that risks do
not come in atomic particles, but are parts of complex organisms, shaped by the flow of events. And he would know in his heart that
there is no more risky practice than that of disaggregating risks, so as one by one to forbid them. Even bureaucrats, in their own private lives, will take the same line.
They too are rational beings and know that risks must constantly be taken and constantly weighed against each other. However, when a bureaucrat legislates for others
and suffers no cost should he get things wrong, he will inevitably look for a single and specific problem and seize on a single and absolute principle in order to solve
it. The result is the Precautionary Principle and all the follies that are now issuing from the unconscionable use of it. This suggests another and deeper
irrationality in the principle. It is right that legislators should take risks into account, but not that they should automatically forbid
them, even when they can make a show of isolating them from all other relevant factors. For there is an even greater risk attached
to the habit of avoiding risks-namely, that we will produce a society that has no ability to survive a real emergency when
risk-taking is the only recourse. It is not absurd to think that this is a real danger. How many a soporific Empire, secure in its longstanding abundance, has been swept away by barbarian hordes, simply because the basileus or caliph had spent his life in risk-free
palaces? History is replete with warnings against the habit of heeding every warning. Yet this is the habit that the Precautionary
Principle furthers. By laying an absolute edict against risk, it is courting the greatest risk of all, namely, that we shall face our
next collective emergency without the only thing that would enable us to survive it.
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The Precautionary principle causes complete stultification, everything has some risk of an impact
Hathcock, Council for Responsible Nutrition, 00
J.N. Hathcock, (2000). The precautionary principleAn Impossible burden of proof for new products. AgBioForum, 3(4), 255258
The zero-risk impetus of the precautionary principle fails to recognize that although science can provide a high level
of confidence, it can never provide certainty. Absolute proof of safety is not achievable because it would require the
proof of a negative, a proof that something (risk) does not exist. The precautionary principle always tells us not to
proceed because there is some threat of harm that cannot be conclusively ruled out. Thus, "the precautionary
principle will block the development of any technology if there is the slightest theoretical possibility of harm. " (Holm
& Harris, 1999, p. 398). With a separate precautionary principle as a component of risk management, such an assertion by
regulatory decision-makers could completely negate the role of science in food safety decisions.
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Precautionary Principle Bad- Innovation (1/3)

The precautionary principle stifles innovation and essential technologies
Miller, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 01
Dr. Henry I. Miller, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Gregory Conko, Director of Food Safety Policy at
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, June,2001 http://www.policyreview.org/jun01/miller print.html
In both the United States and Europe, public health and environmental regulations usually require a risk assessment to
determine the extent of potential hazards and of exposure to them, followed by judgments about how to regulate. The
precautionary principle can distort this process by introducing a systematic bias into decision making. Regulators face an
asymmetrical incentive structure in which they are compelled to address the potential harms from new products, but are free
to discount the hidden risk-reducing properties of unused or underused ones. The result is a lopsided process that is inherently
biased against change and therefore against innovation. To see why, one must understand that there are two basic kinds of mistaken
decisions that a regulator can make: First, a harmful product can be approved for marketing called a Type I error in the parlance of
risk analysis. Second, a useful product can be rejected or delayed, can fail to achieve approval at all, or can be inappropriately
withdrawn from the market a Type II error. In other words, a regulator commits a Type I error by permitting something
harmful to happen and a Type II error by preventing something beneficial from becoming available. Both situations have negative
consequences for the public, but the outcomes for the regulator are very different. Examples of this Type I-Type II error dichotomy in
both the U.S. and Europe abound, but it is perhaps illustrated most clearly in the FDAs approval process for new drugs. A classic
example is the FDAs approval in 1976 of the swine flu vaccine generally perceived as a Type I error because while the vaccine
was effective at preventing influenza, it had a major side effect that was unknown at the time of approval: A small number of patients
suffered temporary paralysis from Guillain-Barr Syndrome. This kind of mistake is highly visible and has immediate consequences:
The media pounce and the public and Congress are roused, and Congress takes up the matter. Both the developers of the product and
the regulators who allowed it to be marketed are excoriated and punished in such modern-day pillories as congressional hearings,
television newsmagazines, and newspaper editorials. Because a regulatory officials career might be damaged irreparably by
his [or her] good-faith but mistaken approval of a high-profile product, decisions are often made defensively in other
words, above all to avoid Type I errors. Former FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt aptly summarized the regulators dilemma:
In all our FDA history, we are unable to find a single instance where a Congressional committee investigated the failure of FDA to
approve a new drug. But, the times when hearings have been held to criticize our approval of a new drug have been so frequent that
we have not been able to count them. The message to FDA staff could not be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug is
resolved by approval of the drug, the agency and the individuals involved likely will be investigated. Whenever such a drug is
disapproved, no inquiry will be made. The Congressional pressure for negative action is, therefore, intense. And it seems to be ever
increasing. Type II errors in the form of excessive governmental requirements and unreasonable decisions can cause a new product to
be disapproved, in Schmidts phrase, or to have its approval delayed. Unnecessary or capricious delays are anathema to
innovators, and they lessen competition and inflate the ultimate price of the product. Consider the FDAs precipitate response to the 1999
death of a patient in a University of Pennsylvania gene therapy trial for a genetic disease. The cause of the incident had not been identified and the product class (a
preparation of the needed gene, encased in an enfeebled adenovirus that would then be administered to the patient) had been used in a large number of patients, with no
fatalities and serious side effects in only a small percentage of patients. But given the high profile of the incident, regulators acted disproportionately. They not only
stopped the trial in which the fatality occurred and all the other gene-therapy studies at the same university, but also halted similar studies at other universities, as well
as experiments using adenovirus being conducted by the drug company Schering-Plough one for the treatment of liver cancer, the other for colorectal cancer that had
metastasized to the liver. By these actions, and by publicly excoriating and humiliating the researchers involved (and halting experiments of theirs that did not even
involve adenovirus), the FDA cast a pall over the entire field of gene therapy, setting it back perhaps as much as a decade . Although they can dramatically
compromise public health, Type II errors caused by a regulators bad judgment, timidity, or anxiety seldom gain public
attention. It may be only the employees of the company that makes the product and a few stock market analysts and investors who are knowledgeable about
unnecessary delays. And if the regulators mistake precipitates a corporate decision to abandon the product, cause and effect are seldom connected in the public mind.
Naturally, the companies themselves are loath to complain publicly about a mistaken FDA judgment, because the agency has so much discretionary control over their
ability to test and market products. As a consequence, there may be no direct evidence of, or publicity about, the lost societal benefits, to say nothing of the culpability
of regulatory officials. Exceptions exist, of course. A few activists, such as the AIDS advocacy groups that closely monitor the FDA, scrutinize agency review of
certain products and aggressively publicize Type II errors. In addition, congressional oversight should provide a check on regulators performance, but as noted above
by former FDA Commissioner Schmidt, only rarely does oversight focus on their Type II errors. Type I errors make for more dramatic hearings, after all, including
injured patients and their family members. And even when such mistakes are exposed, regulators frequently defend Type II errors as erring on the side of caution in
effect, invoking the precautionary principle as they did in the wake of the University of Pennsylvania gene therapy case. Too often this euphemism is accepted
uncritically by legislators, the media, and the public, and our system of pharmaceutical oversight becomes progressively less responsive to the public interest. The FDA
is not unique in this regard, of course. All regulatory agencies are subject to the same sorts of social and political pressures that cause them to be castigated when
dangerous products accidentally make it to market (even if, as is often the case, those products produce net benefits) but to escape blame when they keep beneficial
products out of the hands of consumers.Adding the precautionary principles bias against new products into the public policy mix
further encourages regulators to commit Type II errors in their frenzy to avoid Type I errors. This is hardly conducive to
enhancing overall public safety.
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Innovation key to life saving medical tech
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, June,2001 http://www.policyreview.org/jun01/miller print.html
Activists have since extended their antichlorine campaign to so-called endocrine disrupters, or modulators, asserting that
certain primarily man-made chemicals mimic or interfere with human hormones (especially estrogens) in the body and thereby cause a
range of abnormalities and diseases related to the endocrine system. The American Council on Science and Health has explored the
endocrine disrupter hypothesis and found that while high doses of certain environmental contaminants produce toxic effects in
laboratory test animals in some cases involving the endocrine system humans actual exposure to these suspected endocrine
modulators is many orders of magnitude lower. It is well documented that while a chemical administered at high doses may cause
cancer in certain laboratory animals, it does not necessarily cause cancer in humans both because of different susceptibilities and
because humans are subjected to far lower exposures to synthetic environmental chemicals. No consistent, convincing association has
been demonstrated between real-world exposures to synthetic chemicals in the environment and increased cancer in hormonally
sensitive human tissues. Moreover, humans are routinely exposed through their diet to many estrogenic substances (substances having
an effect similar to that of the human hormone estrogen) found in many plants. Dietary exposures to these plant estrogens, or
phytoestrogens, are far greater than exposures to supposed synthetic endocrine modulators, and no adverse health effects have been
associated with the overwhelming majority of these dietary exposures. Furthermore, there is currently a trend toward lower
concentrations of many contaminants in air, water, and soil including several that are suspected of being endocrine disrupters.
Some of the key research findings that stimulated the endocrine disrupter hypothesis originally have been retracted or are not
reproducible. The available human epidemiological data do not show anyconsistent, convincing evidence of negative health
effects related to industrial chemicals that are suspected of disrupting the endocrine system. In spite of that, activists and many
government regulators continue to invoke the need for precautionary (over-) regulation of various products, and even outright
bans. Antichlorine campaigners more recently have turned their attacks to phthalates, liquid organic compounds added to certain
plastics to make them softer. These soft plastics are used for important medical devices, particularly fluid containers, blood bags,
tubing, and gloves; childrens toyssuch as teething rings and rattles; and household and industrial items such as wire coating and
flooring. Waving the banner of the precautionary principle, activists claim that phthalates might have numerous adverse
health effects even in the face of significant scientific evidence to the contrary. Governments have taken these unsupported
claims seriously, and several formal and informal bans have been implemented around the world. As a result, consumers have
been denied product choices, and doctors and their patients deprived of life-saving tools.
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The Precautionary Principle forces society away from technological advancement
Hathcock, Council for Responsible Nutrition, 00
J.N. Hathcock, (2000). The precautionary principleAn Impossible burden of proof for new products. AgBioForum, 3(4), 255258
The problem with the precautionary principle is two-fold, one logical and the other perceptual . First, the logical fault
the precautionary principle was originally developed to provide risk managers with a tool for decision-making on
environmental threats from processes or substances that had not undergone safety evaluation or regulatory approval. The
precautionary principle was not defined or developed for application to the intentional components of foods that require or
depend on a conclusion of safety. Application of this principle could create an impossible burden of proof for new food
products or ingredients. Second, the perceptual faultthe term "precautionary principle" is seductively attractive
because it sounds like something that everyone should want and no one could oppose.
Upon initial consideration, it might seem that the only alternative to precaution is recklessness but, in fact, excessive
precaution leads to paralysis of actions resulting from unjustified fear. In many cases, the slight but non-zero risk
associated with a product or process is far safer than the alternative of doing nothing. Excellent examples include the
outbreak of cholera resulting from fear of chlorinated water (Anderson, 1991) and the reluctance to permit food
fortification with folic acid to reduce the incidence of specific birth defects for fear of masking vitamin B-12 deficiency
(United States Food and Drug Administration [US FDA], 1996).
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Precautionary Principle Bad- Pandemic

The Precautionary principle enables mass pandemics
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, June, 2001 http://www.policyreview.org/jun01/miller print.html
The danger in the precautionary principle is that it distracts consumers and policymakers from known, significant threats to
human health and diverts limited public health resources from those genuine and far greater risks. Consider, for example, the
environmental movements campaign to rid society of chlorinated compounds. By the late 1980s, environmental activists were
attempting to convince water authorities around the world of the possibility that carcinogenic byproducts from chlorination of
drinking water posed a potential cancer risk. Peruvian officials, caught in a budget crisis,used this supposed threat to public
health as a justification to stop chlorinating much of the countrys drinking water. That decision contributed to the acceleration
and spread of Latin Americas 1991-96 cholera epidemic, which afflicted more than 1.3 million people and killed at least 11,000.
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Precautionary Principle Bad- Militarism

The precautionary principle is used to legitimize military interventionism
Sunstein professor at the University of Chicago Law School 2005,
Cass R Sunstein. prominent law professor at the University of Chicago Law School. Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary
Principle p3-4 2005
My point of departure is the Precautionary Principle, which is a focal point for thinking about health, safety, and the
environment throughout Europe. In fact the Precautionary Principle is receiving increasing worldwide attention,
having become the basis for countless international debates about how to think about risk, health, and the environment.
The principle has even entered into debates about how to handle terrorism, about preemptive war , and about the
relationship between liberty and security. In defending the 2003 war in Iraq, President George W Bush invoked a
kind of Precautionary Principle, arguing that action was justified in the face of uncertainty. If we wait for threats
to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. He also said, I believe it is essential that when we see a threat, we
deal with those threats before they become imminent. Its too late if they become imminent. What is especially noteworthy
is that this way of thinking is essentially the same as that of environmentalists concerned about global warming, genetic
modification of food, and pesticides. For these problems, it is commonly argued that regulation, rather than inaction, is the
appropriate course in the face of doubt.
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Utilitarianism precludes any claim of moral rights rights not quantifiable.
McCloskey, professor of philosophy, 1984

HJ. Utilitarianism and Natural Human Moral Rights. R. G. Frey. Utility and Rights. Pgs 121-122.
In spite of this, Bentham's clear apprehension of utilitarianism's commitment to rejecting the view that there are certain
basic natural human moral rights that hold of human beings as human beings, very many utilitarians today seek to reconcile
their utilitarianism with theories of human moral rights, with theories of natural moral rights of persons of the kinds set out
in the UN Declarations, according to which we are claimed to possess various basic, fundamental moral rights simply by
virtue of being human beings, or human persons, and not by virtue of the utility of a belief in and action on the basis of
respect for such rights. Utilitarianism denies, and is committed to denying, that there are natural moral rights that hold of
persons as persons, of human beings qua human beings. If its ethic is to be expressed in the language of moral rights, it
might be said to hold that it is the greatest good or the greatest /pleasure that has a moral right to exist, that individual
persons and animals have no moral right to a specific share in or of the greatest good, I their roles being those of being
instruments for achieving or vehicles for bringing into being and sustaining the greatest good, they having a moral right to
contribute to the common good as vehicles or instruments thereof. Of course, strictly speaking, an abstraction such as the
greatest good cannot in any literal sense of 'moral right,' possess moral rights, whilst the rights individuals may possess as
vehicles or instruments of the greatest good would be a mixed bunch, including such rights as the rights to live or to be
killed, to be free or to be constrained, to be helped or to be harmed or used-the rights varying from person to person,
situation to situation, from time to lime. Thus, if the greatest good could be realized by promoting the pleasure of only one
or other of two distinct groups of one hundred persons, then, in terms of utilitarianism, it would morally be indifferent
which group was chosen, and no member of either group would have a moral right to the pleasure. Similarly, if, in a war,
the greatest good could be achieved only be sending a particular platoon on a suicide mission, the officer in charge would
have the moral right to order the platoon to go on the mission, and the members of the platoon would have the moral right
to be killed for the sake of the greatest good. This is a very different way of thinking about moral rights from that in terms
of there being certain basic human moral rights.
No legitimate reason to include rights discussion under util f/w

HJ. Utilitarianism and Natural Human Moral Rights. R. G. Frey. Utility and Rights. Pg 124.
A utilitarian might seek to accommodate talk about human moral rights within the utilitarian framework by arguing that
there are good utilitarian reasons for attributing human rights to persons who do not possess moral rights, just as there may
be good utilitarian reasons for ascribing responsibility to persons who are not morally responsible for their actions. This
might be urged in terms of act-utilitarianism as a tactical move for maximizing good. Alternatively, it could be developed as
an element of a rule-utilitarianism. Clearly it would be difficult to find plausible act-utilitarian reasons for propagating
such a falsehood. On the other hand, whilst a rule-utilitarianism that incorporated such a human moral rights component
would normatively be more attractive than many versions of rule-utilitarianism, it would remain exposed to the basic
criticisms of rule-utilitarianism set out by JJ. C. Smart, myself, and others.'
Utilitarianism is the only calculus that takes into account human response
Ratner, professor of law at USC, 1984 (Leonard G. Ratner p.735, professor of law at USC, 1984 Hofstra Law Journal. The
Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution HeinOnline)
Because evolutionary utilitarianism is concerned with human survival and depends on human response, its goal
is necessarily fulfillment of human needs and wants. Utilitarian choices are made by existing humans. The
decisions of every human are derived from the experience, and reflect the desires, of that human. Humans may
be concerned with the needs and wants of animals or of future generations, but that concern is inescapably a
product of existing human needs and wants.
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Util Good K2 Policymaking

Utilitarianism key to policy making
Ratner, professor of law at USC, 1984 (Leonard G. Ratner p.731-2, professor of law at USC, 1984 Hofstra Law Journal.
The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution HeinOnline)
Evolutionary progression toward majoritarian decision-making follows from the utilitarian function of social organization
to enhance human need/want fulli1lment. Because the need/want preference of community members are best
known to them, resource allocations and behavior constraints that significantly reflect their in- put best
implement those preferences. The need/want fulfillment of such members expands with their approval
of community decision-making institutions. Such approval lowers the costs of dissenter disruption
while increasing psychological security and productive efficiency. The utilitarian enhanced-fulfillment
goal is most effectively implemented by communities that optimize (not maximize) individual
participation in policy formulation. Optimal participation involves the selection of capable officials who make
independent community fulfillment decisions but remain subject to effective community supervision. Self-constrained
majoritarianism thus appears to be the evolving political counterpart of utilitarianism, a continuity suggested by the
progression of western nations from autocracy toward representative democracy, the enhanced need/want fulfillment that
has accompanied the progression, and the inability of totalitarian governments to match that fulfillment.
Policymakers should adapt utilitarian calculus applicable throughout society.

Goodin90 [RobertE. Goodin The Utilitarian Response.
Ed p. 140-1 http://books.google.com/books?
id=l3ZBwjK_1_QC&pg=PA61&lpg=PA61&dq=%22That,+I+submit,+is+a+fallacy
%22+goodin&source=bl&ots=9hUQGnLTzV&sig=URHUw3uamFPyVmKwTyG1onBQvZI&hl=en&ei=zKxmSsfVMpCE
tgfLvP3yDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1]
The distinction I shall here propose works along a dimension orthogonal to that one. Instead of differentiating
utilitarianisms on the basis of what they are used to choose, I suggest doing so on the basis of who is supposed to use the
utilirarian calculus to make choices, Implicitly, contemporary discussions of varieties of utilitatianism are all standardly
addresses, first and foremost, to individuals acting in their personal capacities and making choices which, while they may
affect others as well, principally affect the choosers own lives, Implicitly, public officials choices of general social policy.
A different menu of options in some respects greater, in others, less, but in any case different- is available to public and
private users. That, I submit, is a fallacy. It does not matter who is using the utilitarian calculus, in what circumstances and
for what purposes. Using the felicific calculus for micro-level purposes of guiding individuals choices of personal conduct
is altogether different from using it for macro-level purposes of guiding public officials shoices of general social policy. A
different menu of options in some respects greater, in others, less, but in any case different is available to public and
private choosers. Those differences are such as to neutralize in the public sphere, most of the objections standardly lodged
against utilitarianism in the private sphere. True through such complaints may be as applied to utilitarianism as a standard
of personal conduct, they are irrelevant (or anyway much less problematic) as applied to utilitarianism as a standard of
public policy. Or so I shall argue.
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Util Good - K2 Determine Rights

Utilitarian calculus is the only way to determine rights relative importance.
Brandt, professor of philosophy @ U Mich. 1992
Richard. Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights. Cambridge University Press. Pg 199.
Before turning to possible " deeper" difficulties, let me make just one point favorable to the utilitarian view, that it tells us,
in principle, how to find out what are a person's rights, and how stringent they are, relative to each other, which is much
more than can be said of most other theories, unless reliance on intuitions is supposed to be a definite way of telling what a
person's rights are. How does one do this, on the utilitarian theory? The idea, of course, is that we have to determine
whether it would maximize long-range expectable utility to include recognition of certain rights in the moral code of a
society, or to include a certain right with a certain degree of stringency as compared with other rights. (For instance, it
might be optimistic to include a right to life with more stringency than a right to liberty and this with more stringency than
the right to pursue happiness.) Suppose, for instance, one wants to know what should be the scope of the " right to life."
Then it would be proper to inquire whether the utility-maximizing moral system would require people to retrain from taking
the life of other adults, more positively to support life by providing adequate medical care, to abstain from life-termination
for seriously defective infants or to refrain from abortion, to require abstaining from assisting a person with terminal illness
in ending his own life if he requests it, to refrain from assisting in the discharge of a sentence of capital punishment, or to
refrain from killing combatants in war time and so on. If one wants to know whether the right to life is stronger than the
right of free speech on political subjects, it is proper to inquire whether the utility maximizing moral code would prefer free
speech to the cost of lives (and in what circumstances).
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Util Good Best Interest

Utilitarianism necessitates public policy that requires that leaders take the action which is in the best
interest of people
Shaw Philosophy Professor 1999 (William H. Shaw, 1999, Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy at SJSU, contemporary
ethics: taking account of utilitarianism p 171-2)
Utilitarianism ties right and wrong to the promotion of well-being, but it is not only n personal ethic or a guide to individual
conduct. lt is also a "public philosophy" - that is, a normative basis for public policy and the structuring of our social,
legal, and political institutions. Indeed, it was just this aspect of utilitarianism that primarily engaged Bentham, john Stuart
Mill, his father James, and their friends and votaries. For them utilitarianism was, first and foremost, a social and political
philosophy and only secondarily a private or personal moral code. In particular, they saw utilitarianism as providing the
yardstick by which to measure, assess, and, where necessary, reform government social and economic policy and the
judicial institutions of their day. In the public realm , utilitarianism is especially compelling. Because of its
consequentialist character, a utilitarian approach to public policy requires officials to base their actions,
procedures, and programs on the most accurate and detailed understanding they can obtain of the
circumstances in which they are operating and the likely results of the alternatives open to them .
Realism and empiricism are the hallmarks of a utilitarian orientation, not customary practice, unverified abstractions, or
wishful Promotion of the well being of all seems to be the appropriate, indeed the only sensible, touchstone for assessing
public policies and institutions, and the standard objections to utilitarianism as a personal morality carry little
or no weight against it when viewed as a public philosophy . Consider, for instance, the criticisms that
utilitarianism is too impersonal and ignores one's individual attachments and personal commitments, that it is coldly
calculating and concerned only with maximizing, that it demands too much of moral agents and that it permits one to
violate certain basic moral restraints on the treatment of others. The previous two chapters addressed sorne of these
criticisms; others will be dealt with in Chapter 8. The point here, though, is that far from undermining utilitarianism
as a public philosophy, these criticisms highlight its strengths. We want public officials to be neutral,
impersonal. and detached and to proceed with their eyes firmly on the effects of the policies they
pursue and the institutions that their decisions shape. Policy making requires public officials to address
general issues, typical conditions. and common circumstances. Inevitably, they must do this through general
rules, not on a case by case basis. As explained later in this chapter, this fact precludes public officials from
violating the rights of individuals as a matter of policy. Moreover, by organizing the efforts of countless
individuals and compelling each of us to play our part in collective endeavors to enhance welfare, public officials can make
it less likely that utilitarianism will demand too much of any one individual because others are doing too little.
Utilitarians will seek to direct and coordinate people's actions through effective public policy and to
reshape, in utility-enhancing ways, the institutions that structure the choices people face. By doing so,
utilitarians can usually accomplish more good than they can through isolated individual action,
however dedicated and well intentioned. For this reason, they will strive to Easter institutions that false over from
individuals much of the task of promoting the general welfare of society. General welfare is a broad goal, of
course, and sensible policies and institutions will typically focus on more specific desiderata - such as
promoting productivity, increasing individual freedom and opportunity, improving peoples physical
health, guaranteeing their personal security, and so on that contribute significantly to people's wellbeing. Implementing even there goals can prove difficult. Furthermore, many of the problems facing society have no
simple answers because they are tangled up with contested issues of fact and controversial questions of psychology,
sociology, and economics. To the extent that utilitarians disagree among themselves over these matters, their policy
recommendations will diverge. Nevertheless, by clarifying what is at stake and continually orienting discussion toward the
promotion of well-being, a. utilitarian approach provides the necessary framework for addressing questions of institutional
design and for fashioning effective public policy. The present chapter explicates the utilitarian approach to three matters
that have long engaged social and political philosophers and that concern.
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Util Good Concrete Decisionmaking

Only Utilitarianism makes justifications based on the end result rather then ambiguous language
Ratner, professor of law at USC, 1984 (Leonard G. Ratner p.758-9, professor of law at USC, 1984 Hofstra Law Journal.
The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution HeinOnline)
Disregarding the significance of evolutionary survival, nonutilitarian intuitionists deny that utilitarianism provides a
"moral" basis for choice between competing need/want fulfillments. They seek instead to identify the intuitive "preexisting
rights that must, they insist, underlie such choice.' But they disclose no nonrnystical. source of the rights,*' which are, in
fact, derived from the search for increased per capita need/want fulfillment. Although frequently accorded a
transcendental immutability, rights identify the resource and behavior allocations that are perceived by the community as
enhancing such fulfillment. Indeed, revelation of various a priori rights or moral standards is often
accompanied by disparagement of other such rights or standards as crypto-nti1itarian. A priori rights

divorced from need/want fulfillment depend on the magic power of language. When not determined by
social consequences, the morality of behavior tends to be resolved by definition of the words used to
characterize the behavior. Necessarily ambiguous generalizations, evolved to describe and correlate
heterogeneous events, acquire a controlling normative role. Definition, of course, reflects human experience.
But the equivocal significance of that experience may be replaced with the illusory security of fixed meaning. Ethical
connotations are then drawn not from the underlying empirical lessons that provide a context for meaning, but from
inflexible linguistic "principles and their emotional overtones. Derivation of meaning from the social purposes that
engender the terminology leads to a utilitarian appraisal of need] want fulfillment. The preexisting rights of
nonutilitarian morality are usually identified as components of "liberty," "equality, and autonomy,"'
labels that suggest a concern with individual need/want fulfillment and its social constraints. Liberty is
perceived as freedom for behavior that improves the quality of existence, such as speech, religion, and
other "civil rights activity; equality as rejection of disparate individual worth and "discriminatory"
treatment; autonomy as the individual choice implied by liberty and equality.
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Util Good Prevents Nuke War

Utilitarianism prevents nuclear war
Without effective reciprocity, self-defense is the only survival remedy. Passive resistance to a Hitler has survival costs that
are acceptable to few communities. Rejection of those costs is perhaps being accommodated with the intolerable survival
costs of nuclear warfare by payment of more immediate nuclear-deterrence costs. Negotiations to reduce the nucleardeterrence costs confront the participants with a predicament like the "prisone1s dilemma"' if nuclear weapons can escape
detection: although both participants would benefit from a reduction, each is impelled to increase its nuclear weapons as
protection against an undetected increase by the other. But each may also be impelled to refrain from their use. If that
accommodation fails, so may the evolutionary process. While the accommodation holds, nonnuclear self
defense remains the survival remedy pending a reciprocity solution. The survival costs of nonnuclear
warfare of course continue to be high, but when the survival costs of capitulation are perceived as
exceeding them, compensation for combatants commensurate with risk would provide a kind of market
accommodation for those induced thereby to volunteer and would reduce the disproportionate wartimecon-scription assessment.
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Utilitarianism inevitable
utilitarianism reconciles autonomy and reciprocity, surmounts the strident intuitionist attack, and exposes the utilitarian
underpinning of a priori rights." In the context of the information provided by biology, anthropology, economics, and other
disciplines, a functional description of evolutionary utilitarianism identities enhanced per capita need/want
fulfillment as the long-term utilitarian-majoritarian goal, illuminates the critical relationship of self interest to
that goal, and discloses the trial-and-error process of accommodation and priority assignment that implements it . The
description confirms that process as arbiter of the tension between individual welfare and group
welfare (i.e., between autonomy and reciprocity)* and suggests a utilitarian imperative: that
utilitarianism is unavoidable, that morality rests ultimately on utilitarian self interest, that in the final
analysis all of us are personal utilitarians and most of us are social utilitarians.
Utilitarianism is inevitable - people are inherently utilitarians
Gino et al 2008 [Francesca Gino Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, Don Moore Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University, Max H.
Bozman Harvard Business School, Harvard University No harm, no foul: The outcome
bias in ethical judgments http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-080.pdf]
A home seller neglects to inform the buyer about the homes occasional problems with
flooding in the basement: The seller intentionally omits it from the houses legally required
disclosure document, and fails to reveal it in the negotiation. A few months after the closing, the
basement is flooded and destroyed, and the buyer spends $20,000 in repairs. Most people would
agree that the sellers unethical behavior deserves to be punished. Now consider the same
behavior on the part of a second seller, except that it is followed by a long drought, so the buyer
never faces a flooded basement. Both sellers were similarly unethical, yet their behavior
produced different results. In this paper, we seek to answer the question: Do people judge the
ethicality of the two sellers differently, despite the fact that their behavior was the same? And if
so, under what conditions are peoples judgments of ethicality influenced by outcome
information? Past research has shown some of the ways that people tend to take outcome information into account in a
manner that is not logically justified (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Allison, Mackie,
& Messick, 1996). Baron and Hershey (1988) labeled this tendency as the outcome bias.
Extending prior work on the effect of outcome severity on judgments (Berg-Cross, 1975;
Lipshitz, 1989; Mitchell & Kalb, 1981; Stokes & Leary, 1984), their research found that people
judge the wisdom and competence of decision makers based on the nature of the outcomes they
obtain. For instance, in one study participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario of a
surgeon deciding whether or not to perform a risky operation (Baron & Hershey, 1988). The
surgeon knew the probability of success. After reading about identical decision processes,
participants learned either that the patient lived or died, and were asked to rate the quality of the
No Foul 4 surgeons decision to operate. When the patient died, participants decided it was a mistake to
have operated in the first place.
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Survival Instinct Good Extinction

Multiple Inevitable Scenarios for extinction make it necessary to act on our
survival instinct
Mathney, Consultant to the Center for Biosecurity, 07
Jason G. Mathney, 07 (MBA is a Consultant to the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC. Sommer Scholar s at Johns Hopkins' )
http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/se/util/display_mod.cfm?MODULE=/se-server/mod/modules/semod
_printpage/mod_default.cfm&PageURL=/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15reducingrisk.html&VersionObject=A09EDA45D011A282BA7021E754D0B39C&Template=79799&PageStyleSheet=81604
We already invest in some extinction countermeasures. NASA spends $4 million per year monitoring near-Earth
asteroids and comets (Leary, 2007) and there has been some research on how to deflect these objects using existing
technologies (Gritzner & Kahle, 2004; NASA, 2007). $1.7 billion is spent researching climate change and there are many
strategies to reduce carbon emissions (Posner, 2004, p. 181). There are policies to reduce nuclear threats, such as the
Non- Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as efforts to secure expertise by
employing former nuclear scientists. Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The
knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary
equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can
have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006).5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are
funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and
emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, &
Shuler, 2006).
There is currently no independent body assessing the risks of high-energy physics experiments. Posner (2004) has
recommended withdrawing federal support for such experiments because the benefits do not seem to be worth the risks.
As for astronomical risks, to escape our suns death, humanity will eventually need to relocate. If we survive the next
century, we are likely to build self-sufficient colonies in space. We would be motivated by self-interest to do so, as
asteroids, moons, and planets have valuable resources to mine, and the technological requirements for colonization are not
beyond imagination (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996).
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Consequentialism Good
Consequentialism is best, short term impacts are key even when the longterm impacts are uncertain.
Cowen 2004 [Tyler Cowen, Department of Economics George Mason University The epistemic Problem does not refute
consequentialismNovember2,2004
http://docs.google.com/gview?
a=v&q=cache:JYKgDUM8xOcJ:www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf+%22nuclear+attack+on+Manhattan
%22+cowen&hl=en&gl=us]
Let us start with a simple example, namely a suicide bomber who seeks to detonate a nuclear device in midtown Manhattan.
Obviously we would seek to stop the bomber, or If we stop the bomber, we know that in the short run we will save millions
of lives, avoid a massive tragedy, and protect the long-term strength, prosperity, and freedom of the United States.
Reasonable moral people, regardless of the details of their meta-ethical stances, should not argue against stopping the
bomber. No matter how hard we try to stop the bomber, we are not, a priori, committed to a very definite view of how
effective prevention will turn out in the long run. After all, stopping the bomber will reshuffle future genetic identities, and
may imply the birth of a future Hitler. Even trying to stop the bomber, with no guarantee of success, will remix the future in
similar fashion.Still, we can see a significant net welfare improvement in the short run, while facing radical generic
uncertainty about the future in any case. Furthermore, if we can stop the bomber, our long-run welfare estimates will likely
show some improvement. The bomb going off could lead to subsequent attacks on other major cities, the emboldening of
terrorists, or perhaps broader panics. There would be a new and very real doorway toward general collapse of the world.
While the more distant future is remixed radically, we should not rationally believe that some new positive option has been
created to counterbalance the current destruction and the new possible negatives. To put it simply, it is difficult to see the
violent destruction of Manhattan as on net, in ex ante terms, favoring either the short-term or long-term prospects of the
world. We can of course imagine possible scenarios where such destruction works out for the better ex post; perhaps, for
instance, the explosion leads to a subsequent disarmament or anti-proliferation advances. But we would not breathe a sigh
of relief on hearing the news of the destruction for the first time. Even if the long-run expected value is impossible to
estimate, we need only some probability that the relevant time horizon is indeed short (perhaps a destructive asteroid will
strike the earth). This will tip the consequentialist balance against a nuclear attack on Manhattan.
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Consequentialism Fails
Consequentialism, by very nature, will fail in public policy to improve the well-being of others
Scheffler, prof philosophy, Princeton, 94
(Samuel Scheffler, prof philosophy, Princeton, 11/24/94, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 14-16,
http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=M95w6e9pzZsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA14&dq=reject+consequentialism&ots=hbQFBohbTL&sig=VgDh7pP6sAhJ1IKGaB
A3BW7hi1Y)
I will maintain shortly that a hybrid theory which departed from consequentialism only to the extent of incorporating an
agent-centred prerogative could accommodate the objection dealing with personal integrity. But first it is necessary to give
fuller characterization of a plausible prerogative of this kind. To avoid confusion, it is important to make a sharp distinction
at the outset between an agent-centred prerogative and a consequentialist dispensation to devote more attention
to ones own happiness and well-being than to the happiness and well-being of others .
Consequentialists often argue that a differential attention to ones own concerns will in most actual
circumstances have the best overall results, and that such differential treatment of oneself is therefore
required on consequentialist grounds. Two sorts of considerations are typically appealed to in support of this view. First,
it is said that one is in a better position to promote ones own welfare and the welfare of those one is closest to than to
promote the welfare of other people. So an agent produces maximum good per unit of activity by focusing
his efforts on those he is closest to, including himself. Second, it is said that human nature being what it is,
people cannot function effectively at all unless they devote somewhat more energy to promoting their own well-being than
to promoting the well-being of other people. Here the appeal is no longer to the immediate consequantialist advantages of
promoting ones own well-being, but rather to the long-term advantages of having psychologically healthy agents who are
efficient producers of the good. We find an example of the first type of argument in Sidgwicks remark that each man is
better able to provide for his own happiness than for that of other persons, from his more intimate knowledge of his own
desires and needs, and his greater opportunities of gratifying them. Mill, in the same vein, writes that the occasions on
which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his powerto be a public benefactor are but exceptional; and on
these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness
of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Sidgwick suggests an argument of the second type when he says that
because it is under the stimulus of self-interest that the active energies of most men are most easily and thoroughly drawn
out, it would not under actual circumstances promote the universal happiness if each man were to concern himself with
the happiness of others as much as with his own.
Consequentialism is based on the greater good, not on self-interests

Kagan, prof social thoughts and ethics, Yale, 84
(Philosophy and Public Affairs, Kagan, prof social thoughts and ethics, Yale, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1984), pp. 239-254
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2265413.pdf)
Consequentialism claims that an act is morally permissible if and only if it has better consequences than
those of any available alternative act. This means that agents are morally required to make their largest possible
contribution to the overall good-no matter what the sacrifice to themselves might involve (remembering only that
their own well-being counts too). There is no limit to the sacrifices that morality can require; and agents are
never permitted to favor their own interests at the expense of the greater good.
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Consequentialism Fails
There is a limit to what morality can require for us, which consequentialism fails to incorporate
Our ordinary moral intuitions rebel at this picture. We want to claim that there is a limit to what morality can
require of us. Some sacrifices for the sake of others are meritorious, but not required; they are supererogatory. Common morality grants the agent some room to pursue his own projects, even though other actions might
have better consequences: we are permitted to promote the good, but we are not required to do so. The objection that
consequentialism demands too much is accepted uncritically by almost all of us; most moral philosophers introduce permission to perform nonoptimal acts without even a word in its defense. But the mere fact that our intuitions support some
moral feature hardly constitutes in itself adequate philosophical justification. If we are to go beyond mere intuition
mongering, we must search for deeper foundations. We must display the reasons for limiting the
requirement to pursue the good.
Consequentialism can result in sacrifices on some for the sake of others

Furthermore, discussions of the claim that consequentialism demands too much are often undermined by failure to
distinguish this claim from the widely discussed objection that consequentialism permits too much- improperly
permitting sacrifices to be imposed on some for the sake of others. Some theories include
deontological restrictions, forbidding certain kinds of acts even when the consequences would be good.
I will not consider here the merits of such restrictions. It is important to note, however, that even a theory which included
such restrictions might still lack more general permission to act nonoptimally-requiring agents to promote the good within
the pennissible means. It is only the grounds for rejecting such a general requirement to promote the overall good that we
will examine here.
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Util Bad No Equality/Justice

Utilitarianism cant address the issues of equity and distributive justice
Liu PHD University of Pennsylvania 2000 (Dr. Liu, PHD @ University of Pennsylvania, writes 2000 [Environmental
Justice Analysis: theories, methods and practice, 2000 ISBN:1566704030, p.20-21])
However, its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its quantifications techniques are far from being simple,
straightforward, and objective. Indeed, they are often too complicated to be practical. They are also to flexible and
subject to manipulation. They are impersonal and lack compassion. More importantly, they fail to deal the issue of
equity and distributive justice. Seemingly, you cannot get fairer than this. In calculating benefits and costs, each
person is counted as one and only one. IN other words, people are treated equally. For Mill, justice arises from the
principle of utility. Utilitarianism in concerted only the aggregate effect, no matter how the aggregate is
distributed. For almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of benefits and costs. Some people
win, while others lose. The Pareto optimality would is almost nonexistent. A policys outcome is Pareto optimal if
nobody loses and at least one person gains.
Utilitarianism policies result in inequality

Liu PHD University of Pennsylvania 2000 (Dr. Liu, PHD @ University of Pennsylvania, writes 2000 [Environmental
Justice Analysis: theories, methods and practice, 2000 ISBN:1566704030, p.20-21])
Besides these ridiculous policy implications in the United States and in the world, the logic underlying Summers proposal
represents cultural imperialism, the capitalist mode of production and consumption, and a particular kind of politicaleconomic power and its discriminatory practices (Harvey 1996:368). Except for its beautiful guise of economic logic, the
proposal is nothing new to those familiar with the history. The capitalistic powerhouses in Europe practiced material and
cultural imperialism against countries in Africa, America, and Asia for years. They did it by raising the banner of trade and
welfare enhancement. They did it through guns and powder. Of course, they had their logic for exporting opium to Canton
(Guangzhou) in China through force. Now, we see a new logic. This time, it is economic logic and globalization. This time,
the end is the same, but the means is not through guns and powder. Instead, it is political-economic power. This example
illustrates clearly the danger of using the utilitarian perspective as the only means for policy analysis. Fundamentally, the
utilitarian disregards the distributive justice issue altogether and espouses the current mode of
production and consumption and the political-economic structure, without any attention to the inequity
and inequality in the current system. Even worse and more subtly, it delivers the philosophy of it
exists, therefore its good. However, just because it sells, doesnt mean we have to worship it (Peirce 1991).
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Util Bad Mass Murder

Utilitarian thinking results in mass murder
Cleveland Professor of Business Administration and Economics 2002 (Cleveland 2002 Paul A., Professor of
Business Administration and Economics at Birmingham-Southern College, The Failure of Utilitarian Ethics in Political Economy, The
Journal of Private Enterprise, http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602)
A final problem with utilitarianism that ought to be mentioned is that it is subject to being criticized because of a potential
fallacy of composition. The common good is not necessarily the sum of the interests of individuals. In their book, A History
of Economic Theory and Method, Ekelund and Hebert provide a well-conceived example to demonstrate this problem. They
write: It is presumably in the general interest of American society to have every automobile in the United States equipped
with all possible safety devices. However, a majority of individual car buyers may not be willing to pay the cost of such
equipment in the form of higher auto prices. In this case, the collective interest does not coincide with the sum
of the individual interests. The result is a legislative and economic dilemma. Indeed, individuals prone
to political action, and held under the sway of utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor
of the supposed collective interest over and against that of the individual. But then, what happens to
individual human rights? Are they not sacrificed and set aside as unimportant? In fact, this is precisely
what has happened. In democratic countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred
years has occurred primarily for this reason. In addition, such thinking largely served as the justification for the
mass murders of millions of innocent people in communist countries where the leaders sought to
establish the workers paradise. To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to
discern between the various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails
to provide an adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is extremely
important for a whole host of policy issues. Among them, the issue of the governments provision of public goods is worth
our consideration.
Utilitarianism is used to justify mass murder by governments

Cleveland, Professor of Business Administration and Economics 2002 (Cleveland 2002 Paul A., Professor of
Indeed, the widespread confusion over this point is one of the primary reasons why western market economies have continued to drift towards the ready
acceptance of socialist policies. Edmund Opitz has rightly observed that utilitarianism with its greatest happiness principle completely neglects the
spiritual dimension of human life. Rather, it simply asserts that men are bound together in societies solely on the basis of a rational calculation of the
private advantage to be gained by social cooperation under the division of labor. [2] But, as Opitz shows, this perspective gives rise to a serious problem.
the utilitarian principle will tend to lead to the collective use of

government power so as to redistribute income in order to gain the greatest happiness in society.
Regrettably, the rent seeking behavior that is spawned as a result of this mind set will prove
detrimental to the economy. Nevertheless, this kind of action will be justified as that which is most socially expedient
in order to reach the assumed ethical end. Utilitarianism, in short, has no logical stopping place short of
collectivism.[3] If morality is ultimately had by making the individuals happiness subservient to the
organic whole of society, which is what Benthams utilitarianism asserts, then the human rights of the
individual may be violated. That means property rights may be violated if it is assumed to promote the utilitarian end.
However, property rights are essential in securing a free market order. As a result , utilitarianism can then be used to
justify some heinous government actions. For instance, the murder of millions of human beings can be
justified in the minds of reformers if it is thought to move us closer to paradise on earth. This is
precisely the view that was taken by communist revolutionaries as they implemented their grand
schemes of remaking society. All of this is not to say that matters of utility are unimportant in policy decisions, but
Since theft is the first labor saving device,
merely to assert that utilitarian ethics will have the tendency of promoting collectivist policies.
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Util Bad Annihilation

Medical utilitarian calculus ensures human dehumanization and annihilation.
Smith 2002 (Michael G Smith 2002, Leadership University, The Public Policy of Casey V. Planned Parenthood
http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/casey/ch3.html)
Furthermore, abandoning the principle of human equality could lead to eugenics because eugenics is founded on
the same philosophy that some people are of lesser value than others. Eugenics is founded on the utilitarian philosophy
of German philosopher Hegel. Utilitarianism, also known as pragmatism, holds that "the end justifies the means." If a
means provides a solution to a practical problem, it is morally justifiable.{86} The Holocaust, in which
Nazi Germany saw a problem in the existence of Jews, Gypsies, and mentally and physically handicapped
people, was founded on Hegels pragmatic philosophy.{87} C.G. Campbell,{88} President of the American
Eugenics Society Inc. in 1931{89} has written:
"Adolf Hitler ... guided by the nation's anthropologists, eugenicists and social
philosophers, has been able to construct a comprehensive racial policy of population development and improvement ... it sets a
pattern ... these ideas have met stout opposition in the Rousseauian social philosophy ... which bases ... its whole social and
political theory upon the patent fallacy of human equality ... racial consanguinity occurs only through endogamous mating or
interbreeding within racial stock ... conditions under which racial groups of distinctly superior hereditary qualities ... have
emerged." (Emphasis added).{90} Mr. Campbell, a leader in the eugenics movement,{91} has clearly rejected the
idea of human equality. This rejection helped pave the way toward intellectual acceptance of Nazi
Germanys "Final Solution." and has helped pave the way toward Americas final solution to problem pregnancy. "Nazi
Germany used the findings of eugenicists as the basis for the killing of people of inferior genetic stock."{92} Another leader in
the eugenics movement, Madison Grant,{93} connected the purported inequality of the unborn to the goals of the eugenics
movement. "...Indiscriminate efforts to preserve babies among the lower classes often results in serious injury to the race ...
Mistaken regard for what are believed to be divine laws and sentimental belief in the sanctity of human life tend to prevent both
the elimination of defective infants and the sterilization of such adults as are themselves of no value to the community"
(Emphasis added).{94} As recently as six years ago, two medical ethicists, Kuhse and Singer, have argued that no human being
has any right to life.{95} Using a utilitarian approach, they have concluded that "mentally defective" people,
unborn people, and even children before their first birthday, have no right to life because these people are
not in full possession of their faculties.{96} These utilitarian authors are fully consistent with other
utilitarians in that they first reject the principle that are humans have equal moral status, then, using
subjective criteria that appeals to themselves personally, they identify certain humans they find expendable.
While Kuhse and Singer may be personally comfortable with their conclusions, this approach leaves all of us less than secure
from being dehumanized. If newborn infants can be found to lack equal moral status, then surely there are other innocent and
vulnerable member of society who can be similarly found to lack equal moral status. The Nazis left few people in Germany safe
from the gas chambers, and any other society that uses utilitarianism in medical ethics also leaves great portions of society at risk
of death at the convenience of society at large. Clearly, the equal moral status of all humans must be recognized by the law.
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Utilitarianism takes away all value to live
Cleveland Professor of Business Administration and Economics 2002 (Cleveland 2002 Paul A., Professor of
Another problem with utilitarianism is that it has
being. Within Benthams view, human beings
a very narrow conception of what it means to be a human

are essentially understood to be passive creatures who
respond to the environment in a purely mechanical fashion . As such, there are no bad motives, only bad
calculations. In these terms, no person is responsible for his or her own behavior. In effect, the idea being
promoted is that human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation. This notion
reduces a human thought to nothing more than a series of bio-chemical reactions. Yet, if this is true, then there is no
meaning to human thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point of being
meaningless.[6]
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Util Excludes Rights

Rights incompatible with utilitarianism.
The first thing to notice is that utilitarianism is a general normative theory either about what is desirable, or about what
conduct is morally right, but in the first instance not a theory of rights at all, except by implication. A philosopher can be
a utilitarian without offering any definition of "a right" and indeed without having thought about the matter. It is true that
some definitions of "a right" are so manifestly incompatible with the normative theses of utilitarianism that it is clear that a
utilitarian could not admit that there are rights in that sense. For instance, if someone says that to have a right (life, liberty)
is for some sort of thing to be secured to one absolutely, though the heavens fall, and that this is a self-evident truth, then it
is pretty clear that a utilitarian will have no place for rights in his sense. Again, if one follows Hobbes and says, "Neither by
the word right is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties
according to right reason," one is not going to be able to accept a utilitarian normative theory , for a utilitarian is not going
to underwrite a man's absolute liberty to pursue his own good according to his own judgment.
Util ignores fundamental rights and creates a slippery slope until rights lose all significance
Bentley 2k [ Kristina A. Bentley graduate of the Department of government at the University of Manchester.
Suggesting A Separate Approach To Utility and Rights: Deontological Specification and Teleogical
Enforcement of Human Rights, September.
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/postgrad/vol1_issue3/issue3_article1.pdf]
Utilitarian theories usually present the view that they are capable of accommodating the idea of legal rights, as well as
providing a normative theory about such rights, which Lyons calls the legal rights inclusion thesis (Lyons, 1994: 150). On
the other hand however, utilitarian theorists are sceptical of the idea of moral rights unsupported by legal institutions, as
such rights would then in certain circumstances preclude the pursuit of the most utile course of action owing to their moral
force, or normative force (Lyons, 1994: 150). Conversely, legal rights are seen as being compatible with utilitarian goals as
they are normatively neutral, being morally defensible (which entails the idea of a moral presumption in favour of
respecting them) only in so a far as they contribute to overall utility (Lyons, 1994: 150). The problem then, as conceived
by Lyons, is whether or not utilitarians can account for the moral force of legal rights (which people are commonly
regarded as having by rights theorists and utilitarians alike), as: although there are often utilitarian reasons for respecting
justified legal rights, these reasons are not equivalent to the moral force of such rights, because they do not exclude direct
utilitarian arguments against exercising such rights or for interfering with them (Lyons, 1994: 150). This being the case, the
utilitarian finds herself in the uncomfortable position of having to explain why rights ought to be bothered with at all, as if
they may be violated on an ad hoc basis to satisfy the demands of maximal utility, then they seem as confusing on this
scheme as natural or moral rights are claimed to be. This then raises the question as to whether or not utilitarianism can
accommodate any rights at all, even legal rights as its exponents claim it is able to do, in its rule formulation at least.
However, leaving this debate aside as it exceeds the scope of this paper, an alternative approach, that of government house
utilitarianism (see Goodin, 1995: 27) is worth considering as a possible means to a solution.
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Survival Instinct Bad Destroys Humanity

The quest for survival destroys humanity
Callahan, director of The Hastings Institute, 73

Daniel Callahan, Co-founder and former director of The Hastings Institute, PhD in philosophy from Harvard University,
The Tyranny of Survival 1973, p 91-93
There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of
survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when
survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to
defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is
directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would
ignore, suppress, or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value
is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values, Survival can become an obsession and a
disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing . We come here to the fundamental moral
dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition
for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life- then how
will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival, without in the process, destroying everything in human
beings which makes them worthy of survival? To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation,
then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory
to end all Pyrrhic victories Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage
their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so.
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**RIGHTS/DEONTOLOGY**
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Must Evaluate Human Rights (1/2)

Violations of freedom and justice must be evaluated before every other impact
Petro Professor of Law 74.
Sylvester Petro, Prof of Law @ Wake Forest U, University of Toledo Law Review, pg. 4801)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind
David Hume's observation: " It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion
of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects . That road leads to chaos,
tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration . Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in
freedom as a supreme value and the Proper ordering; principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then
every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.
Dehumanization outweighs every other impact

Montagu and Matson, scientist and professor 83
Ashley Montagu, Esteemed Scientist and Writer; and Floyd Matson, Professor of American Studies at University of Hawaii The
dehumanization of man, http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:hnDfqSFkJJwJ:www.cross-x.com/vb/archive/index.php/t-939595.html+montagu+matson+dehumanization&hl=en
The contagion is unknown to science and unrecognized by medicine (psychiatry aside); yet its wasting symptoms are plain for all to see
and its lethal effects are everywhere on display. It neither kills outright nor inflicts apparent physical harm, yet the extent of its
destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natual calamity on record -- and its potential damage to the
quality of human life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason, this sickness of the soul might well be
called the Fifth Hourseman of the Apocalypse. Its more conventional name, of course, is dehumanization.
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Must Evaluate Human Rights (2/2)

Human rights abuses must be evaluated
Copelon, Professor of Law, 98
Rhonda Copelon, Professor of Law and Director of the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of
New York School of Law, New York City Law Review, 1998/99, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev. 59
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in the international
arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority of the U.S. version of rights, to rebuild popular
expectations, and to help develop a culture and jurisprudence of indivisible human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic
inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and
environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is being broadened
today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of
women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and
betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a
state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The
emerging rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given
the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the human
rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.
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Deontology O/W Util

Deontology precludes util- the values of deontology come first
Mcnaughton and Rawling 98 [David McNaughton and Piers Rawling are professors of philosophy at Keele University
and the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Ratio, On Defending Deontology, issue 11, p. 48-49 Ebsco]
Nagel effectively accepts the consequentialist view that a system of moral rules can only be defended
by showing that their adoption brings about some good that could not otherwise be realized, and then
seeks to show that deontology is such a system. The claim is not, of course, that agent-relative reasons rest
directly on considerations of value in a manner obviously susceptible to the CVC; rather, the grounding is indirect the
notion is that worlds in which there are agent-relative reasons are better than worlds in which there are not. Nagel argues
that an agent relative morality, qua moral system, is intrinsically valuable. Thus we concur with Hooker
(1994), then, pace Howard-Snyder (1993), that rule consequentialism is not a 'rubber duck'. Thus rights (the obverse
of constraints) have value, and are, therefore, part of the basic structure of moral theory. A right is an
agent-relative, not an agent-neutral, value, says Nagel (1995, p.88). This is precisely because it is supposed to
resist the CVC (one is forbidden to violate a right even to minimize the total number of such
violations). So Nagel faces the Scheffler problem: How could it be wrong to harm one person to
prevent greater harm to others? How are we to understand the value that rights assign to certain kinds of human
inviolability, which makes this consequence morally intelligible? (p.89, our emphasis note the presumption inherent in
the question). The answer focuses on the status conferred on all human beings by the design of a
morality which includes agent-relative constraints (p.89). That status is one of being inviolable (which
is not, of course, to say that one will not be violated, but that one may not be violated even to minimize the
total number of such violations). A system of morality that includes inviolability encapsulates a good
that its rivals cannot capture. For, not only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but
for it to be permissible to harm the person in those ways is an additional and independent evil (p.91). So
there is a sense in which we are better off if there are rights (they are a kind of generally disseminated intrinsic good
(p.93)). Hence there are rights. In short, we are inviolable because
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Deontology O/W Util

Deontology comes first, the means must justify themselves utilitarianism justifies the Holocaust.
Anderson, 2004 (Kerby Anderson is the National Director of Probe Ministries International, , Probe Ministries Utilitarianism:
The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number http://www.probe.org/theology-and-philosophy/worldview--philosophy/utilitarianismthe-greatest-good-for-thegreatest-number.html)
One problem with utilitarianism is that it leads to an "end justifies the means" mentality. If any
worthwhile end can justify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that the
end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to
purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a
communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. A particular act
cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some
objective and consistent standard of morality. Second, utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of
minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century
could justify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans.
Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third
problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on results, then we would have
to
have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only
guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is
that consequences themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are
good or bad results. Utilitarianism provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results
because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself.inviolability is intrinsically valuable.
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Deontology O/W Util

Deontology precludes util- the values of deontology come first
Mcnaughton and Rawling 98 [David McNaughton and Piers Rawling are professors of philosophy at Keele University
and the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Ratio, On Defending Deontology, issue 11, p. 48-49 Ebsco]
Nagel effectively accepts the consequentialist view that a system of moral rules can only be defended
by showing that their adoption brings about some good that could not otherwise be realized, and then
seeks to show that deontology is such a system. The claim is not, of course, that agent-relative reasons rest
directly on considerations of value in a manner obviously susceptible to the CVC; rather, the grounding is indirect the
notion is that worlds in which there are agent-relative reasons are better than worlds in which there are not. Nagel argues
that an agent relative morality, qua moral system, is intrinsically valuable. Thus we concur with Hooker
(1994), then, pace Howard-Snyder (1993), that rule consequentialism is not a 'rubber duck'. Thus rights (the obverse
of constraints) have value, and are, therefore, part of the basic structure of moral theory. A right is an
agent-relative, not an agent-neutral, value, says Nagel (1995, p.88). This is precisely because it is supposed to
resist the CVC (one is forbidden to violate a right even to minimize the total number of such
violations). So Nagel faces the Scheffler problem: How could it be wrong to harm one person to
prevent greater harm to others? How are we to understand the value that rights assign to certain kinds of human
inviolability, which makes this consequence morally intelligible? (p.89, our emphasis note the presumption inherent in
the question). The answer focuses on the status conferred on all human beings by the design of a
morality which includes agent-relative constraints (p.89). That status is one of being inviolable (which
is not, of course, to say that one will not be violated, but that one may not be violated even to minimize the
total number of such violations). A system of morality that includes inviolability encapsulates a good
that its rivals cannot capture. For, not only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but
for it to be permissible to harm the person in those ways is an additional and independent evil (p.91). So
there is a sense in which we are better off if there are rights (they are a kind of generally disseminated intrinsic good
(p.93)). Hence there are rights. In short, we are inviolable because
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Deontology O/W Util

Deontology comes before util- utilitarianism can be a last resort to preserve fundamental rights
Kateb 1992 [George Kateb is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, at Princeton University The Inner
Ocean http://books.google.com/books?id=MtGJdmzqLZoC&dq=kateb+%22what+does+a+theory%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s]
What does a theory of rights leave undecided? Many issues of public policy do not affect individual rights, despite frequent
ingeniuous efforts to claim that they do. Such issues pertain to the promotion of a better life, whether for the disadvantaged
or for everyone, or involve the clash of interests. So long as rights are not in play, advocates of rights can rightly allow a
loose utilitarianism as the proper guide to public policy, though they should always be eager to keep the states energy
under suspicion. One can even think, against utilitarianism, that any substantive outcome acheived by
morally proper procedure is morally right and hence acceptable (so long as rights are not in play ). The
main point, however, is that utilitarianism has a necessary place in any democratic countrys normal
political deliberations. But its advocates must know its place, which ordinarily is only to help to decide
what theory of rights leave alone. When may rights be overridden by the government? I have two sorts of cases in
mind: overriding a particular right of some persons for the sake of preserving the same right of others, and overriding the
same right of everyone for the sake of what I will clumsily call civilization values. An advocate of rights could
countenance, perhaps must countenance, the states overriding of rights for these two reasons. The subject is painful and
liable to dispute every step of the way. For the state to override-that is, sacrifice- a right of some so theat
others may keep it, the situations must be desperate. I havein mind, say, circumstances in which the
choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost . The state (or some other
agent) may kill some or allow them to be killed), if the only alternative is letting everyone die. It is the
right to life which most prominently figures in thinking about desperate situations. I cannot see any resolution but to heed
the precept that numbers count. Just as one may prefer saving ones own life to saving that of another when both cannot be
saved, so a third party-let us say, the state- can (perhaps must) choose to save the greater number of lives and at the cost of
the lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. That choice does not mean that those to be sacrificed
are immoral if they resist being sacrificed. It follows, of course, that if a third party is right to risk or sacrifice the
lives of the lesser for the lives of the greater number when the lesser would otherwise live, the lesser
are also not wrong if they resist being sacrificed. To accept utilitarianism (in some loose sense) as a
necessary supplement. It thus should function innocently, or when all hope of innocence is gone . I
emphasize, above all, however, that every care must be taken to ensure that the precept that numbers of lives
count does not become a license for vaguely conjectural decisions about inflicting death and saving life
and that desperation be as strictly and narrowly understood as possible. (But total numbers killed do
not count if members of one group have to kill members of another group to save themselves from
threatened massacre of enslavement or utter degradation or misery; they may kill their attackers in an
attempt to end the threat.)
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Deontology O/W Util

Deontology preserves fundamental rights and still accesses the ultimate good, accessing the same things
as util
Bentley No Date [ Kristina A. Bentley graduate of the Department of government at the University of
Manchester. Suggesting A Separate Approach To Utility and Rights: Deontological Specification and
Teleogical Enforcement of Human Rights http://www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/postgrad/vol1_issue3/issue3_article1.pdf]
The second area of departure between utilitarianism and rights-based theories is that utilitarians advocate a simple
maximising strategy as the aim is to maximise social utility and a society is justified in doing whatever enhances its
aggregate utility (Jones, 1994: 52). Conversely, the opponents of this view hold that rights constitute an area which is
beyond the reach of such calculations, as it would be pointless if rights could be set aside in a mere calculus of
competing preferences (Jones, 1994: 53). This is because rights are regarded as being considerations which are special in
the sense that they protect individuals from the potential excesses of such calculations. Consequently, to refer back to
Gewirths example, according to the rights-based account, it would always be morally wrong to torture an innocent
person, even if this would result in a large increase in aggregate utility in such a society, while a utilitarian approach
would weigh up the evidence, such that if thousands of lives would be saved by the torture, then it ought to be done. This
roughly reflects Dworkins notion of Rights as Trumps which override, or supersede ordinary notions of well-being.
The difference however is that Dworkins theory occupies some middle ground, as it does not rule out rights being
overridden by such considerations when other fundamental rights are threatened (Jones, 1994: 53). So while Dworkin
would probably argue that to torture someone to give others in society pleasure at the sight would be trumped by the right
not to be tortured, he would perhaps concede that to torture an individual to prevent the detonation of a nuclear bomb, as
is the case in Gewirths example, may be justified, as the right to life of all others in society may, in this instance, trump
the right of an individual not to be tortured. Dworkins formulation again places the domain of rights beyond the reach of
ordinary considerations of utility, but he does make provision for rights to be balanced against one another (to trump
one another) in cases of extreme gravity for rights themselves. Consequently, theories of rights quite simply consider
respect for rights to be the primary consideration in the course of social deliberation, while utilitarians consider the
ultimate good or utility on the balance to be the correct goal to pursue, even if this potentially infringes on individual
rights. However, assertions that these conceptions of justice are incompatible are not always acknowledged by exponents
of consequentialism. As Richard B. Brandt states: There is a fundamental incompatibility between utilitarianism and
human rights. Most utilitarians of course have not thought there is such an incompatibility (Brandt, 1992: 196).
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Evaluating the deontological aspects of a policy is critical to policy making
Pinstrup-Andersen, 2005. [Ethics and economic policy for the food system. General Sessions, 01DEC-05, American Journal of Agricultural Economics Ebsco Host.]
Economists seldom address ethical questions as they infringe on economic theory or economic
behavior. They (and I) find this subject complex and elusive in comparison with the relative precision and
objectivity of economic analysis. However, if ethics is influencing our analyses but ignored, is the precision and objectivity
just an illusion? Are we in fact being normative when we claim to be positive or are we, as suggested by Gilbert
(p. xvi), ignoring social ethics and, as a consequence, contributing to a situation in which we know "the
price of everything and the value of nothing?" The economists' focus on efficiency and the Pareto
Principle has made us less relevant to policy makers, whose main concerns are who gains, who
loses, by how much, and can or should the losers be compensated. By focusing on the
distribution of gains and losses and replacing the Pareto Principle with estimates of whether a big
enough economic surplus could be generated so that gainers could compensate losers, the socalled
new welfare economics (which is no longer new) was a step toward more relevancy for policy
makers (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz). Another major step toward relevancy was made by the more recent
emphasis on political economy and institutional economics. But are we trading off scientific validity for
relevancy? Robbins (p. 9) seems to think so, when he states that "claims of welfare economics to be
scientific are highly dubious." But if Aristotle saw economics as a branch of ethics and Adam Smith was a moral
philosopher, when did we, as implied by Stigler, replace ethics with precision and objectivity? Or, when did we as
economists move away from philosophy toward statistics and engineering and are we on our way back to a more
comprehensive political economy approach, in which both quantitative and qualitative variables are taken
into account? I believe we are. Does that make us less scientific, as argued by Robbins?
I am not questioning whether the quantification of economic relationships is important. It is. In the
case of food policy analysis, it is critically important that the causal relationship between policy
options and expected impact on the population groups of interest is quantitatively estimated . But not at
the expense of reality, context, and ethical considerations, much of which can be described only in
qualitative terms. Economic analyses that ignore everything that cannot be quantified and included in
our models are not likely to advance our understanding of economic and policy relationships. Neither
will they be relevant for solving real world problems. The predictive ability is likely to be low and,
if the results are used by policy makers, the outcome may be different from what was expecte.
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Deontology Good K2 VTL

Deontology key to giving human life value.
Kamm 92 [ FM Kamm is Littauer Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy, Kennedy School Non-consequentialism,
the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status., Philosophy and Public Affairs, p. 390 JSTOR]
If we are inviolable in a certain way, we are more important creatures than violable ones; such a
higher status is itself a benefit to us. Indeed, we are creatures whose interests as recipients of such
ordinary benefits as welfare are more worth serving. The world is, in a sense, a better place, as it has
more important creatures in it.3' In this sense the inviolable status (against being harmed in a
certain way) of any potential victim can be taken to be an agent-neutral value. This is a nonconsequential
value. It does not follow (causally or noncausally) upon any act, but is already present in
the status that persons have. Ensuring it provides the background against which we may then seek
their welfare or pursue other values. It is not our duty to bring about the agent-neutral value, but only
to respect the constraints that express its presence. Kagan claims that the only sense in which we can
show disrespect for people is by using them in an unjustified way. Hence, if it is justified to kill one
to save five, we will not be showing disrespect for the one if we so use him. But there is another
sense of disrespect tied to the fact that we owe people more respect than animals, even though we
also should not treat animals in an unjustified way. And this other sense of disrespect is, I believe,
tied to the failure to heed the greater inviolability of persons.
Deontology does not dismiss consequences, categorical imperative means deont still maximizes happiness
Donaldson 95 (Thomas Donaldson is Professor of Business Ethics at Georgetown U, Ethics and International
Affairs,International Deontology Defended: A Response to Russell Hardin, pg. 147-154)
When discussing nuclear deterrence or intervention it is common to exaggerate the nonconsequential nature
of Kantianism. It is a false but all-too common myth that Kant believed that consequences were
irrelevant to the evaluation of moral action. In his practical writings Kant explicitly states that each of us
has a duty to maximize the happiness of other individuals, a statement that echoes Mills famous principle of
utility. But Kants duty to promote beneficial consequences is understood to be derived from an even
higher order principle, namely, the categorical imperative that requires all of us to act in a way that
respects the intrinsic value of other rational beings. Kant does not dismiss
consequences. He simply wants them in their proper place.
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Callahan (1/2)
Callahan embraces reason and says it must be used in combination with a moral obligation to make
decisions
Callahan, fmr. Director of the Hastings Institute, 75
DANIEL CALLAHAN, Fmr. Director of the Hastings Institute, author of The Tyranny of Survival & Senior Fellow at Yale, February
1975,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3560956
correspondent, after praising the position I took in opposition to Garrett Hardin's "Life-boat Ethic" ("Doing
Good by Doing Well," Dec. 1974), ended her letter with a complaint. I had, she implied, fallen into a fatal trap by trying to
argue with Hardins thesis on "rationalistic rounds. The issue at stake is "humanitarianism" and the future of altruism,
neither of which will be saved if they must be defended on the narrow base of reason and logic. Indeed, she seemed to be
saying, there is an inherent conflict between humanitarianism and rationalism. As an unreconstructed rationalist, I
balk at admitting such a dualism, just as I rebel at the general black-balling of reason and logic which seems to many
to offer the only antidote to the generally insane, depressing state of the world. One can well understand how rationality has
come to have a bad name. We have in the twentieth century been subjected to endless wars, ills and disasters carried out in
the name of somebody or other's impeccable logic and assertedly rational deliberations. One can also understand the sense
of distaste any feel in the face of articulate proponents of "triage" in our dealings with poor countries and a "lifeboat ethic"
in deter-mining our own moral responsibilities toward the starving, particularly when such positions are advanced in the
name of no-nonsense rational calculation. For all that, I am far more fearful of a deliberate abandonment of reason
than of the evils which can be done in its name. The fault with the latter form of attacking "reason" is that it takes
those arguing in its name too much at their own word. Poke around a bit under the facade of carefully-honed
rationality and precise logical moves and what does one usually discover? Pure mush. Those vast, intricate edifices
rest on a bowl of porridge, made up of irrational self-interest, the worst forms of sentimentality (or pure cruelty),
utterly unanalyzed assumptions about politics, or ethics, or human nature, tribalism, and god knows what else. None of
that has much if anything to do with reason. A recent article by Robert L. Heilbroner, author of the much-acclaimed
book, An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect, is indicative of the muddle created when one calls for an abandonment of
rationality in favor of something more Illuminating. In "What has Posterity Ever Done for Me?" (New York Times
Magazine, January 19, 1975), Prof. Heilbroner tries to make the case that contemporary human beings will never learn to
take responsibility for the future of mankind until they give up trying to find a compelling reason why they should. Only
some fundamental revelatory experience-to wit, famine, war and the like-will bring people back to what is an essentially
"religious" insight, that of "the transcendent importance of posterity for them." It is intriguing to see the way Heilbroner
develops his case. "Why," he asks, "should I lift a finger to affect events that will have no more meaning for me 75 years
after my death than those that happened 75 years before I was born? There is no rational answer to that terrible question. No
argument based on reason will lead me to care for posterity or to lift a finger in its behalf. Indeed, by every rational
consideration, precisely the opposite answer is thrust upon us with irresistible force." Going on, Heilbroner quotes an
anonymous "Distinguished Younger Economist" who has concluded that he really doesn't "care" whether mankind survives
or not. "Is this," Heilbroner queries, "an outrageous position? I must confess it outrages me. But this is not because the
economist's arguments are 'wrong'-indeed, within their rational framework they are indisputably right. It is because their
position reveals the limitations-worse, the suicidal dangers-of what we call 'rational argument' when we con-front questions
that can only be decided by an appeal to an entirely different faculty from that of cool reason." I find Heilbroner's despair
at finding a rational basis to care about posterity, or the distant past, simply startling. Surely, to begin with the past, he
can hardly believe (to stick to his own field of economics) that Adam Smith and the other "worldly philosophers" have no
significance whatever any more, despite the fact that they had a critical place in shaping the world in which we live today.
And surely, as an American, he must find some slight trace of present and personal meaning in the historical fact that some
distant people once upon a time signed a "declaration of independence." My beginning with the past is no accident. If a case
is to be made for caring about the fate of posterity, it will arise out of the highly rational recognition that (for better or
worse) we are where we are because it seemed to our ancestors only sensible to worry about the fate of their descendants,
just as (also for better or worse) still earlier generations had worried about their descendants. More deeply, unless one has
decided that human life is, regardless of its condition, meaningless and terrible-in which case, what the hell-one will also
recognize the moral interdependence of generations as one of the conditions for extracting whatever possibilities there are
for human happiness. To love and believe in life at all is not just to love one's own life; it is to love both the fact and idea of
life itself, including the life of those yet to be born. My point here, however, is not to make the rational case for obligations
A RECENT
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toward posterity. It is only to indicate there are rational ways of going about it (and if you don't like the reasons I've given, I
can think of still others), just as there are rational ways of establishing a variety of other moral duties. The truly
hazardous part of despairing of reason, and longing for a return to something more primitive, can readily be seen in
the texture of some of Heilbroner's other arguments. He is looking for what he calls the "survivalist" principle, by which
he seems to mean some deep sense of obligation toward the future, powerful enough to give us the courage and the
toughness to take those immediate steps necessary to discharge our obligation. "Of course," he writes, "there are moral
dilemmas to be faced even if one takes one's stand on the 'survivalist' principle.... [But] this essential commitment to life's
continuance gives us the moral authority to take measures, per-haps very harsh measures, whose justification cannot be
found in the precepts of rationality, but must be sought in the unbearable anguish we feel if we imagine ourselves as the
executioner of mankind." Of course we may have to act harshly. But, to bring the circle full turn, how are we to act harshly,
to whom and under what circumstances? Are we also meant to abandon reason in trying to answer that question? Are we
supposed to solve the evident "moral dilemmas" to which Heilbroner refers by a dependence, not on reason, but on a
sense of "unbearable anguish"?I see no reason to hope that even a fully shared sense of anguish would tell us how to
resolve moral dilemmas. Moreover, Heilbroner himself cites at least one person who does not share his feelings, and unless
we are to suppose that person to represent a class of one, the pillar to the center of the earth Heilbroner offers us begins to
look like a piece of balsa wood. The amusing side of all this is that the two principal "survivalists" of our day, Garrett
Hardin and Robert Heilbroner, seem to come out at opposite poles in the place they give to reason. Hardin appears the very
paradigm of that cool rationality which Heilbroner believes to be our greatest threat to survival. And Heilbroner's quest for
some deeper affective, "religious" motivation for survival seems the very model of that soft-hearted and woolly-headed
humanitarianism which Hardin identifies as the villain. Neither is likely to carry the day, and for very healthy reasons.
Heilbroner is correct when he discerns that the appeal to reason has its limitations. It takes more than mere logic to
move people deeply, especially to move them to act. More than that, the frequently indignant reaction which greeted
Hardin's "lifeboat ethic" indicates that many are not about to adopt a policy of calculating callousness, "logical" though that
may seem. Hardin is correct when he says that we must think very hard about the question of survival, however much such
thought may end by posing hard, even revolting, choices. But he seems not to have realized that, unless the drive for
survival has a moral basis and a saving reference to some-thing deeper than rational calculation, some and perhaps many
people will decide that survival at any price is not a moral good. Nothing I have said here solves the vexing problem of
the right relationship between reason and feeling in the moral life. But it seems to me at least clear that the worst
possible solution is to choose one at the expense of the other, or to think that we can make a flat choice between
them. There is enough evidence from recent psychological research to indicate that our feelings and emotions are
vigorously tutored by our perceptions and cognition; reason has its say even in the way we feel. A no less important insight
is that there is all the difference in the world between being "rational and being "logical."Almost anyone can work through
a simple syllogism, presuming he is spared the ordeal of worrying about whether the premises are correct. It is a far more
difficult matter to be rational, particularly where ethics is concerned
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We replace survival as the sole aspect of decision making
Moore, Cambridge University Press, 75
Harold Moore, The Review of Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 1975), Cambridge University Press,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406214
If the solution does not lie in the development of more efficient technology, then contemporary society needs a new basis
for analyzing the moral problems precipitated by recent technological developments. Callahan claims that two
extremes are to be avoided in forging a responsible perspective: the "tyranny of survival" on the one hand and the
"tyranny of individualism" on the other. He very effectively points out that there is almost nothing people won't do
once they are convinced that survival (of a group, life or kind of life) is at stake. The moral difficulty is obvious: the
social concern with survival as the only or as the decisive variable in making decisions on technological utilization is
decision-making at a level well below any acceptable moral minimum. If survival is the only value, then indeed just
about anything is permitted. The "survival only" thesis fails by overemphasizing one value. The thesis of
"individualism" errs in another way: in making the satisfaction of individual needs and desires the locus of morality it offers
no real hope of coping with either man's communal life or the moral problems that ineluctably follow from man's social
nature. Given the failure of the extreme positions, Callahan argues for the development of a public morality, one that
is capable of integrating values other than mere survival.
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Moral Justice First

Moral justice vital sets us apart from animalistic tendencies.
Taylor, professor of philosophy @ Princeton. 2003.
Robert. Rawls Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction. Princeton University Press. Philosophy & Public
Affairs 31, No. 3, Pg 12. Project MUSE.
Reasonableness, or the capacity for a sense of justice, is the ability to limit the pursuit of ones conception of the good out
of a respect for the rights and interests of other people and out of a desire to cooperate with them on fair terms. A person
who acts reasonably acts according to a principle of reciprocity: he seeks to give justice to those who can give justice in
return (p. 447). The tight connection between reasonableness and autonomy is explained by Rawls in sec. 86 of Theory:
the sense of justice . . . reveals what the person is, and to compromise it is not to achieve for the self free reign but to give
way to the contingencies and accidents of the world (p. 503). When we act reasonably, says Rawls, we demonstrate an
ability to subordinate the pursuit of our own good, which may be unduly influenced by the contingencies and accidents of
the world, to those principles we would choose as members of the intelligible realmour reasonableness, in other words,
is emblematic of our autonomy, our independence from natural and social contingencies. This explains our sense of shame
when we fail to act reasonably: we behave then as if we were members of a lower order of animal , whose actions
are determined by the laws of nature rather than the moral law (p. 225).
Moral law outweighs other considerations integral to human nature.

The Priority of Right over the Good and the Priority of Justice over Welfare and Efficiency are both expressions of our
nature as reasonable beings, i.e., beings able to act in conformity with, and out of respect for, the moral law. In Kants
terms, to sacrifice justice for the sake of welfare or excellence of character would be to sacrifice what is of absolute value
(the good will) for what is of merely relative value (its complements). Rawls himself makes the same strong connection
between reasonableness and these two kinds of priority: But the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational
being can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first priority. . . . Therefore in order to
realize our nature we have no alternative but to plan to preserve our sense of justice as governing our other aims. This
sentiment cannot be fulfilled if it is compromised and balanced against other ends as but one desire among the rest (TJ, p.
503, emphasis added). Just as reasonableness is a key facet of our autonomy, so the priorities of right and justice are
expressions of our reasonableness: we best indicate our commitment to guide our actions by the principles of justice by
refusing to compromise those principles for the sake of our other ends.
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Moral Rationality First

Moral rationality key to sustainable decisionmaking avoids animalistic tendencies.
Rationality is our capacity for a conception of the good, which we pursue through a plan of life. We schedule, prioritize,
temper, and prune our desires in accordance with this plan; rather than living from impulse to impulse, as other animals do,
we arrange the pursuit of our interests and ends according to a coherent scheme (secs. 6364). Now, given what was said in
the previous subsection, one may find it difficult to see the connection between rationality, so defined, and autonomy: if our
desires are largely the product of natural and social contingencies, then how can acting in accordance with a plan to
advance them be an aspect of our autonomy? In other words, if rationality is merely the slave of the passions, 11 and these
passions are the result of such contingencies, then how can rationality possibly express our nature as free and equal beings?
According to Rawls, however, rationality is much more than a slave of the passions. The exercise of rationality involves a
clear distancing from ones immediate desires, as Rawls indicates in the following passage: The aim of deliberation is to
find that plan which best organizes our activities and influences the formation of our subsequent wants so that our aims and
interests can be fruitfully combined into one scheme of conduct . Desires that tend to interfere with other ends, or which
undermine the capacity for other activities, are weeded out; whereas those that are enjoyable in themselves and support
other aims as well are encouraged. 12 The image of rationality here is active, not passive. Rather than being haplessly driven
on by the dominant desires, rationality exercises authority over them: rationality elevates some desires and lays low others;
it integrates retained desires into one scheme of conduct; and it even shapes the development of future desires. Far from
being a slave of desire, rationality is its master. This conception of rationality is consistent with at least one reading of
Kants idea of practical reason as applied to the pursuit of happiness: H. J. Paton notes that prudential reasoning in Kants
moral theory involves a choice of ends as well as means and a subsequent maximum integration of ends. 13
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Rights Absolute
Rights absolute cant infringe on one persons rights to increase well-being of others.
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U Chicago. 1994.
Alan. Are There Any Absolute Rights? Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics. Joram Graf Haber. Pgs 137-138
Ought Abrams to torture his mother to death in order to prevent the threatened nuclear catastrophe? Might he not merely
pretend to torture his mother, so that she could then be safely hidden while the hunt for the gang members continued?
Entirely apart from the fact that the gang could easily pierce this deception, the main objection to the very raising of such
question s is the moral one that they seem to hold open the possibility of acquiescing and participating in an unspeakably
evil project. To inflict such extreme harm on one' s mother would be an ultimate act of betrayal; in performing or even
contemplating the performance of such an action the son would lose all self-respect and would regard his life as no longer
worth living.' A mother' s right not to be tortured to death by her own son is beyond any compromise. It is absolute . This
absoluteness may be analyzed in several different interrelated dimensions. all stemming from the supreme principle of
morality. The principle requires respect for the rights of all persons to the necessary conditions of human action, and this
includes respect for the persons themselves as having the rational capacity to reflect on their purposes and to control their
behaviour in the light of such reflection. The principle hence prohibits using any person merely as a means to the wellbeing of other persons. For a son to torture his mother to death even 10 protect the lives of others would be an extreme
violation of this principle and hence of these rights, as would any attempt by others to force such an action . For this
reason , the concept appropriate to it is not merely 'wrong' but such others as 'despicable', 'dishonorable", 'base', 'monstrous' .
In the scale of moral modalities , such concepts function as the contrary extremes of concepts like the supererogatory ,
What is supererogatory is not merely good or right but goes beyond these in various ways; it includes saintly and heroic
actions whose moral merit surpasses what is strictly required of agents, In parallel fashion, what is base, dishonourabte. or
despicable is not merely bad or wrong but goes beyond these in moral demerit since it subverts even the minimal worth or
dignity both of its agent and of its recipient and hence, the basic presupposition s of morality itself, Just as the
supererogatory is superlatively good, so the despicable is superlatively evil and diabolic, and its moral wrongness is so
rotten that a morally decent person will not even consider doing it. This is but another way of saying that the rights it would
violate must remain absolute.
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Rights/Liberty K2 Rationality
Rights and basic liberties are a prerequisite of rational decisionmaking.
In order to advance the reconstruction of the Hierarchy Argument, we must now answer the following question: How does
this highest-order interest in rationality and its preconditions justify the lexical priority of the basic liberties over other
primary goods, as called for by the Priority of Liberty? In short, it justifies such priority because the basic liberties are
necessary conditions for the exercise of rationality, which is why parties in the Original Position give first priority to
preserving their liberty in these matters (pp. 13132). If the parties were to sacrifice the basic liberties for the sake of other
primary goods (the means that enable them to advance their other desires and ends [p. 476]), they would be sacrificing
their highest-order interest in rationality and its preconditions, and thereby failing to express their nature as autonomous
beings (p. 493). A brief examination of the basic liberties enumerated by Rawls will indicate why they are necessary
conditions for the exercise of rationality (p. 53). The freedoms of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom
of thought are essential to the creation and revision of plans of life: without secure rights to explore ideas and beliefs with
others (whether in person or through various media) and consider these at our leisure, we would be unable to make
informed decisions about our conception of the good. Freedom of the person (including psychological and bodily integrity),
as well as the right to personal property and immunity from arbitrary arrest and seizure, are necessary to create a stable and
safe personal space for purposes of reflection and communication, without which rationality would be compromised if not
crippled. Even small restrictions on these basic liberties would threaten our highest order interest , however slightly,
and such a threat is disallowed given the absolute priority of this interest over other concerns. Note also that lexical priority
can be justified here for all of the basic liberties, not merely a subset of them (as was the case with the strains-ofcommitment interpretation of the Equal Liberty of Conscience Argument). 14
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Moral Resolution O/W Util

Utilitarianism fails to take into account prima facie rights moral resolution of conflicts necessary.
McCloskey, professor of philosophy. 1986.
HJ. Utilitarianism and Natural Human Moral Rights. Pg 133.
The theory of prima facie human rights that is outlined here is one in terms of prima facie rights, many of which are
rights of recipience, in which the rights create obligations and claims that collide with one another and with the moral
demands created by other values. Many of these conflicts are to be resolved without reference, or with only negative
reference, to consequences. When the consequences do enter seriously into the resolution of the conflicts, the solution
arrived at is often very different from that which would be dictated by utilitarian con siderations. The points made in the
preceding section may be illustrated by reference to conflicts of prima facie human rights such as the right to life, viewed
as a right of recipience, the right to moral autonomy and integrity- and values such as pleasure and happiness, and the
absence of pain and suffering. A consideration of the morally rightful resolution of such conflicts brings out the inadequacy
of the utilitarian calculus as a basis for determining the morally right response to such situations and conflicts.
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Morals Compatible With Util

Concept of morals not mutually exclusive with utilitarianism.
Richard. Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights. Cambridge University Press. Pg 204-205.
There is, however, another line of thinking that connects desirability with moral obligation for the utilitarian, and in fact
shows why a utilitarian requires a concept of moral obligation and what the concept will be. This line of reasoning goes
as follows. We begin with the assumption that the utilitarian wants to maximize happiness in society. Now, he knows that
one important means to his goal, indeed the only one within our control, is human actions with that effect. So he will want
acts that produce welfare, ideally ones that will maximize it as compared with other options. Let us say, then, that he will want
expedient acts as a means to happiness. But the thoughtful utilitarian will further ask himself how he can bring it about that people perform acts which,
taken together, will maximize happiness. One way, and surely a good way up to a point, is to employ moral education to make people more sympathetic or
altruistic; if they become so, they will tend to act more frequently to produce happiness in others. It looks, however, ;as if such educational encouragement
of sympathy is not enough, mainly because people are ill-informed about the probable consequences of what they do, and in any case because the intent to
do as much good as one can may lead to action at cross-purposes rather than to more beneficial cooperative behavior. S o the utilitarian, who wants
maximal happiness, will do something more than just try to motivate people to aim directly at it. It will occur to him that a
legal system, with its sanctions and implicit directives, will both guide people what to do, and at the same time provide
motivation to conform to the legal standards. He will want, with Bentham, a legal system which as a whole will maximize
happiness by producing pro-social conduct at the least cost. Moreover, the one thing should be clear: If the moral system
has been carefully devised, there will not be gross disparity between what it requires and conduct that promises to
maximize benefit. To avoid such disparity, an optimal rule-utilitarian moral code will contain " escape clauses." For
instance, it will permit a driver to obstruct a driveway illegally when there is an emergency situation. But suppose there is a
minor disparity between the requirements of the moral code and what will do most good: suppose Mary will have to walk
to work tomorrow, but the gain in convenience to the person who obstructs her driveway will be: greater than the loss to
her. Will the consistent utilitarian then advise the driver to park illegally? Let us suppose the utilitarian has decided that a
utility maximizing moral code will not direct a person to do what he thinks will maximize expectable utility in a particular
situation, but to follow certain rules - roughly, to follow his conscientious principles, as amended where long-range utility
requires. If he has decided this, then it is inconsistent of him to turn around and advise individuals just to follow their
discretion about what will maximize utility in a particular case. Of course, the utilitarian will want everyone to be sensitive
to the utility of giving aid to others and avoiding injury; requirements or encouragement to do so are pan of our actual
moral cede, and it is optimal for the code to be $0. But once it is decided that the optimal code is not that of actutilitarianism, the utilitarian will say it is desirable for a person to follow the optimal moral code, that is, follow conscience
except where utility demands amendment of the principles of the code, So it seems the consistent utilitarian will conclude
that there is a moral obligation not to obstruct Mary' s driveway illegally, in accordance with the optimal code.
Successful integration of morality into utilitarian calculus possible.

My conclusion is that if we are to be utilitarians in the sense that we think morality should maximize long-range utility, and
at the same time think that a utilitarian morality should have room for recognition of rights that cannot be overridden by
marginal gains in utility, there are two positions we must espouse. First, we must hold that a person does the right act, or the
obligatory act, not by just following his actual moral principles wherever they may lead, but by following the moral
principles the acceptance of which in society would maximize expectable utility. Of course, this means that people who
want to do what is right may have to do some thinking about their moral principles in particular situations. Second, we must
emphasize that the right act is the one permitted by or required by the moral code the acceptance of which promises to
maximize utility, and not compromise, except in extreme circumstances, in order to do what in a particular situation will
maximize utility , where so doing conflicts with the utility-maximizing code. Only if we do this will we have room for a
concept of " a right" which cannot be overridden by a marginal addition to the general welfare. It is clear that acting
morally in this sense will never be very costly in utility, and where it is costly at all, that is the price that has to be paid for a
policy, a morality of principle. If my exegesis of J. S. Mill is correct, these recommendations are ones in which he would
join.
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No Rights = Violent Backlash

Failure to satisfy moral obligations leads to violent backlash.
Richard. Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights. Cambridge University Press. Pgs 188-189.
How can we absorb this idea into the conceptual scheme developed so far? Morality, as I have described it, is a feature of
agents - their motives, dispositions to fed guilt - and of the attitudes of the generality of other persons toward agents approval or disapproval of them. In my account nothing has been said about the patients, the targets of the behavior of
agents. I now suggest that we should extend our description of moral codes, to include something about patients. First.
patients may have a disposition to resent infringements of the rules we have been talking about when these impinge on
them, when they are the parties injured. or deprived. or threatened. Of course, people tend to resent any deliberate injury .
so this reaction is not specific to rules of rights.10 Second, persons who resent it when they are injured or deprived in one
of these ways or even when they are threatened because of the nonexistence of institutions able to protect them, may also be
inclined not to feel ashamed or embarrassed to protest on their own behalf. This feature need not occur, and in societies in
which individuals have felt it is their place to be downtrodden, ill-treated, and so on, it was not the case. Of course there are
several levels of this. The first is expression of resentment to the injuring party. A second level is public protest, or joining
in a public protest, calling attention to the situation and inviting sympathy and support, particularly for the institution of
legal devices for prevention of what has occurred or redress or punishment when it already has occurred. A third level is
that of passive disobedience, lack of cooperation, perhaps nonviolent economic pressure that causes inconvenience or
discomfort on behalf of a cause. Finally there is violent action, willingness to cause personal or property damage, in order
to bring about a change in those who are infringing moral obligations or to bring about legal institutions to prevent or
punish such infringements. Presumably the level of protest will normally correlate with the strength of the obligation being
infringed and the seriousness of the damage or threat. The practice of company stores might elicit one level of protest, the
practice of lynch law on members of a racial minority quite another.
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Right To Health O/W

Right to health outweighs violation of right to life.
HJ. Utilitarianism and Natural Human Moral Rights. R. G. Frey. Utility and Rights. Pgs 127-128.
The right to health, like the right to bodily integrity, is related to but not whol1y based on the right to life. Ill health and
mutilation of the body need not threaten life. Deliberately to harm the health of persons is to violate their personhood,
impairing capacities, causing needless suffering, overriding wills. So too with violation of bodily integrity, as with
compulsory sterilization, barbarous forms of punishment such as chopping off hands, blinding, removing the tongue. In a
real sense, although not in the sense suggested in Locke's labor argument for private property nor in the sense claimed by
many feminists in their defense of abortion from a woman's right to control (and mutilate?) her body, our body is ours to
care for and maintain as the vehicle of our personhood. Although it is true that we can lose an organ, a leg, an eye, and still
be the same person, our body appertains to us as persons. The negative aspect of the case for the rights to health and bodily
integrity is evidently strong. How can another have the right to injure, infect, disease a person? So to act is to violate a
right. A very powerful moral justification would be necessary for such an act not to constitute a grave end illegitimate
violation of a right.
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Poverty Moral Obligation

Humanity has a moral obligation to alleviate poverty.
UN General Assembly Press Release. December 2006.
United NationsWORLD HAS MORAL OBLIGATION TO FIGHT POVERTY, PROTECT HUMAN
RIGHTS OF MOST VULNERABLE, SAYS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT IN HUMAN
RIGHTS DAY MESSAGE 2006 www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gasm380.doc.htm
Following is the message by Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa ( Bahrain), President of the General Assembly, on the occasion
of Human Rights Day, observed 10 December: This year, we commemorate Human Rights Day with the theme Fighting
Poverty: a matter of obligation not charity. When poverty is so immediate and the suffering so intense, the world has
a moral and strategic obligation to fight poverty and to address the human rights concerns of the most vulnerable. The
poorest are more likely to experience human rights violations, discrimination or other forms of persecution. Being poor
makes it harder to find a job and get access to basic services, such as health care, education and housing. Poverty is
above all about having no power and no voice. History is littered with well-meaning, but failed solutions. If we are to
eradicate poverty and promote human rights, we need to take action to empower the poor and address the root causes
of poverty, such as discriminateon and social exclusion. It is because human rights, poverty reduction and the
empowerment of the poor go hand in hand that we all have a moral duty to take action.
We have a moral obligation to solve poverty

Al Khalifa, President of the General Assembly, 06
Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa ( Bahrain), President of the General Assembly 8 December 2006
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gasm380.doc.htm
When poverty is so immediate and the suffering so intense, the world has a moral and strategic obligation to fight
poverty and to address the human rights concerns of the most vulnerable. The poorest are more likely to experience
human rights violations, discrimination or other forms of persecution. Being poor makes it harder to find a job and get
access to basic services, such as health care, education and housing. Poverty is above all about having no power and no
voice. History is littered with well-meaning, but failed solutions. If we are to eradicate poverty and promote human rights,
we need to take action to empower the poor and address the root causes of poverty, such as discrimination and social
exclusion. It is because human rights, poverty reduction and the empowerment of the poor go hand in hand that we all
have a moral duty to take action.
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Action Key End Result Irrelevant

People are not a means to a result, the results of an action are never as important as the action itself.
Schapiro 2001 [Tamar Schapiro is professor of philosophy at Stanford. Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory Ous, Mar
2001, Vol. 35 Issue 1, p93, 25p Ebsco]
Kamms view of action, though less explicit and developed, shares this propositional orientation. An action in accordance
with moral constraints, Kamm claims, states that another person has or lacks value as a matter of fact. And since there is
such a fact of the matter, actions can succeed or fail to express the truth.18 And yet on both Wollastons and Kamms
accounts, the world to which action relates us descriptively is not the utilitarians world of natural causes
and effects. The claim that youre really something is a not a claim about a persons empirical or
psychological state; rather it is a claim about his status.19 Similarly, the examples Wollaston invokes to
illustrate his theory of action all involve claims about the status of an agent in relation to others. Thus Wollastons view,
echoed by Kamm, seems to be that action tracks certain practical factsfacts about where we stand in
relation to one another as members of a social world. Wollastons conception of action seems to presuppose a
moral psychology which is different from Cumberlands. While Wollaston would not deny that every action
involves an exercise of efficient causality, his view suggests that our ultimate practical concern is
not for the effects we can produce. Indeed his conception implies that in addition to a causal element, action
contains a reflexive element. The exercise of human agency, according to Wollaston, involves a reflective
awareness of ourselves in relation to others.20 Action expresses a conception of where we stand in relation to
the other constituents of the world, conceived as a realm of status relations. Moreover, this awareness
determines an ultimate end of action which is not an effect to be brought about. That end is the faithful
representation of the interpersonal order of which we are members.
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**AT DEONTOLOGY/RIGHTS**
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Rights Violation Inev

Hatred between groups of people make human rights violations inevitable
Kohen, Assistant Professor. Ph.D. Duke University Contemporary Political Science 05
Ari Kohen. "The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of Generic Consistency" Peer Reviewed Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 17, 2005,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/8crjwyet6g6mr9fh/fulltext.pdf
The trouble with this response is pointed out by Richard Rorty, who offers the rejoinder, made by an agent who wants to
infringe upon the rights of another, that philosophers like Gewirth "seem ,oblivious to blatantly obvious moral distinctions,
distinctions any decent person would draw. ''8~ For Rorty, the problem cannot be solved by sitting down with a chalkboard
and diagramming how the agent and his potential victim are both PPAs. It is, he argues, a problem that will not be solved by
demonstrating that the agent violates his victim on pain of self-contradiction because, for this agent, the victim is not
properly a PPA, despite looking and acting very much like one. The old adage about looking, swimming, and quacking like
a duck comes to mind here; no amount of quacking will convince the agent that his victim is, in fact, a duck . As Rorty
points out,
This rejoinder is not just a rhetorical device, nor is it in any way irrational. It is heartfelt. The identity of these people, the
people whom we should like to convince to join our Eurocentric human rights culture, is bound up with their sense of who
they are not . . . . What is crucial for their sense of who they are is that they are not an infidel, not a queer, not a woman, not
an untouchable .... Since the days when the term "human being" was synonymous with "member of our tribe," we have
always thought of human beings in terms of paradigm members of the species. We have contrasted us, the real humans,
with rudimentary or perverted or deformed examples of humanity. 82
There are, I believe, two problems for Gewirth's theory here. The first is that an agent can quite clearly sidestep rational
inconsistency by believing that his victim is somehow less of an agent (and, in the case presented by Rorty, less of a human
being) than he is himself. The agent, here, might recognize that his victim is a PPA, but other factors (being an infidel, a
queer, a woman, or an untouchable) have far greater resonance and preclude her having the same rights as the agent. He
might also recognize his victim as a potential PPA, but not one in the fullest sense of that term or one who has actually
achieved that status; as Gewirth himself notes, "there are degrees of approach to being prospective purposive agents. ''83 It
seems to me that the Nazis knew quite well that their Jewish victims could be PPAs in some sense; the Nuremberg Laws of
1935 confirm their awareness that Jews could plan and execute the same sorts of actions they could (voting and working,
for example). The rights of the Jews could be restricted, however, because Jews were quite different from Germans; rather
than PPAs in the fullest sense, they were, in the eyes of the Nazis, what Rorty calls "pseudohumans. ''~4 On this point,
Rorty's point is both clear and compelling: "Resentful young Nazi toughs were quite aware that many Jews were clever and
learned, but this only added to the pleasure they took in beating such Jews. Nor does it do much good to get such people to
read Kant and agree that one should not treat rational agents simply as means. For everything turns on who counts as a
fellow human being, as a rational agent in the only relevant sense--the sense in which rational agency is synonymous with
membership in our moral community. ''s5 The second problem for the PGC pointed out by Rorty is that it is overly
academic and insufficiently pragmatic. In other words, its fifteen steps might be logically compelling to those in a
philosophy department, but not to those who are actually making these decisions on inclusion and exclusion. "This is not,"
Rorty tells us, "because they are insufficiently rational. It is, typically, because they live in a world in which it would be just
too risky-- indeed, would often be insanely dangerous--to let one's sense of moral community stretch beyond one's family,
clan, or tribe. ''86 This second point leads to the final critique of Gewirth's argument for the PGC.
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AT: Rights First

Rights dont come first conflicting values and ideologies.
Problems of a different kind are encountered by the claim that certain negative rights, for example, the right to life
interpreted as a right not to be killed, are always absolute, namely, that such a claim leads to morally unacceptable
conclusions. Different rights, for example, the rights to life and to moral autonomy and integrity, may conflict with one
another, such that we have morally to determine which to respect and in what way; the one right, such as the right to life,
may give rise to conflicts, such that we can protect, save one life, only by sacrificing or not saving another life. And rights
may conflict with other values, such as pleasure or pain, in ways that morally oblige us to qualify our respect for the right,
as in curtailing acts directed at a persons' self-development to prevent gross cruelty to animals. Thomists have offered
partial, but only partial, replies to criticisms based on these difficulties in terms of theories such as the Doctrine of Double
Effect, the theory of the Unjust Aggressor (who may be neither unjust nor morally responsible for what he does). However
these replies themselves encounter difficulties of many kinds, including those of involving their exponents in morally
abhorrent conclusions not unlike those to which they object when such I conclusions are shown to follow from rival
theories.
Rights not absolute doesnt take into account intended good.

Thus the Doctrine of Double Effect permits the knowing, unintentional killing of thousands of innocent children for the
sake of a proportional good; yet it commits its exponents to losing a just war if success can be achieved, and millions of
innocent lives be saved, only by the intentional killing of one innocent person. Similarly objectionable conclusions follow
about the permissibility of killing morally innocent 'unjust aggressors' to save one's life. At the same time, acceptance of
these supporting theories amounts to an admission that human rights such as the right to life are not always absolute. How
can it be so if we are said to have the moral right intentionally to kill the morally innocent unjust aggressor, and knowingly,
albeit unintentionally, to kill innocent persons, when and if the intended good is proportionately good, and cannot be
achieved without bringing about the unintended, foreseen good?
No appropriate duty to satisfy rights of conscience.

HJ. Utilitarianism and Natural Human Moral Rights. R. G. Frey. Utility and Rights. Pg 123..
The view that rights and duties are correlative would, if true, lend support to the reducibility-of-rights-to-duties thesis.'
However, whilst duties and rights may be correlative-as when by a voluntary act a person enters into a promise, contract,
becomes a parent - commonly / rights, and more evidently, basic human moral rights, and duties are not correlative. This is
so with the examples cited above. There may be no correlative duty to a right of conscience. With rights of recipience,
rights to aids and facilities, the duties that arise from the right are not the determinate, fixed, finite duties, correlative duties
are thought of as being. Equally, we may have important duties in respect of other persons, without those persons
necessarily having rights against us. This is often so in respect of duties of benevolence towards determinate persons. The
duty to maximize good, which dictates that we visit our lonely, ailing I aunt in hospital, need give her no moral right to our
visit.
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No absolute rights competing values and rights of different groups.
A similar distinction needs to be drawn and a similar terminology is required in respect of basic human rights. They are
always rights-inalienable, intrinsic rights-but they are simply prima facie rights; they are rights that are absolute rights
only if they are not overridden by more stringent moral rights or other moral considerations. The introduction of this
distinction into human moral rights theory is both right and necessary. It does however greatly complicate the problem of
determining what are the absolute, morally operative rights of a person in any concrete situation. Yet the acknowledgment
of this feature of basic human rights is necessary for two reasons, the one because (physical resources may be inadequate to
allow all to enjoy their basic rights, and the other because, in specific situations, we may have to decide between the rights
of different persons, and between respecting rights and securing other values.
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AT Rawls
Rawls conception of rights flawed fails to explain why small incursions on liberty would threaten
citizenship.
Up to this point, Rawls has said nothing about the priority of the basic liberties; rather, he has focused exclusively on their
equal provision. Only at the end of his main presentation of the Self-Respect Argument does he briefly discuss the Priority
of Liberty: When it is the position of equal citizenship that answers to the need for status, the precedence of the equal
liberties becomes all the more necessary. Having chosen a conception of justice that seeks to eliminate the significance of
relative economic and social advantages as supports for mens self-confidence, it is essential that the priority of liberty be
firmly maintained (p. 478).These two sentences provide a good illustration of what I earlier called the Inference Fallacy:
Rawls tries to derive the lexical priority of the basic liberties from the central importance of an interest they supportin
this case, an interest in securing self-respect for all citizens. Without question, the Self-Respect Argument makes a strong
case for assigning the basic liberties a high priority: otherwise, economic and social inequalities might reemerge as the
primary determinants of status and therefore of self-respect. It does not explain, however, why lexical priority is needed.
Why, for example, would very small restrictions on the basic liberties threaten the social basis of self-respect, so long as
they were equally applied to all citizens? Such restrictions would involve no subordination and, being very small, would be
unlikely to jeopardize the central importance of equal citizenship as a determinant of status.
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AT Rawls
Rawls fails to provide warrants for the absolute preservation of basic liberties over other ends.
Affairs 31, No. 3, Pgs 20-21. Project MUSE.
Although Rawls briefly discusses and defends the Priority of Liberty early in Political Liberalism (PL, pp. 41, 74, 76), his
most sustained arguments for it are to be found late in the book, in the lecture entitled The Basic Liberties and Their
Priority. All of these arguments are framed in terms of Justice as Fairness rather than liberal political conceptions of justice
more generally, a point to which we will return below. The three arguments for the Priority of Liberty that we identified in
Theory can also be found in Political Liberalism, and both their strengths and weaknesses carry over into the new
context.18 At least two new arguments can be found, however, arguments that I will refer to as the Stability Argument and
the Well-Ordered Society Argument, respectively. As I will now show, both of these arguments are further illustrations of
the Inference Fallacy. The Stability Argument has a structure similar to that of the Self- Respect Argument. In it, Rawls
notes the great advantage to everyones conception of the good of a . . . stable scheme of cooperation, and he goes on to
assert that Justice as Fairness is the most stable conception of justice . . . and this is the case importantly because of the
basic liberties and the priority assigned to them.Taking the second point first, Rawls never makes clear why the Priority of
Liberty is necessary for stability, as opposed to strongly contributory to it. Very small restrictions on the basic liberties
would seem unlikely to threaten it, and some types of restrictions (e.g., imposing fines for the advocacy of violent
revolution or race hatred) might actually enhance it. Even if we assume, however, that the Priority of Liberty is necessary
for stability, this fact is not enough to justify it: as highly valued as stability is, sacrificing the basic liberties that make it
possible may be worthwhile if such a sacrifice is necessary to advance other highly valued ends. Pointing out the high
priority of stability, in other words, is insufficient to justify the lexical priority of the basic liberties that support itonly the
lexical priority of stability would do so, yet Rawls provides no argument for why stability should be so highly valued.
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AT Rawls
Rawls conception of personal freedom cannot resolve utilitarian democratic ideals.
Affairs 31, No. 3, Pgs 22-23. Project MUSE.
Rawls speculates that the narrower the differences between the liberal conceptions when correctly based on fundamental
ideas in a democratic public culture . . . the narrower the range of liberal conceptions defining the focus of the
consensus.25 By correctly based, Rawls appears to mean at least two things: first, that the conceptions should be built
on the more central of these fundamental ideas; second, that these ideas should be interpreted in the right way (PL, pp.
16768). For example, Rawls asserts that his conception of the person as free and equal is central to the democratic
ideal (PL, p. 167). This idea is in competition with other democratic ideas, however (e.g., the idea of the common good
as it is understood by classical republicans), as well as with other interpretations of the same idea (e.g., the utilitarian
understanding of equality as the equal consideration of each persons welfare). A necessary condition, then, for Justice as
Fairness to be the focus of an overlapping consensus would be for adherents of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines to
endorse this idea, along with the interpretation Rawls gives it, as more central to the democratic ideal than other
fundamental ideas. If they were to accept not only this idea but also its companion idea of society as a fair system of
cooperation, then the procedures of political constructivism (including the Original Position) would presumably lead them
to select Justice as Fairness as their political conception of justice.
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AT: Liberty/Rights First

Priority of liberty not viable as basis of government at best it would be a competing theory among other
liberal conceptions of justice.
Is such acceptance likely? Consider the important example of the adherents of utilitarian reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. Would a utilitarian be able to endorse a Kantian conception of free persons, with its elevation of rationality over
the satisfaction of desire and its consequent implications for agent motivation in the Original Position? It seems unlikely
that any utilitarian (with the possible exception of John Stuart Mill in his most syncretic mood) would countenance this
variety of asceticism. Thus, utilitarians would be likely to focus on another interpretation of the idea of free persons or
perhaps on an entirely different fundamental idea or set of ideas; doing so would lead them to structure the Original
Position differently and would presumably produce a political conception of justice that did not include the Priority of
Liberty. Rawls argues in Political Liberalism that classical utilitarians (such as Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick)
would be likely to endorse a political conception of justice liberal in content, but he never suggests that they would
choose the Priority of Liberty, or Justice as Fairness more generally (PL, p. 170). We can conclude from this finding that
the class of liberal political conceptions of justice constituting the focus of a realistic overlapping consensus would include
conceptions that did not endorse the Priority of Liberty (although they would all give the basic liberties special priority).
Moreover, Justice as Fairness might not be alone among the liberal conceptions in endorsing the Priority of Liberty: a
reasonable comprehensive doctrine might, for example, support a Kantian conception of free persons but not Rawlss
particular interpretation of society as a fair system of cooperation, leading through the procedures of political
constructivism to a liberal conception of justice that endorsed the Priority of Liberty but rejected, say, the Difference
Principle. Thus, the Priority of Liberty would be one competitor idea among many in an overlapping consensus, endorsed
by both adherents of Kantian comprehensive doctrines and their fellow travelers, but rejected by others.
No justification for violation of rights to prevent external loss - principle of intervening actions means
that government is not held responsible for death of others.
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U Chicago. 1994.
Alan. Are There Any Absolute Rights? Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics. Joram Graf Haber. Pgs 143.
He may be said to intend the many deaths obliquely, in that they are a foreseen but unwanted side-effect of his refusal . But
he is not responsible for that side-effect because of the terrorist s' intervening action. It would be unjustified to violate the
mother's right to life in order to protect the rights to life of the many other residents of the city. For rights cannot be
justifiably protected by violating another right which, according to the criterion of degrees of necessity for action, is at
least equally important. Hence, the many other residents do not have a right that the mother' s right to life be violated for
their sakes . To be sure , the mother also does not have a right that their equally important rights be violated in order to
protect hers. But here too it must be emphasized that in protecting his mother's right the son does not violate the rights of
the others; for by the principle of the intervening action, it is not he who is causally or morally responsible for their
deaths . Hence too he is not treating them as mere means to his or his mother's ends.
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Government cannot act to uphold the rights of the subject on the basis of moral principle.
Gewirth, professor of philosophy, 81.
Alan. Reason and Morality. Pg 65.
In the agent's statement, 'I have rights to freedom and well-being,' the subject of the rights is the agent himself, the same
person for whom freedom and well-being are necessary goods. The object of the rights is these same necessary goods. Now
in rights-judgments, the subject who is said to have rights is not always the same as the person who makes a claim or a
right-judgment attributing the rights to the subject. Moreover, a rights-judgment need not be set forth independently; it
may, instead, figure as a subordinate clause wherein the attribution of rights to the subject is only conditional. In all cases.
however, there is assumed some reason or ground that is held, at least tentatively, to justify that attribution. This reason
may, but need not, be some moral or legal code. In the present case, where what is at issue is the justification of a moral
principle, such a principle cannot, of course, be adduced as constituting the justifying ground for the attribution of
the generic rights to the agent. Rather, in his statement making this attribution, the justifying reason of the generic rights
as viewed by the agent is the fact that freedom and well-being are the most general and proximate necessary conditions of
all his purpose- fulfilling actions, so that without his having these conditions his engaging in purposive action would be
futile or impossible. Because of this necessity, the agent who is the subject of the generic rights is assumed to set forth or
uphold the rights-judgment himself, as knowing what conditions must be fulfilled if he is to be a purposive agent; and he
upholds the judgment not merely conditionally or tentatively but in an unqualified way.
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Gewirths theories fail to leave the theoretical realm
Despite his best efforts to demonstrate the way in which the PGC applies to real agents, Beyleveld has
simply restated Gewirth's argument and, in my estimation, added additional jargon that seems to encourage
rather than refute Held's objection. The biggest difficulty with this defense--apart from the way it is worded,
which lends credence to our belief that there is something not quite human about these PPAs --is that Beyleveld seems
to have conflated characteristics and purposes. It is correct that a PPA must accept the PGC regardless of the
nature of his purposes, for having any purposes at all entails that he is a PPA and being a PPA necessitates his acceptance of
the PGC. However, it does not follow that he must accept the PGC regardless of the nature of his (or
others') characteristics, for these characteristics might invalidate some aspect of the PGC. He might be,
for example, one of the unfortunate marginal agents discussed above; alternately, he might be acting upon one
of those marginal agents, in which case he need not worry about granting the generic rights that he claims for himself.
Beyleveld's response to this concern seems lackluster : "a PPA, regardless of its particular occurrent
characteristics, is logically required to concentrate attention on the generic features as the basis of its rights-claims, and
must restrict its categorically binding rights-claims to these features, because it is not logically required to attend to any
other features. "94 Leaving aside the fact that Beyleveld refers to PPAs as neither "him" nor "her," but rather
"it," at the same time that he is attempting to humanize them, the argument he makes here does not
stand up to scrutiny. All he claims is that PPAs are required to base their rights-claims on the generic
features of action (which everyone, except for marginal agents, must possess)b because they are not required to base
those claims on other features. This does not mean that a PPA cannot base his claim on characteristics other
than the generic features of action ; it simply means he must also include the generic features of action
in his claim, as they--like the other characteristics--are necessarily connected with agency. By and large,
then, it seems that Gewirth has not gone a great distance toward refuting this critique nor has Beyleveld
offered much assistance. In fact, Gewirth seems to recognize his shortcoming even as he attempts to offer
his response to Engels: "Hence, while not entirely exempt from Engels's criticism, the present approach in terms of the
generic features of action has an important justification. For it sets up a morally neutral starting point that does not accept
persons' actual power relations and other differences as a moral datum. ''95 This, though, seems to be the point of Engels'
critique and of more recent critiques of analytical theories that attempt to abstract from the world in order to discuss it.
Indeed, Michael Sandel's objections to Rawls' well-known ideas of the original position and veil of ignorance are equally
apt in looking at the greatest weakness of Gewirth's theory. Although Sandel stands quite close to Rawls on the question of
what a liberal society's principles of justice ought to be, he contends that Rawls' assumptions about the populace of that
society provide a poor foundation for his principles.
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AT: Gewirth
Gewirths study of contradiction fails, he never isolates where negative consequences come from
To begin, then, let us consider the argument that engaging in a self-contradictory action could be impossibly problematic
for any agent. It is important to note that the problem of contradiction seems simply to be implied, for nowhere does
Gewirth actually make a case for why we may not engage quite comfortably in self-contradiction. In fact, in a footnote
dealing with Millard Schumaker's multiple objections to the PGC, Beyleveld points out that quite the opposite is the case:
"The error lies in Schumaker's reading of "incurring the pain of sell-contradiction.' We are to understand that Gewirth
argues that PPAs will be motivated to be moral by the fact that to act immorally is to suffer some form of emotional
distress. But to say that X does Y on "pain of self contradiction" is to say only that if X does Y, then X contradicts itself. It
is not to say that if X does Y. then X contradicts itself and that this state of affairs causes X to suffer anguish. ''67 It seems,
then that self-contradiction is not necessarily painful for the agent. If it is not, we might wonder, what reason is there for
avoiding it, particularly if engaging in it could be in an agent's self-interest or if avoiding it turns out to be costly? The only
answer that Gewirth seems to provide comes at the very beginning of his argument for the PGC, in the following statement
about his rational agent: "It is to be noted that the criterion of "rational' here is a minimal deductive one, involving
consistency or the avoidance of self-contradiction in ascertaining or accepting what is logically involved in one's acting for
purposes and in the associated concepts. "68 The assumption, here, is that all agents have a meta-desire for consistency
upon which all of their rational decisions are built. And yet, it seems important to question whatever we can assume that
human beings are necessarily rational actors who behave as Gewirth outlines or, instead, a bundle of desires engaged in
continual struggle, especially after looking at the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan.
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AT: Gewirth
Gewirth ignores the fundamental differences between peoples
While this Lacanian critique is an interesting one, it is not the strongest argument against Gewirth on the question of
contradiction. Though it might be the case that people are unable to rationally order their preferences, as Lacan argues, or
that some people do not have the sort of meta-desire for rational consistency that Gewirth assumes for the purposes of his
theory, it certainly seems to be more often the ease that people can and do. What Gewirth fails to consider properly ,
however, is the ability that people have to rationalize their actions in an effort to avoid the cognitive
dissonance that comes with self-contradiction. He clearly recognizes the problem , pointing out that "some
person may without inconsistency claim the right to inflict various harms on other persons on the ground that he possesses
qualities that are had only by himself or by some group he favors. ''72 By way of a response, as noted above, he puts
forward the ASA: that being a PPA is both the necessary and sufficient justificatory reason for having the
generic rights. This answer seems not to have placated Gewirth's detractors, nor has it gone far enough
to suit me. Of course, Beyleveld deals with multiple versions of this objection in the fortieth through forty-fifth objections
to the PGC. One such objection is that of Donald E. Geels, who "alleges that '[i]t is trivial to claim that whatever
is right for one person must be right for any relevantly similar person in any relevantly similar
circumstances,' because there is no determinate criterion of relevant similarity. ''73 This sounds remarkably similar to
Gewirth's own objection to the formal principle, described above. As Beyleveld points out, however, Gewirth has quite
clearly specified the criterion of relevant similarities: "a PPA must claim that it has the generic rights (according to the
argument for the sufficiency of agency [ASA]) for the sufficient reason that it is a PPA. Because a PPA logically must claim
the generic rights, it is the property of be/ng a PPA that is logically required to be the criterion of relevant similarities. ''74
More interesting, in my estimation, are arguments like the one made by N. Fotion, that "a 'fanatic' (read 'elitist')
can grant itself rights on the grounds that it is a superior PPA, yet refuse to grant these rights to other
PPAs, who are not superior PPAs, without contradiction. ''75
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AT: Gewirth
Gewirths theories fail to answer how different people treat each other equally
More challenging for Gewirth is the claim not that a PPA is in some way special and thereby deserving of rights, but instead that
some other PPA is somehow damaged and thereby not worthy of them. Such an argument, however, seems neither to have been
made directly against Gewirth nor is it carefully considered by him or by Beyleveld. Gewirth seems to recognize the existence of
this problem--indeed, he seems to put it forward himself--but fails really to grapple with it in any meaningful way.
He says, To be P, that is, a prospective purposive agent, requires having the practical abilities the generic features of action: the
abilities to control one's behavior by one's unforced choice, to have knowledge of relevant circumstances, and to reflect on one's
purposes. These abilities are gradually developed in children, who will eventually have them in full; the abilities are had in
varying impaired ways by mentally deficient persons; and they are largely lacking among animals...Since the quality that
determines whether one has the generic rights is that of being P, it follows from these variations in degree, according to the
Principle of Proportionality, that although children, mentally deficient persons, and animals do not have the generic rights in the
full-fledged way normal human adults have them, members of these groups approach having the generic rights in varying
degrees, depending on the degree to which they have the requisite abilities. 77 Of course, in reading these remarks, one must
wonder whether it is acceptable to infringe upon the rights of those who fall within the categories Gewirth lays out. If one is like
a child, then perhaps it is acceptable for society to take away one's rights to freedom and well-being. Surely that must be the case
if one is like an animal for, as Gewirth says, "the lesser the abilities, the less one is able to fulfill one's purposes without
endangering oneself and other persons. ''78 There is something rather troubling about making these sorts of statements, but
Gewirth seems not to see it. For him, it is sufficient to argue that one ought to have the generic rights to the degree to which one
approaches being a PPA. Beyleveld's response to this objection, unlike his many others, is surprisingly lacking and is confined to
a footnote. By doing so, he seems to have made things worse for Gewirth, as he points out that five theorists have taken issue
with the PGC on this important point but then offers no substantive rejoinder.
He says, It seems to me that Gewirth's theory is essentially a theory of the rights of PPAs, and not a theory of human rights as
such...From this ft follows that there are some human beings (those who are not even marginal agents) who do not have the
generic rights, and that nonhuman beings might have the generic rights...The question of the rights of "marginal agents" is,
however, a more complex one. I do not discuss this, because I view its importance as being for the argument from the PGC,
rather than the argument to the PGC, with which this book is solely concerned; so I shall not discuss any of the above claims in
detail. 79
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Human beings are infinitely more complex than Gewirths theories assume
In order to offer a truly compelling secular foundation for the idea of human rights , one must do more than Gewirth has
done in demonstrating the logical necessity of accepting a principle that entails the universalization of the generic rights of
freedom and well-being. As we have seen. Gewirth crafts an interesting argument for human rights in theory, but runs into
considerable trouble when his theory is put into practice. As critics like Rorty and Sandel point out, there is something
about the Principle of Generic Consistency that rings a bit hollow. For Rorty, the problem lies in Gewirth's failure to
appreciate the fierce partiality that often drives human rights violations; it is a confusion to point out contradictions to those
who either refuse to recognize them or are not terribly troubled by them. For Sandel, the PGC must fail for the same reason
that Rawls' original position fails; there is simply no getting around the fact that human beings are more complex than
abstract possessors of goods or prospective purjoiiooposive agents. Any examination of human life that abstracts in these
ways removes the discussion too far from the real world in which human rights are actually violated. These violations
cannot be said to be the same thing as the simple removal of freedom and well-being from a PPA, for this sort of language
is hopelessly sterile. Human rights violations happen, instead, to men like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Primo Levi, who
struggle desperately to survive and, if successful, carry the scars of their experiences with them for the rest of their lives.
This is a mistake of the highest order, one that insults the victims and survivors of some of humanity's most terrible
tragedies. It is one that Gewirth and Beyleveld cannot possibly intend to make, but one that creeps up on them as the
abstractions with which they deal multiply.
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Gewirths academic discussion of human rights ignores the actual human cost and suffering of
torture and death
In abstracting away so many characteristics from human beings in order to create the prospective purposive agent,
something has clearly been lost from Gewirth's account of the justification for human inviolability . It
might be philosophically interesting to consider whether the generic features of action can logically provide a secular
grounding for the idea of human fights, but what is at stake for Gewirth seems overly academic. Human
rights, however, are not simply academic and their justification is far more than a philosophical puzzle;
they are deadly serious, often a matter of life and death. For this reason, human fights cannot be
considered in a vacuum, and any attempt at their justification must be firmly entrenched in the real
world. While I have quibbled with the PGC on its own terms and argued that (15) does not necessarily follow from (1),
and while I have noted that a great many other theorists have done likewise, my deepest critique is that the PGC's
assumptions cause a great deal of trouble whether or not Gewirth's theory ultimately makes logical
sense. As Rorty argues, Gewirth's theory removes the discussion of human rights from the realm of the
actual and concentrates on the purely theoretical. In doing so, it calls to mind Arthur Koestler's point that
"Statistics don't bleed; it is the detail which counts . ''98 Neither, it seems to me, do PPAs. And the terrible
reality is that human beings do, often at the hands of others . This grim reality is not surprising to
anyone, but it is not often expressed in the way that Samantha Power does, for example. In writing about the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, Power offers a quotation from a UN official on the ground during the worst of the violence: When we
arrived, I looked at the school across the street, and there were children, I don't know how many, forty, sixty, eighty
children stacked up outside who had all been chopped up with machetes. Some of their mothers had heard them
screaming and had come running, and the militia had killed them, too. We got out of the vehicle and entered the church.
There we found 150 people, dead mostly, though some were still groaning, who had been attacked the night before .... The
Rwandan army had cleared out the area, the gendarmerie had rounded up all the Tutsi, and the militia had hacked them to
This sort of thick description stands in marked contrast to the kind of language that Gewirth
employs in his discussion of the PGC's applications . Consider the following example, one of the few in
which Gewirth departs from talking about PPAs and assigns names: Suppose Ames physically assaults Blake,
death. 99
who defends himself by physically assaulting Ames. In a purely formal view, Ames and Blake are each disobeying the
moral principle that requires persons to respect and not infringe one another's well-being. On the PGC's substantive view,
however, these two infractions are not on a par as being both unjustified. Since Ames inflicted or acted to inflict basic harm on
Blake. and hence intended to violate a generic right of Blake while acting in accord with his own generic rights, Ames's intention
was inconsistent and his action morally wrong? ~176 Because they are not real and no attempt has been made to
make them real for us, we do not--we cannot--become emotional'ly attached to Ames and Blake, and we do
not care, therefore, what happens to either of them. Our eyes trip lightly over the words "physically
assaults" in Gewirth's example in a way that they cannot move past the words "who had all been
chopped up with machetes" in Power's.
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Ethics Bad
Ethics is structurally flawed, in that it implies a transgression
Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 00
(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 95-96)
This is why we propose to maintain the concept of the act developed by Kant, and to link it to the thematic of overstepping
of boundaries, of transgression, to the question of evil. It is a matter of acknowledging the fact that any
(ethical) act precisely in so far as it is an act, is necessarily evil. We must specify, however, what is meant
here by evil. This is the evil that belongs to the very structure of the act, to the fact that the latter
always implies a transgression, a change in what is. It is not a matter of some empirical evil, it is
the very logic of the act which is denounced as radically evil in every ideology. The fundamental
ideological gesture consists in providing an image for this structural evil. The gap opened by an act (i.e.
the unfamiliar, out-of-place effect of an act) is immediately linked in this ideological gesture to an image. As a rule this is
an image of suffering, which is then displayed to the public alongside this question: Is this what you want? And this
question already implies the answer: It would be impossible, inhuman, for you to want this! Here we have to insist on
theoretical rigour, and separate this (usually fascinating) image exhibited by ideology from the source of uneasiness from
the evil which is not an undesired, secondary effect of the good but belongs, on the contrary, to its essence. We could
even say that the ethical ideology struggles against evil because this ideology is hostile to the good,
to the logic of the act as such. We could go even further here: the current saturation of the social field
by ethical dilemmas (bioethics, environmental ethics, cultural ethics, medical ethics) is strictly correlative to
the repression of ethics, that is, to an incapacity to think ethics in its dimension of the Real, an
incapacity to conceive of ethics other than simply as a set of restrictions to yet another aspect of
modern society: to the depression which seems to have became the social illness of our time and
to set the tone of the resigned attitude of the (post)modern man of the end of history. In relation to
this, it would be interesting to reaffirm Lacans thesis according to which depression isnt a state of the soul, it is simply a
moral failing, as Dante, and even Spinoza, said: a sin, which means a moral weakness. It is against this moral weakness or
cowardice [lachete morale] that we must affirm the ethical dimension proper.
The ideology of good and evil is inherently flawed

The first difficulty with this concept of diabolical evil lies in its very definition: that diabolical evil
would occur if we elevated opposition to the moral law to the level of a maxim (a principle or law). What
is wrong with this definition? Given the Kantian concept of the moral law which is not a law that says do this or do
that, but an enigmatic law which only commands us to do our duty, without ever naming it the following objection arises:
if the opposition to the moral law were elevated to a maxim or principle, it would no longer be an
opposition to the moral law, it would be the moral law itself. At this level no opposition is possible. It
is not possible to oppose oneself to the moral law at the level of the (moral) law. Nothing can oppose itself
to the moral law on principle that is, for non-pathological reasons without itself becoming a moral law. To act
without allowing pathological incentives to influence our actions is to do good. In relation to this
definition of the good, (diabolical) evil would then have to be defined as follows: it is evil to oppose
oneself, without allowing pathological incentives to influence ones actions, to actions which do not
allow any pathological incentives to influence ones actions. And this is simply absurd.
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Ethics Bad
The real drive behind ethics is desire, not the will to do good
Kants second break with the tradition, related to the first, was his rejection of the view that ethics is concerned
with the distribution of the good (the service of goods in Lacans terms). Kant rejected an ethics based on my
wanting what is good for others, provided of course that their good reflects my own.
It is true that Lacans position concerning the status of the ethics of desire continued to develop. Hence his position in
Seminar XI (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis) differs on several points from the one he adopted in
Seminar VII (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis). That the moral law, looked at more closely, is simply desire in its
pure state is a judgment which, had it been pronounced in Seminar VII, would have had the value of a compliment;
clearly this is no longer the case when it is pronounced in Seminar XI. Yet even though the later Lacan claims that the
analysts desire is not a pure desire, this does not mean that the analysts desire is pathological (in the Kantian sense of the
word), nor that the question of desire has lost its pertinence. To put the matter simply, the question of desire does not so
much lose its central place as cease to be considered the endpoint of analysis. In the later view analysis ends in
another dimension, that of the drive. Hence as the concluding remarks of Seminar XI have it before this
dimension opens up to the subject, he must first reach and then traverse the limit within which, as desire, he is bound.
Morality is a demand for the impossible as it is based on our desires

(Alenka Zupancic, researcher, Institute of Philosophy in the Slovene Academy of Sciences, 2000, Ethics of the Real, p. 3)
Kant is admired by Lacan above all for his break, at two crucial points, with traditional ethics. The first is his
break with the morality that spelled out obligations in terms of the possibility of fulfilling them .
According to Lacan, the crucial point here is that morality as such, as Kant well knew, is a demand for the
impossible: the impossibility in which we recognize the topology of our desire. By insisting on the fact that the
moral imperative is not concerned with what might or might not be done, Kant discovered the essential
dimension of ethics: the dimension of desire, which circles around the real qua impossible. This dimension was
excluded from the purview of traditional ethics, and could therefore appear to it only as an excess. So Kants crucial first
step involves taking the very thing excluded from the traditional field of ethics, and turning it into the only legitimate
territory for ethics. If critics often criticize Kant for demanding the impossible, Lacan attributes an incontestable
theoretical value to this Kantian demand.
Ethics is merely a tool by which personal morals are imposed on others, which is the root of discontent in
society
The Freudian blow to philosophical ethics can be summarized as follows: what philosophy calls the moral law and,
more precisely, what Kant calls the categorical imperative is in fact nothing other than the superego. This
judgment provokes an effect of disenchantment that calls into question any attempt to base ethics on foundations other
than the pathological. At the same time, it places ethics at the core of what Freud called das Unbehagen in der
Kultur. the discontent or malaise at the heart of civilization . In so far as it has its origins in the constitution of the
superego, ethics becomes nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology which may try to pass
off its own commandments as the truly authentic, spontaneous and honourable inclinations of the
subject. This thesis, according to which the moral law is nothing but the superego, calls, of course, for careful
examination, which I shall undertake in Chapter 7 below.
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Ethics Bad
It is impossible to determine whether an action is truly ethical or not
By spelling things out in this way we can see clearly that the ethical is, in fact, essentially a supplement. Let us, then, begin
with the first level (the legal). The content of action (its matter), as well as the form this content, are
exhausted in the notion of in conformity with duty. As long as I do my duty nothing remains to be
said. The fact that the act that fulfils my duty may have been done exclusively for the sake of this duty
would change nothing at level of analysis. Such an act would be entirely indistinguishable from an act
done simply in accord with duty, since their results would be exactly the same. The significance of acting
(exclusively) for the sake of duty will be visible only on the second level analysis, which we will simply call the level form.
Here we come across a form which is no longer the form of anything, of some content of other, yet it is not so much an
empty form as form outside content, a form that provides form only for itself. In other words, we confronted here with a
supply which at the same time seems to be pure waste, something that serves absolutely no purpose.
Ethics in terms of attempts to do something good only re-entrenches the presence of the omnipresent
evil
The theme of radical evil is currently something of a hot topic, and Kant, as a theoretician of radical evil, is subject to
very diverse and sometimes contradictory readings. In his book, LEthique Alain Badiou points out that the topic
of radical evil has become a spectre raised by ethical ideologists every time a will to do something
(good) appears. Every positive project is capable of being undermined in advance on the grounds
that it might bring about an even greater evil. Ethics would thus be reduced to only one function:
preventing evil, or at least lessening it. It seems that such an ethics of the lesser evil is justified in its reference to
Kant. The criticism of Kant according to which he defined the criteria of the (ethical) act in such a way that one can never
satisfy them goes as far back as Hegel . From this point it follows that all our actions are necessarily bad,
and that one can remain pure only if one chooses not to act at all. In this perspective, good does not
exist, whereas evil is omnipresent.
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254
Deontology Bad No Assume Nuke War

Deontology does not hold up against the threat of nuclear war.
Hardin and Mearsheimer 85 [ Russell Hardin and John Mearsheimer are both Professors of Political Science at the University
of Chicago, ol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence JSTOR ]
Discussion among philosophers often stops at the point of fundamental disagreement over moral
principles, just as discussion among strategists often stops at the point of disagreement over hypothetical assertions about
deterrence. But most moral theorists -- and all utilitarians -- also require consideration of hypothetical
assertions to reach their conclusions, although they are typically even less adept at objective, causal argument
than are strategists, who are themselves often quite casual with their social scientific claims. Even if one
wishes to argue principally from deontological principles, one must have some confidence in one's
social scientific expectations to decide whether consequences might not in this instance be overriding .
Only a deontologist who held the extraordinary position that consequences never matter could easily
reach a conclusion on nuclear weapons without considering the quality of various outcomes . Alas, on this
dreadful issue good causal arguments are desperately needed.
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Deontology Bad - Policy

Deontology is a terrible system for policy- policies must use means to an end framework and are judged
by their effectiveness
Institute For Public Policy 97 [ Institute For Public Policy New Mexico June, 1997 A Forum on the Role of Environmental
Ethics http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7_2/72.pdf]
At the same time, deontologically
based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for

public policy. At best, a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in
public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a
regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually
making it worse. For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the
best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any
policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and
others, although seemingly consistent
with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental
policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental
laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement
officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive
structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation.
(There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes
of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins,
1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe,
be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of
values
typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above
all, thescope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so
conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that
only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interes t (1958, p. 12). It therefore follows that in a
democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives
and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do
something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of
utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient,
though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.
.
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256
Deontology Bad - Policy

Deontology is irrelevant in policy making - intentions are impossible to know, only the outcome matters
Hinman98
(LawrenceHinmanisaprofessorofEthicsEthics:APluralisticApproachtoMoralTheory,p.186)
When, for example, we want to assess the moral correctness of proposed governmental legislation, we
may well wish to set aside any question of the intentions of the legislators. After all good laws may be
passed for the most venal of political motives, and bad legislation may be the outcome of quite good
intentions. Instead, we can concentrate solely on the question of what
effects the legislation may have on the people. When we make this shift, we
are not necessarily denying that individual intentions are important on some
level, but rather confining our attention to a level on which those intentions become largely irrelevant .
This is particularly appropriate in the case of policy decisions by governments, corporations, or other groups. In
such cases there may be a diversity of different intentions that one may want to treat as essentially
private matters hwen assessing the moral worth of the proposed law, policy, or action. Therefore, rule
utilitarianism's neglect of intentions intuitively makes the most sense when we are assessing the moral
worth of some large-scale policy proposed by an entity consisting of more than one individual.
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257
Deontology Bad - Democracy

Deontology in policy making fails to uphold democracy and legitimizes oppression.
Institute For Public Policy 97 [ Institute For Public Policy New Mexico June, 1997 A Forum on the Role of Environmental
Ethics http://apsapolicysection.org/vol7_2/72.pdf]
Regarding the policymaking role of deontological philosophy in a democracy, I am concerned about

the
same issue that concerned scholars such as Herman Finer and Victor Thompson--the specter of
policymakers (whether elected or unelected) imposing their own perceptions of higher-order moral
principles on an unwilling or uninformed society. History has shown that the imposition of higherorder moral principles from above all too often degenerates into instrumental oppression . Thus as Finer
has--I believe correctly--pointed out, the crucial difference between democracy and totalitarianism is the
people's power to exact obedience to the public will. In a democracy, values are not "discovered" by
policy activists; instead, yhey emerge out of the democratic process. For this reason I find very troubling the
suggestion by Joel Kassiola that environmental ethics requires that such long-standing and powerful values as national
sovereignty and property rights will have to be ethically assessed and, perhaps, redefined or subordinated to a
more morally-weighty, environmentally-based values and policies. I cannot help but wonder just who will
be doing the refining and subordinating of these values and how this is to be done. As Kurt Baier reminds us, in a
democracy the moral rules and convictions of any group can and should be subjected to certain tests
(1958, p. 12). That test is the submission of those moral rules and convictions
to the sovereign public. While policymakers are expected to sort out the value conflicts that arise in
light of their duty to serve the public interest, they are seldom entitled to act solely according to some
perceived a priori moral imperative. (Those who would act this way in the case of environmental policy are aptly
described by Bob Taylor as environmental ethicists who discover 'truth' even though this truth can't or won't be seen by
their fellow citizens.) Herein lies one of the important moral dilemmas of democratic government.
Individuals are free, within the constraints of law, to act on perceived moral imperatives; democratic
governments are not. It is, for example, one thing for individuals to donate their property for
environmental preservation, but it is quite another thing for the government
to seize private lands (i.e., redefine property rights) for the same purpose.
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258
Deontology Bad -- Conflicts

Deontology fails-- no way of evaluating conflicting obligations
Rainbow 2002 [ Catherine Rainbow is a teacher at Davidson College.Descriptions of Ethical Theories and Principles
http://www.bio.davidson.edu/people/kabernd/Indep/carainbow/Theories.htm]
deontology contains many positive attributes, it also contains its fair number of flaws. One weakness
of this theory is that there is no rationale or logical basis for deciding an individual's duties . For
instance, businessman may decide that it is his duty to always be on time to meetings. Although this
appears to be a noble duty we do not know why the person chose to make this his duty . Perhaps the reason
Although
that he has to be at the meeting on time is that he always has to sit in the same chair. A similar scenario unearths two other
faults of deontology including the fact that sometimes a person's duties conflict, and that deontology is not concerned
with the welfare of others . For instance, if the deontologist who must be on time to meetings is running
late, how is he supposed to drive? Is the deontologist supposed to speed, breaking his duty to society to
uphold the law, or is the deontologist supposed to arrive at his meeting late, breaking his duty to be on
time? This scenario of conflicting obligations does not lead us to a clear ethically correct
resolution nor does it protect the welfare of others from the deontologist's decision. Since deontology
is not based on the context of each situation, it does not provide any guidance when one enters a
complex situation in which there are conflicting obligations (1,2).
The need for exceptions means deontology fails as a theory.

Treasury Board 2006 [Canadian Treasury Board Professional Ethics and Standards for the Evaluation Community in the
Government of Canada http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/eval/dev/career/pesecgc-enpcegc/pesecgc-enpcegc_e.asp]
Among the criticisms of deontological theory is that
it is difficult to get universal agreement on

what principles should be considered fundamental. It is also difficult to prioritize and to apply
such abstract principles as truth telling and the sanctity of life to specific cases that arise in ones
day-to-day work. In addition, the application of certain principles, without reference to
consequences, can have extremely negative resultsfor example, when telling the truth results
in penalties for well-intentioned actions. Moreover, it is often the case that one principle will
come into conflict with another. A celebrated example is truth telling versus the sanctity of life
when one is considering whether to lie to a prospective murderer about the location of the
intended victim. It is also argued that if exceptions are made in the application of a principle, it
cannot be considered a fundamental one. Many deontologists, however, would approve of
exceptions when a greater moral principle is at stake. At a less dramatic level than life and death,
one can envisage an evaluator having to choose between the publics right to know and a clients
right to privacy.
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259
Deontology Bad Subjective Rights

The subjectivity of what rights are important means deontology fails.
Rainbow 2002 [ Catherine Rainbow is a teacher at Davidson College.Descriptions of Ethical Theories and Principles
http://www.bio.davidson.edu/people/kabernd/Indep/carainbow/Theories.htm]
In the rights ethical theory the rights set forth by a society are protected and given the highest priority. Rights
are considered to be ethically correct and valid since a large or ruling population endorses them. Individuals
may also bestow rights upon others if they have the ability and resources to do so (1). For example, a person
may say that her friend may borrow the car for the afternoon. The friend who was given the ability to borrow
the car now has a right to the car in the afternoon. A major complication of this theory on a larger scale,
however, is that one must decipher what the characteristics of a right are in a society. The society has to
determine what rights it wants to uphold and give to its citizens. In order for a society to determine what rights
it wants to enact, it must decide what the society's goals and ethical priorities are. Therefore, in order for the
rights theory to be useful, it must be used in conjunction with another ethical theory that will consistently
explain the goals of the society (1). For example in America people have the right to choose their religion
because this right is upheld in the Constitution. One of the goals of the founding fathers' of America was to
uphold this right to freedom of religion. However, under Hitler's reign in Germany, the Jews were persecuted
for their religion because Hitler decided that Jews were detrimental to Germany's future success. The American
government upholds freedom of religion while the Nazi government did not uphold it and, instead, chose to
eradicate the Jewish religion and those who practiced it.
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260
Extinction O/W Deontology

The risk of extinction is so great that deontological framework needs to be ignored in evaluating it.
Schell 82[Jonathan Schell 1982 Fate of the Earth pp. 93-96]
To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation just as it would be a
misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If
one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the
ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient
enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that
mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to
calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a
holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet
unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be
extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of
uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of
the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we
do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear
weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a
nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the
absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear
armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass of "the basic power of the universe" and of
a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth.
In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question
of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and
there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what
point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy
itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that
at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every
day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of
extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of
any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk
has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not
the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time.
We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that
we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To
employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake
is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn
that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will
be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically
speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring
about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to
address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end
to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering
with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder
should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution
should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.
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Deontology Bad - Absolutist

Deontologys absolutism prioritizes morality as a concept over moral results.
Nielsen 93 [Kai Nielsen is a Philosophy Professor at University of Calgary
Absolutism and It Consequentialist CriticsEdited by Joram Haber, p. 170-2]
Blowingupthefatmanisindeedmonstrous.Butlettinghimremainstuckwhilethewholegroupdrownsis
stillmoremonstrous.Theconsequentialistisonstrongmoralgroundhere,and,ifhisreflectivemoral
convictionsdonotsquareeitherwithcertainunrehearsedorwithcertainreflectiveparticularmoral
convictionsofhumanbeings,somuchtheworseforsuchcommonsensemoralconvictions.Onecouldeven
usefullyandrelevantlyadaptherethoughforaquitedifferentpurposeanargumentofDonagan's.
ConsequentialismofthekindIhavebeenarguingforprovidessopersuasive"atheoreticalbasisfor
commonmoralitythatwhenitcontradictssomemoralintuition,itisnaturaltosuspectthatintuition,not
theory,iscorrupt."Giventhecomprehensiveness,plausibility,andoverallrationalityofconsequentialism,
itisnotunreasonabletooverrideevenadeeplyfeltmoralconvictionifitdoesnotsquarewithsucha
theory,though,ifitmadenosenseoroverrodethebulkoforevenagreatmanyofourconsideredmoral
convictionsthatwouldbeanothermatterindeedAnticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity
of
people who will sanction such killing of the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of
the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far
greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but
merely forbore to prevent it? Insuchacontext,suchreasoningandsuchforbearingtopreventseemstome
toconstituteamoralevasion.Isayitisevasivebecauseratherthansteelinghimselftodowhatinnormal
circumstanceswouldbeahorribleandvileactbutinthiscircumstanceisaharshmoralnecessityhe
allows.whenhehasthepowertopreventit,asituationwhichisstillmanytimesworse.Hetriestokeep
his'moralpurity'and[to]avoid'dirtyhands'atthepriceofuttermoralfailureandwhatKierkegaard
called'doublemindedness.'Itisunderstandablethatpeopleshouldactinthismorallyevasivewaybutthis
doesnotmakeitright.
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Deontology Bad - Absolutist

Deontologys absolutism means it will inevitably fail.
Pritchett No Date [ Adrian Pritchett is a University of Georgia graduate and an attorney. Paper written post 1998. Kai
Nielsens Support of Consequentialism and Rejection of Deontology http://pritchea.myweb.uga.edu/phil3200paper1.htm]
Throughout the article, Nielsen concurrently argues that deontology should be rejected but that consequentialism is viable.
We may reconstruct his argument as follows: Deontology, as a morally absolute theory, makes mistakes .
Likewise, an absolutist form of consequentialism also makes mistakes. So absolutism is wrong. Unfortunately,
deontology can only be formulated as some type of moral absolutism, while consequentialism can be
flexible. Therefore, deontology should be rejected, and by rejecting deontology we are left with
consequentialism as a viable theory.Nielsen relied heavily on examples to support his first premise that
deontology makes mistakes. He discussed warfare to show how it is not the case that one is necessarily morally
corrupt if he or she knowingly kills the innocent while making moves to kill combatants, but this point would not have been
salient without having seen the movie he referred to, The Battle of Algiers. Nielsen did present an effective example,
though, with the case of the innocent fat man. In this thought experiment, a fat man is leading a group of people
out of a cave when he gets hopelessly stuck in the opening. There is a rising tide that will cause
everyone inside the cave to drown unless they can get out. The only option for removing the fat man is
to blast him out with dynamite that someone happens to have. Nielsen explains that the deontologist
would hold that the fat man must not be blasted and killed because this would violate the prohibition
against killing and it is only nature responsible for everyone else drowning. Nielsen challenges this
principle by declaring that anyone in such a situation, including the fat man, should understand that the
right thing to do is blast the fat man out in order to save the many live s in the cave. Furthermore, the
deontologist exhibits moral evasion whenever he stands idly by and allows a greater tragedy than is
necessary to occur. Nielsen explains that this is the kind of example that highlights the corrupt nature
of deontology.
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Ethical Action/Legality Mutually Exclusive

Ethical action cannot be based on legality and the illegal
We might say that the ethical dimension of an action is supernumerary to the conceptual pair
legal/illegal. This in turn suggests a structural connection with the Lacanian notion of the Real. As
Alain Badiou has noticed, Lacan conceives of the Real in a way that removes it from the logic of the
apparently mutually exclusive alternatives of the knowable and the unknowable. The unknowable is
just a type of the knowable; it is the limit or degenerate case of the knowable; where the Real belongs
to another register entirely. Analogously, for Kant the illegal still falls within the category of legality
they both belong to the same register, that of things conforming or failing to conform with duty. Ethics
to continue the analogy escapes this register. Even though an ethical act will conform with duty,
this by itself is not and cannot be what makes it ethical. So the ethical cannot be situated within the
framework of the law and violations of the law. Again, in relation to legality, the ethical always
presents a surplus or excess.
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Ethical Action/Legality Mutually Exclusive

Ethical action and legality cannot be related
But then, what exactly is at stake, what is this pure form? First of all, it is clear that the form in question cannot be the
form of the matter, simply because Kant situates the legal and the ethical in two different registers. Hence matter and
form, the legal and the ethical, are not two different aspects of one and the same thing. Despite this, several commentators
have suggested the following solution to the Kantian problem of form: every form has a content associated with it; we are
always and only dealing with a form and a content. So, in this view, if we are to decide whether an act is ethical or not, we
simply have to know which in fact determines our will: if it is the form, our actions are pathological; if it is the form, they
are ethical. This indeed, would rightly be called formalism but it not what Kant is aiming at this his use of the concept of
pure form.
First of all we should immediately note that the label formalism is more appropriate for what Kant calls legality. In terms
of legality, all that matters is whether or not an action conform with duty the content of such an action, the real
motivated for this conformity, is ignored; it simply does not matter. But the ethical, unlike the legal, does in fact present a
certain claim concerning the content of the will. Ethics demands not only that an action conform with duty, but also that
this conformity be the only content or motive of that action. Thus Kants emphasis on form is in an attempt to disclose a
possible drive for ethical action. Kant is saying that form has to come to occupy the position formerly occupied by
matter, that form itself has to function as a drive. Form itself must be appropriated as a material surplus, in order for it to
be capable of the will. Kants point, I repeat, is not that all traces materiality have to be purged from the determining
ground of the moral will but, rather, that the form of the moral law has itself become material, in order for it to function as
a motive force of action.
As result of this we can see that there are actually two different problems to be resolved, mysteries to be cleared up,
concerning the possibility of a pure ethical act. The first is the one we commonly associate with Kantian ethics. How is it
possible to reduce or eliminate all the pathological motives or incentives of our actions? How can a subject disregard all
self-interest, ignore the pleasure principle, all concerns with her own well-being and the well-being of those close to her?
What kind of a monstrous, inhuman subject does Kantian ethics presuppose? This line of questioning is related to the
issue of the infinite purification of the subjects will, with its logic of no matter how far you have come one more effort
will always be required. The second question that must be dealt with concerns what we might call the ethical
transubstantiation required by Kants view: the question of the possibility of converting a mere form into a materially
efficacious drive. This second question is, in my view, the more pressing of the two, because answering it would
automatically provide an answer to the first question as well. So how can something which is not in itself pathological
(i.e. which has nothing to do with the representation of pleasure or pain, the usual mode of subjects casuality)
nevertheless become the cause or drive of a subjects actions? The question here is no longer that of a purification of
motives and incentives. It is much more radical: how can form become matter, how can something which, in the
subjects universe, does not qualify as a cause, suddenly become a cause?
This is the real miracle involved in ethics. The crucial question of Kantian ethics is thus not how can we eliminate all the
pathological elements of will, so that only the pure form of duty remains? but rather, how can the pure form of duty itself
function as a pathological element, that is, as an element capable of assuming the role of the driving force or incentive of
our actions?. If the latter were actually to take place if the pure form of duty were actually to operate as a motive
(incentive or drive) for the subject we would no longer need to worry about the problems of the purification of the will
and the elimination of all pathological motives.This, however, seems to suggest that for such a subject, ethics simply
becomes second nature, and thus ceases to be ethics altogether. If acting ethically is a matter of drive, if it is as effortless
as that, if neither sacrifice, suffering, nor renunciation is required, then it also seems utterly lacking in merit and devoid of
virtue. This, in fact, was Kants contention: he called such a condition the holiness of the will, which he also thought was
an unattainable ideal for human agent. It could equally be identified with utter banality the banality of the radical good
to paraphrase Hannah Arendts famous expression. Nevertheless and it is one of the fundamental aims of this study to
show this this analysis moves too quickly, and therefore leaves something out. Our theoretical premiss here is that it will
actually be possible to found an ethics on the concept of the drive, without this ethics collapsing into either the holiness or
banality of human actions.
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**AT EGAL**
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1. Distributive justice leads to global poverty
Carl Knight P.h.d International Studies 2008, 34, 713733, British International Studies Association A
pluralistic approach to global poverty
ButRawls masterpiecealsopresentssomeobvious obstacles to global poverty alleviation. A Theory of Justice
explicitly states that the theory is only to be applied within a society .Furthermore,inthosefewplaceswherethebookoerssome
tangentialdiscussionoftransdomesticjustice,itischaracterisedasaquestionofthe justiceofthelawofnationsandofrelationsbetweenstates.16 Hence,

inadiscussion occasionedbyhisanalysisofconscriptionandconscientiousrefusal,Rawlssuggests thatonemayextendtheinterpretationoftheoriginal
positionandthinkofthe partiesasrepresentativesofdierentnationswhomustchoosetogetherthe fundamentalprinciplestoadjudicateconictingclaims
amongstates.17 Hecom mentsthatthisprocedureisfairamongnations,andthattherewouldbeno surprisesintheoutcome,sincetheprinciples
chosenwould...befamiliarones ensuringtreatycompliance,describingtheconditionsforjustwars,andgranting rightsofselfdefenceandself
determinationthe latter being a right of a people to settle its own aairs without the intervention of foreign powers.18
Thisis,then,a thoroughly nationalist conception of justice: social justice applies only within a state or nation . Rawlss
radicalprinciplesofdistributivejustice,suchasthedierence principle,wouldonlyholdtransdomesticallywhere,improbably,stateshadsigned treatiesto
thiseect. Given that such wide ranging internationally redistributive treaties have never been signed, A Theory of
Justice provided a rationale for the Western general publics impression that their duties to the global poor are, at
most, those of charity. Rawlsfullexpressionofhisviewsinthisareacamenearlythreedecadeslaterin TheLawofPeoples.19 HereRawls
againusesthenotionofatransdomesticoriginal position,arguingthatitisan appropriate instrument for selecting laws to govern
relations betweenbothliberalsocietiesanddecentnonliberalsocieties,especially thosewhicharedecenthierarchicalsocieties,beingnonaggressive,
recognisingtheir citizenshumanrights,assigningwidelyacknowledgedadditionalrightsandduties, andbeingbackedbygenuineandnotunreasonable
beliefsamongjudgesandother officialsthatthelawembodiesacommongoodideaofjustice.20 ThisSocietyof Peopleswouldagreetobeguidedby
eightprinciplesconstitutingthebasiccharterof theLawofPeoples.21
2. Focusing exclusively on the poor stigmatizes the issueno solvency

Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ Louisiana State, January 1999 Misfortune,
welfare reform, and right-wing egalitarianism
Yet nobody in the welfare debate, as far as I know, invoked the Charles Murray of The Bell Curve rather than the Murray of Losing Ground. Moreover, while
many right-wing arguments are neutral about questions of class distinctions, others actually seem to be grounded in a kind of relational egalitarianism. For
example, conservatives sometimes argue that welfare stigmatizes recipients. As we have already heard Gingrich (1995, 71) say, "The welfare state
reduces the poor from citizens to clients." This argument raises a serious issue for relational egalitarians : How can the poor
be given material aid without others thinking less of them? The stigma of being on the receiving end of welfare may create the very
divisions in society that the relational egalitarian seeks to avoid. If government programs designed to help the poor
stand in the way of citizens relating to each other non-hierarchically, maybe we should abolish such programs in the
interest of a society in which citizens stand as equals.
3. Egalitarianism does not equate society

Jan Narveson P.hD @ Harvard University 1997 Egalitarianism: Partial, Counterproductive and
BaselessBlackwell
Egalitarianism forces persons who exceed the average, in the respect deemed by the theorist to be relevant, to surrender,
insofar as possible, the amount by which they exceed that average to persons below it. On the face of it, therefore,
egalitarianism is incompatible with common good, in empowering some people over others: roughly, the unproductive
over the productive. The formers interests are held to merit the imposition of force over others, whereas the interests of the
productive do not. Yet producers, as such, merely produce; they dont use force against others. Thus egalitarianism denies the
central rule of rational human association. What could be thought to justify this apparent bias in favour of the
unproductive, the needy, the sick, against the productive the healthy, the ingenious, the energetic? What are the latter
supposed to have done to the former to have merited the egalitarians impositions? The answer cant be, Oh, nothing
theyre just unlucky! or We dont like people like that! A rational social theory must appeal to commonvalues. By
definition, those have not been respected when a measure is forced upon certain people against their own values.
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4. Principles of justice cement the political sphereerode the possibility for real change
William W. Sokoloff -- PhD Candidate @ Amherst. 2005 Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on
Decision, Political Research Quarterly, http://prq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/58/2/341
In Rawlss (1993:157)universe, consensus is cemented into the political founding and overrides all other issues. 26
Anything that triggers political conflict is excluded from the public sphere:A liberal view removes from the political
agenda the most divisive issues,seriouscontentionabout whichmustunderminethebasesofsocialcooperation. Difficult
issuesmaybeinterestingbut,forRawls,they are not the stuff of politics.They threaten consensus and must be excluded
or contained in the private sphere. Politics is about tinkering, not controversy. TheonlytrulypoliticalmomentinRawlss
work,then,is layingthegroundforjusticeasfairnessintheoriginalposi tion.Once the principles of justice as fairness are
established,however,the political sphere is essentially closed. Effortstoreopenthefoundationareathreattopolitical
stability.The range of acceptable politicalissues is framed by principles that are not up for debate. Hence,citizensare
preventedfrompursuingthosemodesofcivicinvolvement thatwouldopenthepoliticalspheretorealcontestation. Giventhe
imperativeofconsensus,theregimemustprotect itspoliticalfoundingfrominterrogation.Narrowing the range of
acceptable political issues exacts a high cost from citizens.Space for dissent is eliminated. The range of political
possibilities is restricted to one(and onlyone)thatwillbefixedonceandforall(Rawls1993: 161).Once the principles
of justice are instituted, only the support of the status quo is possible(Alejandro1998:144). ForRawls,allcitizensaffirm
thesamepublicconceptionof justice(1993:39).Public discussion about alternative political possibilities is not
necessary.31 Sinceacriticaldisposi tiontowardthefoundingmomentofjusticeasfairness wouldriskdestroyingconsensus,
itisbettertotreatitasa monumentbeforewhichonegenuflects. Rawls, however, does not purge all conflict from his model of
politicsinthenameofconsensus.Some level of reasonable disagreement is permitted in his liberal utopia.It arisesfromthe
burdensofjudgment.Thecausesofthese burdensareformidable:
5. Inequality inevitablecapitalism
Stuart White 2k, ReviewArticle: Social Rights and the Social Contract Political Theory and the New
Welfare Politics Cambridge University Press, B.J.Pol.S. 30, 50753
How Much Equality of Opportunity Does Fair Reciprocity Require? I have presented only a very intuitive account of the
conditions of fair reciprocity; I have not formally presented a full conception of distributive justice and demonstrated how each
condition follows from this conception, something one might attempt in a lengthier analysis. However, I do wish to examine
one general philosophical issue that arises when we come to think about the conditions of fair reciprocity. Assume that
distributive justice is centrally about some form of equal opportunity. The notion of equality of opportunity can, of course,
be understood in a number of different ways. But assume, for the moment, that we understand it in the radical form
defended in contemporary egalitarian theories of distributive justice.40 Equal opportunity in this sense requires, inter
alia, that we seek to prevent or correct for inequalities in income attributable to differences in natural ability and for
inequalities in capability due to handicaps that people suffer through no fault of their own. The question I wish to consider can
then be put like this: How far must society satisfy the demands of equal opportunity before we can plausibly say that all
of its members have obligations under the reciprocity principle? One view, which I shall call the full compliance view, is
that the demands of equal opportunity must be satised in full for it to be true that all citizens have obligations to make
productive contributions to the community under the reciprocity principle. The intuition is that people can have no obligation
to contribute in a signicant way to a community that is not (in all other relevant respects) fully just at least if they are
amongst those who are disadvantaged by their societys residual injustices. Reciprocity kicks in, as it were, only when the
terms of social co-operation are fair, where fairness requires (inter alia) full satisfaction of the demands of equal
opportunity. If equal opportunity is understood in our assumed sense, however, then this full compliance view effectively
removes the ideal of fair reciprocity from the domain of real-world politics. For there is no chance that any advanced
capitalist (or, for that matter, post-capitalist) society will in the near future satisfy equal opportunity, in our assumed
sense, in full. And so, following the full compliance view, we should, if we are egalitarians in the assumed sense, simply
abandon the idea that there can be anything like a universal civic obligation to make a productive contribution to the
community.
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Public Sphere Ext Arg Plurality

As an intellectualerr on the side of protecting argument plurality
MarthaC.Nussbaum 01P.h.D@HarvardPoliticalObjectivityVol.32,No.4,ObjectivityinEthics,
Politics,andAesthetics(Autumn,2001),pp.883906
Butthe project of political liberalism constrains the search for objectivity.Oneofthethingsaboutwhichpeople
reasonablydisagreeis whattypeofobjectivityweareabletoattaininjudgmentsabout fundamentalethical/politicalmatters.
Differentcomprehensivedoc trinesgivedifferentverdictsonthismatter.Thecomprehensivedoctrine ofRomanCatholic
Christianity,forexample,givesaverydifferent answerfromthatsuppliedbypostmodernism,Utilitarianism,Kantianism, and,
even,ProtestantChristianity.Ishallexploretheimplicationsofthis factfortheroleaconceptofobjectivitycanandshould
playinthe politicalsphere.Ishallarguethatrespectforpluralismindeedcon strainsushere.Althougheachofusinour
ethicalandscienticliveswill havesomeviewabouttheissuesaddressedinthepresentsymposium,we ought not to build
our fundamental political principles around a particular contested conception of objectivity,forexampleAllenWoods
conception,ortheconceptionofselfevidenttruthusedintheU.S. DeclarationofIndependence.Ontheotherhand,wearenot
entirelyat aloss:forwecanarticulateanddefendaspecicallypoliticalconception ofobjectivitythatcanitselfbetheobject
ofanoverlappingconsensus amongcomprehensivedoctrines. Toindicatethedirectionofmyargumentverybriey,think
whatit wouldbeliketoliveinanationthatbuiltitsfundamentalpolitical principlesaroundtheviewthatAllenWoodsview
ofobjectivityis correct,andthatanyonewhoholdsotherwiseissimplymistaken.I admireWoodsarguments.Ithinkthat
somethingclosetothisis probablytrue.Butstill,tobuildbasicpoliticalprinciplesonWoods view10seemsproblematic.Even
ifthedoctrinedidnothaveanyspecic consequencesforpoliticallife,asitprobablywould,stillitspublic recognitionitself
posesaproblem.AllthoseAmericanswhoholdto somerevealedreligion,andgroundtheirunderstandingofobjectivity on
theideaofrevelation,aswellasallthoseskepticalorrelativistorneo HumeanAmericanswhothinkthatWoodiswrongon
othergrounds, wouldbeputinthepositionofsecondclasscitizens.11Becausetheydonotsharethetruedoctrine,theirvision
oftruthandobjectivitydoesnot gettocountinwhatshapesthepolity,eventhough, let us suppose, it is a liberal regime and
their freedom of speech would in no way be curtailed.Wewouldnotlikesuchawayofproceedingeveninthe classroom:
we philosophers think that all the major positions should be studied and debated, and treated withrespect,and none
should be an unexaminedcornerstonefortheentireenterprise.Howmuchworse, then, if the foundations of a nation itself
were built in ways that show disrespect for the views of many people about what truth is and where it lies. AlthoughI
disagreewithmoreorlesseverythingRichardRortysays, andthinkthatonthematterswhereheandWooddisagreeWoodis
rightandRortyiswrong,still,Iwouldnotliketoliveinanationbuilt aroundthedenialofRortysepistemologicaland
metaphysicalview,any morethaninonebuiltaroundthedenialofmyown.Heisareasonable man,andafellowcitizen;the
disagreementswehavearereasonable disagreements.Political respectforhisreasonrequires respecting his comprehensive
doctrine,andthat,inturn,requiresnotbuildingthe polityonthecontradictionofthatdoctrine.12
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Hierarchies Inevitable
Hierarchies are inevitable even after the redistribution of wealth
BaselessBlackwell
Egalitarians can only defend their view by reference to values that manyormost people do not have. People below the
mid-point of the proposed redistributional scale will,ofcourse,havesome reason to rejoice at their unearned
egalitarian windfalls temporarily. Meanwhile, people from whom they are wrested have the opposite motivation, so
common good is out the window fromthestart. Nor can equality relevantly be held to be an objective oranabsolute
valueavalueinitself,thatdoesntneedto beheldbyanybody(exceptthetheoristhimself,ofcourse).That is
intuitionaltalk,whichhasalreadybeendismissed. Do real people(asopposedtotheorists)care about equality as
such? No. They want betterandmorereliablefoodonthetable, nicertablestoputiton,TVs, theatres, motorcars,
books,medical services,churches,coursesinChinesehistory,andsoon,indefi nitely.Equality is irrelevant to
these values: how much of any or all of them anyone has is logically independent of how much anyone else has. People
are rarely free of envy,tobesure.Most people would like to be better than others in some wayand somewillpay
otherstoletthemlookdownonthem. But few will make themselves worse off in order to make some other people
equally badly off. Valuesthatcanbeimprovedbyhumanactivityarenotindependentinanyotherway,though,for
productioniscooperative, requiringarrangementsagreedtobyagreatmanypeoplework ers,financiers,

engineers,customers.Nobody can attain to wealth,insofarasthefreemarketobtains,without others likewise
benefiting.These are truisms,thoughIamawarethattheywillbe seenbymanyreadersasideological even at
thepresenttime, whentheabsurditiesofalternative views of economics have been socompletely exposed.13
Equality is impossibleenvy
Jon Mandle 2k Reviwed: Liberalism, Justice, and Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality by Colin M.
Macleod The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 601-604 Duke University Press.
Jstor
Here, I can only illustrate one of Macleod's many distinct criticisms of Dworkin's use of idealized markets. Dworkin argues
that the initial division of resources (prior to adjustments made in light of differences in individual ambition) should satisfy an
"envy test": "No division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any [person] would prefer
someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle" (Dworkin 1981b, 285). And the mechanism he proposes to satisfy
this test is a hypothetical auction in which individuals bid on resources using some counter (itself without value and equally
distributed). This market-based solution values resources entirely in terms of the preferences that individuals express in
the auction. Macleod recognizes that a great strength of Dworkin's auction is that it is sensitive to the opportunity costs to
others of giving some resource to a particular individual. As Macleod helpfully points out, "The resources a person can
acquire are a function not only of the importance she attaches to them but also of the importance attached by others to
them .... Phrased in the language of opportunity costs, the auction ensures that aggregate opportunity costs are equal" (26).
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Distribution of benefits to equalize the impoverished is indefensible encourages envy and moral
disorientation.
Page 2007
Edward. Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach. Journal of Global
Ethics. Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2007, pgs 3-20.
Suppose, again, that the sufficiency level for all was 50. Whereas intrinsic egalitarianism seems, other things being equal, to
favour outcome (3) and prioritarianism would favour allocation (1), sufficientarianism would favour outcome (2) since this
would be the only outcome in which at least some people had enough. For the sufficientarian, the distribution of benefits
and burdens to achieve equality or priority in such circumstances is indefensible. It would be analogous to the tragedy
involved in a famine situation of giving food to those who cannot possibly survive at the cost of those that could survive if
they received extra rations. In this sense, the ideal of sufficiency is related to the medical concept of triage according to
which, when faced with more people requiring care than can be treated, resources are rationed so that the most needy
receive attention first. However, because the category of most needy is defined in terms of the overarching aim that as
many people as possible should survive a given emergency, triage protocols often lead to the very worst off being denied
treatment for the sake of benefitting those who can be helped to survive. Frankfurts view is that all distributive claims
arise in some way from an analysis of where people stand relative to the threshold of sufficiency, or as he puts it the
threshold that separates lives that are good from lives that are not good (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). Egalitarianism, by contrast,
posits a relationship between the urgency of a persons claims and their comparative well-being without reference to the
level at which they would have enough. Since allocating people enough to lead decent lives exhausts our duties of
distribution, sufficientarians argue that egalitarianism recognizes duties that do not exist. In fact, in linking ethical duties to
the comparative fortunes of people, egalitarianism encourages envy and thereby contributes to the moral
disorientation and shallowness of our time (Frankfurt 1987, pp. 2223; Anderson 1999, pp. 287ff.).
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Egal = Infinite Redistribution

Egalitarian and Prioritarian thinking flawed no standard baseline for equality guarantees never-ending
redistribution.
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Although Frankfurt focuses his critique of rival distributive views on intrinsic egalitarianism, it can be readily extended to
cover prioritarianism. While the priority view is grounded in the badness of absolute rather than comparative disadvantage,
it is also inclined to divert resources to the worst off even if this would mean sacrificing substantial benefits to other,
slightly better off, persons who could be helped to lead a decent life. Frankfurt argues that: It is true that people in the lowest
strata of society generally live in horrible conditions, but this association of low social position and dreadful quality of life is
entirely contingent. There is no necessary connection between being at the bottom of society and being poor in the sense in which
poverty is a serious and morally objectionable barrier to life. (Frankfurt 1997, p. 2) The problem with prioritarianism, then, is
not that it fetishizes comparative wellbeing but rather that it fetishizes absolute well-being with the result that it mandates
constant interference in peoples lives to benefit the worst off. By doing so, prioritarianism is inclined to generate just as
much envy and pity as its egalitarian rival and to mandate a range of redistributions that do not help their recipients to lead
decent lives. Consider the following example. There are two groups in society, where one enjoys a considerably lower level
of well-being than the other, where both groups enjoy a far better than decent life, and where the inequalities are
undeserved. We can call these groups the very happy and the extremely happy. Egalitarians claim that, if we could do
something about it, the very happy group should be compensated for their relative well-being deficit. This is because this
theory regards undeserved inequality as bad even if everyone is at least very happy; that is, it makes no ethical difference
that the inequality is between groups, or persons, who are very well off. Prioritarians, by contrast, regard the very happy in
isolation of their relative happiness as they are only interested in absolute levels of well-being. Nonetheless, the very happy,
as the worst off, deserve our attention even if their lives are so good they want for nothing. According to sufficientarians,
however, the egalitarian and prioritarian claims are absurd. How can there be a duty to help the worst off, they ask,
when they already lead lives of such a high standard?
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Egal Biased
Egalitarian claims are biased
BaselessBlackwell
Further reflectiononthis leads to an important further point against egalitarianism :that it is essentiallycertaintobe
counterproductive aswellto defeat the very values whose equalization is required by the theory. Forced transfers from rich
to poor,from capitaliststoproletarians,willworsenthe lot of the poor even as it decreases the wealth of the rich. Not only
is egalitarianism biased, but the particular people against whom it is biased are the productive the source of what the
people it is biased in favour of hope to receive in consequence. It is not too much to say, even, that egalitarianism is a
conspiracy against those it claims to be trying to help.
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Rejection of Egal K2 Check Abuse

Acceptance of egalitarianism dominates the political sphere and makes us powerless to the abuses of
elites
William W. Sokoloff -- PhD Candidate @ Amherst. 2005 Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on
Decision, Political Research Quarterly, http://prq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/58/2/341
If Rawlss appeal to the burdens of judgment seems disingenuous insofar as the founding moment of justice as fairness is
somehow protected from them, his underlying notion of citizenship also leaves much to be desired. Even though he claims
citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument (Rawls 1993: lvii), he methodically closes spaces for the types of
dissent, conflict and argument that nurture democratic citizenship. If citizens with competing comprehensive doctrines
happen to meet on the street in Rawlss liberal utopia, they nervously grimace at each other and then retreat to the private
sphere, simply shrugging shoulders in silence during encounters. Both the immediate impact and the intergenerational effect
of Rawlss neutralization of public dialogue will produce a society of inarticulate shoppers on Prozac: By taking Prozac,
they may be able to alleviate their angst, which might be a disruptive force to the liberal order (Alejandro 1998: 13). Citizens
will not only be unable to contest abuses of power but they will be incapable of negotiating encounters with others in
substantive ways. Rawlss allergy to even mild modes of political conflict results in a de-politicization of politics under the
banner of neutrality.35 He evacuates all political content from public discussion: We try to bypass religion and
philosophys pro- foundest controversies so as to have some hope of uncover- ing a basis of a stable overlapping consensus
(Rawls 1993: 152).36Much to his credit, Rawls acknowledges the great deal of indeterminacy of decision in the burdens of
judgment but this indeterminacy is somehow absent from his image of political society. The indeterminacy of decision in
Rawls is mitigated by his de-politicization of political foundations. The indeterminacy of politics is precisely what Rawls
seeks to expel from the political horizon. Political liberalism purges politics from politics and encloses the political field
under the terror of uniformity.37The value Rawls ascribes to pluralism is disingenuous. It is incompatible with the
imperative of unanimity on basic principles.
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AT: Moral Egal

Moral calls for egalitarianism are self defeating
Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ Louisiana State, January 1999
Misfortune, welfare reform, and right-wing egalitarianism
How will democratic decision makers choose which welfare policy to endorse? They will speculate. The average voter, for
example, will havenooptionotherthanguessingwhichpolicyhasthebestlong termconsequences,andthe
averageelectedrepresentativeisprobably innobetterposition.Inspeculatingaboutlongtermconsequences they

maybeinordinatelyswayedbyanynumberofprejudicesorpre conceivedideas.When the truth does not present
itself clearly, it is easy to seize on the evidence that supports one's ideological presuppositions. The consequence of
applying equality of fortune to the welfare debate is not usefully neutral in the sense that it avoids blind ideological
presuppositions or commitments. It is tragically neutral inthe sensethat it providesdemocraticvotersandtheir
representativeswith no reason to challengetheirblind ideological commitments.For equality of fortune would focus
the debate on the empirical question thatdid,infact,commandthelion'sshareofattention:Whichpolicy isbestfor
thepoor?Answerstothisquestionwillbedetermined by prejudice and mood more than reasoned deliberation or real
debate. If this consequence is inevitable, then the implications for the ideal of equality are dismal :it would appear
impotent as a political ideal,forit requiresdemocraticbodiestomakedecisionsbasedonspeculation about
economiceffectsoverthecourseofdecadesorevengenerations.
Err on the side of combining political consequences with humanitarianism

Thomas Weiss 99, Presidential Professor of Political Science @ CUNY Graduate Center, "principles,
politics, and humanitarian action"
Political actors have a newfound interest in principles, while humanitarians of all stripes are increasingly aware of the
importance of politics. Yet, there remain two distinct approachespolitics and humanitarianism as self-contained and
antithetical realities or alternatively as overlapping spheres. Nostalgia for aspects of the Cold War or other bygone eras is
perhaps under- standable, but there never was a golden age when humanitarianism was insulated from politics. Much
aid was an extension of the foreign policies of major donors, especially the superpowers. Nonetheless, it was easieq
conceptually and practically, to compartmentalize humanitarianism and politics before the present decade. Then, a better
guide to action was provided by an unflinching respect for traditional principles, although they never were absolute ends
but only intermediate means. In todays world, humanitarians must ask themselves how to weigh the political
consequences of their action or inaction; and politicians must ask themselves how to gauge the humanitarian costs of
their action or inaction. The calculations are tortuous, and the mathematics far from exact. However, there is no longer
any need to ask whether politics and humanitarian action intersect. The real question is how this intersection can be
managed to ensure more humanized politics and more effective humanitarian action. To this end, humanitarians should
be neither blindly principled nor blindly pragmatic.
Moral views of egalitarianism are self serving

BaselessBlackwell
2. Our subject concernsnormativepolitical theory,whichI taketobepartofmorality.The subject is not depiction of
a way of life,aformulaforindividualhappiness,oraviewofthemean ingoflife,but rather, rules for the (large)
community,orbetter (asassumedhenceforth),everybody.InthewordsofAquinas, a moral theory imposes a
uniformity. It proposes a set a single set, howevercomplicatedofrules,declaring that all should adhere to it. But
this uniformity need not be egalitarian inthesense definedabove.The one basic set of directives to which everyone
ought to adhere,andby reference to which the conduct of anyone may be called to account, could be wildly
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inegalitarian(as withslavemoralities.)Universality sameness of rules for all is a defining feature of morals;

egalitarianism is not.
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AT: Democratic Egal

Egalitarianism isnt democraticinevitable dilemma
Fabienne Peter Ph.D. in Economics 13 November 2006 The Political Egalitarians Dilemma
SpringerLink
The dilemma is the following. If, on the one hand, the substantive constraints on the deliberative process are kept to a
minimum, only a weak criterion of political equality can be imposed on the deliberative process. This criterion may fail to
ensure the effective equality of participants in the deliberative process, which undermines the legitimacy of the outcomes of
such a process. If, on the other hand, political equality is interpreted comprehensively, many substantive judgments will
be packed into the conditions imposed on the deliberative process. They will be treated as exempt from deliberative
evaluation. The stronger the criterion of political equality, the more emphasis is placed not just on general political
resources, but on peoples abilities to make effective use of these resources, the narrower the scope for democratic
scrutiny. This, again, jeopardizes democratic legitimacy. Thus, a strong criterion of political equality, which focuses on
peoples possibilities to participate in the deliberative process as effectively equals, will fail to ensure democratic
legitimacy because it will exempt too many value judgments from deliberative democratic scrutiny. A weak criterion of
political equality will fail to ensure democratic legitimacy because many will not have been able to participate in the
deliberative process as effectively equals. In other words, the political egalitarians dilemma reveals a clash between the
attempt to ensure equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of subjecting
substantive judgments to deliberative evaluation.
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AT: Radical Egal

Forced attempts at equality perpetuate inequality
BaselessBlackwell
Theconclusionstands,then,thategalitarians propose measures incompatible with Common Good,conceivedin
liberal terms.Appeals to equity that are not simply question-begging fail; appeals to moral intuitions are useless;
appeal to the arbitrariness of nature is irrelevant; appeals to marginal utility are of questionable basic relevance, and
exactly wrong insofar as they are relevant. Society,Iconclude,should make no interference in the free actions of
individuals in using their resources as they see best,by theirownlights,within the constraints of a no-harm-to-others
rule. There is no socially acceptable case for forced equality.
Egalitarianism hurts the poor

BaselessBlackwell
Further reflectiononthis leads to an important further point against egalitarianism:that it is essentiallycertaintobe
counterproductive aswellto defeat the very values whose equalization is required by the theor y. Forced transfers
from rich to poor,from capitaliststoproletarians,willworsen the lot of the poor even as it decreases the wealth of the
rich. Notonlyisegalitarianismbiased, buttheparticularpeopleagainstwhomitisbiasedaretheproductivethe
sourceofwhatthepeopleitisbiasedinfavourofhopeto receiveinconsequence.Itisnottoomuchtosay,even,
thategalitarianismisaconspiracyagainstthoseitclaimstobetryingtohelp. Thereisareasonforthis,whose
incomprehensionbyphilosopherseventothisdayshouldbeamatterofastonishment.Afree economyisonein
whichnooneforciblyintervenesagainstthe propertyrightsofanyotherallarefreetousetheirresourcesas they
judgebest,includingengagingincommercialexchanges.In suchasystem,theonlywaystoachievewealthareby
meanswhich improvethesituationsofothers.Successfulbusinesspeoplebecome sobyorganizingorfinancially
supportingtheproductionof thingsthatotherpeoplewant,andwantmorethantheexisting alternativessince
thosepeople,havingnoobligationtobuy, wouldnototherwisebuythem.Theonlyotherpossibilitiesare fairly
uninteresting:gift,andthediscoveryororiginalacquisitionofvaluablethings.Butgift,assuch,ispuretransfer
anddoes notcreatewealth,exceptintheformofgoodwill. We may praise occasional acts of charity, but if everyone
were only charitable and unproductive, all,including the poorandsick,would quickly die. Andastoacquisition,if we
would attain to wealth, those items must be harnessed to human usenature does not afford a free lunchanymore
thanourfellows.Evensomeonewho acquiredanaturalbeautyspot,say,andkeepsitnatural,willbe abletomake
adecentlivingtherebyonlyifheisabletocharge othersfortherighttoenjoythatspot.Andsoon.
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AT: Egal = Util

No such thing as a utilitarian defense of egalitarianism
BaselessBlackwell
Animmenselypopularargument, thought to provide a clear utilitarian defense for egalitarianism, appeals to a
principle of diminishing marginal utility.Theideaisthatthemarginal returnfrompossessionofsomemeasurable
gooddecreasesasa functionoftheamountonealreadyhasmoneybeingthemost familiarandobviouscasein

point.Fromthisitisinferredthat generalutilitywillbepromotedbytransferringsuchgoodsfrom thoseabovethe
midpointtothosebelow,wherethemarginalutil ityofunitincrementsismuchgreater.Two major flaws destroy
this argument.Thefirstisfundamental:general (aggregate)utility simply isnt a common value, and therefore cannot
be appealed to.Individualsarenotnecessarily concernedtopromotetheaggregatesumofgood.Theyare mostly
concernedtopromotethegoodsofcertainparticular personsthemselves,friends,countrymen,whateverandnot
thesumofutility,evenifthatsumcouldbeobjectivelydeter mined.Itisthereforeinadmissibletoappealtoit.
Only if the particular individual addressed can be shown that what matters to himwill be forwarded if the aggregate of
utility growssome timesplausible,tobesureis he rationally interested in its growth. That special case apart,
utilitarian arguments are dismissed. Second,andmoreimportantforpresentpurposes,the argument suffers from
myopia: it focuses only on the consumptionutil- ity of money. Butallgoodthingscomefromsomewhere:namely,
humaneffortandknowhow.Allocationofthoserequiresinvest ment.But the poor, obviously, do not invest the
better-off do that. Awellinvesteddollaryieldsgoodsandservicesinthefuture greatlyexceedingthestockof
consumptiongoodsonecouldbuy withthesamemoney. The marginal utility of dollars in the upper incomes is
therefore greater, not less, than the marginal utility of dollars for the poor.
Utilitarian calculus not egalitarian doesnt act on the principle of intrinsic equality.
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Perhaps the simplest theory of the pattern of justice is that benefits and burdens should be distributed across some
population so that inequality is minimized. We might call this view intrinsic egalitarianism as it holds that inequality is
bad or unjust (I use these terms interchangeably) in itself and not because of its consequences. As Temkin has put it, the
essence of intrinsic equality is that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own (Temkin
2003, p. 62). It is worth contrasting intrinsic equality with some closely associated views. Utilitarians hold that acts and
social policies should be evaluated only in terms of their consequences and that these consequences ought to promote the
maximum amount of welfare possible. Depending on the circumstances the utilitarian may prefer an equal distribution of
well-being because this coincides with the desire to maximize welfare. The reason for this is that it is generally easier to
help the worse off than othersone only has to give them a little for their welfare level to improve a lot. In this sense,
utilitarians are accidental, rather than intrinsic, egalitarians.
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Inegal Solves
In-egalitarianism solves benefits trickle down
BaselessBlackwell
Inshort, successful investment enhances the lot of others in society. When people are employed, this enhances their real
incomes, morethananyotheropportunitiestheymayhavehad.And when they spend their money, it is because they
judge that expenditure to contribute maximally to their well-being. Thus, if we wrest the gains from investment or wellpaid work from the investors and workers in question, we take from the productive and transfer to the unproductive.
Thistakesmoneythatwouldhaveproduced moreandensuresthatitwillbeusedinlessproductiveways . A large
society that undertakes this kind of activity extensively decrees poverty for itself ,incomparisonwithwhatitcould
have doneinsteadinafreedupmarket.And it is the poor, above all, who benefit, relativelyspeaking,from
commercialactivityactiv- ity that, if unimpeded, continually drives down prices, continually finds new employment
for available labour, and continually real- locates resources in the way that does most good for most people, asindicated
bytheactualchoicesandpreferencesofthose people.11
Egalitarianism is distinct from liberalism

BaselessBlackwell
I argue that egalitarianism is wrong, or at least incompatible with liberalism. Recent writers alleging to be liberals dont
often bother about defining what they believe, but in fact it is not particularly difficult to do so. It may be sufficiently identified
by just two theses: First, liberalism denies that government or morality is justified by its tendency to benefit those in
power. Justice is not the interest of the stronger party. Both liberals and conservatives hold instead that the only
justificatory purpose of legislation is the good of the ruled those whose behaviour is to be controlled. Second, there is the
question how the good of the people is to be understood. Here lies the special feature of liberalism. It denies the very naturalsounding idea of Plato, Aristotle, and perhaps most people, that if government is for the good of the people, surely the rulers
should find out what is good for people and then use the laws to make them good rather than bad. Liberalism, on the
contrary, holds that it is the preferences, the values held by those very peoplet hat is to guide legislation, whether or not
those preferences accord with others notion(s) of the good. We may discuss the good with people, of course, and urge
them to do things our way; but we may not force them to do so: individuals may live their lives as they see best. Rules for the
community are justified exclusively by their conduciveness to that end or rather, that very diverse set of ends.
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Econ Turns Egal

Economic collapse crushes egalitarian legitimacy
Stuart White 2k, ReviewArticle: Social Rights and the Social Contract Political Theory and the New Welfare
Politics Cambridge University Press, B.J.Pol.S. 30, 50753
Respectforreciprocity is instrumentally importantinsofarasobvious violationsoftheprinciplewill undermine the
legitimacy of economic arrangementsandthewillingnessofindividualstomaintainthesearrangements. This isperhaps
especially true of egalitarian arrangementswhichinvolve signicantamountsofredistribution.If egalitarian objectives
are pursued in a way that is inattentive to economic freeridingandparasitism,there is a clear risk that the egalitarian
institutions in question will provoke feelings of alienation and resentment and so undercut the very spirit of solidarity
on which they depend.Inthisvein,SamuelBowlesandHerbertGintishaverecently arguedthatpopularresistancetothe
Americanwelfarestatederivesnotfromanoppositiontoegalitarianredistribution perse,buttoredistributionthat enables
citizenstoevadethecontributiveresponsibilitiesthatderivefroma widelysharednormofstrongreciprocity.11 Bowlesand
Gintisstartwiththe observation,conrmedinavarietyofexperimentalsettings,thatindividuals tendnottoconformtothe
standardmodelofHomoeconomicus,who rationallypursueshis/herselfinterestwithoutregardtoanynormsoffairness.
Peopletendnottoberationalegotists,norunconditionalaltruists,but conditionalcooperators,willingtodotheirbitinco
operativeventurestowhich theybelongsolongastheycanbeassuredthatotherswillalsomakeareasonable contribution:
Homoreciprocans.Commitmenttothenormofreciprocityis suchthatpeopleareoftenwillingtoacceptcoststothemselves
ratherthansee thisnormviolatedwithimpunity.Widespreadadherencetothenormmaybe explicableinevolutionaryterms:
communitiesinwhichHomoreciprocans predominatesmaynditeasiertosolveimportantproblemsoftrustand collective
actionthancommunitiesinwhichHomoeconomicuspredominates. 12 If,however,commitmenttothereciprocitynormisso
deeprooted,then egalitariansmustframetheirreformproposalsinawaythatexplicitly acknowledgesandupholdsthenorm
ratherthanbeingindifferenttoit.Avery similarargumentconcerningthenecessaryconditionsunderwhichcitizenswill grant
theircontingentconsenttoegalitariansocialpolicyismadebyBo RothsteininrelationtoEuropeanuniversalisticwelfare
states.Wheresocial policiesareuniversalisticinthesensethatthereisaninclusiveshareoutofboth benetsand
contributions,thesepolicieshavegreaterperceivedlegitimacyand, Rothsteinargues,will thusberelativelyresistanttothe
politicsofwelfarestate retrenchment.13
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Sufficientarianism Good
The goal of the judge should not be to make sure each person is equalrather
ensure each person is sufficient
Yuko Hashimoto --ph.d. Japanese. Associate Professor of Economics. June 2005 What Matters is Absolute
Poverty, Not Relative Poverty http://www.cdams.kobe-u.ac.jp/archive/dp05-10.pdf
Therefore, sufficientarianism is an alternative to economic egalitarianism. Sufficientarianism presents the idea of
sufficiency as an alternative to the idea of economic equality. The essence of sufficientarianism is to show that the idea of
economic equality has no intrinsic value. According to sufficientarianism, when people consider what is important for their
own lives, the amount of goods owned by other people becomes irrelevant. Instead, comparison with the amount of goods
owned by others prevents people from seeking what they consider valuable for themselves. It is unnecessary to attach moral
significance to economic egalitarianism. While Frankfurt enumerates some reasons for the failure of economic
egalitarianism, he indicates that egalitarians do not actually defend the idea of equality, as indicated by the priority view. In
other words, egalitarians objections are not based on their moral aversion to a person holding a smaller amount of
goods as compared to other people. In reality, their objection is to the fact that the person owns only a remarkably small
amount of goods. This naturally gives rise to the following questions. What does sufficiency imply? What is the standard
of sufficiency? Although Frankfurt does not define the meaning of sufficiency in concrete terms, it does not imply that
sufficientarianism is pointless. Indeed, the meaning of sufficiency can be defined in various ways. However, the essence of
sufficientarianism is to seek what one finds valuable in his/her life and not compare the amount of goods one owns with
that of others; this is crucial to judge sufficiency.
Everything is relativethe goal should not be to carve everyone into the same
statuerather ensure each person is sufficientthis is distinct from economic
egalitarianism
Yuko Hashimoto --ph.d. Japanese. Associate Professor of Economics. June 2005 What Matters is Absolute
Poverty, Not Relative Poverty http://www.cdams.kobe-u.ac.jp/archive/dp05-10.pdf
Irrespective of the definition of sufficiency selected, sufficientarianism cannot justify distribution to those whose
circumstances are above the standard of sufficiency. Therefore, it does not lead to the implausible conclusion that goods
should be distributed to millionaires in a society that comprises only billionaires and millionaires. Sufficientarianism,
which rejects economic egalitarianism and simultaneously requires distribution to those below the standard of
sufficiency, is consistent with moderate libertarianism or classical liberalism, which rejects distribution aimed at reducing
income disparity and admits the necessity of distribution that guarantees a minimum standard of living. Indeed, the
interpretation of sufficientarianism that I present in this paper might conflict with the original intention of sufficientarians. As
we have seen, I support sufficientarianism. Despite differences between
sufficientarianism and the priority view, I re-emphasize the fact that they have a common crucial viewpoint regarding
egalitarianism. They share the belief that being worse off than others does not have moral significance in terms of the ethics of
distribution. While the idea of equality that emphasizes relativity with others is set as a default position in the argument on
distribution, both theories demand criticism of the above assumption. Egalitarians often confuse equality with priority or
sufficiency; however, it is important to bear in mind that the apparent plausibility of egalitarianism is derived from its
humanitarian appeal. The point I wish to emphasize is that absolute poverty, and not relative poverty, is important. Next,
before turning to an examination of the connection between sufficientarianism and libertarianism, I shall consider the necessity
of highlighting the abuse of egalitarianism.
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Sufficientarianism Good
Egalitarianism fosters never-ending comparison and obligation a sufficientarian framework should
take precedence.
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In contrast to egalitarians and prioritarians, some theorists, such as Harry Frankfurt, hold that benefits and burdens should
be distributed in line with the doctrine of sufficiency. This states that as many people as possible should have enough (of
the currency of justice adopted) to pursue the aims and aspirations they care about over a whole life; and that this aim has
lexical priority over other ideals of justice (Frankfurt 1987, pp. 2143; 1997, pp. 314). Attaining what we really care
about, for Frankfurt, requires a certain level of well-being, but once this level is reached there is no further relationship
between how well-off a person is and whether they discover and fulfil what it is that they really care about. Frankfurt holds
that, above the level of sufficiency, it is neither reasonable to seek a higher standard of living nor expect, as amatter of
justice, any additional allocation of some currency of justice to further improve their prospects . It is important to add that
having enough is not the same as living a tolerable life in the sense that one does not regret ones existence. Rather it
means a person leads a life that contains no substantial dissatisfaction. According to Frankfurt, the flaw in intrinsic
egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of
how much either of them has (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34). What matters, Frankfurt argues, is not that everyone should have
the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough it would be of no moral consequence whether
some had more than others (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21; original emphasis). This does not mean, however, that egalitarian and
prioritarian concerns will always frustrate sufficiency since each and every person should be helped to the threshold of
sufficiency if possible, and those who can be helped to lead a decent life are often among the worst off in a population. But
the aim of reducing inequality, or of improving the position of the worst off, has no intrinsic value for sufficientarians.
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Sufficientarian Perm
Moderate sufficentarianism offers a pluralist approach to justice which maximizes contextual equality.
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One way of responding to the problems raised by these two examples would be to construct a pluralist approach to
distributive justice. Pluralism, in this context, means that we would appeal to contrasting ideals in different contexts
(Daniels 1996, p. 208). There are three possibilities, which I can only sketch here. First, the ideals could apply in different
distributive circumstances. For example, we might give lexical priority to sufficiency when at least some can be brought up
to the threshold, but appeal to equality or priority when all are above, or all below, the threshold (Crisp 2003, pp. 758ff.).
Second, sufficiency might be allocated non-lexical priority over other values so that large gains in these values will
sometimes outweigh lesser gains in sufficiency. Arneson has usefully labeled this moderate sufficientarianism (Arneson
2006, p. 28). The strength of this view is that it can explain why we should opt for (2) over (1) since it offers tremendous
gains in both equality and priority with no adverse impact on sufficiency. Similarly, though more controversially,
moderate sufficientarians have at least some reason to opt for (4) over (3) since great benefits arise, in terms of equality and
priority, if we ignore the sufficiency of the few for the prize of giving major benefits to the many. Third, we might subsume
one ideal under another while attributing some degree of intrinsic value to the subsumed ideal. Sufficientarians generally
view inequality as regrettable because of its consequences, such as the way in which it inhibits economic growth,
undermines political processes, or is a malign influence on cultural life. Yet, there is a more subtle way that inequality
matters. This is that some people might fail to reach the standards of a decent life if they are continually faced with the
discomfiture that many others are far better off. Similarly, some people might fall below the threshold of sufficiency if they
begin to enjoy life less as a result of identifying with the resentment of others who are worse off (Marmor 2003, pp. 127ff).
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**AGENCIES**
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Generic Agencies Fail

Regulatory agencies empirically failinherent problems
Tibor Machan, Chair in Business Ethics & Free Enterprise at Chapman University's Argyros School, research fellow @ Pacific
Research Institute & Hoover Institution 6/29/09The reality of regulatory agencies
The confidence shown in regulators in the first statement seems to me to be plainly undermined by the historical claim
in the second, one that seems to follow from a certain plausible understanding of public choice theory, actually ignoring
rather than investigating warnings would come naturally to those who are, whether consciously or not, embarking upon
vested interest dealing, in this instance working for regulations to continue instead of doing what might make them
unnecessary in time. Regulators have a good job, and it is no surprise that they might work not so much to fix
problems they perceive in the marketplace but to keep working at what keeps them employed and well fed. In free
markets, to the extent that they exist, such vested interest dealings are checked by competition and budgetary
constraints (to the extent these are not thwarted by government policies that often produce monopolies). A shoe repairer
may be tempted to fix shoes not quite as well as they need to be fixed but just enough that they will last a while but need to
be returned for further repair. Indeed, automobile repairers are often suspected of this. What, apart from conscientiousness,
keeps such folks on the straight and narrow is competition, the knowledge that if they don't do the work well enough
someone else will jump in to do so. One main reason that bureaucracies are generally sluggish and unenthusiastic
about serving the public as distinct from private vendors is this element of constant competition, combined with
the fact that bureaucrats gain their income from taxes, which can often be raised with impunity by those who hire them.
What public choice theorists claim is that bureaucrats have a far better opportunity to yield to the temptation of
malpractice than are those in the private sector. The theory does not claim that all bureaucrats are cheats and all those in
the private sector are professionally responsible. But it identifies an evident tendency and shows it to exist through the
study of economic and political history. Common sense supports this, as well, when most people notice that if they go to,
say, the Department of Motor Vehicles (one of the more visible government outfits), they mostly get a reluctant, bored, at
times even curmudgeonly treatment, whereas in the private sector the routine tends to be eagerness to serve, to
generate and keep business. There is an element about public choice theory that economists do not emphasize often
enough, namely that the objectives of regulators are often very obscure, unclear, even contradictory. For example,
governments often embark on historical preservation but at the same time they are supposed to make sure that building and
other facilities are properly managed, kept safe, etc. But historical preservation mostly require keeping things in their
original form, while the pursuit of safety involves making use of the most up-to-date technology and science. One can
generalize this kind of conflict within government policies all over the place which is what accounts for vigilant
propaganda against smoking while tobacco farmers keep receiving government subsidies.
285
Impact Generic
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286
NGOs Key Federal Sucess

NGOs the number one internal to federal government success
Booz Allen Hamilton, leading consulting firm, helps government clients solve their toughest problems The Role of Mission Integration in
Government Nov 5, 2008 http://www.acuf.org/issues/issue121/081201news.asp
the Federal
An Increasingly Complex Environment Federal agencies are no longer communities unto themselvestechnology
and globalization have created greater interdependence between NGOs and the private sector. Respondents in
every federal sector, from agriculture and energy to defense, describe their mission as very complex. Furthermore, 88
percent of respondents report that the complexity of their missions requires collaboration with other federal
agencies or third parties outside the government structure. The need for increasingly integrated and complex
misions will increase in the coming years. More than 84 percent of respondents believe that their missions complexity
has increased dramatically since 2000. Furthermore, they recognize complexity and mission integration as vital to
mission success. According to respondents, joint missions will be increasingly critical in the future for agencies to
meet mission goals. Nearly three quarters of respondents (73 percent) believe that by 2012 joint missions will play a
greater role in their agencys ability to achieve mission success. A full 50 percent of respondents believe their missions
will become significantly more integrated over time. The Need for Mission Integration In an era of pervasive
complexity, mission success is increasingly dependent on mission integration. Federal agencies need to draw on a
diverse mix of specialties and capabilities, work across organizational boundaries, and operate from deliberate
plans with accountability for clear, measurable results.
286
Impact Generic
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287
Administration for Children and Families

Administration for Children, has jurisdiction over asylum children
Chriss
McGann June 19, 2003 U.S. gives harsh welcome
to
children
seeking
asylum
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/127345_juv19.html.
Responsibility of care for unaccompanied immigrant children was transferred in March from the INS to the Office
of Refugee Relocation a division of the Administration of Children and Families in the Department of Health and
Human Services.
ACF fails at implementation

GAO December 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d039.pdf
ACF conducts much of its work through nonfederal service providers, which often limits the extent to which ACF
can influence national performance goals and can seriously complicate data collect ion. To address this, ACF has
successfully collaborated with providers to develop national performance goals and build data collection capacity. This
has also raised awareness of the importance of collecting and reporting performance data uniformly
287
Impact Generic
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288
Agriculture Department
Agriculture department has internal problems and performance gaps
GAO-09-650T 6/29/09 U.S. Department of Agriculture: Recommendations and Options Available to the New Administration and
Congress to Address Long-Standing Civil Rights Issues Summary
ASCR's difficulties in resolving discrimination complaints persist--ASCR has not achieved its goal of preventing
future backlogs of complaints. At a basic level, the credibility of USDA's efforts has been and continues to be
undermined by ASCR's faulty reporting of data on discrimination complaints and disparities in ASCR's data. Even
such basic information as the number of complaints is subject to wide variation in ASCR's reports to the public and the
Congress. Moreover, ASCR's public claim in July 2007 that it had successfully reduced a backlog of about 690
discrimination complaints in fiscal year 2004 and held its caseload to manageable levels, drew a questionable portrait of
progress. By July 2007, ASCR officials were well aware they had not succeeded in preventing future backlogs--they had
another backlog on hand, and this time the backlog had surged to an even higher level of 885 complaints. In fact, ASCR
officials were in the midst of planning to hire additional attorneys to address that backlog of complaints including some
ASCR was holding dating from the early 2000s that it had not resolved. In addition, some steps ASCR had taken may have
actually been counter-productive and affected the quality of its work. For example, an ASCR official stated that some
employees' complaints had been addressed without resolving basic questions of fact, raising concerns about the integrity of
the practice. Importantly, ASCR does not have a plan to correct these many problems. USDA has published three annual
reports--for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005--on the participation of minority farmers and ranchers in USDA programs, as
required by law. USDA's reports are intended to reveal the gains or losses that these farmers have experienced in their
participation in USDA programs. However, USDA considers the data it has reported to be unreliable because they are based
on USDA employees' visual observations about participant's race and ethnicity, which may or may not be correct, especially
for ethnicity. USDA needs the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to collect more reliable data.
ASCR started to seek OMB's approval in 2004, but as of May 2008 had not followed through to obtain approval. ASCR
staff will meet again on this matter in May 2008. GAO found that ASCR's strategic planning is limited and does not address
key steps needed to achieve the Office's mission of ensuring USDA provides fair and equitable services to all customers
and upholds the civil rights of its employees. For example, a key step in strategic planning is to discuss the perspectives of
stakeholders. ASCR's strategic planning does not address the diversity of USDA's field staff even though ASCR's
stakeholders told GAO that such diversity would facilitate interaction with minority and underserved farmers. Also, ASCR
could better measure performance to gauge its progress in achieving its mission. For example, it counts the number of
participants in training workshops as part of its outreach efforts rather than access to farm program benefits and services.
Finally, ASCR's strategic planning does not link levels of funding with anticipated results or discuss the potential for
using performance information for identifying USDA's performance gaps.
288
Impact Generic
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289
Department of Health and Human Services

Conscience rule acts as a bureaucratic barrier to health care
Medical News Today, 22 Dec 2008 HHS 'Conscience' Rule Creates 'Huge Bureaucratic Barrier,' Opinion
Piece Says http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/133861.php
The HHS "conscience" rule is "a huge bureaucratic barrier to health care -- a barrier the incoming Obama
administration will find difficult to remove," a Philadelphia Daily News editorial says. The editorial notes
that several state laws "already protect the 'right to conscience' of doctors and nurses not to perform
abortions. But federal laws also protec[t] the rights of patients to legal health care." It continues that
the new rule would "choose the former over the latter, and also remove protections for the 584,294
federally funded medical entities -- hospitals, doctors' offices and pharmacies -- that might find it an
'undue burden' to pay employees who refuse to do the work for which they were hired." According to
the editorial, it will cost about $44 million annually for medical entities to certify compliance with the
rule, which "doesn't include the cost in pain and confusion, and maybe litigation, that would come with
allowing health care workers to decide who is worthy of receiving what care." The editorial continues
that the rule demonstrates that the Bush administration "doesn't care about the objections of doctors or
hospitals or patients -- but what about the approximately 70 million Americans who voted Nov. 4 to let
Barack Obama lead the nation? Apparently, they don't matter either." To undo the regulation, Congress
could "resort" to using the Congressional Review Act, "which has been used only once," the editorial says. The
other option would be for incoming HHS Secretary Tom Daschle to "restart the rule-making process,"
which would "take months," according to the editorial. It adds, "The Obama team has signaled that it is
ready to go this route, with the inevitable political divisiveness -- and who knows how many
individuals who won't get the health care or information they need?" The editorial concludes that the
HHS rule provides "[m]ore proof that George W. Bush's historic unpopularity is the only thing he's
ever earned" (Philadelphia Daily News, 12/18).
HHS is to large to be effective
GAO, March 18, 1997 Department of Health and Human Services: Management Challenges and Opportunities
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97098t.pdf
In summary, the first challenge HHS faces is its ability to define its mission, objectives, and measures of success and
increase its accountability to taxpayers. Because of the size and scope of its mission and the resulting organizational
complexity, managing and coordinating HHS programs so that the public gets the best possible results are
especially difficult. The Department has eleven operating divisions responsible for more than 300 diverse programs.
HHS has not always succeeded in managing the wide range of activities its agencies carry out or fixing
accountability for meeting the goals of its mission. Another complicating factor is that HHS needs to work with the
governments of the 50 states and the District of Columbia to implement its programs, in addition to thousands of
private- sector grantees. Developing better ways of managing is essential if HHS is to meet its goals.
HHS is too vulnerable to exploitation

GAO, March 18, 1997 Department of Health and Human Services: Management Challenges and Opportunities
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97098t.pdf
Finally, HHS responsibilities require it to constantly combat fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. HHS has
several programs that are vulnerable to such exploitation. For example, the size and nature of Medicare, which
accounts for over half of HHS total budget, make this program particularly vulnerable. HHS needs to be vigilant now
and in the future because its programs will probably continue to be the targets of fraud and abuse and because waste and
mismanagement can have such serious effects on taxpayers and program beneficiaries.
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Department of Education
The DOE is a total failure
Cato Cato Handbook for Congress 2003 http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/index.html
The inevitable pattern of bureaucracy is to grow bigger and bigger. The Department of Education should be
eliminated now, before it evolves into an even larger entity consuming more and more resources that could be better
spent by parents themselves. 7. The $47.6 billion spent each year by the Department of Education could be much better
spent if it were simply returned to the American people in the form of a tax cut. Parents themselves could then decide how
best to spend that money. 8. The Department of Education has a record of waste and abuse. For example, the
department reported losing track of $450 million during three consecutive General Accounting Office audits. 9. The
Department of Education is an expensive failure that has added paperwork and bureaucracy but little value to the
nations classrooms.
The DOE is inefficient and wasteful

The NCLBA provides the Department of Education with $26.5 billion for spending on the program and perpetuates
most of the old federal education programs, most of which are ineffective and wasteful. The total could climb to $37
billion a year by the end of the six-year authorization period. If past experience is any guide, those dollars will go
primarily to feeding the hungry bureaucracy and will have little positive impact on public school students. Instead of
decreasing the role of the federal government in education, the NCLBA allows the federal government to intervene more
than ever in what should be strictly a local and state matter. While the act provides school districts with increased flexibility
in spending some of their federal subsidies, mandated testing and staff restructuring represent an unprecedented
usurpation of the authority of local communities to run their own schools. During his presidential campaign, Bush
emphasized that he did not want to become the federal superintendent of schools. But the NCLBA gives the president
and the federal government far too much power over local schools and classrooms. Instead of proposing more top-down
fixes for education, the president should use his position to push for the return of control of education to states and
localities and urge state-level reforms that return the control of education to parents.
Federal action deters key state and local governments

2. No matter how brilliantly designed a federal government program may be, it creates a uniformity among states
that is harmful to creativity and improvement. Getting the federal government out of the picture would allow states
and local governments to create better ways of addressing education issues and problems.
Congress is to far away from local needs

Since most information about the problems and challenges of education is present at the local level, Congress simply
does not have the ability to improve learning in school classrooms thousands of miles away. These problems are
best understood and addressed by local authorities and parents.
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States Solve Education

State action solves beststates model other states
The way for Congress to improve American education is to step aside and let the states experiment with choice in a
variety of ways. Some will expand charter schools or experiment with private management. Others will institute
scholarship tax credits, parental tax credits, or vouchers either on a limited basis or open to all students. The most
successful policies and programs will be emulated by other states.
State programs have better educational effectiveness

3. If education were left at the local level, parents would become more involved in reform efforts. Differences in
school effectiveness among states and communities would be noted, and other regions would copy the more
effective programs and policies.
291
Impact Generic
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292
Department of Interior
Infrastructure problems prevent DOI productivity
GAO Department of Interior Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Interior also faces a challenge in adequately maintaining its facilities and infrastructure. The department owns, builds,
purchases, and contracts services for assets such as visitor centers, schools, office buildings, roads, bridges, dams,
irrigation systems, and reservoirs; however, repairs and maintenance on these facilities have not been adequately funded.
The deterioration of facilities can impair public health and safety, reduce employees morale and productivity, and
increase the need for costly major repairs or early replacement of structures and equipment. In November 2008, the
department estimated that the deferred maintenance backlog for fiscal year 2008 was between $13.2 billion and $19.4
billion (see table 1). Interior is not alone in facing daunting maintenance challenges. In fact, we have identified the
management of federal real property, including deferred maintenance issues, as a government wide high-risk area since
2003.23
292
Impact Generic
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Department of Interior (Natives Link)

The aff falls under the department of interior
BIA is the primary federal agency charged with implementing federal Indian policy and administering the federal
trust responsibility for about 2 million American Indians and Alaska Natives. BIA provides basic services to 562 federally
recognized Indian tribes throughout the United States, including natural resources management on about 54 million acres
of Indian trust lands. Trust status means that the federal government holds title to the land in trust for tribes or individual
Indians; land taken in trust is no longer subject to state and local property taxes and zoning ordinances. In 1980, the
department established a regulatory process intended to provide a uniform approach for taking land in trust.14 While some
state and local governments support the federal governments taking additional land in trust for tribes or individual Indians,
others strongly oppose it because of concerns about the impacts on their tax base and jurisdictional control. We reported
in July 2006 that while BIA generally followed its regulations for processing land in trust applications from tribes and
individual Indians, it had no deadlines for making decisions on them. 15 Specifically, the median processing time for
the 87 land in trust applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005 was 1.2 yearsranging from 58 days to almost 19
years. We recommended, among other things, that the department move forward with adopting revisions to the land in
trust regulations that include (1) specific time frames for BIA to make a decision once an application is complete and
(2) guidelines for providing state and local governments more information on the applications and a longer period of time
to provide meaningful comments on the applications. While the department agreed with our recommendations, it has not
revised the land in trust regulations.
BIA is the department of interior

FCC Federal Communications Commision 11/26/ 08 Department of Interior (DOI)
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
http://www.fcc.gov/indians/internetresources/bia.html.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (www.doi.gov/bia) is responsible for the administration of federal programs for federally
recognized Indian tribes, and for promoting Indian self-determination. In addition, the Bureau has a trust responsibility
emanating from treaties and other agreements with Native groups. Indian Affairs (IA) is the oldest bureau of the United
States Department of the Interior. Established in 1824, IA currently provides services (directly or through contracts,
grants, or compacts) to approximately 1.7 million American Indians and Alaska Natives. There are 562 federally recognized
American Indian tribes and Alaska Natives in the United States. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is responsible for the
administration and management of 66 million acres of land held in trust by the United States for American Indian, Indian
tribes, and Alaska Natives. Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) provides education services to approximately 44,000 Indian
students. The mission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is to: " enhance the quality of life, to promote economic
opportunity, and to carry out the responsibility to protect and improve the trust assets of American Indians, Indian tribes,
and Alaska Natives."
293
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Department of Interior (U.S. Territories DA)

A. Department of interior has jurisdiction over U.S. territories
The Secretary of the Interior has varying responsibilities to the island communities of American Samoa, Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, all of which are U.S. territoriesas well as
to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, which are sovereign
nations linked with the United States through Compacts of Free Association. The Office of Insular Affairs (OIA), which
carries out the departments responsibilities for the island communities, is to assist the island communities in developing
more efficient and effective government by providing financial and technical assistance and to help manage relations
between the federal government and the island governments by promoting appropriate federal policies. The island
governments have had long-standing financial and program management deficiencies.
B. Not only is federal aid insufficient, but it creates dependency and ruins local economies
In December 2006, we reported on serious economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges facing American
Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.16 The economic
challenges stem from dependence on a few key industries, scarce natural resources, small domestic markets, limited
infrastructure, shortages of skilled labor, and reliance on federal grants to fund basic services. In addition, efforts to
meet formidable fiscal challenges and build strong economies are hindered by financial reporting that does not
provide timely and complete information to management and oversight officials for decision making. As a result of
these problems, numerous federal agencies have designated these governments as high- risk grantee s. To increase
the effectiveness of the federal governments assistance to these island communities, we recommended, among other
things, that the department increase coordination activities with other federal grant-making agencies on issues of common
concern relating to the insular area governments. The department agreed with our recommendations, stating that they
were consistent with OIAs top priorities and ongoing activities. We will continue to monitor OIAs actions on our
recommendations.
294
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Housing and Urban Development

HUD policies get co-opted by financial regulators
Ralph Nader, April 26, 2004 Bureaucratic Impediments to a Much Needed Integrated Urban Policy
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0426-04.htm
HUD has been looked on as the "urban department," but the ills and the needs of urban communities cut across a
wide swath -- health, transportation, education, business development, the environment. HUD remains essentially a
housing agency and even this responsibility has been scattered across the federal government. Similarly, on Capitol
Hill urban policies land under the jurisdiction of multiple standing committees, not just the Senate and House Banking
Committees with jurisdiction over HUD.
The giants of housing finance -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- and the financial regulators like the Federal Reserve,
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of Thrift Supervision exercise immense power over housing and urban policy - probably more so than HUD. The Community Reinvestment
Act, for example, requires banks and thrifts to help meet the credit needs of their communities. It's requirements are
enforced by financial regulators interested in safety and soundness of federally insured institutions, not urban policy.
As a result, only a handful of institutions fail to get passing and outstanding grades on their efforts to help finance
housing. And HUD has no role despite the myth that it holds all the keys to urban policy.
HUD has no authoritytrapped in bureaucratic hurdles

Ralph Nader, April 26, 2004 Bureaucratic Impediments to a Much Needed Integrated Urban Policy
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0426-04.htm
HUD has to be an important cog in any new efforts to establish a workable urban-metropolitan policy, but it is folly to look
on the department as the centerpiece. Urban needs extend beyond affordable housing. Jimmy Carter was wise in
broadening the scope to include other Cabinet offices in the urban policy mix, but he left HUD as the key decision maker.
In the end the other Cabinet offices began to worry that their funds, staff and power would be eroded. And in such
situations, the officeholders always decide to scuttle the ship. This bureaucratic hurdle has to be removed if we truly
are interested in developing and managing an urban policy which stretches across the interconnected problems of
housing, health, transportation, education, jobs and livable wages. With nearly 80 percent of the nation's citizens living
in urban-metropolitan areas, it is time to establish a new office that recognizes the real world in the 21st Century-an
office with the authority to coordinate the disparate facets of federal programs which affect the overwhelming number of
our citizens. An Urban-Metropolitan Coordinator should be established under the President in a manner similar to that of
the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office of Management and Budget with the authority to recommend, review and
coordinate programs and budgets with a direct impact on urban-metropolitan areas. Only with such a structure can we
place the full force of the federal bureaucracy behind an urban policy worthy of the name.
HUD mismanages funds

GAO June 09 PUBLIC HOUSING HUDs Oversight of Housing Agencies Should Focus More on Inappropriate Use of Program
FundsGAO0933
Further, HUD has stated that its analysis of housing agency financial data is primarily intended to ensure the accuracy of
the information that is used to calculate the housing agencies PHAS scores and not to identify at-risk housing agencies.
Our analysis of housing agency financial data illustrates how such data could be leveraged to identify housing agencies
at greater risk of inappropriate use or mismanagement of public housing funds that neither PHAS nor the
departments current approach to analyzing financial data would detect. For example, our analysis of PHAS and
financial data from 2002 through 2006 found that 200 housing agencies had written checks that exceeded the funds
available in their bank accounts (bank overdrafts) by $25,000 or moreindicating a potential that these housing agencies
could have serious cash and financial management problems and could be prone to increased risk of fraudulent use of
funds. However, 75 percent of these agencies received passing PHAS scores. Although HUD has focused its efforts on
the challenges of improving the quality of single audits, the department has not taken steps to develop mechanisms
to mitigate the limitations of its oversight processes. Without fully leveraging the audit and financial information it
collects, the department limits its ability to identify housing agencies that are at greater risk of inappropriately
using or mismanaging program funds.
295
Impact Generic
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Department of labor
Falls under the department of labor
Department
of
Labor
July
6,
2009
III.
DOL
Mission
and
Agency
Functions
http://www.dol.gov/osbp/pubs/dolbuys/mission.htm
The Department's many activities affect virtually every man, woman, and child in our country. Such activities include
protecting the wages, health and safety, employment, and pension rights of working people; promoting equal
employment opportunity; providing job training, unemployment insurance and workers' compensation;
strengthening free collective bargaining; and collecting, analyzing, and publishing labor statistics. Although created to help
working people, the Department's services and information benefit many other groups such as employers, business
organizations, civil rights groups, government agencies at all levels, and the academic community. Its enforcement
activities and job training services, in particular, affect large numbers of people who are not currently working. As the
Department seeks to assist all Americans who need and want work, special efforts are made to meet the unique job
market requirements of older workers, youths minority group members, women, the disabled, and other groups.
The DOL is massively incompetent GAO sting operations prove

Steven Greenhouse 5/25/09 Labor Agency Is Failing Workers, Report Says New York Times
The federal agency charged with enforcing minimum wage, overtime and many other labor laws is failing in that
role, leaving millions of workers vulnerable, Congressional auditors have found.
In a report scheduled to be released Wednesday, the Government Accountability Office found that the agency, the Labor
Departments Wage and Hour Division, had mishandled 9 of the 10 cases brought by a team of undercover agents
posing as aggrieved workers. In one case, the division failed to investigate a complaint that under-age children in
Modesto, Calif., were working during school hours at a meatpacking plant with dangerous machinery, the G.A.O., the
nonpartisan auditing arm of Congress, found. When an undercover agent posing as a dishwasher called four times to
complain about not being paid overtime for 19 weeks, the divisions office in Miami failed to return his calls for four
months, and when it did, the report said, an official told him it would take 8 to 10 months to begin investigating his case.
This investigation clearly shows that Labor has left thousands of actual victims of wage theft who sought federal
government assistance with nowhere to turn, the report said. Unfortunately, far too often the result is unscrupulous
employers taking advantage of our countrys low-wage workers. The report pointed to a cavalier attitude by many
Wage and Hour Division investigators, saying they often dropped cases when employers did not return calls and sometimes
told complaining workers that they should file lawsuits, an often expensive and arduous process, especially for low-wage
workers. During the nine-month investigation, the report said, 5 of the 10 labor complaints that undercover agents
filed were not recorded in the Wage and Hour Divisions database, and three were not investigated. In two cases, officials
recorded that employers had paid back wages, even though they had not. The accountability office also investigated
hundreds of cases that it said the Wage and Hour Division had mishandled. In one, the division waited 22 months to
investigate a complaint from a group of restaurant workers. Ultimately, investigators found that the workers were owed
$230,000 because managers had made them work off the clock and had misappropriated tips. When the restaurant agreed to
pay back wages but not the tips, investigators simply closed the case.
Employees have no motivation

Steven Greenhouse 5/25/09 Labor Agency Is Failing Workers, Report Says New York Times
The report concluded that the Wage and Hour Division had mishandled more serious cases 19 percent of the time . In
such cases, the accountability office said, the division did not begin an investigation for six months, did not complete an
investigation for a year, did not assess back wages when violations were clearly identified and did not refer cases to
litigation when warranted.When you have weak penalties and weak enforcement, thats a deadly combination for
workers, said Representative George Miller, Democrat of California, who, as chairman of the House Education and Labor
Committee, asked the accountability office to do the report. Its clear that under the existing system, employers feel
they can steal workers wages with impunity, and that has to change.
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Department of Justice
Lack of data sharing hampers effectiveness
Office of the Inspector General, March 2009 The Department of Justices litigation case management system Audit Report
09-22 http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0922/final.pdf.
Each of the Departments litigating divisions currently maintains its own case management system, which is not able
to share information with other systems in the Department. As a result, these divisions cannot efficiently share
information or produce comprehensive reports among the divisions. separate systems also hamper the ability of the
litigating divisions to collaborate and limit the timeliness and quality of case information available to Department
leadership.
Courts are clogged

Mary Mack, Corporate Technology Counsel,. 4/9 2009
Total Revamp of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

http://www.discoveryresources.org/library/case-law-and-rules/total-revamp-of-federal-rules-of-civil-procedure/.
Two and a half years after the amendments to the FRCP took effect, the trial lawyers overwhelmed by clogged courts
as a result of increased litigation, discovery in general and e-discovery in particular are calling for change to fix a
broken system. While the starting point of their analysis was focused on discovery, the reports recommendations
ultimately upend current procedure in many significant ways.
297
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298
Environmental Protection Agency

EPA has staff and resource allocation problems
GAOMarch2009 Environmental Protection Agency http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09434.pdf
Addressinghumancapitalissues.EPA has struggled for several years to identify its needs for human resources and
to deploy its staff throughout the country in a manner that would do the most good .Wefoundthat EPAs process
for budgeting and allocating resources does not fully consider the agencys current workload, andthatinpreparing
requests for funding and staffing, EPA makes incremental adjustments, largely based on an antiquated
workforceplanningsystemthatdoesnotreflecta bottomupreviewofthenatureordistributionofthecurrent
workload.6 Moreover, EPAs human capital management systems have not kept pace with changes that have
occurred over the years as a result of changing legislative requirements and priorities ,changesinenvironmental
conditionsindifferentregionsofthecountry,andthemuchmoreactive rolethatstatesnowplayincarrying
outdaytodayactivitiesoffederal environmentalprograms.
EPAs lack of data hampers effectiveness

Improving development and use of environmental information. Critical, reliable environmental information is needed
to provide better scientific understanding of environmental trends and conditions and to better inform the public
about environmental progress in their locales. We found substantial gaps between what is known and the goal of
full, reliable, and insightful representation of environmental conditions and trends to provide direction for future
research and monitoring efforts. 7 EPA has struggled with providing a focus and the necessary resources for
environmental information since its inception in 1970. While many data have been collected over the years, most water,
air, and land programs lack the detailed environmental trend information to address the well- being of Americans. EPA
program areas have also been hampered by deficiencies in their environmental data systems. For example, the
quality of environmental data constrains EPAs ability to assess the effectiveness of its enforcement policies and programs
throughout the country and to inform the public about the health and environmental hazards of dangerous chemicals.
Performance problems
While EPA has made some progress in improving its operations, many of the same issues still remain. EPAs mission
is, without question, a difficult one: its policies and programs affect virtually all segments of the economy, society, and
government, and it is in the unenviable position of enforcing myriad inherently controversial environmental laws and
maintaining a delicate balance between the benefits to public health and the environment with the cost to industry and
others. Nevertheless, the repetitive and persistent nature of the shortcomings we have observed over the years points
to serious challenges for EPA to effectively implement its programs. Until it addresses these long-standing
challenges, EPA is unlikely to be able to respond effectively to much larger emerging challenge s, such as climate
change. Facing these challenges head-on will require a sustained commitment by agency leadership. As a new
administration takes office and begins to chart the agencys course, it will be important for Congress and EPA to continue
to focus on the issues we have identified.
298
Impact Generic
299
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Office of National Aids Policy

Sorry, its exclusively international
Jeff
Gow
2002
The
HIV/AIDS
Epidemic
In
Africa:
Implications
For
U.S.
Policy
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/21/3/57
In response, the focus of U.S. government activities toward HIV/AIDS has shifted away from a domestic orientation
toward an increasingly international focus. The Office of National AIDS Policy now has an explicit international
focus. Although the African epidemic is now the worst, the potential exists for an epidemic of similar magnitude in Asia
over the next decade. Emerging epidemics in the Caribbean and Latin America are smaller in scale but closer to home.
299
Impact Generic
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300
Social Security Administration

SSA funds get wasted
GAO-07-986 August 31, 2007 Social Security Administration: Policies and Procedures Were in Place over MMA Spending, but
Some Instances of Noncompliance Occurred
SSA spent the $500 million in MMA funds from December 2003 through January 2006 to implement activities outlined in
MMA. The majority of costs paid with MMA funds consisted of personnel-related expenses, contractors, and
indirect costs. More than half of the funds were spent on payroll for staff hours used on MMA activities in SSA
headquarters and field offices (see table). Once the $500 million was spent, SSA began to use its general
appropriation to fund the remaining costs of implementing MMA activities. SSA used its cost analysis system to track
the total costs of its implementation of MMA activities. As of February 20, 2007, SSA had completed implementation of
16 of the 22 tasks for the six provisions under the act.
SSA funds dont get enforced

GAO-07-986 August 31, 2007 Social Security Administration: Policies and Procedures Were in Place over MMA Spending, but
Some Instances of Noncompliance Occurred
SSA had agency wide policies and procedures in place for its cost tracking and allocation, asset accountability, and
invoice review processes. It also established specific guidance to assign and better allocate SSAs costs in implementing
MMA. There were some instances though where SSA did not comply with these policies and procedures. SSA did not
effectively communicate the specific MMA-related guidance to all affected staff. SSA subsequently identified and
corrected at least $4.6 million of costs that initially were incorrectly allocated to MMA, but had not corrected
approximately $313,000 misallocated credit card purchase transactions. In addition, GAO found instances where
accountable assets purchased with MMA funds, such as electronic and computer equipment, were not being properly
tracked by SSA in accordance with its policies and instances where purchase card transactions were not properly
supported. Although purchase card transactions and accountable asset purchases represented a small percentage of total
MMA costs, proper approval and support for these types of transactions is essential to reduce the risk of improper
payments.
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ICE
Immigration courts are brutally unfair and clog the system
Brad Heath 3/29/2009 Immigration courts face huge backlog USA TODAY
WASHINGTON The nation's immigration courts are now so clogged that nearly 90,000 people accused of being in
the United States illegally waited at least two years for a judge to decide whether they must leave, one of the last
bottlenecks in a push to more strictly enforce immigration laws. Their cases identified by a USA TODAY review of the
courts' dockets since 2003 are emblematic of delays in the little-known court system that lawyers, lawmakers and others
say is on the verge of being overwhelmed. Among them were 14,000 immigrants whose cases took more than five years to
decide and a few that took more than a decade. "It's an indication that they just don't have enough resources," says Kerri
Sherlock Talbot of the American Immigration Lawyers Association. Some immigration courts are now so backlogged
that just putting a case on a judge's calendar can take more than a year, says Dana Marks, an immigration judge in
San Francisco and president of the National Association of Immigration Judges. "You could have a case that would take an
hour (to hear). But I can't give you that hour of time for 14 months," Marks says. In the most extreme cases, immigrants
can remain locked up while their cases are delayed. More often, the backlogs leave them struggling to exist until they
learn their fate, Marks and others say. The immigration courts, run by the Justice Department, have weathered years of
criticism that their 224 judges are unable to handle a flood of increasingly-complicated cases. Justice Department
spokeswoman Susan Eastwood acknowledges some long delays, but says that's often the result of unusual circumstances.
She says the department has enough judges.
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Veterans Health Administration

VA misuses its budget
Randall B. Williamson -- Director, Health Care, March 12, 2009 Challenges in Budget Formulation and Execution
VAalso faces challenges executing its health care budget. These include spending and tracking funds for specific
initiatives and providing timely and useful information to Congress on budget execution progress and problems.
GAOs2006reportonVAfundingfornewmentalhealthinitiativesfoundVA haddifficultyspendingandtrackingfunds
forinitiativesinVAsmentalhealth strategicplantoexpandservicestoaddressservicegaps.Theinitiativeswere to
enhanceVAslargermentalhealthprogramandweretobefundedby $100millioninfiscalyear2005.SomeVA medical
centers did not spend all the funds they had received for the initiatives by the end of the fiscal year ,partly duetothe
timeittooktohirestaffandrenovatespaceformentalhealth programs.Also,VA did not track how funding allocated
for the initiatives was spent. GAOs2006reportonVAsoverallhealthcarebudgetfoundthatVA monitoreditshealth
carebudgetexecutionandidentifiedexecutionproblems forfiscalyears2005and2006,butdidnotreporttheproblemsto
Congressin atimelyway.GAOalsofoundthatVAsreportingonbudgetexecutionto Congresscouldhavebeenmore
informative.VAhasnotfullyimplemented oneofGAOstworecommendationsforimprovingVAbudgetexecution.
Soundbudgetformulation,monitoringofbudgetexecution,andthereporting ofinformativeandtimelyinformationto
Congress for oversight continue tobe essential as VA addresses budget challenges GAO has identified. Budgeting
involves imperfect information and uncertainty,butVAhastheopportunityto improvethecredibilityofitsbudgeting
bycontinuingtoaddressidentified problems.Thisisparticularlytrueforlongtermcare,whereforseveralyears GAO
workhashighlightedconcernsaboutworkloadassumptionsandcost projections.Byimprovingitsbudgetprocess,VAcan
increasethecredibility andusefulnessofinformationitprovidestoCongressonitsbudgetplansand progressinspending
funds.GAOspriorworkonnewmentalhealthinitiatives mayprovideacautionarylessonaboutexpandingVAprograms
namely,that fundingavailabilitydoesnotalwaysmeanthatnewinitiativeswillbefully implementedinagivenfiscal
yearorthatfundswillbeadequatelytracked.
VA inefficientfraud, waste, and abuse

GAO September 2008, Improvements Needed in Design of Controls over Miscellaneous Obligations
VHA recorded over $6.9 billion of miscellaneous obligations for the procurement of mission-related goods and
servicesinfiscalyear2007. AccordingtoVHAofficials,miscellaneous obligations were used to facilitate payment
for goods and services when the quantities and delivery dates are not known. AccordingtoVHAdata,almost$3.8
billion(55.1percent)ofVHAs miscellaneousobligationswasforfeebasedmedicalservicesforveteransand another
$1.4billion(20.4percent)wasfordrugsandmedicines.The remainderfunded,amongotherthings,statehomesforthe
careofdisabled veterans,transportationofveteranstoandfrommedicalcentersfor treatment,andlogisticalsupportand
facility maintenance for VHA medical centers nationwide. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government states that agency management is responsible for developing detailed policies and procedures for
internal control suitable for their agency's operations. However,VApoliciesandprocedureswerenotdesignedto
provideadequate controlsovertheauthorization anduseofmiscellaneousobligationswith respect tooversight by
contractingofficials,segregationofduties,and supportingdocumentationfortheobligationoffunds.Collectively,these
control design flaws increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (including employeesconvertinggovernmentassetsto
theirownusewithoutdetection). ThesecontroldesignflawswereconfirmedinourcasestudiesatVHAMedical centers
inPittsburgh,Pennsylvania;Cheyenne,Wyoming;andKansasCity, Missouri.
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303
Ineffective Agency Political Capital Link

The solvency deficit is our linkCongress reluctant to fund inefficient agencies
Mark Wilson, Nina H. Shokraii, and Angela Antonelli August 7, 19 98 Labor-Health-Education Appropriations: Eliminating Waste
and Enhancing Accountability http://www.heritage.org/research/labor/bg1212.cfm
Fortunately, the House of Representatives has become far less willing to continue to feed the appetite of an ineffective,
bloated federal bureaucracy. The House Appropriations Committee has taken a bold first step by reporting an FY 1999
Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill that begins to hold agencies accountable for poor performance, eliminates
programs that are wasteful or no longer needed, and demands results from those that continue. It would either
terminate or reduce funding levels and reform many of the following programs because of their poor track records:
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**INTERNATIONAL LAW**
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Intl Law Good

Acceptingcustomaryinternationallegalnormsiskeytosolvingmultipleglobalissues.
Charney03[10/03JonathanI.Charney,OftheBoardofEditors.Supportforthispaperwasprovided
bytheVanderbiltUniversitySchoolofLaw.ResearchassistancewasprovidedbyJenniferMcGinty,
J.D.VanderbiltUniversity,1993.UniversalInternationalLaw,Lexis]
To resolve such problems, it may be necessary to establish new rules that are binding on all subjects of
internationallawregardlessoftheattitudeofanyparticularstate.Forunlessallstatesarebound,anexempted
recalcitrantstatecouldactasaspoilerfortheentireinternationalcommunity .Thus,statesthatarenotboundby
internationallaws designedtocombat universalenvironmentalthreatscouldbecomehavensfortheharmful
activitiesconcerned.Suchstatesmighthaveaneconomicadvantageoverstatesthatareboundbecausethey
wouldnothavetobearthecostsoftherequisiteenvironmentalprotection.Theywouldbefreeridersonthe
systemandwouldbenefitfromtheenvironmentallyprotectivemeasuresintroducedbyothersatsomecost.
Furthermore,theexampleofsuchfreeridersmightunderminethesystembyencouragingotherstatesnotto
participate,andcouldthusderailtheentireeffort.Similarly,inthecaseofinternationalterrorism,onestatethat
servesasasafehavenforterroristscanthreatenall.Warcrimes,apartheidorgenocidecommittedinonestate
might threateninternationalpeaceandsecurityworldwide. Consequently,forcertaincircumstancesitmaybeincumbentonthe
internationalcommunitytoestablishinternationallawthatisbindingonallstatesregardlessofanyonestate'sdisposition.Unfortunately,the
traditionsoftheinternationallegalsystemappeartoworkagainsttheabilitytolegislateuniversalnorms.Statesaresaidtobesovereign,thusableto
determineforthemselveswhattheymustormaydo.Stateautonomycontinuestoservetheinternationalsystemwellintraditionalspheresof
internationalrelations.Thefreedomofstatestocontroltheirowndestiniesandpolicieshassubstantialvalue:itpermitsdiversityandthechoiceby
eachstateofitsownsocialpriorities.Few,ifany,statesfavoraworldgovernmentthatwoulddictateuniformbehaviorforall.Consequently,many
writersusethelanguageofautonomywhentheydeclarethatinternationallawrequirestheconsentofthestatesthataregovernedbyit.Manytake
thepositionthatastatethatdoesnotwishtobeboundbyanewruleofinternationallawmayobjecttoitandbeexemptedfromitsapplication.If
sovereigntyandautonomyprevailedinallareasofinternationallaw,however,onecouldhardlyhopetodeveloprulestobindallstates.Ina
communityofnearlytwohundreddiversestates,itisvirtuallyimpossibletoobtaintheacceptanceofalltoanynorm,particularlyonethatrequires
significantexpensesorchangesinbehavior.Completeautonomymayhavebeenacceptableinthepastwhennostatecouldtakeactionsthatwould
threatentheinternationalcommunityasawhole.Today,theenormousdestructivepotentialofsomeactivitiesandtheprecariousconditionofsome
objectsofinternationalconcernmakefullautonomyundesirable,ifnotpotentiallycatastrophic.InthisarticleIexplorethelimitsofstateautonomy
todeterminewhethersomeorallofinternationallawmaybemadeuniversallybindingregardlessofthepositionofoneorasmallnumberof
unwillingstates.Toaccomplishthisobjective,Ibeginbyanalyzingthesecondaryrulesofrecognition(thedoctrineofsources)usedtoestablish
primaryrulesofinternationallaw.Whiletreatiesmayrequiretheconsentofindividualstatestobebindingonthem,suchconsentisnotrequiredfor
customarynorms.Finally,Iexploreingreaterdepththeactualprocessesbywhichmanycustomarylawnormshavecomeintobeinginthelasthalf
ofthetwentiethcentury.Thecontemporaryprocessthatisoftenusedissignificantlydifferentfromthatdescribedintheclassictreatisesonthe
formationofcustomarylaw.Contemporaryproceduraldevelopmentsplacetheinternationallegalsystemclosertothemoreformalnotionsof
positivelaw,facilitatingthedevelopmentofuniversalinternationallaw.Theseproceduraldevelopmentsstrengthentheargumentthatthesystemmay
establishgeneralinternationallawbindingonallstates,regardlessoftheobjectionofasmallnumberofstates.Likemanyothers,Itaketheposition
that there exists an international legal system with standards and procedures for making, applying and enforcing international law. n6 As a
jurisprudentialmatter,thesourceoftheobligationtoabidebyinternationallawisamatterofdebate.Perhapsthemostpopulartheoryisthatstates
becomeboundtotheinternationallegalsystemonthebasisofasocialcontract,actualconsentortacitconsent. n7 Othertheoriesdispensewith
consentasthesourceofastate'sobligationtoabidebyinternationallaw.Theprincipalonesmaintain(1)thatnaturallawimposesadutyonthose
locatedwithintheterritorialscopeofthelegalsystemtoabidebyit,especiallywhenitislegitimateandjust; n8(2)thatprinciplesoffairplayor
gratitudebindthosewhobenefitfromthelegalsystemtoabidebyitsrules;n9and(3)thatutilitarianconsiderationsbasedonthevalueoftheruleor
ofthesystemtoindividualsobligatethemtoabidebythelaw.n10Dependinguponthetheory,theconsentofstatesmayormaynotbefoundatthe
root of all international law. Be that as it may, the system of international law serves the practical interests of states. Asistrueofall
societies, the international community has aneed forrules toimpart a degreeoforder, predictability and
stabilitytorelationsamongitsmembers.Therulesofthesystemalsopermitmemberstoavoidconflictand
injury,andpromotebeneficialreciprocalandcooperativerelations.Theymayevenpromotevaluesofjustice
andmorality.Theinternationallegalsystemissupportednotonlybystates'interestsinpromotingindividual
rules,butalsobytheirinterestsinpreservingandpromotingthesystemasawhole.Thus,statescollectivelyand
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severallymaintainaninterestinencouraginglawabidingbehavior. Thereisalsoaneffectivedecentralized
systemforimposingsanctionsonviolatorsofthelawthroughindividualstateandcollectiveactsof
Intl Law Good

disapproval,denialandpenalties.Fearofsanctions,thedesiretobeviewedbyothersaslawabiding,and
domesticinstitutionalinclinationstoconformtorulesdenominatedaslawfurtherimpelstatestocomplywith
internationallaw.Despitethedecentralizednatureoftheinternationallegalsystem,therearestrongreasons
whystatesneedinternationallawandarecompelledtoabidebyit.Itsdecentralizedstructureplacessomelimits
onwhatcanbeaccomplished,butwithinthoselimitsinternationallawhasanimportantrole.Eventhough
individualstatesmayfindshorttermadvantagesinviolatingthelawinparticularsituations,theirlongterm
interestsarelikelytobeservedbestbythesystem.Becausethedecentralizedinternationallegalsystemis
governeddirectlybythesubjectsofthelaw,i.e.,states,itinherentlyfavorsrulesoflawthatoptimizethe
interestsofstates. Despitethedifferencesinpowerandinfluenceofstates,noindividualorsmallgroupof
statesisnowdominant.Decisionstendtoreflectthepowerrelationshipsandtherightofallstatestoparticipate
inreachingthem.Whenthelawmakersthemselvesaretheprimarysubjectsofthelaw,thelawshouldreflect
theircollectiveinterests.
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Intl Law Impact

Theonlyalternativetointernationallawisgenocideandnuclearwar.
Shaw01[10/3/01MartinShawProfessorofInternationalRelationsandPoliticsattheUniversityof
Sussex.Theunfinishedglobalrevolution:intellectualsandthenewpoliticsofinternationalrelations
http://www.martinshaw.org/unfinished.pdf]
Thenewpoliticsofinternationalrelationsrequireus,therefore,togobeyondtheantiimperialismoftheintellectualleftaswellasof
thesemianarchisttraditionsoftheacademicdiscipline.Weneedtorecognizethreefundamentaltruths.First,inthetwentyfirst
centurypeoplestrugglingfordemocraticlibertiesacrossthenonWesternworldarelikelytomakeconstantdemandsonoursolidarity.
Courageousacademics,studentsandotherintellectualswillbeintheforefrontofthesemovements.Theydeservetheunstinting
supportofintellectualsintheWest.Second,theoldinternationalthinkinginwhichdemocraticmovementsareseenaspurelyinternal
tostatesnolongercarriesconvictiondespitethelingeringnostalgiaforitonboththeAmericanrightandtheantiAmericanleft.The
ideathatglobalprinciplescanandshouldbeenforcedworldwideisfirmlyestablishedinthemindsofhundredsofmillionsofpeople.
Thisconsciousnesswillapowerfulforceinthecomingdecades.Third,globalstateformationisafact.Internationalinstitutionsare
being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly
internationalisedWesternconglomerate.Thesuccessoftheglobaldemocraticrevolutionarywavedependsfirstonhowwellitis
consolidatedineachnationalcontextbutsecond,howthoroughlyitisembeddedininternationalnetworksofpower,atthecentreof
which, inescapably, is the West. From on these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic
movementscannotregardnongovernmentalorganisationsandcivilsocietyasendsinthemselves.Theymustaimtociviliselocal
states,renderingthemopen,accountableandpluralistic,andcurtailthearbitraryandviolentexerciseofpower.Second,democratising
localstatesisnotaseparatetaskfromintegratingthemintoglobalandoftenWesterncentrednetworks.Reproducingisolatedlocal
centresofpowercarrieswithitclassicdangersofstatesascentresofwar.84 Embe
ddingglobalnormsandintegratingnewstate
centreswithglobalinstitutionalframeworksareessentialtothecontrolofviolence. (Toputthisanotherway:theproliferationof
purelynationaldemocraciesisnotarecipeforpeace.)Third,whiletheglobalrevolutioncannotdowithouttheWestandtheUN,
neithercanitrelyonthemunconditionally. Weneedthesepowernetworks,butweneedtotamethemtoo,tomaketheirmessy
bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of
cosmopolitandemocracyarguedforbyDavidHeld85. Itwillalsorequireustoadvanceaglobalsocialdemocraticagenda,to
addresstheliterallycatastrophicscaleofworldsocialinequalities.Thisisnotaseparateproblem:socialandeconomicreformisan
essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political
economies.Fourth, ifweneedtheglobalWesternstate,ifwewanttodemocratiseitandmakeitsinstitutionsfriendliertoglobal
peaceandjustice,wecannotbeindifferenttoitsstrategicdebates.Itmatterstodevelopinternationalpoliticalinterventions,legal
institutionsandrobustpeacekeepingasstrategicalternativestobombingourwaythroughzonesofcrisis.Itmattersthatinternational
interventionsupportspluraliststructures,ratherthanratifyingBosniastyleapartheid.86AspoliticalintellectualsintheWest,weneed
tohaveoureyesontheballatourfeet,butwealsoneedtoraisethemtothehorizon.Weneedtograspthehistoricdramathatis
transformingworldwiderelationshipsbetweenpeopleandstate,aswellasbetweenstateandstate.Weneedtothinkabouthowthe
turbulenceoftheglobalrevolutioncanbeconsolidatedindemocratic,pluralist,internationalnetworksofbothsocialrelationsand
stateauthority.Wecannotbesimplyoptimisticaboutthisprospect.Sadly,itwillrequirerepeatedviolentpoliticalcrisestopush
Westernandothergovernmentstowardstherequiredrestructuringofworldinstitutions.87WhatIhaveoutlinedisahugechallenge;
butthealternativeistoseetheglobalrevolutionsplutterintopartialdefeat,ordegenerateintonewgenocidalwarsperhapseven
nuclearconflicts.Thepractical challengeforallconcernedcitizens,andthetheoretical andanalytical challengesforstudentsof
internationalrelationsandpolitics,areintertwined.
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Intl Law K2 Rights

International law key to global human rights
Ignatieff April 4-7, 2000. The Tanner Lectures on
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/Ignatieff_01.pdf
Human
Values,
Princeton
Univ.
In If This Is a Man, Primo Levi describes being interviewed by Dr. Pannwitz, chief of the chemical department at Auschwitz.1
Securing a place in the department was a matter of life or death: if Levi could convince Pannwitz that he was a competent chemist, he
might be spared the gas chamber. As Levi stood on one side of the doctors desk, in his concentration camp uniform, Dr. Pannwitz
stared up at him. Levi later remembered: That look was not one between two men; and if I had known how completely to explain the
nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different worlds, I
would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the third German [reich]. Here was a scientist, trained in the traditions
of European rational inquiry, turning a meeting between two human beings into an encounter between different species. Progress may
be a contested concept, but we make progress to the degree that we act upon the moral intuition that Dr. Pannwitz was wrong: our
species is one and each of the individuals who compose it is entitled to equal moral consideration. Human rights is the language that
systematically embodies this intuition, and to the degree that this intuition gains inuence over the conduct of individuals and states,
we can say that we are making moral progress. Richard Rortys denition of progress applies here: an increase in our ability to see
more and more differences among people as morally irrelevant.2 We think of the global diffusion of this idea as progress for two
reasons: because if we live by it, we treat more human beings as we would wish to be treated 1 Primo Levi, If This Is a Man,
translated by Stuart Woolf (London: Abacus, 1987), pp. 11112. The signicance of the passage was pointed out to me by Alain
Finkielkrauts LHumanit perdue: essai sur le 20ime siecle (Paris: Seuil, 1996), pp. 711. 2 Richard Rorty, Truth and Moral
Progress: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 11. [287] 288 The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values ourselves and in so doing help to reduce the amount of unmerited cruelty and suffering in the world. Our grounds for believing
that the spread of human rights represents moral progress, in other words, are pragmatic and historical. We know from historical
experience that when human beings have defensible rightswhen their agency as individuals is protected and enhancedthey are
less likely to be abused and oppressed. On these grounds, we count the diffusion of human rights instruments as progress even if there
remains an unconscionable gap between the instruments and the actual practices of states charged to comply with them. Calling the
global diffusion of Western human rights a sign of moral progress may seem Eurocentric. Yet the human rights instruments created
after 1945 were not a triumphant expression of European imperial self-conscience but a reection on European nihilism and its
consequences, at the end of a catastrophic world war in which European civilization very nearly destroyed itself. Human rights was a
response to Dr. Pannwitz, to the discovery of the abomination that could occur when the Westphalian state was accorded unlimited
sovereignty, when citizens of that state lacked criteria in international law that could oblige them to disobey legal but immoral orders.
The Universal Declaration represented a return by the European tradition to its natural law heritage, a return intended to restore
agency, to give individuals the juridical resources to stand up when the state ordered them to do wrong. 2. The Juridical, Advocacy,
and Enforcement Revolutions Historically speaking, the Universal Declaration is part of a wider reordering of the normative order of
postwar international relations, designed to create re-walls against barbarism. The juridical revolution included the UN Charter of
1945, outlawing aggressive war between states; the Genocide Convention of 1948, protecting religious, racial, and ethnic groups
against extermination; the revision of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, strengthening noncombatant immunity; and nally the
international convention on asylum of 1951 to protect the rights of refugees. Before the Second World War, only states had rights in
international law. With the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the [Ignatieff] Human Rights 289 rights of individuals
received international legal recognition.3 For the rst time, individualsregardless of race, creed, gender, age, or any other status
were granted rights that they could use to challenge unjust state law or oppressive customary practice.
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Intl Law Bad

International law is vague and unenforceable sovereign nations can interpret or ignore it
Casey et al. 06
(August 18, 2006, International Law and the Nation-State at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers, Lee A. Casey and David B.
Rivkin, Jr.)
At the same time, it is also fair to say that, beyond a few academics and activists, most Americans do not look to
international institutions or the international community for validation of their governments actions or their own. One
might well ask, in response to the German Foreign Ministry, what is the international community? Does it, for example,
include Chinas Communist rulers or the Persian Gulfs divine right monarchs? And what obligations, exactly, might
Americans have to them? Law, in the United States, is made by our elected representatives, and the measure of its
legitimacy is the United States Constitution. As a result, of course, international law has never been treated as a rigid and
imperative code of con duct by U.S. policymakers. This attitude toward international law transcends political ideology and
party label. Nowhere was it better displayed than in an exchange between then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and
her British counterpart, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, during the run-up to NATOs 1999 intervention in Kosovo. As
reported by Mrs. Albrights spokesman James Rubin, when Cook explained that British lawyers objected to the use of
military force against Serbia without U.N. approval, she replied simply get new lawyers.[3]Mrs. Albrights suggestion
was perhaps undiplomatic, but it revealed a firm grasp of the essential genius of international law: It is a body of norms
made by states for states, and its content and application are almost always open to honest dispute. Moreover, and most
important of all, there is no global power or authority with the ultimate right to establish the meaning of international law
for all. Every independent state has the legal rightand the obligationto consider and interpret international law for
itself. In other words, when questions are asked about the meaning and requirements of international law, the answers will
probably, and properly, depend on who the lawyers are. This does not mean that international law is illusory or that it can or
should be ignored by states in the day-to-day exercise of power. It does mean, however, that international law is best
viewed as a collection of behavioral normssome arising from custom and some from express agreement, some more
well-established and some less sothat it is in the interest of states to honor. As Chief Justice John Marshall explained in
1812 in describing one important aspect of international law:[4]The world being composed of distinct sovereignties,
possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by
an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented [to
certain legal norms].The key, of course, is consent. Ultimately, the binding nature of international law is a matter of the
consent of sovereign states. They can interpret that law in accordance with their understanding and interests, they can
attempt to change it, and they can choose to ignore itso long as they are prepared to accept the very real political,
economic, and even military consequences that may result. This is the essence of sovereignty, which itself is the basis and
guarantor of self-government.
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Intl Law K2 Democracy

IL is key to democracy and survival.
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Intl Law Bad

International law is un-American tyranny which the US must subvert
Casey et al. 06
(August 18, 2006, International Law and the Nation-State at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers, Lee A. Casey and David B.
Rivkin, Jr., http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/bg1961.cfm)
The reason is simple enough. A genuine system of international law, comparable to domestic legal systems in its reach and
authority, would require a universally accepted institution entitled both to adjudicate the conduct of states and, by
extension, their individual officials and citizens and to implement its judgments through compulsory process with or
without consent of the states concerned. Such a universal authority, however, would be fundamentally at odds with the
founding principles of the American Republic. It would require the American people to accept that there is, in fact, a legal
power that has legitimate authority over them but is not accountable to them for its actions.
Pending this revolution in American beliefs and principles, U.S. officials and diplomats should recall two basic points in
their approach to international law:
As an independent sovereign, the United States is fully entitled to interpret international law for itself. The views of
international organizations, including the United Nations, other states, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be
informative, but they are not legally binding unless, and only to the extent that, the United States agrees to be bound.
Any institution or individual invoking international law as the measure of U.S. policy choices is only expounding an
opinion of what international law is or should be. That opinion may be well or poorly informed, but it is not and cannot be
authoritative. There is no supreme international judicial body with the inherent right to interpret international law for states.
In short, the United States, like all other states, is bound by international law; but, like all other states, it is also
entitled to interpret international law for itself. Whether the U.S. or any other state has been reasonable in its
interpretation is ultimately a political determination.
311

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Impact Generic

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Japanese Relations (Spratly Islands).....................91

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Precautionary Principle Bad- Paralysis (1/3).......180

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Morals Compatible With Util..............................228

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

AT: Democratic Egal............................................272

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

transmissible through coughs.

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Biodiversity loss outweighs all impacts

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 95

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Drug resistant diseases threaten human extinction.

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Economic slowdown will cause WWIII

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

incomparably preferable than existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Human Rights Credibility

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Patriarchy is the root of all violence and war

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

this nation to its promises.

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

racism makes it possible to establish a relationship

race or racism is the

Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

, for example, in the late 1990s,

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

The timeframe for TB is immediate

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Runaway warming leads to extinction

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

Allen PK: Home of the Curiously Strong,, Minty Fresh Nose

X TURNS CASE

NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIOS